Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Twentieth sitting)
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chairs: Sir Mark Hendrick, Mr Philip Hollobone, † Mrs Sheryll Murray, Ian Paisley
† Atherton, Sarah (Wrexham) (Con)
† Benton, Scott (Blackpool South) (Con)
Farron, Tim (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)
Gibson, Patricia (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
† Henry, Darren (Broxtowe) (Con)
† Johnson, Gareth (Dartford) (Con)
† Lewell-Buck, Mrs Emma (South Shields) (Lab)
† Maskell, Rachael (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
† Moore, Robbie (Keighley) (Con)
Mortimer, Jill (Hartlepool) (Con)
† Nici, Lia (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
† Norris, Alex (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
† Pennycook, Matthew (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
† Scully, Paul (Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
† Smith, Greg (Buckingham) (Con)
† Vickers, Matt (Stockton South) (Con)
Bethan Harding, Kevin Maddison, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill Committee
Thursday 8 September 2022
(Morning)
[Mrs Sheryll Murray in the Chair]
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill
Hon. Gentlemen are welcome to take off their jackets if they wish to do so. I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink, except for the water provided, is permitted during sittings of this Committee. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. I welcome the Minister to his place.
Schedule 11
Infrastructure Levy
I beg to move amendment 162, in schedule 11, page 288, line 11, after “development” insert “of the area”.
This amendment seeks to ensure consistency with inserted section 204A(2) on page 282 and ensure that consideration of viability relates to the area as a whole.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 163, in schedule 11, page 289, line 33, leave out “or require”.
This amendment and Amendment 164 would prevent the Secretary of State imposing a nil rate, differential rates, reductions, or a minimum threshold below which IL is not charged and ensure that rates are set by the charging authority.
Amendment 164, in schedule 11, page 289, line 36, leave out “or require”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 163.
It is a pleasure to reconvene with you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. I warmly welcome the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam to the caretaker role that he has bravely taken on today. He is the third Minister I have engaged with in proceedings on the Bill. The shadow Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities team are setting new records when it comes to the ministerial attrition rate. It may be overly ambitious to hope that we can get through five Ministers by the completion of proceedings on the Bill, but we live in hope.
On a serious note, I place on record our thanks to the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones) for his efforts in taking the Bill through Committee in recent weeks, including before the summer recess, and for the constructive way in which he did so. I hope that we can continue in that vein today.
We had, in our last sitting, an extensive debate on the infrastructure levy, and touched on the issue of viability as part of the design of any new proposal. This group of amendments relates to the infrastructure levy rate-setting process, and how viability testing will be used to inform it. Once again, allowing for the fact that we do not have the detail we need, and for the fact that the required forthcoming regulations will be subject to further consultation, I am assuming for the purposes of these amendments—largely because of the remarkable similarity between schedule 11 and the provisions in the Planning Act 2008 that gave effect to the community infrastructure levy—that the Government are minded to base the IL rate-setting process on that which applies to the process for adopting a CIL charging schedule.
If that is the case, the process will require charging authorities to undertake—if not directly, then by commissioning consultants for the purpose—an area-wide viability assessment. Such assessments would be similar to—and indeed could, where appropriate, be combined with—the area-wide viability testing that forms part of the evidence base for the examination of new local plans. As “full viability assessments”, these will involve a large number of residual land valuations for different development typologies, and potentially strategic sites, to test what IL rates could be supported in different circumstances. It is likely that they would have to consider all aspects of development appraisal, including average values, costs, profit and land value, rather than using gross development value as the value-based metric used to determine specific IL liabilities.
The new levy has broader scope than the CIL, incorporating as it does both infrastructure and affordable housing. Higher rates will be necessary as a result. Given that, and given that GDV—the metric to be used—does not take into account site-specific development costs, IL has the potential to result in significant non-negotiable liabilities, so the stakes involved in the IL rate-setting will be far higher than those that pertain in the CIL charging schedule adoption process. Thus it is almost certain that the IL rate-setting process in any given area will be heavily contested; landowners and developers will task their representatives with challenging the scope of the assessment, its methodology, inputs, assumptions and conclusions, with a view to reducing IL rates and their future liability. There is therefore a strong case for putting in place additional measures to ensure that the IL rate-setting examination process is fair, and I hope that the Government are exploring what might be done to ensure that the Planning Inspectorate is able to draw on the necessary expertise so that that is the case.
The aim of amendment 162 is to ensure that the bar for viability testing in the IL rate-setting and examination process is not set unreasonably high, and that there is therefore a more level playing field between charging authorities and those who might potentially object to a proposed IL rate or rates. The amendment seeks to avoid authorities being compelled to either undertake onerously detailed analysis, bring forward overly complex charging structures or set artificially low rates to compensate for the risk that the Bill creates of developers arguing that specific projects in an area are unviable. It does that by specifying, using the language used in proposed new section 204A(2) of the 2008 Act, that when setting IL rates, charging authorities must consider the economic viability of development in the area as a whole. That would make it clear that in the rate-setting process, the test of viability should not be so specific as to relate to individual sites, unless perhaps they are of strategic significance to the charging authority area, but should instead take into account viability across a range of sites, and the overall delivery of the amount of development envisaged in the local plan. That is in line with current practice, and would mean that IL rates would not be unduly influenced by the characteristics of development sites that may not be typical of the area, and that could result in nil or particularly low rates being set across the whole of it.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. It is clear that the system is not working, because when going through the planning process many developers argue that the site is no longer viable, and therefore make changes to the plans. What should be put in place to ensure that we have more accurate viability testing before planning permission is granted?
I thank my hon. Friend for that well-made point. We had, as she will know, an extensive discussion on viability in the last sitting. The system is flawed in many respects, but there are ways in which it has been improved in recent years, and it could be improved further. The Mayor’s threshold approach in London is a good example of how that can be done; it draws in relevant expertise to ensure that contentious sites undergo a full viability assessment.
Our issue with the proposed system is that it is premised on removing the viability issue from the process entirely, but the point here is that the system certainly does not do that; at the rate-setting stage, viability is very much an issue. That needs to be addressed through the amendments. Amendment 162 would ensure that IL rate-setting testing and examination cannot be unfairly manipulated by developers seeking to drive down levy rates, because the amendment would clarify that charging authorities will not be expected to test every development site in their area. It would mitigate the risk that the infrastructure necessary to support development will not come forward, and that amounts of affordable housing will be reduced.
Amendments 163 and 164 are necessary to give full effect to the Government’s commitment that the new system will be, to quote the policy paper, a “locally determined Infrastructure Levy”, with Il rates set locally by charging authorities. The amendments do that by altering the provisions that give the Secretary of State the power to impose specific IL rates, nil rates or minimum thresholds that have not emerged as a result of an examination, or been justified with reference to local evidence. By preventing the Secretary of State from overriding a charging authority in those respects, the two amendments seek to avoid a scenario in which a charging authority is either prevented from developing its own IL rates or, after the lengthy and resource-intensive process of determining the IL rates and thresholds appropriate for its area, and after having them verified by an independent examiner, has them overridden by the Secretary of State.
There is nothing in the Bill to ensure that IL rates imposed by the Secretary of State in the way that the Bill allows would be based on local evidence or subject to independent assessment. There is therefore an obvious risk that the Secretary of State may, on occasion, be persuaded to bypass the IL rate-setting process on spurious grounds. We feel strongly that the process should be genuinely local, and that charging authorities should be confident, if they develop a rate or rates that are approved in examination, that they will be able to apply those without interference from the Department. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on each of these important amendments.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray, and to address the Committee and answer the questions raised. The hon. Gentleman talked about attrition rates, which are important for all of us as constituency MPs, and we all want to make sure that we get this right. I, too, thank the former Minister for Housing, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones), for the work that he has done over the summer.
I begin by acknowledging the work of the Committee so far. The planning reforms will clearly be important in supporting our growth agenda, so I look forward to the next few days. I understand why the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce the amendments. I will try to clarify some of the points, and to explain why we do not believe that the amendments are necessary. I will start with amendment 162.
Local planning authorities will be responsible for setting infrastructure levy rates, and for charging and collecting the levy, and they can spend the levy revenues on local priorities. When setting rates, they must have regard to the economic viability of the development of the area. I reassure the hon. Gentleman and the Committee that proposed new section 204A(2) of the Planning Act 2008 already ensures that that is the case. It states that the overall purpose of the levy,
“is to ensure that costs incurred in supporting the development of an area and in achieving any purpose specified under section 204N(5) can be funded (wholly or partly) by owners or developers of land in a way that does not make development of the area economically unviable.”
The overall purpose of the levy applies to all levy regulations, including those made under proposed new section 204G(4)(a), to which the hon. Gentleman has proposed additional text. This means that when charging authorities set rates or other criteria, they must have regard to matters specified in levy regulations relating to the economic viability of development. Although I understand his point, I hope that with that explanation, he will agree that amendment 162 is unnecessary.
Amendments 163 and 164 would prevent the Secretary of State from requiring, through regulations, that differential rates of the levy be set. They would also prevent the Secretary of State from specifying in regulations the basis on which a threshold for such rates may be determined. Again, I recognise that the aim of the amendments is to ensure that the rates are set solely by the charging authority, but I reassure the Committee that local rate-setting is indeed essential to the levy design. However, the levy must be charged in a coherent and consistent way, so that it meets its objectives of capturing more value and raising more revenue for local planning authorities, while maintaining the viability of developments across an area.
How the levy is charged should reflect the different amounts of additional value that might be generated across different kinds of development. In some circumstances, it might be necessary to require in the levy regulations that rates be set at higher or lower levels. For example, the additional value created by new floor space might be a lot greater than that created when existing floor space undergoes change of use. Similarly, the additional value generated by a residential development might be a lot higher than the amount generated by some types of commercial development, and it is right that the difference in value is reflected in levy rates.
There might be types of development on which it is simply not appropriate to charge the levy, or on which it would be appropriate to charge a reduced rate. Providing for that in the levy regulations will ensure the coherence of the regime that I talked about.
How much additional value is generated by a development depends in part on how much it cost to build, and on the value of the land before development takes place. The minimum threshold will broadly account for the costs of development in an area by charging the levy on the final gross development value. Above the minimum threshold, the levy is charged only on the additional value of a development. Without a minimum threshold, the levy would not be able to reliably capture more of the value uplift in different development types and land uses, while maintaining viability. The ability for levy regulations to require that thresholds for nil or reduced rates be determined in a specified way, including the ability to adjust them with reference to the cost of development in a charging authority’s area, is key to ensuring that this aspect of the levy function works in a coherent and consistent way.
The approach to nil and reduced rates has precedent in the existing system of developer contributions, which already allows for circumstances under which reduced or no contributions are sought. We will design the detail of our approach to nil and reduced rates in our forthcoming consultation.
For those reasons, and given that the upcoming consultation will allow plenty of time to discuss, debate and shape these measures, I am unable to accept the amendments and ask the hon. Member to withdraw them.
I appreciate that comprehensive answer from the Minister, but I am afraid to tell him that I am not reassured. I am not sure—I will happily go back and check the record—that he addressed my specific points. As I said, our concern is that the language in proposed new section 204G(4)(a), when it comes to specifying how viability is handled within the rate-setting process, refers simply to “development”. It is not consistent with the language in proposed new section 204A(2), which specifically refers to “development of an area”.
The Minister spoke in general terms about the local rate-setting process. I take no issue with that. It is absolutely right that the local charging authority looks at viability as part of that process, but the specific concern that we have, as I said, is that it may be forced to assess the viability of every site in the area that it oversees, rather than being able to undertake a general assessment of viability in that area and not have specific sites skew the results. This could potentially have very serious implications for the levy rates that are set and the ability of developers to try to drive down those rates as part of the process. We are not satisfied on that score.
On amendments 163 and 164, we do not take issue with the fact that there needs to be a minimum threshold or the need for specified ways of setting or adjusting the levy rates. Our issue is with the powers that the Bill provides for the Secretary of State to intervene and overturn a locally determined rate that has gone through an examination process. The Minister has not convinced me that there is a good reason for those powers. On that basis, I am keen to make the point that we think this is one of the many weaknesses in the Government’s proposed infrastructure levy, so I am minded to press amendment 162 to a vote.
Let me just answer a couple of points as the hon. Member considers whether to press the amendment to a vote. I assure him that charging the levies is very much for the local authorities. The intention is to not have a system that is different for every single development, because that becomes incredibly unwieldy—that is the point of introducing this system rather than the existing, technically complex system, where developers, who have deeper pockets than many local authorities, and more expertise, get round section 106 and CIL and so on. If they so choose, local authorities should be able to have different levies in different areas within their remit, but that should not be just from development to development. That is the intention of the measures here.
The powers of the Secretary of State reflect the current system. As I mentioned, the Secretary of State has powers under the existing system and we are reserving that same right, which is to be used only very sparingly.
I thank the Minister for that useful further clarification of the Government’s intention, but in many ways he made my point for me. No one is taking issue with the fact that the Bill specifies that local charging authorities set the rate. That is absolutely right. It is an advantage of the proposed system vis-à-vis that outlined in the 2020 “Planning for the Future” White Paper, which envisaged a nationally set rate or rates. The issue we have—the Minister spoke directly to this point—is the inequality of arms between developers and local planning authorities. Our concern is that the language in the Bill will allow developers, not in the way they do with the current section 106 system but under the new system, to use their extra resources, skills and expertise to drive down levy rates at the point at which they are set, due to the way that viability is dealt with in proposed new section 204G(4)(a). I am not satisfied by the Minister’s comments, and I will press amendment 162 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 168, in schedule 11, page 288, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) IL regulations must make provision for a sliding scale of charges increasing in proportion to the share of the development that is on greenfield land, for the purposes of incentivising brownfield development, unless any development on greenfield land is offset by the re-greening of an agreed area of brownfield land in a densely developed or populated area.”
This amendment is offered as an alternative proposition to Amendment 59, adding safeguards intended to prevent extremely dense development in urban centres with an undersupply of open space.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 59, in schedule 11, page 288, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) IL regulations must make provision for a sliding scale of charges increasing in proportion to the share of the development that is on greenfield land, for the purposes of incentivising brownfield development.”
This amendment would require rates of the Infrastructure Levy to be varied in line with the proportion of the development that is on greenfield land in order to promote brownfield development.
It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mrs Murray. I welcome the Minister to his place.
Amendments 168 and 59 have the same objective. Labour has set out clearly that we believe it is important that brownfield sites be developed on first. Many sites across the country have been wasteland for too long. We have a housing crisis and there are economic opportunities, so we very much want to see developments. Such sites are often old industrial areas, which are begging for housing development.
York has the largest brownfield site in the country, adjacent to the station, so we have obviously given much thought to this issue. I am glad that the Government supported our call to make it a site of development. What will go on there is another matter of dispute, but it is welcome that, the site having been derelict for 30 years, we now see roadworks on it—I was looking at them just last weekend—thanks to the additional funding to release it that has been locked in by the railways, but my amendments seek to go further than that.
The White Paper—it is important that we refer to it—suggested that development could be brought forward almost on street corners if sufficient land was available in developed areas. Of course, that takes away vital green space from local communities. My amendments therefore seek to recognise the value of green space in urban environments. It is crucial that we join up the agendas across Government—I often think the Government think too much in their own silo—when looking at the opportunities to create green spaces in urban areas. They could address environmental issues, including drainage and flooding, and mental health issues.
In my constituency, brownfield sites’ being turned over for development has led to a very heated-up urban centre, which has serious consequences. The York Central site and other developments on the west side of the city are taking up spaces that were either old industrial land or school playing fields, which means that we have more traffic. As a result, the west side of York will become gridlocked because the development has not been properly thought through. Within the planning process, the developers are referring back to our local transport plan from 2011, which is well out of date.
If we keep developing on brownfield sites without thinking about the wider consequences, it will have a significant impact on the urban environment and will ultimately create more congestion and pollution, which will have a significant impact on the local community, whose frustrations will grow. We have to make sure that we talk about infrastructure and the transition from car use to public transport or active travel, and we need to take a more holistic view rather than focus on brownfield site development, but my amendment seeks to go further than that in recognising the importance of having some of that land converted into green spaces.
I can give a fantastic example in Tang Hall, a densely populated area of York. It used to be the old refuse site and would have been classified as rich for development, but it was turned into St Nicks environment centre and an incredibly important space for wellbeing. The centre runs opportunities for people experiencing mental health challenges and engages in environmental projects, thereby improving the wellbeing of all residents in the local area. That was a project of yesteryear, but as the housing crisis, which is significant, has grown in York, I have noticed that areas where there is the greatest deprivation—somewhere such as Clifton, where life expectancy is 10 years less than elsewhere in York—also have the least green space.
The former Bootham Park Hospital was on public land, and people would go there and walk around. That space will be handed over to a private company with the disposal of the hospital, but Bootham School will take over the land for its playing fields, which will lock out the public. However, the rest of the estate, where there is currently green space, will be turned into further housing. That involves changing somewhere that is green but categorised as a brownfield site into a developed area, which means that the area will lose public green space. People will not be able to walk their dogs, get fresh air and improve their mental health. We know the correlation between mental health and deprivation, so that is really important.
I can give another example. Acomb had a secondary school in what was the old Acomb Park area, and the school had playing fields. Although the school has been disposed of, the area has been used by the public as a free park for the community, which has been really important. However, the land would be categorised as a brownfield site, and our local council has the intention to develop the site and put more housing there. We desperately need housing—I am not decrying that—but we should re-categorise some brownfield space as green space and then use some current green space as brown space, thereby getting the green lungs into the city. We know from research that that was very much the focus over 100 years ago, because that was how York was built out.
Putting in green lungs will increase the opportunities to improve mental and physical health, to have a better environment and to address some of the issues around pollution and so on. It will also improve the whole area by creating public space and a sense of community. If we see a direct swap with current greenfield sites, I do not believe that the area should be penalised for not building on brownfield sites but choosing to build on greenfield sites. This is about providing greater opportunity and recognising that we can develop brownfield sites first but put in those green lungs in order to place the proposed housing in other areas. We should not penalise local authorities for improving public health and wider aspects of their community. That is a perspective that a joined-up Government would be looking at: how we improve not just homes and units, but communities and people, which is what planning should be all about. My amendment seeks to provide that opportunity, recognising the reality of this in highly populated areas in particular.
I will close by turning to York Central itself, which the Minister will hear mentioned several times today. There is a proposal to put a new public park adjacent to the station, in the heart of York. I welcome that perspective and opportunity, but the way to get the numbers on that brownfield site is to build really densely populated accommodation in York. It will not be accommodation that is required in York; this is about ticking boxes in order to fit in with Government objectives, as opposed to fitting in with what is needed in the community. For the first time, we will have high-rise flats in our city. There is an unwritten law that there should not be a level above five storeys in the city, so this will change the whole context of the city. For instance, it will mean that the view from the Minster—a line that must not be crossed—will be obliterated for much of my community in Holgate.
We see this happening more and more—density, then crowding out—when these accommodations are made for green space. Building high-rise, high-density accommodation goes against what we know is good for communities. The only way it can be viable, returning to that issue, is through high-value accommodation; we are talking about luxury apartments that no one in my city can afford. We will end up with 2,500 units—which my families will not be living in, so their housing situation will not be solved—in order to create a green space. By recognising the need for green space, we would not have to build high-density housing on that location, but would be able to take it elsewhere, while also prioritising the development of that brownfield space.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I join you in welcoming the Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam, to his place on the Front Bench. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for York Central; I recognise the point she made about green lungs in urban environments, and about parkland and green spaces being in towns and cities up and down the land.
Listening to her comments, I remembered my own time in local government some moons ago, in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. We gave planning permission to one of Europe’s largest regeneration projects on brownfield land, crossing the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, around Earl’s Court and West Kensington. That development had multiple parks and lots of green space locked into its design, and into the planning permissions that were granted. It was, in fact, the incoming Labour council in 2014 that undid all of that and turned it over. While I have not been there in some time, I think I am right in saying that Earl’s Court still sits in rubble, as opposed to housing and beautiful green parks.
I will speak principally to amendment 59, which is tabled in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers), to which I too have put my name. It goes to the nub of the concerns that many Members across the House have about planning reform and the way we should go forward. There is a debate about where we should build; should we build on brownfield, or should we build on green space—green belt, greenfield, agricultural land and so on? When I look at my constituency, covering 335 square miles of north Buckinghamshire, 90% of that land is agricultural land. We have seen substantial development over the last 20 or 30 years. Some villages that started off small are now almost unrecognisable because of the vast housing estates that have been built, and which continue to be built on greenfield land around them. I think of villages such as Haddenham—close to my home village, for total transparency—where, yet again, another huge acreage of agricultural land is being built on for homes right now. Buckinghamshire Council, a good Conservative-run council, has a clear vision to build the housing the county needs through the light densification of some of the towns in Buckinghamshire.
However, what amendment 59 principally talks to is the need to incentivise developers to consider brownfield sites when they look at where to build the homes needed in Buckinghamshire and the rest of the country, and that they are not disincentivised because it is so much easier for them to build on greenfield, where they do not have the decontamination costs and all the other expensive costs of developing out brownfield sites. We can use the infrastructure levy to do that. If there is a sliding scale that says to developers that we can create that incentive through the taxation system and the infrastructure levy and potentially make these things cost-neutral, we can take the challenges of decontamination and other costs associated with brownfield land out of the equation for them. In that way, they will pay less infrastructure levy for building out on brownfield sites than they would for destroying the great British countryside.
It is not a perfect solution by any stretch of the imagination, because we still need the money for the roads, the GP surgeries, the schools and everything else the infrastructure levy is there to provide. However, unless we can create a system that really does come good on the Government’s welcome and solid commitment to building on brownfield first, I fear—and I had another developer in my inbox yesterday wanting to build out on a partially greenfield site in Waddesdon in my constituency—that all we will see is planning applications come in for greenfield development, and the brownfield first policy will not be realised.
I therefore urge the Minster to consider how we can use the infrastructure levy, in the spirit of amendment 59, to ensure that there are not financial penalties on developers for developing on brownfield land, so that we make that brownfield first policy come true. In that way, we can give local authorities that have lost a considerable chunk of greenfield and agricultural land in recent years—food security is important to all of us, and it is a pretty simple proposition that the more agriculture land we lose, the less food we can grow—the tools and powers as planning authorities to say that certain proposals are not what they need right now. In some areas, the proposals might be fine and might be what they want but, to use Buckinghamshire as an example, we could put in the differential rate enabled by this amendment to protect our greenfield and agricultural land and to drive development of the homes, commercial units and businesses we need on to the brownfield sites that exist predominantly in towns, and in some villages, in Buckinghamshire.
I urge the Government to look at the spirit of the amendment and to incorporate it into what will undoubtedly, after the leadership election, be quite a different Bill by the time it emerges on Report, to see whether we can make these proposals a reality.
First, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for York Central on amendment 168. She rightly speaks about the importance of green space in urban areas and about how we can increase the rate of it, if anything, when it comes to individual planning applications.
I will speak primarily to amendment 59, because I think it is worth putting the following on the record. I understand the point that the hon. Member for Buckingham is making, but my reading of the Bill is that the framework established in part 4 already allows charging authorities to set different IL rates according to existing and proposed uses, and those could include different rates for greenfield and brownfield sites. So the means to resolve the issue he is driving are already in the Bill, and Buckinghamshire Council will be able to set different rates on brownfield and greenfield sites if the Bill is given Royal Assent.
Our concern is that, by seeking to make mandatory a sliding scale of charges relating to land type or existing typologies by site, amendment 59 could result in reduced infrastructure contributions and lower levels of affordable housing in areas where development mainly or exclusively takes place on brownfield land, because it would prevent charging authorities from setting rates that are effective and suitable for their area and that consider local circumstances. For example, a mandatory sliding scale of charges, as proposed in the amendment, could result in the expectation that a charging authority whose development sites are entirely or mainly on brownfield land would set low IL rates to incentivise development in that area and disincentivise development in other areas with fewer brownfield sites.
Furthermore, brownfield development in higher-value areas will almost certainly generate sufficient values to support higher levels of contributions than would be possible on greenfield sites. As such, a mandatory sliding scale of charges would mean the loss of developer contributions that could viably have been delivered on brownfield sites, with no assurance that this would be offset by a higher level of contributions on greenfield land. Labour firmly believes in the principle of brownfield first, as do the Government, and that is absolutely right. However, we feel strongly that the setting of different IL rates for different land types should ultimately be determined by individual charging authorities taking account of local circumstances, rather than by the method proposed in amendment 59.
The Government are already providing strong encouragement for the take-up of brownfield sites—we are all agreed on that—and are prioritising suitable brownfield land for development wherever possible. There is significant investment through the £550 million brownfield housing fund and the £75 million brownfield land release fund to unlock brownfield land across different communities across the country. Our national planning policy framework makes it clear that local authorities should give substantial weight to the value of using suitable brownfield land in settlements for homes and other identified planning need.
We recognise the importance of delivery on brownfield sites, as has been raised by the hon. Member for York Central and my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham. However, we believe that that is better achieved through planning policy rather than through a fixed algorithm that automatically increases levy charges on the basis of the proportion of greenfield to brownfield. This further amendment would add a new element to the levy formula, which would still allow for greater greenfield development in certain circumstances, but would remain a formulaic approach rather than a policy-driven one.
The proportion of greenfield development within the local authority should continue to be policy driven at that local level, as we have heard. I agree with the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that it should be the local authority—the charging authority—driving that, based on their local circumstances. In any case, proposed new section 204G(5) and (8) in schedule 11 already contains powers for the levy regulations to permit or require local planning authorities to set different levy rates for different kinds of development, and proposed new section 204G(4) makes it clear that the local authority must have regard to the increases in land value that result from planning permission. That provides a framework where, if increases in land values are higher, as we have heard is often the case with greenfield development, higher rates can be set. On that, we agree in terms of policy.
In answer to the hon. Member for York Central, I totally understand her drive when she talks about buildings going up to five storeys, and it is important that it is the local area that determines exactly these things. Whether it is the view of the Minister or the affordability of properties, that should not be determined centrally with an artificial algorithm. It very much needs to be locally driven, so that local families and communities benefit from housing themselves and from the economic value of bringing in new people and new investment. It is about getting that balance right, and that will change for different areas. It was interesting to hear the hon. Member’s tour de force—that tour of York, and I suspect I will get a bit more about green spaces later this morning.
A lot more.
A lot more, the hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position.
Clearly, we do need those green lungs, as my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham said. Those of us who have an urban, suburban or semi-urban area need to get that balance right, and I would much rather that that was done through a policy framework than by an algorithm, which can be game-played by developers. It is important to get this right at a local level, so it is important to get for local authorities to get the local plan in, so that they can shape their place. They have the determination to do so. For those reasons, amendments 168 and 59 are not necessary.
I thank the Minister for his authoritative words in recognising the importance of green lungs in urban environments, because they are so important. Often in planning we lose the wider benefits we are trying to achieve when we look just at bricks and mortar as opposed to people and places. It is so important that we bring that to the fore in this debate, so I will certainly refer back to his speech when talking about this issue. It is important to draw that out as we consider how we take planning forward.
Of course, I am disappointed that the Minister does not want to advance my amendment, but I will withdraw it at this stage and see on Report whether the Government will recognise the opportunity to stress the importance of green in brown areas. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 169, in schedule 11, page 294, leave out lines 15 to 28 and insert
“(a) roads and other transport facilities, including routes for good quality active travel including cycling, walking and micro-mobility, parking facilities and street infrastructure including benches,
(b) flood defences,
(c) schools and other educational facilities including nurseries, play areas and family friendly areas,
(d) medical facilities including dentists, diagnostic hubs, general practices and other community spaces to address mental health and promote wellbeing,
(e) sporting and recreational facilities including youth centres and skate parks,
(f) open spaces,
(g) affordable houses,
(h) facilities and equipment for emergency and rescue services,
(i) facilities and spaces which—
(i) preserve or improve the natural environment, or
(ii) enable or facilitate enjoyment of the natural environment,
(iii) provide outdoor space for communities including allotments and forest schools,
(iv) provide flood and drought mitigation,
(j) space for energy generation
(k) space for business incubation
(l) community buildings for social, cultural, religious purposes,
(m) community facilities including post offices, cafes, libraries, support and advice centres
(n) day centres for the elderly or disabled people, including for the purposes of state-provided day or residential care.”
This amendment broadens the scope of inserted section 204N(5), which defines “infrastructure” for the purposes of the Infrastructure Levy.
I appreciate being able to talk about this amendment, not least because although the schedule—I do not mean any offence—is a list of areas the infrastructure levy could be focused on, it is not a comprehensive list. Therefore, I wanted to expand on areas I think are important for the Government to consider in the planning process at this stage.
We are going through perhaps the greatest change to our economy in our lifetimes, whether that was caused by Brexit, covid or, now, the energy crisis, and none of us knows what is around the corner. As we look at planning, we need to think in a more holistic way. Many of these crises are forcing us into that space, and in many ways we have had to do that thinking, which could be positive. Therefore, in looking at the opportunities available to us, I would argue that the definitions in the schedule are too narrow and that the list should be more expansive.
It could be argued that my amendment puts down an even more expansive list but still is not comprehensive, and I will come back to that in a moment because I recognise that a number of other areas could be included. I am sure the Minister will argue that many of the things that I have listed in my amendment could easily fit into some of the points already in schedule 11. However, my amendment provides an emphasis. For instance, proposed new section 204N(3)(a) in schedule 11, which covers
“roads and other transport facilities”,
sets out a car-focused future. Of course, our future should not be dependent on roads and cars. We have active travel, so we should be talking much more about cycleways and footpaths, and opportunities for micro-mobility, which we are seeing the advent of. Proposed new paragraph (a) emphasises development around a hydrocarbon future, as opposed to moving away from that.
I could talk a lot about many of the other areas. We will concur around such issues as flood defences—York is unfortunately at the top of the league for flooding—but I want to come on to such things as schools and other educational facilities. For instance, what about nurseries and play areas? We know that investment in early years is really needed. That goes beyond an educational facility; we need play areas for children. I would argue that play is education, but would that fit within the definition when we came to argue such points within our local planning systems? We need to ensure that there are family-friendly areas and areas where people can feel safe and included. Looking at expanding the definition under proposed new section 204N(3)(c) is very important.
On medical facilities, the world of medicine is changing. Diagnostic hubs are coming forward from the Government, which I very much welcome. We are seeking to get them in my constituency, and we need to think about health in a very different way than we have in the past. Medical facilities will not necessarily just be clinics or hospitals, as we have seen in the past. We are moving much more into social prescribing, particularly on mental health. When it comes to mental health and wellbeing facilities, we need to look at the most advanced place pioneering mental health work, the city of Trieste in Italy, which does not have hospitals for mental health, because people have facilities in the community. Would that be included here, or would it be seen as something very different? Again, I would argue that the brief definition in the Bill is quite outmoded within its own context.
Proposed new section 204N(3)(e) covers “sporting and recreational facilities”, but what about youth centres and youth clubs? The Government brought forward a proposal to develop 300 new youth facilities, and of course we welcome them into our communities. Sadly, in York we are losing ours, but if we introduce more youth clubs and facilities where do they fit into the proposals? We know that we absolutely need them.
My amendment goes further in looking at some of the areas that we particularly need to focus on. My proposed new section 204N(3)(i) focuses on the need particularly for allotments. We have not heard much about allotments in the debate on planning, but I have been talking to the York Allotments Charitable Incorporated Organisation, which oversees our allotments. YACIO has been talking about the impact that allotments have on mental and physical health. We need to go back over 100 years, and look at New Earswick for the model regarding allotments. Many will know that New Earswick is the first garden village in the country. It is not in my constituency; it is in that of my neighbour, the hon. Member for York Outer (Julian Sturdy). It was designed for urban clearance—for moving people out of the slums and tenant homes in York into a new village—but every home was allocated an allotment. This was family housing, where people had some garden space, but also an allotment.
If we think of today and the food crisis, and the mental health challenges that we all face in our constituencies, having allotments available for families is incredible for the community and for wellbeing. In York 1,500 people are currently waiting for allotments. There is a real shortage. Being able to develop allotments through the amendment would be really good for the wellbeing of our communities and for the people waiting for them. I said that 1,500 people are waiting, but we have 1,350 allotment spaces, so some people are being told that it could be 10 years before they get an allotment. Bringing plots forward could, again, join up Government, tick lots of boxes, and make things available for our wider communities. I think that is really important. s
What the Rowntrees achieved there with their pioneering social work could have a significant impact if we think about the need. In urban spaces in particular, more and more flats and apartments are being built, but people do not have any green spaces, so where do they have the opportunity to grow their own veg? Community gardens and community allotments where there is a collective share are really important in giving people the opportunity to grow their own food. At a time when there is a food crisis, this is a step for many families in food poverty towards greater resilience. These crises are focusing our attention, and we have to think about these things in our modern age.
Turning to my proposed new section 204N(3)(j), the Government are missing a massive trick—I want to stress that this is so important. I was just listening to a BBC World Service programme, which a constituent drew to my attention, about what other countries are doing in relation to energy. It was a fascinating listen; I do not know whether the Minister heard it. Particularly in the Netherlands, but also in Scandinavia, they are making facilities for local energy production on the outskirts of areas. We are currently in an energy crisis, and we all obviously want the very best for our constituents. I notice that the energy debate has started in the main Chamber; I am sure we are all longing to see what the exact proposals are, but in Scandinavia, they allocate land to be used for energy development and production. That is renewable energy production for a local community, so there is a dependence on local energy, which of course can be built into wider networks.
It is really important that the Bill puts into the planning system those allocated opportunities for the IL to be used for future energy production. If we do not have that in the Bill, those spaces will disappear, and we will miss that opportunity. If we are looking at the opportunity presented by wind, solar and in other areas, this could be part of the solution, not only in relation to local energy prices and the costs that people are having to pay now, but also job opportunities on those sites and for future energy supplies. The fact is that other countries are ahead of us. We often focus on what is happening here in the UK, trying to get those plasters out and stretch them as far as we can, but if we look to Finland, we can see that they are instituting microgeneration and large generation of energy for their local communities. That creates a direct relationship, but it is also fantastic for the climate.
We should be thinking about future opportunities. I think it is remiss of the Government to not include those opportunities in this Bill, so I want the Minister to give this issue some thought as the Bill goes through Parliament. Obviously, it would be great to have support for that today, but if at a later stage of the Bill we can ensure that there is space for energy generation, that would be a real advance and would represent a commitment to the people that energy challenges will be addressed.
I also want to draw attention to my proposed new section 204N(3)(k), which deals with business incubation. We know where there are opportunities for investing in business growth. Often, we think about growing out housing, but we also need to build a high-skill economy with good wages for the future. We want to give our entrepreneurs opportunities; they need incubators and accelerators to grow their businesses, root them and ensure they are successful. We know the great success that comes from businesses, but they need those start-up opportunities. Again, I have been hearing about amazing projects that are building that infrastructure, but it has been because somebody has given them a peppercorn rent or they have had generosity from elsewhere. If we are building new conurbations in particular, we need to think about rooting opportunities in those areas for new businesses and ensuring they get the support that they need to grow, but getting that first building—that first step—can be incredibly challenging. I would certainly want to see that in the legislation.
That takes me to my final proposed new paragraph, although it also draws into some of the other areas. When seeing new developments, we often see a lack of opportunity to celebrate the diversity of our communities. I have been greatly concerned about that in York. Many moons ago, there was a proposal for a cultural centre that was kiboshed for whatever reason and never went forward. We do not have a cultural centre in York. We are increasingly seeing a diverse community and that is fantastic, but not places where people can congregate and socialise. We are seeing greater isolation in our communities, particularly among old people. Nine million people are lonely in our country and they do not have somewhere safe to go and meet other people. Therefore, it is important to be able to build community centres, as well as new churches, mosques and places of worship.
If we think about the old villages and towns, there was no place in the country without a church in every community—a place where the community could gather and members could have their spiritual, social and so many other needs met. Those pillars in our community were the pub and the church. I appreciate that some of those pubs have been facing many challenges, but the church still stands—those buildings still stand.
We need to see those opportunities coming forward for new developments so the community’s needs are met. Those things need investment. The infrastructure levy can be used to support vital community infrastructure. That is drawn out through proposed new paragraph (m), which looks at local facilities, and they can be pooled. It is possible to have a church that is a post office. I do not know whether it could be a pub as well, but it certainly could be a café. We are seeing a lot of those facilities coming together.
Where is the heart of community if we just build? We have all been to those horrific estates where there is no community centre and where there is just housing, housing, housing or flats, flats, flats, but the community is not pulled together. I have seen that in developments in York and it is horrid. People are not centred; they do not know their neighbours, they do not know anybody around them and they are increasingly isolated. As I said, 9 million people in our country experience loneliness. If we think about that wider context of where that goes because of the type of housing—increasingly flats and apartments—being built, if we do not invest in that social infrastructure as well, we are going to end up with a massive mental health and isolation challenge in the future.
My final proposed new paragraph, (n), focuses on older and disabled people and ensuring there is proper provision around that social care. Again, we are talking, as Homes England would, not about just building but place making. That is essential to meet the needs of our communities. I would be encouraged to hear that the Government want a wider perspective on how we build our communities to be sustainable, connected, energised by their new energy sources and able to work as a community, as opposed to just building volumes of houses that have no soul.
It has been interesting moving around some of the areas where the infrastructure levy can be used, whether for cycles, footpaths or micro-transport. The hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich mentioned from a sedentary position that we are going to get the good experience of York. I did not realise that we were going to have the experience of Trieste in Italy as well. It is interesting to hear about that, although I understand that in Trieste they do not have mental health provision in hospitals either because they tend to keep to people suffering with their mental health in their homes. It is a different cultural situation, but the point was taken.
The hon. Member for York Central talked about allotments. I do not want to see the community levy contributing to a dulling of good developers who want to provide community facilities as part of their place-shaping. Allotments are comparatively low cost to design and implement, but have massive social and community value. I very much understand that point. Having been the Hospitality Minister for two years, and now the Minister for Faith, I find the hon. Lady’s proposal to combine those roles in the church/pub really interesting—we will see how that goes.
This is the problem with putting lists in Bills. The list is not supposed to be exhaustive and comprehensive—there are plenty of things that charging authorities can, should and will be looking at, such as those the hon. Lady has outlined. The Bill gives a starting point, but I do not think we need to go further at this stage, because the rest of the Bill gives the local authorities wide powers, allowing them to spend the levy on the infrastructure that their communities need, rather than it being imposed by us in the detail proposed by the amendment.
I reassure the hon. Lady that, should a local authority wish to spend the levy on items of infrastructure that are not expressly stated in the list in proposed new section 204N, as long as it is infrastructure in the common sense and natural meaning of the word, it will indeed be able to do that. The levy can be spent on any infrastructure that supports the development of an area, including funding the provision, improvement and replacement, operation or maintenance of infrastructure, providing that it is in accordance with the original aim of the levy as set out in proposed new section 204A.
The Bill also allows for regulations to add, remove or vary the content of the list to support infrastructure delivery through the levy if it is necessary and if any clarification is needed.
Energy should get particular mention in a redrafting of the Bill. Other countries are further advanced; we are behind. That is a specific point, and we should see that change. Does the Minister conclude that all the other issues in the amendment would be facilitated by proposed new section 204A, as set out in that broader definition of the Bill? If that is the case, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
I do not see the need to put energy generation in the list because, absolutely, that and the other areas she raises are included. I am happy to give her that reassurance. As long as the local authority thinks something is needed, and it fits within the definition of infrastructure—I think we can agree that all the points she raises fit within that definition of infrastructure—the answer is yes.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. Just for clarity: if the authority were to bring forward a proposal for microgeneration of energy or an energy facility in order to support a local town, conurbation or whatever, that would be included, too. I made the point about energy having a separate mention in the Bill because it is such a big issue and much broader than some other areas, but would that also be covered?
Yes. If the local authority thinks it is needed, then absolutely. The discourse around housing is often just about the supply of housing, but clearly energy, and energy generation of all sorts, needs to be brought into it. We need to bring in schools, hospitals and medical facilities of all types, and indeed allotments, as she said. Yes, I can give her that assurance, and ask her to withdraw the amendment.
I have heard what the Minister has said. I will take his words as authoritative—they will be in the Hansard record of today’s debate—and, as a result, I will withdraw my amendment. The point about energy is significant, not least if I look at the Derwenthorpe development by the Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust in York, which has put energy and a community centre at the heart of that social/private development. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 165, in schedule 11, page 306, leave out from line 38 to line 2 on page 307.
This amendment would limit the circumstances under which the Secretary of State could direct a charging authority to review its charging schedule.
This amendment, much like amendments 162, 163 and 164, which we debated earlier in relation to the IL rate-setting process, is concerned with ensuring that the new levy system is genuinely local and that charging authorities are fully in control of developing its discretionary elements at a local level. It would remove proposed new section 204Y(1)(b), which provides the Secretary of State with the power to direct a charging authority to alter its charging schedule in a range of circumstances, including
“in any other circumstances that IL regulations may specify”.
That is of particular concern.
Given that the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to revise individual charging schedules at their sole discretion, with no need to justify that intervention by means of any objective evidence-based criteria, we are concerned that, as drafted, it could have significant implications. For example, it could allow a future Secretary of State to require a charging authority to amend its locally developed charging schedule as a result of lobbying by a developer, without having to provide any evidence that the levy as implemented in the area in question is impairing viability and frustrating development.
We believe that this amendment is necessary to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot direct a charging authority to alter its charging schedule merely due to the passage of time or any other circumstances they see fit, given that the only justified rationale for an intervention from Ministers in relation to a charging schedule—namely, its impact on viability—is already covered by subsection (1). I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Proposed new section 204Y(1)(b) enables the Government to require an authority to review—not necessarily alter—its levy charging schedule if a significant amount of time has passed since its last issuing, review, revision or replacement. Proposed new section 204Y(1)(c) enables the Government to require a review in any other circumstances as may be specified through regulations. It is important to have a power to direct a review to be undertaken after a significant period has elapsed since the schedule was put in place or revised. That is because there may be occasions when a schedule has been in place for many years without a proper review, and so is not up to date.
The levy will be a mandatory charge, and for many local authorities operating a levy on new developments it will be a novel means to capture land value. Monitoring and reviewing charging schedules will therefore be important, especially for authorities that are unaccustomed to charging a levy. That is why we want levy charging rates to be reviewed on a timely basis. We will issue guidance on what that might reasonably mean in terms of time and circumstances. I hope that provides reassurance, including for communities and developers, that the rates remain appropriate. We want to make sure the approach is balanced.
Historically, local planning authorities have not always reviewed and updated key documents, such as local plans, in a timely fashion, which is why it is appropriate to take this power to direct a charging authority to issue, review, revise or replace. Furthermore, it is entirely consistent for the Bill to secure timely reviews of charging schedules and to require that local authorities introduce a charging schedule in the first place. Levy charging schedules are underpinned by evidence on local economic circumstances and viability. Reviews either provide confidence that the charging schedule remains appropriate or starts a process of revision if they are considered not to be.
We also consider it important to have the power to regulate for any other circumstances in which the Government may want to direct that a review be undertaken, such as if a new local plan is issued soon after the publication of a charging schedule. Any further circumstances identified will be introduced through affirmative regulations, and so will be laid before this House and debated and approved here. With that clarification, I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw the amendment.
I appreciate that response from the Minister. I am partly reassured, and I note the point that he made about the use of “review” as opposed to directly “revise” in terms of the power available to the Secretary of State. I also note what the Minister said about the forthcoming guidance. I remain slightly concerned about how broadly defined line 2 of page 307 is, in that it does allow the Secretary of State to call for that review on the basis of anything that might come forward in future regulation, subject only to the affirmative procedure. We all know the limitations of that.
I am not going to press the amendment to a Division, but I hope the Government will reflect on the Opposition’s concerns about the ability in the Bill, as presently drafted, for the Secretary of State to intervene in a number of ways that should be the preserve of local charging authorities. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 166, in schedule 11, page 308, leave out line 25.
This amendment would prevent IL regulations making unspecified provision about how powers under section 106 of TCPA 1990 (planning obligations) are used.
The Committee will be relieved to hear that this is the last of our amendments on the infrastructure levy. It relates to the interaction of the infrastructure levy with other existing powers. As drafted, proposed new section 204Z1(1) in schedule 11 provides for future IL regulations to make unspecified provisions about how a range of existing powers, including CIL and section 106 planning obligations, are to be used or not used.
Our specific concern relates to the application of those broad powers to the use of section 106 agreements. While we appreciate fully that there are circumstances where the use of section 106 will have to be limited—for example, to avoid double charging a development for the same infrastructure item—we feel strongly, for reasons that I went into in exhaustive detail on Tuesday in relation to that part of the Bill in the round, that section 106 agreements have a crucial role to play in ensuring we secure sufficient levels of affordable housing. We are concerned that proposed new subsection (1) could be used to unduly restrict their use.
By deleting line 25 from page 208, amendment 166 simply seeks to ensure that future IL regulations cannot make unspecified provisions about how section 106 agreements are used once the levy system is operational. I hope the Minster will seriously consider accepting the amendment. If not, I feel that we need, at a minimum, far greater clarity about the precise circumstances in which the Government expect to have to restrict section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
Proposed new section 204Z1 in schedule 11 enables the Secretary of State to prescribe how certain powers are to be used or not. As we have heard, proposed new subsection (1)(c) enables the Secretary of State to prescribe how section 106 applications may or may not be used alongside the levy. That power has been used previously to make provision under the community infrastructure levy regulations to ensure that section 106 obligations are necessary in planning terms, directly related to the development, and fair and reasonably related to the scale and kind of development.
We need to be able to continue to ensure, under the new system, that section 106 obligations are used in ways that are appropriate, necessary and fair. We need to be able to delineate between matters that should be funded by the levy, and contributions to infrastructure or mitigation that should be secured by the more narrowly focused section 106 agreement. That means that developers will know that they will receive consistent treatment across different local authorities.
Removing section 106 from the list of powers will mean that the Secretary of State is unable to provide clear, coherent and consistent boundaries between what the levy should be used for, and what section 106 agreements can and cannot be used for. That would remove a key provision that will provide for coherence across the levy and the planning obligations regime. It is important to remember that the levy will take most of that. It will be more complicated, niche or bespoke schemes for which section 106 will remain. That coherence is why we want to keep that power and consistency. For that reason, I hope the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw the amendment.
That is a welcome additional clarification from the Minister, and I do not want to rehearse the previous debates that we have had. As I set out at length, we believe that the infrastructure levy should be discretionary and that, if it is not discretionary, affordable housing should not be within scope, so we remain concerned about the ability of this power to restrict how section 106 agreements are used. However, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 114
Power to designate Homes and Communities Agency as a charging authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I have a question relating to clause stand part. The Homes and Communities Agency, which operates under the trading name of Homes England, can already be designated as a local planning authority under the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The clause amends section 14 of the Act to provide that, if a designation order is made under section 13 to designate the HCA as a local planning authority for all or part of a designated area, the designation order may also make provision for the HCA to be the IL charging authority for all or part of the designated area.
The current situation with CIL is that the Homes and Communities Agency, urban development corporations and enterprise zone authorities can also be collecting authorities for development where they grant permission, but only if the relevant charging authority agrees. It would appear that the new provision in the clause allows Homes England to be a charging authority for the area where it acts as the planning authority, without the need for agreement from the local planning authority, as is currently the case with CIL.
Given the circumstances, I am more than happy for the Minister or his successor to respond to me in writing at a later date, but I would be grateful if he could explain the rationale behind the change of approach, what engagement and consultation Homes England will be required to carry out with other relevant local bodies in the absence of an explicit agreement to exercise the relevant powers, and what processes Homes England will use to decide how IL should be spent in that area.
I will write to the hon. Gentleman with further details. As he rightly says, the clause is designed purely to act as a framework for having Homes England become a charging authority as well as a local planning authority. That power has not be exercised to date, but if it were, Homes England could become a charging authority. It is important to have the power in order to allow the Homes and Communities Agency to become the charging authority as well as the local planning authority, and to specify the purpose and kinds of development. Without the clause, the levy may not be able to function effectively in areas where the Homes and Communities Agency may be designated as the local planning authority. I commend the clause to the Committee, and I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with further details, should he require them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 114 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gareth Johnson.)
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.
National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chairs: † Rushanara Ali, James Gray
† Bell, Aaron (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Con)
† Eagle, Maria (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
† Elmore, Chris (Ogmore) (Lab)
† Everitt, Ben (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
† Hart, Sally-Ann (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
† Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)
† Hosie, Stewart (Dundee East) (SNP)
† Jones, Mr Kevan (North Durham) (Lab)
† Jupp, Simon (East Devon) (Con)
† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)
McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
† Mann, Scott (North Cornwall) (Con)
† Mohindra, Mr Gagan (South West Hertfordshire) (Con)
† Mumby-Croft, Holly (Scunthorpe) (Con)
† Phillips, Jess (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
† Sambrook, Gary (Birmingham, Northfield) (Con)
† Tugendhat, Tom (Minister for Security)
Huw Yardley, Bradley Albrow, Simon Armitage, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill Committee
Thursday 8 September 2022
(Morning)
[Rushanara Ali in the Chair]
National Security Bill
On a point of order, Ms Ali. I bring good news to the Committee: yesterday, I met the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is alive and well. We asked why he did not attend the Committee, but we have not yet had an explanation from the Government. From what he told me, I understand that the reason why he was told to stay away was that he would not move part 3 of the Bill.
Related to that, however, we also raised the issue of losing a day last Tuesday because the Government insisted on adjourning the Committee. Has any thought been given to an extra day next week—if we need it—to complete the Bill’s proper scrutiny?
Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. On both occasions that the Committee met on Tuesday, although only for a short time and without being able to make any progress on the Bill, I asked the Minister in charge, the Government Whip, for an explanation of why the former Minister had not turned up to the Committee. Had he engaged in dereliction of his duty—he said he would stay in post until the new appointment and then did not turn up—or had he been asked to stay away? My right hon. Friend put forward—we would call this hearsay in the courts—an explanation that he heard from the hon. Gentleman in question, but I had asked the Whip to tell us. I think the Committee deserves to hear why that happened. Will one of the Ministers tell us what the Government’s explanation is? It has been requested since Tuesday.
Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. The right hon. Member for North Durham made the request for additional time. Given how much is yet to be done, in particular the most contentious new clauses—contentious in the minds of some perhaps—especially relating to the public interest defence, which may take substantial time to deal with fully, will proper consideration be given to replacing at least the day lost earlier this week?
May I ask the Minister to respond?
This is the first time that I have spoken on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It is an enormous privilege to be here. I realise that I enter this process—this lion’s den—at a moment when other lions have been through the Bill a few times before—there are an awful lot of Christians in this Committee and only one lion.
Before I say anything further, I pay enormous tribute to the Bill team, who have been phenomenal. The very fact that this has continued at all in such a professional way—
It hasn’t!
It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.
On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—
Right honourable.
My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—
Right first time.
I will endeavour to find out what the reason is. You will understand, Ms Ali, that I was not appraised of this situation. I have spent rather a long time reading the Bill in the past 36 hours and not so much time asking about the movements of former Ministers.
On the point made by the right hon. Members for North Durham and for Dundee East about time, I will endeavour to do what I can to ensure that we have time available. Let us see how we go today. If time is needed, I will talk to the Whips team about it.
The Minister has addressed the key points. I have nothing further to add in response to the point of order, so we will now begin our proceedings.
Clause 41
Variation of measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 42 to 44 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
As the comparable sections in the terrorism prevention and investigation measures legislation make clear, clauses 41 to 44 are technical elements that improve the regime and make it work in practice. Clause 41 mirrors TPIMs by making provision for the measures imposed to be varied while they are in force. That will allow changes to be made to the restrictions where necessary, in response to changes in the individual’s personal or family circumstances or to the assessment of the risk they pose. Those provisions will be important in ensuring that the regime is able to respond dynamically and flexibly to changing circumstances, and that the individual is able to live as normal a life as is possible without posing a threat to the British people.
The provisions will also be important to securing the effective operational management of state threats prevention and investigation measures. Critically, the underlying requirement that the measures imposed must always be necessary and proportionate remains, and that is explicitly the case for any variation that has the effect of strengthening the measures imposed.
It is a pleasure to serve under you as Chair once again, Ms Ali. They say a week is a long time in politics: never has that been truer than this week. I am very pleased to see the Minister in his place, but—for the second time over the course of this Committee—not quite as pleased as the hon. Member for North Cornwall that he once again has a Minister in place. I welcome the Minister to his role; as others have said, he is the fourth Minister we have had over the course of this Bill. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work together, now that we can make some vital progress on this really important piece of legislation. I also look forward to working with him on this policy area beyond just the legislation that is in front of us.
Turning to the detail of this group of clauses, clause 41 makes provision for the measures imposed under a part 2 notice to be varied in a number of different circumstances, as the Minister has outlined. Subsection (2) makes it possible for the Secretary of State to vary a relocation measure in a part 2 notice if considered necessary
“for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”.
We are satisfied with those measures, and recognise the necessity of the remaining provisions in the clause.
Clause 42 provides a power for the Secretary of State to revoke a part 2 notice at any time by serving a revocation notice, whether or not in response to a request by the individual. The Secretary of State may exercise that power where they consider it is no longer necessary for the part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it to remain in force. The explanatory notes say that
“although the measures may no longer be necessary at the time that the Part 2 notice is revoked (for example because the individual has been detained in prison), they may subsequently become necessary again (when the same individual is released from prison, perhaps following an unsuccessful prosecution for a criminal offence).”
As I have said before, the assumed prosecution rate for state threats in the Home Office impact assessment is just 33%, so I am concerned that we might need that level of flexibility, depending on the circumstances.
Subsection (6)(a) of the clause also provides a power for the Secretary of State to revive for a period of a year a notice that has previously expired without being extended, without the need for evidence of new state threat activity. Surely if a person continues to be a threat, the notice should not be allowed to expire; alternatively, if the notice has been allowed to expire because the person is no longer deemed a threat, reviving a notice without any new information surely could not be justified. On that basis, I would be keen to hear any further rationale for the provisions in subsection (6)(a).
When considering the revocation of part 2 notices, it is also worth considering what Jonathan Hall QC described as the “TPIM Catch-22” in his annual report on the terrorism equivalent of these part 2 measures:
“On the one hand, in order to test whether an individual would revert to terrorism-related activity in the absence of TPIM measures, there may be no alternative but to reduce or remove measures; for example, by allowing an individual to associate or move more freely.
“On the other hand, association and movement measures have been imposed precisely to counter the risk of terrorist-related activity. In the absence of evidence of risk reduction, to do so might put members of the public at risk of harm.”
It is not easy to step down from STPIMs once they have been imposed and there is a clock ticking on the restrictions imposed on a suspect, so what efforts are we making to establish best practice on this, so that clauses 41 and 42 can be deployed as effectively as possible?
Clauses 43 and 44, also in this group, make provision for circumstances in which a part 2 notice is “quashed” or directed to be revoked as a result of court proceedings, and schedule 6 rightly provides other circumstances in which an individual who is convicted of an offence under clause 50 has a right of appeal against that conviction.
Other than the points we have raised, we are satisfied that these measures strike an appropriate balance.
I welcome the Minister to his place.
In this group, clause 41 allows for the variation of STPIMs, either on application by the individual on whom it has been served or by the Secretary of State, when certain circumstances apply. Most of the clauses in this group seem to make sense, but there is some slightly odd wording. I know the Minister described these measures as “technical” and said that they would improve provision, but will he give some clarity?
Clause 41(1)(c) provides the power to vary, which is available if necessary
“for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity.”
Why is that? The words “purposes connected with” appear to be a slightly odd formulation. Why is the requirement not simply to prevent or restrict involvement in “threat activity”?
That same question arises in relation to clause 41(2)(a), but in that paragraph what is meant by allowing a new relocation measure to be invoked when
“necessary for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”?
What does that actually mean? The Minister described these provisions as “dynamic” and “efficient”. Are we saying that people may be moved for a second time simply to save money? The explanatory notes suggest that is the case, so I seek reassurance that such a provision will not be used unless genuinely necessary.
Clause 42 allows for the revocation of notices, including on application, but it does not appear to restrict the number or frequency of revocation applications. It also allows the Secretary of State to make a “revival notice” in regard to a part 2 notice that has expired or been revoked. It protects against expired notices already extended to the maximum limit, but it seems to leave open the possibility of revoking a four times extended part 2 notice and then reviving it, despite the time limit. That seems to be expressly permitted in clause 42(7)(b), although clause 42(9) appears to stop that. Will the Minister confirm that revival notices cannot be used to try to circumvent the absolute maximum of five years and that clause 42(9) will prevent that happening?
Turning briefly to schedule 6, which covers circumstances in which a person has been convicted of breaching a part 2 notice but the notice or extension is “quashed” so that the offence would not have been committed had it been quashed earlier. There are some very tight timescales in this schedule. For example:
“An appeal under this Schedule to the Court of Appeal against a conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland…may not be brought after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the right of appeal arises”.
The same 28 days is used in relation to
“an appeal under this Schedule to the High Court of Justiciary”—
the Scottish High Court of Appeal—
“against a conviction on indictment in Scotland”.
There is a 21-day deadline on
“an appeal under this Schedule to the Crown Court against a summary conviction in England and Wales”.
There is a 14-day time limit on
“an appeal under this Schedule to the Sheriff Appeal Court against a summary conviction in Scotland”.
Some of these timescales, particularly the 14 day one, are very tight and it may be very tricky to know precisely when the clock starts ticking, as that depends on when a different clock has run out.
We may be slightly over-cautious. However, it appears ridiculous if people are left with convictions for breaching what would have been illegal orders. Would it not be more sensible in those circumstances, to avoid people having to go to appeal courts of one sort or another in short timescale, simply to automatically quash them? Why is there a time limit on the ability to appeal in any circumstance?
Let me answer some of the questions that have just come up. The hon. Member for Halifax and the right hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire, if I am correct—
Dundee East.
Forgive me; the right hon. Member for Dundee East. They have raised some interesting points. The first is on the notice to be revived without new evidence of a lapse. The reason for that variation is to allow for prison sentencing. Should an individual find themselves being sentenced for a crime in the middle of an STPIM, that allows the STPIM to be paused for the purpose of imprisonment and revived afterwards, without having to go through the whole process again. The purpose is practical, rather than that of having a massive legal effect. Therefore, I believe it is entirely proportionate with the requirements of security.
That seems a slightly illogical formulation. If the prison sentence is substantially longer than the maximum the STPIM could provide for, it seems preposterous that the remainder of the STPIM’s time would be added to the end of a sentence once it was fully discharged. That does not appear to be fully thought through.
Perhaps the hon. Member will appreciate that not everybody who spends time in prison will do so for the offence for which the STPIM might have been applied. It is perfectly possible that somebody might spend six months in prison for something completely unconnected—a driving offence, a minor theft, or whatever—and therefore a pause would be entirely in keeping with that. The STPIM is about controlling different people’s ability to move and communicate, in which circumstances prison would simply not be a relevant application because the prison sentence effectively supersedes the controls that would have been put in place. In that sense, it is merely a way of recognising that, in certain circumstances, different applications would apply.
Clause 39 requires police to keep under review criminal investigations. STPIMs are a civil measure to protect against national security threats when a criminal prosecution is not possible. They are not overlapping; they are compatible and, indeed, complementary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 45
Appeals
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause set out the rights of appeal of a person subject to an STPIM notice and the function of the court on considering such an appeal. Those rights of appeal are in addition to the automatic review of each case and ensure that the individual subject to a notice is able to appeal against all relevant decisions taken by the Secretary of State using the powers contained in the Bill—for example, to extend or revive a notice, to vary the measures or to refuse an application for measures to be varied.
In determining an appeal brought under the clause, the court must apply judicial review principles. That is a particularly intense level of scrutiny and will ensure that the Secretary of State’s decisions are subject to independent consideration. Clause 45 makes clear the powers of the court on considering an appeal, which include to quash the extension or revival of the notice or the measures within, or to give directions to the Secretary of State for the revocation of the notice or in relation to the variation of the measures specified in the notice. As I have said already, a key feature of the Bill is the extensive and multi-layered approach to judicial oversight, which will ensure that the courts can be involved at every stage of the process, and that every decision of the Secretary of State can be reviewed by the judiciary and can be overturned if the court so decides.
To recap, there is an initial permission stage before measures are imposed. There is then the automatic full review of the decision to impose measures, and there are the extensive rights of appeal contained in the clause. Taken together, those provide important safeguards.
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. It is absolutely right that clause 45 sets out those rights to appeal. I have nothing further to add at this stage, but we will come back to oversight when we discuss later amendments and new clauses.
Clause 45 includes the important power to appeal to the court against the decision to review or revive a part 2 notice; against variations, or the refusal of them; against unlimited revocation applications; and in relation to permission applications. As the Minister said, the function is to review the decision, and the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.
That sounds fine—so far, so good—but why is there no right to appeal against a clause 35 permission to impose STPIM decisions, as made clear in clause 47? Is it because it is expected that other procedures will have the same effect, for example an application to revoke, or is this an attempt to limit in statute the ability of those subject to STPIMs having access to court to appeal in those circumstances?
I warmly welcome the Minister to his position. He and I go back a long way: when I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, he was a bright, fresh young officer, and I think we both have fond memories of our time working together. One of the dangers he faces is being appointed to a position that he knows a lot about. That is always a downer for any Minister and strikes fear into the civil service. I wish him well, and he will do a good job.
Throughout the entire Bill, there should be an ability for the individual to have recourse to appeal. That is not because I am somehow soft on terrorism or on the individuals we are dealing with. It is because we must have a system whereby, when the state takes hard measures to limit someone’s freedom, they need the counterbalance of the ability to appeal. That is why I welcome the measures. My problem with the Bill is that, although this measure is present in this part of the Bill, there are no safeguards in other parts of the Bill. Those types of appeal mechanisms balance state power and the individual.
I have two specific points on the process, which I support. How will the appeals be done in the court? Some of the information that the Secretary of State will rely on will be highly classified, so how will the process work? It will mean the disclosure of some information that we would not want disclosed in open court. I shall not rehearse the arguments on part 3, but it is clear that, if part 3 is retained, the individual will not have recourse to legal aid for an appeal. I am opposed to that. That is not because I am on the side of individuals who wish us harm, but we must ensure that we have a system that is robust in ensuring that justice is done, and people must not be arbitrarily detained or subject to those restrictions if they clearly have legitimate arguments against what the state is trying to apply.
Before I come to the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s words, I will just address the very generous tribute from the right hon. Member for North Durham. I remember that I used to call him sir; he never called me sir, and he still will not. I do not feel special in that; I do not think he has ever called anyone sir in his life. It was very kind of him.
On the question raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, clause 38 means that there has to be a review wherever a STPIM notice is imposed, which is in clause 35. The individual can attend the automatic review. I will come on to that element, because as the right hon. Member for North Durham rightly says, there is likely to be material that is extremely sensitive. That is why the procedure relates to what is already established with special advocates. The right hon. Member knows much more about Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings, and the various ways in which advocates can have access to information that is relevant to a court but is not then shared with somebody for whom that would not be conducive. That is the way that the proceedings will work, and I think that provides the right balance between disclosure, justice and protection.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Jurisdiction in relation to decisions under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Members will be pleased that this is very brief. Clause 46 makes an important but largely technical provision. The purpose is to provide absolute clarity that the High Court is the appropriate forum for judicial proceedings arising from decisions relation to STPIMs, or in Scotland, the Outer House of the Court of Session. That is important given that such proceedings may rely on closed material, which we will come on to next.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Proceedings relating to measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Clause 47, and schedule 7, to which the clause gives effect, make further provision for court proceedings in relation to decisions taken under the Bill. I will spend slightly longer on those measures, given the important issue raised by some of the key aspects of those provisions.
Subsection (1) makes clear that an appeal against a court decision in STPIM proceedings may only be brought on a point of law. That limitation is appropriate. The court of first instance has the expertise in fact finding for national security determinations. It has developed expertise and a body of knowledge in an experienced judiciary who hear national security cases. That means it is right that the court of first instance, which has significant expertise, has the final determination on points of fact.
In such cases, it is therefore right to limit the right of appeal to a point of law, as higher courts will not have available the national security information or expertise to make a fair determination on the facts. The approach is reflected from the provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
Schedule 7 makes further provision relating to court proceedings under the Bill, including, in particular, powers to make rules of court about various matters. Critically for the operation of the scheme, the rules will make provision that court proceedings in relation to STPIMs will operate with both open and closed elements given the sensitivity of the evidence that will be a key component of why an individual cannot be prosecuted and why the use of a STPIM is necessary. It would fundamentally undermine the scheme if closed proceedings, where sensitive intelligence and national security arguments can be made, were not available. The individual, and his or her chosen legal representatives, can be present at the open hearings, and see all the material used in those hearings, but they cannot be present at the closed part of the proceedings or see the closed material.
Schedule 7 provides for the appointment of a special advocate in relation to any closed proceedings, who will attend all parts of the proceedings—both open and closed—and, like the judge, they will see all the material, including the material that is not disclosed to the individual.
The role of the special advocate is to act in the individual’s interests in relation to the closed material and closed hearings. Each individual who is subject to a TPIM must be given the gist of the key allegations against them and it is the judge reviewing the case, rather than the Government, who will decide on the level of disclosure required to allow a fair trial.
The proposed level of disclosure is submitted by the security service. Special advocates, who are barristers, representing the defendant in closed material proceedings may then make the case for further disclosure, with the final decision on the level of disclosure being made by a judge.
It is true that this process does not necessarily involve the individual knowing the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of the allegations against them. There are clear reasons why it would not be in the public interest to disclose all that information, for example where the information comes from an informant who may be put at risk, or if the information was obtained using an investigative capability that might be compromised. However, it is equally clear that the requirements of a fair trial would not be satisfied where a case is based purely or mostly on closed material and the open material consists purely of general assertions.
Paragraph 5 of schedule 7 expressly provides that nothing in this rule-making provision or in the rules of court made under it is to be interpreted as requiring the court to act in any way that is inconsistent with article 6 of the European convention on human rights. In other words, the proceedings and any rules of court must be applied in accordance with the right to a fair hearing, which would be concerned in particular with provisions about withholding information from the individual.
Schedule 7 makes further provision relating to the rules that may be made. This includes a power for the court to make an anonymity order preventing the disclosure of information that could identify, or that could tend to identify, the individuals subject to the measures.
Currently, the courts tend to make such an order in respect of most TPIM cases and there are several benefits. The anonymity order limits the impact, including from media intrusion, on the individual’s private and family life. It also limits the impact on the community in which the individual lives, both in terms of community cohesion and ensuring the ability to monitor and enforce the measures effectively without drawing attention or causing concern within the community.
I am grateful to the Minister for that introduction to clause 47 and schedule 7. I am particularly interested in what he had to say on special advocates and I will perhaps come on to that.
Schedule 7 introduces provisions relating to prevention and investigation measures and proceedings, as we have already heard. As outlined in the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2 will take into account closed elements of proceedings where sensitive material is not disclosed as it would be contrary to the interests of the UK’s national security to do so, with paragraph 3 setting out the rules for the court on disclosure. In previous exchanges, we have examined the balance that needs to be struck on both these issues, so we expect the commitments to both transparency and national security to be weighed delicately in each instance.
We certainly welcome the guarantee around article 6 of the European convention on human rights, which is set out in paragraph 5. Paragraph 10 provides for the appointment of a special advocate in relation to any closed proceedings. A special advocate attends all parts of the proceedings—both open and closed—and plays a key role in scrutinising material while acting on behalf of the individual subject to the proceedings. The explanatory notes say that part of the function of the special advocate is to ensure that the closed material is subject to independent scrutiny and adversarial challenge, including making submissions in closed session on whether the closed material should be disclosed to the individual.
I think that the Minister confirmed that the special advocate would be a barrister, but I could not find any detail within the Bill or the explanatory notes about how a special advocate would be appointed and what their experience and background would be expected to be in such circumstances, when they would be providing such a specialist function. I would be grateful if there was a commitment to ensuring that those things are clear in the Bill and the explanatory notes that accompany it.
Schedule 7 empowers the court to make rules in relation to reviewing proceedings and onward appearance, and the rules of court must secure not only a proper review of decisions, but
“that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the public interest.”
We can have determinations without a hearing, without full reasons being given for a decision—the Minister described that—and, when sensitive information is to be laid, hearings without the accused. There is a duty of disclosure on the Secretary of State, but he or she can apply not to disclose certain information on the grounds that disclosure would be
“contrary to the public interest.”
That rule means that the Secretary of State might be able to ignore other requirements to disclose information. That is Kafkaesque.
The Minister, rightly, prayed in aid national security; he was absolutely right to do that. We can all understand that there could be circumstances where such rules would be necessary, but does the legislation describe those circumstances appropriately? The watchwords appear to be “public interest”, but is that not far too wide or far too vague? Given he prayed in aid national security, why do we not only allow the avoidance of disclosure on genuine national security crimes?
I think the Minister has explained that. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, but as I said earlier on, I think the rules are a sensible safeguard in terms of what we need. Frankly, with no access to legal aid they are for the birds, because no one will be able to use them. We will come on to that debate later.
I want to ask the Minister about the issue of juveniles, which is an increasing problem for our security services. For example, the “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism” report that we just produced in the Intelligence and Security Committee found that, increasingly, those individuals are young people—some as young as 15. If we are going to apply the rules in some possible circumstances to those individuals, what are the protections for them? If the Minister does not know the answer, I am quite happy for him to write to explain the situation. We are perhaps fixated on thinking that this is about Islamic terrorists and grown-ups, but certainly according to the ISC report, very sadly, in many cases those who are now coming before the courts are minors.
Let me quickly answer the question on who is the appropriate advocate. That is somebody appointed by the Attorney General under schedule 7(10)(1). The person has to be an appropriate law officer, so a barrister or a solicitor. That is how it is determined.
On the question of genuine national security, I understand the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He will understand that this is a matter of concern for many of us who are devoted, as he knows I am, to the application of the rule of law and the access to justice that this country and many countries in Europe have secured over the past century. That is vital to the provision and protection of liberty in our country. I appreciate his point and the right to a fair trial is essential.
However, it is simply the reality of life in our world that sometimes we need to frame that justice within certain provisions to allow it to be real, and not to be silenced by the inability to bring together evidence that would otherwise protect British people. That means that we have to find ways of balancing it. That is why these court proceedings, which are less than ideal and not the ones that we would like to see, are sadly necessary because of the security restrictions that apply.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he knows that I spent some time in the past few decades hunting people who sought to do our country harm, and he is absolutely right. Sadly, it was not always the people who we see on the various TV shows. Very often, it was people who came at it from a very different angle. I therefore appreciate his point; I will look into it and come back to him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 48
Reports on exercise of powers under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 49 stand part.
New clause 2—Reviews of Parts 1, 3 and 4
“(1) The operation of Parts 1, 3 and 4 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The operation of Part 3 must be reviewed by the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(3) The operation of Parts 1 and 4 must be reviewed by either—
(a) the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, or
(b) a different person appointed by the Secretary of State.
(4) Reviews under this section must be carried out in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which any section in this Part comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(5) Each review under subsection (1) must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(6) The person or people mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under subsection (1) as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(7) On receiving a report under subsection (6), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(8) Section 36(6) of the Terrorism Act 2006 shall be read such that the ‘expenses’ and ‘allowances’ mentioned therein may include the discharge by the person or people of their functions under this section.”
Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every quarter on the exercise of her powers under this part of the Bill. The Committee will recognise the parallel to similar measures in the TPIM Act 2011. Although details of the operation of the system and of particular cases will necessarily be sensitive and cannot be disclosed publicly, the clause acts as an additional safeguard by welcoming public scrutiny of the use of the regime and powers, and offers reassurance that crucial information about the operation of the regime will be public and kept up to date. Crucially, that information will include the extent of the Secretary of State’s use of her powers and the number of cases in which measures are imposed. It will also include details of court judgments handed down in the relevant period that relate to the use of those powers.
Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to appoint an independent reviewer to review the operation of part 2 annually. First, the reviewer is required to undertake a review of the operation of the STPIM regime as soon as is reasonably practical at the end of each year, and a report on the outcome of the review must be sent to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practical after the review has been completed. Then, the Secretary of State is obliged to lay the report before Parliament. That replicates the approach in TPIMs, for which the annual reports have been an effective way of examining the Government’s use of their powers.
The independence of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, combined with their unrestricted access to Government papers and intelligence, has led to real insight and informed reports that have aided the functioning and development of the TPIM regime. Using the same approach for STPIMs will ensure similarly robust scrutiny. Omitting the clause would undermine the level of oversight and transparency of the regime. I hope the Committee agrees that the provision is important for the effective operation of STPIMs.
New clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Halifax, proposes commitments to review annually the operations of parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill. I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the new clause and I understand the intention behind it. Appropriate oversight of national security functions—particularly the use of intrusive powers—is important. A range of oversight mechanisms are in operation and govern both the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police, which are the primary bodies that will utilise the new powers in the Bill.
As I have just mentioned in addressing clause 49, the Government have made a commitment to an independent reviewer of part 2 of the Bill. Although there may well be merit in extending oversight of the legislation beyond part 2, careful consideration must be given to how that is done. In some cases, it could create an undesired overlap of duplication of responsibility. The Committee discussed that earlier—a little bit before my time—in the context of the hon. Lady’s proposal for an independent body to monitor disinformation. There are further examples of potential duplication, such as the powers in clause 22, which are already the responsibility of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The new clause also proposes that part 3 of the Bill be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. As the Committee knows, part 3 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants who are seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review those measures. An explicit commitment to oversight of part 3 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the existing discretion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.
With those points in mind, the Government cannot accept new clause 2 at this stage. Although I fully appreciate the purpose behind the new clause, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it for now. The Government take oversight of the Bill seriously, and we will consider the best way to approach it. I will be in touch with her about that.
I am grateful for the way the Minister has approached the new clause. I accept entirely the volume of work he has had to do in the past 24 to 36 hours.
We feel quite strongly about some of the proposals we are advocating for in new clause 2. There is an acceptance of the real value of the work undertaken by the independent reviewers right across the agencies that work with this type of legislation. We think we are largely doing the Government a favour in putting these proposals forward.
Let me work through the other elements of this group. As the Minister outlined, clause 48 creates a duty for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on a quarterly basis on the exercise of certain powers under part 2 of the Bill. Given the seriousness of the measures, we very much welcome this accountability and transparency as to the use of part 2 notices, providing an evidence base that will help both parliamentarians and the independent reviewer undertake their roles in assessing the effectiveness and proportionality of STPIMs.
Subsection (1)(b) states that the Secretary of State will
“lay a copy of each such report before Parliament”,
mirroring section 19 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which states that the Secretary of State must update the House on active TPIMs every three months. However, the clause does not state explicitly whether a written statement will be laid before both Houses, rather than just, for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee or another subsection. I had the opportunity to clarify that with Home Office officials earlier this week, who confirmed that the intention was to lay the report before both Houses, and I am grateful to them for that; none the less, we would welcome the Minister’s commitment to ensuring that that happens.
I also take this opportunity to make the point that the TPIMs statements have taken longer to publish in recent months. In 2021, and prior to that, they were being presented to the House within two months. The latest report, which covers December 2021 to February 2022, was presented in June, taking four months to prepare. The report covering March 2022 to May 2022 has not yet been published. We would like to make a request to return to the timely publication of those statements and a plea that the STIPM equivalent starts as it means to go on.
I will turn to clause 49 and our new clause 2, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), and myself. Clause 49 states that the Secretary of State
“must appoint a person to review the operation”
of part 2 of the Bill and that the independent reviewer must carry out a review every 12 months. We have probed previously as to who will perform that function, as we believe the oversight is integral to finding the appropriate balance of powers and freedoms. I hope the Minister will be able to clarify who the independent reviewer will be. Will those responsibilities be added to those of an existing independent reviewer, or will a new post be created for this legislation?
As my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary outlined on Second Reading, the scrutiny provided by David Anderson QC and Jonathan Hall QC of terrorism legislation has been invaluable. Members across the Committee will know that their scrutiny has identified weaknesses in terrorism legislation and highlighted areas where stronger safeguards are needed, and provided crucial checks and balances on those powers.
Giving evidence to the Committee, Jonathan Hall outlined the value of the independent function of his office in reviewing TPIMs, stating:
“When I review TPIMs, I have a completely free hand. I am able to interrogate officials and able to see whatever I want. That is really important. I am not just looking at judgments in courts, or just reading documents; I am actually there able to interrogate, test and challenge. That is what I do. Also, I think it is important that Parliament and the public have a sense of what is going on. Regrettably, because legal aid has not been made available in all cases for TPIMs, there are now fewer court cases, so general information about how this important but serious power is being exercised is relatively cut off. The independent reviewer can provide a lot of transparency about how it is operating.”
I asked him whether there is a logic to his office taking on the additional responsibilities and if he had the capacity to do it. He said:
“My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation. The reason is that this new legislation is really modelled on terrorism legislation. In crude terms, the concept of the foreign power condition sits in place of the purposes or acts of terrorism, and then there is the same framework in terms of very strong arrest power, detention up to 14 days, strong powers of cordons and search and investigations, and, of course, the PIMs. There are so many learning points between the two regimes that it does make sense.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 5-6, Q4-5.]
We have the highest regard for Jonathan Hall; we recognise the merits in adding the responsibilities created by clause 49 to his remit and we can see the benefit of a coherent, joined-up approach in assessing both counter-terrorism and state threat legislation. That said, if the Minister were to make a case for the creation of a brand new position exclusively for the independent review of these laws, we would certainly be open to that. Sir Brian Leveson, in his capacity as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, also has some responsibilities as an independent reviewer, so there are options.
At this stage in proceedings, clarity on who will undertake that work is necessary, as is agreement that their role will begin immediately once this legislation is enacted. The Minister might be aware that the position of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has, unbelievably, remained vacant since Dame Sara Thornton left the post. There have also been a series of gaps and delays in the appointment of other posts providing crucial oversight. We refuse to allow the Government to let that happen in this instance.
As I have said several times before in our discussions, it is odd that clause 49 deems just part 2 provisions eligible for ongoing independent review. We feel that the new provisions created by the rest of the Bill should be similarly subject to the same ongoing consideration. This legislation is required in a space that is dynamic and can shift quickly. We are often dealing with highly capable state-sponsored individuals with potentially unlimited resources. They will adapt to the barriers that we put in place, so it would seem logical that we continue to keep the legislation under review.
With new clause 2, we have replicated the framework of clause 49 and extended it to the remaining parts of the Bill. We anticipate that the Independent Reviewer Of Terrorism Legislation would automatically take in part 3, as I think the Minister has confirmed. He has already issued a five-page assessment of the terrorism clauses in this Bill which was not entirely complimentary to the Government’s approach. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley will come to that. However, there is precedent for having further oversight of the measures, rather than exclusively of those in part 2 of the Bill. Jonathan Hall has assumed that he already has responsibility for part 3, so I hope the Minister can as a minimum confirm that that is the case.
In his final contribution, before the recess, the Minister’s predecessor, the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland) said:
“Here is the bit that the hon. Lady and our friends in the SNP will be most keen to hear about: as with TPIMs, there will be an independent reviewer to ensure that clause 40 and the whole of the STPIMs regime will be implemented correctly.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 19 July 2022; c. 240.]
While I very much welcome that, I am certainly not overly excited by it. That is on clause 49, and we have consistently argued that clause 49 must be extended. This is one of the areas that we feel most strongly about, so, with that in mind, I urge the Minister to reconsider whether he will support new clause 2.
Clause 48 requires quarterly reports by the Secretary of State on the exercise of powers to impose, extend, vary, revoke or revive part 2 notices. Clause 49 requires an independent reviewer of this part—that is, the STPIMs. Annual reports are to be prepared and laid, and that is all good and well. The only issue we have is the scope of the clause 48 report, in that its requirement is
“the exercise of the powers”,
while the scope of the clause 49 review is about
“the operation of this Part”.
It is important that the review includes information about the workings of what I described as potentially Kafkaesque rules for reviews and appeals in schedule 7. I will be very brief, but new clause 2, in the name of the hon. Member for Halifax, which calls for a broader review requirement to cover parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill, does seem rather sensible.
The amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax is, as I said earlier, part of a broader piece about ensuring that we get the balance right between giving our security services, agencies and people the powers that I personally support, and providing proper scrutiny for the individual and for the operation of the Bill. That is the thing that has been missing from the Bill. Knowing Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, I know that system works well in terms of warrantry and so on. If we are going to give powers to our agencies to do their job rightly, we have to ensure that they are robust and reviewed as things change.
I know the Minister is only a day or a bit into his job, so he might not be able to accept an amendment today, but I think this aspect needs to be looked at throughout the Bill. It was certainly raised with his predecessor, though I cannot remember if it was his immediate predecessor or the one before that.
My other point is to do with this issue of laying before Parliament. I support that, but the report will be very anodyne in terms of what it can provide in public, so I might look to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am not looking for work for that Committee, but it has the ability to access material that cannot, for obvious reasons, be put in the public domain. The Minister will soon learn about the battles going on at the moment with parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office and various other agencies about our role and access to material. We already get, for example, the independent commissioner’s report, but we have an ongoing row about our access to the annex, which we had in the past but for some reason are now not allowed to have. Given the role of Parliament and for its reassurance, will the Minister consider the ISC having access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain? That would be helpful. I accept that some people think the ISC just agrees with everything the agencies do, but it is another review body that can give assurance to the public and Parliament that the powers are proportionate.
We know that once we implement the Bill, we will learn and powers will change. I am not against Brian Leveson, the independent tribunals and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—they do a fantastic job. They have helpfully pointed to some of the lessons that need to be learned, for example, from the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. The ability of parliamentarians at least to ask the questions and have access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain would be an added layer of scrutiny, allowing the public to know at least that we have a full spectrum to ensure that such things are done proportionately and are working effectively.
I thank hon. Members for the tone of this discussion. I appreciate that scrutiny is important. This is about protecting not just the rights of individuals, but the agencies that are carrying out such important work on our behalf. Their heroism and courage on operations need to be protected, so that the agencies are not later found in legal difficulty in areas where they have acted not only with integrity but with enormous courage. I therefore appreciate the tone.
Briefly, I will touch on the question of scrutiny and laying before the House. I will make an absolute commitment to bring forward reports as soon as possible. I appreciate that there have been a few issues of late, which may have delayed things. I assure the hon. Member for Halifax that I will do my best to ensure that those timelines are reduced and are as sharp as possible. I absolutely appreciate her point. The issue of being laid before both Houses is made absolutely clear in the publication.
To touch on the question of who the commissioner might be, that has not been resolved as yet. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point and there is merit on both sides of the argument, but either way, there is huge merit in ensuring that whoever is doing TPIMs has a very close connection with whomever is doing STPIMs. Whether that is a newly appointed individual or the extension of a role, I am happy to ensure that they work closely together.
We have been probing that during the passage of the Bill. Because that role is so crucial to the oversight that needs to follow the rest of the provisions in the legislation, can the Minister, as an absolute minimum, confirm that that person will be in post and that that issue will have been resolved by the time the Bill is enacted, so that that is not an ongoing question that starts to run into the legislation being enacted?
The hon. Member will be aware that I have been in post for only a few hours, so I will be cautious about making commitments that I cannot keep, but I can assure her that I will do my absolute damnedest to make sure that they are in post, because I can see exactly the point that she makes and I appreciate it. As I say, this is about protecting the rights not just of those who are subject to the provisions but of those carrying out the protection of our state and our nation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause provides for a criminal offence of breaching a measure specified in a part 2 notice without reasonable excuse. This echoes, as do many of the provisions, a similar provision in the TPIM regime, and includes cases in which a person has permission from the Secretary of State to contravene a measure and does not adhere to the terms or conditions of that permission. For the sake of enforceability, it is vital that a part 2 notice is reinforced with effective penalties if the subject does not comply. Hence the maximum penalty on conviction is a custodial sentence not exceeding five years, unless the travel measure is breached, in which case the maximum sentence is 10 years.
The clause provides for an offence of contravening without reasonable excuse any measure specified in a part 2 notice. That, again, mirrors section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. According to the Government’s most recent transparency report, in December 2020 the total number of individuals who had been served a notice since TPIMs were introduced in 2011 was 24, so compliance is relatively high. But so are the stakes when someone breaches the terms of such measures.
According to the “Statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation” quarterly report from the Home Office, the number of people who have been prosecuted and convicted under section 23 of the TPIM Act, meaning that they contravened an order, is 10. Like TPIMs, the primary function of STPIMs is to be able to control and monitor those who represent a serious threat to our national security but cannot yet be prosecuted. We have been assured that the primary function of an STPIM is to be able to manage a person while an investigation into a part 1 offence is established, rather than simply creating a situation where a prosecutable breach is highly likely.
We note the particular focus on travel in clause 50, and that under subsection (2) an individual who travels without permission loses any reasonable excuse defence. Given that we anticipate that there might be a higher number of foreign nationals and dual nationals in this cohort due to the state threat nature of the offences, it is possible that we might have higher numbers of requests to attend overseas births and deaths of family members and loved ones among the cohort. However, the risk of permitting that travel, which might mean a return to a very hostile state that we fear is sponsoring the individual’s activity, presents a massive challenge. To ensure there are robust decision-making processes around those considerations and to have good reporting and a review of those elements of the clause would be welcome additions.
As the Minister said, the clause creates a criminal offence of contravening without a reasonable excuse a measure in a part 2 notice, but there is no defence of reasonable excuse if the subject leaves the UK when they are restricted from doing so. In normal circumstances, a breach of a part 2 notice would leave the individual subject to five years’ imprisonment on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment on a summary conviction in Scotland, but that becomes nine years’ imprisonment on indictment for a breach of a travel measure.
I wish simply to get to the bottom of why some of the breaches of a part 2 notice appear to be disproportionately harsh. The Minister said that much of this provision mirrors the provisions of TPIMs; does this bit—the doubling of the tariff for a breach of a travel measure—mirror the TPIMs provisions? If it does, how often was such a penalty imposed for such a breach under the existing provisions?
It is quite clear that any order given must have consequences if it is disobeyed—I do not think anyone in this room would disagree with that—and it is important that the penalties for disobedience against a lawfully given order must be proportionate. The penalties are proportionate, and it is normal to have an increased penalty for an aggravated offence, whatever that may be. In the circumstances, travelling abroad would be considered an aggravation and therefore have a greater penalty attached. That is entirely appropriate, so it is entirely reasonable to have that increased sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Powers of entry etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 8 be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
The clause gives effect to schedule 8, which provides the police with powers of search, entry, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to STPIMs. For the sake of ease, I will cover the clause and the schedule together.
Before I go into the detail of the clause, I remind the Committee that STPIMs will be a tool of last resort. The Government will use every other tool at our disposal before resorting to such significant measures. Again, I remind the Committee that these measures mirror those in the TPIMs regime.
In order to effectively enforce the regime and check an individual is complying with the measures under their STPIM, the police will have the powers they need to enter premises, conduct necessary searches and seize and retain items as necessary. They will also be able to arrest the individual for a “breach of” offence if they fail to grant police access.
Schedule 8 provides powers to the police to enter and search premises without a warrant to locate an individual for the purpose of serving an STPIM notice or another specified notice on them; to search an individual or premises when serving an STPIM notice for the purpose of discovering anything that might breach any measures specified in the STPIM notice; to search premises on suspicion that an individual subject to an STPIM notice has absconded; and to search an individual subject to an STPIM notice for public safety purposes. It provides a power to police with a warrant to search an individual or premises to determine whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the STPIM notice. There are also powers for a constable to seize and retain items found in the course of such searches.
I remind the Committee that the STPIM itself is kept under review and requires a court’s permission to impose the measure. That means that a court will have already agreed with the assessment of the Secretary of State that the individual meets the meet five conditions in clause 33, which the Committee has already agreed to. That means it is proportionate in terms of a national security determination for the police to be able to undertake the aforementioned activities without a warrant. The powers will be essential to managing and enforcing the measures imposed under STPIMs and, importantly, they provide the right balance between effective powers and safeguards for the rights of the individual.
I have a couple of queries on schedule 8, which provides powers of entry, search, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to part 2 notices.
I have queried the use of the word “constable” in legislation before, but it seems to be standard. Paragraph 9(9) states:
“The warrant may be executed by any constable.”
Previous schedules specify certain ranks and specialisms, such as counter-terrorism officers, to undertake such duties. Are we satisfied that further stipulations on who may execute a warrant are not required?
Sub-paragraph (10) states that a warrant issued by a court to search the individual, the individual’s place of residence, or other premises specified by the warrant, expires after 28 days. That period feels a bit odd to me. We want officers to have the flexibility they need, but I cannot imagine a scenario in which they have grounds to apply for a warrant but then take more than 20 days after it is issued to execute it. I am grateful to counter-terrorism police for sharing a bit more about their operations and how these warrants are used, which has provided some reassurance on this front, but will the Minister confirm that a warrant cannot be executed more than once in the 28-day period?
Clause 51 applies schedule 8, which makes provision about various powers of entry, search, seizure and retention—to enter and search premises for the purpose of personally serving, to search for items that breach the notice, and to search when there is a suspicion of absconding. A warrant is required to search people or premises for the purposes of determining whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the notice, and the warrant is to be granted only if necessary.
However, some of the powers in paragraph 10 appear to be rather broad, allowing a person to be searched without a warrant to see whether they might be
“in possession of anything that could be used to threaten or harm any person”.
I am not quite sure what that means. Unlike in the case of other warrantless powers, there is no requirement even for suspicion that someone is likely to threaten or cause harm. What is the justification or the reason for that?
Paragraphs 11 and 12 contain very strong powers to retain certain items which are seized, with no time limit other than
“as long as is necessary in all the circumstances.”
There follows a non-exhaustive example of what could represent necessity, but necessary for what? Is there provision for a person to challenge the ongoing retention of property seized by police under these powers? Is there a model for this drafting that has been used elsewhere? If there is, and if a piece warrantless search and retention legislation exists, how frequently is such a measure used?
The hon. Member for Halifax asked about the use of the term “constable”. It is standard, and she will realise that mostly it will be counter-terrorist police who lead on STPIMs, and who the most appropriate person is will be reviewed by the operational commander. The use of the term “constable” and the equivalent ranks in other forces and relevant services is standard for these purposes.
The provision on when a warrant may be executed is operationally beneficial to those who may have reason to delay or have to wait for a window to open when action can be taken. I will not go into the potential operational requirements on any element, but clearly they will vary: in some circumstances, it will be appropriate to act immediately; in others, it may be necessary to wait.
The provision on retention for
“as long as is necessary”
is also standard, including in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Bill also contains provisions allowing people to apply to have property returned.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 52
Fingerprints and samples
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 9 be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.
The clause will give effect to schedule 9, which makes provision for the taking and retention of biometric material from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. I will cover the clause with the schedule.
The biometric data retention provisions relating to state threats prevention and investigation measures are in line with those existing elsewhere in the statute book, including in TPIMs, which have been well established for more than 10 years. The schedule makes separate provisions for taking the fingerprints and samples of an individual subject to a specified prevention and investigation measure in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to that of Scotland. That ensures that provisions are in line with different police procedures and legislation.
constable may take biometric data, which could include physical data, from an individual subject to a part 2 notice. The individual will be informed of the reason for the fingerprints or sample being taken. Police can require an individual to attend a police station for the purpose of providing biometric data, and that material may be checked against other such material held under a variety of other powers. The schedule requires the destruction of relevant material, including fingerprints, DNA profiles or relevant physical data, unless there is a power to retain, which I shall come to.
The purpose of the provisions is to ensure the right balance between the protection of the public and individual civil liberties. Under paragraph (11), any samples taken from the individual must be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile has been derived from that sample or, if sooner, within six months of taking the sample. Paragraphs (8) and (9) contain powers to retain biometric data. Where there is no relevant previous conviction, fingerprints, DNA profiles and physical data may be retained for six months after the end of the relevant part 2 notice being in force.
Under paragraph (9), a national security determination can be made by a chief officer of police, enabling the police to retain for up to five years data relating to an individual who may pose an enduring national security threat. All national security determinations that can be reviewed must be reviewed by the biometrics commissioner, who has continued oversight of the retention and use of such data.
We recognise the importance of safeguarding individuals’ right to privacy, so paragraph (12) sets out the limitation of uses for any retained material taken from a person subject to a part 2 notice, which are in the interests of national security, for the purposes of investigation foreign power threat activity, for the purposes of a terrorism investigation, for the detection and prevention of crime, or in the interests of identification only.
I listened intently to the Minister. Schedule 9 makes provision for the taking and retention of fingerprints and non-intimate samples from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. Schedule 9, like schedule 3, is subject to several Government amendments. As the explanatory notes explain, fingerprints and non-intimate samples have the same meaning as that given in section 65 of PACE 1984. I would be grateful to the Minister for some clarity on that, which he may need to provide in writing. There is a lot going on in relation to biometrics in different parts of the Bill.
Paragraphs (6) to (11) make provision relating to the destruction and retention of material taken from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. The explanatory notes say that where an individual has no relevant previous convictions, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be kept for only six months after the part 2 notice ceases to be in force. Paragraph (11) goes on to state that, as provided in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, material taken under PACE, for example, or that is subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 or the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, need not be destroyed if a chief office of police determines that it is necessary to retain that material for purposes of national security. Given that we are dealing almost exclusively with matters of national security in schedule 9, can we assume that the majority of biometric evidence taken from individuals subject to part 2 notices may be held indefinitely under this provision?
I am reliably informed that the biometric retention provisions in the Bill are designed to bring the powers into line with similar provisions in terrorism legislation. Schedule 9(8) deals with the retention of biometrics collected in the course of the service of a part 2 notice under the STPIM provisions. That provides us with a retention of six months prior to a national security determination being made, and is therefore in line with the provision under schedule 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
A separate provision for the retention of biometrics can be found in paragraph 22 of schedule 3. It provides for a retention period of three years for those detained under schedule 4 provisions, in line with biometrics collected under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which qualify terrorism offences.
Beyond the initial retention period, both provisions are capable of retention by way of a national security determination process. I have lost track—I do not know whether other Members have—of whether we are keeping biometrics for an initial six months, as schedule 9 seems to outline, or for three years, which is the case elsewhere in the Bill. I suspect the Minister is unable offer absolute clarity right now—although I have no doubt that the civil servants think it is absolutely crystal clear—but I would be grateful if he could outline, perhaps in writing, the rationale for the different provisions.
Government amendment 32 specifies that the chief constables of the Ministry of Defence police and the British Transport police, and the director general of the National Crime Agency, are added to paragraph 9(4) of schedule 9. The responsibilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are different from those of other forces, but is the Minister certain that it does not need to be added to the list?
I am aware that similar provisions were debated in relation to schedule 3, and concerns were raised then that the provisions may end up allowing the indefinite retention of the material of people who have accepted cautions—indeed, even youth cautions—meaning that they were never charged, never mind convicted. The Minister has not provided much of a justification for that, other than that he wants the legislation to mirror the provision in other Acts. He used the same argument in his introductory remarks.
That is not enough. Provisions on the ability to retain material indefinitely on whatever grounds must be justified in their own terms in this legislation. I know that the Minister is new to the job, so if he cannot do that now, he can write with that explanation, as the hon. Member for Halifax said. Notwithstanding the fact that we all want the maximum powers necessary to tackle the state threat and the terrorist threat, if his explanation is not compelling or convincing, the provisions will need to be revisited at a later stage.
I do appreciate that elements are being raised about which I will write to various Committee members, and I will follow up on areas that I have not covered in detail.
Although the operational use of biometrics remains the same across provisions, we are taking a different approach to the powers provided under STPIMs and the powers in schedule 3. That ensures the right balance and proportionality in tackling foreign state threat activity while protecting individuals’ right to privacy. Although there is the option to make a national security determination under both regimes, under our police powers the initial retention period is longer than for STPIMs to reflect the seriousness of an arrest made for suspected involvement in foreign power threat activity.
Following arrest for involvement in foreign power threat activity, an individual’s biometric data may be retained for three years, with the option of extending that, irrespective of whether there is no further action, or whether they are charged or acquitted. Certain national security offences under this Bill will be added to the list of qualifying offences in PACE to reflect the seriousness of the offence that justifies longer retention periods.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9
Fingerprints and samples
Amendments made: 25, in schedule 9, page 133, line 1, leave out paragraph (f).
This amendment removes paragraph (f) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (f) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 26, in schedule 9, page 133, line 9, at end insert—
“(ia) any of the fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, or information derived from such a sample;”.
This amendment inserts a reference to the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 under which fingerprints, data or samples may be taken, so that fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 9 may be checked against fingerprints, data or samples taken under that Act.
Amendment 27, in schedule 9, page 133, line 13, leave out paragraph (k).
This amendment removes paragraph (k) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (k) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 28, in schedule 9, page 133, line 30, after “paragraph 8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 29, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, at beginning insert—
“(Z1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual who has no previous convictions or (in the case of England and Wales or Northern Ireland) only one exempt conviction.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 30, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, leave out “Paragraph 6” and insert “The”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.
Amendment 31, in schedule 9, page 134, line 26, at end insert—
“8A (1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual—
(a) who has been convicted of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction) or of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) who is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of paragraph 8.
(2) The material may be retained indefinitely.
8B (1) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A an individual is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the individual has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the individual has admitted,
(ii) the individual has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the individual has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the individual’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the individual has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the individual, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the individual is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraphs 8, 8A and this paragraph, so far as they relate to individuals convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A—
(a) an individual has no previous convictions if the individual has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the individual was aged under 18.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 8, 8A or this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If an individual is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 8 or 8A whether the individual has been convicted of one offence.”
This amendment and Amendment 36 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Amendment 32, in schedule 9, page 134, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(e) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or
(f) the Director General of the National Crime Agency.”
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force and the Director General of the National Crime Agency to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 33, in schedule 9, page 135, line 32, after “8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 34, in schedule 9, page 137, line 34, leave out paragraphs (h) to (j).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 35, in schedule 9, page 137, leave out lines 38 to 40.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 36, in schedule 9, page 137, line 40, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ has—
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”.
See Amendment 31.
Amendment 37, in schedule 9, page 138, leave out lines 5 to 19 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;”.
This amendment and Amendment 38 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer or police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 38, in schedule 9, page 138, line 22, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
See Amendment 37.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Twenty First sitting)
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chairs: Sir Mark Hendrick, † Mr Philip Hollobone, Mrs Sheryll Murray, Ian Paisley
† Atherton, Sarah (Wrexham) (Con)
† Benton, Scott (Blackpool South) (Con)
Farron, Tim (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)
Gibson, Patricia (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
† Henry, Darren (Broxtowe) (Con)
† Johnson, Gareth (Dartford) (Con)
† Lewell-Buck, Mrs Emma (South Shields) (Lab)
† Maskell, Rachael (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
† Moore, Robbie (Keighley) (Con)
Mortimer, Jill (Hartlepool) (Con)
† Nici, Lia (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
† Norris, Alex (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
† Pennycook, Matthew (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
† Scully, Paul (Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
† Smith, Greg (Buckingham) (Con)
† Vickers, Matt (Stockton South) (Con)
Bethan Harding, Kevin Maddison, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill Committee
Thursday 8 September 2022
(Afternoon)
[Mr Philip Hollobone in the Chair]
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill
I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee that Mr Speaker has asked me to read out. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes @parliament.uk.
Clause 115 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 116
Power to specify environmental outcomes
I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 116, page 133, leave out lines 13 to 20 and insert—
“(a) protection of the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape from the effects of human activity;
(b) maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the natural environment, cultural heritage or the landscape;
(c) protection of people and their long-term health, safety and wellbeing from the effects of human activity on the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape;
(d) protection of the climate from the effects of human activity;
(e) monitoring, assessing, considering, advising or reporting on anything in paragraphs (a) to (d).”
This amendment would broaden the definition of environmental protection to allow the Secretary of State to specify outcomes relating to climate change obligations and public health objectives.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. Part 5 of the Bill concerns the Government’s proposed new approach to assessing the potential environmental effects of relevant plans and major projects —namely, environmental outcomes reports. The reports are intended to replace the partly European Union-derived systems of strategic environmental assessment, including sustainability appraisals, and environmental impact assessments.
The Government’s rationale for the change in approach—this is gleaned not only from reading the Bill and its accompanying documents, but from the 2020 White Paper—is that the SEA and EIA systems can lead to duplication of effort and overly long reports, which inhibit transparency and add unnecessary delays to the planning process, and that the EOR framework will provide for clearer, simpler and presumably shorter assessments, with designated environmental outcomes that are easier to understand and monitor, and therefore to mitigate, remedy and compensate for, and will ensure that strategic and project scale assessments are properly joined up.
The Government’s critique significantly overstates the weaknesses of the SEA and EIA systems. That is not to suggest that they are perfect; for example, they can rightly be criticised for too often producing assessments that are too complex and cumbersome to be used effectively. However, the Government already have the necessary powers to improve many aspects of the SEA and EIA systems, if they chose to exercise them. Overall, the existing systems have made an enormous difference to how the environmental impact of development is considered. They are well established and understood, and when used correctly, they provide for rigorous, evidence-based, comprehensive assessments of the direct and indirect effects of projects and their mitigation in a way that involves the public.
As things stand, we really have no idea whether the proposed system of environmental outcomes reports provided for by part 5 will ultimately improve the process of assessing the potential environmental effects of relevant plans and major consents, because, as with so much of the Bill, the detail required to understand how EORs will operate in practice is simply not available. For example, we have no idea what range of factors the EORs can consider, or when EORs will be mandated. These and a wide range of other questions will be answered only when the regulations that set outcomes emerge in due course. Given the wide-ranging powers provided for in this part of the Bill, that is a cause of real concern.
When it comes to the basic EOR framework provided for by clauses 116 to 130, we take the view that an outcomes-based system could be an improvement on the present systems, given that they assess on the basis of the significance of effects on all relevant environmental receptors—although, again, it is impossible to arrive at a considered judgment on how much practical difference the EOR system will make when we have no idea how detailed or ambitious those outcomes will ultimately be, or what timeframe they will involve.
However, while we recognise the potential for an outcomes-based approach to establish an improved system of environmental protection, we are extremely concerned that part 5 is likely to lead to an approach that is too limited in scope, is insufficiently aligned with important obligations and requirements in environmental and climate legislation, and—for all the assurances to the contrary—provides an opportunity for environmental regression in the future.
It is essential that we have confidence that the new environmental outcomes report system will maintain the robustness and scope of the strategic environmental assessment and environmental impact assessment frameworks, and will lead to tangible improvements in our natural environment, as well as helping to fight climate change. If we are to build that confidence and provide reassurance that the new system will deliver improved outcomes, the EOR framework provided for in clauses 116 to 130 needs strengthening in a number of important respects. Amendment 173, and others that will be debated later, are designed to achieve that aim.
Clause 116 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that set out specific environmental protection outcomes against which relevant plans and consents will be assessed, and sets out what the Secretary of State must have regard to when making those regulations. Subsection (2) sets out the definition of environmental protection for the purposes of the Bill. The Committee will note that it includes
“protection of the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape from the effects of human activity”,
as well as protection of people from the effects of human activity on each of those, and their maintenance, restoration or enhancement.
We take no issue whatsoever with any of the definitions in subsection (2). Indeed, the Government’s decision to explicitly include references to cultural heritage and the landscape in what is meant by “environmental protection” is welcome; but we still believe that the definition is too limited. Specifically, protection of the climate, and protection of people’s long-term health, safety and wellbeing from the effects of human activity, should be explicitly included in the Bill’s definition of environmental protection. Amendment 173 provides for that broader definition, and would enable the Secretary of State, when making regulations under part 5 of the Bill, to specify environmental outcomes relating to both climate change obligations and public health objectives.
In short, the amendment would expand the range of possible environmental outcomes that Ministers could, if they chose, specify by regulation in the future, and therefore expand the range of things that assessments under the EOR regime could encompass. It would allow the Secretary of State to, for example, specify as a desired outcome the long-term flood-proofing of key infrastructure, so that it is climate resilient; or measures to promote walkability and urban cooling, so that development promotes key public health objectives. This is a sensible and proportionate amendment, and I hope that the Minister will consider accepting it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. As we have heard, the amendment seeks to expand the definition of “environmental protection” in clause 116 to include explicit reference to public health and climate change. Before I turn to the detail of the clause and the introduction of the new environmental outcomes reports, I should say that the Government have been clear that the new system is intended to improve the assessment of projects’ environmental impacts, and to place environmental matters—including climate change and public health—at the centre of decision making.
In line with that ambition and the commitment to non-regression, the definitions in clause 116 reflect and build on the definitions in the Environment Act 2021. Many of the terms used in the EU system of strategic environmental assessment and environmental impact assessment duplicate existing processes, or are poorly understood. Our broader approach to defining what outcomes may be covered will allow the Secretary of State greater flexibility to consider all relevant matters, including those that form part of the current assessment regime, such as human health and climate change.
As set out in subsection (2)(b) of the clause, the definition of environmental protection includes the protection of people, which would allow the Secretary of State to consider matters relating to health when setting outcomes. Subsections (2)(a) and (b) refer to protection from the effects of human activity, which would include protection from the impacts of climate change. Further, the definition of environmental protection is covered by the definition of the natural environment in subsection (3). This definition includes natural systems, cycles and processes, to ensure that matters such as climate change are properly built into consideration of outcomes under the new system.
While climate change and human health will undoubtedly be important considerations in setting outcomes, it is not necessary to make more explicit reference to them in primary legislation; doing so would risk limiting the range of outcomes that can be set, and risk our suggesting that climate change and health will be considered above other environmental topics that may, in individual cases, be equally important.
It is right that environmental outcomes reports focus on the full range of environmental issues. Developing the detail of what outcomes will be covered in secondary legislation will allow us to consult stakeholders, so that we can ensure that climate change and public health commitments, as well as other environmental matters, are captured. Outcomes will also draw on the extensive commitments made across Government, including the requirement in subsection (5) for the Secretary of State to have regard to the latest environmental improvement plan when setting outcomes. Setting out details around climate change and public health in secondary legislation will also enable us to minimise the risk of duplication and ensure alignment, as these are important considerations across other policy areas in the planning and consenting systems. In the light of these assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich is able to withdraw his amendment.
I appreciate that response, but I do not think it addresses the concern raised by the amendment. I very much welcome what the Minister said about the Government’s intention to put public health and climate at the centre of decision making. The concern, though, is that although the clause gives a comprehensive list of what “environmental protection” means, it does not explicitly reference public health—human health—or climate, and I cannot for the life of me understand how inserting those things in the Bill explicitly would in any way limit the outcomes that could be set. We would merely be specifying and clarifying that outcomes relating to those two objectives were caught under the powers in the Bill.
I note what the Minister says about forthcoming secondary legislation capturing those objectives, but this issue speaks to our concern that there is a real gap in how the Bill addresses climate and public health. We feel that while opportunities to reinforce the Government’s commitments are woven through the fabric of the Bill, those issues are often neglected or left out.
I will not press the amendment, but we shall come back to the issue of public health and climate, because they need to have a much more central role in this legislation, and to be written into the Bill in many important respects, including in clause 116. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 116, page 133, line 29, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) Before making any EOR regulations which contain provision about what the specified environmental outcomes are to be, the Secretary of State must ensure they are in accordance with—
(a) the current environmental improvement plan (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Environment Act 2021),
(b) biodiversity targets including those required under sections 1 and 3 of the Environment Act 2021,
(c) the duty to conserve biodiversity as required under section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006,
(d) local nature recovery strategies as required under section 104 of the Environment Act 2021, and
(e) lowering the net UK carbon account as required under section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008.”
This amendment would ensure that when using EOR regulations to specify environmental outcomes the Secretary of State would have to ensure they are in accordance with the current environmental improvement plan and additional criteria.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 52—Super-affirmative procedure for major regulations made under Part 5—
“(1) If the Secretary of State proposes to make EOR regulations which fall under section 192(5), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a document that—
(a) explains the proposal, and
(b) sets it out in the form of draft EOR regulations.
(2) During the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the document was laid under subsection (1) (‘the 60-day period’), the Secretary of State may not lay before Parliament draft regulations to give effect to the proposal (with or without modifications).
(3) In preparing draft regulations under this Part to give effect to the proposal, the Secretary of State must have regard to any of the following that are made with regard to the draft regulations during the 60-day period—
(a) any representations, and
(b) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft regulations.
(4) When laying before Parliament draft regulations to give effect to the proposal (with or without modifications), the Secretary of State must also lay a document that explains any changes made to the proposal contained in the document laid before Parliament under subsection (1).
(5) In calculating the 60-day period, no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than 4 days.”
This new clause would require major EOR regulations made under Part 5 to be subject to the super-affirmative procedure.
Clause 116(5) simply states that before making any EOR regulations that contain provision about what the specified environmental outcomes are to be, the Secretary of State must have regard to the current environmental improvement plan within the meaning of part 1 of the Environment Act 2021. At present, that environmental improvement plan is the 25-year environment plan, which was published in 2018 and is due to be reviewed next year. We welcome the fact that the Bill makes it clear that when making EOR regulations, the Secretary of State will have to have regard to that 25-year environment plan, although I encourage the Minister and his departmental colleagues and officials to do what they can to ensure that its review is completed before this Bill receives Royal Assent, so that the measures in the plan are fully aligned with the now operable Environment Act 2021, and so that the nature of the safeguard provided for in subsection (5) of this clause is clear and unambiguous.
However, while the explanatory notes to the Bill make it clear that the Secretary of State can draw on other relevant material when developing outcomes, there is nothing in the Bill to ensure that the Secretary of State must have regard to other important obligations and requirements set out in environmental and climate legislation beyond the environmental improvement plan.
I am grateful for the work that my hon. Friend is doing on the environment, and to try to ensure that the climate is front and centre in the Bill. Commitments were made at COP26 and COP15. We need the application of those commitments to come through in planning; there is nowhere else that they can come through. Is it not important that the determinations reached at those summits be brought into the planning process?
It absolutely is. The amendment seeks to ensure that the obligations we have made, and the way that they are written into domestic legislation, is accounted for in the framework that part 5 provides for. After all, we are talking about how to assess the environmental impact of development. It stands to reason that requirements and obligations that flow from things such as the Climate Act 2008 should be written into the Bill explicitly. Leaving them out is problematic because it would lead to important EOR regulations being made without there being sufficient regard to significant relevant targets, duties, strategies and obligations, which, we should remember, the Government themselves legislated for.
Amendment 174 seeks to replace subsection (5) of clause 116 with a subsection containing a more comprehensive list of requirements that the Secretary of State should have regard to—it is only “should have regard to”—before making any EOR regulations that make provision about specified environmental outcomes. In addition to the environmental improvement plan, the Secretary of State would have to have regard to: biodiversity targets, including those under sections 1 and 3 of the Environment Act 2021; the duty to conserve biodiversity, as is required under section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006; local nature recovery strategies, as is required under section 104 of the Environment Act 2021; and lowering the net UK carbon account, as is required under section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008.
Putting that expanded list of requirements in the Bill would strengthen the EOR framework by making it perfectly clear that the Secretary of State has to take into account those important legislative commitments when making EOR regulations.
In addition to expanding the list of requirements that the Secretary of State must have regard to before making any EOR regulations relating to specified environmental outcomes, we also believe there is a compelling case for greater parliamentary oversight of any such regulations that are proposed. The explanatory notes to the Bill make it clear that set outcomes will be subject only to public consultation and the affirmative parliamentary procedure. I will not detain the Committee with a digression on the limitations of the affirmative procedure as a means of effective parliamentary scrutiny—we are all familiar with them, and have discussed them in the context of the Bill previously.
Clause 116 and the other clauses in part 5 provide the Secretary of State with expansive powers allowing them to pass, by regulation, as yet unspecified, and potentially far-reaching, measures affecting the environment and environmental law, so we strongly believe that any such regulations should be subject to the super-affirmative procedure. New clause 52 would provide for use of that procedure for regulations made under part 5. I hope the Minister will give the new clause consideration, along with amendment 174.
I understand the hon. Member’s concerns, but I hope to explain why the approach that we have taken in the Bill is sufficient. Amendment 174 would require environmental outcomes to be set in accordance with the environmental improvement plan, biodiversity targets, local nature recovery strategies and the Climate Change Act 2008. The environmental improvement plan, the current iteration of which is the 25-year environment plan, is where the Government set out how we aim to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. The Government have made it clear that an outcomes-based approach will be developed to support our environmental ambitions. For the purposes of this legislation, the environmental improvement plan is the most relevant document in informing the setting of outcomes. It is where the breadth of the ambitions are captured, and it is itself informed by a wide range of commitments and matters from other sources.
The Environment Act 2021 created a duty on the Government to prepare annual reports on the implementation of the environmental improvement plan, and to review and, if necessary, reissue the plan every five years. As such, it is a dynamic document that will evolve over time and reflect the most up-to-date position on the Government’s efforts to support the environment.
The environmental improvement plan also sets interim targets in respect of each of the key matters for which the Government have applied legally binding environmental targets, which will be reviewed regularly. That includes the biodiversity target mentioned in the amendment. Other more general duties and local strategies will also be informed by this overarching plan.
The amendment would also introduce a duty to act in accordance with a range of existing legislative provisions, and therefore risks creating potential conflict and unnecessary confusion. It is unclear how, for example, a national outcome could be set in accordance with a local nature recovery strategy, which is by definition spatial and site-specific.
Outcomes will cover a broad range of topics. The intention is not to create an exhaustive list of everything that will be considered when they are being set; rather, it is to recognise that the environmental improvement plan is at the heart of the Government’s agenda. Other duties will of course be reflected in outcomes at the moment they are set, but the duty to have regard to the current environmental improvement plan is the clearest way of ensuring that outcomes reflect the Government’s environmental ambitions.
With that in mind, it is important to note that the environmental improvement plan and commitments such as those under the Climate Change Act 2008 were not conceived as a way of informing outcomes for the EOR. As such, it would not be appropriate to set a hard requirement that EOR outcomes be set in accordance with those commitments.
The purpose of environmental outcome reporting, as is true of the existing system, will be to ensure that the right information is gathered to inform the right decisions, not to prioritise any one particular policy over another. Not everything in the environmental improvement plan will be relevant to development and environmental assessment, and there will be ambiguity as to how the plan should best be translated into outcomes for individual plans and developments. Equally, we will want to set outcomes in respect of landscape and cultural heritage, which are not in the scope of the plan.
When making EOR regulations that specify outcomes, we will have regard to the environmental improvement plan and other relevant considerations. Just as importantly, we will use the process of public consultation to ensure that we are capturing the outcomes that will best support the delivery of our environmental priorities. The amendment therefore risks both confusing and limiting the process by which outcomes are set. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will be able to withdraw the amendment.
New clause 52 seeks to make the EOR regulations subject to the super-affirmative procedure—something comparatively new to me. We have sought to take a proportionate approach to parliamentary scrutiny and consultation, placing the strongest requirements on the core elements of the new system. Clearly, we want to ensure that we have the best debates, consultations and discussion on such incredibly important issues. The use of powers in this particular part of the Bill, however, is tightly constrained with broad use of the affirmative procedure to ensure that Parliament gets the opportunity to scrutinise regulations properly in detail.
In addition to requiring the affirmative procedure, clause 125 ensures that EOR regulations that cover the most significant aspects of the new regime—for example, those that specify outcomes—will also require public consultation or consultation with stakeholders. That will provide stakeholders and parliamentarians with the opportunity to consider the details of the proposed regulations in advance of their being laid. Regulations requiring public consultation will be followed up by an official Government response on how those views have been taken into account in setting the detailed policy.
Before engaging formally on the detailed regulations, after the Bill achieves Royal Assent we plan to launch a high-level consultation on the core elements of the new system—for example, on the outcomes-based approach to assessment and the use of the mitigation hierarchy in assessing reasonable alternatives. That will be combined with conceptual roundtables and expert policy forums to inform the design of the new regulations and wider implementation.
As such, the super-affirmative procedure would duplicate the consultation and the approval requirements, so we do not deem it necessary. It would only serve to slow down the process of bringing forward necessary reforms that we believe will help to improve the environment in the long run. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member will agree not to press new clause 52.
I am somewhat reassured by that response from the Minister. However, I take issue with it in a number of respects. I appreciate fully that the 25-year environment plan is the current environmental improvement plan. It may be the most relevant document, but it is limited. I note the point about biodiversity targets, but the document does not contain all the other requirements in the legislation listed in the amendment. The environment plan may be informed by those other requirements, but it does not contain them and does not operate in the same way.
If I am honest, I struggle to understand the issue with the insertion of language relating to legislation the Government have passed, which one would hope has been aligned and made compliant with other bits of legislation that could create potential conflicts during the process of passing it. We remain concerned that the reference in subsection (5) is too limited and we would like to see a wider set of requirements written into the Bill, but I do not intend to press amendment 174 to a vote.
On new clause 52, I welcome the Minister’s comments on the processes that the Government intend to follow when it comes to designing EOR regulations. That measure of public involvement is welcome and will be an important part of the process, but we are still concerned that, overall, the safeguards are insufficient—I will come on to talk about the other safeguards provided in part 5. We do not believe that they tightly constrain the use of the powers; in fact, we think they do the opposite, and there are a number of loopholes that need to be closed.
I cannot for the life of me understand how a public consultation would duplicate the parliamentary oversight that would be afforded to this place by the super-affirmative procedure. I go back to the point I made on a previous amendment. These are broad, expansive powers, which are as yet unspecified. There is a need for greater parliamentary oversight, as well as other stronger safeguards. I am not going to press the new clause to a vote at this point, but we will come back to this and other matters on this part. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I have said already that we are committed to delivering a modern system of environmental assessment that properly reflects the nation’s environmental priorities. The Bill allows us to introduce a new framework to replace the EU’s systems, while recognising the important role that environmental assessment plays. The previous regime could be overly bureaucratic and disproportionate. Expanding case law has led to a situation where unnecessary elements are being assessed for fear of legal challenges. The costs for big projects run into hundreds of thousands of pounds on occasions; yet, despite the lengthy reports, they often prove ineffective at securing better environmental outcomes or encouraging development to support the country’s most important environmental priorities.
The 25-year environment plan acknowledges that the UK is one of the most nature-depleted countries of Europe. The 2019 “State of Nature” report led by conservation research organisations found that 41% of UK species are declining and one in 10 is threatened with extinction. Given the urgency with which we need to restore the environment to leave it in a better place for future generations, we desperately need a new approach.
The powers in the Bill will extend to all regimes currently covered by the EU system, to ensure the best approach for the interoperability between regimes, particularly for projects that are often in the scope of more than one regime, such as planning and marine. The new approach will be centred around the creation of environmental outcomes reports, which will directly set out how consents and plans should support the delivery of environmental priorities by assessing the extent to which they support the delivery of better environmental outcomes. That moves us away from the uncertainty of assessing likely significant effects to a more tangible framework that provides more clarity on what should be assessed and when.
Assessing consents and plans directly against those outcomes will ensure that reporting is focused on those matters that will make a real difference to environmental protection. In turn, that will support more effective decision making and make reports more accessible to the public.
The outcomes will be fairly high level and user-friendly, simply setting out environmental priorities. It will be the job of indicators underpinning those outcomes to measure the delivery towards the outcomes. Indicators will be created and outlined in guidance for the different types of plans and projects and for different spatial scales. For example, indicators could set out which air pollutants should be measured and against which limits to measure the contribution towards an air-quality outcome seeking to reduce emissions.
To implement that, clause 116 provides the Secretary of State with the power to set specified environmental outcomes. The second of those outcomes is essential to that more active approach to environmental assessment, drawing a strong link between assessment and the delivery of positive outcomes for the environment. The core outcomes against which consents and plans will be assessed will be set in regulations and will assure that the ambitions of the Government’s landmark Environment Act 2021 and the 25-year environment plan are reflected in the consenting process and truly inform decision making.
Setting out those three regulations also provides scope for the Government to add more ambitious outcomes in response to developments in technology and to keep in step with increasing societal expectations. It is important that outcomes are created collaboratively with sector experts and, therefore, regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, as we have discussed, and the setting of outcomes will be informed by public consultation. By being up front about what needs to be assessed, the outcomes-based approach will strip away unnecessary bureaucracy and focus resources to where they can most effectively deliver for the environment. They are outcomes that will be for the purpose of environmental protection, which covers the protection of the natural environment and cultural heritage, and the natural processes and systems that affect our environment, such as climate change.
The definitions align with the landmark Environment Act 2021, reflecting that holistic cross-Government approach. Our approach to the definitions, which also include cultural heritage, provides the necessary flexibility to ensure all relevant aspects of the environment can be captured when drafting outcomes. Despite the different approach to definitions, outcomes will cover the same topics that are assessed currently—for example, air, biodiversity, climate and health. It is a key part to the clause and to meeting the Government’s ambitions on the climate. It allows us to make the necessary regulations to set those outcomes, signalling their importance at the heart of a new system, and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 116 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 117
Environmental outcomes reports for relevant consents and relevant plans
I beg to move amendment 175, clause 117, page 134, line 26, at end insert
“relative to the current status of the environment as assessed in a prepared baseline study”.
This amendment would ensure that the preparation of a baseline study which sets the context for assessing the environmental effects of a proposed project remains a core requirement of producing an EOR.
This amendment relates to a technical matter, but still an important one. Clause 117 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations requiring the preparation of an environmental outcomes report for relevant plans and relevant consents, the criteria for which will be set out in due course in regulation. It is this provision that establishes the outcomes-based approach to assessment, which the Minister has just described, wherein anticipated environmental effects are to be measured against the specified environmental outcomes, which clause 116 provides the power for the Secretary of State to specify.
Clause 117 ensures that where an EOR is required, it must be taken into account when considering whether to grant planning consent and the terms on which it is given, or to bring a plan into effect. The core requirements of what an EOR should contain are set out in subsection (4). It specifies that an EOR
“means a written report which assesses—
(a) the extent to which the proposed relevant consent or proposed relevant plan would, or is likely to, impact on the delivery of specified environmental outcomes”.
Paragraph (b) specifies any steps that may be proposed in terms of mitigation, remediation or compensation, and paragraph (c) discusses any proposals about how paragraphs (a) or (b) should be monitored or secured.
It would therefore appear that, when it comes to EORs, the Government have in mind, essentially, a simplified environmental assessment report—one, as the explanatory notes make clear, based on the mandatory information required in the reporting stages of the environmental impact assessment directive and the strategic environmental assessment directive. However, in setting out the core requirements of what an EOR should contain, subsection (4) contains no reference to the need for an environmental baseline assessment to have been prepared. We believe that oversight needs to be addressed.
A baseline study is an essential part of preparing an EIA because it is necessary to assess the current status of any given environment prior to development taking place. It covers, for example, what habitats exist within the environment and how they are changing, or the type and number of species present, in order to accurately judge the expected impact of development on the outcomes previously specified. Indeed, because baseline studies are an integral part of the existing SEA and EIA systems, we believe their removal could well contravene the non-regression safeguard provided for by clause 120, which we will debate in due course.
When it comes to EORs, it is difficult to conceive of how they will operate in practice without some kind of baseline study taking place, because quantifying the impact of development on any given outcome requires that the precise characteristics of the locality in question are known.
By amending subsection (4)(a) of clause 117, amendment 175 simply seeks to ensure that the preparation of a baseline study, which would set the context for assessing the environmental effects of a proposed plan or consent, remains a core requirement of producing an EOR. I look forward to hearing from the Minister that the Government are content to accept the amendment or, if not, an explanation as to why the Government believe that baseline studies are no longer required when it comes to assessing the environmental impact of any given development.
As we have discussed, amendment 175 would give an explicit requirement for the impact of a consent or plan to be set up relative to a baseline study on the current environmental state. Subsection (4)(a) of clause 117 explains that an environmental outcomes report must demonstrate how the plan or consent would affect the delivery of specified environmental outcomes. The environmental baseline is a reference point against which the assessment is carried out. It will remain part of the process of demonstrating how a plan or project supports the delivery of environmental outcomes.
While outcomes will reflect national priorities, it is important that they can be translated to the regional or local level, given that that is the level at which the plans and projects, which will require EORs, will normally take place. As such, outcomes will be underpinned by a set of specific indicators, which will measure the contribution of a plan or project towards outcomes. Those indicators will be relevant to the geography of an area and will change over time to reflect the latest scientific understanding. Indicators will outline how a plan or project shows whether they are contributing to outcomes, and will be tailored to the needs and characteristics of different outcomes.
The details of outcomes and indicators will be developed, as I have said, through consultation with relevant stakeholders, and we will work with experts to gain insights on how best to utilise baseline data to inform them and ensure that overall environmental protections are maintained. Following that, clear guidance will be provided setting out how a plan or project should use indicators to demonstrate that they are supporting outcomes.
I do not think that we are that far apart in this, and I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will accept my explanation that although the baseline data is clearly important in measuring those outcomes and using those indicators, we do not need the duplicative nature of having it in the Bill. I therefore hope the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment.
I appreciate that response from the Minister. I think we would still like something to be written into the Bill regarding baseline studies. However, I very much welcome the clarification that he has just provided—that they will “remain part of the process” , and that they will be translated and tailored to the regional and the local level. I think that is very important and, on that basis, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The outcomes-based approach to assessment will ensure that the Government’s environmental commitments and priorities are placed right at the centre of the consenting process, in a system that is streamlined, transparent, accessible and clear. As outlined in the previous clause, we would want to make reports user-friendly and concise, enabling communities to understand what forms part of the assessment and how impacts are measured via indicators. We also want to improve the accessibility of reports and the data that underpins them by improving their format and avoiding multiple PDFs of tens of thousands of pages, for example.
In order to introduce the new outcomes-based approach to environmental assessment, the Government need the power to require the production of an environmental outcomes report for relevant proposed contents and plans. In taking that power, the Government are able to ensure that, where a report is required for a relevant consent or plan, the report must be completed before consent is granted or a plan is adopted.
Furthermore, the clause ensures that where an environmental outcomes report is produced, it must be considered by the relevant decision maker, which means that decisions are informed by quality information that fully considers the environmental effect of the plan or consent. It also sets out what the content of the reports should be. They will primarily assess how the proposed consent or plan would impact on specified environmental outcomes, supporting our ambition to move towards an outcomes-based system.
In structuring the clause, we recognised the need to provide powers to support the reform of a wide range of environmental assessment regimes across Government, but we have sought to ensure that core requirements are brought to the fore. For example, reports must consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed consent or plan and assess any steps taken in line with the mitigation hierarchy. This is the first time that explicit consideration of the mitigation hierarchy has been included in environmental legislation. Importantly, that hierarchy recognises that prevention is better than cure. In every consideration, plans and projects should first seek to avoid the impact happening in the first place, before considering mitigation and finally compensation, which should be absolutely the last resort. That sequential approach will finally be enshrined in law.
Having the powers to set out specifics in regulations rather than on the face of the Bill will ensure that the new system is more dynamic, allowing for updates to our approach to be considered and consulted on as our understanding of the environment deepens. It will also allow the differences between regimes to be accommodated. The clause sets out crucial provisions required to implement environmental outcomes reports and ensures that reports have sufficient weight and status in the decision-making process. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 117 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 118
Power to define “relevant consent” and “relevant plan” etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 119 stand part.
Clause 118 gives the Government a constrained power to set what plans and consents require an environmental outcomes report. The Government want to be clear about which consents and plans require assessment, and we will use subsequent regulations—bounded by the commitment to non-regression—to provide clarity on when an EOR is required. By clearly setting out the different categories for consent and the types of plan that require assessment, we will be able to address the key issue with the current system, where debate about whether assessment is required acts as a block to moving forward with meaningful assessment.
We want to avoid unnecessary screening work, so it is more likely that more plans and projects will automatically be subject to a proportionate report and only in borderline cases must a criteria approach be followed. Developers will know where they stand up front, and local planning authorities can save the time and resources that are usually taken on screening of opinions.
Let me reassure the Committee that the clause will be used to reduce uncertainty, not assessment. The Government remain committed to ensuring that all plans and projects assessed in the current system will continue to be assessed, while removing troublesome uncertainty. The Government will also consult on which projects and plans should be subject to EORs. Parliament will have the opportunity to debate and approve the regulations that set that out. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Moving on to clause 119, the Government have made it clear that the protection and enhancement of the natural environment is a policy priority, and the measures designed to achieve that should be consistent and long term. The existing system does little to follow through on the commitments made during the assessment process—for example, whether the mitigation measures actually work or are implemented in the first place. Environmental statements are often created at great length, only for the follow-up monitoring and reporting of the impacts on the ground to be inconsistent at best.
Our proposed reforms to environmental assessment therefore provide a renewed and stronger emphasis on monitoring, to ensure that stated outcomes are delivered and that remedial action is taken where required throughout all stages of the development process. That means that achieving environmental outcomes does not stop once a consent is granted or a plan adopted. Importantly, clause 119 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring action to be taken when monitoring or assessment processes have highlighted that a given outcome is not being delivered.
Those actions align with the mitigation hierarchy and the principles of avoidance, mitigation and compensation being built into that process to ensure accountability and to address fully any unanticipated or cumulative adverse effects on the environment.
I have been listening carefully to the Minister. My concern about what he has been saying is that the process does not have sufficient teeth in the event that the EOR is not delivered. Can he clarify whether planning permission would be granted if the EOR requirement is not adhered to? Should that not be a condition for planning?
The point is that some of that is to be looked at now. At the moment, an environmental assessment is effectively prose that may or may not be adhered to, whereas an environmental outcome is far more data driven, so it can be measured and mitigated, as I have said. That will happen in the lead-up to planning, but a lot will clearly be about how it is followed up after planning permission is given. As we have just been discussing, that effectively sets a baseline, saying, “That is the report; that is what you said you are going to do. You must now adhere to that, and we can follow up afterwards.” This is clearly a framework, and the teeth that the hon. Lady describes will need to be set out through enforcement teams and so on, but the measures provide a far more evidence-based approach to be able to follow up afterwards.
That is the point, because we will then have a dynamic monitoring process, which will account for any changes in conditions and available data to inform mitigation strategies. That is a significant benefit of the new system: it ensures that we take an ongoing approach to environmental protection rather than having just a snapshot in time. Monitoring the impacts over a longer period will allow for the collection of more high-quality data that can be used to drive better decision making and improve environmental outcomes.
We do not want an EOR to be an extra burden; we see it more as a rebalancing of resource and effort. We want a streamlined pre-consent process that provides up-front requirements and guidance, allowing more time to be spent on post-consent monitoring, which will be of far more value to the system in terms of both securing positive outcomes and making better use of the data produced so that we can learn from it.
Capturing that data also links to the digital powers in the Bill, and will ensure that the rich source of environmental data is put to use to inform future interventions and give a deeper and far wider understanding of the environment. It will be easier to form best practice and avoid making the same mistake twice. The clause is integral to ensuring that the environmental assessment process considers potential long-term environmental impacts, ensuring accountability and the delivery of outcomes, and ensuring that mitigation is working as it should. For all the reasons I have mentioned, I commend the clause to the Committee.
I welcome the detail provided by the Minister, but I will push him a little further on both clauses. Again, in the circumstances, I am more than happy for him to write to me to elaborate on his answers if he feels he needs to.
As the Minister said, clause 118(2) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out those consents that should be considered category 2. Although category 1 consents will always require an EOR, category 2 consents will be required to produce one only where they meet criteria set through regulations made under the provision. I would be grateful if the Minister gave the Committee an idea of the criteria likely to be set through regulations under this provision that will require a category 2 consent, and of the rationale behind those criteria.
Clause 118(4) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations imposing a requirement for a consent in relation to a project. The requirement will be used, as in the current environmental impact assessment agriculture regime, where no other consenting mechanism exists. The Bill simply states that
“EOR regulations may impose a requirement for a consent in relation to project, which is to be a category 1 consent or a category 2 consent”.
Can the Minister explain the rationale for not specifying that the Secretary of State may impose a requirement for a consent in relation to a project only where no other consenting mechanism exists?
Clause 119(1) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out how the delivery of specified environmental outcomes should be assessed or monitored. Can the Minister tell us whether the Government have a general sense of how outcomes will be assessed and monitored under this new framework and, if so, will he share it with the Committee?
Finally, clause 119(3) states that EOR regulations may make provision requiring action to be taken, if an assessment or monitoring under subsection (1) or (2) determines that is appropriate for the purposes of compensating for a specified environmental outcome not being delivered to any extent. Will the Minister explain the thinking behind the penalties and remedies available in the new EOR system when it comes to environmental outcomes not being delivered, and will he tell us whether the Department has undertaken any work to research the impact of introducing an outcomes-based approach on rates of delivery and non-delivery of environmental targets in development projects?
Let me try to answer some of those points, and I will happily write with extra detail should I fail in my objective. We will clearly be consulting on which developments require an EOR when certain criteria are met, and we will publish those following Royal Assent. In line with our commitment to non-regression, we will ensure that any plan or project requiring assessment under the current regime because of its potential impact on the environment will continue to do so under the new framework. We want to avoid unnecessary screening work, so it is likely that more plans and projects will automatically be subject to a proportionate report, but only in borderline cases. As I said, we will work towards that through a consultation process on the criteria approach.
The regulations will determine the process for considering whether the plans or projects meet the criteria for a full environmental outcomes report, and clearly we will work with stakeholders to inform our approach to the criteria, and the processes for determining whether those criteria have been met. We want to ensure that the development management system continues to determine projects. We want the EOR to reform the process, but we do not want to replace it. The majority of consenting regimes base the consenting decision on a range of different factors. They will need to make a subsequent decision following assessment, but we want to ensure that the Secretary of State effectively has a light touch on this because, having done the consultation with stakeholders, this should be done at a local level as best we can.
The hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich talked about monitoring. The detail of monitoring regimes, including how long monitoring should be carried out for, will be set out in regulations to reflect the different approaches required for each assessment regime. It is not a one-size-fits-all system, because that is unlikely to be optimal, but the intention is that, with a more streamlined pre-consent process, more time and resource can be put into post-consent monitoring, which will likely be of far more value both in terms of securing positive outcomes and gathering useful environmental data to feed back into the system.
One thing that I am not sure I brought out enough in my speech is that the data that the exercise provides, being more data driven rather than the prose that I was talking about, will not only be useful for permissions and monitoring but have a far wider effect on our understanding of the environment in general, because some really interesting data will be brought out that cannot be captured in the analogue system that we have at the moment. I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman’s question about the research to date, so I will write to him on that, and other points that I have not covered.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 118 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 119 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 120
Safeguards: non-regression, international obligations and public engagement
I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 120, page 137, line 21, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) The Secretary of State may only make EOR regulations if doing so will result in no diminution of environmental protection as provided for by environmental law at the time this Act is passed.”
This amendment would ensure that the new system of environmental assessment would not reduce existing environmental protections in any way rather than merely maintaining overall existing levels of environmental protection.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 120, page 137, line 26, leave out from “Kingdom” to end of line 28.
This amendment would ensure that for the purposes of making EOR regulations international obligations are not limited to those that regulate the process for environmental impact assessment.
The clause provides for a series of safeguards premised on a commitment to non-regression of environmental protection, suitable opportunity for public engagement and international obligations. While we welcome the inclusion of these safeguards in the EOR framework set out in part 5, we feel strongly that they are insufficiently robust. When it comes to public engagement, we note that subsection (3) of the clause specifies that
“the public will be informed of any proposed relevant consent or proposed relevant plan”,
and should have an opportunity to engage in the process, as per the requirements of the Aarhus convention. We are concerned the force of the provision is undermined by the fact that “adequate public engagement” is defined in subsection (4) as whatever the Secretary of State “considers appropriate”.
When it comes to international obligations, it is welcome that subsection (2) specifies EOR regulations
“may not contain provision that is inconsistent with the implementation of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”,
but we are concerned that in qualifying this constraint by specifying it only applies to those international obligations
“relating to the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents”,
the Bill could restrict applicable international obligations to those that simply regulate the process for environmental impact assessment. The Minister may say it is entirely appropriate that they do so, but we feel qualifying the constraint in this way could have the effect of ensuring that international obligations relating to air or water quality standards, for example, need not be considered because they would not form part of the actual “assessment” of environmental impacts. We believe the constraint provided for by subsection (2) should be less ambiguous, so as to close a potential loophole. Amendment 177 would achieve that objective by deleting the relevant qualification to make clear that EOR regulations may not contain provision that is inconsistent with the implementation of any international obligations that apply to the UK.
Finally, we welcome the inclusion of a non-regression clause in the Bill, on the grounds that any additional safeguard that constrains the use of the regulation-making powers in this part of the Bill is beneficial. However, we have three serious concerns about the effect of the non-regression provision set out in clause 120(1). Firstly, its application is entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State; it is they who have to be satisfied that making the regulations will not result in environmental regression. As such, it is an entirely subjective constraint, and one that is unlikely to ever be challenged in the courts. Secondly, we are extremely concerned about the practical implications of specifying the Government’s non-regression commitment applies only to the
“overall level of environmental protection”.
In failing to make clear that the principle of non-regression, as it relates to the EOR framework, applies to specific aspects of environmental protection, we fear the new system will engender, as the CEO of Wildlife and Countryside Link, Richard Benwell, put it to the Committee in the oral evidence he provided many weeks ago,
“a runaway offsetting mentality where the assurance that things will be better overall can be taken to obscure a lot of harm to the natural environment at the local level.”––[Official Report, Levelling-up and Regeneration Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2022; c. 117, Q146.]
Thirdly, we are also concerned about the definition of “environmental law”, cited in subsection (1) and set out in subsection (4) of the clause. In limiting the non-regression constraint in the Bill to environmental law as defined in the Environment Act 2021, a number of relevant considerations would not be covered—including some of those set out on the face of the Bill in clause 116, such as cultural heritage and landscape—as they fall outside of the definition used in the 2021 Act. Section 46 of the Environment Act 2021 defines environmental law as “any legislative provision” that is “concerned with environmental protection”. A literal interpretation of environmental law, so defined, would cover only UK law. The Minister may argue that is unproblematic, given the commitments relating to “international obligations” set out in subsection (2), but for the reasons I have addressed we are concerned they are defined on the face of the Bill in an overly restrictive manner that will limit how much protection they provide against potential future regression.
We therefore believe that subsection (1) should be replaced with a new subsection specifying that the Secretary of State may make EOR regulations only if doing so will result in no diminution of environmental protection as provided for by environmental law at the time that the Act is passed, as provided for by amendment 176. The amendment would significantly strengthen the non-regression constraint provided for in the clause, so that Ministers cannot determine to make EOR regulations that increase environmental harm in some areas if they judge they are somehow offset in others, but must ensure there is no diminution of environmental protection whatsoever. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to these two important amendments.
The new system that we have been discussing is all about improving environmental assessment, not weakening environmental protection. Moving to the outcomes-based approach that I have outlined will allow the Government to set ambitious outcomes, building on the Environment Act 2021 and other environmental commitments.
I understand the spirit and reasoning behind amendment 176, which proposes to amend the wording of the non-regression provision in clause 120 so that regulations must “result in no diminution of environmental protection”.
However, in drafting the Bill, we recognised the need to provide assurance that the new system will continue to support the protection of the environment, and the clause was drafted specifically to mirror the provisions of the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement. That ensures that these reforms live up to our commitment to non-regression with our partners in that area. If we are to meet the complex environmental challenges that we face, we need to take a holistic approach and focus on how well the system delivers for the environment overall. We will concentrate on the aspects of the system that deliver real, positive outcomes for the environment, rather than on bureaucracy.
Where needed, we will seek to streamline the system, for example in areas where there is duplication of other existing processes, thereby allowing resources to be better focused elsewhere. However, along with the commitment to non-regression, we have also included significant duties to consult with the public and relevant stakeholders. We are also giving Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise subsequent regulations through the affirmative procedure, which is entirely appropriate. In the light of those reassurances on our commitment to maintaining environmental protections, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw amendment 176.
Amendment 177 provides that EOR regulations must not be inconsistent with any international obligations, rather than specifying consistency with international obligations relating to environmental assessment. The inclusion of clause 120(2) demonstrates the Government’s commitment to legislating in a manner that is consistent with our international obligations. The clause seeks to provide explicit assurance of the importance of international obligations in respect of environmental assessments, and those commitments will be at the foundation of the new process of environmental outcomes reports, which builds on the core principles at the heart of the current practice.
Ultimately, the focus of EORs is the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents, which is why clause 120 refers to our international obligations relating to the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents. That ensures that relevant international obligations, such as those under the Espoo and Aarhus conventions, are properly reflected. To make the provision broader would sacrifice clarity and risk introducing confusion as to which areas of international law are particularly relevant and pertinent in such cases. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will also consider withdrawing amendment 177.
I welcome the Minister’s clarification. Particularly on amendment 176, it is extremely useful to hear that the wording was chosen specifically to mirror that in the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement. I do not want to digress into that agreement in any way—no one on the Committee would thank me for doing so—but it is a useful clarification.
I take what the Minister said about amendment 177; I do not intend to press it to a vote. However, we strongly feel that, international obligations aside, when it comes to safeguards the Bill still contains too many loopholes, many of which I mentioned when I was speaking to the amendment. In particular, what concerns us about the non-regression provision in clause 120 is the reference to only
“providing an overall level of environmental protection”.
We are extremely concerned that that might mean that environmental harm could take place at a local level because the Government could say, “Overall, we are satisfied that the level of protection has been maintained.” For that reason, and to make very clear how strongly we feel about the point, I am minded to push amendment 176 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
As I have said, we are committed to ensuring that the new system of environmental assessment will provide at least the same level of overall environmental protection as the existing system. The clause enshrines that commitment, building on the landmark Environment Act 2021, and is in line with our commitments in the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement.
It is a vital commitment, and it will ensure that EORs support the Government’s objective to be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. We want to make it clear that, in introducing these reports, we are not trying to lower standards or bypass important environmental protections, and so it is important that we enshrine in legislation this commitment to non-regression.
We have also ensured that the Secretary of State’s powers are tightly constrained when considering whether overall levels of protection have been maintained. We have provided significant commitments to consultation and secondary regulations, which will be laid under the affirmative procedure and will thereby enable parliamentary scrutiny on this issue.
This clause also sets out that regulations made may not be inconsistent with the implementation of the relevant international obligations of the UK. As in other parts of the planning system, public engagement is a crucial feature of environmental assessment, and the clause sets out our commitment to maintaining opportunities for public engagement to take place. This will ensure that the public can be involved in the process of preparing an environmental outcomes report, in line with the requirements of the Aarhus convention, which includes provision on public participation in decision making on environmental matters. The clause provides a strong commitment to non-regression and to maintaining opportunities for public engagement, as we move to that new system, and so I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 120 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 121
Requirements to consult devolved administrations
I beg to move amendment 178, in clause 121, page 138, line 3, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
This amendment, along with Amendments 179 and 180, would ensure that EOR regulations which contain provision within devolved competence can only be made with the consent of the relevant devolved administration.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 179, in clause 121, page 138, line 16, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 178.
Amendment 180, in clause 121, page 138, line 34, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 178.
Clause 121 specifies that, where EOR regulations contain provisions within devolved competence, the Secretary of State must consult the relevant devolved Ministers. Our concern is that this is an unduly weak requirement that could see EORs imposed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland without the consent of their respective devolved Administrations. Because the requirement is only to consult with the relevant devolved Ministers about EOR regulations containing provision within devolved competence, we could see EORs imposed without consent. We fear this could lead, advertently or inadvertently, to environmental regression if an EOR specified weaker outcomes than that sought by the relevant devolved Administration.
These three amendments simply seek to ensure that the consent of the relevant devolved Minister is obtained when EOR regulations contain provision within devolved competence to safeguard against that particular scenario. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them and the concerns they are designed to address.
It really is “The Matthew Pennycook Show” this afternoon, is it not?
It is a delight to hear the one-man show. In bringing forward the EOR system, we are absolutely committed to respecting the devolution settlements. We are currently in active discussions with the devolved Administrations as to how the powers should operate across the UK, including whether there is any scope to extend them to provide a shared framework of powers across the UK.
The provisions in the Bill are focused on the environmental assessment regimes in areas reserved to the UK Government, but there are limited circumstances in which the UK Government have historically legislated in areas of devolved competence, such as between the inshore and offshore regimes for marine works. As such, to maintain the current position, the clauses as introduced include a limited power for the UK Government to legislate in areas of devolved competence where the relevant devolved Administration has been consulted. A failure to include that power risks introducing a legislative gap that could undermine the delivery of certain types of development, which is clearly not something we want to happen.
When the discussions with the devolved Administrations have concluded, the Government will bring forward any necessary amendments to implement what is agreed with them. Rather than doing that here and now in Westminster, we want to do it in full consultation with the devolved Administrations: we want them to be absolutely at the heart of those discussions. I hope that on the basis of that explanation, the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw his amendment.
I accept those assurances, and on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will be brief, because I think my previous remarks addressed the point about transposition of the EU directive leading to the creation of a range of environmental assessment regimes that have different territorial extents and applications. As I have already explained, discussions are ongoing with the devolved Governments regarding how best to work together to ensure a consistent and coherent approach to environmental assessment across the UK. We are hopeful that we can work closely with devolved Governments to extend the powers in the Bill to place all the nations on an even footing. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 121 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 122
Exemptions for national defence and civil emergency etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 123 to 126 stand part.
In some rare cases, particularly those relating to national defence or responding to a civil emergency, it may be necessary for the Secretary of State to direct a project to progress without an environmental outcomes report when the production of one would usually be required. The provisions in clause 122 enable that. The clause does not aim to bypass environmental protections, which are important for all the reasons I have set out; it simply accounts for those rare instances in which there is an urgent need to progress with development. Clause 122 replicates a similar provision in the existing regulations, and would only be used in the most extreme circumstances.
In addition to the civil and defence needs, the clause also provides powers via regulations for the Secretary of State to be able to direct that no environmental outcomes report is required in other circumstances. Such directions will, of course, be presented in regulations subject to the affirmative procedure, and will be consulted on and constrained accordingly.
I appreciate the Minister highlighting that there could be extenuating circumstances in which the measures could be suspended, but he has not set out what mitigations will be put in to address that, either in close proximity to that or elsewhere. Could he say a bit more about that?
Good question! As well as the non-regression clause that I talked about earlier, we have a built-in power under these clauses that allows aspects of the regulation to apply even if a project can initially progress without an EOR. That is a good way to manage those high-risk needs with environmental protection and get that balance right. It allows a project to progress without a report, but still requires certain aspects of the regulations to be adhered to, such as monitoring and remediating effects once the plan or project is in operation. I again highlight the fact that that would only relate to the plans and projects in greatest need, relating to matters of national importance.
If a development had been exempted from an EOR, the Government could still impose post-consent monitoring and management of environmental effects. That is a valuable element of the clause because it allows the flexibility to respond where needed while still requiring aspects of the regulations to be adhered to. Furthermore, the Secretary of State would have the power to modify and revoke any exemption they have made under the provisions, ensuring that when the emergency situation is resolved, the regulations go back to operating as normal. That ensures that the Government can respond to important and urgent issues where needed.
Turning to clause 123, a key focus for the Government is to ensure that better environmental outcomes are delivered and that assessment has real and quantifiable benefits. The Bill, particularly in clause 123, strengthens the powers and sanctions available to decision makers, including local planning authorities, to deal with individuals who do not abide by the rules and processes of the system, for example, by failing to implement important mitigation measures to lessen the environmental effects. That raises the importance of environmental issues and action will be taken if legislation is not adhered to.
An increased focus on monitoring will be central to the new system. It will not only provide an important source of environmental data, but ensure that what is committed to in the EOR is actually carried out in practice. To make increased monitoring provisions more than an academic exercise, we need to have enforcement powers to ensure steps can be taken when an individual does not accord with the legislation. Those enforcement powers benefit from broader strengthening of the planning enforcement regime under chapter 5 of part 3. Subsection (2) of clause 123 sets out the range of enforcement provisions that the Secretary of State may introduce through regulations for that purpose. The Secretary of State is under a duty to consult relevant public authorities when making any regulations in respect of enforcement.
Given the importance of enforcement provisions for the functioning of the new system, and for those affected, the Government believe they merit close parliamentary scrutiny and time for debate and, therefore, have proposed that regulations made under the provisions be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. The powers include the ability to create criminal offences and civil sanctions under the new system, but also to grant powers to public authorities for inspection and power of entry. Any new enforcement mechanism will have the aim of protecting the environment by ensuring that the new system is being followed. The purpose of the system is to improve environmental outcomes on the ground and there cannot be any compromise here. We will use all the necessary powers to make sure the system is not undermined.
As mentioned in respective earlier clauses, environmental statements have become far too lengthy and do little to follow up on monitoring and reporting the impacts on the ground. To address that problem, clause 124 will enable the Secretary of State to implement a more consistent reporting process, allowing the Government to better understand the extent to which outcomes are being delivered. That will require public authorities to report or provide information on the delivery of outcomes. That is a significant step that will also allow the Government and relevant experts to understand the impact of what is happening on the ground. In doing so, the reports will also inform the ongoing evolution of the system. Clause 124 is essentially making sure delivery against outcomes is documented clearly to enable a variety of stakeholders to keep track of environmental impacts at a local and national level.
Clause 125 is, I trust, straightforward and sets out the Government’s approach to consultation for subsequent regulations for environmental outcome reports. We have sought to take a proportionate approach to consultation, placing the strongest duty to consult with the core elements of the new system. For example, due to the importance of outcomes in the new approach, they require public consultation before regulations can be laid before and debated in Parliament.
For certain other aspects of the reforms, the Secretary of State would be under a duty to consult such persons as they consider appropriate, including public bodies such as statutory consultees. That will cover, for example, consideration of which plans and projects should be covered, regulations providing the exemptions and the interaction with existing environmental assessment legislation. We recognise the value of bringing in appropriate bodies and experts when determining the technical aspects of the system and we want to capture the input of those who will use and contribute to it. In addition to the legislative requirements to consult on regulations, we understand the importance of early up-front engagement to inform the direction of travel. That is why we plan to consult early on how we could use the powers in regulations, with a more detailed consultation on the draft regulations following Royal Assent.
Clause 126 has been designed to ensure that those involved in the assessment process are provided with clear and comprehensive guidance that can be used to demonstrate how a plan or consent contributes to the delivery of outcomes. The ability to provide guidance is vital to ensuring that best practice is embedded across the assessment process and reflects the latest scientific understanding. The greater certainty and consistency achieved through the guidance will, for example, allow the Government to work with the relevant experts and arm’s length bodies to ensure that the delivery of outcomes reflects the very latest best practice. The guidance will act as a living document, aiding transition to the new system, reflecting the most up-to-date scientific knowledge and methodologies, and placing decision makers in the best possible position to make informed judgments. That is why it is important that any guidance provided for EORs will be subject to public consultation to ensure that all stakeholders have their chance to comment and have input. This clause is integral in ensuring that EORs reflect best practice, remove uncertainty and reduce the risk of legal challenge in the system.
For those reasons, I commend all these clauses—I have forgotten the numbers once again.
Clauses 122 to 126.
Exactly. This is why you get paid the big bucks, Mr Hollobone. Thank you very much.
The Minister touched on a number of the issues that I wanted to raise. This is a series of important clauses and therefore I have a couple of questions for him. I hope that I can draw out a little more detail, but as ever, he is more than welcome to write to me if he requires to do so.
Clause 122(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may direct that no environmental outcomes report is required to be prepared in relation to a proposed relevant consent which is solely for the purposes of national defence or preventing or responding to civil emergency.”
Subsection (2) of that clause further states:
“EOR regulations may provide for further circumstances in which the Secretary of State is to be able to direct that no environmental outcomes report is required to be prepared.”
Can the Minister give the Committee some examples of the “further circumstances” in which no environmental outcomes report may be required as per subsection (2), given that civil emergencies and national defence, as he said, are already covered by subsection (1)?
Clause 123 is a new provision that sets out the enforcement provisions that can be made in respect of EORs. The Minister touched on a few, I believe, but I would be grateful if he could provide any further detail as to how enforcement of EORs will operate and how they will operate compared with the current SEA and EIA systems.
Clause 125(2) specifies that the Secretary of State, as the Minister has also said, may consult only
“such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”
before making certain EOR regulations, or issuing, modifying or withdrawing certain guidance. Can the Minister give us some idea of which persons or bodies the Secretary of State would be likely to approach before making or modifying regulations and guidance? Specifically when it comes to statutory consultees, which he spoke about, is there any rationale for not specifying statutory consultees in the Bill?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that contribution. On the formal consultation, I cannot yet give him details as to whom specifically we will speak to, barring the fact that, as I said earlier, we will clearly seek to speak to all the key stakeholders that we work with really closely. Indeed, we have worked with a number of those in the lead-up to the Bill. We want to ensure that we get the expert advice of people not only who can contribute to our knowledge, but who will be using the system, so that we can get the benefit of that on-the-ground experience, because what we do not want to have is unintended consequences.
On enforcement, the Bill amends and strengthens the powers and sanctions available to decision makers. We want to ensure that the new system is effective at delivering on the outcomes, so it will be necessary for the regime to have enforcement mechanisms. The exact details of the new system are in the process of being developed. We will be working with the same stakeholders on the design of the new system, in terms of enforcement as well as exemptions, and we want to ensure that we have a full consultation.
In addition to consultation, there will be parliamentary debate. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that we are prepared to work collaboratively to ensure that this regime—the framework that we are talking about now—works well in practice, and that that coherent approach makes it easier to understand and enforce. Enforcement is no good if we just have a bit of prose that means nothing; we need to make sure we enforce that as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 122 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 123 to 126 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 127
Interaction with existing environmental assessment legislation and the
Habitats Regulations
I beg to move amendment 181, in clause 127, page 141, line 32, leave out “in particular” and insert “not”.
This amendment would ensure that any specified environmental outcomes arising from EOR regulations made would augment not substitute those arising from existing environmental assessment legislation and the Habitats Regulations.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 182, in clause 127, page 142, leave out lines 12 and 13.
This amendment would ensure that EOR regulations cannot be used to amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.
Clause 127 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations on how the EOR framework provided for by part 5 interacts with existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations. The explanatory notes accompanying the Bill state:
“This is necessary to ensure that where an Environmental Outcomes Report is prepared, where appropriate, this is capable of meeting the requirements of existing environmental assessment so as to avoid duplication.”
It would be recognised as meeting both.
Our serious concern is that by providing for requirements undertaken in relation to an EOR to satisfy the requirements under the habitats regulations, this clause could allow the Secretary of State to substitute the protections afforded by those regulations with weaker requirements that had undergone only limited parliamentary scrutiny under the affirmative procedure. In our view, this is deeply problematic because the habitats regulations provide for an extremely high level of environmental protection for our most precious and vulnerable habitats and species, indeed for greater protection than the SEA and EIA systems, requiring as they do applications proposing a development that will affect a site to first prove that mitigation is in place to avoid significant harm, or that there is an overriding public interest reason to proceed and compensatory measures are necessary. In revising subsection (2) of the clause, amendment 181 would address that concern by ensuring that any specified environmental outcomes arising from EOR regulations made would augment, not substitute, those arising from existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations.
An additional concern with this clause comes in the form of subsection (3), on page 142 of the Bill, which provides for EOR regulations under the clause to
“amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation”.
Even with the list of what constitutes “existing environmental assessment legislation” set out on the face of the Bill in clause 130(1), we believe this provision is unnecessarily broad. Amendment 182 therefore seeks to remove clause 127(3) to ensure that EOR regulations cannot be used to amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.
It is essential, as the Minister himself accepted during debate about an earlier clause, that we recover nature and that we do so quickly, or we risk irreparable damage to the natural world upon which life depends. To that end, proven, effective laws should be maintained and strengthened rather than undermined in any way. For that reason, I hope the Minister will appreciate the concerns we raise and give both of these amendments serious consideration.
Given the scale of the underpinning legislation, as we transition from the current complex system of environmental assessment to the new framework of EORs, the Government require powers to manage the interaction between the old and new systems.
The interaction provisions in clause 127 are designed to ensure that when an EOR is prepared, it is capable of meeting the requirements of existing environmental assessment legislation where appropriate. That allows the Government to guard against duplication while the various assessment regime owners bring forward regulations to introduce environmental outcomes for their regimes. It also allows existing environmental assessment legislation to meet the requirements of an EOR, which is to avoid duplication and manage co-ordination across the different assessment regimes. We all know that it takes time to consolidate the complex legislation covering a number of Departments and agencies, and we want to make sure there are no gaps in the process.
Clause 127 also replicates the current ability to allow for co-ordination between environmental assessment regimes and habitats regulations. Those provisions are necessary to ensure we are able to manage the transition to the new system without introducing multiple requirements and costly duplication. As with all the provisions under this part, the use of these powers will be bound by our commitment to non-regression and our duty to consult on new regulations. That means that, in managing the transition, EOR regulations that interact with the habitats regime or other listed environmental legislation cannot reduce the overall level of the environmental protection. The requirements of the existing habitats regulations assessment legislation will continue to need to be met. Given the need to manage the effective transition to the new system while honouring our commitment to non-regression, I hope the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will consider withdrawing amendment 181.
In addition to the interaction between the old and the new systems, EORs will replace the existing EU-derived systems of environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments. Given the breadth of environmental assessment regimes, the Government intend to take a phased approach to the introduction of environmental outcome reports. The powers in clause 127 are necessary to manage that phased introduction. As we introduce regulations to implement the new system, it is important that legislation for the old system ceases to apply and is properly removed from the statute book. Clause 127 provides the necessary powers to achieve that, which means that the new system will be able to fully replace the old system and operate effectively.
Amendment 182 would limit our ability to remove the old legislation as the new system comes online. The current system would be frozen in time, and there would be no capacity to update its provisions to better reflect current pressures on the environment and the UK’s changing needs. In effect, it could lead to there being multiple overlapping systems of environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments operating at the same time, leading to confusion, additional bureaucracy and wasteful duplication. With that in mind, I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw amendment 182.
I thank the Minister for that response. I note and accept what he said about amendment 182, although I will go back and satisfy myself that the concerns raised in that regard are fully addressed.
We continue to have concerns about the issues raised by amendment 181. I heard what the Minister said about the Government’s intention for these provisions to avoid duplications and enable co-ordination, but I remain concerned that, as drafted, they could lead to the powers substituting rather than augmenting the protections provided for by the habitats regulations, in particular. The Minister’s defence was that we are protected in that regard by the safeguards in clause 120, but he has heard our concerns about their robustness. Along with our concerns about clause 120, that is one of the fundamental weaknesses of part 5 that we would like to see addressed. For that reason, I will press amendment 181 to a Division. This will be the final one today.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
As we have already heard concerns about clause 127, let me use this opportunity to clarify its intention and to provide the reassurance that it is does not allow any amendments to the habitats regulations.
The clause serves two purposes. First, it enables us to make sure that assessments under the new EOR system will be interoperable with those required by existing environmental assessment and habitats legislation. Secondly, it gives the Government the power to repeal, revoke or amend the current SEA and EIA regulations in each of the relevant regimes once the new framework for an environmental outcomes report is in place.
The provision is about providing powers in relation to the interaction between the new system and existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations. It does not remove the need to comply with the habitats regulations. It is an ancillary power. Any regulations must relate to the purpose of the clause, which is about interaction between processes. Regulations can set out how an EOR report can meet the requirements of existing environmental assessment legislation or the habitats regulations, but only in so far as the processes interact.
There has been some misinterpretation, or a difference in opinion, about subsection (3), which allows regulations to
“amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.”
The habitats regulations are specifically excluded from that power, meaning that it is not possible to make any changes to the habitats regulations under it. This is simply about streamlining within the constraints of the legislation. We want to avoid overlaps, such as, for example, repetitions in evidence, while optimising the synergies—for example, the effects identified in the habitats regulations assessment that could help to inform the contribution to outcomes in the EOR. This is about how the two are co-ordinated and how they work together. The clause must also accord with our commitments to non-regression under clause 120, so any interaction between assessments must maintain overall environmental protections.
In parallel, the Government have indicated our intention to improve the habitats regulations regime, while maintaining or enhancing the level of protection it provides. DEFRA has recently consulted on that via the consultation on the “Nature Recovery” Green Paper, which the Government will respond to in due course. There are real opportunities to improve processes across the piece, and the clause allows for that interaction between processes and for the benefits of efficiencies and streamlining. I hope the Committee is reassured on the purpose of the clause, which is heavily constrained and seeks no powers to make any changes to the habitats regulations. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 128
Consequential repeal of power to make provision for environmental
assessment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 129 and 130 stand part.
Clause 128 is a straightforward provision to remove what will become an obsolete regulation-making power, along with references to that power, after the powers contained in the Bill come into effect. It was a broad power, allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations for consideration to be given to environmental effects. It will no longer be required, as the new powers will cover the consideration of the environmental effects of development. The provision simply aims to clear it from the statute book.
Clause 129 gives power to make regulations on a variety of procedural and technical matters relating to environmental outcomes reports. Those include, for example, setting out who should prepare reports, to whom completed reports should be given and how information should be collected and provided. It also makes provision for regulations to state the level of assistance required from local authorities in the production of those reports, when reports that fail to meet various requirements can be declined, and how appeals and reviews of decisions should work. The clause also makes provision for the collection of fees. We intend to keep fees to a minimum, but we will seek views from stakeholders in future consultations.
While those matters are generally procedural or technical in nature, they are all important and necessary for the successful implementation of environmental outcomes reports. Setting those out in regulations allows for those matters to be decided following consultation, and allows for flexibility in the system. That means that the specific technical ways that the system works can be more easily updated in the future, and it will allow the difference between regimes to be accommodated.
Finally, clause 30(1) is a straightforward provision that simply lists all the current regulations that implement the EIA and SEA regimes. As such, those are the regulations that the powers in this part will allow the Secretary of State to replace with EOR regulations. They implement the assessment regime in a similar way across a broad range of sectors, from transport to energy production to town and country planning. It is our intention that this remains the case for the regulations implementing the new system.
Subsection (2) is primarily a reference list, bringing together the various definitions used in this part. It also introduces some straightforward definitions such as “public authority” and “relevant document”.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 128 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 129 and 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gareth Johnson.)
Adjourned till Tuesday 13 September at twenty-five minutes past Nine o’clock.
Written evidence reported to the House
LRB58 London Councils
LRB59 Guide Dogs
National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chairs: † Rushanara Ali, James Gray
† Bell, Aaron (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Con)
† Eagle, Maria (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Elmore, Chris (Ogmore) (Lab)
† Everitt, Ben (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
† Hart, Sally-Ann (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
† Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)
† Hosie, Stewart (Dundee East) (SNP)
† Jones, Mr Kevan (North Durham) (Lab)
† Jupp, Simon (East Devon) (Con)
† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)
McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
† Mann, Scott (North Cornwall) (Con)
† Mohindra, Mr Gagan (South West Hertfordshire) (Con)
† Mumby-Croft, Holly (Scunthorpe) (Con)
† Phillips, Jess (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
† Sambrook, Gary (Birmingham, Northfield) (Con)
† Tugendhat, Tom (Minister for Security)
Huw Yardley, Bradley Albrow, Simon Armitage, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill Committee
Thursday 8 September 2022
(Afternoon)
[Rushanara Ali in the Chair]
National Security Bill
Clause 53
Notices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Let me briefly say that we all pray for Her Majesty; it is an extraordinary moment. God save the Queen.
Clause 53 sets out how certain part 2 notices are to be served. A part 2 notice, an extension notice, a revival notice or a notice of a variation of the measures without consent must be served in person to the individual in order to have effect, whereas other notices may be served through the individual’s solicitor.
Schedule 5 contains a supporting power for the police to enter and search premises to find an individual for the purpose of serving a notice on them. This is so that the individual is informed in person and the implications of the notice can be explained to them.
Clause 53 also provides that when a subject is served the relevant notice they must be provided with a confirmation notice that sets out the period for which that notice will remain in force. This will give the individual certainty regarding the period of time for which the measures apply to them.
Clause 53 states that a confirmation notice must be served on an individual who is served with a state threats prevention and investigation measure, or a revival notice or extension notice, setting out the period, including dates, for which the individual will be subject to the STPIM, unless it is quashed or revoked before its expiry.
We recognise the need for the clause, and it is right that there is a great deal of emphasis on serving the notice to an individual personally. There is, however, a distinct lack of detail in the Bill about who can serve a notice. Counter-terrorism police have again been very helpful in taking me through how such work might be undertaken operationally, but I put it to the Minister that it is not clear in the legislation that it would need to be a constable of a certain rank, or that it would need to be a constable. Other areas of the Bill do specify that.
It is not just a case of serving the notice: it is also the point at which a person is informed of the terms of the part 2 notice notice and presumably relocated and monitored to ensure their compliance with it. I wish to probe whether the provisions in clause 53 would benefit from being ever so slightly tightened up in that specific regard.
The Minister has laid out clearly what clause 53 does. It sets out the requirements for notices to be served and for how long they are in force, and it makes it clear that the individual is not bound unless they have been personally served the notice. I have one question: although the list of different sorts of notices is very clear in the legislation, are individuals to be told in the documents with which they are served of their rights to challenge, seek a revocation or seek a variation of the notice served upon them?
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I will have to write to him on that question. As for the question about the rank of the officer, a constable or any warranted officer is the answer.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Contracts
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 54, page 38, line 29, at end insert—
“(2) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the Secretary of State intends to exercise the power under this section. The statement must include an list of illustrative examples of the kinds of contracts or other arrangements this power relates to.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.
Clause 54 makes me uncomfortable and requires some thorough consideration. Amendment 67 seeks to flesh out some of the detail as to what the clause means in reality.
The explanatory notes say:
“This clause grants the Secretary of State authority to purchase services in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with measures specified in Part 2 notices. This would include, for example, electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence requirement provided for in Schedule 4.”
Frankly, the Government have a somewhat chequered history in awarding contracts, and while I will not go through the back catalogue, it is against that backdrop that we ask for more detail before we sign off on this clause. Section 29 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 includes the same provision, so I hope that the Minister is in a position to share with us how private companies have been involved in the monitoring of those subject to TPIMs, so that we can gain a clearer understanding of how that would be replicated with STPIMs.
I am looking for reassurance on two fronts. The first is that we are not using contractors who are vulnerable to hacking or other forms of cyber-attack. There will be marked differences between the cohort of people currently subject to a form of monitoring—and even those subject to TPIMs—compared with STPIMs, which stand to present different challenges, so what tech will be used for monitoring someone subject to a part 2 notice, and how do we ensure that we, but no one else, knows where that individual is? I am assuming, based on what little we are asked to go on in the clause and explanatory notes, that we could be talking about wearable technology or monitoring hardware and software. I suspect that at least some component parts will be made overseas, if not all of them.
We sought to establish where the ankle monitors that are currently used come from. With some help from the House of Commons Library, we found that in November 2017 the Ministry of Justice awarded a contract for the supply of electronic monitoring services, which includes software and hardware, to G4S, and it appears to have been extended, but we could not establish where they were purchased from or just how robust they are. How do the Government plan to address that concern operationally and ensure that there are no holes to be exploited in the technology itself? How do we write those protections and technical specifications into contracts under clause 54?
Secondly, we are dealing with particularly capable people, potentially with the support of entire nation states. I want to know that our security services and trained police officers are undertaking this monitoring work, rather than private contractors who stand to be overwhelmed if not equipped and trained adequately. I had a look at what happens currently. The National Audit Office’s recent report published in June 2022, called “Electronic monitoring: a progress update”, states on page 22 that G4S supplies tags and home monitoring equipment as part of HM Prison and Probation Service’s tower delivery model for its tagging transformation programme.
HMPPS is an agency of the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for tagging. The report explains that the tower contracting approach has four different suppliers, each responsible for a different element of the national programme: supplying and fitting tags to offenders; running a monitoring centre; providing underlying mapping data; and providing the communications network. HMPPS acts as an integrator to co-ordinate work across the four suppliers. Can the Minister confirm that that is the same model, which has a number of private contracts and moving parts, presumably with the exchange of a lot of information between those moving parts, that we use for monitoring those subject to TPIMs, and that it is therefore the same way in which we will monitor people subject to STPIMs?
I would greatly appreciate some clarification from the Minister on that, to ensure that our national security cannot be outsourced and that we have specialist and trained people from our dedicated services undertaking this really important monitoring, using technology that can withstand the threat of outside interference. Given the situation in which we find ourselves, I urge the Minister to consider the merits of amendment 67.
Clause 54 grants the Secretary of State authority to use third parties to assist in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with the measures specified in part 2 notices. As the hon. Member for Halifax rightly identified, the electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence measure, such as by entering into a contract with a third party to provide tagging services, is exactly the form of contract that is envisioned. In practice, the Government will ensure efficiency by aligning, where possible, with existing contracts, and therefore may use ones that are already set up for comparable provisions in law, such as TPIMs.
The intention of the amendment is to seek clarity about what types of contracts the Home Secretary might enter into in relation to STPIMs and how she intends to exercise the power. Though the Government do not feel that publishing further detail on any such contract is necessary, I absolutely assure the Committee that the clause is not designed to do anything to outsource intelligence services. Instead, it is a standard approach that we have with TPIMs, where in some instances it is necessary for the Government to outsource some services. An example of such is the contract for ankle monitoring services to which the hon. Lady referred. She will be aware of my own views on outsourcing technology to various states; she can be absolutely assured of my own interest in making sure I prosecute this.
I understand perfectly well what the Minister is saying about the occasional need to outsource. I also understand why he would say that much of the contractual information should not be released. However, there are valid questions about the clause. What information would a third-party contracting company have about the subject? For example, would that company be told that the subject may not even have been convicted of committing a crime, but was the recipient of a state threats prevention and investigation measures order?
As the right hon. Member will be aware, in all such circumstances there will be a great variety, because what might be shared with somebody providing one service may not be the same as what is shared with another. It is also evident that the normal regulation on protecting privacy would apply where appropriate, and the Government would therefore abide with all due legal requirements. I cannot give a further commitment than that, for the obvious reason that the variety in which such contracting would apply is enormous. I can therefore only assure him that the existing previsions would endure.
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said. He talked about the convenience of extending existing contracts; however, given the cohort of those who will be subject to STPIMs, that is the exact point that concerns me. We are talking about a volume of those who have committed more typical types of crime, but we need to think much more carefully about the types of technology, the software and the individuals involved in monitoring those subject to STPIMs.
Given the Minister’s reputation and understanding of the detail, and as he has already given me those assurances, I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt that he will go back to officials and interrogate clause 54, so that he and I are satisfied that there are no vulnerabilities in that approach. I hope we can continue that conversation with the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Legal aid in relation to Part 2 notices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Halifax; she can be assured that my commitment to protecting our security through electronic means, as through every other means, will endure.
Clause 55 will extend the scope of legal aid so that it will be available for state threats prevention and investigation measures. It will allow individuals to access legally aided advice and representation in relation to a part 2 notice, subject to means and merits tests. That replicates the position in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
The measures are a civil order designed to protect and mitigate the risk to the public from individuals who pose a threat but cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. Legal aid will be made available in those cases due to the restrictive nature of the measures that an individual may be subject to. It is right that we balance robust investigation and prevention measures with the access to justice and judicial oversight that this House would demand.
As we have already heard, clause 55 inserts a new paragraph in schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2021, to enable individuals subject to part 2 notices to receive civil legal services in relation to those notices.
Order. Will the shadow Minister speak up, for the benefit of colleagues at the back?
Thank you for that helpful observation, Chair; I will certainly will.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley will discuss part 3 of the Bill shortly. However, clause 55, which is in part 2, and clauses 62, 63 and 64, which are in part 3, pull in completely opposite directions in principle. Dare I say that it is almost as if they were produced by two different Government Departments that have not been speaking to each other?
My hon. Friend is making an important point. Does she agree that the reasoning appears to be that this is such an intrusive and important provision, affecting people’s rights in such a potentially serious manner, that legal aid, subject to merit and means, ought to be available? Would that not also be an argument for getting rid of the whole of part 3 of the Bill?
My hon. Friend makes a really powerful point: there are very different principles evident in this element of part 2 compared to those in part 3. We will get into the details of part 3 shortly, but my hon. Friend is exactly right. Part 3 prevents civil legal aid from be