, in pursuance of the notice he had previously given, rose to make his motion relative to the defence of the country, and addressed the House to the following purport:—I am afraid, Sir, before I proceed to discuss the motion of which I have given notice, I shall find it absolutely necessary to make some preliminary observations, occasioned by what has fallen from time to time in conversation in this House, whenever this subject of the defence of the country has occasionally been touched upon. And, Sir, those preliminary observations appear to me the more necessary, on account of the construction, which members of this House, and others out of it, have been pleased to put on the extraordinary zeal which has appeared, not only in this House, but in every rank and class of society in support of the war. I am, Sir, one of those who highly approve that zeal, and have ever been forward to give it my warmest commendation. Nothing can, in my opinion, he more proper, nor redound more highly to the honour of the country; but, when I see an attempt made to turn that zeal into the course of a fallacious channel, and to argue on it as proceeding from an approbation in those who possess and evince it of the grounds on which the war was originally undertaken, or the manner in which it has since been conducted by his Majesty's ministers, I feel it necessary to enter my protest against any such assumption, and briefly to shew, that such zeal is in no degree connected with those subjects to which it has been attributed. That such a degree of zeal did from the commencement of the war exist is most certain; I am myself a very striking and exemplary proof of it; that is to say, I felt myself, Sir, from the first moment that I saw hostilities could not be avoided, anxious and zealous in the extreme for the defence of the country, which I saw menaced with an immediate and desperate attack, beyond what had ever before been known. But I can appeal to the recollection of the members of this House, and to that of the country at large also, that I by no means approved either the mode of commencing the war, or the manner of carrying it on. I shall, therefore, trouble the House with but very few words indeed on it. Sir, from the first moment the war was actually commenced, it was immediately followed up by the continued cry of instant invasion, and that apprehension has been kept alive with a steadiness and activity which I may say has been almost incessant. Is it possible, then, Sir, under such circumstances, to attribute the zeal which has so eminently and extensively displayed itself amongst all ranks and classes of the people, eager to defend themselves, their properties, and families, against the attacks of so inveterate and formidable an enemy, as we have now to contend with, into an approbation of the war? I say, no, Sir. To what is the war to be attributed? To the fear of the danger we should incur by strictly complying with the terms of the peace. If this be so, Sir, it follows, that the minister who brings us into the greatest danger, will henceforth be entitled to have the most ample share of approbation. The question, as stated by ministers, and conceived as such by the whole country from the commencement of hostilities, was a question involving life, liberty, and existence; as such it was understood; as such it was universally felt; and this feeling, I say, is not attributable to the war, or to the causes which brought it on, but to the actual view the people saw it in, and the consequences which they were almost certain must result from it, more than ever has been the issue of former wars. It may, perhaps, be argued by his Majesty's ministers, that great numbers had voted for the first address, from whom I had the misfortune to differ; but it must be recollected, that on the second agitation of the subject, there was a much greater difference of opinion, and afterwards great numbers wished they had acted otherwise than they had done, when they called to their recollection how ministers had acted; 1st, as to timeing the war; 2dly, as to the cause assigned for it; and 3dly, as to the particular manner in which it was conducted.—These preliminary observations, Sir, I have thought the more necessary, because, when about to make a motion of this kind, and to go into further consideration of the defence of the country, I cannot agree at all with those statements which infer, that the extraordinary zeal of the country, evinced in behalf of every thing that is most dear to it, should be construed to imply an approbation either of timeing the war, or of the mode of conducting it.—With respect to the motion itself, I think it necessary, Sir, in the first place, to clear away the objections that may be made to it. When gent. have been reproached with feeling the "panic of invasion," it may be requisite to notice shortly, what is generally understood by the word panic. I should suppose, Sir, that the word panic applies to those who would run away from, and not those who are desirous to defend any thing; I am therefore desirous not to have it said, that I, and those with whom I have the honour to act, are influenced by the panic of invasion, but that, well aware of the serious consequences which must inevitably result from such an event taking place, we earnestly wish, and are most anxious to put the country in the best possible state of defence. I beg, Sir, that in expressing this wish, we may not be supposed to have acted on light or frivolous grounds, or of any inclination to raise alarm and dread, where none before existed. For when see and advert to the numerous paper which have been laid on the table on this subject; when I take a view of the measures already adopted by his Majesty's ministers, as well as those with which we are told they are intended to be followed up, I cannot help saying, with Sir Christopher Hatton in the Critic,

"Oh pardon me, if my conjecture's rash,

But I surmise—the State—

Some danger apprehends!"

I must own, Sir, that I think the language held out by some, of a wish to be invaded, is wrong, except with two provisoes; 1st, that our fleet may immediately fall in with them, and instantly convince them of the folly and madness of the attempt; an 2dly, that having eluded the vigilance our fleets, our state of defence should be such as, that when landed, they should soon be convinced that, as this was the first, so it would be the last time the would ever dare to meet us on our own shores. And I think, Sir, we ought no by any means to build our hopes, or to form any idea, that because the enemy has not hitherto put his threats in execution, that he has therefore given up his design. Such reasoning would be fallacious in the extreme. If the enemy have duly considered all the various dangers and difficulties attending the enterprize, it is of very little signification at what particular period the attempt may be made; whether it be in the year 3, 4, or 5 of the war; we should only consider, that the longer it is delayed, the more formidable it may prove, and it our first and most essential duty to be fully prepared to meet it, let it come whenever it may. With the attention that I have been able to give of this subject, I once thought, Sir, that a general view the defence of the country would be the best; but when I consider that there are so many difficulties attending the subject, the difficulties of the finances of the country, the state of Ireland, and many others of various natures, I have been in- duced to prefer coming to a motion of a narrower kind. I mean, therefore, Sir, to confine myself to the notice I gave of a particular defence of the country, and that shall also endeavour to narrow as much is possible, in order to enable gent. to take as clear and perspicuous a view of it is possible. It is not, therefore, my invention, Sir, to take any notice at present of the naval defence of the country. In the next place, Sir, as to the volunteers, considering that the system has been so lately discussed in this House, it will be needless for me to touch on them, except as an incidental subject, and by way of illustrating or strengthening any other.—I come now, Sir, therefore, to the partiticular ground on which I mean to move, leaving it open to gent. to turn it in their consideration, and to form such opinions on it as to them shall seem best. I mean, Sir, to confine myself to the land defence; and in doing so, I beg leave to observe, that passing by for the moment the volunteers, there are, in my opinion, two great objects to be kept in view, and on which the utmost reliance may ultimately be placed. These are, the regular army on one hand, and an army consisting of labourers, artificers, and peasantry, on the other. Now, Sir, as to the regular army, I have listened with the greatest attention to the arguments used by the right hon. gents. opposite to me, and also to those repeatedly urged with so much zeal and ability by an hon. officer (Colonel Craufurd) behind me, between which statements I find there is a difference of, at least, one half. This being the case, I should be glad, Sir, to know what objection his Majesty's ministers can have to let us know the real state of our army? They have frequently favoured us with different statements of so much and so much; but I would wish to have the real state. This cannot, Sir, give any fresh intelligence to the enemy. When we have the number of regiments, and not the number of rank and file, we have only a defective statement. What danger can there possibly be in giving that? At all events, I think such statements will be much better known from papers on the table, than from the partial, mutilated accounts which the House receives from the different statements of ministers, at different periods of time, without any documents by which we can fairly judge of their truth and exactness. With respect to one circumstance, Sir, I own I cannot but feel considerable surprize. I have repeatedly heard it asserted, that, with regard to Ireland, our force there is at this moment as great as it was on the conclusion of the last peace—an assertion which may possibly be true, but which I must own it is somewhat difficult to believe. I speak now, Sir, of the regular force, and in so doing, I must say, that with respect to the regular army in Ireland, I do not mean to confine myself to troops of the line only, but to include the Irish militia, and the British fencible regiments, which, at the conclusion of the last war, amounted in Ireland to 50, or 60,000 men. To them are to be added also the several English militia regiments, at that time in Ireland; and when this is done with care and accuracy, we may perhaps come to something like a certainty on these points, but not otherwise. As to what relates to the artillery, it is not the number of guns alone, but of drivers, horses, carriages, ammunition, &c. which should be fairly and accurately stated, in order to enable us to form any thing like a competent judgment on the subject. I think, also, Sir, that with respect to G. Britain, the statement of his Majesty's ministers, that our forces are greater than at the conclusion of the war, are by no means more accurate than those statements they have given us respecting Ireland. But I have been told, Sir, that if I had had my way, and my advice had been adopted, we should have had still a less force than we now have. This, Sir, is stating the question comparatively between a state of war and a state of peace, which certainly stand on very different grounds; and I appeal to the recollection and candour of the House whether, on every occasion in which I recommended a low establishment, I did not expressly confine it to a supposition of the continuance of peace; and that I never could have done so, had I conceived or had it in contemplation that his Majesty's ministers intended so soon to renew or re-commence a war. My opinion has, at all times, invariably been in favour of a large regular army, in time of war; but peculiarly so, where we had to begin with so extreme and pushing a necessity, for the defence of the country. No man, Sir, can have a higher or more favourable opinion than I entertain of a militia, considered as a constitutional defence. I know also that the discipline of the militia is carried to a degree of excellence far beyond what it has ever been in former times; but with all that can be said of that brave and respectable body of men, no man can say that the militia is equal to regular troops; it is impossible to conceive that those who have not seen service can be equal to those who have repeatedly been in action.—Having thus slightly touched on this subject, Sir, I will now proceed to observe on what has been our progress in recruiting. We have been told that it has gone on as well, notwithstanding the various measures which have been adopted by ministers, as it used to do in former periods. I must here, Sir, beg the House to recollect, that different times afford proportionate differences in recruiting. It cannot be doubted, that every contraction and difficulty thrown in the way of our manufactures and commerce, must facilitate the recruiting service, so long as such contraction and difficulties exist. Now, Sir, however strong this favourite theory of the day may influence the minds of ministers on the subject, I have no hesitation in saying, that in point of practice, it is not so easy to get a man to enlist for life for 10l. as it is to obtain one for 50l. to enlist for a limited service. And I will maintain, Sir, that it is an incredible and extravagant proposition to say that the recruiting service has not been injured. And though I should be inclined to admit, by way of argument, that we have actually gained in the course of this year, yet I insist, at the same time, that we should have done so in a much greater degree, had it not been for the bounties which have been given with so lavish a hand. I am not arguing this subject now, Sir, by way of inquiry; but when ministers declare their intention of suspending the army of reserve, I cannot avoid pointing out to them that, for fear they should succeed, they are taking the utmost possible care and pains to meet themselves in their own market. There is, however, one measure, Sir, which I will venture to recommend, and that is, to leave off the monstrous custom of particularly distinguishing this country from all the rest of Europe in military economy, by enlisting men for life. What shall we say, if we are told, that those who have the greatest military powers on foot, that those who have the greatest demand for military forces, and who govern countries where every thing gives way to the army, the men are enlisted only for a limited time? but in this country, whose pride and boast for centuries have been that of enjoying the greatest freedom of any nation under the sun, your soldiers must be slaves for life. Now, Sir, it is not from my own opinion and feelings alone that I venture to speak so decisively on this subject; but I am convinced of the propriety of it from the authority of officers of the highest character and respectability, not in our own army only, but in those of almost every other military power in Europe who have either spoken or written on the subject. If, however, Sir, I went on that principle only, I would not, at such a crisis, venture to recommend an alteration. But this, Sir, I say, is not only what ought to be done, but what ought particularly to be done at this time. In support of this doctrine, Sir, I beg leave to mention a single fact, which is well known to have happened within the last 12 months. A whole regiment of the proposed army of reserve would have enlisted into the regular army, if it had been for a limited service; and as it is at present, very few indeed have been prevailed on to do so with all the influence that could be exerted. This is not mere theory; it is reasoning that is almost self-evident. Who is it that does not know the effect produced among the lower orders of the people when any of their own class enlists into the army? they consider him as lost to the community for ever. If a son enlists into the regular army, his disconsolate parents consider him as in a manner annihilated, and the wretched father has frequently been known to distress himself, and the rest of his family, to hoard and scrape together a sum that may be sufficient to buy him off.—Now, Sir, let us take it in another point of view. Let us consider the time of life when this is generally done. By the established law of this country, and a most wise law it is, no man or woman is allowed to be capable of entering into any contract for the disposal of their property, or of their persons in marriage, till they arrive at a certain age, and that age is in all cases fixed, at the period of arriving at man's estate, at 21 years. Yet, in the particular case of enlisting for a soldier, when it is perhaps the result of momentary passion, or folly, or the effect of intoxication, a poor, ignorant, unfortunate lad of 16 or 17, is allowed to enter into a contract which is to bind him for life to a state in which he is liable to be sent from his friends and country to any part of the world. If, therefore, this evil could, Sir, be, to a certain degree, alleviated, it must undoubtedly very much contribute to increase the satisfaction and happiness of the lower orders of the people; and such persons as tradesmen and farmers, far from looking on their sons as they now do, lost to them for ever, would, on the contrary, part from them with a certain degree of satisfaction, in hopes of seeing them return, in the course of a few years, improved in their manners and demeanour, and with a superior knowledge of men and things, which might render them more fitted for the very purposes to which it was his original intention to bring them up. In answer to this, it may perhaps be urged, that if the soldiers who compose the regular army were enlisted for a certain time only, those who had it in their power would all quit at once, and so we might be left without an army at all. But this I take to be an assumption by no means warranted in the nature of the case. On the contrary, I believe it has been pretty clearly proved by experience, that those who are really the best soldiers become so from a decided liking to the service, and having been so long initiated in and enured to, habits which they have imbibed by degrees, and grown partial to from age, are the most likely, when their time is out, to re-enter either into their own or some other regiment they may have private reasons for preferring. What! it will be asked, without any additional reward?—Certainly not. They will expect and be entitled to an increase of pay, or a new bounty, which is the first principle of recruiting the army. This mode of increasing our regular force, when added to the other, the taking away the competition produced by the army of reserve, &c. cannot fail to produce advantages which may be almost said to be incalculable.—The next circumstance, Sir, which I wish to advert to, as having greatly retarded and injured our recruiting for the regular army, is the pernicious consequence of raising men for rank. This being a custom which has long prevailed, will require great steadiness and perseverance to prevent it. How far it is even to be regulated, I will not pretend to say; and I beg leave to observe, Mr. Speaker, that I am not now mentioning this as a peremptory measure, but only as a desirable measure, which I heartily wish should be at- tended to. I wish the House to go into a committee, in order to see what may be done towards increasing considerably our regular army, and to ascertain how far and in what proportion the competitions which have existed have retarded and injured the same.—Now, Sir, having stated this on the subject of the regular army, I shall proceed to the other more general and extensive armament, the volunteers. In doing this, Sir, it is not my intention to go into the question of how far the first formation of the volunteers was political; how far it was right to encourage them to so great an extent; how far it was then either right or consistent to repress their ardour, and discourage their zeal; how far it was politic to give such extensive exemptions, when no exemptions at all were looked for, and then to dispute, inch by inch, every privilege that had been granted them. The zeal of the volunteers certainly stands on very high and advantageous grounds; and it cannot be denied, that having the volunteers, we have obtained a very large, and, it may be hoped, what will in time turn out a very efficient force: they are meant undoubtedly to act with the regulars; and if they are, in any great proportion employed, must prove a most material weapon. Still, Sir, we must not neglect the next material weapon which the nature of the country has put into our hands; I mean an armed peasantry. I own, Sir, that if these were meant to fight in battalion, they would not be so truly efficient as volunteers; but I beg leave to be understood, that I am not technically speaking of an army. An army, however efficient, is not the only power, in a country like this, which ought to be looked to: there is a general force besides, which is equally, or perhaps more formidable to an invading enemy, which would be continually throwing itself in their way, and harassing and distressing them at every turn and on every occasion; sometimes when least expected, and always with great advantage to themselves. I have been told, Sir, that I want to substitute an armed peasantry in the place of the volunteers. Sir, I would have the volunteers come to the trial; but still I would also get the others. I should never have done, Sir, were I to state all the advantages resulting from such a body of men, and will therefore content myself with citing only a few. In the first place, the enormous expence of the volunteer corps may tend in time greatly to diminish them. What then will become of the state, should a great proportion of the volunteers be disbanded or dissolved? In possessing an armed peasantry, you have a formidable force ready on all occasions to act in aid of a regular army. Who is it, Sir, that has not heard or read of the almost innumerable advantages attendant on having persons ready and willing and able to fight on the spot, or in the neighbourhood of those places in which they have been used to live, who are perfectly and accurately acquainted with the topography of the country, which must give them a power almost incalculable, from their being able to take advantage of every rising ground, and its adjoining valley, to fall upon a retreat from the enemy, as circumstances and occasions may require, to his almost certain defeat and discomfiture, as he will never be free from their repeated and continued attacks? I freely confess, Sir, I see more advantages in this, as a permanent rather than a temporary system, which war may and certainly will give birth to, but which being once fairly raised and trained, may remain for ever as a strong bulwark and invincible defence of the country. I say, therefore, arm the people, but do not put an end to the service, which we may purchase at a trifling expence of money and of time, both in war and peace. It would become in a very short time an amusement instead of a toil, and each man in a parish would pride himself in being thus considered as the intrepid guardian and protector of his own family and rights, as well as those of his neighbours, so that the whole country would soon become linked in a band of patriotic affection, which all the foreign foes in the world would never be able to sever or cut asunder.—Now, Sir, I will consider it with a view to the volunteers: if such a system as this had been adopted 20 years ago, the volunteer service would have been far more advanced. If you look to the volunteers alone, it ought to be for a mass of the country, who have been properly trained to and perfectly know the use of arms. This, Sir, I am clear in, that the more you trust and place confidence in the people of this country, the better you will find their behaviour. If we had a number of armed persons in every part of the country, we could quell every insurrection without the interference of the military to settle civil feuds. It is not, however, to times of peace that I am to allude, but rather to the time of war. I do not think that I am quite wrong when I say, suppose an enemy to land in this country, and his warfare to go on, I must not shut my eyes to the possibility of an English army being defeated, for such possibilities do exist in the fate of war. Will any man say, that if a report of the English army being defeated be circulated through the country, it is a matter of indifference whether we be armed or not throughout the whole kingdom? Even after any partial success of the enemy, it could not be in their power to procure provisions, or any other accommodation, without sending a detachment of their army to force it, and such detachments might be successfully opposed, and even their victories, in the end, might prove their ruin. Let us now take another view of the case, and suppose that the British army had gained an advantage, but had not put the enemy to a total rout, will any man say, that if an army be forced to fly in different directions, the rallying of that army will not be rendered exceedingly difficult by means of an armed peasantry?—I shall now proceed to take a view of what has actually been done by ministers to provide for the defence of the country; and, first of all, with regard to the Defence Act, passed last session: I wish to make a few observations on the unlimited assertion of his Majesty's prerogative. I attach to myself some blame in having participated in agreeing with such an assertion. It certainly is impossible for the members of this House to watch every word and sentence of every bill that is brought in; and, therefore, the particular authors of each bill are looked to as more peculiarly responsible for glaring errors. I believe that 99 acts out of 100 pass without being critically and carefully examined, as they ought to be, by the members of the House, consistent with their strict and rigid duty. But, it is in a particular way the duty of ministers, that no bill be suffered to assert any false or dangerous doctrine, in the persuasion that it may pass unobserved in the hurry of legislation. In July, 1803, the alarm of invasion was so imminent, according, to ministers, that the Defence Bill must be passed by acclamation; and the zeal of the country being aroused to meet the invasion, which was to take place in Aug. no time was to be lost in weighing and judging of the bill. Accordingly, I find we overlooked a most serious declaration in the preamble of the bill, and which, certainly, if I had seen, I should have exerted the utmost efforts of my mind to have corrected, namely, "that the King has a right to command all his liege subjects to take up arms, &c." a doctrine which, to be admitted as true, ought to have been qualified and defined. It may be said, that his Majesty has the right to do justice, but he is to do justice according to law. And so is the prerogative of calling forth his people in arms. It must undoubtedly be said of any community, that they must possess the means of preserving themselves; and that, on the principle of the salus populi suprema lex, the power of calling forth the physical strength of the community must reside in it; and that the King, as the head represents this community, and is the organ of its will. But this species of reasoning would justify the arbitrary assertions; and all such reasoning the spirit of our constitution utterly reprobates. The rights which our Sovereign possesses are defined as well as limited: and this has been most sensibly as well as ably stated by a great judge, who, speaking of this sort of abstract right, made use of these words: "for I freely declare, that ancient precedents, unless supported by modern usage, in cases of prerogative, have little weight with me." Nothing can be more true than these words of the learned Mr. Justice Foster; and nothing can be more applicable to this strange assertion in the preamble of this act. No such right can be claimed by the King; no such right, however it may have been part of the undefined prerogative in ancient times, can be exercised after the words of the statute in the 25th of Ed. III. A statute made in an epoch which I respect, because the statutes of that period were marked by their wisdom, and by the principles of sound legislation. In a statute of that year it is expressly declared, "no person shall be liable to serve but such as are, bound by their tenures." If, indeed, there were such a prerogative, it would be impracticable. The constitution has wisely planted an inseparable check over the abuse, and thank God! not one of the ancient undefined prerogatives can be exercised against the liberties of the people. To what an extent, and to what complete overthrow of every thing for which our ancestors have successfully contended, would this right go? Money has been, perhaps by a strained metaphor, called the sinews of war. If his Majesty has the right of commanding the military service of his subjects, he must also be supposed to have the right of maintaining them; and so the power of the purse would be taken out of the hands of the representatives of the people. I state this only to shew how improper and unjustifiable it is to introduce such an expression into a bill, and how negligent it is to let it pass. And it is not in the preamble of this act only that we see a dangerous door opened to abuse.—Let us look, then, at the enactments of the General Defence Act, respecting this prerogative, which is asserted to be inherent in his Majesty. It states, that in the event of invasion, or the appearance of the enemy in force upon the coast, it shall be lawful for his Majesty to call out the persons who are enrolled under this act in the different counties; that it shall be lawful to call them out in such proportion as shall seem meet; to place them in any regiment of regulars, militia, or fencibles; to put them under martial law, and march them to any part of the coast, &c. This act, therefore, without any limit or qualification of rank, age, or station, empowers the King to compel any individual, however unfit for military service, to serve in the ranks exactly on the footing of enlisted soldiers, to be subject to all the severities of military duty and of martial law. If this really be the prerogative of his Majesty, it is one which cannot be contemplated without anxiety. Not to suppose the existence of great and violent abuse, it is sufficient to know, that such power is liable to abuse; and no man, with the sentiments of freedom, and the confidence of independence, can feel perfectly easy to think, that to a law so unmitigated and so unqualified he may be subject. Is it possible to reflect on such a power, without seeing how it may be abused and perverted? It may be an extreme case, indeed, to state, that its sweeping provisions give authority to the King to take the Prince of Wales, place him under the command of his footman, and march him in that inferior capacity against the enemy. I know that such a case is impossible, but it illustrates the boundless authority which the act confers, and which, in many instances, it is quite easy to conceive might be exercised. Might not a tradesman or a farmer be hurried away from his, family and occupations, and placed under the command of a corporal or serjeant, their own servants? Persons of every situation may be pitched upon by malice or by revenge, and sent to perform military service, for which they are unfit. I see that such a scheme of things does lie open to abuse, and the monstrous abuse and injustice with which the execution of it would be attended, must have prevented the attempt to carry it into effect at all. I do not understand exactly the mode in which these provisions are to be reduced to practice. If the quota of men to be furnished by a parish was to be fixed by ballot, the inconvenience might frequently be very great, even where a sense of abuse did not aggravate the case. The ballot might, without any distinction of rank, age, or circumstances, compel any man to serve in person. In truth, a principle more inconsistent with that sound and rational equality, which all laws and all human institutions ought to aim at in the imposition of burdens, never was devised. In practice it must be productive of extreme inequality, hardship, and grievance. From a true equality the principles of subordination flow; but, in the operation of such measures as this, all distinctions are annihilated, and every thing is levelled under the discretion of the crown. Indeed, ministers themselves, on some occasions, have acknowledged enough to shew that they were themselves convinced that the General Defence Act could not be carried into practice. It was said by one of them, that the Defence Act would have "given way;" and so it must, for such extravagant powers could not have been exercised without an abuse that would have proved fatal to the measure. But still ministers contended it had been of use, as it backed the volunteer system. What? Was it then thought necessary to goad the people of this country forward in the defence of their houses, their property, and their liberties, by the terror of these severe provisions? I am certain that the spirit of the nation required no such spur. Why such bugbears then? Why thus compel the volunteers on, like a front rank by the bayonet of that behind it? But, in truth, what was this bugbear? Ministers admit that this act might have "given way!" What was the value of this threat, this stimulus of the General Defence Act, which had its use? At any rate, if the peo- ple wanted a spur, as they do not, would you employ a menace, which, in fact, had in it nothing that could really alarm? At least you ought not to threaten what you cannot enforce. I remember an anecdote of one of your predecessors, Sir, who is allowed to have maintained the dignity and authority of the chair in a manner superior to all those who went before him, however he may have yielded to those who have come after him. It was a custom with that person (Mr. Speaker Onslow), when any member was guilty of any irregularity, to cry, "take care, Sir, or I'll name you." And, on one occasion, a member, not much frightened by the threat, asked coolly, "and suppose you do name me, what will be the consequence?" "The consequence!" replied the Speaker, "God only knows!" Now, in the same manner, ministers have thought it convenient to keep up the terror of the General Defence Act, in order to stimulate the volunteers; yet they are sensible, that the menace would fail them, and that if they were to be asked, what would be the consequence of their threat, their answer would be, "God only knows!" for no man could think of putting in practice a measure so pregnant with oppression and injustice. In the volunteer bill, which was lately so much the subject of discussion in the House, it was argued to be unjust that a farmer should, against his will, be deprived of the labour of his servant; and this provision, I understand, has been altered in the other House. But indeed it was of little consequence to talk of the hardship of the farmer, being deprived of his servant, if he himself was liable to be taken, and sent to serve in the army or militia, in Cornwall or Northumberland, or any other place the most remote from his abode. But, in truth, the very atrocity of the fact made it impossible to put it into execution; so that, in reality; it was as little calculated to be useful, as it was altogether unnecessary as a stimulus to the zeal and to the patriotism of the country.—Having seen, therefore, that the General Defence Act was neither necessary in terrorem, and could be of no avail as a bugbear, what practical good was it calculated to afford in strengthening our means of repelling invasion? I have repeatedly stated in this House, that I conceived it desirable that, in addition to our other means of defence, we should have an armed peasantry. Minis- ters themselves go so far as to say, that an armed peasantry may be of use to back the volunteers, as the latter will be of service to back the regular army. They have never, however, proposed any rational practical means by which this advantage can be obtained. Let us, therefore, go into the committee, and discuss the subject. Let us there try if we cannot devise some mode of strengthening and confirming whatever is well conceived in the present system of defence, by that which all consider useful and important, though in different degrees. Let us there discuss how the peasantry are to be called out, armed and arrayed. Let us discuss how, in case of emergency, they are to be employed; how far, if fire arms cannot be found, pikes may not with advantage be put into their hands, and whether it may be necessary to place them under martial law; or by what other code they may be rendered subject to discipline. These are fit objects for discussion in the committee, and there alone, indeed, can they be discussed with advantage. There, too, we may revise, amend, and improve the different measures that have already been passed for the public defence; there we may correct their errors, remove their contradictions, and increase their effect. I have already hinted the general importance of calling forth the exertions of an armed peasantry, and in this, even they who think more highly of the volunteers, will perfectly concur, because the armed peasantry is not intended to supersede the volunteers. As to a detailed plan on this head, I do not propose to trouble the House with any at present. Neither am I prepared to say how far this service should be voluntary or compulsory. That the voluntary zeal of the country would supply every thing that could be desired, I am perfectly convinced. At the same time, if it should be thought necessary to make the service in some degree compulsory, I will not say that it might not be proper to make some provision for it. Nevertheless, the means of calling forth that aid must be freed from that injustice and inequality to which the General Defence Act would now be liable. How, likewise, is this force to be armed? And if muskets cannot be furnished to all, surely those who are most inclined to despise the pike, must admit that the pike is a much better weapon than the spade or pitchfork, with which alone the peasantry are now armed, even were they so arrayed and organized as to be capable of being employed with effect. These, however, and many other questions which are naturally connected with the subject, and winch will, no doubt, be more particularly insisted upon this evening, will be proper for the consideration of the committee, which it is the purpose of my motion to institute. I shall therefore conclude with moving, "That it be referred to a committee of the whole House to revise the several bills for the Defence of the Country, and to consider of such further measures as may be necessary to make that defence more complete and permanent."

.—Sir, I am induced to offer myself to your notice at this moment, rather than at a more advanced period of the debate, for the purpose of combating the arguments which the hon. gent. has urged at considerable length, in support of one of the most extraordinary motions that, within my parliamentary experience, has ever been submitted to the consideration of this House. I have another inducement, also, arising from some incidental circumstances in the speech you have just heard, for trespassing, at this early hour, upon the attention of the House. The hon. gent. has alluded to the zeal and unanimity which at present pervades all ranks and classes of society; but his approbation is qualified by the observation, that it is a zeal and unanimity solely to be attributed to the fear of invasion, inferring thereby, that his Majesty's ministers, neither by their measures, nor their conduct, have conduced either to excite or maintain it. The hon. gent. has adverted to some discussions which took place at the commencement of the war; but it must be in the recollection of gent. that the observations which fell from him on one of those occasions, drew forth the reprehension of the House; on another question, I had the benefit of that hon. gent.'s support. When a motion was made, the tendency of which was to condemn me and my colleagues for engaging in the war, that hon. gent. refused to support it. By his vote on that question, he did, in the fullest and most unqualified manner, absolve and acquit us entirely from the guilt of having commenced that war. But, Sir, we do not depend for our justification on the accidental approbation of that hon. gent., great as the effect of his approbation might be. We build it on much more solid and extended grounds, the almost unanimous vote of this House, by which it has been sanctioned and confirmed. I come now to the hon. gent.'s present motion, certainly one of the most extraordinary that has ever been brought before this House, for which there is no precedent in the parliamentary history of this country, to which there is nothing analogous in the parliamentary usages of the country, and which I am well justified in describing as a measure most uncommon and extraordinary, when coupled with the strange and singular matter which the hon. gent. has contrived to mix with it. The object of his motion is to appoint a committee to revise the acts that have been passed for the defence of the country, and to consider of, and provide adequate means for, the protection of it in future. Sir, there is no man in this House who more highly values the privileges of Parliament than I do; there is no man in the House who will be more ready to assert and maintain them. I know, that by the constitution it is invested, and it is fitting it should be, with very great and extensive powers; and I will not deny its right to institute a committee for the purposes that are proposed. But, Sir, while I admit the power of the House to do this, I think I may safely apply to the discretion of gent. that they will not, by supporting the motion, countenance the establishment of a committee, which, in its proceedings and result, must terminate and become, to all intents and purposes, a committee of a purely military nature. Such a committee would be rather a novel and uncommon mode of manifesting either the authority or the prudence of this House, and one to which, I am persuaded, it will not easily recur, except upon much stronger grounds than the hon. gent. has brought forward in support of his motion of this night. There is something peculiar also in the matter of the hon. gent.'s motion. For reasons peculiar to himself, no doubt, but which the House will have little difficulty in guessing at, he has totally omitted all mention or allusion whatever to the navy, and has wholly excluded from his consideration the 400,000 volunteers, composing so essential a part of our means of defence. But this peculiarity is not to be exclusively appropriated to the purport of his motion, or the various details that it is intended to embrace. He has so worded it, as to take in all descriptions of persons in this House, with all their floating and contradictory opinions; one man objecting to too great an extension of one part of our force, another lamenting any attempt at its diminution; some recommending a greater and some a lesser addition to the regular army, and others, who differ as to that particular species of naval force we should employ; some preferring a large number of small vessels, and some a small number of large vessels; all, all these, the hon. gent. has found means to gratify, in their individual caprices and opinions, and to include them within the compass of this sweeping and general motion.—I come now to another part of the hon. gent.'s argument, in which he has said that he did not attach much credit to the apprehension of invasion. The hon. gent. as I stated before, has been pleased to declare that the present unanimity arose entirely from the actual danger of the country, I know not by what dexterity of argument the hon. gent. will be able to reconcile those two observations, that, as he says, there is no danger of invasion, and again, that our unanimity is entirely owing to it. Nor am I very solicitous on that head, when I recollect, that during the last war, that hon. gent. continually asserted, that it was the injustice of that war which prevented us from being unanimous then. During that war, I believe it cannot be imputed to that hon. gent. that he ever came forward with any proposition to avert any danger with which the country might have been menaced, nor during the actual hostility, has he ever favoured his Majesty's ministers with any project or suggestion of his, or given them, in any way whatever, the advantage of his great talents. Indeed, the hon. gent. has said, that if ministers had frankly communicated to him that they were really apprehensive of danger, he would have concurred in any augmentation to the public force they might have thought necessary for the public defence. But, Sir, was it necessary that this should have been made the subject of particular and specific communication to him, or to any thinking man in this country? Is it possible that hon. gent. could have shut his eyes, and closed up his enlightened mind against the active, unceasing, and immoderate ambition of France, stimulated and invited to the exertion of that ambition, and possessing the means of gratifying it, in the possession of so many hundred leagues of sea coast, extending almost from the Texel to the Adriatic?—In the course of the hon. gent's. speech he has frequently adverted, but with a partiality which I have reason to complain of, to the declarations of ministers respecting the probable duration of the peace of Amiens. Sir, we never did pledge ourselves for the continuance of that peace. On the contrary, we always thought, and omitted no opportunity of declaring so, that the best security for the continuance of peace, was to impress France, and not only France, but all Europe, with a conviction that our strength, our spirit, and our means, were whole and inexhausted; and that although we were willing to adhere to the peace we had made, we were ready for war, whenever insult or aggression, on the part of any power, should compel us to it. It was, Sir, from these motives, that our peace-establishment so greatly exceeded the peace-establishment of 1792, an augmentation which brought down on us the censure of the hon. gent.—I come now to the hon. gent.'s motion, narrowed and restricted to a degree inconsistent with his usual candour, and unworthy of his great mind. He has directed his observations principally to the regular and militia force, omitting the navy and volunteers, and has recommended, with his accustomed zeal and perseverance, the adoption of his favourite project of adding an armed peasantry. He has chiefly relied upon two points for the appointment of this committee, from which he affects to suppose, that so many advantages may be derived; one is, that the pernicious principle of recruiting by competition may be abolished in it, and next, that the extent of service may be altered from life to term of years. I trust I shall be able to prove, to the satisfaction of the House, that it would not be justified, that it would not be prudent nor advisable in it, to proceed to the formation of such a committee, upon such slight and insufficient reasons as have been mentioned. My noble friend who sits near me (Lord Castlereagh) has stated, from authentic documents, that although the recruiting for general service was not so great at present as it was on former occasions, yet that it was as great as circumstances gave us any right to expect. When, gent. Sir, are informed, that the persons who are entrusted with his Majesty's govt. were compelled to collect and take out of your population no less than 200,000 men for the purpose of recruiting your army and your navy, and that within the space of little more than 12 months, they will cease to express any surprise that the recruiting service should have experienced a momentary cessation; when I declare to this House, on the part of that govt. that there is at present a regular force, in this country and in Ireland, composed of troops of the line and militia, of no less than 184,000, I trust it will be acknowledged that his Majesty's ministers have not been remiss or improvident in making adequate preparations for the defence of the country. When gent. reflect upon the difficulties we had to encounter, that we had the militia to raise, that we had the army of the line to recruit, that we had the army of reserve to establish, that we had the defence act to prepare, and that we have a regular army, line and militia of 184,000, that we have 400,000 volunteers, that we have 27,000 sea fencibles, independent of troops in other points, in garrisons, and in colonies, making in the whole a force little short of 800,000, and greater in number by 200,000 than the greatest exertion of the enemy can bring forward? I say, Sir, when such difficulties and such successes are weighed against each other, I trust the House and the country will admit that we are not that incapable and incompetent description of men the hon. mover of the question before you endeavours to represent us. This, Sir, could be proved by documents the most authentic and irrefragable; and though for many reasons which will be obvious to gent. I feel strong objection to the production of such information, yet I will consent to give those gent. who make the want of it a ground of complaint and accusation against ministers, an account of the military and naval force of the country as it actually is, but upon the express condition that they do not ask for the distribution of it. I am persuaded, Sir, that if such an account were laid on the table, it would be the best, I will go farther, and say, it would be a decisive answer to the best argument the hon. gent. has urged in support of his motion.—The hon. gent. has gone at considerable length into the consideration of that principle expressed in the defence act, that it is his Majesty's prerogative to call upon the services of all ranks of his subjects capable of bearing arms, in case of invasion. Sir, in discussing that bill, that principle was frequently alluded to in debate, but never opposed; for it was admitted, generally admitted, that his Majesty possessed such a prerogative in case of invasion, and the only question was, I well remember, whether he could not resort to it before invasion. The hon. gent. affects to acquit ministers of any blame in introducing the assertion of that particular prerogative into that bill, by presuming that in their anxiety to prepare for the defence of the country, a solitary instance of recognizing it might have escaped their observation. Sir, I desire that principle may be thoroughly examined and enquired into; I desire that it be not taken, pro admisso, but that it may stand on its fair and general constitutional grounds.—With respect to the hon. gent.'s motion, I am to look for other motives, than those he has thought prudent to avow, for proposing it. I am to seek for other reasons for a motion peculiarly calculated to collect all the floating opinions of the House, and to create such an opposition to his Majesty's ministers as would tend to produce a change of administration. If that be the object of the hon. gent.'s motion, let him state so, broadly and unequivocally; let him produce some specific accusation; let him bring forward some direct, explicit charge, and let him take the sense of the House on it; but let him not bring it forward in this covert and underhand mode, and by a detour endeavour to stigmatize those he has not the courage to accuse boldly and manfully. Let not the hon. gent. I say, have recourse to a paltry expedient of this nature, it is unworthy of him. If we are fairly attacked, if we are accused upon specific grounds, we are ready and willing to meet the charge, and we shall find, I trust, no difficulty in defending and justifying ourselves upon fair, open, and constitutional principles. To the motion of the hon. gent. I feel the strongest objections, and I am bound to resist it upon every consideration of prudence and of public policy. I call upon every member of this House to look at the state of the country, and to say, whether such a committee is practicable or adviseable? To accomplish all the objects proposed by it, you must bring officers from their duty, with great inconvenience to the public service, and possibly with greater danger to the public safety; you must collect documents and information from various quarters; you must have all the records and accounts, the plans and the proposals that are possessed, or have been submitted to the different departments, laid on that table, and examined, and, what is no trivial objection, made public, before you can come to a right, or indeed to any conclusion, as to whether the naval and military force of the country has been properly employed and administered. I do not mean to say, that a great state necessity may not justify the appointment of such a committee; but I leave it to the wisdom of the House to determine, if any proofs of such necessity have been advanced in support of the present dangerous and extraordinary measure. And I must say, that the arguments in support of the motion are too feeble, impotent, and insignificant to justify so important and delicate a proceeding. I entertain a perfect confidence, therefore, that in opposing the motion, I shall have the concurrence of a large majority of the House. I say a large majority of the House, for I cannot suppose, that they will be so indifferent to the order and dignity of their own proceedings as to be misled by such statements into a measure, so unprecedented and dangerous as the motion the hon. gent. proposes. I therefore feel it my duty to give it a decided negative.

.—I cannot agree, Sir, with the right hon. gent. who has just spoken, in the description of the motion which is now before the House. It is a motion, in my view of it, which is neither calculated to embrace opinions hostile to govt. nor to any ministers whatever, nor to embrace opinions that may have been entertained on small and minute points, and thereby produce a general concurrence against ministers to criticize upon their conduct, when such members might have but small and minute differences in their opinions as to the detail of a system to which they generally assent; but it is a motion calculated to embrace all those who consider that such a measure ought to be adopted and substituted for that which they consider to be inadequate for our defence, and to call the attention of those who are disposed to take a grave and radical review of our public affairs—a review of all the resources which govt. have brought forward; who think that no part of our defence is adequate to what we ought to expect—all those who are convinced, by experience, that after 12 months have been given to these gent. to exhaust all the re- sources of their minds, to amend, and what they have thought, to improve from the suggestion of others; all those who are convinced upon mature reflection, that from the present ministers, or under them, nothing is likely to originate to give to this country any fair chance of having what is due to its own zeal and its own exertion, at the most important and the most critical period that ever existed in its history, which he embraced by the present motion; and I confess I am one of those who look at this subject in that point of view, and I am inclined to support this motion on almost all the grounds which the hon. gent. urged who moved it. I feel it my duty to my sovereign and to my country, to do so, not only on all the reasons which that hon. gent. has urged in support of it, but also for many which he omitted to state, and which I shall slightly touch upon. But the right hon. gent. who spoke last, with all his recollection of the records of parliament, and with all the force of his imagination, which he indulged to supply his recollection, has only proved that he knew of no motion like the present; and also by the same authority, which is himself, that when circumstances are extraordinary, the measures to provide for them are likewise extraordinary; and I think we may add, that whatever extraordinary measures may be adopted, the present crisis which requires them is also extraordinary; and this the right hon. gent. appears to be surprized at, as if it were extraordinary to propose a committee of this House, to consider of the means for providing for the defence of the country; as if it were extraordinary, that after 12 months of the war, preceded by a peace which, by the confession of ministers themselves, was a mere notice of that war, and a war in which they themselves have been exhausted in their skill; and yet in the course of the last 12 months, they have brought forward nothing in which there has not been a variety of contradictions in the plans, repugnancies in the measures, and imbecility in the execution. Nothing in which every step has not been marked by unnecessary delay; and at last the measures adopted amounting almost to a retraction of the principle upon which it was founded. I should say it is extraordinary indeed, if after having such and so many melancholy proofs that ministers themselves, after repeated trials, have proved what is to be expected from them, by what they have produced, if this House did not inquire into this important subject, in the hope of being able to devise some better means for the defence of the country than any which they have brought forward for that purpose; a course in which, if they are permitted to go on, there can be no hope of safety to this country. Such has been the mode in which they have managed the important charge of defending the country! I feel that I am compelled to make this strong and explicit declaration of my sentiments. I do consider the measure for the increase of the regular army as a measure for which ministers are unable to provide; for it is only a few nights ago, since we had the confession of ministers themselves, that the necessity was so great for the making a provision for this purpose, that the measure they themselves had formerly brought forward, they would consent to abandon, if by any other measure the increase of the regular army could be produced.—I do not mean to say any thing of the propriety of the measure proposed upon the subject of an armed peasantry, nor of substituting an armed peasantry for the volunteers; which the right hon. gent. who spoke last, at one time was about to state, as being the idea of the hon. gent. who has brought forward this motion; but he set himself right afterwards, and admitted of a difference, not a very slight one, that of adding an armed peasantry to the volunteers, instead of substituting them for the volunteers. And if there are persons who think, that, in point of substance, the volunteers are more essential for the actual and efficient service of the country than the armed peasantry, as certainly there are great numbers that would be for altering the quality of our mode of defence; but then they may assent to having the aid of the peasantry, but not in the way in which it was stated by the right hon. gent.; and, as to the volunteers, we have a right to avail ourselves of the full benefit of that force; a force which has often been, and justly is, a favourite with this House and the public; a force, which whatever it may have been in its origin, has now the advantage of being formed, and of being in a great state of efficiency as a force, though none of its efficiency has been owing to ministers. Often it has produced among us some difference of opinion; as to the precise extent to which you should carry it, and as to the circumstances under which you should render it most effectual; but it is a force which all of us allowed to be an extremely valuable force; and now there is hardly any difference between the hon. gent. who made this motion, and his Majesty's government, on the subject of the armed peasantry, he says it may be a proper thing if ministers and parliament shall think it right. So the right hon. gent. has gone the length of admitting the measure may be right, if he shall hereafter think so. I say, I think it clearly right that you should institute an inquiry whether it is right or not. Have we not been told by ministers for these six months past, that the invasion might take place perhaps within 24 hours? Is it a time to procrastinate any wise measures, any efficient plans of defence, at a time when we see that the enemy have surmounted many of those preliminary difficulties which some months ago were deemed invincible? Have not the enemy supplied those means of conveyance which it was at first thought must render all the threats of the enemy vain and futile? Have they not, in the face of that navy which ministers so confidently boast has been carried to its utmost strength, and has been distributed with the most perfect judgment—have they not, within sight of our shores, and in defiance of our obstruction, assembled in one port between 13 and 1400 vessels, capable of conveying from 50 to 100 and 150 men each? Have they not proved that all our reasonings about the impossibility of sailing from one port, the difficulty of a concerted attack, the obstacle of winds and tides, were unfounded, and that the contempt we entertained for their preparations and for their menaces were ill-founded and unwarranted? With such facts before us, ought we to suspend or delay any means that can contribute to our safety? We ought not to treat with contempt, or with a false security pronounce impracticable, the projects of a bold, enterprizing, and desperate, though often fortunate enemy, and one, too, that never stood in the way of good fortune by a dread of bad. If, then, an armed peasantry is calculated to be of any utility in Essex, Kent, or Sussex, in opposing an enemy, and retarding their progress to the metropolis, it is fit that no time should be lost in devising a plan for obtaining this additional aid. The hon. gent. next contends, that the motion is unconstitutional; but what is there unconstitutional in referring to the consideration of a committee of the whole House, which I understand to be the object of the motion (Mr. Fox nodded assent), certain acts passed by the legislature, so that they may be modified, altered, and improved? Is the hon. gent. who so long filled that chair, with so much credit to himself and advantage to the House, so little acquainted with parliamentary usages as not to know, that in a committee of the whole House alone several proceedings can regularly originate. Matters of religion, grievance, trade, finance, &c. must first be discussed in a committee of the whole House. If, then, questions on those subjects must originate in a committee, can there be any scruple to refer to a similar committee, measures, the object of which is to defend every thing that is dear and valuable to a state, the religion which exalts, the commerce which enriches, the laws which regulate and protect? Is there any thing extraordinary, any thing dangerous, thing in the present motion? Will it be said that the system of defence is so good that there is nothing to be added to it? Is the experience of it in its fruits and effects such as to encourage us to rely with implicit confidence in the energy and resources of ministers? What measures have they ever adopted that have not been thwarted by some other of their measures? What efficient plan has been proposed for the recruiting the regular army? Can we indulge the vain and chimerical hope, that, without any new regulations as to the period of service, such as those proposed by the right hon. gent. recruits will be obtained for eight guineas, when they can hardly be procured for forty and fifty pounds? Is it upon the wisdom, the vigilance, and the energy of these ministers that we can rely, when we have seen that no one measure for the public defence can they be truly said to have originated, when several they have retarded or enfeebled? I am satisfied that some plan for the permanent recruiting of the army ought to be settled, and that we ought with all dispatch proceed to that important subject. But neglecting the regular army, have ministers improved and perfected that system of the volunteers in which they have spent so much time? I venture to affirm, that the volunteer system is still far from that state of perfection to which it might be carried. The army of reserve, instead of being suspended, should be modified. In regard to fortifications, too, in which, hitherto, so little has been done, I will venture to state, that due precautions in that department have been much neglected, and that many things have been omitted to be done, which, in case of invasion, would tend both to save the lives of men and to check the progress of an invader. From all that I have heard, too, on the subject of the navy, and in spite of that magnificent catalogue of ships which ministers have produced, and which I shall not at present dissect, I must repeat, that the conduct of that branch of our defence, has not been such as the public had a right to expect, and upon this subject I may take an opportunity to state circumstances that, will astonish the House and the country. These, and many other considerations, form the most conclusive argument in favour of the motion, and though the right hon. gent. who made it, did not dilate on these topics, he naturally expected, and stated his expectation, that they would be taken up by other speakers in the course of the debate. It is true that ministers on this as on former occasions, have given us a pompous enumeration of the force of the country. I have heard that statement with pride. It affords the most consolatory evidence of what the country is capable of doing. But I and other members of this House have at least as good a right to exult in that survey of our strength as ministers. We have not been wanting in our exertions to contribute to call forth the spirit of the country, and to organize its strength. That spirit and exertion, however, belong to the country, and are not to be ascribed to the direction or the energy of the government. Indeed, if there be any who ought peculiarly to separate that pride from any feeling of personal merit, it is the present ministers, who have had so little share in the national energy. No one measure can they claim as their own; no one measure have they improved and perfected; very many they have weakened by their delays, and destroyed by their incongruities. Whatever then the spirit and zeal of a free and brave people may have been, under the sense of danger, ought fairly to be separated from the tardiness, langour, and imbecility of ministers in every thing of which they have assumed the direction. Ministers boast of what others have suggested, or voluntary public zeal has effected, as if what was done was perfectly adequate to our security. But is it enongh to have provided against the danger of a final conquest? Enough has not been done unless we have adopted every practi- cable and rational means of checking the enemy, should they invade our shores, with the least sacrifice of life, with the least waste of the public resources, with a rapidity that will disappoint the enemy's projects of devastation. Enough has not been done, unless every thing has been provided, by which, in the shortest space, we may be enabled to defeat the enemy with that signal overthrow and destruction, as will for ever deter them from a repetition of the attack, and for ever relieve the country from the alarm and anxiety of invasion. I do not mean to say that the enemy would, according to all human calculation, succeed in their designs, even had we no other means of defence but those which now exist; but have we reason to believe that our strength is yet arrayed in the best manner, that our forces are distributed at the proper points, so as to act with the most decisive effect? Unless this be done (as I fear it is not), it is not enough to say that we have 184,000 regulars and militia, and 400,000 volunteers; and, indeed, when it is proved by their own statements, that the resources of the country are so great, it forms an additional ground of censure against ministers, if our system of defence be not adequate to every demand. As to the observations which have been made upon the amount of force which should have been kept up during the peace, and the proportion which existed at the renewal of the war, whatever I may think with respect to the opinion held by the hon. gent. who opened the debate upon a former occasion, I cannot, without surprise, hear from the right hon. gent. who has just sat down, that he conceived the force which was maintained during the peace as amply sufficient to meet any probable emergency; for that right hon. gent. was in possession of much knowledge of the disposition of the enemy, which must have satisfied his mind of the propriety of making more extensive preparations for a state of hostility. That knowledge the right hon. gent. to be sure studiously concealed from parliament, and therefore the hon. gent. upon the opposite bench was, with many others, incompetent to form any opinion of the impending danger; but not so his Majesty's ministers, who had yet neglected to provide against it. They who, by a manifesto since published to the world, explained that there were grounds, almost from immediately after the conclusion of the peace, to complain of the conduct and to suspect the intentions of Buonaparte, had yet omitted to devise measures to counteract his designs, and to put the country in a state fitted for the description of hostility to be apprehended. In this state the country is not, in point of fact, even now placed; and this forms one of my reasons for concurring in the motion before the House, because, as they who thought the peace not likely to continue, did not prepare for war, and who, since the war has commenced, have not preserved that course of vigorous exertion which the situation of the empire called for, are not those in whom I would confide for the establishment of our security. Ministers foresaw the war, and yet they did not attempt to ballot for the militia, as they should have done, during the peace. They should have availed themselves of that period, when they must, according to their own confessions, since so repeatedly made, have contemplated war as something more than probable, set every means in motion of defending the country against invasion.—The observations they were enabled to make, at the close of the last war, of the plans and purpose of Buonaparte, were sufficient to assure them that his first notion was an invasion of this country, which the short period that elapsed between the establishment of peace upon the Continent, and the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, did not qualify him to attempt, but the progress of his then preparations served to shew that his resolution was not to make desultory attacks upon us, but to do that which he has since accomplished, viz. to collect a large force upon some part of the coast most convenient for the purpose of making a descent upon this country. What then are we to think of those ministers who, with such an opportunity of observation, overlooked renewing the ballot for that important part of our force, the militia, during peace? And how did they act towards the volunteers, on whose gallantry they now profess so much to rely? The House must have in recollection the letters which ministers addressed to that body of men during the peace, which letters were so much calculated rather to damp than to animate and encourage the zeal of those corps. But this was not all; for, under circumstances peculiarly auspicious for the purpose, and with the prospects before them I have already mentioned, they refused to attend to a plan suggested to them for providing a certain resource for the recruiting and supply of our regular army. This plan was founded upon the same principle as that of the army of reserve, with the addition of that which I took occasion lately to lay before the House, and which, if adopted when my opinion was first urged to ministers, would have furnished the means of adding to our army, with all possible expedition, not less than 40 or 50,000 men. This plan has, I admit, been since adopted in part; and I shall certainly feel it my duty to urge the adoption of the whole of it again and again. The committee proposed by the motion, I conceive the most convenient place for entering into the detail of this and other measures for the public defence, to no branch of which, I perceive with regret, have ministers attended in due time, and to the execution of none of which do they appear to be adequate. Passing by all the omissions I complain of during the period of peace; drawing a veil over their conduct on that occasion altogether; and supposing the war recommenced as much to the surprise of ministers, as to that of many persons in that House and the country; supposing that they were not at all prepared to expect it, let us only look at their proceedings since that event, and let us examine how far their measures have been so contrived or executed as to justify a hope, much less an opinion, of safety to be derived from their exertion. The first part of their plan of defence, and that to which they seemed principally to look, related to volunteers. This topic has, I am aware, been already very fully discussed, and on that account overlooked by the hon. mover of the proposition before the House; but upon this point I would wish to ask of ministers whether they foresaw, or had even a remote idea, at the commencement of hostilities, that this description of our force would have extended so far, whether they contemplated that it ever should be so numerous? It was known by those who had any knowledge of their sentiments, who had any conversation with ministers, that they had no such intentions, and that, on the contrary, they expressed their disapprobation of the policy of their predecessors, in allowing the volunteer system to enlarge so much. This fact I allude to merely to shew that they are entitled to no praise for the multiplication of the volunteers; and to state that the spirit which produced the increase of that body, arose out of the discussions of this House—a spirit which, as ministers themselves admitted, far outvies their calculation or hopes; and also, as it seemed, exceeded their power of direction, for they afterwards thought proper to check and restrain it. So much as to the origin of the volunteer system. But how did ministers proceed to carry that system into execution? Why, without going much at length into this part of the subject, which I do not mean at present, I will merely remark, on the case of exemptions, which have been much and very justly objected to. The propriety of granting of these exemptions I never could see—certain it is that they were never necessary; for the volunteers, for the most part; required no such thing in the shape of encouragement to offer their services, and many of them were not at all aware, when they did engage, that any exemptions were to be granted: on the contrary, it is notorious that they were in several districts actually subscribing a certain sum each to purchase substitutes for any of their body which might be balloted for the militia. Such was the state of the volunteers when the act of parliament was passed, with the strong recommendation of ministers, for allowing exemptions, clogged, however, with such conditions, that the measure was not to be well understood. In another part of this act of ministers, there was something still less intelligible with respect to a volunteer's right of resignation, upon which ministers had evinced the most complete want of penetration and foresight. Had they judged wisely, they never would have attempted to dispute this right; for, paradoxical as it may seem, nothing tends more to preserve discipline among those corps, than the undisputed exercise of this right; and the reason is this, that while a volunteer has the right of leaving a corps, he cannot object to any regulation that may be deemed necessary by a commanding officer for the promotion of order and discipline in such corps, the private having his choice to submit or resign: but as to the act of ministers, the Attorney-General, for whose judgment and learning I entertain the most unfeigned respect, interpreted the law upon resignations in one way, and the court of King's Bench in another. Ministers, in this cor- tradiction, thought proper to circulate the opinion of the former as that to be acted upon by the volunteers, although they have since avowed that they did not agree with that opinion, and that they intended to introduce a declaratory law upon the subject. This I must class among the most unaccountable proceedings of ministers. As to the volunteer system generally, according to its present constitution, it appears to me to have several radical errors, and principally as to the mode in which the volunteers are distributed over the face of the country. When they were forming, and particularly when it was determined to limit their numbers, regard should have been had to the proportion proper to be assigned to each district. With that view, it would have been right to consider the difference between the inland and maritime counties, which were the more probable points of attack, and which was the most important to preserve. Our great naval arsenals, and those places which are most contiguous to our principal manufactories, ought of course to be the first objects of govt. in settling the relative proportion of volunteers which the several districts should be allowed to furnish—allowed, I call it, for it was at the discretion of govt. to accept the services of many corps which they rejected, and generally without any reference to the consideration of local defence which I have mentioned. When they thought proper to limit the volunteers to six times the number of the militia, and for what reason I cannot divine, they put Staffordshire and Derbyshire quite on a par with the maritime counties. No distinction was made in favour of those districts which lie most convenient to the enemy's coast, and which are most likely to be the first points of attack. Can any man say that there was any thing like policy in such an arrangement, or that indeed there is to be found in any part of the structure or execution of the volunteer system, so far as ministers are concerned, that which can deserve the character of discretion, or the approval of a statesman; There was, in fact, no part of the conduct pursued by govt. towards the volunteers, which did not form some ground for complaint, which did not offer some evidence of wavering and inconsistency. The House has witnessed the part they took at the close of the last sessions, when an hon. gent. on the other side (Mr. Sheridan) undertook to panegyrise the zeal and gallantry of the volunteers. When that hon. gent. two days before the sessions closed, thought proper, and, in the opinion of many intelligent respectable members, very prematurely, to move a vote of thanks to the volunteers, he stated that such vote was not only a just acknowledgment for the patriotism, they, who were then embodied had manifested, but that it would operate to encourage further voluntary offers of service. Ministers applauded warmly the motion of the hon. gent. but how did they afterwards act? The hon. gent. moved at the same time, that there should be laid before the House, at its meeting after the recess, a list of such new corps as should volunteer; but there was another list which the hon. gent. neglected to move for, namely, of all the corps which should be reduced or rejected in the same interval. Had the hon. gent. done so, he would have seen what use had been made of his motion, for the first step taken by ministers almost immediately after its adoption was, to suspend the progress of that voluntary zeal which the hon. gent. in common with every man who valued the character and safety of the country, so much admired. Ministers determined at once that the volunteers should not be increased any further, but that, on the contrary, their numbers should be diminished. The notice of this determination was speedily circulated among the volunteers, accompanied by the hon. gent.'s vote of thanks. Thus the volunteers were complimented for that, which govt. at the same time told them they did not wish for, they would not accept. There is a word in French, remercier, which literally implies returning thanks for proffered services, which it is not intended to accept; and this word has close analogy to the conduct of ministers in the communication of the motion of thanks, which they agreed in, in company with the strange resolution which I have already mentioned. In regard to the enrolment of volunteer corps, so far as such enrolment is connected with the provisions of the Defence Act, I must again repeat the complaint I have often made, of the total omission of govt. to execute the powers vested in it by that act; and any difficulties that have arisen in the progress of the ballot, I do conceive to be attributable to the non-exercise of the power I have referred to. As to the refusal of adequate, pecuniary, and military aid to the volunteers, I must observe, that it is amongst the most culpable and inconsistent part of the conduct of ministers. Without going minutely into the consequences of such conduct, which it would be more convenient to detail in the proposed committee, I have only at present to remark, that whatever difference of opinion may exist between my hon. friend on the lower bench (Mr. Windham) and me, with respect to the volunteers, and the practicability of rendering them perfect in military discipline, there can be no difference between us as to this point, that they ought to be furnished with the best instruction that is attainable, and both he and I have a right to complain of ministers in not following up their own principle, by giving the necessary aid to promote the improvement of the volunteers. My hon. friend has always maintained that the volunteers cannot be rendered equal to, or fit to act with regular troops; but ministers have uniformly resisted this opinion. Why then have they not provided adequately for the execution of their own ideas? No, they have only allowed pay for 20 days in a year, although, in the opinion of all military men, no new raised regiment of the regular army, with all the advantages of subordination, martial law, &c. could be disciplined fit for service in less than six weeks, or two months. Will any man say, that so short a period should be deemed sufficient for the discipline of the volunteers? But I shall be told, probably, that it was expected the volunteers would, independently of the 20 days, attend to drill on every Sunday. If they were, should I maintain that, Sundays included, the time was not sufficient to instruct them, and should not be relied on in the existing circumstances of the country, when we were daily menaced with invasion—that invasion which ministers have been perpetually telling us was daily to be expected since the middle of last summer. Notwithstanding this apprehension, such has been the behaviour of ministers, that I much fear if the enemy should not attack us until even the middle of next summer, he would find the volunteers very imperfectly disciplined. I cannot help expressing my surprise that ministers could have ever seriously calculated upon the probability that the labouring classes, of whom so many of the volunteers consist, would be so prompt to devote the only day they have for recreation and repose to the study of military discipline. It certainly did not betray any policy or consideration so to calculate; but even supposing they were so to assemble, and also to attend the 20 days, how were they to attain the instruction desired from the present mode, and from that which has prevailed uniformly. I suggested to ministers a plan of instruction, which I was told should be considered; but as they have never yet acted upon it, nor appear at all to consider it, their promise of consideration upon this, as well as upon other points, reminds me of a practice in the legislative assembly of a neighbouring nation (the United States of Holland), in which, when it was determined to get rid of a question, the resolution was ad referendum, which meant to take no more notice of it. The nature of the project I thought it my duty to recommend to ministers, related particularly to that which I have often mentioned in this House. For the advancement of the discipline of the volunteers, I urged the necessity of appointing adjutants to a certain number of men. This has been in part acceded to, but in what manner? An adjutant is appointed to such corps only as amounts to 400 men, and to them only in case they exercise 80 days in the year, although the men are allowed pay but for 20 days. Where, I would put it to the common sense of any man, can be found a stronger instance of weakness and inconsistency, than this order furnishes? No provision is made for the pay of the adjutant, unless the corps exercise 80 days, for one-fourth of which only the men are made any allowance. Is not this alone enough to expose the mind of ministers—to shew their disacquaintausce with the means of executing their own purposes? Indeed, I am perfectly convinced of their want of vigour; every circumstance serves to shew it, and I have therefore the strongest conviction upon my mind that they are incapable of acting upon any thing like system, of adopting or executing any well-digested or energetic plan for the defence of the country. I do not of course place any hope on their exertions, and therefore concur in the propriety of the proposed committee, where every question connected with our security may be fully investigated. One reason, I recollect, for so tardily adopting the plan for the appointment of adjutants was, the difficulty of procuring officers from the line to fill those stations. I recommended that serjeant-majors should be chosen; but to this I was told, that serjeant-majors could not be persuaded to give up their situations for such adjutancies, unless they were allowed half pay. I saw no good reason for declining to make this allowance, and I therefore advised it in December last. I was promised that the subject would be taken into consideration. I afterwards applied, in March, to know the result of the consideration, but I was told that no decision was made, and I understand it is undecided still, while the discipline of the volunteers does and has for months back so imperatively called for an immediate decision respecting it, although this was one of the defects in the volunteer system, which govt. promised to cure. When, before last Christmas, an application was made to ministers with regard to the confusion which prevailed among the volunteers, the gent. who applied were desired to wait until after the Christmas recess, when a digested plan would be brought forward by ministers, which should remove and prevent the recurrence of the evils complained of, and communicate to the volunteer system all the perfection of which it was susceptible. This digested plan has been laid before the House, and at length made its way, after various alterations, through it. Those alterations were added in the House of Lords; and now it is returned to us, there is scarcely one feature remaining of the original measure, of the well-digested plan of ministers. The suggestions made to them by others they reluctantly adopted, and the object of those suggestions they in some instances have almost defeated, as in the case of inviting the volunteers to permanent duty, and applying the guinea proposed to be given them as bounty, which is to be distributed in such a way as to hold out no inducement to the men, or benefit to their families. Ministers have been equally injudicious in every other project of defence, from the army of reserve to the enrolment of classes under the General Defence Act—an act which I had the honour of a large share in suggesting, and I lament much that ministers did not adopt it at a more early period; but the fact is, that so far from ministers having spontaneously taken any vigorous proceeding for the defence of the country since the commencement of the war, I state broadly, that no part of the measures for the increase of our military establishment has originated with them. If, said he, the right hon. gent. means to deny my assertion, I shall appeal to the recollection of the House, whether in June last, when the army estimates were under discussion, I did not ask the right hon. Sec. at War (Mr. Bragge) after he had finished his statement—I did not ask if what he had mentioned comprehended all the provision that ministers meant to make for the defence of the country. To this I was answered in the affirmative, and I accordingly gave notice of my intention to submit a measure founded on the same principle with that of the army of reserve. Any benefit that may have resulted from that measure is not, I assert, attributable to ministers, who were quite at a loss what course to take—who knew not, in fact, what measures were applicable to the dangers of the country. I will not dwell on the execution of the Army of Reserve act, as I shall go into that subject very fully on Wednesday next, and if I should not then have the good fortune of persuading the House to accede to the proposition which I would wish to have ingrafted on the Army of Reserve Bill, in order to provide a constant and regular supply of recruits for our regular army, I shall feel an advantage in the existence of such a committee as the motion before the House proposes to establish, as I may thus have an opportunity of again pressing the project upon the consideration of the House—a project which, if I am able to demonstrate its practicability for great objects in view, I am sure that every man will feel it to be desirable, and all will be ready to give it their concurrence. If I can shew that even a small increase can be derived from this project to our regular army, it is impossible to doubt that any member will refuse it his support. The mode proposed by ministers to raise any addition to the regular army, to supply the suspension of the army of reserve, I confess I cannot understand. They have not stated any inducement to men to enlist beyond 8 guineas bounty, and how they can procure them for such a sum, while 30 guineas and more are giving for militia substitutes, it is difficult to imagine; unless the intention be that which no one has yet avowed, because all have been unanimous in condemning the prac- tice, viz. that of raising men for rank. It may be said that this practice has prevailed when I was in power, but then the experience of that practice afforded a complete warning against it. I am quite ready to declare, that I am sorry for the share I had in that measure, and experience convinces me, that it ought never again to be resorted to. Other gent. have appeared, and professed to be equally adverse to that measure, and their minds must be of a strange character, if what they have observed is not sufficient to dissuade them from it. Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose, that it they persist in the old and scandalous practice of crimping, all its attendant frauds and impositions will not return; and it is equally absurd to fancy, that only 8 guineas bounty will be given. Why not let the army of reserve go on along with this new plan, whatever it may be? If officers are to run a race together for rank, as I understand they are, for although the intention is not avowed in this House by ministers, applications are known to be made to and by several officers—why take away the competition of the army of reserve? I cannot conceive any thing more irrational. When a new mode of raising recruits for the regular army is proposed, it naturally brings to my mind an opinion which is much disputed, and upon which, because it is so disputed by some great military authorities, I cannot presume to pronounce a decided sentiment, I mean the propriety of raising men for limited service in point, although I certainly should think it the more eligible policy, and best calculated to render the army respectable and efficient. However, military objections as to the difficulty, if such a system existed, of supplying our foreign stations, must be overcome before the system be attempted. As to the plan for bringing the Irish militia over here, I do not approve of it under existing circumstances. No argument can be drawn in favour of such a plan at present, from a precedent which occurred in quite a different situation of things. With respect to the interchange of the militias of the two countries, there are many physical objections to it that would render it a measure very disagreeable to the officers connected with both militias; and here I must notice a rumour which has gone abroad, that applications have been lately made to the privates of the West Kent militia, without the knowledge of their officers, to volunteer their services for Ireland: this practice deserves to be strongly reprobated. What, to try to prevail on men to quit their own coast, within half a day's sail of the enemy, to proceed to the distance of Ireland!—The hon. mover of the proposition under debate has alluded, in the course of his speech, to the power which, in my opinion, belongs to the Crown, to call out the population of the country in the event of an invasion, as expressed in the preamble to the General Defence Act. I perceive, that the hon. gent.'s sentiment differs from mine. I do not mean to discuss this subject at present; but I must observe, that nothing appears clearer to me than this proposition, that the state has a right to call on the people to defend it, and that in the Crown, being the depositary of the power of the state, is vested the right of so calling out the people upon a great emergency. This right I think I could shew, from a series of precedents, to be recognized by the constitution and custom of this country; that it is a right inherent in the Crown to exercise this power according to the necessity of such case as may arise, and to be limited by that necessity. The Crown, it must be admitted, possesses the power of putting any district of the kingdom under martial law, in case of invasion; subject, however, to that responsibility to which ministers would be liable for the abuse of any such power.—Upon the respective interchange of the services of the two militias of England and Ireland, I think, considering the peculiar principles on which they are officered, it would put the landed gent. of both countries to great and unexpected inconvenience; and therefore would operate injuriously on that constitutional establishment. If, however, this interchange of service is right at all, it must be on general principles, or on account of particular and pressing urgency, that supersedes all regular establishment, such as arose from the situation of Ireland, when, during the former administration, the English militia volunteered their services to that country. If the present ministers do not advance any general principle to justify the measure, and certainly no idea of urgency presents itself on either side the water, that there is no necessity is obvious from the very arguments of ministers, for they say, don't be afraid to vote with us on this subject, for it is not our intention to carry it into execution by a partial and discretionary measure; it must of course be unjustifiable and wrong. On general principles they have not attempted to defend it. This last measure of his Majesty's ministers, shews clearly that the regular army is not yet adequate to the necessity of the state, and implies that means should be taken to increase it. The method of so doing may be subject to some variety of opinion; perhaps I may not see it exactly in the same light as the hon. gent. (Mr. Fox), yet I do not perceive any material practical difference between us. The general principle and outlines of our national defence appears to me good, regarding as it does the regulars, army of reserve, militia, and volunteers. Were they less defensible in principle than they are, I should consider them as existing establishments, in the present moment, more agreeable to confirm and improve, than abolish and substitute by new. Thus I declare my opinion on this subject, without at this time entering into a more particular defence of it. With respect to the power of the Crown to call on every subject under its dominion, in case of absolute need, this, I take, under some form or other, to be incident to the very establishment of civil society, and, in fact, whenever occasion required, has been exercised. The principle is, however, limited by its necessity, which scarcely can arise but when the state of things would authorise the Crown of itself to proclaim martial law; and if the constitution should survive that urgent state of things; the counsellors of his Majesty would, doubtless, be as amenable to constitutional responsibility for that, as any other act of their administration. As such is the undoubted right and prerogative of the Crown, I should think, with a view to possible emergencies, that legislative provision should, in the present juncture, a little anticipate the justifiable necessity to which I have referred, at least so far as to put every man in the Maritime counties, likely to be the seat of the enemy's attempt, under the immediate power of the crown, in case of actual or imminent danger of invasion. In those counties most likely to be the seat of war, such as Kent, Essex, Sussex, Suffolk, Devonshire, Cornwall, and the vicinity of Newcastle, I also think a greater proportion of volunteers should be allowed than in others at least so far as the convenience and vo- luntary offers of individuals will allow. But I shall not stop here; I must say, that our naval means are insufficient for our defence; and that there is a great deficiency of the means for keeping up our navy. Into these points I shall enter minutely, upon some future occasion. At present, I shall only say, in vindication of myself, from all the obloquy thrown upon me by officers brought from distant stations to support the present system; that, as to the specific force which I recommended, I did not recommend barges and lighters and such sort of trash, as they reproached me with advising. I recommended good stout gun-brigs, and I have had the pleasure of seeing great activity of late to increase that very species of force. Another objection has been made to my system. I recommended fortifications, and I have on this account been reproached with an attempt to lessen the spirit of the country, and to involve a great and unnecessary expence. What I recommended was, not a general system of fortification, but that where there were great districts possessing great local bulwarks, there a judicious mixture of art and nature, which, at a small expence in money, might spare many thousands of men, would be the best and wisest policy. I know many places in which a few thousand pounds expended, would give more security than as many thousand men could afford. This is obvious to all military men, and the system is beginning to be acted upon; but at the same time it must be admitted, that it was as obvious last summer as it is now. I do not wish, by these observations, to interfere with the department to which this system may seem to belong. I believe, however, that it does not rest with the department of the Commander in Chief, or any other, but with the cabinet. I have discharged my duty by delivering this my sincere and undisguised opinion. I hope it is not hastily or inconsiderately entertained; but sure I am that I should consider it treason to the best interests of my country, if, such as it is, I did not openly declare it.

explained, and stated, that he had not said, as imputed to him by the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, that it was not within the power of parliament to institute such a committee as was proposed. It must be in the recollection of the House, that he admitted the competency of parlia- ment, although he doubted its inclination to appoint such a committee.

said, he could not help expressing his surprise at this mode of making an attack against his Majesty's ministers. If they had been guilty of any gross misconduct or neglect, there were abundant means of recrimination against them. But no sush motion as that was now before the House; and therefore he might be excused from entering into any detail on the conduct of ministers, until a direct charge was made against them. The object of this motion was to enter into an examination of the different acts of parliament that had been lately passed for promoting the defence of the country. This he must consider extremely improper to do, when it was competent for any member to move for the repeal of a particular act, if it should be found to be inefficient for its purpose. He had another objection to the present motion, which was, that it would be impossible for that House to enter into the consideration of such further measures of defence, as might be fit to be adopted, at this critical period, without calling to its bar all the military officers who were now on duty, and without having reports, documents, &c. from various offices. He would not pretend to say, but that such an enquiry and examination might be gone into; but he was sure, that to do so at the present moment, when it was necessary to call forward all the force of the country towards its common defence, would be productive of the greatest inconvenience and prejudice to the country. And such step ought never to be taken except on the gravest and most serious grounds. He regretted that he had lost the confidence of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), and he hoped, that in any other arrangement he would be supported as steadily and independently as he had been by himself and his friends. When such a motion as the present was made, he would ask, was there any thing melancholy in our situation? Had any misfortune happened to us, or any advantage been gained by the enemy in consequence of the inadequate measures of govt.? He would put it to any gent. in that House, whether the state of preparation in which the country was at this moment, could be considered as inadequate to the danger that threatened us? If the House was now to go into a committee on the state of our public defence, it must do so on either of these three grounds: 1st. They must be persuaded that some great misfortune had happened; 2d, that a great degree of discontent had prevailed, throughout the country with regard to the conduct of govt.; and 3d, that there was something so inconsistent and incongruous in the conduct of his Majesty's servants as to make such an inquiry necessary. Now, as to the first of these, he would ask did any misfortunes happen? He would make one short answer—that there were none; and upon that part of the subject he thought it unnecessary to say any more. Was there any discontent or dissatisfaction? (a loud cry of hear! hear!) I know, exclaimed Mr. Yorke, that great dissatisfaction against his Majesty's ministers prevails among many individuals in this House; but I will ask, if there are any symptoms of dissatisfaction throughout the country? Are there any addresses from any part of the country, praying for the removal of ministers? If there have been any, let them be stated. He was ready to admit, that, during a part of the last autumn, there prevailed a certain degree of discontent in a distant part of the country, on account of the greatest part of our force having been concentrated in the vicinity of the metropolis. But these complaints no longer existed; and the distant parts of the island were now as well defended as Ireland was at the time when Hoche arrived there with a formidable fleet and army. In the year 1779, when the French ships were masters of the Channel, there was not a sufficient military force to defend the coasts of Devon, Somerset, and Cornwall. These places were almost as badly defended at the commencement of the late war, when Gen. Dumourier was on the point of overrunning Holland, which, if he had done, an armament might be sent against this country. They were, however, now, in a complete state of defence; and he was confident it would be a great misfortune to enter into an examination on a subject where no ground of blame whatever existed. He could not see on what grounds the hon. gent. brought forward the present motion. That hon. gent.'s character he certainly had always admired; but he must say that he never could agree with him in his political principles; and still less could he agree with him in the line of conduct which he adopted that day. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) who supported the motion, and appeared to coalesce with him, was still more undisguised; for he had openly declared that those whom he could formerly consider to be his friends, were now unfit for the management of the public affairs. One subject on which the right hon. gent. had dwelt, was that of the volunteers; and, in reply to that part of his charge, he must answer, that from the best information he could procure, the volunteers had arrived at such a state of perfection in discipline, that they were the astonishment of all Europe, and were also the astonishment of their own country, which had not, until that vast force was collected, known the strength and power it possessed. Out of the whole number of volunteers now in the country, there were not above 13,000 of them who had not been supplied with firelocks. The entire number amounted to 330,000. With this great number, and with the spirit which, as Britons, actuated them, he did not think there was any occasion for an armed peasantry, as had been recommended by an hon. gent. But if ever it should be necessary to put arms into the hands of a greater number of people than the volunteers consisted of, his Majesty had the power of resorting to the compulsory clauses of the general defence act. He could not agree with the hon. gent. that an armed peasantry would answer any purpose. They might be useful on the banks of the Necker or in the Black Forest. But in this country, he was sure many a peasant did not know the butt from the muzzle of a gun. He very much doubted then whether the plan of an armed peasantry could be adapted to any extent in this country. Such a body of men could not be treated as soldiers, and therefore, they could not be converted to any efficient purpose. The hon. gent. who proposed the motion, had followed the example set him in another place, and had objected to the defence bill as involving in it certain phrases explanatory of the Royal prerogative. It was very extraordinary that this should be the first time he should have stated this objection, although he had so fit and favourable an opportunity of doing it during the progress of the bill. As far, however, as he (Mr. Yorke) considered the functions of the British Crown, he thought they were fairly recognized in the terms of the bill, and he thought consistently with what he had always understood to be the sentiments of the hon. gent. ever since he had the honour of hearing him in parliament. Nothing could be more unjust than to censure ministers for not completing the volunteer system, either in respect to the application of the prerogative, or any other particular. All that had been professed or attempted, was to prepare the way for a more eligible system, which should be formed on the sure basis of experience, and would not therefore be subjected to those difficulties which, under the novelty of this establishment, it was at present necessary to encounter. What was the situation in which it was required that the House should again form itself into a committee? It had already, in the same form, entered at large into the various modes of defence now proposed; the result of its deliberations had been sent to the Peers, and the amendments suggested by them were to be considered. Why then adopt this retrograde measure? why undo all that had been performed, for no one reason on earth but to produce delay at a moment when procrastination was the greatest evil we had to apprehend? It was said, that if the conduct of his Majesty's servants be attended to before the war began, or after its commencement, they have neglected the exertions suited to the public defence. Looking as he did to the geographical situation of the states of Europe, and to the peculiar circumstances of France before he held a responsible situation, he had endeavoured to predict the consequences of the domineering influence of the latter, and had adverted to the peculiar attention to be paid by this country to its own security. The same sentiments which he held before, he had more strongly felt since he had the honour of acting in the capacity of one of his Majesty's confidential servants, and he conceived he had acted upon them to the fullest extent in his power. The only diminution which had been effected in the infantry was to the number of 7000, and that was in regiments which had returned harassed from foreign and dangerous services. But gent. inquired, why did you not take measures earlier for enrolling the militia? He for one could not plead guilty to any charge of the kind alluded to in this question; he had brought forward a plan for this express object, and if it had not been at length adopted, the country would have been totally destitute of a militia at this moment. It was again said, that the volunteer system had been abandoned at the most inauspicious moment. The fact, however, was, that a bill was proposed as soon as possible for the specific purpose of preserving it, and by this vigilance 10,000 yeoman cavalry were provided, and a considerable portion of infantry, which were ready to present themselves for the public service at the commencement of the war. Besides all this, every possible inducement was held out to the fencibles and militia, to induce them to enter into the regular service—a service that had been greatly injured and reduced by the calamities of a protracted war, so long and so discouraging, as to present to ministers more numerous difficulties than had been at any former period encountered, difficulties for which no reward could compensate, which nothing but the zeal they felt to serve their sovereign and their country could dispose them to meet. He objected to the suspension of the recruiting for the army of reserve. It did not appear to him that ministers were in any way culpable in that particular; but this was not the time to discuss that point; it would be enough for him to say, that from the experience he had had, it was impossible, with any regard to public economy, to push the enlisting at present any further. It had not quite answered the wishes of govt. but, perhaps, under the existing circumstances, it had fulfilled every reasonable expectation, Forty thousand had been projected for England, and 10,000 for Ireland, of which 37,000 had been actually raised. A measure was to be considered in the House on Wednesday, of a levy for the regular service, and the success of this would depend on the suspension of the former, for a period of about 12 mouths. The object was, to raise by this expedient not less than 18 or 20 battalions, and the best military authorities had been consulted, by whom the opinion of his Majesty's ministers had been assisted and guided. He needed only to mention, that it was the particular recommendation of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, with whom the measure had originated, and military men were only competent to decide on a question of this nature. But gent. said, you disappoint your own designs by reducing the bounty. The bounty now proposed was 10 guineas, further to officers 2 guineas, and 1 guinea levy money. Gent. who conduced by their influence and liberality to increase the public force, were also advanced one step in military rank. Very great abuses had prevailed in former periods, and under the last administration, from the proposed method, under the old regulations, and the right hon. gent. behind him (Mr. Pitt) had candidly acknowledged he had found it detrimental; but this experience, he trusted, would be no objection to the present plan, because peculiar precautions were intended to prevent those abuses, and it would be directed that every officer who should promote them, should be obliged to recede from the step of rank he would otherwise acquire.—Two inure points had been pressed upon the House to expose the neglect of administration, in neither of which he considered them blameable: he alluded to the naval defence, and to the plan of fortification. The right hon. Sec. then adverted to the observations made by the right hon. gent. as to the state of the naval defence of the country, and expressed his astonishment that he should have asserted, that a certain naval commander had been sent for expressly to town to ridicule the opinions which he (Mr. Pitt) had given with respect to the state of the navy. He assured the right hon. gent. that the term the gallant commander had used, namely "musquito fleet," was the common word of expression used by nautical men to describe the enemy's preparations. He contended that the commander alluded to had as much right to deliver his opinion freely and honestly as any other civilian, and defended the preparations carried on by the board of admiralty, as being greater than those made use of by former boards for the last 50 years. If any blame was imputable to any part of govt. with respect to the erection of fortifications, he wished it distinctly to be understood, that the blame rested with the whole of govt. and not with any one particular department. The erection of Martello towers had been relied on by some military characters, but he could assure the House, that it was the opinion of a great number of experienced officers, that the application of them would not be of any material service. The right hon. gent. concluded with expressing his sense of duty to the House and his country, and trusting that the House would consider what they were about to do before they acceded to the motion, which had for its object to effect, by a side-wind, the dismissal of ministers, who were prepared to meet it fairly and manfully.

said, he considered the present motion to be an attempt to force the ministers out of their places, and was similar to that made in the year 1784, which was reprobated by every person in the country. If his Majesty's present ministers were guilty of misconduct, let that misconduct be specifically stated, and then let an address be moved to his Majesty for their removal. He must protest against the present proceeding, because it was an unconstitutional act for that House to take upon itself the appointment of his Majesty's ministers. If such proceedings as this were allowed, the country would be subject to the same cabals, which for a long time had agitated the French govt. The attack now attempted to be made was much more improper than that of 1784, in as much as the country was now in a situation of alarm and danger that did not exist at that period.

thought there was no ground to justify the motion before the House, because, he thought, on all those points where an attempt had been made to throw blame on his Majesty's ministers they had done right. They were, however, but men, and must not be expected to be perfect. To human nature allowance must be made for some faults, from which, they could not be wholly free any more than their predecessors, in whose conduct there were many faults, and gross ones too, which he could easily point out. When the present ministers came into office, the country was engaged in prosecuting a long, arduous, expensive, and unpopular war, which had been so long carried on by their predecessors, and with such enormous expence, that the right hon. gent. who had this night joined so heartily in the censure of ministers, could not have carried it on for 3 months longer. He must have been forced from his situation, by the spirit and sense of the country, had he longer persisted in it; and he had no difficulty in asserting that he could not have made peace with an enemy implacable against his administration. In this critical and arduous moment, his Majesty's present ministers came forward and concluded that peace so welcome to the wishes of the people. But, if unhappily, his Majesty's ministers had since found that the revival of the war was unavoidable, was there a man within or without those walls, was there a power in Europe who was not convinced that the fault lay solely in the restless ambition and insulting aggresions of the enemy, and was by no means justly attributable to his Majesty's present ministers, for whose conduct on that occasion, the country owed them indelible obligations; for, by that conduct, they manifested their sincerity in the wish of peace, and their readiness to make every concession, not dishonourable to the country, for its maintenance; and by that means, under the dire and inevitable necessity of renewing the war, they justified themselves in the eyes of their country and of all Europe, and attached that unanimous and glorious spirit, in which the nation stood ready to vindicate its own honour and security, and to hurl defiance to the foe. When war was found inevitable, they adopted, with the utmost promptitude, the measures best calculated to call forth the military strength of the country.

pointed out an error in the account upon the table, of the number of vessels in our service, which was stated at 1874, but which, upon examining the figures, proved to be only 1652. In the account also of the number of seamen and marines, at two periods, Nov. and March, there was an allowance made for deaths and casualties in the intervening time, although some of our ships had, during that period, been lost, and some of the crews either lost or taken prisoners.

said, there certainly appeared to be an error in casting up the account, which he had never adverted to. As to the other objection with respect to the number of seamen, the Admiralty were compelled to take two periods when the Navy Board had no returns, and in fact he pledged himself to prove, that there was a greater number of men employed than there were mentioned in the account. The impressed men were not included in the account, these would serve to fill up the vacancies occasioned by desertion or death. As to the 1400 vessels collected at Boulogne, which appeared to have caused so much alarm in the mind of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), he believed no man who pretended to be a seaman would say, that the best way of stopping that flotilla was by a similar one. It appeared, however, that the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), who had just before only mentioned gun-boats, now talked of gun-brigs being equipped for our service; at this rate he would get on from larger to larger vessels, until he at length came to those large vessels which alone ought to combat the French flotillas like giants amongst chil- dren. As to Sir Edward Pellew (here he was called to order for mentioning the name of a member), that gallant officer had been out 19 weeks, and it was therefore no matter for wonder that he should come up to Parliament: he came to town as a commander, to do business which could be better done by himself. He (Capt. M.) had spent his life in the naval services of his country, and the longer he lived, the more he found he had to learn.

, in explanation, said, that the hon. Capt. had entirely misunderstood him, as he had all along recommended the building of gun-brigs, such as was used during the late war. He had never stated that he wished small vessels to be substituted, or larger ones built, to constitute our additional force. The hon. Capt. was also equally unfortunate in misunderstanding him respecting another point; as he had never stated that such a description of vessels ought to be employed exclusively on the enemy's coast, but that, from the enemy's coast to our own, and in mid-channel alternately. As to the gallant officer (Sir Edward Pellew), if he was not sent for on purpose, he certainly came very opportunely.

.—Sir, I beg to express my humble reliance, that the House will indulge me with their attention to a few observations upon the subject now before them, and in vindication of his Majesty's ministers, whose dismissal from their situations is the avowed object of the motion this night brought forward by the hon. gent. over against me; and, Sir, I should not feel that I had done my duty this night to my King and country, if I should omit to express my astonishment at the manner in which the question has been opened by that hon. gent. If the question be carried this night in favour of that motion, and especially upon the arguments of the right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt), there can be no question of its being followed by the resignation of his Majesty's ministers, who can no longer retain their situations under so obvious a declaration that they have lost the confidence of the House of Commons. But I would ask the hon. gent., if this is the species of conduct I am to expect from his candour and liberality? Is it on a motion of this sort, containing no direct charge of any criminal act or omission on the part of his Majesty's ministers, that I am to expect a decision, in which is insidiously involved the question, whether or not they shall any longer retain the confidence of this House, or continue to fill those situations in which they have acted with so much zeal and integrity, and I will add, with such signal effect for the service and security of their King and country? Is this a species of conduct consistent with the candour and manliness of his character, or the dignity which I have on so many occasions admired, though on so many others I have had reason to censure? Could I have expected from him, to choose such a mode or such a subject, to collect every stray vote and every stray opinion, to impress with his purpose the minds of many gent. brought together from the most distant parts of the country with no trivial share of management and industry?—(A cry of Hear! Hear!)—Sir, I repeat it, gent. brought hither with the utmost industry from every quarter of the kingdom, to hear the attack this night upon his Majesty's ministers, preparatory to their fall, under a subsequent measure, namely, an address to his Majesty for their dismissal. This, it is obvious, the motion before the House is the forerunner of: but if this House shall agree to a motion brought forward in such a manner, I have no hesitation in declaring, that it will sanction a project the most to be deplored, under existing circumstances, that ever was adopted by a House of Parliament. With regard to the principle of the prerogative vested in the Crown for calling on the services of the body of the people for the defence of the country, the hon. gent. has endeavoured to show some doubts on the existence of that prerogative. In support of his reasoning, he adduced some passages from Judge Foster. Certainly, I will allow his authority upon any legal subject; and he concludes, that if this prerogative does exist, it is only in the sanction of modern usage, and in cases of actual invasion. Now, Sir, I would beg to ask, if it exists only in cases of invasion, what is the occurrence in modern usage in this country, by which only it is sanctioned? for certainly the instances of modern invasion to this realm, afford no opportunity for instances of its exercise; and the practice has obtained principally, if not entirely, on ancient usage. For my own part, I have no doubt of the existence of the prerogative in the Crown; and it must appear to every man of ordinary perception, that cases of invasion, when the power of the magistrate and of the law courts is for a time suspended, the prerogative of the Crown is all in all for the well being of the realm. With respect to the motion before the House, Sir, if it is meant to precede an address to his Majesty for the dismissal of his present ministers, it is necessary, at least, to consider on what grounds, or what those ministers have done or left undone, that so marked a measure of censure is called for; and it will behove the wisdom and justice of this House, before they consent to affix their hand to such a measure, to consider well how it can be justified, and to look a little further and consider what are the consequences likely to result from the councils of men, such as those who are likely to become the successors of the present administration. An hon. gent. who has this night taken occasion to censure his Majesty's ministers for the peace they had concluded, seems to forget his own declaration on the subject of that peace upon a former occasion. He then gave it his approbation, and said, that, considering the state of the world, and the situation in which this country stood, it, was the best that could be obtained, and he hailed it as such; while another right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), whom I will call his new ally on the present occasion, deprecated the peace, and condemned it as a most mischievous and ruinous measure. Those difficulties I shall leave for those great statesmen to settle at the next cabinet they hold; but, putting the authority of the one against the other, I will ask, what sort of congruity the country can expect from a junction of both? For the peace which was concluded, every British heart acknowledged gratitude to his Majesty's present ministers; and to them is entirely owing the unanimity of the whole empire in support of the present war—an unanimity worth all the soldiers that were disbanded at the conclusion of the peace. Yet the hon. gent. allows no excuse to his Majesty's ministers for recommencing an unavoidable war; but charges them with involving the country in danger. I should be glad, Sir, if his talents had been always roused to action by a sense of his country's danger. I should rejoice, Sir, to remember, if his vigilance and his energies had always been excited by a sense of the danger of that country for which he now professes so much alarm and solici tude. But, Sir, when public danger threatened this country on a former and no very remote occasion, how did the hon. member manifest his solicitude? Was it by deserting his duty in this House? When the annihilation of the naval power of the country was menaced by the mutiny, where was the hon. gent.? Not at any place where his duty should have pressed him. So much for the hon. gent.'s zeal, and his alarm at the public danger. I have no charge to make against his consistency in supporting the peace, because, during the whole of the war, he was ready to make peace upon almost any terms; and, therefore, I might suppose he would be as ready on the same principle to support peace again. But, how will he reconcile this principle to the right hon. gent. who goes along with him in this measure, and who has so repeatedly declared that peace to have so sunk the spirit of the country, and the hearts of Englishmen, that they have not courage to raise their hands against France? I know not how much the arrogance and acerbity with which that peace was condemned, and the character and courage of the country traduced, may have contributed to excite the enemy to new designs of hostility against us; but certainly, if Buonaparte felt any disposition to insult and attack this country, I know of nothing so well calculated to induce him to believe he may do it with impunity, as the language held on that occasion by the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham.) But now that this fallen, dispirited, and pusillanimous nation is again disposed to assert itself, and shew its spirit against the common enemy, his Majesty's ministers are attacked for renewing the war, and condemned through every vestige of their proceedings in conducting it. Sir, I say it would be an act of the utmost rashness in this House, at such a crisis as the present, to move for the dismissal of his Majesty's ministers, or agree to any motion necessarily leading to such a measure, without well considering what would be likely to follow, and who to succeed them—to consider a little the disposition of those successors; and, Sir, if we only examine a little the consistency of those principles and politics, we shall find but little cause to rely on the success of their measures.—We are told that our country is in a state of siege; and how does it appear? Why, in our fleets blockading the ports of the enemy! It is said that we are degraded in the eyes of all Europe. I should be glad to know the name of that nation, which, amongst the surrounding countries of humiliated Europe, can, from its proud and elevated dignity, look down upon the present humble, prostrate state of degraded England! If, indeed, the powers of the Continent felt that England, crouching with terror within her own ports, felt alarm only for her own safety, they might feel sentiments of contempt for her situation; but, viewing her as the only nation able to cope with the gigantic power and ambition of France, which had humbled all the rest of Europe, and the only rallying point to which Europe can turn for the hopes of its emancipation, I am at a loss to conceive what is meant by this degradation. I recollect, indeed, Sir, the vaunts of the enemy, the threats of our annihilation, the "delenda est Carthago," the assertion that France and England could not both exist in the same hemisphere, and the menaces of Buonaparte of our utter destruction; but we have seen him afterwards crouch to a peace with this country, and to purchase that peace by surrendering the territories of his allies; and how does he now menace our destruction? Why, by fleets that dare not quit his shores beyond the protection of those batteries that line his coast from Dunkirk to Boulogne.—From an union, such as the motion of this night proposes to affect, in succession to his Majesty's present ministers, no unity of sentiment can be expected. In a cabinet composed of such opposite principles, no union can exist. I think it extremely probable, for instance, that one of the first measures that would be proposed by the right hon. gent. opposite to me (Mr. Fox), would be a peace with Buonaparte, and probably through the mediation of Russia. But, I ask, is it to be expected such a peace would be proposed in such terms as his right hon. ally (Mr. Windham) would be induced to agree to? I know there are many gent. in this House to night, who may be induced to vote in favour of this question, even with intent to the removal of his Majesty's present ministers, in hopes that it might lead to form a ministry, at the head of which might be placed the right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt). I know, Sir, his great talents and his exalted mind; and I know that great good must be attained for this country, under any govt. where he is placed at the head. But does any man imagine it possible he could ever unite with the hon. gent. opposite to me, who has so often arraigned his govt. as an abomination to this country, and the whole of his measures as the most wicked, dangerous, and unconstitutional? who has arraigned him repeatedly as guilty of the vilest corruption and profligacy, and accused him of wickedly and unnecessarily protracting the late war, and promoting the ruin of his country? Can it be possible, Sir, that the hon. member over against me (Mr. Fox), now just returning to this House from that retirement he sought in disgust at the measures of the right hon. gent. under the gallery, will dedicate his first exertion to raise again to power that minister whose former sway he considered so odious, and his ministry the greatest calamity to this country? Sir, I cannot suppose such an object possible. It may be imagined, that the right hon. gent. under the gallery is desirous of raising to power the hon. member over the way: this I think equally improbable. I do not say the disgrace would be greater to one than to the other, but that it would be equally disgraceful to both. I am ready to give the right hon. gent. under the gallery credit for every thing magnanimous, for every thing liberal, for every readiness to sacrifice political resentment or party pique, when, at such a crisis, they may stand in the way of his country's good; and I am sure he would feel it a load cast from his feelings. But, Sir, I do not believe that he can sacrifice the great principle of his consistency; and I can never think that two men of principles so totally opposite, could meet at the same council board, without such concealments or dissimulation as would render each despicable in the eyes of the other, and both in their own. I beg to ask, if this could be considered as a means of defending the nation? If it could be for the good of the country, that administration should continue in their situations after the confidence of Parliament is withdrawn from them? And if they are to continue in place, would it not be madness for the House to accede to this measure? I beg to ask, is this a time to repeal the Habeas Corpus Suspension Law in Ireland, or the Martial Law bill? Is it, I ask, a prudent moment to agitate the Catholic question? Is it a time to assimilate this homely constitution of ours to that "exalted monument of human wisdom," the govt. of France? With respect to the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), I conjure him by the many well-fought days of argument he has maintained in this House—I conjure him by the memory of his departed friend, Mr. Burke—I conjure him by a memory he should and he ought to respect still more, the memory of his departed self, to pause, before it is too late, and before he signs and seals for ever his own inconsistency. I would ask him, whether he is prepared to join the advocates of French principles? (a loud cry of Order! Order!) or whether he considers this the proper moment for the introduction of such principles? I again conjure the House to look seriously to the consequences of agreeing to the present motion, as it must infallibly lead to the introduction of a new ministry worse than that which at present exists.

said, he gave the learned gentleman credit for his endeavours to rouse the House from that languor into which it had been insensibly sinking. He had chaunted the funeral obsequies of the ministry in melodious strains.

He sang Darius, great and good,

Fallen, fallen, fallen, fallen,

Fallen from his high estate,

And weltering in his blood.

But he did not seem to thinkthe cause altogether desperate; and as he proceeded,

He burst the bands of sleep asunder,

And rous'd him like a rattling peal of thunder.

The learned gent. had considered the motion in two different aspects. For his own part, he must confess he had no objection to the one part of the motion, as stated by the learned gent. that the present administration should be removed; but, at the same time, the conclusion that had been drawn from it by no means followed. Though they might disapprove of the conduct of the present ministers, it was not necessary they should point out, at the same time, who were the most proper to be their successors. Neither was it necessary that they should begin by charging ministers with misconduct previously to any investigation. Had they done this, he could easily conceive that the learned gent. would have been the first to cry out at the injustice of the proceeding. He would have asked a fair trial previous to any sentence of condemnation; he would have cried out very much had they moved the dismissal of ministers, with- out assigning any reason, or merely because they did not like them, have concluded them to be bad. He wished to go into the question on its own intrinsic merits, and not on the ground on which the learned gent. had shewn so much feeling, and in which he no doubt was sincere. Before deprecating so warmly, however, the union of opposite sentiments, which he seemed so much to apprehend, he would request the learned gent. to look to a gent. not more than 4 or 5 benches from him (Mr. Tierney), whose sentiments and his had not been always congenial, and who had been for many years the friend and companion of the admirer of French principles; who had been the champion of reform, and those other questions which were so obnoxious to the learned gent. He had no objection to take advice, but he did not know if the advice, in the present instance, was purely disinterested. The learned gent. from his professional habits (and no man had a greater respect than he had for his professional character), was so much accustomed to plead for his client, that, in the present instance, he seemed to have forgotten that he was both advocate and client too.

said, he did not imagine he was of so much consequence as to be so often arraigned. Few questions ever were so little productive of difficulty to him in the vote he ought to give. With respect to what had been said, as to his inconsistency, it was for the event to shew how, on the subject of parliamentary reform, he should act. For the present, let that be left ad referendam. As to accusations of entertaining French principles, he should take that as he always took it, in no ill humour. He had opposed his Majesty's late ministers, and certainly for one strong reason, among others, that the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Windham) was a member of it. The present question was evidently one, on the confidence that ought to be reposed in administration. The ground stated for the motion was the defence of the country; but the latter part of the motion went to take away from the executive govt. what had been always entrusted to it. It was nothing else but the question of dismissing ministers, which ought to have been brought forward in a fair, manly manner. He might be accused of self-interest, but he knew he had not been actuated by any such motive. It was said, that administration acted on no system, and this by those who were a part of the last; of that administration which formed the provisional cavalry, and whose income tax was the subject of complaints without end. Ministers had been abused for listening to the suggestions of others; such was the return for their impartiality. But any candid man, who looked at the multiplicity of affairs that crowded upon them, would see that their fault was rather in attempting too much. Look at Ireland, and see what a small force there was last war to defend it, compared with what there is at present; yet from the same mouth that ordered the then Irish establishment, the House now heard the voice of complaint. The right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt) had sufficiently shewn the excellence of the volunteer system on different occasions. The zeal of the people at large had certainly been great, but ministers had done every thing in their power to promote and direct it; and the volunteers in general had shewn an excellent disposition. They were not equal to regular troops on a military system; but he did not think that the united talents of the different coalescing parties could point out a better mode of assisting the public defence. If party had raged abroad as much as in that House, they never could have been formed. If they were used properly, they would do their duty. With all the conquests and power of France, all that she has been able to do since the last peace, and all the additional means afforded her, we were now actually preparing, not for defence, but for offensive measures against her. The country was, therefore, as well defended as if even the late Sec. at War had the care of defending it. He had a great respect for the abilities of that right hon. gent. but he really believed that his return to the management of military affairs would strike more dismay than the appointment of any other man in the country: so many things would immediately occur to disgust the public mind. He might get a disposeable force, and he believed, too, he would, as formerly, soon find out a way of disposing of it. The present negligent and incapable ministry, as it was called, had scarcely done any thing like the transactions of St. Domingo, or the invasion of Holland, for which men were enticed and sent off intoxicated, and not knowing to what regiment they belonged, to have their brains beat out. But on this question the right hon. gent. ought to be able to state what his expectations were with respect to the successors of the present administration. He had heard a good deal of a coalition: that it had actually taken place he could not say; but he had also heard of a co-operation. Three large bodies had, it seemed, agreed in nothing else, but in their efforts to get rid of the present ministry. To accomplish such an union, many things must have been given up, and probably the right hon. gent. had made his peace with the hon. mover, for the attack made on the unblemished character of the hon. gent. (Mr. Fox) while that right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) was in Office, by striking him out of his Majesty's Privy Council! If gent. suffered such a motion as this to be carried, what would they say to the country, after the various acts they had passed, and the measures they had taken? It was necessary to look at the remedy proposed, as well as the disorder. The leaders of the combined parties had many partizans undoubtedly; but he was perfectly confident, that if they succeeded, there would be a general feeling of regret in the public mind, whenever the present administration should retire. The feelings of the public were, he was certain, with the present ministers. After ten years experience, the public had felt the blessing of being deprived of the vigorous proceedings of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham). But where were the petitions against ministers? From what city, or county, or borough? Some gent. in opposition, had a pretty good notion of the mode of procuring them; but they did not appear. Perhaps he might hear of them by-and-by. There might be some meetings in Palace-yard for that purpose, and very probably in the borough of Southwark too; but at present, gent. knew, that to procure any thing of importance in this way was impracticable. He was perfectly satisfied with the conduct of Ministers, and he should always look back to his connexion with them with satisfaction.

said a few words in support of the motion, after which,

rose to reply, and addressed the House to the following effect:—Sir, so much of this debate has been employed in personalities; so many observations have been made upon the character and construction of the motion, and upon the manner in which I introduced it, and so little has been said upon the motion itself, that it becomes necessary to trespass upon the House with a few observations. If ever there was a debate conducted with the spirit of party, indeed I ought rather to say with the spirit of faction, for it does not deserve the honourable name of party, it is the manner in which this debate has been conducted by the opponents of the motion, with the exception only of the Sec. of State, who met it in a fair and manly manner. If ever there was a case, in which those who opposed a motion displayed a total want of talent and capacity, and in their room had recourse to unjustifiable personality (and if I was to call it coarse ribaldry, I should not over-rate it) it is the present. I will begin what I have to say with a few observations respecting myself. I have been used to debates of this kind, and I have always observed, that when those whom I have opposed are pressed hard, and feel themselves in danger of a defeat, then I am sure to have all my political sins set forth in array against me; then I am sure to be told of my attachment to French principles; of my culpable love of peace, and of the coalition. I waited in confident expectation that they would go back, as usual, to the Middlesex election, but in this I was for once disappointed. We will begin first with the coalition, an event which occurred one-and-twenty years ago, before, I believe, the learned gent. engaged in public life. If he wants any information upon that subject, I wish he would not apply merely to me, but to others, and what he, of course, will consider more respectable authority. Let him apply to one of the members of the present administration, I mean the President of the Council, who will give him some information upon the principles on which that measure was founded. Let him apply to one of the Post-Masters-General, who was supposed to have had a considerable share in bringing about the event, and from the information which the learned gent. will receive from his friends, he will be able to form an opinion upon the subject. The learned gent. has this night indulged himself in a declamation against union of all sorts, but he does not seem always to have entertained such a violent antipathy to them. When a number of my friends, whom I valued most highly, joined the late administration; when the Duke of Portland, when one of the pre- sent Post-masters-General, when Lord Fitzwilliam, and several others with whom I had for years concurred in opinion, coalesced with the late ministers, where then was all his indignation, where was all his declamation against coalitions. When I was hurt and vexed, as I certainly was by the loss of such friends, did I attribute their conduct to any thing but an honourable difference of opinion, which forced them to take the part they did? But whenever a coalition is in favour of a ministry of which he forms a part, then it is entitled to every praise; but if it should have the effect of disturbing such an administration, then it immediately becomes the subject of the learned gent.'s vehement invective. The learned gent. then represents me as an admirer of French principles. I do not know his history from the beginning of the French revolution; but I believe that was an event at which 99 men out of every 100 were extremely rejoiced—I mean the overthrow of the govt. of France; and I believe that even his Majesty's ministers at first entertained similar sentiments upon the subject. But he combines the revolution with all the dreadful events and crimes that followed, and makes me a party to the whole. The learned gent. I presume, knows the history of his own country, let him look to the year 1641; he will find that good and honourable men took a part in producing the events of that time; he knows also that they were followed by miseries and crimes which those men could neither foresee nor prevent; and it was one of the misfortunes of this country, that those calamities made men afterwards go into an opposite extreme; and this will always happen as long as men are men and human nature remains the same. But I clearly perceive the disappointment of the learned gent. He appears of late to have employed himself in considering parties; he looks at my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham), and at me; and he takes it for granted, that whatever change may take place, we cannot come in; but the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) he supposes will come in, and upon these suppositions, he formed his speech. He therefore came down prepared to treat me with every species of hostility, supposing that I should make a long speech against the ministers, and he prepared a very moderate reply for the right hon. gent. under the gallery, who, he took it for granted, would be rather gentle in his censure of them. All his venom was therefore poured out upon my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) and myself, while he lavished his still more disgusting adulation upon his right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt). He is not satisfied with praising the former ministers, but he says, that nothing could give greater satisfaction than the return of that right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) to administration, and that this was a fact of which the present ministers were perfectly convinced. But is he aware how strongly he is censuring his present friends by such language? He is actually accusing them, in the technical words of an indictment, "that they, well knowing that he, the said Mr. Pitt, was a fit person to be minister of this country, and well knowing that his return to administration would give general satisfaction, yet that they wilfully, at the instigation (I will not say of whom), did continue to retain their places and offices, to the exclusion of the said right hon. gent. from the office of minister." But it must be observed, that all this praise of the right hon. gent. is only conditional: They say to him, "You may return to office, and it will give great satisfaction; but you must take care not to bring any new friends with you, because if you do, then you will lose all the praise we have given you." One would really suppose, by the apprehension which he expresses about me, that I was a barrister, and that he thought I wanted to supersede him in his office. The learned gent. has been very liberal of his advice; he advises my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) to take care of his character; he advises his right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt) not by any means to join with us; but I don't recollect that he has been kind enough to bestow any advice upon me. Dr. Johnson once said to a person who was loading him with praise, "pray, Sir, consider what your praise is worth, before you bestow it so liberally." So, I must beg the learned gent. to consider what his advice is worth, before he is so lavish of it—It has been contended that this was an unusual motion: in answer to this, I only begged to refer to the journals, where innumerable precedents would be found. But it is said, your object is to turn out the ministers; why do you not move openly at once? If this motion has the effect of turning out the ministers I shall like it the better for it; but I take it to be more parliamentary to prove the misconduct of ministers before a motion made to dismiss them. It is said, why do you not move to censure ministers; Why, this motion does contain a censure upon them for not doing their duty; for not taking any steps to increase the regular army; for not taking any measure for arming the people, and these are charges which they will find it difficult to answer. It may be asked why I did not bring forward this charge before? My answer is this: I thought it fair to wait to see whether ministers would adopt any effectual steps for the security of the country; and finding they had not, I thought it my duty to make this proposition to the House.—I have but a few observations more to trouble the House with, except upon what fell from the Sec. of State. He says, that he does not think an armed peasantry fit for this country. This is a fair opinion for him to entertain. But what do the other ministers say? Why, that they will have an armed peasantry and volunteers also; but this is a point which I hope to have an opportunity of discussing fully with him upon another occasion. The right hon. gent. says, this motion is only a pretence, and that the real object of it is to turn out ministers, and that every member ought to vote upon that idea.—I most sincerely hope they will, for if every member, who thinks that the ministers ought not to continue in their stations, will vote for this motion, I shall not despair of dividing in a majority. He then says there is no discontent in the country, there are no petitions; and another right hon. gent, (Mr. Tierney) says I am very skilful in procuring petitions; if I am, it only proves that I am an apt scholar of his. But upon such a subject, is not the House of Commons competent to form a judgment upon the conduct of ministers and to determine whether they are worthy of confidence or not? But then it is asked with greater eagerness, if you remove the present ministers, who will you put in their place? And one right hon. gent. (Mr. Tierney) seems particularly anxious to obtain some information upon that subject. To this question my answer is this: I would exercise the constitutional power of the House of Commons in endeavouring to turn out incompetent ministers, but I would never invade the prerogative of the Crown by pointing out who were to succeed them. I wish to turn out those ministers because I think they are a curse to the country, but I should never think of interfering with the prerogative of the Crown in the ap- pointment of their successors. Upon this subject, therefore, I can give no answer to the anxious enquiries of the right hon. gent.; who has, however, openly declared, that he will oppose any administration of which my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) forms a part, though he seems by no means disinclined to bow to another (Mr. Pitt). Another topic of public animadversion has been noticed by the learned gent. with the bitter spirit of malignity, if not in the language of disappointment or despair. It is the clamour against a supposed coalition. If I have experienced a return of friendship from those men with whom for some years I have widely differed in public opinions, and with whom any difference at all times was a subject of sincere regret, I cannot conceive why the union of sentiment on this occasion should call forth so harsh and so severe a reprehension from the learned gent.; but if there be any crime for embracing a return of former friendship and affection, between men who had always entertained for each other private sentiments of esteem, I have no hesitation in pleading guilty to the charge. Thus far I think due to attentions which are always grateful to my heart; and I cannot see any just cause why the learned gent. in the hey-day of his spleen, should attempt to interrupt our intercourse, or disturb our repose. It surely is not necessary that either they or I should consult him on our selection of friends, or ask his leave how far our mutual civilities should extend. With regard to a coalition between me and the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) under the gallery; I know of no other coalition, no other cause of co-operation, than what may appear to both fair and honourable as members of parliament, acting for the true interests of the country. I am totally unacquainted with any sinister views or private understanding. I know of no other cause, no other secret springs, than what may be openly proclaimed at Charing-cross. Surveying the very critical situation of public affairs, fully persuaded that some effort should be made to restore the credit and the honour of the country both at home and abroad, we have publicly concurred for the honourable attainment of the same desirable object; and it is hard, indeed, that public men cannot agree upon public measures without being liable to the bitter reproach of the learned gent. and his hon. colleagues. In my motion of this night I am proud of acknowledging the powerful aid of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt); but as to the particular line of conduct or argument, which the right hon. gent. meant to adopt, I was, before the delivery of his speech, as completely unacquainted with as any man in the House. So far we may safely disclaim any coalition, or private understanding. It is evident, indeed, that we fully concur in one particular opinion: we are perfectly agreed as to the weakness and incapacity of the present ministers. The motion now before the House will prove, if a committee he granted, the truth of this position; and should it be negatived, no proof can, from that circumstance, be inferred, that the ministers are either wise or able to conduct the affairs of a great empire. With all my condemnation of their measures, I have no hesitation to acknowledge that some of their acts I approved, believing them for the good of the country. But there is no general rule without an exception. Am I always to support their measures, whether wise or foolish? Am I always to agree with them, whether in peace or war? Although I highly approved of peace, as necessary for the interest of the country, yet I highly disapproved of some of its articles. With all my partiality for the peace of Amiens, I could not see any propriety in the shameful surrender of all our conquests. So glad, however, was I of the return of peace, that I did not dwell much upon the terms. Had such a happy event been properly managed, we might still have been at peace. But foolish and improvident ministers are ill calculated to avail themselves of the advantages of such an event. I do not, however, now oppose them, because we are at war, but because the country and its interests are in the most imminent danger. But I shall not neglect my public duty should any great emergency arise. I shall not, like some people, sit in silence when my country is in danger. I shall not passively let the French march to London, because I cannot give ministers my confidence. I hope public men may oppose and condemn ministers, without being charged as friendly to the common enemy. I and those with whom I had the honour of acting, totally disapproved of the American war. Did we, however, ever shrink from our public duty? No. I can refer those who entertain any doubt on the subject, to many great and respectable names. I can refer them to several distinguished characters, who were active in a military capacity in the militia. I can refer them to some noble commanders, who, notwithstanding their detestation of the American war, cordially united in every arrangement to repel the enemy, who then also threatened a descent on our coast. Coxheath and Warley witnessed their zeal and patriotism, by heading troops very little interior to veterans in discipline, but equal to them in sentiments of glory. I beg pardon of the House for engrossing so much of their attention at so late an hour; but when so grossly and so illiberally charged, I hope for some indulgence. The motion is certainly not made with a design favourable to administration. It is made for the purpose of inquiring into the means of our defence, and improving our situation. All those who are real friends to the country—all those who would render even justice to administration, by affording them an opportunity of vindicating their conduct, will vote with me this night. I wish for the votes of these men, and these men only, Grant me but the committee, and I will endeavour to prove the truth of my allegations. If the result of the inquiry should be favourable to administration, they will have cause of triumph. Let us, however, investigate the facts. Let us not allow every act of parliament for our defence to remain as a mere dead letter. Let us, as there appears danger, improve our military spirit. Let us immediately adopt plans for the better and more general arming of the people.

The question being called for, the ayes went forth, and on the division the numbers were,

Adjourned at 4 o'clock on Tuesday morning.