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Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Volume 840: debated on Monday 4 November 2024

Committee (3rd Day)

Welsh legislative consent sought.

Clause 6: Automatic penalties for certain offences

Amendment 69 not moved.

Amendment 70

Moved by

70: Clause 6, page 10, line 35, at end insert—

“(8A) All fines imposed on the undertaker or its employees under this section by—(a) the Secretary of State,(b) the Welsh Ministers, or(c) another relevant authoritymust be gathered together and once per annum be used to reduce all customers’ bills by an equal amount per customer.(8B) Any reduction applied under subsection (8A) must be separately disclosed within the customer’s statement of account.”

My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, back to her place. Her contributions have been missed on earlier days in Committee.

The main focus of the Bill is on improving the health of our rivers, and that aim will likely lead to a larger number of punishable offences. In its manifesto, Labour set out its plans to impose severe fines on water companies that failed to meet the expected standards, but it did not establish what would be done with that additional income. Amendment 70 seeks to put in place a system whereby the fines imposed on water companies and their employees—by this Government, the devolved Governments or, in fact, any other relevant authorities—are collected. Then, once a year, the income from these fines could be used to reduce customer bills.

In government we created the water restoration fund, which sees the money collected by the Treasury from fines and penalties and then channelled into improving the water environment. However, we sit here today with consumers facing pressure on their water bills as part of the inflationary environment that has created the cost of living crisis, as well as the cost of investing to improve water quality. It seems appropriate that fines and penalties should be returned to those consumers and identified by a separate line in their bills, making it clear that the regulator is taking action to punish wrongdoing and that money is returned to the consumer as a consequence.

An amendment such as this would benefit so many individuals and resolve how additional income from stricter fines is applied. It is not a subject that the Bill adequately addresses, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, has recognised in other amendments. Does the Minister agree that the money from the fines should be used to benefit the consumer through mechanisms such as the water restoration fund that we implemented when in government or by using the sum to reduce customer Bills, as this amendment suggests? As such, will the Minister confirm that the penalties will not return to the Treasury under this Government? I beg to move.

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee and the Minister for my absence on the first and second days in Committee. I regret that an attack of Covid meant that I was confined to quarters and unable to travel to London. I did, however, watch the debate on both days on parliamentlive.tv and was therefore able to hear the nuances of the contributions, which you do not always get by reading Hansard. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, for his comments.

A seminar of all the devolved Administrations once a year, to discuss how to return all fines to the relevant customers, will do nothing to fix the problems of inadequate investment in crumbling and inadequate infrastructure. I am sympathetic to the need to keep customers’ bills to an acceptable level. Consumers should not have to pay for the inadequacies of the water boards to ensure that problems are fixed. I do not see why an annual gathering of the devolved Administrations or other authorities will be sufficient to refund bill payers in a timely fashion.

On these Benches, we believe that setting up a water restoration fund is a much more effective and transparent way of moving forward. It is also more likely to see the necessary investment in infrastructure carried out in a timely fashion. I will listen to the Minister’s response. However, I do not feel certain that she will give this amendment a positive welcome.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, for raising this important issue and tabling Amendment 70, which speaks to the administration of fines. I too welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, back to her rightful place. I hope that she is now completely recovered, but I also congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Russell, on doing such a sterling job in her absence.

I emphasise that the money from civil penalties imposed by the Environment Agency and fines issued by the court go to the Government’s Consolidated Fund. This is in line with other enforcement regimes under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. On the use of penalty funds, the water restoration fund, which launched in April this year, is reinvesting water companies’ environmental fines and penalties into projects to improve the water environment. Up to £11 million of funding from fines and penalties accrued since 2022 was made available on a competitive basis to support a range of water restoration projects. Defra is continuing to work with His Majesty’s Treasury regarding the reinvestment of water company penalties and fines, because while the Budget has of course now been announced, decisions have not yet been taken on all departmental spending.

I assure noble Lords that there are existing procedures in place to ensure that customers are reimbursed for poor performance. As the economic regulator, Ofwat sets specific performance targets for water companies and, where these are not met, companies must reimburse customers through lower water bills in the next financial year. I will give an example: as a result of Ofwat’s annual performance assessment process, it is requiring 13 companies to return £157 million to customers for underperformance in the financial year 2023-24.

Ofwat also has powers which ensure that companies return money to customers for failings related to specific breaches. For example, in 2019 Southern Water returned £123 million to its customers as a result of an Ofwat enforcement case. I hope that the noble Lord is therefore content that this amendment is not necessary, as we believe it would duplicate existing protections.

My Lords, I am grateful for the comments from the Minister. It is perhaps not the fullest reassurance that I was looking for about the future destination for fines and penalties. Amendment 70 is, by its nature, a probing amendment and I look forward to further discussions with the Minister.

Amendment 70 withdrawn.

Amendment 71

Moved by

71: Clause 6, page 11, line 9, at end insert—

“(11) Section 5(6) also applies for the purposes of this section.”Member’s explanatory statement

This amendment provides that Clause 6 applies to water supply and sewerage licensees only in relation to their licensed activities.

Amendment 71 agreed.

Clause 6, as amended, agreed.

Amendment 72 not moved.

Amendment 73

Moved by

73: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—

“Power to revoke licencesAfter section 17R of the Water Industry Act 1991 insert—“17S Power to revoke licencesThe Authority may revoke a water supply and sewerage licence (WSSL) with six months’ notice.””Member’s explanatory statement

This amendment provides Ofwat with the power to remove a water supply and or sewerage licence with six months’ notice.

My Lords, this group of amendments is on water company ownership. In preparing for this Bill, my Whips’ Office briefing note said that, in some circumstances, Ofwat could take no fewer than 25 years to revoke a water licence. When I read this, I found it hard to believe that this was the case, so I had to go away and have a look at it myself.

I note that different conditions apply to household water companies and retail or business suppliers, as retail suppliers operate within a different market, and that this is an extremely complex area of legislation. I understand that Ofwat can take up to 25 years to revoke the licence of a water company in some cases where it is in breach of its licence conditions. My amendment is a probing one. I want to be certain that it is possible for licences to be revoked much earlier than 25 years for matters such as sewage spills and failures to invest in infrastructure. I am also interested in looking at whether six months is a feasible timeframe for revoking licences in the cases of the worst sewage spill offenders.

It is unacceptable that, in 2023, for example, water companies dumped 54% more sewage in our lakes, rivers and coastal areas than they did in the previous year. This amounted to some 464,000 incidents and some 3.6 million hours of untreated sewage discharges in England alone, yet few water and sewage discharge licences have been revoked as a direct result of sewage spills.

The Government have given a clear commitment to make improvements, and this Bill contains many measures that we welcome. The framework for these proposed improvements is one where the Government are passing this Bill to bring in more immediate measures in order to hold the water companies to account and to strengthen the powers of the regulators. This is being done now while the water commission undertakes deeper, more fundamental thinking to make further recommendations in due course.

The Government’s argument is based on the belief that Ofwat can be supported, strengthened and remade to be an effective regulator. The arguments I want to discuss relate to the ultimate sanction of revoking water and sewage discharge licences. If Ofwat is to be effective, the ultimate sanction must act as a real deterrent against illegal and improper behaviour. I fully recognise that my suggestion of changing this to six months may not work and may need a rethink; I would be more than happy to discuss this with the Minister if it is of interest. I recognise that there is a need to balance the needs of water companies, their investors and customers, as well as to ensure continuity of supply.

I will be honest: I know that there are many different licences and conditions for revoking them, and that this is a complex area. The conditions for a quick termination, applying to the issues of a special administrator and bankruptcy, are welcome. My concerns relate more to the broader, far from general, form of deterrence for water companies doing what they have been doing up to now with no real comeback, such as siphoning funds off to shareholders while failing to meet the required levels of investments, falsifying self-reporting of sewage discharges and failing to prevent sewage spills.

I want this amendment to lead to a brief discussion on the licence conditions in place now. I seek reassurance from the Government that they will have a look at these powers, look at how they are used in practice and consider whether any changes are required as part of this Bill. I do this as there are no real changes to any of the licence termination conditions; I wondered whether this was a mistake or oversight. The imposition of tougher prison sentences and higher fines are welcome measures, but what happens if these measures alone failed to regulate companies’ behaviour?

For comparison, the revocation of licences in other regulated sectors appears generally to happen on a much quicker timescale. Can the Minister give the rationale behind leaving the 25 years in statute, and can she give examples of Ofwat acting much earlier in relation to lack of investment or pollution incidents? What is the average time for revoking a water and sewage licence?

I beg to move.

My Lords, I will speak to three amendments in this group: Amendments 97, 98 and 99. This weekend saw tens of thousands of people marching for clean water in London. It was the most amazing event. It was a chance for me to speak to people who agree with me—as opposed to being here in your Lordships’ House, where not many people agree with me.

I am sorry. Thank you; it is lovely to see the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, back in her place.

All three of my amendments are intended to be helpful—that is, to help the Government regulate the water industry properly and end the 30 years of fleecing bill payers while dumping sewage into our waterways. It is an absolutely unforgivable three decades of abuse of the system.

Amendment 97 would prohibit the Government bailing out shareholders and creditors of water companies in the event of special administration. Amendment 98 would allow the Government to take back control with public ownership of water companies, but it is only an option. It is an option that I believe the Government could use as a lever in their negotiations with the water companies, so I think it is worth putting it back in the Bill. Amendment 99 would allow water companies to be put into special administration for failing on environmental issues, such as leaks and sewage spills.

What strikes me about these issues is that the public are demanding that this is sorted, but the Government are giving us half measures. I am concerned that that will not bring the sort of change we need. There is a democratic shortfall here because polls tell us that 82% of the public want to end privatised water, but only a few of us in Parliament are willing to consider it. To me, this suggests that the Government are out of step with the public, which is very concerning for me; I would like the Labour Government to last longer than one term because I really do not want to see another Conservative Government in my lifetime. There is, of course, a fear among many campaigners that this Bill will raise their water bills by enabling the Government to bail out and reward the people who got us into this mess in the first place.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for signing Amendment 97. It is essential that the Government do not bail out the water companies in such a way that they simply hand money to shareholders and creditors and let them start afresh, behaving in the same way but perhaps with a little more regulation. Amendment 97 would prohibit this so that the public purse does not underwrite the casino capitalism and financial engineering that has been going on in the water sector. We have a ridiculous situation where the debt is being traded by hedge funds, which are gambling on water bills going up in future to finance a bailout. If these companies fail, let us instead bring them into public ownership and democratic control. The shareholders and creditors took a gamble on greed when the companies used £75 billion since privatisation to pay dividends rather than invest. Let them take the hit.

Amendment 98 would allow the Government to set out how they will bring water companies into public ownership. The Greens are deeply disappointed that the Government have ruled this out. I do not understand any sort of ideological addiction to private ownership of a public service such as this, particularly when it is not even a competitive market. It is a monopoly, and it is time it stopped.

I have heard the Government say that private investment is essential, but it is simple maths that, if we stop paying dividends and debt payments, that frees up 40% of people’s water bills to be invested in fixing the sewerage system and building more reservoirs. The Government have been using overinflated estimates from the water industry—a figure of some £90 billion—to claim that public ownership would be too expensive, but actually, it is the complete opposite: it is privatised water that is too expensive to continue. Water company shareholders have spent decades sucking out the profits while loading debt on to the balance sheets and hiking people’s bills. That is inevitable, as free market economics simply does not work without competition. Thatcher turned a public monopoly into a cash cow for people who are greedy. Unless amended, this legislation does nothing to stop that continuing for another decade. I want the Government to at least have the power to bring the companies into public ownership. If they rule out that option, the Government will make any taxpayer bailout a lot more expensive, as a potential buyer has the upper hand in all negotiations.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for signing Amendment 99. Water companies have a job to do and, if they fail to do it, we should put them into special administration. That is simple logic that is hard to disagree with. If people across the country are in hospital because rivers and beaches are contaminated by E. coli, that is failure. If fish and wildlife—whole ecosystems—die due to regular sewage dumping, that is failure. If dumping regularly damages tourism in a national park or on a pleasure beach, that is failure. These water company bosses need to know that, if they continue as they have been, that will end with special administration without compensation or with the companies being brought into public ownership. The water companies must either clean up their act or hand over control to somebody who will.

This legislation is a set of political choices, and I am very concerned that the next election will be tough on the Labour Government if this all goes through in the way they seem to predict it will. If they try to get water bill payers to carry the debt from all the decades of privatised failure, that will not be popular with the wider population. So I hope the Government have a proper think about this and make the choices that put them on the side of bill payers and the environment.

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 97, 99 and 102. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, on her speech. I fully support Amendment 97.

It is interesting that, following an article in the Telegraph, on 19 September, the Government issued a press release in which they said:

“These powers would never be used to pay bondholders, shareholders or creditors … we do not expect customers to pay the price for water companies’ mismanagement … The new measures in the Water Bill will protect taxpayers”.

At the same time, the Explanatory Notes state, on Clause 10, that the Secretary of State “may provide financial assistance” to companies. It is hard to see how these statements can be reconciled. I hope the Minister will tell us what kind of financial assistance the Government envisage providing to water companies while they are being restructured. Their being restructured means that they are already financially, environmentally and morally bankrupt, so why provide financial assistance?

In the debate last week, the Minister said that water companies are “private companies”. If they are, they should be fully exposed to the laws of capitalism, with absolutely no bailout of any kind. Why are we making these special provisions to indulge them and, presumably, write down some of the debt? This was a key assumption made by the last Government in what was code-named Project Timber. Information leaked out that it was talking about how the Government, presumably, may write the debt of Thames Water down to merely 40% of the amount owed.

Whenever we talk about not bailing out shareholders and bondholders, or refer to public ownership, the Government’s immediate response is to say that it will cost billions of pounds. I once again invite the Minister to show me the Government’s calculations—I will happily critique them for free and talk about whether those numbers make any sense. Will the Minister accept my challenge and please publish the numbers?

The Government also say that it would be hard to reintegrate the companies. We are doing it for railway companies, so why can we not do it for water companies? What exactly would be the hardship? Every day, there are numerous mergers and takeovers in the corporate sector, and they are easily integrated and rewired. I hope that the Minister will explain this. I would particularly like to see the calculations of what the cost of public ownership would be, so that we can then start looking at this and talking about the optimum solution.

I hope the Minister will not refer me, as she did previously, to the 2018 Social Market Foundation report. It fetched a number out of thin air and said it was worth about £90 billion—the following year, this was contradicted by Moody’s, which said it was only £14.5 billion. Since then, as we know, a lot of shares of water companies have become worthless and the debt has junk status, so it is easy to let the normal rules of capitalism apply.

I support the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on Amendment 99. I will say a little more about Amendment 102. Currently, water companies can violate rules and legal limits on sewage dumping ad infinitum. They can easily do cost-benefit analyses and see that it is cheaper to pay fines for illegal practices than to invest in infrastructure and act responsibly. This boosts profits, dividends and executive pay, while the public picks up the cost of unplugged leaks, sewage dumping, health hazards, and the destruction of biodiversity and marine life. To some, such costs are just externalities, but the public sees this as abuse, as clearly shown by yesterday’s mass demonstration in London.

The puny financial penalties have not curbed the predatory practices. The Minister promises us that there will be more and says that the executives may be prosecuted—that is, if they can wait another 20 years to have their cases heard, as there is already a backlog of 60,000 cases in the Crown Court. The result is that the whole industry is now under the control of entities that have criminal convictions. Wastewater companies in England and Wales have been convicted 1,109 times since 1989. The dismal roll-call is as follows: United Utilities has 205 convictions, Thames Water has 187, South West Water has 174, Anglia Water has 128, Yorkshire Water has 125 and Southern Water has 119. Perhaps the Minister would care to name a pristine water company—never mind pristine water, just a pristine water company. That would be helpful.

There are no pristine, honourable, responsible or ethical water companies, but successive Governments continue to indulge them and give them monopolies in an essential public good. What would happen if 10 major food or medicine companies were convicted of 1,109 crimes that they knowingly committed? They would be shut down and consumers would sue them, but regulators in the water industry do no such thing. Indeed, Ministers make excuses, and successive Ministers have done nothing.

My amendment requires that habitual offenders be placed into special administration, if two or more criminal convictions are secured in a five-year period. This is akin to yellow and red cards in football. The first yellow card is a warning, effectively saying, “Don’t do it again. Mend your ways. Clean up your act”. If no heed is taken, the second yellow card, which is effectively a red card, would follow, and the companies would be placed into special administration.

It is often claimed that shareholders are passive. The threat of special administration for abusive practices would encourage them to actively invigilate companies and their boards and take an interest in their governance. For far too long, companies have got away with abuses; my amendment would ensure that there were serious consequences for them. If the Minister does not accept my amendment, can she say how many convictions water companies need before they are considered unfit and improper to own crucial infrastructure?

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 73, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I thank the noble Earl, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their contributions.

On these Benches, we have grave concerns about these amendments. While it is important that the water sector operates with integrity, we fear the amendments may have unintended consequences that could destabilise the industry and ultimately be detrimental to the public and the environment.

On Amendment 73, the power to revoke a water company’s licence is one of great consequence and must be exercised judiciously. An abrupt removal of a licence, without sufficient consideration of the ramifications for infrastructure and service continuity, could leave customers vulnerable and lead to service interruptions. It would also be a very substantial barrier to private sector investment. Investors must be able to have confidence that they will be able to enjoy returns on their investments without elevated risk of loss of licence. Should such an amendment be included in this Bill, it would lead to a much higher cost of capital for the industry and higher consumer bills as a consequence. While we appreciate the intent to hold companies accountable, we suggest exploring whether there are more balanced approaches to achieving compliance, without risking instability.

Amendment 97 raises further concerns. The possibility of cancelling debt in the event of special administration proceedings could create moral hazard. This amendment, while aiming to protect consumers from the fallout of financial mismanagement, might inadvertently incentivise risky financial behaviour by companies under the impression that their debts could be forgiven in times of crisis. The bankruptcy route already allows debt to be repaid in part or renegotiated in an orderly manner, respecting the contractual rights of all creditors. This would not be desirable.

As for Amendment 98, this is a matter of significant complexity. We must not overlook the potential costs and operational challenges associated with such transfers. The water industry requires immense resources, infrastructure investment and technical expertise. A shift to public ownership would strain government resources and create operational challenges. We support the Government in not wishing to see a return to public ownership of the industry.

I wish to address Amendments 99 and 102. These amendments would empower the Government to put companies into special administration if they breached certain environmental conditions or held criminal convictions. While we wholeheartedly support stringent environmental standards and rigorous compliance, it is essential that these mechanisms do not inadvertently undermine the ability of water companies to continue their core operations. The amendments could place companies in special administration for relatively minor infractions, which may not warrant such a severe response.

We must be careful not to adopt measures that could disproportionately impact employees, customers and investors who depend on the water industry. I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments and regret that we cannot support them—and could not even before the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, gave her views on my party.

I thank noble Lords for the suggested amendment in relation to water company ownership.

I come first to Amendment 73, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell. The intention of the amendment is to provide Ofwat with the power to remove a water supply or sewerage licence with six months’ notice. I want to emphasise that the Government’s priority is to ensure that customers have a safe and stable supply of water. We are concerned that the proposed amendment could jeopardise this.

There are already established measures to replace an existing sewerage undertaker, by way of licence removal, under certain scenarios. For example, while it is true that an undertaker’s appointment is made for a period of at least 25 years, I can reassure noble Lords that it is not true that appointments cannot be terminated until 25 years have passed. If an undertaker cannot carry out its functions, Ofwat has powers to terminate the appointment, provided that a replacement can be identified and that the undertaker consents.

Our concern about the proposed new clause is that it would create significant uncertainty in the water sector and reduce the willingness of investors to remain in the sector if companies could lose their licence with only six months’ notice. This could deter investment at a time when investment is more needed than ever to deliver the changes that we want to see in the sector.

The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked for examples of Ofwat requiring companies to fund pollution programmes. A current example is PR24, the programme going through at the moment; it will require billions to improve water company assets, which will reduce pollution incidents. An example of that is the funding of 2,500 storm overflow upgrades.

I hope that the noble Earl understands why we will not be accepting this amendment, but I understand his real concerns and why he has tabled it. If he wants to discuss this further, I am happy to do so.

Amendment 97, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would prohibit the Secretary of State and the Treasury directly or indirectly discharging, assuming or guaranteeing any water company debts during a special administration regime. I emphasise that the exact quantity of debt recouped by creditors, or equity recouped by shareholders, following a special administration is a matter for the court-appointed special administrator. Within this, the special administrator will have to act in accordance with its duties, as well as with the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, both as modified for the purpose of special administration by the relevant legislation.

When the water company in question exits from special administration via either rescue, such as a debt restructuring, or transfer, such as a sale, it will be for the special administrator to determine the level of repayment, as per its statutory objectives. The level of reductions suffered by creditors in accordance with the repayment priorities is already clearly set down in statute. If noble Lords are wondering about creditors asking for debt to be repaid during the special administration regime, for example, the answer is that they cannot, because there is a moratorium on legal proceedings during an SAR, which takes away creditors’ ability to enforce debt repayments. On the other hand, employees have some protection by being able to recoup certain debts, such as unpaid wages, via the redundancy payments service. I hope that that helps to clarify some of those issues for the noble Baroness, and that she understands why we think the proposed new clause is unnecessary.

I move on to the noble Baroness’s Amendment 98, which looks to confer a power on the Secretary of State to make provision for transferring water companies into public ownership through secondary legislation. The Government have been clear that public ownership is not the right solution to the challenges the water industry currently faces. The cost of nationalising the whole industry would be over £90 billion—this is based on Ofwat’s regulatory capital value figures for 2024. My noble friend Lord Sikka asked for details of the figures, and we are happy to share them with him and with the noble Baroness, if that is of interest.

The noble Baroness’s amendment rightly highlights that shareholders and debt holders must be fairly compensated, but the costs of compensation are high. Nationalising the water industry would clearly put a huge burden on the public purse at a time when public finances are already very stretched. Moreover, there is no evidence that it would fix the root of the problem. We see a variety of ownership models in the UK and internationally, with mixed performance.

It would also take years to transition from the current ownership model. During that time, there would be no action taken at all to fix the acute issues faced by the sector, which noble Lords have already raised at length during our debates on the Bill. If a future Government were to take a different view, it would be more appropriate to make provisions for reform through primary, not secondary, legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for wanting to see a Labour Government for more than one term and I reassure her that the Government are serious about tackling the problems of the water industry: it is why we have set up the review and why we have somebody as serious as Sir Jon Cunliffe to chair that review. We want to make permanent, long-term change in this area.

The new clause proposed by Amendment 99 looks to create a legal obligation for the Secretary of State to apply to the courts to place a water company into special administration should certain conditions be met. Special administration is the ultimate regulatory enforcement tool and, as such, the bar is set high. A water company can already be placed into special administration on performance grounds where it is in such serious breach of its principal statutory duties, or an enforcement order, that it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence, as set out in Section 24 of the Water Industry Act 1991. We believe that lowering the statutory threshold for special administration on performance grounds would be inappropriate and could impact the investability of the water sector. For these reasons, I hope my noble friend understands why we consider her amendment to be unnecessary.

Finally, Amendment 102, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka, would create a new performance ground for applications for companies to be placed in special administration. The new performance ground would be based on the number and frequency of the company’s criminal convictions. I reiterate to my noble friend that special administration is a last resort. It must be a last resort because it has significant consequences for a company’s investors. Investors would not have the confidence to invest money if the special administration regime could be triggered without allowing a company to rectify any performance issues. The consequence would be instability in the market. Instead, the Secretary of State and Ofwat consider all aspects of a company’s performance and enforcement record when considering whether to pursue a special administration regime on performance grounds.

Further, it is worth noting that performance in general, not just where poor performance has led to a prosecution, is already a criterion. My noble friend asked what financial assistance the Government would provide to a company under a SAR. I confirm that the Government would provide financial assistance to ensure the day-to-day operation of any water company under a SAR. However, we expect that many of these costs would be recouped through the sale of a water company at the end of the special administration, to minimise any cost to the taxpayer. I hope for these reasons that my noble friend will not move his amendment and I thank noble Lords for their contributions.

Before the Minister sits down, I had better clarify: I want another Labour Government only if I cannot have a Green Government. On the issue about having monopolies where market forces do not operate, can she see that there are inherent problems in having monopolies on something such as water—or any public service that we all need?

I completely get the noble Baroness’s point. I would hope that, when we do the review, we look completely across all the issues to do with a water company, including the way it behaves because of the way it is set up, and that that should be part of any consideration. By the time we have reported, I am sure the noble Baroness will be very happy to have another Labour Government.

I thank the Minister for her responses on this group. Mine was a probing amendment and I appreciate her response. I fully recognise that there would be issues with six months as a period, but I think it is important that we have a discussion about the power of revoking licences. I appreciate that the Government are keeping that under review. On Amendment 97, I appreciate what she says about the courts and their powers in all this: that was a welcome response. On Amendment 98 on the public ownership of water companies, I think her response to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, giving those figures and calculations, was useful in moving that debate forward. Obviously, there are costs involved in that and in the Government supporting failing water companies as well. I know that these are difficult matters. Of course, on our Benches we want to have public ownership of water companies, and we will continue to support that, but I thank the Minister for her inclusive responses and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 73 withdrawn.

Amendments 74 to 75A not moved.

Clause 7: Abstraction and impounding: power to impose general conditions

Amendments 76 and 77

Moved by

76: Clause 7, page 11, line 25, leave out from “if” to end of line 28 and insert “—

(a) it is held by a water undertaker or sewerage undertaker, or(b) it is held by a water supply licensee or sewerage licensee, within the meaning of the Water Industry Act 1991, for the purposes of the activities to which its water supply licence or sewerage licence relates;”Member's explanatory statement

This amendment provides that Clause 7 applies to water supply and sewerage licensees only in relation to their licensed activities.

77: Clause 7, page 11, line 29, leave out “a reference to such licences includes those” and insert “regulations under this section may apply to water industry licences”

Member's explanatory statement

This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s previous amendment.

Amendments 76 and 77 agreed.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed.

Amendments 78 to 82 not moved.

Clause 8: Charges in respect of Environment Agency and NRBW functions

Amendment 83

Moved by

83: Clause 8, page 12, line 32, at end insert—

“but, in relation to water supply licensees and sewerage licensees, includes those functions only so far as performed in respect of the activities to which their licences relate.””Member’s explanatory statement

This amendment provides that Clause 8 applies to water supply and sewerage licensees only in relation to their licensed activities.

Amendment 83 agreed.

Clause 8, as amended, agreed.

Clause 9 agreed.

Amendments 84 and 85 not moved.

Clause 10: Modification by Secretary of State of water company’s appointment conditions etc to recover losses

Amendment 86 not moved.

Debate on whether Clause 10 should stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, Clause 10 risks unfairly burdening consumers with costs likely stemming from earlier regulatory and management failures. Involving consumers to compensate for governmental losses would turn customers into de facto guarantors for companies, which contradicts consumer protection principles. As my noble friend Lord Remnant argued earlier in Committee:

“Clause 10 gives the Secretary of State the power to modify a water company licence in order to recover any shortfall in costs for the Government from its consumers. New subsection (4) extends this recourse to all other companies in the sector”.—[Official Report, 28/10/24; col. 1000.]

My noble friend addressed his comments to concerns over the impact on other companies in the sector, with which we agree. My concerns today are with the impact on consumers.

The clause provides no substantial safeguards to prevent excessive or unjustified charge increases. It grants broad powers to the Secretary of State to implement

“such amounts as may be determined”,

without clearly defined criteria or caps on those amounts. This vagueness opens the door to unlimited increases in bills for consumers at a time when cost of living pressures are high. Consumers rely on water services as a fundamental utility and trust is paramount in sectors with limited provider choice. By involving consumers in recovering losses associated with government interventions, the clause risks eroding public trust in the water industry. Why should the Government be able to depart from a consumer pricing model that the regulator has determined to be adequate for providing the service? Why should the consumer face surcharges due to the fault of others?

Clause 10 lacks clarity on how funds raised from consumers will be used or justified beyond the broad purpose of offsetting special administration order loss. Consumers have a right to transparency in any additional costs that they face, particularly when those costs arise from governmental action rather than direct service improvements. Without a clear, transparent breakdown of how these funds will be applied, consumers may view these measures as an arbitrary tax rather than a justified expense.

Permitting the Secretary of State to intervene in pricing to recoup government-incurred costs sets a disturbing precedent. It also highlights the importance of this debate in that the Government feel able to set themselves undefined and unaccountable pricing powers that are not available to the private sector. Is this not why the sector must remain privately owned and accountable rather than in the hands of government or some mysterious public benefit structure?

My Lords, it is a while since I have taken part in proceedings where a stand part debate has been used to try to remove clauses of a Bill. On our Benches, our departed colleague Lord Greaves was very fond of this measure to enable him to make detailed speeches railing against the Government of the day’s proposed legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Roborough, has set out his case eloquently for why he believes that Clauses 10 and 11 should be removed from the Bill. Clause 10 refers to England, and Clause 11 offers the same powers to Welsh Ministers. Both clauses are complex and deal with the recovery of losses. I respect the motives of the noble Lord, who appears to be on the side of the water industry and the bill payers at the same time. However, when 15,000 people from around the country are prepared to give up their Sunday to come to London to join a protest against the action of the water companies, I fear that he may have misjudged the mood of the water company bill payers. The public are rightly furious that, while their water and sewage bills have increased, the infrastructure has not been improved, but directors’ bonuses and shareholders’ dividends have not reflected the poor service that some water companies have given. I say “some” water companies, because some are performing well and do meet their targets; unfortunately, it is the ones that do not do so that we hear about on a continual basis.

Removing from the Bill the two clauses, which would have seen some balance being provided to enable costs to be recovered from those water companies that have failed to deliver on their Ofwat targets, is to give a signal to bill payers that the poor service that they have received is acceptable. If Clauses 10 and 11 are removed from the Bill, there would be no clarity on what is happening or how recompense would be achieved. I am therefore afraid that, on the Lib Dem Benches, we are unable to oppose these clauses standing part of the Bill.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, for his interest in Clauses 10 and 11 and also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support for them standing part. A special administration regime—or SAR—enables a company that provides vital public services to be put into administration in certain circumstances to ensure that the public service will continue to be provided pending rescue or transfer to new owners. An SAR would be required only when there is evidence that a company is insolvent or in serious breach of its statutory duties. It is the ultimate enforcement tool in Ofwat’s regulatory toolkit and, as such, as I said in the last debate, the bar is set high.

Although government has had the powers to place water companies into special administration for over three decades, it is important that we regularly update legislation to reflect modernisation of law and experiences in other sectors. If a SAR occurs, government funding would be required to cover the costs of a special administration, including both operational and capital expenditure—for example, ensuring that statutory environmental obligations were met, as well as for paying the cost of the special administrator.

In the unlikely event that the proceeds of a sale or the repayments agreed as part of a rescue at the end of a SAR are insufficient to cover repaying government funding, there is a risk of a funding shortfall. Clauses 10 and 11 introduce a flexible power, allowing the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to recover any shortfall in funding in a manner that is appropriate to the circumstances. They allow for modification of water company licences to recover any shortfall in financial assistance provided in a water industry SAR. These clauses will align the water industry SAR regime with the energy sector. Without this power, there is a risk that taxpayers will foot the bill for the water industry SAR.

The Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers will be able to decide whether or not they should use this power and the rate at which the shortfall should be recovered from customers. This will include which group of customers it should be recovered from—for example, all water company customers, a subset of the sector, or only customers whose water company went into a SAR.

Although the power is flexible, the design of a recovery mechanism will be subject to consultation with all relevant sector stakeholders. The Government must consider these views and explain our approach accordingly. If a SAR occurs and this power is ever required, this will allow a decision to be made, and be consulted upon, on what the fairest cost recovery option is, based on the evidence and circumstances at the time.

I reiterate that the shortfall recovery mechanism does not mean that customers end up paying for water companies’ failures. Any intervention that would increase customer bills would be considered very seriously and as a last resort. In the first instance, the Government would seek to recoup all the funds spent on financing the SAR through the sale or rescue of the water company after the administrators’ conclusion. This new power would be utilised only if it were not possible to recover what the Government spent funding the administration. If there was a shortfall, Ministers would then decide whether they felt that it was appropriate to exercise this power.

This power would allow the Secretary of State to decide, subject to consultation, the rate at which the shortfall should be recovered from customers and which group of customers it should be recovered from, as I just mentioned. This will ensure that the shortfall recovery mechanism is always implemented in a way that ensures that costs are recovered fairly. I hope that noble Lords agree that this power is essential to protect taxpayers’ money in the event of a SAR, and that these clauses should stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, may have misunderstood me. Far from speaking in favour of the water industry, I am seeking additional protection for the consumer and companies that have not fallen into a SAR.

The Minister has not fully reassured me that the powers in this clause are necessary. The Government perhaps should stand as guarantor, not the innocent. That this measure is very unlikely to be used is not in itself reassuring to me, but at this stage I will not press my opposition to the clauses standing part.

Clause 10 agreed.

Clauses 11 and 12 agreed.

Amendments 87 to 104 not moved.

Clause 13: Extent, commencement, transitional provision and short title

Amendments 105 and 106 not moved.

Clause 13 agreed.

House resumed.

Bill reported with amendments.

House adjourned at 6.40 pm.