wished to be informed what progress had been made with respect to the property tax, and for that purpose intended to move for an account of the assessments returned to the tax-office; if, however, there was any objection he should merely give notice of it for a future day. He also intended to move for an account of the sums paid into, and of the charges upon the consolidated fund, between the 5th of Jan. 1803, and the 5th of January, 1804, distinguishing each quarter. There was another circumstance on which he wished to make a remark, relative to the printing of accounts laid before the House; it frequently happened, from only one copy of an account being laid before the House, which was immediately sent to be printed, that the members were, in the meantime, deprived of all information upon the subject. He concluded by moving for the account he had alluded to respecting the consolidated fund.

said, he saw no objection to the motion; but with respect to the other motion which the hon. gent, had mentioned, relative to the property tax, although he was not aware of any objection, yet he wished to avail himself of the hon. gentleman's wish to give a notice for a future day.—The motion was then agreed to, and Mr. Gregor gave notice of his intention to bring forward the other motion on Monday.

observed, with respect to accounts laid upon the table, that it would be for the convenience of the House if duplicates from the different offices were presented, in order that members might obtain information upon the subjects of these accounts whilst they were printing.

—I now rise, Sir, in pursuance of the notice I gave some time since, to move for certain papers and documents for the purpose of information, and as grounds for further inquiry respecting the war which the King's government in Ceylon has lately been carrying on in that island. I should not have presumed, Sir, to take upon myself the office of calling the attention of the House to this subject, had it not appeared to me of a very limited nature, and one lying within a very narrow compass, or had I perceived a disposition in any other gentleman to do the same thing. As the subject, however, now, Sir, has been some time before the public, as it appears to me to be one of the greatest importance, as no gentleman has appeared disposed to take it up, and as his Majesty's ministers have not thought fit to give this House any information respecting it, I have thought it any duty to introduce it to the consideration of Parliament. As the House and the Public are not in possession of any official account of the course or origin of this war, of many of the transactions which took place in the course of it, and of many of its effects and consequences, I will shortly state to the House such leading particulars as, from the information I am in possession of, I believe to be true. I am certain they are mostly true, and where I am incorrect the papers I shall move for will set me right,—From the year 1795, when we first took the island of Ceylon from the Dutch, to the end of 1802, our government in Ceylon seems to have pursued its proper objects, to have confined itself to the possession of the coast and open countries of the island, to the introduction of wholesome laws and civilization amongst the natives who live under our government, and every thing, I believe, during the period I have mentioned bore the strongest and most flattering prospect of improvement. We had never apparently, during this period, entertained the dangerous policy of interfering with the unprofitable interior of Ceylon, the woods and mountains, and wild inhabitants of the King of Candy's dominions. Some time, however, in 1802, it seems some subjects of the British government had purchased, in Candia, a quantity of the Areka nut, and which, in its way to our settlements, was seized by officers of the Candian government. I have heard that such contracts by Candian subjects are against the laws of that country; but, be that as it may, our government claimed the property, and it was agreed to be restored, or the value to be paid for it—the value, I believe, was 300 certainly not more, and the first difference between the English and the Candian governments was. whether this sum of £300 should be paid instantly or at the expiration of a few months; the real cause, therefore, of the war which was about to take place, was the difference between the prompt and protracted payment of 300 it was in this transaction that our national honour was supposed to he involved, for this our government left its useful occupation, and put all the troops in Ceylon in motion to chastise the King of Candy, to invade his dominions, and seize his capital. It is, perhaps, necessary for me here to state, that the King of Candy's dominions are composed principally of woods and mountains, affording no possible object for any rational enterprise, situated in a climate the most fatal to Europeans, and that his capital is in the heart of his dominions. Some time in January, 1803, this war began, and in a very short time, and scarcely with the loss of ten men killed in battle, we penetrated as far as Candy, which we took, and found the King was fled; so far we were all successful, but then, Sir, came, what our government of Ceylon knew must come, that dreadful malady the jungle fever, that forever infests the interior of Ceylon, and forever destroys the inhabitants of Europe. This fever, Sir, upon this occasion, destroyed hundreds upon hundreds of our troops in Candia; of the 51st regiment alone above 300 perished, of the 19th regiment 170, besides the 200 of the same regiment who were afterwards murdered. One should have thought, Sir, as we had thus displayed our power by the seizure of the King of Candy's capital, and putting the King to flight, as we had paid so dearly for it in the death of our soldiers, and as the country presented no object worthy of our possession, that our government would have instantly withdrawn the surviving troops; but it seems, Sir, our governor was not determined to play a great part in the politics of the Candian government—for this purpose he left a garrison in Candy to secure success to our intrigues, and from this most ridiculous and contemptible interference of ours in the affairs of Candy, come all the dreadful and disastrous consequences we since have heard of. We first dethroned the reigning monarch, and put upon his throne a new king of oar own choice, a person so unskilfully selected for that purpose, so universally odious to the Candians, that we finally withdrew him, and he has since been murdered on account of our partiality to him and his own presumption. We then, Sir, resolved upon changing the Candian monarchy into an aristocracy, and we guaranteed a form of government of this species, and put the first adigar, or first minister at the head of it. During all this time, Sir, the garrison of Candy were daily diminished and enfeebled by death and sickness; there were only left of British troops, the 19th regiment reduced to 200 men, and a Malay regiment; the House will know how to appreciate the climate of Candy when I state to them, that of the 200 of the 10th regiment, 100 were sick in their cots and perfectly disabled. At this period, Sir, the town of Candy was surrounded, I have heard, by 20,000 Candians—certainly, I believe, by not less than 10,000. Our troops cut off from all provisions, reduced by death and sickness as I have mentioned, and the Malay regiment beginning to desert, surrendered, and laid down their arms. The termination of this dreadful tragedy we all know; upwards of twenty British officers, with the 200 unfortunate troops of the 19th regiment were led out two by two in the streets of Candy, and there, by the orders of the very adigar we had guaranteed in his government, they were knocked on the head, and had their throats cut, and this not even with the exception of the 100 sick men of the 19th, who were dragged from their cots and murdered. About the same period all our fortresses in Candia were attacked, all the garrisons compelled, to evacuate them, and all the sick in those fortresses were left and murdered. Thus ended, Sir, our invasion of Candia; it begun in January, and before the end of June our invading army Was all either expelled, had died, or were murdered. From the date of the event I have last alluded to, the destruction of our garrison in Candia, to the latest accounts I have seen, which are dated in September last, the situation of the island became every day more alarming; the Candians elated with the expulsion and destruction of the British had, in immense numbers, invaded our settlements from one end of the island to the other, and, according to the latest accounts, had left us nothing but our forts. The natives or coolies who live under our dominion, men of the most ferocious natures, encouraged by the example and successes of the Candians, were beginning to display the most alarming spirit of disaffec- tion to us; such of the King's troops as remained alive were still under the influence of the diseases they had contracted in the Candian expedition; and, in short, such was supposed to be the danger of the colony on the continent of India as well as at Ceylon, that in the beginning of September, an expedition was fitting out at Calcutta for its immediate assistance. The latest letter that I have seen on this subject is of the 15th of September, and is from Madras; the writer of it states, as a most extraordinary circumstance, that no tidings from Columbo have been received since the 4th, and from this and from other circumstances I have stated, expresses the roost serious apprehensions for the safely of the island. Now, Sir, if this statement be correct, (and I am sure in most parts that it is so) it is, I think, a little extraordinary, that his Majesty's ministers should never have communicated a single syllable of information to Parliament upon a subject of so much importance; I apprehend the facts I have stated are perfectly sufficient to induce Parliament to call upon ministers for the most full and minute particulars respecting a war apparently so rash and so impolitic, apparently so destitute of all advantage, and so evidently fatal and disastrous in its effects; it is the duty of Parliament at all times to examine into and ascertain the objects for which the brave defenders of our country are sacrificed, and it is more peculiarly the duty and the interest of Parliament to do so at this present time. There are, Sir, likewise, circumstances connected with this war, and consequences arising out of it, that more imperiously call upon us to inquire into the conduct of the governor, and which I will briefly state to the House. When we first took possession of Ceylon it was not the least of our advantages, that we took with it all the experience of the preceding settlers, the Dutch. The Dutch had made this particular experiment of subduing the Candians over and over again, they had twice, with as little loss as ourselves, seized the capital and expelled the King, but on every occasion their army was finally destroyed by the same causes which have destroyed ours. It is singular, Sir, that on one occasion the precise calamity which has lately befallen our garrison at Candia befell the Dutch. The Dutch garrison at Candia were compelled to capitulate, and, on their march, and within two days journey of Columbo were, to The amount of 400 men, all murdered. The effect of these experiments upon the Dutch was to convince them, that all attempts upon the interior of Candia were not only fruitless, but fatal to themselves; and, accordingly, for the last twenty years of their settlement in that island, such projects were never again repeated. The present governor of Ceylon was in possession of these facts, and of this experience, before he doomed our soldiers to such inevitable destruction; they are recorded in a very valuable and interesting account of Ceylon, written by an officer of the army we first sent there, and the materials for which history were collected under the immediate eye of the governor. I wish, Sir, the writer of that history had been more correctly prophetic, when he says, "our government will, doubtless, avoid the errors of former European masters of Ceylon, who wasted, unprofitably, in vain 44 attempts to subdue the natives, that time and those resources which might have rendered this island one of the most valuable colonies in the world."—With respect to the consequences of this war (independent of the unprofitable termination of it, and the mortification we must feel at having our brave troops apparently so idly sacrificed) they are really, Sir, of the most alarming nature. I need scarcely remind the House of the contiguity of Ceylon to the continent of India. India is allowed to be the great object of French ambition; we act upon this supposition in all our political calculations; it is with reference to this that Ceylon derives its greatest importance as a conquest; it is with reference to India that the harbour of Trincomale is beyond all value; and yet, Sir, with a war carrying on in India on an enormous scale, with a French squadron in the Indian seas full of troops, so often said to be captured, but still unaccounted for, with the French ports full of vessels and troops ready for expeditions, with a necessity at home for our regular army, move urgent than was ever known, and with that regular army more than ever neglected, we are placed in the distressing dilemma, that we must either, by with-holding assistance from the government of Ceylon, endanger our possession of that most important colony, or we must, in this hour of need and necessity, deprive ourselves of a part of our most valuable and most rare species of defence. I am informed, Sir, that 1000 troops of the line are now embarking, or have embarked already, for Ceylon. I am sure such supply is necessary for the security of the colony; but I ask the House if they will permit the country to make so important a sacrifice without a full and most minute enquiry into what has caused the necessity for so unfortunate a measure. Sir, there is another most dreadful consequence of this war; after the little discretion our government has hitherto shewn in going to war for apparently so trifling an object, I am afraid when the passions and resentment of our countrymen are roused by the recollection of what has lately passed at Candy, I am afraid that any prospect of peace with these Candians is very remote. I am afraid we are doomed to an internal war with this race of people, and that Ceylon, instead of being the valuable acquisition it is so naturally made for, will prove only to be the grave of our armies. I do hope, Sir, that ministers in their dispatches to the governor will not fail to remind and to press upon him the past experience of this island; I hope, Sir, they will remind him of that great lesson for all Europeans, the late fate of St. Domingo. As long, Sir, as the natives of Candia or St. Domingo shall possess the local advantages they now do; as long as the inhabitants of Europe shall be subject to the diseases they now are, I believe, Sir, that all our attempts to subdue the natives of these countries must prove not only fruitless bat fatal to ourselves. I think, Sir, if this war shall appear to have been as rank and impolitic in its origin and commencement, and as calamitous in its consequences as I have stated it to be, I think the opinion of this House will be, that there is abundant matter for enquiry into this subject. There are too, Sir, transactions of this war that I have touched upon before, which I apprehend the House must likewise think call for particular enquiry: I allude to our interference in the politics of Candy; of our dethroning and making of princes and new forms of government in that country. If, Sir, we are really in earnest when we profess our respect for established governments, and our abhorrence of all usurpations; if we really wish for any character of consistency in the eyes of Europe, upon this important subject, it is high time that we bestow some criticism upon the very singular transactions of our colonial governors. I am not aware, Sir, of any other reasons I can adduce in support of the enquiry I wish to be instituted; but before I conclude, Sir, I beg to advert to a very cruel and unfeeling account that has lately been published by his Majesty's ministers, purporting to be a dispatch from the government of Ceylon, and giving an account of the murder of our garrison at Candy. This letter, Sir, is an attempt to account for the final disasters of this war, and which rest entirely with the governor by insinuations the most fatal to the honour and character of a British officer who has fought and who has perished in the service of his country and this, Sir, in the absence of any species of testimony on which such insinuation could be founded I do entreat this House, on behalf of the character of this most unfortunate officer, to recollect Low he was situated:—there were only 200 British troops, 100 of those were sick in their beds; the remaining 40, I presume, were not very healthy, they were surrounded by at least 10,000 Candians, they were cut off from provisions, and they were 60 miles from our nearest settlement: in this situation they were ordered by our new ally, the First Adigar, to lay-down their arms, and they were deserted by the Malays in our service. Does any man believe it to be physically possible that these 40 men, so unhappily circumstanced, could have cut their way through all these difficulties? Of this, at least, we may be certain, that had they attempted so to do, the 160 who were sick would have been murdered. I contend, then, that if in the absence of all testimony respecting the conduct of this unfortunate officer, we allow ourselves to speculate upon his motives, we are bound in fairness to believe, that he W3s influenced by a very natural and generous sympathy for this great majority of his sick and helpless fellow-soldiers, and that in acting as he did, he consulted what he conceived to be the best, not only for himself alone, but for the whole garrison of Candy.—Mr. Creevey concluded by moving for "Copies of all papers, letters, and dispatches, from his Majesty's governor of Ceylon to the government of Candia in that island, and from the Candian government to his Majesty's governor respecting the cause or origin of the war in Ceylon: 2. Copies of all correspondence between his Majesty's governor of Ceylon and officers commanding his Majesty's troops in that island during the war in Ceylon: 3. copies of all treaties entered into between his Majesty's governor of Ceylon and the Candian government: 4. All the returns of his Majesty's forces in Ceylon, from the first of January, 1803, to the present time."—On the first motion being put,

said, he should trouble the House with as few words as possible, as when the papers were laid before the House, they would then have an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the subject. He assented to the general principle, that when a war was entered into in any part of our colonial possessions, unless gov. could slate some reason of expediency for not producing such information, that Parliament had a right to possess itself of full information with respect to the origin and causes of that war. To this point the present motion went, and so far he had no objection; but he should certainly object to any motion which went to produce information as to the state of our force in Ceylon, as that would be shewing the enemy the number of troops we had in the island to defend it, and might tend to invite an attack. It might be also inexpedient to disclose the state of any negotiation carrying on in the island by the governor. He only wished that no prejudicial impression might remain in the minds of gentlemen. The hon. gent. (Mr. Creevey) had stated the war to have originated in a dispute about property to the amount of only 300I. but the value was of little consequence the Candian gov. had long demonstrated an hostile mind towards us, and the detention of property, about which the first dispute took place, was only one of the symptoms of that hostile disposition. The form of the motion was, he said, not accurate, as Ceylon formed no part of the dominions of the East India Company, but was annexed to the Crown; he had, therefore, framed a motion which he would make, if the hon. gent, would consent to withdraw his. He concluded by reading his motion, "that an humble address be presented to his Majesty, praying that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to order to be laid before the House, copies or extracts of such letters and papers as had been received from the hon. Frederick North, governor of Ceylon, relative to the causes of the hostilities which had taken place between his Majesty's gov. and the King of Candy."—Mr. Creevey having consented to withdraw his motion, the motion of Lord Castlereagh was agreed to, Mr. Creevey then moved for copies of all dispatches and letters from the governor of Ceylon to the British officers employed there, and from the latter to the former.

objected to this motion, as calling for information which it would be inexpedient to produce, and therefore moved the previous question.

was utterly astonished at the language held by the noble lord as to the production of this paper. The noble lord had asserted that a time would come when no objection could exist to the production of the paper; but had he given the least argument against its production at the present moment? Had he offered a single little of reason to prove that the present time was not the fit moment for its being laid before Parliament? Was it a matter undeserving of instant inquiry, that a part of our force in Ceylon had sustained not only disaster, but disgrace; that blame had been thrown on the conduct of the officer who commanded that party of troops by the governor of the settlement: and that no document was before Parliament, to enable them to ascertain, whether such an imputation was of was not well founded? He could not conceive a stronger ground of Parliamentary inquiry than that laid down by his hon. friend. Ft was really extraordinary to hear ministers resisting the production of information on a subject where the necessity of information was admitted by every description of mankind who chose for a moment to exercise their judgment. If this was not the moment for inquiry, he wished to know when that moment would arrive? Did the noble lord mean to say that no inquiry should be made till the conclusion of the war? If that was to be the case, the grand object of the motion would be lost. Nothing could then be gained but the punishment of the criminal party. Rat the great object was to prevent the continuance of existing disasters. Viewing the motion as founded on the clearest grounds, it had his most cordial support.

thought that the hon. member who spoke last had not fully understood the force of the noble lord's observations. To him it appeared, that from the noble lord's statement the production of the paper in question would be attended with inconvenience, and this was a fair Parliamentary ground for refusing its production. If the description of the state of Ceylon was such as the hon. mover described it, he thought that the paper relative to this matter ought not to be produced. It could only have the effect of conveying dangerous information to the enemy. The first paper contained every thing now wanted, A time for the production of the others without inconvenience would arrive, and he trusted that this period was not very remote.

was of opinion, that any argument drawn from the impolicy of giving information to the enemy was quite inapplicable. If we looked to the situation of Ceylon, it was evident that before this time, the war must have come to a crisis. Our troops must cither have prevailed, or been expelled from the settlement, or destroyed. Under existing circumstances, besides, it could not be conceived for a moment that the French government would entertain the project of sending such a body of troops to India as would endanger oar eastern possessions. He was decidedly therefore for the inquiry. The noble lord had said that govt. was in posses- sion of very scanty information. This was the general complaint against the governors of all our foreign possessions. They gave such unsatisfactory details as to the most important events, that neither Parliament nor the public were able to form correct opinions on the subject. The motion was calculated to procure more information, and the hon. member who introduced it, deserved the thanks both of the House and the public. He was entitled to thanks for the motion, and the ability with which he had defended it.

in explanation stated, that when he spoke of the scanty information of govt., he alluded to the unfortunate massacre of the garrison of Candy.—Sir. W. Geary strongly supported the motion, and Mr. Wallace was against it.

was astonished at the argument of on hon. general on the other side of the House. That hon. gen. had resisted the motion on a case which he himself did not allow to be in existence. His argument was, that as Ceylon was in state of weakness, it would be improper to produce documents to establish the existence of this weakness. But even while using this argument, he had denied the existence of the case on which it was founded. He himself was decidedly for the inquiry.

was astonished at the sort of argument set up by ministers against the motion. It would be a very curious sort of argument for those entrusted with the management of a ship on a voyage, when a proposition was made to examine her timbers or general state, to say, that such an inquiry would come much better after the vessel got into port. But this was precisely the argument of ministers on the present occasion. His lordship declared, that he doubted much whether there existed means of effectually carrying on with success the war in Ceylon; and surely it was at least prudent to inquire into these means before a resolution was taken to protract so arduous a contest. He had heard a rumour that the governor general of India had determined to attempt the conquest of Candy; and that 10,000 men were to be sent from the Continent of India for that purpose. It behoved the House to know the grounds for the war and the probability of success, before the lives of so many brave men were idly sacrificed. He was therefore decidedly in favour of inquiry.

said, that the papers already ordered would give sufficient information to ground upon them any ulterior decision as to the point whether the war in Ceylon was undertaken on justifiable grounds.—The object, the causes, and circumstances of the war would be explained by these papers, and if the House should then think that the war was unjust, it would be competent for them to advise his Majesty to prevent its thither prosecution. With respect to the statement of the noble lord (Petty) of 10,000 men being about to be sent to Ceylon from Madras, no information of that nature had been received by his Majesty's ministers.—The question was then loudly called for, and the House divided.

moved, that the 35th clause of the 24th of the King, should be read, viz.—"whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation; be it enacted &c.," and then addressed himself to the Speaker to the following effect.—Sir, in moving to have this clause now read, I have two objects, 1st. to remind the House of their own unanimous resolution, on which the subsequent act of Parliament was founded; and then to shew that, in the motion which I propose to submit to the House, I am governed by that resolution, and aim at nothing but to inforce the execution of that law. In this purpose, and on this ground, I hope for the support and concurrence of the House; because I do not believe it, will be asserted by any man, that it is very right to pass laws for the better government of a distant, dominion, and very wrong to inquire whether such laws are obeyed or not In my opinion it would be a wiser policy and a safer practice not to make any laws, than to suffer them to be slighted with impunity. Habits of disobedience are very catching; and they are the more dangerous in proportion to the distance of the offending parties, and to the facility which that distance gives them, to conceal or disguise their transactions. I state these principles generally, as a rational ground of parliamentary suspicion and inquiry, whenever the government of India appear to be engaged in measures which the law prohibits; and not at all meaning to affirm, that such measures, when they are thoroughly examined, may not admit of a sufficient justification. The business and duty of this day does not call upon me to accuse any man, or to affirm that anything deserving the censure of Parliament has been done. My object is to inquire, and then, according to the result of the inquiry, to desist or to proceed. All I contend for, in the first instance, is, that a British governor who commences a war in India, is prima facie doing that which the law prohibits; that his own act of itself puts him on his defence; that he is bound to justify on the case; and that; until he has so justified his conduct, the presumptions are against him. All the authorities of this, country have muted with one voice to condemn arid forbid the carrying on war in India for any purpose but defence, or on any ground but necessity. I need not tell the House that the practice in India has been almost uniformly, or with very short exceptions, directly opposed to the prohibition. While the Directors of the India Company had any power, they certainly laid down very wise principles, and gave very proper orders on this subject. When their power over their own governors was found to be insufficient, the legislature interposed, but, as it appears by the facts, with no more success than the Directors. Since the prohibitory act passed in 1783, I appeal to the House whether we have heard of any thing from India but war and conquest; many victories, and great acquisitions, with only now and then a short interval of repose, to take breath and begin again. There is another ground of presumption against the necessity and justice of these wars, which seems to me as strong and conclusive, as any presumption can be before the contrary is proved; I mean, Sir, that almost all these wars are supposed to originate in acts of provocation and aggression committed by the weak against the strong. The strength of any single Indian state at any time, and now I believe of all of them put together, is not to be compared to the military power and resources of the English. I do not say that these nations have no means of defence, or that the Mahrattas for example, can do us no mischief; but that, considering the great disparity of force, it requires very clear evidence to make it credible, that whereas the disposition of the British power in India, is always, if possible, to preserve the peace, and to be satisfied with what we possess, this excellent disposition is never suffered to prevail because the Indian Princes are so restless and unruly, that we cannot, in common justice to ourselves, retrain from invading them. The fable says, the fierce, rebellious lamb, would never suffer the mild, gentle, moderate wolf to be quiet: it it was not you it was your father. These propositions may be true., but they require some proof; and, when the proof is produced, I shall desire it always to be observed and remembered that the evidence, that comes before us, is ex parte. We hear little or nothing of what the opposite, and possibly the injured party, have to say for themselves. Ever since I have known any thing of Indian affairs, I have found that the prevailing disease of our governments there has been a rage for making war. The strong though ineffectual remedies which have from time to time been applied to this disorder, are a sufficient proof of its existence. That individuals may find their account in the conduct of such wars, I do not mean to dispute. But I deny that they are or can be for the benefit of the India Company or the nation, particularly in the present circumstances of the Company's affairs. In these circumstances, and in actual possession of half the peninsula, you engage in a new war with the Mahrattas, the success of which can give you nothing but an addition of territory, which you cannot keep without an intolerable increase of your military establishments, and a perpetual drain of all your resources, of men as well as money, and which you ought not to keep if you could. Whether the Mahrattas have united in defence of their country, or to carry the war into the heart of our best provinces, as they have done in former times, or with what loss or expense our success against them may have been purchased, are questions on which we are utterly in the dark. By public report alone we are informed, that a war of great, extent at least, and liable to many important consequences, is now carrying on in India, and that no information of it has been communicated to Parliament. Sir, I can safely assure this I House, that the Mahrattas, though not capable of meeting us in the field, or at all likely to encounter us in a pitched battle, are nevertheless very well able to do us a great deal of mischief. In the year 1778, the Presidency of Bombay received and gave their protection to a Mahratta fugitive called Ragoba, and muttered all the force they could collect lo escort him back to Poona and to make themselves masters of that place. If the expedition had succeeded, I do not doubt that the persons who were engaged in it, would have been very well paid for their trouble. The event was, that their army was surrounded, starved, and compelled to capitulate. At some earlier periods of the history of India, the Mahrattas have frequently crossed the rivers arid made rapid incursions into the upper provinces of Bengal and Bahar, carrying universal desolation with them wherever they went, ruining the country, and making it impossible to collect the revenues. I know no reason, why they may not make the same attempts again, and with the same success. With such bodies of horse as they can collect at a very short warning, from fifty to a hundred thousand in different quarters, they may pour into our provinces, over run and lay waste the country, and then make their retreat with the same rapidity, without its being possible for us either to meet or to overtake them. This is their mode of making war, and it has always succeeded with them They are the Tartars of India. In these circumstances, I ask, is it proper or not that Parliament should know, why this war was undertaken, for what purposes it has been pursued, and with what success it has been attended; and finally, has it the sanction and approbation of the Court of Directors, and of his Majesty's ministers? I cannot believe it possible.—If it should be stated, as I have some reason to expect it may, that the papers to which these motions allude, have not in fact been received by the Court of Directors, that answer must silence me for the present, but I must say that, in another point of view, it will be very unsatisfactory. The orders given by lord Wellesley, in consequence of which the hostilities began on the Malabar coast, must have been dated some time in June or early in July last. I beg of the House to observe the dates: we are now in the middle of March; so that 8 months and a half must have elapsed since the orders were given, and no information received at home on that subject. This is a case which the act of Parliament has foreseen and provided for. The words of the law are, that "in all cases, where hostilities shall be commenced or treaty made, the governor general and council shall, by the most expeditious mean they can devise, communicate the same to the Court of Directors, together with a full state of the information and intelligence upon which they shall have commenced such hostilities or made such treaties, and their motives and reasons for the same at large." Until it shall appear in evidence that this delay of information directly from Lord Wellesley is no; owing to any neglect or omission on his part, I am bound to presume that there is a fault somewhere. Supposing the measures in question should appear, upon inquiry, to deserve censure, that cause, of censure will be greatly aggravated by the neglect of sending home; timely information on the whole subject.—I am not able to foresee what sort of objection ran be stated to the motions for papers, I with which I mean to conclude. I rather hope for the acquiescence of the noble lord on the other side. At all events, I hope and expect, that persona character, or the persona confidence due to any man, will not be alleged in bar to this inquiry. At prefect there is no charge, and there ought to be no defence. If have laid sufficient ground for inquiry, we are bound of inquire of crimination should follow, it must be answered, not by character, but by proof, When an inquiry was moved for is this House, in the year 1791, into the causes of; the first war with Tippoo Sultaun, no man's reputation stood higher in the estimation of the public than that of Lord Cornwallis. But I do not remember that any opposition I to the inquiry was set up on the score of his personal character, though none was more generally respected. On the contrary, his Majesty's ministers met the inquiry fairly, and thought they could not defend his conduct better than by giving us all the information they possessed. I hope and I expect that the noble lord, now at the head of the Indian department, will follow that example. He professes to invite and encourage a free discussion of all Indian questions If not, and if the motion, with which I am now about to conclude, should be resisted, I think the House will be reduced to one of these two conclusions; either that there is something in the personal merits of Lord Wellesley, which entitles him to greater confidence than was thought due to Lord Cornwallis; or that there has been something in his conduct, to which no other defence can be applied but a favourable opinion of his character. I move you, Sir, "That there be laid before this House copies or extracts of all dispatches received from the governor general of Bengal, or from the presidencies of fort St. George and Bombay, as far as such dispatches relate to or account for hostilities, now or lately subsisting between the said governments and any of the Mahratta princes or states with the dates of the receipts of such dispatches."—"Copies or extracts of all the correspondence between the said governments and any of the Mahratta princes or states, relative to the said hostilities."—"Copies or extracts of all orders or instructions sent to India by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, on the same subject."—On the question being put from the chair,

rose. He expressed his approbation of the candid manner in which the hon. gent, had introduced his motion, and joined issue completely with him in regard to the general principle, that the cause of the war is a very proper subject of parliamentary inquiry. Independent of the acts, he was ready, his lordship said, to admit of the propriety of an inquiry, both as a matter of policy and justice.—But the question was at present, whether such, an inquiry could be safely made in the present circumstances. And here he differed, his lordship said, very materially from the hon. gent. Independently of the disadvantages that might arise from such an investigation, during a war not yet terminated, on which he was not disposed to lay very great stress, he had stronger and very ostensible reasons for objecting to the motion. The government were not in possession of the circumstances that preceded the rupture; and, therefore, any investigation of the kind proposed by the present motion, must necessarily terminate unsatisfactorily, and to the obvious prejudice of the noble lord (Wellesley) to whom the government of India was entrusted. Without having all the circumstances that led to the war, it would be impossible to form a proper estimate of the case, or to do any justice to the conduct of the governor-general. The Mouse must wait, therefore, till the necessary communications be received by his Majesty's government. Such a communication was soon to be expected. That it should have been made sooner was impossible, from the date at which the war took place. It had been said that the war commenced in the beginning of June, but instead of this it was not till the 6th of August that hostilities took place. The communications between the Mysore and Poonah could not be effected in less than a month, and the latest communications received from Madras were of the first of September: there must be necessarily many documents therefore, in regard to the preliminaries, of which government could not be in possession, and which were absolutely necessary to do justice to die noble lord's conduct. He bad no objection to the principle, but be was not able at present to comply with the motion. He was ready, however, as soon as government should be in possession of the necessary documents, net only to comply with the motion, but even apprize the hon. gent, as soon as such dispatches are received.

was of opinion that, though the war might not have commented till the period stated by the noble lord, yet there must necessarily be many circumstances previous to open hostilities which ought certainly to have been communicated to government. It was not of the 6th of August only to which he wished to look back but to trace the war to its source. From the moment that orders had been given, to march the troops from the Mysore, the commencement of the war was certainly to be dated The very march of that army, he would insist, was against the acts and resolutions of the House as much as any event on the 6tb of August. The moment Lord Wellesley issued those orders to his army, he ought to have sent dispatches at the same time to this country, stating his reasons for such measures; But he was apprehensive there was too frequently a suppression of documents. All the proceedings of the government of India ought to appear on the records of the Company, and be regularly transmitted to this country. Were this the case, we should at all times have the fullest information. He was afraid that the war had originated in aggression on our part, and was owing to that spirit of ambition that had been too prevalent in India, and which particularly had characterized the government of the noble lord. But, whatever be the issue of the war, he contended, it mast be disastrous in its consequences. If attended with success, our empire in India must be as large as the two peninsulas, and consequently ready to fall in pieces by its own weight But, should we be defeated in our attempts at aggrandizement, the most probable, consequence is, that we shall be turned out of India, and a period put at once to our empire Here the hon. gent, insisted on the power and influence of the Mahrattas: In our former wars in India, our resources had been derived from there-venues of Bengal, which always remained untouched: but here the case was extremely different. The revenues of Bengal would be immediately affected; and in case of defeat, or in case, which was not; at all improbable, of the enemy laying waste the country, the consequences might be fatal. The present case resembled, in some degree, perhaps that of the Carnatic. The dispatches to which the noble lord alludes to, and for which he desires us to wait, may in all probability contain nothing. Such was the case exactly in the dispatches from Lord Clive, in regard to the Carnatic,

was ready to admit the importance of the communications in regard to the causes of the war; but the end also of the correspondence was certainly equally important, and absolutely necessary either to justify or condemn the conduct of the governor-general in his commencement of hostilities.

thought that reasons might; have been assigned by the governor-general for the issue of his orders to the troops to march, which had happened two months previous to the period alluded to by the noble lord. He was willing, however, to rely on the engagement which the noble lord had taken on himself to apprize him of the first arrival of the necessary dispatches, and begged leave therefore, at present, to withdraw his motion.—The other orders of the day being disposed of, the House adjourned till to-morrow.