rose to make his promised motion relative to the interests of the holders of the Loyalty Loan. He entered into a minute history of all the particulars in any sort connected with the negotiation of that Loan, the passing of the act which legalized the transaction, and every subsequent event, by which he thought the faith of govt. was in the least implicated, or the interests of the holders of that loan affected. The loan was proposed on Thursday the 1st of Dec. and by ten o'clock on Monday the 5th, the names were put down for the whole amount of 18 millions. On the 23d of the same month, when the bill received the Royal assent, there was the sum of one million five hundred thousand actually paid down on the faith of the agreement which had been made with the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. There were several meetings had afterwards, and different opinions were known to have been given as to the legal interpretation of the precise terms of the act. On the whole he argued that, if the subscribers did actually expect to have a right to demand re payment in two years after the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, it could not be deemed consistent with the honour or good faith of the nation to permit individuals to suffer by any embarrassment or doubtfulness in the formation of an act of parliament. He therefore moved, "that the said act be referred to a committee of the whole House."

, in reply to the objections of the hon. mover to the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, maintained that they had pursued the line which, under similar circumstances, their predecessors, or any other ministers, would have attended to, namely, where a doubt existed as to the interpretation of an act of parliament to consult the law officers of the Crown; who upon this occasion had delivered an opinion that differed, it was true, from that of a respectable barrister (Mr. Pigot); but he must state that which came to his knowledge, that the case upon which the learned barrister alluded to had pronounced an opinion, was erroneously drawn up, and particularly with respect to the date of the definitive treaty of peace, or otherwise he presumed that no difference would have existed between that and the opinion of the law officers of the Crown.

argued that the resolution of the committee of ways and means, which immediately followed the proposal made with the subscribers to the loyalty loan, was a confirmation of the bargain which they concluded with ministers, and that any deviation from that resolution in the bill that was grounded upon it must have been a mistake, for it was impossible to suppose that any breach of faith with the subscribers, could have been intended. The opinion of the law officers he maintained to be not perfectly agreeable to that which from all the circumstances was to be expected, for as they admitted the case to be doubtful, he conceived that their duty was to lean to the side of equity, and to attend to the well-founded claims of the public creditor.

said, that he had a great share in the origin of this transaction, and he thought it right to say that he meant to consider it merely as a question of good faith and justice. The statute upon which the difference of opinion existed, departed from the resolution of the committee which preceded it, and which, in his judgment, was binding upon that house with respect to the contract with the subscribers to the loyalty loan. Some doubts existed, he understood, as to the construction of the statute, as to the time when the holders of the loyalty loan had a right to claim payment. For himself, he had no hesitation to say, that his opinion coincided with that of Mr. Pigot, both as founded upon the justice of the case, and warranted by the letter of the act. It was stated that the opinion of that learned barrister was erroneous because it was founded upon an erroneous statement as to the date of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; but his opinion, it should be remembered, did not hinge upon any thing of that kind, but related to this question, whether the notice, which by the statute, was to precede the payment of those subscribers was to be concurrent with, or superadded to, the two years subsequent to the treaty of peace, which were to elapse before any claim should be made? From the words of the act, and from all the circumstances connected with the transaction, he was decidedly inclined to the opinion of Mr. Pigot, and to deviate from that opinion, would not, in his judgment, be to accord with the principles of good faith, which he hoped ministers would sufficiently feel it their duty to attend to. If there was any doubt in their mind as to the best mode of proceeding in consequence of the alteration in the act, from the words of the resolution, he thought it was their duty to apply for the advice of that House, and if there was any mistake, to have it rectified, but by no means to trust to any opinion against the equity of the case. The bargain was known to be concluded when the resolution of the committee was published, and any departure from that resolution in the progress of the bill, was an alteration made by one of the parties without the consent of the other. As such departure had occurred through inadvertency, he trusted that ministers would not run the risk of exposing parliament to the charge of imposition, by refusing to correct the evil complained of, a charge which was never attempted to be cast before. He begged leave to impress on the minds of the House, that almost immediately after the resolution of the committee was agreed to, by which the proposal of those sub- scribers was acceded to, some of them made a deposit, and many of them paid their first installments before the bill was passed in which that resolution was altered.

resisted the motion, and the arguments by which it was supported. He contended that good faith was not in any degree violated towards the subscribers to the loyalty loan, as they paid in their installments with their eyes open to the terms of their bargain; the bill which sanctioned that bargain having passed in Dec. 1796, and no part of the subscription having been advanced until Jan. following. From this he inferred that no claim on the score of justice could be advanced, and if any of the parties were aggrieved, the courts of law were open for their redress. He saw no reason for an application to that House upon the subject. That application, however, he had to mention, was not sanctioned by above one-third of the holders of this loan; and even among that party very few of the original subscribers were to be found. This he mentioned in order to weaken the claim on the ground of liberality. If, however, those subscribers were to wait until the period when, according to the construction of the statute, they were entitled to payment at par, he wished it to be understood, that if they should not be paid before the 5th of April, 1805, they would then have to receive the whole of their original subscription, with not less than from 7 to 8 per cent. interest upon it from the time of the first advance. Then no loss would arise to the persons for whom so much anxiety was expressed by the advocates for the motion before the House—a motion which he trusted would not be acceded to; and he had to observe, that there was no necessity for it, for he had no doubt that some accommodation might be made with the subscribers, that by a bonus they would be reconciled to postpone their demand for payment until the period of peace. Sure he was that such payment could not, under the present circumstances, be made without very material inconvenience to the public, and therefore he would have no share in assenting to any propostion of this nature, particularly as there was no obligation of justice or good faith to call for such payment.

said, he considered this a question of infinite importance, and concurred with the whole of the arguments advanced by the right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt.) He stated, that it never was the custom to propose alterations in a bill, founded upon a resolution in a committee of ways and means, respecting any loan. He challenged the right hon. gent. on the treasury bench to quote one instance where any such proposition was made by him, or any other gent. who ever sat on the bench which he had occupied for so many years. This observation he made, in order to mark the respect for good faith towards public creditors, which had been uniformly felt in that House, and to shew that no one had ever before meditated any thing like an alteration in the terms of a loan particularly injurious to the contractors. It had often, to be sure, been attempted to throw out a loan bill altogether, as it might be in the Lords, but never in any case to alter the terms; that is, if the interest to the lender was proposed to be 5 per cent. no one ever moved in any stage of a loan bill, that such interest should be reduced, and for this obvious reason, that it would be a scandalous breach of faith to new-model a contract without the consent, and in a manner not subject to the control of one of the contracting parties. The contracting parties in this transaction, he considered to be the House of Commons, and the subscribers to the loyalty loan, and he trusted that that House would never, by an act of power, violate a solemn act of covenant, to which it subscribed when it agreed to the report of the committee, the resolution of which formed the bargain now under discussion: The hon. member asserted that the contractors had a right to consider the resolution of that committee as conclusive of their bargain, and could not be supposed to have any cognizance of the subsequent proceeding upon the bill, for it would be monstrous to extend to such a case the maxim of ignorantia legis non excusat. The alteration, therefore, which took place, they could not be considered as aware of before they advanced their money. To make use, then, of such an alteration, to evade the original agreement with them, he could not but pronounce as little short of an absolute fraud. Indeed, he could not help considering the conduct which ministers seemed resolved to observe towards those creditors, as little less than bad faith personified. That they should, in the construc- tion of an act, the meaning of which was confessed to be doubtful, take that construction which was opposite to good faith, instead of the contrary, was very extraordinary; but the right hon. gent. had said, that only a certain proportion of the loyalty loan holders had asserted this claim, and all the words he had used on that ground, to speak in the mildest manner of them, was, in fact, so much flung away. The right hon. gent, indeed, promised, that if this motion should be rejected, a negociation would be set on foot, with the persons complaining, to induce them to postpone their demand until another opportunity, and such negociation to reconcile them was, it seems to be preceded by a vote of this House to shew that ministers had the absolute power to deal with those claims in what manner they pleased—particularly if it should not be convenient to ministers to discharge them. Here the hon. member took notice of the argument of inconveniency made use of by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and strongly reprobated it as indecent and unbecoming upon such an occasion as that before the House. What, he would ask, would be thought of any private individual who should resort to such an argument to release himself from the execution of a solemn contract, who should propose to sacrifice justice to convenience? How then was the House and the public to judge of a minister who talked of convenience as an objection to the discharge of a debt legally contracted, and justly due to a certain number of public creditors.

observed, that unless the hon. member who had just spoken on the other side meant to introduce party spirit into every question, he saw no reason why he should have discussed this subject with so much heat, or charged his right hon. friend with intending to violate public faith. The right hon. gent argued in favour of the opinion of his Majesty's law officers upon this subject, and the conduct which ministers had pursued. He particularly endeavoured to impress upon the minds of gent. how seriously a vote in favour of the motion before the House, might operate to embarrass the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his dealings to-morrow with the gent. whom he was to meet on the subject of the new loan. They might well speak of a material change since their last interview, if the House should give a vote that would imply that the holders of the loyalty loan should be immediately paid.

called the attention of the House to the nature of the deposit which was usually made in bargains of this kind. If the deposit operated as an obligation on the contractors, it must be equally binding on govt. He saw no reason why the bargain should not be equally binding on the one party, as on the other.

declared that he had not a very distinct recollection of the terms contracted on, or the alteration that took place, but was certain that no communication could have been made to the holders of the loan in regard to that alteration. He regretted that he had not a distinct recollection, but entered into a detail of the circumstances, so far as his recollection could serve him, and concluded by stating, that on the ground that the notice should be given at the expiration of the two years from the signing of the preliminaries of peace, and the six months added to the two years, the time of payment would turn out to be pretty nearly on the 10th of Oct.

insisted that the option, if there was any, should be entirely in favour of the proprietors of the loan, whereas instead of par, to which they were entitled, they were receiving only 94 and 95.

thought, that from the stock being at discount, the natural inference was, that the holders had not sufficient confidence in the faith of govt.

was of opinion, that govt. should raise no money, to be paid at a certain fixed day. It was this dangerous mode of borrowing money, the hon. Baronet alleged, that had ruined the French govt. and which might also be of serious inconveniency to this country.

spoke at some length, against the motion, and principally contended that the terms of the loan were not to be gathered from the resolutions of the committee, but from the act of Parliament as explanatory of those resolutions.

, from the connection he had with the Bank, knew that no communication had been made in that quarter of the alteration that had been introduced into the terms of the loan by the act of Parliament subsequent to the resolutions of the committee.—A division being now called for, the House divided, when there appeared,