Procedure At Trial Of Persons Suffering From Mental Disorder '(1) Sections 174 (Insanity in bar of trial or as the ground of acquittal) and 376 (Power of court to order hospital admission or guardianship) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 shall be amended as follows— (2) After subsection (3) of section 174 there shall be inserted the following subsection:— "(3A) An Order made by a Court in pursuance of the last foregoing subsection, concerning the detention of a person in a State hospital or such other hospital specified, shall cease to have effect if the person the Order refers to is reprosecuted and the case disposed of by a Court." (3) After subsection (1) of section 376 there shall be inserted the following subsection:— "(1A) An Order made by a Court in pursuance of the last foregoing subsection, concerning the detention of a person in a hospital or the placing of a person under the guardianship of a specified local authority or person, shall cease to have effect if the person the Order refers to is reprosecuted and the case disposed of by a Court.".'.— [Mr. Menzies Campbell.] Brought up, and read the First time. 6 pm Mr. Menzies Campbell I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. I shall try to adopt the spirit of the proceedings. The clause is important but I shall try to deal with it briefly. It seeks to address an issue that has been brought to my attention by Dr. Derek Chiswick, an eminent consultant forensic psychiatrist at the Royal Edinburgh hospital. It seeks to deal with the circumstances that may arise If an accused person is found insane in bar of trial under solemn procedure and is thereafter automatically committed to the state hospital at Carstairs without limit of time by virtue of the provisions of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975. When such a person subsequently becomes sane and fit to plead, he may be brought back to be reprosecuted. However, there is now an automatic procedure whereby the original hospital restriction orders are terminated after reprosecution. Thus it may be the case that accused persons acquitted after reprosecution could, theoretically at least, find themselves still liable to be detained without limit of time in the state hospital at Carstairs. Along with two other eminent colleagues, Dr. Chiswick has written a helpful article on this matter in the Psychiatric Bulletin 1990, volume 14, pages 208–10. That article sets out precisely the kind of circumstances to which I have referred and draws attention to two cases, one arising from proceedings in December 1986 at the High Court in Edinburgh and the second in January 1985 at the Dunoon sheriff court. In each of those cases there was reprosecution. In the first case the accused was acquitted by reason of the judge determining that there was insufficient evidence against her to allow the case to continue and the prosecution to proceed. The second case was slightly different, but in both cases it was necessary for the Secretary of State to authorise an absolute discharge some time after the second set of proceedings had been concluded. I understand that in England and Wales there is a power, similar to the one sought by the new clause, in the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. As the Minister will readily appreciate, the new clause applies not only to solemn proceedings but to summary proceedings. That is precisely the kind of issue which a Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill should address, and it should find favour with the Minister because it involves what I suppose one might describe as a tidying up of the legislative situation in Scotland. Such a situation has not arisen in England because of relevant statutory provisions. I urge the Minister to give the new clause a favourable reception. It can hardly be regarded as contentious and would remove a statutory anomaly which the two cases referred to by Dr. Chiswick and his colleagues plainly demonstrate is urgently required. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton The hon. and learned Gentleman has raised an extremely interesting matter. I have considerable sympathy with what he is trying to achieve and there is some force in the new clause. I shall look carefully at the matter with a view to dealing with it comprehensively at an appropriate time in the future. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising the matter. Mr. Menzies Campbell If the Minister would give a little more urgency to "an appropriate time in the future" I should be satisfied, because cases clearly have arisen and may be likely to arise at any time. The longer the delay, the more likely is the continuation of this statutory anomaly. If the Minister will inject a note of urgency into his undertaking, I shall not find it necessary to press the matter. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton We shall do our best in the light of what is possible. Mr. Menzies Campbell I do not wish to be seen as unreceptive to the Minister's generosity but he could do a little better than that. He is like the drowning man, and I offer him a third and last opportunity to say that the matter will be treated urgently. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton I cannot commit the Government to immediate legislation. I do not know exactly what will be in the Queen's Speech, although its terms will soon be revealed. Obviously, we shall do our best. Mr. Menzies Campbell I accept that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.