moved, that the order of the day should be read for the committal of this bill; but, previously to his moving that the speaker do leave the chair, he took the opportunity of mentioning, that by inadvertency a clause had been introduced into the bill which would appear to throw the expense that would attend this measure altogether upon Ireland; this certainly would be unjust, and it was far from the intention of govt.; he therefore intended to remedy this, when the bill should go into a committee, if such was he pleasure of the house. He then moved, that the speaker should quit the chair.

said, that the bill upon the table bore so near a relation to that which had been under discussion last night, and both of them had so close a connexion with others which his Majesty's ministers had in contemplation, that they must be considered not as separate measures each complete in itself, but as component parts of one general plan.—Indeed, the right hon. Sec. of State in opening this business to the house, after a statement (on which he should presently make a few remarks) of the actual amount of the force which had been provided for the defence of the empire, had proceeded very properly to bring under one view the whole of the measures by which it was proposed to procure a disposable force for future offensive operations: and, although the several parts of this plan were now brought successively before the house in separate bills, yet no one of them could, with propriety, be discussed or decided upon, without reference to the others.—He should therefore think it necessary to say a very few words upon the bill for empowering his Majesty to accept the voluntary offers of the Irish militia, before he proceeded to comment upon that which provided for the augmentation of that force. With respect to the former, he said, that he had last night come down to the house with a determination to give it his support, but that the only grounds upon which he should have done so had been so distinctly disavowed by His Majesty's ministers, that he was greatly embarrassed what course to pursue. The principle of the measure had been combated by arguments so strong in themselves, so forcibly stated, and so completely unanswered, that had he come to a decision in consequence of what he heard in the debate, he must, in opposition to his original intention, have voted against the bill. Still however his objections to having a large body of Irish militia acting in Ireland were so strong, that notwithstanding the force of the arguments urged by the opposers of the measure and the weakness of those by which it was defended, he would have adhered to his resolution of giving it his support, had it not been for the very explicit declaration made towards the close of the debate by a noble lord (Castlereagh), which left him little reason to hope that the object which he had in view would be accomplished. Under these circumstances, approving of the measure as an abstract question, but desparing of its being so made use of as to produce the effects for the sake of which alone he did approve of it, he had really been so much at a loss which way to vote, that he had left the house without voting at all.—But although he had experienced this difficulty and embarrassment upon the former bill, he felt not the smallest hesitation in giving his decided negative to the present one. He disapproved of the augmentation of the Irish militia, not only from considerations peculiar to Ireland, but also upon the more general principle of the impolicy of increasing, in either part of the United Kingdom, that local force, whose services, if the general defence of the state required their being employed in the other, must be accepted as a favour, and could not be required as a duty. The inconveniencies resulting from this state of things, were, in his opinion, perfectly sufficient reasons against any increase of the militia either in Great-Britain or Ireland; and instead of giving his consent to such an augmentation, he must, on the contrary, express his wish that we had no embodied militia at all. He did not mean to say we ought not to have any militia in Great-Britain, but that it ought not to form any part of our embodied force. In considering the situation of Ireland, he said, that whatever delicacy other gentlemen might feel, he for one had no scruple in declaring openly that he did not think it good policy to employ, in that country, a large body of regiments composed entirely of Irishmen. But in saying this he must beg it to be distinctly understood, that he did not mean to cast the smallest reflection upon the Irish militia, nor to insinuate that there was any reason whatever to suspect them of disloyalty. In the year 1798 they had conducted themselves in a manner that did them the highest honour; and their allegiance and loyally had triumphed over all the efforts that were made to seduce them. He trusted too that those of the present day were as faithful and as warmly attached to his Majesty as any other part of his forces. Those who had made the voluntary offers to come to Great-Britain had certainly given the most convincing proofs of such a disposition; and he had no reason to doubt of the others being equally well disposed. Still however he must contend that it would be more wise to employ the Irish soldiers any where else than in their own country, in which, if we look back at the events of the last five or six years, we shall find too much reason to believe that great disaffection must still prevail.—He was convinced that he did not exaggerate when he said, that the conspiracy, which existed in the year 1798, comprized nearly three-fourths of the people of that country. The insurrection or civil war which was the consequence of the conspiracy had been preceded by many atrocities on the part of the disaffected, but it had also been attended in its progress, as all civil wars are, with acts of great violence on both sides; and although the insurgents had been defeated and subdued; yet, after all that passed during the contest, it was not natural to suppose that the animosity and hostile spirit which induced them to take arms against us, should have been assuaged by the defects which they experienced, and the punishments which had been inflicted.—Force and severity, however necessary to suppress rebellion, could net possibly conciliate the affections of the people; and he should be glad to know what step had since been taken for the purpose of removing the causes of discontent, and of making the Irish satisfied with their situation and attached to the government. What had been done which could entitle us to suppose that we now possessed the good will of those, who so few years ago were our inveterate enemies?—The union was the only great change or remarkable feature, in our conduct towards Ireland since the rebellion; and it was impossible to think of the union, without feeling the deepest regret, that that great measure, which might have been made the means of conciliating the affections of the Irish people, and consolidating the strength of the empire, had not been allowed to produce any of those consequences which the best and sincerest friends of the King, of the Monarchy, and of the two countries, had expected to result from it. Hitherto the union had been productive of no advantage whatever to the Irish; and so far from having been made, as it might have been, a means of conciliating their affection, it was natural for us to suppose, that the contrary must have been the case, when we considered that the great object which they hoped to obtain by it, that which they expected to be the first consequence of the union, and which they considered as the price of their acquiescence in it, had been positively withheld. Considering therefore, that from the suppression of the rebellion in 1798 to this time, no material change had taken place in the situation of Ireland, or in our conduct towards that country, except the union, in which all their hopes had been disappointed, he could not conceive upon what grounds it was that some gentlemen seemed to indulge the idea that they were now so well affected to the govt., as to make it wholly improbable that that country should again become the scene of insurrection and civil war.—He remembered that in the last session, when some gentlemen were giving us fine accounts of the general loyalty of the Irish people, he had ventured to express his doubts of the possibility of so great a change having been so soon effected, without any apparent cause. His doubts had not been very well received; but unfortunately, in less than three weeks afterwards, an insurrection had broken out in the city of Dublin, sufficiently serious to induce govt. and parliament to grant to the lord lieut. the power of declaring martial law. In the present session, this measure had been renewed; and it was impossible for ministers to justify their having proposed it to the house upon any other ground than that of Ireland being still in such a state, as to give cause for apprehending fresh insurrections. Under these circumstances, he thought that nothing but necessity could justify your keeping in Ireland a large body of Irish militia, taken, as they are, from amongst that class of people of whom there is reason to believe that so large a proportion is disaffected. Nothing but necessity could justify your placing them in a situation where their allegiance would probably be put to a test so severe, that though he did not say that they would not stand it, (for he knew that in the last war their loyalty had resisted every attack, and triumphed over every other feeling) yet it was a trial to which he would not wantonly and unnecessarily expose them. It was not consistent with prudence, with wisdom, with common sense, or even with humanity, wantonly to place brave men in a situation where the best and strongest feelings of human nature, the ties of consanguinity, the affections of a son, a brother, or a father, may come in competition with the allegiance of the soldier. This was a trial to which he, for one, would not consent to expose them, without absolute necessity.—He therefore regretted that any Irish militia had been raised, and should object to its augmentation; believing, as he did, that it was just as easy in that country to procure a force of a different description. Ministers themselves seemed, indeed, to acknowledge that this addition of 10,000 men to the militia establishment of Ireland, was become advisable only in consequence of the voluntary offers which a part of them had made to come to Great Britain: but it was impossible to deny, that there was much inconvenience in being dependent for this extension of their services upon their own voluntary offers; and that it would be much better that the terms of their engagement should be such as to enable his Majesty to command their service in any part of the empire. He therefore could not conceive why, if they could not procure troops of the line, they did not, on the present occasion, have recourse to raising fencible regiments in preference to militia; and he was convinced that the former might be got as easily as the latter, if you extended to them the advantages, now exclusively enjoyed by the militia, of having their families provided for, an advantage which, as well as every other, was surely as fairly due to fencibles and troops of the line, as to that branch of the public force, whose service is most limited.—A noble lord had assigned as one reason in favour of this militia augmentation, that a certain number of men added to an established regiment, would be sooner disciplined and fit for service than if formed into entire new corps. He perfectly agreed with the noble lord as to the general principle, which he himself had strongly insisted upon when he recommended engrafting the army of reserve on the old regiments of the line; but he could not approve of the application of this principle in the present instance, because he objected to any increase whatever of the militia force. If there should be any difficulty of procuring proper officers for the fencibles, a considerable number might be taken from the sixteen reserve battalions, which were so inefficient in the number and the quality of their men, that he considered a very great portion of their officers as being, in their present situation, lost to the service.—With respect to the statement of the effective strength of the forces now actually on foot, which had been made by the right hon. sec. of state, in the speech with which he had introduced these measures to the house, he should at present make only two or three short observations upon it, reserving to himself the right of entering more fully into that subject on a future occasion. In the first place, he must observe, that this statement did, upon the face of it, bear some marks of inaccuracy, and that it would therefore be much more satisfactory if the right hon. gent. would lay before the house the actual returns, of which he professed to give them an abstract: and, secondly, he must observe, that from the manner in which this statement was made, many members of the house would be led to suppose our regular infantry to be much stronger than it really was; in attempting to prove which he could be guilty of no impropriety, because he had access to no documents but what every man in the country might procure as well as himself.—The right hon. sec. had began his statement by saying, that the effective strength of the regulars and militia in Great-Britain, Ireland, and the islands in the Channel, amounted to 199,000 men. When he afterwards proceeded to describe the different species of troops of which this force consisted, he had said nothing of the cavalry; but he had stated, that the regular infantry amounted to 90,000, and the militia to 99,000. The infantry and militia would therefore, according to this statement, amount to 189,000, which being deducted from the total number of 199,000, would leave only 10,000 men for the cavalry; whereas the establishment of cavalry for borne service, as voted by parliament, was 25,019. So that admitting the other parts of the right hon. secretary's statement to be accurate, there would be a deficiency of 15,000 men in the cavalry, which appeared to him to be impossible; and he should rather be inclined to suppose, that taking the whole force at 199,000, and the militia at 99,000, the remaining 100,000 must consist of nearly 20,000 cavalry, and not much above 80,000 infantry. But even supposing the infantry to be 90,000, still it was evident, that great deductions must be made from this gross number in order to ascertain the real effective strength fit for field service. In the first place must be deducted between 5 and 6000 men for the seven garrison or invalid battalions: in the second place, the right hon. sec. had included officers, serjeants and drummers; whereas in talking of the effective strength of regiments, it was the custom of the service to state the numbers of rank and file only: and in the third place it must be observed, that the 16 reserve battalions, which were also included in the 90,000, were composed of the refuse of the men raised under the reserve act; men, whom the regiments of the army, and even the second battalions, had refused to take, and of whom he believed he might say without exaggeration, that 7 or 8,000 were unfit for field service. After making all these deductions, he believed that the 90,000 would be reduced to about 66,000 rank and file; of whom between 5 and 6000 were in Jersey and Guernsey, leaving about 60,000 in Great Britain and Ireland; of which, it would appear, that nearly 25,000 rank and file were in the latter country, and 35,000 in this. But his Majesty's ministers had said, that the Irish militia, whom it is intended to bring to England, would be replaced by an equivalent number of the regiments of the line, or second battalions from hence; so that supposing 6000 men of this description to be sent to Ireland, the whole of the regular infantry (including second battalions) remaining in Great-Britain would be 29,000 rank and file. It must however be remembered, that this computation was founded on the supposition that the gross number of infantry, including officers, serjeants and drummers, and also including garrison and reserve battalions, amounted to 90,000; but he had before observed, that upon the face of the right hon. secretary's own statement, there appeared reason to believe, that this was a mistake. He had already remarked, that the establishment of cavalry voted by parliament for home service being 25,000, it was not presumable that their effective strength could be much below 20,000; particularly as an augmentation of the establishment from 22 to 25,000 had lately been voted; that therefore the whole force being 199,000, and the militia 99,000, the remaining 100,000 probably consisted of about 20,000 cavalry, and about 80,000 infantry. He had also shewn, that taking the gross amount of infantry in Great-Britain, Ireland, and the islands in the Channel to be 90,000, the effective rank and file in Great-Britain would be only 35,000; and therefore, if the former number was a mistake, and ought to have been stated at 80,000, the latter would, of course, be reduced to 25,000:—and in that case, after sending a part of this force to replace the Irish militia, we should not have more than 20,000 infantry fit for field-service in Great-Britain.—He concluded by saying, that being convinced of the necessity of a great and immediate augmentation of our regular infantry, he should at the proper stage of the measures now in progress, take an opportunity of submitting to the house his opinions of the most effectual way of accomplishing it. In the mean-time he thought it his duty to endeavour to shew, what was the real state of that part of our force, as well as such imperfect documents as he had access to, could enable him to ascertain it; and there could be no impropriety in his entering into these details, because they were grounded only upon such information as was open to every man as well as to himself. If, howevever, it should appear, that from want of better information he had underrated our force, it would be easy for his Majesty's ministers to convince the house and himself of his error, by laying upon the table the actual returns of the army, from which their own statements were taken. He was well aware, that there might sometimes be sufficient reasons for not making public the real effective strength of the force existing in the country; but after his Majesty's ministers had volunteered coming forward with a statement of the actual amount of each branch of that force, there could be no impropriety in his asking for the official documents upon which that statement was founded; nor could they, under such circumstances, urge any consideration of prudence or of necessary secrecy, as an objection to the production of them.

said, he did not feel it necessary to follow the hon. officer minutely through the whole detail of his arguments, but merely to apply himself to a few points that he thought should not pass unnoticed: and first, with respect to the subject of the Union, which the hon. officer seemed to think so barren of the good consequences it was expected to produce. He believed it never could have been rationally expected, or feasibly promised by any man, that all the good effects to be hoped from that measure, were to be realized in the short period that has elapsed since it was effected. Those benefits must, in the ordinary course of things, be of gradual growth. What portion of them had hither to obtain- ed, he would leave it for those hon. gents., representatives of that country, whom he saw around him, to declare, which they were competent to do, from their local knowledge and observation. With respect to the bill now before the house, he begged to observe, that it was not in fact for any extraordinary augmentation of the militia of Ireland, to which branch of the service the hon. officer so much objected, but to fill up that vacancy which would be created in that militia, if it should be thought expedient by his Majesty to transfer 10,000 of them to this country; and, even if hey should not be so transferred, the present bill would do no more than raise the militia force of Ireland to the numbers at which they stood during the last war. With respect to the nature of the militia force, he only felt it necessary to say, that, as a matter of opinion he differed from the hon. officer; and he thought he was well warranted in so differing from that opinion, by the gallant conduct of that militia in the time of the rebellion, and the efficient bravery they had shewn, not only in repelling a domestic, but a foreign enemy, aided, certainly, by another body of their brave and loyal countrymen, of whom he never could speak without the highest and most honourable commendation, the Yeomanry of Ireland. With respect to the general strength of the United Kingdom, upon which so many invidious comments were so frequently made, he considered it really so formidable as to leave very little apprehensions of any inconvenience that could result from the scrutinies of the hon. officer, even upon the minutest details of the public force. For looking around him to the gallantry, the heroism, and the prowess, perpetually displayed by British troops in every quarter of the globe; contemplating the achievements recently effected by a mere handful of British troops in India, over the most formidable and numerous armies of the native powers; viewing a few detachments of British cavalry and infantry, annihilating whole armies of 40 or 50,000 men, storming their fortresses, and capturing their artillery; he had no apprehensions for alarm when he looked at home, and viewed such a bulwark for our defence, as an army of 160,000 such troops presented to the foe. When he saw 10,000 such cavalry as the handful that cut to pieces the 20,000 chosen men of Scindia's army; when he viewed a train of 700 pieces of artillery, manned by 7,000 well trained Britions to give them effect, he felt none of that alarm which seemed to affect the hon. gent.

opposed the present bill, not merely as a distinct and detached measure, but as coupled with the bill of last night, to which he also strongly objected as part of a system towards Ireland, which he totally disapproved, and which was designed and calculated to undermine the constitutional principle of a national militia, evinced, first by encouraging the militia to volunteer into the army of the line, next, by admitting as officers of militia, persons who were rather strangers, and possessed no qualification in the respective counties into whose regiments they were admitted; and now, by recruiting men for the militia by bounties, and not by ballot. The noble lord, in the course of his speech, made some allusions to the letters lately written by a noble law lord in Ireland, in which it was asserted, that the lower classes of the people of Ireland were incapable of being rendered loyal subjects to a protestant govt.; a declaration, not only falsified by the whole tenor of historical facts, but coming from such authority, admirably calculated to insult national feeling, and to excite disaffection even where it never existed before.

said, he was one of those who had voted for the measure of Union, which had been alluded to, and who was convinced it was the sentiment of the enlightened people of Ireland, that it was a measure fraught with the happiest consequences to that country; and, though it was not to be expected that, in so short a time, the measure could have produced any thing like its full effects, yet it certainly had produced one thing that laid the foundation for those good effects which he doubted not would rapidly follow. It removed that most objectionable of all political principles, the separate existence of two co-ordinate and independent legislatures in the same state, which constantly exposed the tranquillity of the Empire to dangers arising from discord and mutual strife, which ambitious or designing men might promote by the agitation of irritating questions. Though he was a native of Ireland, he had spent 40 years of his life in this country, 37 of which he had had the honour to be a member of that house, and therefore he must be supposed free from national prejudice. He would declare his own conviction, founded upon the sentiments of other gents. most conversant in the local state of that country, that of the whole mass of the lower orders of the community there, more especially in the Southern provinces, one-third, at least, were of a description that in every war which involved the empire, were rather to be considered dangerous than friendly to the state; men of dissolute and riotous dispositions, easily moulded to the mischievous designs of seditious demagogues: of this description of men it was desirable to get as many as possible out of the country; because thus they would be removed out of the way of temptation, and have their minds improved, by seeing the manners of other countries, and acquire new habits of industry. Removed from home, and forming part of those armies that carried the glory of British arms to the farthest parts of the globe, there were no men on earth more distinguished for their bravery and loyalty; in the various walks of industry, none more distinguished for their perseverance. But, if there ever was a measure more eminently calculated than all others to promote the true ends of the union, it was that of the bill for bringing into this country 10,000 of the Irish militia, because it would transfer men from their home; when heated by whiskey, and prejudiced by local ignorance and bad connexions, they would have an opportunity of witnessing, in this country, the happy effects of sobriety, industry, and subordination to the laws; and they would carry back with them to their own country, new ideas, and new habits, tending more than any thing else to promote the intercourse and the attachment so desirable between the countries, and ultimately to render the inhabitants of both as one people.

opposed the bill, principally on the same ground with the hon. Col. (Craufurd), whose observations upon the state of the public force he fully adopted, and from which he argued, that the present force of the country, in infantry of the line, did not exceed 20,000 men; and notwithstanding the exultation of the right hon. gent. of the formidable state of our public force, he charged his Majesty's ministers with the grossest inattention towards our foreign possessions. For, loudly as the right hon. gent. had exulted in the successes of our arms in India, he seemed to forget, that the almost defenceless state of our West-India possessions, rendered our security in that important quarter extremely problematical; while, by the grossest inattention to our concerns in Africa, and notwithstanding the boasted possession of 1800 ships for our general defence, the enemy had been suffered to wrest from us our most important possession in that quarter of the globe. Towards our possessions in Ceylon, their negligence had been equally reprehensible, nor was it at all certain that the island remained at this hour in our possession; and, with reference to our recent successes in India, which had been so much the subject of exultation, it was yet to be considered, whether those successes were really grounds for triumph. At all events, they were purchased at an expense of blood and of brave men, which created the necessity of recruiting our forces in that country by new drains upon the population of this; and which, the more our territories were extended, the greater would be that necessity at a time when our situation at home tendered it the more embarrassing; while, the more extensive our new acquisitions, the more difficult their defence, and consequently the more uncertain must be the permanence of our tenure. The hon. baronet then, adverting to the situation of our home affairs, observed, that through the incompetence of his Majesty's ministers, we were reduced to a dilemma unparalleled in the history of any nation. We were driven by his Majesty's ministers out of a peace which they made, and did not know how to keep, but which they acknowledged to be untenable, into a war, which they knew not how to conduct, in which we were left without an ally in the world. We were carrying on that war by the most ruinous and inefficacious system on earth, that of a blockade; in which we were wearing out our navy, and exhausting the spirits, the patience, the vigour of our men, and the treasure of our country; and now, finding the raising of even the militia by ballot no longer practicable, it was proposed to resort to bounties upon a reduced scale, which, even at double the rate, had been found ineffectual. Such a system he considered as inevitably ruinous to all means of defence, and thought it absolutely necessary to proceed immediately to some active operation, and to strike some blow which might at once give activity to the native gallantry of our troops and seamen, instead of exhausting their hopes and sinking their spirits in a tardy and inactive vigilance upon the preparatory operations of the enemy. He wished to press on his Majesty's ministers a broad view of what ought to be done. It was not enough if our defence was amply provided for, which he doubted; he wished them to think of a more becoming exertion, to rouse them from the lethargy, the dream in which they were plunged. He would address to them the words of the antient Roman—"si dormis, expergiscere: si expergisceris, sta; si stas, ingredere; si ingrederis, curre; si curris, advola."

observed, that while gentlemen maintained nothing had been done for the defence and security of the country, he should be glad to hear from those who entertained that opinion, what wiser and more effectual plan they themselves had in view for the same desirable end. As to the force which was at that moment in activity, he was convinced it was as large and efficient as any that could have been provided; and he had every just ground to believe, that not a single man more could have been raised to render the disposable force more numerous. When gentlemen conceived themselves so very strongly founded in their opinions, was he not, he should ask, as strongly justified in calling for proofs in support of these assertions?

said, he had voted for the measure under consideration last night, but he considered the present as a totally separate measure. He, therefore, conceived there would be no inconsistency in voting for that, and against this. The motive of his vote last night was, an opinion that the measure then under consideration went to perfect the union between Great-Britain and Ireland; for without some measure of this nature, a legislative act was insufficient to produce a complete union. He was sorry, however, to find that motives of local convenience were stated in objection to it. The militia having been formed here subsequent to the union with Scotland, its services were, of coarse, applicable to the whole extent of Great-Britain; since an union had taken place between Great-Britain and Ireland, he saw no reason why the militia of either should not be mutually applicable to the service of the other. He supported the union on the principle of a community of defence, and he should not have supported it if he had not had such a confidence. He confessed, that his hopes on this head were much weakened when he became acquainted with the resolutions of the meeting of lords lieutenants of counties and members of parliament holding commissions in the militia, at the Thatched-house tavern, held yesterday, in opposition to such a measure. When resolutions of that kind came from persons deeply interested in the well-being of Ireland, from possessing property in that country, and, trout the same cause, likely to be act uainted with the value of that part of the empire, he was surprised that such persons should not have thought it their duty to sacrifice motives of personal convenience to the common defence. He hoped, however, the time would soon come, when the interchange would be carried into effect, as the meeting he had alluded to, assumed that such a measure was already before the legislature. He trusted, at least, that 10,000 highly disciplined Irish militia would not be replaced by new levies. He wished to have British militia substituted; at any rate, he hoped it would not be by a force not capable of being trained in less than eighteen months, neither could he think of the army of reserve as an equivalent, after it had been pinked of every good man to fill up the regiments of the line. He had always doubted whether a militia was the best force for Ireland; he had now a particular objection to this augmentation. It was intended to augment the regular army, and the augmentation of the militia would create a ruinous competition in the country, which was absolutely the best market. He thought it better to raise men in the first instance for general service, or at least for service in the whole extent of the empire, than to raise them for a service from which it was necessary to bring them, by a variety of volunteer offers, to a state in which they would be more generally available. He dissented from the present measure. Had he been aware of the resolutions of the meeting he adverted to, he doubted whether he should have given the vote that he did give, on the measure under consideration last night. If he continued of his present opinion, and more particularly if he saw any thing to confirm it, he did not knew that he should not give a contrary vote on the report of that measure to-morrow. It seemed to him that the honour of his country was compromised by the disposition which had been shewn to make light of the offers.

thought that a great deal had been said about the inefficiency of our regular army; for his own part he perfectly agreed with an hon. baronet who had spoken lately (Sir W. Erskine), that those who were so loud in their objections against the ministers, for not raising the army beyond what it now was, were bound in consistency to point out some plan by which these deficiencies might be supplied. Till they did submit such a plan, he really could not see what right they had to infer that ministers had not made every possible exertion for this purpose. When gentlemen talked so much of the small number of our disposable force, they ought to keep in view the means by which any administration, with the most strenuous exertions, were able to increase its numbers and efficiency. It was to be considered, that the proportion of the population of the country at this moment amenable to actual service was not considerable; that there were circumstances in our general situation which were hostile to the augmentation of our regular regiments; that the progress of wealth and the application of productive labour must indispose the lower orders from entering into a military life. This was an argument which it was very fair to urge, with respect to any supposed deficiencies in our regular force, at the present moment. But it was nothing more than just to look at what had been done in former times, and under former administrations, to increase the regular force of the country. In taking this review, he had no intention to criminate former ministers for any improper want of vigilance and exertion. But he must beg leave to declare, that comparing the exertions made by the late administration, at the commencement of the late war, when the augmentation of a disposable force was the great object in view, with what had been done by his Majesty's present servants, he had no hesitation in saying, that the objections urged against the present deficiency of our disposable force were altogether unsatisfactory and inconclusive. In making this observation, he begged leave to say that he alluded not merely to the number of additional men procured, but the quality and component parts of our regular army. It would not be denied that, in many of the regiments composing the army of reserve, the quality of the men was not so good as could be desired; but at the same time he could not by any means coincide in the general censure passed on the army of reserve by his hon. friend who opened the discussion. If he had inquired a little more accurately into the subject, he would have found that the inferiority of the present regiments of the army of reserve arose out of arrangements which did H. R. H. the commander in chief the highest honour and credit. The fact was, that his Royal Highness had selected out of the general aggregate of the men raised for the army of reserve about 22,000 men, to be incorporated with second battalions of old regiments. Of the men so selected, he wished the hon. officer and the house at large to understand, that a finer body of men never was incorporated with the regular army either of this or any other country in modern Europe. It was true that there were 16 regiments of the army of reserve, the troops of which were of an interior quality. But the whole number of such troops, according to the latest returns, was not much above 6,000 men. It was to be considered also, that such inconveniences could not be avoided by any possible arrangement for the management of the recruiting service. He could state several instances of a similar deficiency under former administrations; and while he adverted to them, he meant no charge of criminal negligence. His only view in referring to them was, to shew that the existence of deficiencies was no proof of want of vigilance, or activity; during the late war the nominal amount of regiments of the line was 160, but the positive amount of our regular force did not exceed 94,000. In consequence of the existence of this deficiency, H. R. H. the commander in chief determined on a consolidation of the regiments particularly deficient in their complement of numbers. The mode in which this arrangement was to be carried into effect, consisted in the consolidation of no less than 53 regiments, so that the whole number of regiments was reduced to 106. What was the consequence of this consolidation? Out of the 53 regiments consolidated, which ought to have amounted to 33,000 men, the whole efficient numbers were not greater than 7,500 men. In stating these facts, he did not mean to blame the government, but only to shew that, if out of so great a proportion of regiments, the trash and dross bore so large a proportion, it was neither fair nor just to attach blame to ministers for their conduct in the military supplies of the country. It would not be denied, that the augmentation of our disposable force was an object highly desirable. But he really had not heard of any such plan, nor could he conceive the adoption of any plan at all consistent with the circumstances of a great, commercial, and flourishing empire. The only plan which at all seemed to him to come up to the idea of many of those gentlemen, who were most decided in their opposition to ministers, would be a plan founded in the utter annihilation of the trade of the wealth, of the industry of the empire. These observations he had thought it his duty to adduce generally, as to the objections advanced against the present establishment of our military system. Adverting more particularly to the measure immediately before the house, he had to state, that many of the objections against the acceptance of the offers of the Irish militia regiments, and the augmentation of that species of national force, proceeded on a complete misapprehension. It was urged against the acceptance of these offers, that deliberative powers were inconsistent with the establishment of a regular army. The general truth of the position he did not mean to deny, but he certainly felt it his duty to controvert the application which had been attached to it. It was true in the theory of an army, that deliberative powers were excluded. The officers and men were theoretically excluded from the right either of acting, or thinking in their military capacity, beyond what the commander in chief thought proper to allow. In particular circumstances of practice, this theory was never attempted to be carried into effect. He might instance many a case where this was the practice of the army, but one or two striking examples would be amply sufficient for his argument. It was in the moment of the most imminent danger, that the theoretical part of the constitution of a regular army was necessarily suspended. When it was determined that a particular place should be carried by storm, it was theoretically above all things necessary, that all deliberative powers in an army should cease. But this was the very crisis when, according to the practice of all regular armies the power of voluntary determination was allowed. The same thing took place as to the body of the army to be employed in the works at a siege.—The hon. general proceeded to allude next to some arguments calculated to show the deficiency of our military establishment in the West and East-Indies. As to the present situation of it. Domingo, he took on himself to assert, that the number of British troops to be kept up in the West-Indies, ought to be less than at any former period. He could hardly conceive it possible to argue, that with relation to other objects in the West-Indies, our force was at all inadequate to the accomplishment of every British purpose. The house were aware of the advantages gained in that quarter of the world since the commencement of the war, and be would put it fairly to the candour of any hon. member, whether advantages of so important a nature had ever been gained within the same period. An hon. baronet (Sir J. Wrottesley) had taken notice of the capture of a small settlement on the coast of Africa. He was willing to admit on the authority of the hon. baronet, for he knew nothing of the matter from any other quarter, that such an advantage had been gained by the enemy; but what did this at all prove as to the general means of own defence both with respect to this country and our foreign possessions? Nothing was more easy than to account for this partial advantage of the enemy. It arose solely from this plain circumstance, which was common in every war, that our settlements on the coast of Africa were the least valuable of our possessions, and occupying the smallest degree of attention, were the most likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, however inconsiderable the force by which they were attacked.—He was utterly at a loss to conceive on what possible ground a charge of the insufficiency of our force in India could be brought forward. He needed not to enlarge on the brilliant and important victories obtained by the gallantry of our forces in that quarter of the world. When however, he stated what a small proportion of European troops were engaged in these services, the house must see that the noble lord at the head of our Eastern dominions had taken no step which could at all endanger their security. He had to state then, according to the most recent accounts which had reached him, that in all the brilliant engagements which had taken place on the continent of India, not more than 5,000 out of 22,000 European troops in our pay had, in any instance, been engaged. He appealed to the house whether there could be a more conclusive proof that any objection against the state of our military defence and state of preparation in India was totally unfounded.

said, he did not think it would have been necessary for him to address the house this day, but he thought it right to offer some observations in reply to the opinions that had been expressed by his hon. friend (gen. Maitland) and by some others, while the impression made by those opinions was still recent. And first, as to what fell from an hon. gent. near him (Mr. Keene), and which had been restated in a more invidious manner by the hon. bart. behind him (Sir J. Newport), as to the resolutions of the lords lieut. and militia colonels. The hon. bart. said that those noble and respectable persons should have sacrificed their convenience to the common defence. Was that the motive of the resolution? it was impossible to believe it; and when the chief principal officers of the militia were stated to be unworthy to have their horses and their hounds, he hoped that such a motive for their conduct would not be considered to be made out. Was it impossible to find out a constitutional objection? When the resolution was adopted by men whom he would not name, but whose connection with Ireland, and whose interest in that country was well known, could it be supposed that the resolution originated in any slackness with respect to the defence of Ireland, when that should be proper? It was not any attachment to horses or hounds, nor yet to convenience, not even a wish to spare one drop of blood that might be necessary to that defence which dictated the resolution. It was a conviction that the interchange was contrary to the constitution of the militia, to the spirit of the union, to the express stipula- tions of the treaty of union by which the militia of each country was reserved for that country. If however, such an interchange was intended, should it not have been announced to the house by a message from his Majesty, and not surreptitiously, as was attempted to be done in the present instance. The hon. gents. opposite supposed themselves possessed of great cleverness in this sort of management, and therefore it was, that when any of their tricks were charged upon them, they met the charge with exultation. There were many gents. who voted for the measure on the ground of the reciprocity which he condemned, but even they had reason to complain that the question was not fairly brought forward, and those who were most in favour of the reciprocity, had reason to be ashamed of the manner in which it was now submitted to their sanction. He would not here go into the romantic scheme proposed by some gents. of bringing the whole people of Ireland to this country, to be better schooled and better taught. It was known that whenever the measure of the union was discussed, he had always been its enemy, and now, when be heard of the benefits Ireland derived from it, he was compelled to say, he knew of no such benefits, except it could be called a benefit to have got rid of its legislature. Whether that was a benefit he knew not. Some of the acts of that legislature gave some ground to say it was a benefit. He would however say, that the union had not had its fair trial. Those who had brought about that measure, had allowed that it would not be complete unless it were followed up by other measures, no one of which had yet been carried into effect. He wished that a fair trial was given by the execution of these measures, though he confessed he doubted whether even then there could be a complete union of countries too distant for local convenience to permit a community of representation. He looked upon it as absolutely impossible that Ireland should ever be fairly represented in that house—With respect to any general assimilation or improvement of manners, there had yet been no such effect; and, therefore, when that was mentioned, he confessed he gave his tribute of thanks to those gents. who had the boldness and sincerity to state, that while the present govt. of Ireland lasted, it was impossible to expect any such event. While there was a Chancellor of Ireland, who told the people of Ireland, that they could not be good subjects while they continued faithful to the religion they professed, and the ideas which they had of what they owed to the God whom they adored it was decidedly impossible that country could be governed by any other means than by force, and as it was governed now, by martial law, and by suspension of the habeas corpus act—His hon. friend who had just sat down, found an inconsistency in the hon. officer's (col. Craufurd) preferring fencibles to militia, when both were to consist of the same men. It was owned both were to consist of the same men, but these men were to be used in a very different manner. The Irish militia would constitutionally be confined to Ireland, but fencibles could be brought here. But it was then urged, that when the Irish militia were brought here, they might be picked, cajoled, and sent out on general service. What did terms signify; it was said, the object most desirable may be obtained, though under other names; that it was the cheapest (a point on which there was much stress) and best way to have the men first militia, then fencibles, and in the end regulars. To say to a set of men, will you or will you not volunteer? when it was previously understood that their officers had volunteered, was placing them in so delicate a situation, that it was evident there was an obvious indelicacy in mentioning the name of an officer who had refused to volunteer. An allusion had been made to the volunteering to storm a fort. The case to be sure, was very similar. It was submitted in that case to a set of men, every one of whom there was a right to command, who would offer himself for a service of danger which required only a few. The men were in that instance taken by the point of honour, when then the men of this or that particular regiment were invited to offer themselves to the danger and the glory. This to be sure, was very like the case of putting it to the Irish militia, whether they were willing to take the danger of coming to England. He hoped that there was no greater danger in coming to England than in remaining in Ireland. He wished that any one would give a good reason for the measure. One point in the most brilliant part of the most brilliant speech made last night on the other side of the house (Mr. Canning's), he looked upon as a complete answer to all that had been said of this measure liberating so much disposable force. The foundation of the argument in that speech was not, that in every moment, or in all circumstances, it was a proper time to increase the disposable force; but that when this disposable force was not in due proportion, that disproportion ought not to be remedied by adding to that description of force of which we had already too much, instead of that which was better, and in which we were more deficient. His hon. friend (gen. Maitland), asked in what year, at the com- mencement of any former war, so much had been taken from the enemy? He would state what he looked upon as a most unfortunate year, and he believed many gents. would agree with him, the first year of the American war, when this country took measures, of which what it suffered now was part of the consequences. In the first year of the Dutch war, in 1780, we had gained more than in the most brilliant war of former times, because we attacked where our opponents were weakest, and took St. Eustatia, Demerary, and other places in the West Indies. But what were the consequences of these captures, and the peace to which they led was well known. Then, as to India, his hon. friend (gen. Maitland) was so enraptured with the splendor of the victories, and splendid he allowed they were, that he did not hear the whole of the hon. baronet's argument, or did not give himself time to understand its force. With regard to the advantage we might derive from the destruction of the Mahratta power, he was not prepared to give any opinion; all he would say at present was, that he must hear more on the subject before he could believe that it was likely to be of any advantage at all. His hon. friend was surprised at the hon. baronet's adverting to India, and could not conceive the object of that allusion. He understood the hon. baronet to have adverted to India for this purpose, whether he was right, it was for the hon. baronet to determine. He understood the hon. baronet's object to be, to shew whether our forces were adequate in every quarter. Had we forces enough here, had we enough in the West-Indies, in Goree, in the East-Indies? Why did the hon. baronet ask these questions? Because, if there was a deficiency any where abroad, a draught would be made on us at home, to supply it. Was it a sufficient answer to this to state that there were 20,000 Europeans in India, and that only 5000 had been engaged in the late battles? But if those of this 5000 who fell were to be replaced; but if the war was to be continued, and an extraordinary drain was to be made on this country, where it had already produced the most pernicious effects, the force of this country must be diminished to supply this drain, and the West-Indies and our other possessions were reciprocally subject to the argument. He looked upon the measure now before the house as generally unconstitutional, and as a direct violation of the articles of union. It was said that the constitutional principle should yield not only necessity, but to strong motives of poli- cy. It remained, in this instance, to shew the policy. He knew of no policy in it, unless it were policy to add to the militia. It was a whimsical way to separate the two measures and the order in which they were put was still more whimsical. Why was not the first thing done to raise a force to supply the vacancy? Because the hon. gentlemen were great lovers of pretences; and if that was done, they would want a pretence for giving this power to his Majesty, while they said his Majesty was not to use it.—Ought not the substitutes to be provided before those whom they were to replace were removed?—Now it was to be shewn what was the policy of the measure. No man would say that 10,000 men were to be taken from Ireland without providing substitutes; let the hon. gentlemen wait till the substitutes were provided, and then let his Majesty be enabled to accept the offers. Supposing the force for the invasion of Ireland to be discomfited, and this country to be thus in a state of comparatively greater danger, he allowed there must be a strong ground of policy in the measure, though even then there would be a constitutional objection. He had respect for the character and opinions of the officers of the militia, and he was not surprised that, at the present moment, at least, they had a constitutional objection. It was said there were 30,000 regulars in Ireland. If Ireland was in a condition to spare a part of them, and it were wanted here, let it be brought over, but he saw no reason for recurring to a legislative measure to provide for a case not likely to occur, when there was a better remedy completely open. If this measure was resorted to for the purpose of laying a foundation by hypotheses for a measure which might possibly please the hon. baronet behind him (Sir J. Newport) and some others, though it would not please him, at least let it be fairly put to the house, let it not be put as a new question; it was one already considered, and the articles of union spoke on it precisely. If the union was complete, a community of militia would certainly be proper. The difficulties of the empire might have increased so as to render it necessary now; if so, let it be fairly proposed, though certainly the fairest time for proposing it would have been at the union. If it was necessary, let it be brought under consideration with a full attendance of Irish members; let there be a call of the house, if that attendance could not be obtained otherwise. He, perhaps, should not be much in favour of the measure; but he would ad- mit it was a great measure, and deserving a full and fair consideration. There was reason to believe, that some inducement had been held out for making the offers; and what added to the suspicion was, that some had been made 3 months back, some 4 months, and some even so long since as 8 months. It appeared, that ministers considered they had been a long time doing nothing, and therefore, they brought forward these three bills together, to have the appearance of doing something.—Of the suspension of the army of reserve bill, he would say nothing, as it was not now before the house, except that it came pleasently recommended. For when an administration came forward to recommend the repeal of its own act, there could be no doubt of the propriety of that repeal. Before they entered into the war, ministers should have considered the means of putting an end to it. It was certainly a satisfactory thing to be able to defend ourselves, but that was not sufficient. The hon. baronet over the way (Sir W. Erskine), asked, why did not the gentlemen on this side propose measures better calculated to this end? The hon. baronet had not long been a member of that house, but did he ever hear of such a thing, or did he think that any plans could be offered in that manner? Certainly no plans could originate with him (Mr. Fox); but it was not natural to expect that any would be brought forward by any man except those who would be concerned in the execution of them. The difficulties in the way of increasing the army were said to be great in the present moment. We had entered into war for a cause that debarred us from all hope of the co-operation of Europe. When therefore ministers spoke of the difficulties of the country, it should be recollected that they were difficulties which they foresaw, and into which they brought the country without preparing any means to deliver it from them. It was certainly very curious, that in stating these difficulties, they should defy others to produce the means of overcoming them, that they should seem to triumph in them, and say, "let you devise a remedy if you can." What a situation had they brought the country into, when the wisest man in the house, could not devise the means of extricating it! The hon. gentlemen appeared angry when they were charged with want of energy. This was certainly, in one sense, without foundation. They had plenty of energy to do mischief. He was not one of those who arraigned them of want of abilities; but he observed they were very sore upon such charges. Their situation appeared to him to resemble that of Grildrig, at the Court of Brobdignag who, finding himself sore from the sensible want of the powers possessed by those about him, and wishing to make it appear that he possessed some powers, set about vaunting of his powers to do mischief? "I assure you," said he to the King, "that in our own country we possess the means of destroying whole cities, and wasting and depopulating whole kingdoms." "Then," said the King, "if I am to believe what thou sayest of thyself, assuredly Grildrig, thou art the most mischievous little animal on the face of the earth."

explained, as did Sir J. Newport, both of whom professed the highest respect for the individuals of whom the meeting alluded to by the hon. member consisted.

.—Sir; I shall not detain the house at any length, for although the hon. gent. opposite to me has entered into a great variety of discussions, yet he has carcely touched upon the question immediately before the house, with the exception of that part of his speech, which went to shew that we were not taking measures to increase that part of our force which is most wanted. But let me ask the hon. gent., was not the proposition accompanied by one to increase the regular force by an addition of 18,000 men. The Union, we have been told, has been attended with no one good effect but that of destroying the legislature of Ireland, and the hon. gent, says, that it has produced no practical benefit. I am confident I am speaking the sentiments of those most competent to from an opinion in this respect, when I say, that the state of Ireland has been most materially improved by the Union; and in point of fact, it is historically true, that since the junction of the representatives of Great Britain and Ireland, the great body of people of Ireland have shewn more attachment to the common cause, and evinced more loyalty than before. [Here Mr. Fox exclaimed, "yes, martial law, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act!"] The hon. gent. says, "martial law, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act," but he should also add, that these measures were sanctioned by the house; and I will freely say, that they were caused more by the peculiar circumstances of the moment, than by any want of attachment and loyalty in the great mass of the people of Ireland. It has been said, that every principle of the constitution requires that the measure should not be resort- ed to, excepting under circumstances of the most pressing necessity, I readily admit this position, but hon. gents. will recollect, it is not a mere novelty, an absolute innovation unexampled in the history of the two countries. Two instances may be adduced, when both the parliament of England and of Ireland acceded to it. This necessity was considered sufficient in the year 1799, even when an honourable termination of a long war was considered in prospect, and a bill was passed, empowering his Majesty to appoint the regiments of Irish militia to serve in this country. The hon. gent. says also, there exists no maxim of policy upon which the expedient can be justified, and that it is an indispensable consequence of resorting to it, that the defence of Ireland will be weakened by it. It is not a part of the measure that the defence of Ireland should be debilitated, but it might be the result, under peculiar circumstances. Such, however, is by no means the intention of his Majesty's servants; and I contend that the present measure, combined with what was proposed last night, may effectually conduce to the security of both countries, for such an expedient would enable his Majesty to replace those who, by this expedient, were drawn from their homes to protect another portion of the Kingdom. On this reasoning I contend that the proposal is founded on the most obvious ground of state policy; but the true motive was very correctly stated by my right hon. friend last night, when he said, this resource would set at liberty a certain portion of the regular troops, which would be ready, on the spur of the moment, to be destined to any service the exigencies of the state might recommend. What has been the uniform subject of complaint, from the benches on the other side, but that, since the commencement of hostility, we have never sufficiently provided for the internal security, and that we have wholly neglected the means of increasing the disposable force; yet most unfortunate it is, that whatever plans are suggested for those purposes, they have to encounter opposition from the same quarter. Such was the case when the bills for the army of reserve, for the national defence, and for the volunteer system, were produced. Whatever may be the sentiments of others, it is the firm persuasion of his Majesty's servants, that the effect of this measure will be to provide, with economy and expedition, an accession of force to the extent of 10,000 men, by which a large proportion of the regular force will be at the disposal of his Majesty, to act in any direction; and that it would be an act of the most egregious impolicy to neglect so favourable an opportunity of enlarging the sphere of our military operations. The hon. gent. confidently stated, that nothing had been done by his Majesty's ministers to promote a cessation of hostilities, and he in consequence charged the continuation of the war on those who had committed this neglect. I do not, Sir, think it proper at this time to controvert this assertion, because the verdict of the people has been pronounced, and ministers have been acquitted of the charge. They have shewn they consider the present war as one of indispensable necessity; they have not thought the forbearance of his Majesty's ministers, before the commencement of hostilities, had any other object than the preservation of tranquillity, and they have vindicated the subsequent proceeding by the universal zeal and animation which prevails for the prosecution of the war. If the opinion of the people of England were to be determined by poll on this great question, and the hon. gent. with all the weight of his authority, and with all the charms of his eloquence, were to canvass the country, he would find himself, if not single and unsupported, at least countenanced by one of the smallest minorities to which the national interests could be submitted. What! has nothing been done to bring the war to a conclusion? The designs of France have been made known, not only by the most explicit avowal, but by those acts which render deception impossible. These designs are the total subversion of the govt. of this nation. What, in this predicament, were the most effectual means to terminate the war? It was by shewing the enemy his views must be disappointed; by providing those powerful and extensive means of public defence to convince him that any attempt to carry his mighty project into execution, would involve him in confusion and disgrace; to place him in a situation, that whether he pursue or abandon his schemes of aggrandisement by the attack on this land, he could not escape the mortification which must ever attend disappointed ambition. These, Sir, were not the only means to which his Majesty's servants had recourse. I may fairly assert, that the first year of no preceding war has been distinguished by such a series of important successes as we have witnessed in that short period on the present occasion. But they contend these are bloodless triumphs, and they would estimate the value of these triumphs by the quantity of British blood that has stained the field of victory. I should be happy indeed, if this were correctly stated: it would shew that ministers anticipated the dangers to which our gallant armies would be exposed, and by the promptitude of their measures prevented the necessity of the sacrifice of the most valuable lives in the state. I have no hesitation in declaring, that this was in some instances the fact, but I mention it not as a source of grief, but of satisfaction. During the negociation on the eve of the war, orders were sent out to the commanders in the West-Indies to take measures to proceed against the enemy. Do gentlemen intend to deny this? Yes, they had orders, not only to act on the earliest notice, but to intercept all supplies that were proceeding to the territory of the enemy. To this precaution we were indebted for the islands of St. Lucia and Tobago. Yet the hon. baronet has thought it correct to say, that no event had happened in the course of this new war which redounded to the glory of the British asms. If any thing were deficient, that has been supplied by that public spirit which has so amply provided for the internal defence. Was there no energy displayed in the contest for St. Lucia? and are we to object from our observation the recent victories in the Eastern world, under those able and gallant leaders Generals Wellesley and Lake, who have made British courage revered and dreaded, in the remotest regions of the earth? Far be it from me to arrogate to ministers the glory of these expeditions; let the laurel decorate the brows of these brave warriors, and ever flourish fresh and green around their temples; but let it not be said that no triumphs have been obtained, that no honours have rewarded British valour. The obstructions we have had to surmount have been accurately detailed by my right hon. friend near me. I will not weaken by repetition what he has so strongly enforced. We have had the greatest military empire to oppose recorded in the annals of mankind, and we were forced to increase our regular force, in order to be enabled to contend with it. We did so to the utmost extent the population and circumstances of the state admitted. This was not sufficient, it was not yet expedient to avail ourselves of the military spirit of the people. Such a resource has not been neglected, and I boldly affirm that we have a greater number of soldiers at this time than France, or any other country of the world. I state this without fear of contradiction, for I know its truth. But let not gentlemen, imagine, that whatever may be my respect for the volunteers, I deem them equal to those veterans who have encountered the dangers and fatigues of a military duty in a protracted war. I admit it was a part of the policy of the late govt. to augment the internal disposable force; I admit the voluntary zeal of the people has essentially contributed to this grand object, and all the credit I presume to claim is, for having directed this powerful torrent of patriotism into its proper channel, so that instead of producing confusion, it has materially promoted the public advantage. A few facts will support the positions I have assumed. The effective force, including the militia in Great-Britain and Ireland, is 184,000 men; the volunteers compose a body of 400,000, all of whom are armed with firelocks, excepting about 15,000 or 20,000 men. Thus there are 580,000 ready for the defence of the two islands. Let any candid man say, if it were probable a superior force could be collected, whether the regular or irregular armies be considered. I rejoice that parliament, on this weighty point, coincided with the opinion of the friend with whom I have acted; I recollect with the warmest pleasure, that by the prudent measure of preserving double or treble the ordinary peace establishment, those means were taken which were most conducive to the national security under the event of war: the result has fully justified the system of policy adopted, and we have now to congratulate the country on its success. An hon. officer had stated the cavalry at 10,000. I have the satisfaction to assure him, that on the 1st of Feb. last the number in Great Britain and Ireland was 17,000. If I advert to former measures, it is not with a view to any invidious comparisons, but to shew how ineffectual very often are the most prudent schemes, and the most diligent exertions when difficulties interpose. It will be recollected some time since three schemes were resorted to for augmenting the public force; 1st, the provisional cavalry; this attempt was so far unsuccessful that it did not produce one-twelfth of the number calculated: 2d, the increase of the militia at the same period equally disappointed the wishes of the right honourable gentleman. This we have been enabled to carry to a very great extent. The third was not attempted during his administration. I mean the expedient of bartering rank for recruits. In this endeavour out of 47 battalions, only 7500 men could be obtained; and had it not been for the sagacious policy of his Royal Highness at the head of the army, an enormous charge would have been perpetrated for this unproductive establishment. Such have been the measures adopted, and such has been the event. It is not surely unreasonable to expect that those who brought forward measures thus abortive and nugatory, should make some allowance for the extraordinary difficulties with which we have had to contend, especially when they learn that the military force now existing is within 14,000 men of its number, as it stood at the highest estimate during the last war. You have drawn for the army and navy during these recent exertions 200,000 men, and if you will compare the amount of the regular army this year, with its state in the late war, you will find a difference of 40,000 individuals in favour of the present activity, and chiefly owing to the plan of the army of reserve, so often reprobated in this house. The measure now under consideration, has for its object to increase the disposable force. I do not pretend it is wholly free from objection, but I aver it is the best, that, under the existing circumstances, can be devised. Concurring therefore, with the rest of his Majesty's servants, I give my most cordial concurrence with the measure.

rose to explain, not what he had said this night, but what he had been represented by the right hon. gent. to have said about a year and a half ago. His observations on that occasion had been founded on the prospect of the continuance of the peace, and, if he had not been over-reached by the statements of the right hon. gent. to that effect, he certainly should have pursued a different course on the occasion.

.—I rise, Sir, for the single purpose of not suffering to pass without notice a declaration made by his Majesty's Chancellor of the Exchequer, the most extraordinary, the most unadvised on his part, considering his station and authority in this house, and the least applicable to the subject in debate, that I ever was witness to in the many years in which I have sat in parliament. The general question between him and those who differ from him this night, is, 1st, whether the measures of govt. in preparing for a war with France which they ought to have foreseen, were such as intitled them to expect success in the prosecution of it; and then, whether the plan, the direction, and the operations of the war have been such as, by shewing that we possessed the force and the means of attacking the enemy with success, might raise our military reputation to a level with the efforts made by the country to furnish ministers with a power sufficient for any enterprize, and thereby accelerate the termination of the war by a safe and honourable peace? On these questions, the right hon. gent. assumes the affirmative. But how does he prove it? Why, Sir, when he ought to tell us in what manner he has prepared to attack France how he proposes to conduct the war in Europe, what rational prospect he has of reducing a most formidable enemy, who threatens us with a contest for our existence, to reasonable terms, or of bringing the war to an early and a safe conclusion; instead of answering these obvious questions, he carries us to the other side of the globe, that is, as far as he can from the home question, and assures us that, by the latest advices from India many brilliant and splendid victories have been obtained over the Mahrattas. Be it so. What connexion is there between those events and the present war in Europe? Can any thing be conceived more extravagant and absurd than, when the question is, by what means you can attack or repel the most formidable military power that ever existed in Europe, to answer it by saying that a British army has completely defeated an India army in the neighbourhood of Delhi? But perhaps the right hon. gent. has some personal share in these transactions and a right to some part of the merit and the honour of the success. Then he must have given the orders which produced the war. In that case the war against the Mahrattas must have originated in England. No such thing. He knows literally nothing of it but what he has been able to pick up from a few straggling gazettes, printed at Madras, and copied from others printed at Calcutta, which by mere accident have found their way to England, and a letter from Bombay. From the fountain head he has heard nothing. From lord Wellesley, whose conduct he extols, he never has received a single line of information on the subject. I have said that such declarations, without knowledge, particularly in a person in his station, are very unadvised, and liable to serious objections. While the very question of the wisdom, the policy, the right and the justice of this war is depending, about all which his Majesty's ministers are just as much in the dark as I am; while parliament is waiting wigs anxiety for the very materials, by which alone their judgment on the whole merits of the war can be determined, and when perhaps this house, upon receiving that compleat information, if ever it should come, which we ought to have received long ago, may be obliged to condemn the whole transaction, the right hon. gent. invades and prejudges that question, which ought to have been left untouched, as I have always most studiously and cautiously left it, and open to the free and unbiassed examination of parliament. To that examination, sooner or later, it must be submitted. But the right hon. gent., if I understand him right, professes to expect that these successes in India will have some favourable effect upon our military or political operations in Europe, and possibly contribute to accelerate the termination of the war. If he does not think so, his mention of those events is nothing to the present purpose. Now, sir, I am of opinion that, if they have any effect at all, which I very much doubt, it will be to our disadvantage, I mean as to war and peace in Europe; because if will furnish Buonaparte with an argument, which the neutral powers in all appearance gill be ready enough to listen to. They have hitherto shewn no sign of a disposition to take part with us against France, or even to assist us with their mediation. But when we ourselves tell them, in a triumphant tone, that our armies have obtained victories in India, from which we expect to become masters of that empire, what will they conclude, but that the English are governed by the same spirit of insatiable avarice and ambition with which we reproach Buonaparté; that they have no interest in our quarrel but to see it continued; and that the rest of the world has no chance of peace, of happiness, or of safety, but in the weakness to which the dangerous power both of France and England may finally be reduced by the continuance of the present war?

explained. He only had alluded to the late affairs in India as splendid military exploits, and had not made any such deductions from them as the hon. member supposed.

entered into a review of the arguments of the right hon. gent. opposite, and of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, both before and since the commencement of hostilities. He vindicated the parliamentary conduct of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham), and insisted that the wisdom of his observations was fully established by the conduct of his Majesty's ministers in adopting them, though they were not disposed to acknowledge the obligation at the same time that they took the benefit of them. The learned gentleman contended that the militia of Ireland were sworn particularly for the defence of that country, and could not, without a violation of faith, be brought from it.—He then adverted to the capture of the French islands, insisting that there had been no display of gallantry on the occasion, except in the trifling operation at St. Lucia, because there had been no force there capable of resistance.—The learned gent. then adverted to the inutility of such conquests, which would be given up at the conclusion of a peace, as had been done in the case of Demerara, Essequibo, &c. after many millions of English capital should be expended in improving them. In taking this view of the case, the hon. and learned gent. was proceeding to comment on some observations that had fallen on a former occasion from an hon. general opposite (Maitland), respecting the policy of taking possession of the enemy's colonial territories at the commencement of a war, though it should be only to keep possession of them pending hostilities, when he was called to order by

, who appealed to the candour and feelings of the House, whether it was regular to advert to what had fallen from a member on a former occasion, when that member would be, by the forms of the House, precluded from replying?

continued, and insisted that no benefit was to be derived from the possessions of the islands, if after much British capital should be expended on them they were to be given up in the end. The learned gent. observed, upon the different constitutions of the militia force of Ireland and of Great-Britain, and concluded by justifying the resolutions to which the hon. baronet (Sir J. Newport) had alluded, and assuring the hon. member that any hopes of reciprocal service which he might have conceived from the last resolution, were not well founded.

, in explanation, stated, that provisional orders had been send out to the West Indies in the early part of March, founded on information that the enemy meant to reinforce one or two islands, to prevent the landing of troops in those islands, and that the orders for the actual commencement of hostilities had been sent out on the 16th of May, the day of his Majesty's message, communicating the result of the negociation.

justified the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the reasoning he had applied to the successes in the West Indies; and he attributed these to the vigour and promptitude with which ministers had acted at the commencement of the negociation which terminated in hostility. Honourable gentlemen had doubted the promptitude declared, but this uncertainty arose from a misunderstanding. There were two descriptions of papers, the one containing directions to the public officers before the war, the other on the event taking place, and he clearly understood it was principally in the former that this vigour and precaution had been evinced. It had been said, that the time when this measure is brought forward is unseasonable. Honourable gentlemen seem to for- get it is not intended to fix any particular period, but to leave it at the discretion of his Majesty when he shall deem it expedient to avail himself of the offer of the Irish soldiery.—The militia, under its present institution, was raised to defend not particular counties, but any portion of the kingdom: and when Ireland, by the Union, became a part of the British Empire, the measure proposed seemed a natural and necessary regulation. What was referable to the Irish militia was equally so to the militia in the other part of the United Kingdom, and it might be prudent to resort to some method to render the services of the national militia capable of being resorted to in every part of these national domains. It was meeting the ardor of the Irish people with frigidity the most repulsive, to enter into long debates on the propriety of accepting the loyal offer of their protection. On this account he should not detain the House with further explanations, but would give his hearty support to a measure so immediately calculated to increase the security of the country.

denied that the war was approved of by the country at large. The unanimity that prevailed arose from very different circumstances. The moment the war was declared, we were threatened with invasion, which united the whole country independently of any consideration of the necessity or expediency of the war. It was a war, he maintained, that could end only in a peace such as was made at Amiens. Could any acquisitions, he asked, we had made in the West-Indies, contribute in the smallest degree to force the French to a peace? The gentlemen on the opposite bench, however, had taken merit to themselves for sending orders to the West-Indies by which we had gained some distant and temporary advantages there. But if this was so much calculated to do them credit, why did they not issue similar orders to the East-Indies, and thus prevent the expedition of Admiral Linois, which certainly would have been of much more importance to this country? The hon. gent. concluded by giving his negative to the Speaker's leaving the chair.

, in explanation, denied that he entertained any contempt for the enemy. He had intended only to put the case, that if little more than 300 men, as had happened lately in India, had defeated so many thousands, what might we not expect from British valour at home?

rose to take notice of what had fallen from an hon. member who had said, that if we gained no glory in the war we should shame the French. He did not exactly understand this principle. His object, in this war, was to bring it to a speedy and effectual termination; not to remain in a miserable state of siege, and be daily putting new fetters on our exertions. This measure was to be accompanied with another, to increase the army by 18,000 men. But how? To be raised here, and in Ireland; and yet by this measure ministers set up a pew competition in the raising this new militia.

thought it unfair to take away the Irish militia for English service, and then oblige Ireland to raise so many more to make up the deficiency; the expense of them being defrayed by the bounties paid by the counties in Ireland, might thus be amazingly increased.

observed, that it was the intention of govt. to introduce a clause to charge the expenses of the bounty on the United Kingdom.

adverted then to the observations that had been made with respect to the beneficial effects of the Union in Ireland. Since that measure had passed, a special commission had been sent down to the county of Limerick, and many people had been hanged there; a special commission had been sent to Tipperary; a rebellion had broke out in the capital of the kingdom, where a special commission had also been issued; since that measure had passed, martial law had been established, and the habeas corpus act suspended; and if these were arguments of the good effects of the union, they surpassed his comprehension. (Here there was a general cry of question! question!)

expressed his satisfaction at the resolutions of the lords lieutenants, &c. on the subject of the militia, as they did not go to preclude any new system of arrangement. He should support the bill, because he wished to support the executive power at the present moment. He hoped for a bill to allow the interchange of the militia of both countries. In England, from the palace to the cottage, there was a greater ignorance of the true state of Ireland, than of any other country with which we professed to be acquainted, upon the face of the globe. He hoped to see the English gentry and persons of other classes mixing with the people of Ireland, and then they would return here advocates for the cause of Ireland, so that no ministers would be able to resist the voice of truth. English members would then be induced to pay more attention to Irish questions than at present they are able to do, from ignorance of the state of the country. He allowed this measure to be founded on a violation of the militia principle, but he took into consideration the attendant circumstances. Ministers had, however, much depressed his feelings, when they appeared desirous of withdrawing from the original grounds on which they supported the measure Here was a bill to bring over 10,000 men from Ireland, but he was astonished to hear that they had no idea of an interchange. They would then take away the country gentlemen of Ireland, and make no kind of return for it. He was sorry to see the great object thus weakened. But let it not be thought that Ireland, because she exhibits this instance of her patriotism, is really satisfied with what has been done since the union. The Irish thought they had the authority of the King, by his royal message originating the union, and indeed that of parliament too, for expecting some further measures. After the solemn pledges they had received, he would ask what had been done for them? But while the Irish felt and expressed their dissatisfaction, they would stand by England to the last. They would never submit to a foreign force, or yield to the haughty despot now hovering on our coasts. They would die with England if necessary, or share her laurels. But let not this be confounded with an idea of their being satisfied with their condition.

observed, that the question was not now, whether Ireland was an aggrieved country, disturbed it certainly was, but whether the militia proposed to be brought to this country thence, ought to be replaced? He had voted for the measure yesterday, but should oppose the present. The militia was a species of force least wanted; and as the men were to be raised by a bounty, be thought the suggestion of several law gentlemen, that their services ought to be taken, under a new covenant, and to a greater extent ought to be acted upon.

replied to some of the observations of the hon. colonel who spoke last but one, and censured the impropriety of adverting in irritating language to the union. He afterwards dwelt on the conduct of two other right hon. gentlemen (Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham), and their strange connexion in opposition to his Majesty's ministers. He heard continual outcries of the incapacity of ministers; but those gentlemen's wisdom seemed to consist in a perfect change, and their integrity in a mutual forgiveness, accompanied by a confession of have been in the wrong before. As to what had been said about the union, gentlemen who supported it had feelings of honour as high as any others, and nothing but disunion could be the consequence to the country, whose cause we ought to support, by the provocation of such subjects. He, therefore, condemned the introduction unnecessarily of such topics in discussion.

said, he should not trespass on the house at that late hour. He rejoiced that his noble friend (Lord De Blaquiere) concurred with him on the present occasion, for it was not without concern, he observed, they had voted on different sides last night, as he should ever be concerned to differ wish that noble lord on any subject. His own objection to the measure which had been discussed last night arose principally from the present measure, for he considered both as forming part of the same system. The opinion of his noble friend would have as much weight with him as that of any member in the house. It was not expedient for many obvious considerations, which might be adverted to without delicacy, to augment the Irish militia beyond a certain proportion. As to what had fallen from an hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Alexander), he could not reply to him, for, he confessed he did not for the most part understand him. He heard, however, a great deal about character, imbecility and so forth; but ministers appeared to be so sore and so conscious of weakness, that they heard nothing but the sound of imbecility and weakness, whatever the words might be, and whatever the subject.—Though the debate had been continued to a late hour, he thought it was not yet exhausted; and he should consider himself at liberty, in some future stage of the measure, to deliver his sentiments on some points which had not, in his opinion, been sufficiently pressed.—The house then divided for the Speaker's leaving the chair.