moved the order of the day for the house to go into a committee on the bill for the Suspension of the Army of Reserve act.—The Speaker having put the question from the chair,

rose, and addressed the house in substance as follows: In rising, Sir, to oppose the motion for your leaving the chair, it is not my intention to occupy the attention of the House longer than ap- pears to me absolutely necessary; and therefore I have no wish to enlarge on topics connected with the general subject, which have, in the course of late debates, undergone the most ample discussion. Before I proceed to the description of the plan of which I have given notice to the house on a former day, it is my wish to say a few words on the nature and complexion of the bill which it is the object of the right hon. gent.'s motion to bring under our consideration in a committee. As far as I am able to understand it, the only effect of its adoption would be to relinquish all chance of the benefit of that augmentation of our disposable force, which, in the unanimous opinion of all persons in this house, ought to be the principal object of attention with his Majesty's govt. It would be to relinquish all chance of the continuance of future benefit, arising from a measure which, though in many points of view impeded and retarded, has had the effect of procuring, within the space of 12 months, a more considerable augmentation of our regular force, than could perhaps have been obtained in any other way, at the time and under the circumstances in which the measure was carried into activity. It appears to me that all these chances of benefit are given up, without substituting in their room any system by which the great object of the augmentation of the regular army is to be obtained. If I understood the statement of the right hon. Sec. of State below me, there were three measures, by the adoption of which his Majesty's ministers flattered themselves that they would be able to augment the regular disposable force of the country. The 1st of these measures was, the acceptance of the voluntary offers of a certain proportion of the Irish militia to extend their services to this country. The 2d measure had in view the augmentation of the militia of Ireland. The last of the measures directed to the great object in view, was the formation of a number of new regiments to be raised, independent of that competition which is at this moment admitted to be most fatal to the speedy recruiting of the regular army. On these different measures proposed for the augmentation of our disposable force, it is not now my intention to enlarge; but I must be permitted to observe, that in none of them does there seem to be any thing which is at all calculated to be effectual in producing the completion of the object which, without exception, is admitted to be of the last consequence in the present circumstances of the empire. It is true, that a certain proportion of the Irish militia have volunteered their services to this country. In this offer, it is doubtful whether there is less of policy than of national advantage. Before the house can admit the policy of receiving such offers, it becomes necessary to look a little to the degree in which the interchange of the services of the militia of both countries is to be conducted, and I may add whether, in extraordinary circumstances, this interchange ought to be encouraged? It cannot, in reason, be denied, that such an interchange must depend on circumstances of special emergency, and what I maintain is, that the acceptance of the voluntary offers of the militia of Ireland at this time, is not only productive of all the evils arising from an undefined interchange of services, but can be attended with none of the advantages arising from such a measure, originating from well-considered views of national interest. On the subject of the augmentation of the militia of Ireland, my opinions are not by any means different. It will not be disputed by his Majesty's ministers, that the offers of extended services by a certain proportion of the militia of Ireland, depends for acceptance, in a great measure, on this subsequent measure. It is allowed on all hands, that Ireland cannot lose such a proportion of the means of its defence, without receiving something like an adequate return. We must understand, that the augmentation proposed is meant to form the return to which I have referred. But will any gent. in this house for a moment affirm, that a mere resolution for the augmentation of the Irish militia, will at all compensate for the loss of a considerable proportion of troops, allowed on all hands to be adequate to the defence of Ireland, combined with the regular military force. In fact, Sir, if ministers act consistently, the offers of the Irish militia cannot be accepted, unless some return be made to Ireland. By the system of augmenting the militia, this return cannot be expected for a considerable period, and therefore the one measure is not only inconsistent with the other, but utterly inefficient for any object of obtaining a greater disposeable force. No man will go beyond me in maintaining that the militia are a constitutional, a respectable, and a most useful force, when kept within proper limits, and applied to the specific object of their formation. It must, however, be with every man a question of peculiar jealousy to find the militia come in competition with the regular army under any circumstances, but more peculiarly under the circumstances in which the proposed measures of ministers necessarily placed that competition. They admit that there is a necessity for the augmentation of the disposable force of the country. They fix on Ireland as that part of the empire where that disposable force is to be more readily procured, and at the time they are holding this language, they are determined that the militia of Ireland shall be, to a considerable degree, increased. It must, Sir, appear singular, that when the deficiency of the quota of the army of reserve to be furnished by Ireland is materially deficient, it should be proposed to augment the militia—a species of force confessedly limited to services less applicable to our present circumstances. If new levies are to be made, why are these deficiencies in the army of reserve, or why are not the new levies to have the precedency? The mischief of competition is allowed. The professed object of ministers is to have a disposable force, yet, with these admissions, the militia of Ireland, allowed on all hands to be limited in their terms of service, are to counteract the new regular levies for which, on a former occasion, so much merit was claimed. It is admitted that, by the measure of the army of reserve, we have obtained a very considerable augmentation of our disposeable force. In Ireland, it is proposed that the militia shall be augmented. On what principle, then, is it that the operation of the reserve bill is not suspended in that country? [Here Mr. Yorke, signified that a bill was brought in for suspending the act in Ireland.] Mr. Pitt continuing his argument, proceeded to say, if the law is to be preserved in force, on what principle is it, that though there are now deficiencies in the army of reserve for Ireland, to the amount of 6 or 7000 men, the augmentation of the militia is to be preferred to this force? Will it be pretended that the augmentation of the militia will so materially contribute to the object in view, as the augmentation of the army of reserve, from which constant supplies for the regular disposable force of the country may be fairly and reasonably expected? It is really not easy to ascertain on what ground a force, though not generally disposable in the first instance, yet not indisposed to general service, should be lost sight of, while a species of force which, by their constitution, is confined to limited service, should be preferred. Must the system which ministers have so much favoured, as calculated to add to the disposable force of the country, be altogether abandoned, because it might not have accomplished all that was expected from it in their sanguine expectations? I really cannot consider it in any other view than a measure inimical to that measure which ministers hold out to our observation. On the one hand, if the militia of Ireland is augmented, the levies for the regular army must, in a great measure, be suspended. On the other hand, if the levies for the regular force are to be carried forward, the proposition for augmenting the Irish militia is altogether preposterous. The language of ministers is, that they want to have men at a reduced bounty. But how is it that they carry their object into practice? They do not pretend to deny that their first object is to have men for disposable purposes, and this they hold forth as the object which ought to have precedence of every other consideration. It is rather curious, however, to look at the mode in which they reduce the plan to practice. They wish recruits for the regulars in Ireland, and they are desirous of having an augmentation of the militia in the same country. It is in vain, Sir, to deny, that the competition in these cases is altogether unequal, and that where it is proposed to raise 10,000 additional militia in Ireland, the plan of raising number of new regiments is quite impracticable and impolitic. On every general principle, then, I do most heartily contend, that the suspension of the army of reserve act is not at all called for on principles of necessity, of policy, or of utility. In stating this, I wish it to be fairly understood, that my opinion is founded on general principles. A great deal of argument will not be necessary to shew that those who most zealously objected to the army of reserve, ought not to agree to the motion now before the House. If they objected to the act, in consequence of the high bounties which it encouraged; if they think that the principle of the ballot which it promoted did not proceed on constitutional principles; if they are convinced that it did not proceed on constitutional principles, then, Sir, they surely cannot give their assent to the motion now submitted to our consideration. If the bill is so much liable to censure; if it is so little in consonance with the opinions of these gent. they cannot surely be satisfied with the suspension of such a measure, which, according to their own principles, ought to be totally repealed. This is a proposition which cannot be fairly denied, and therefore is it the less necessary to enlarge on it. But, Sir, if the system Of the army of reserve, as now existing, can be modified; if a description of persons not at all likely to enter into the regular army can be brought into limited service; if this temporary plan of recruiting can be managed, so as to promote the great end in view, without increasing either national inconvenience or private misery, there will not, I am sure, Sir, exist a doubt that such a system ought to meet with every degree of support and encouragement. If such a system can be brought forward, it must at least, Sir, be one to which the House could not, consistently with their duty, refuse their most serious consideration. Though on the present occasion, my object in rising was to explain the outlines of such a plan, I do not at all so much flatter myself as to suppose that it will be perfect; but it is not too much presumption to imagine that it is a plan not altogether unworthy of the consideration of Parliament. Before I go on very shortly to state to the House the nature of the plan, it may not be improper merely to advert to the grounds on which the suspension of the army of reserve act ought to be considered. The first question that presents itself is, whether the reserve act ought to be suspended, or whether it might not be modified in such a manner as to render its application more advantageous? The second question was, whether, if the idea of suspending the act was entertained, this was not too little; and whether, if the idea of suspension was at all entertained, the act ought not to be totally abolished? Conceiving these to be the two great preliminary views of the subject, I hope I shall meet with the indulgence of the House, while I state the outlines of a plan on this subject, the result of long and careful examination, the effect of digested and careful comparison of the wants and circumstances of the country. Without now, then, going into any details on the subject, which, if the bill for which I mean to move is introduced, I shall have ample means of introducing, it will be sufficient for me at present to give an outline of the general plan. Allow me then, Sir, to introduce the subject generally, by saying that, under the present circumstances of society, under the present extension of commerce, under all the new openings offered to labour in all its branches, it is not saying too much to say that the encouragements to enter on a military life must be very materially diminished. Looking, then, to the difficulties attendant on the recruiting of the army; looking to the difficulties of obtaining men for unlimited service, compared with service for a short period, and on their native soil, I must be allowed to assume it as a fair supposition, that a number of men would be induced to accept of offers of limited service, who would not listen to any idea of military service for life. With this view, then, it will not be denied, Sir, that the services of those who are far from willing to enter into the regular army, should be encouraged for that limited species of service to which they are by no means disinclined. The house will not suppose that I am going too far when I affirm, that such a mode of recruiting for the regular army in a commercial country, is that most fully justified by the whole history of human affairs. Every man knows that limited service must, in the first instance, be preferred to service knowing no limitation of place or time. But while this was allowed it was not less clear, that if men once entered into the army for a limited period, military habits were soon contracted, and those, who, in the first instance, would never have thought of indefinite military service, entered into this enlarged engagement with the greatest possible alacrity. From limited to permanent military service, is therefore what every man, in the least acquainted with military affairs, could anticipate without the smallest difficulty. But, Sir, I would not even put the question on this ground. Even independent of any legislative interference, independent of the acceptance of any offers of those who, originally engaging for limited service, afterwards entered into the regular army, the House, I am sure, will agree with me in thinking, that there may occur periods of patriotic ardour, when all idea of limited service will be lost sight of; that the native courage and heroism of the English character will display itself; that Englishmen will look not alone to the safety, but to the honour, to the dignity, and to the glory of their country. Under such circumstances as these, it is not presuming too far to suppose, that voluntary offers of extension of service will be numerous. If, Sir, we can suppose that the national spirit of the people, even unassisted, will produce these effects, how much more may its influence be expected to be, when it is supported, directed, and encouraged by judicious regulations? On these principles, then, I object to the acceptance of the offers of the Irish militia to extend their service to this country, because the same object may be obtained without any violation of constitutional principles. That the extension of the services of the militia of both countries may be desirable under an emergency of peculiar danger, no man can reasonably deny. But, however the zeal and the alacrity of those making the offer may be commended, the policy of accepting must still be a ground of grave deliberation with those who pretend to guide their public conduct by any principle of wisdom or of policy. Before the services of the militia of Ireland can with propriety be accepted, we have to ascertain whether, by this measure, the general security of the whole empire is consulted. But, reverting particularly to the augmentation of the Irish militia as an addition to the military force of the empire, I must be permitted to make a few observations. The idea of disparaging the services or importance of the militia establishment, is certainly the farthest from my contemplation. At the same time, Sir, it has been allowed by its most zealous friends, that, in many instances, it has been carried to an extent inconsistent with the general circumstances of the country. With this idea I do most cordially agree, and beg leave, at the same time, to add, that in my judgment the militia of England ought not to exceed 48,000. If the number is carried beyond that, then there is a danger that the number of officers fit to discipline the different corps will not be sufficient for that purpose. The importance of regular respectable officers no man will deny; and if the augmentation goes beyond the proportion of officers which can be afforded them, unquestionably that augmentation is impolitic. My first view, then, Sir, is, that the militia of England should as soon as possible be reduced to 48,000. If we are to keep up a considerable limited force, all the descriptions of which it is composed ought to bear some proportion. The militia establishment of the country now amounts to about 72,000, and we ought to have had 40,000 of the army of reserve in G. Britain. What I would, in the first instance, propose, would be, that the militia should not exceed 48,000, and that from 40, the army of reserve should be extended to 64,000 men. In this arrangement, I should propose that there should be an augmentation to the army of reserve in England of 24,000, and that 4,000 should be the augmentation for Scotland. In proposing this arrangement, the House will understand, that I do not at all allude to any sudden and abrupt dismantling of the militia. It is equally far from my wish to interfere with their progress in discipline. All that I propose is, that the vacancies in the militia, as they successively occur, shall not be filled up for that species of the public force; and one important advantage of this arrangement would be, that competition to a material degree would be destroyed. By this arrangement, the number of persons liable to the army of reserve would be enlarged; and it would not require much labour to shew that, by this enlargement, a material advantage would be gained. I may merely call the attention of the house to the experience of last year. If, out of 37,000 raised by the army of reserve act, upwards of 9000, according to the returns on the table, had, within considerably less than 12 months, volunteered into the regular army, I am surely not presuming too much in supposing, that a similar cause would be accompanied with a similar result. In proposing to the house the permanent establishment of the army of reserve, though certainly on a very modified system, I am sensible that objections may be readily started against the proposition. But, Sir, let it be remembered, that the times in which we live are not ordinary times. When we are called to encounter extraordinary and unprecedented dangers, we must lay our account with submitting to extraordinary and unprecedented dangers. If we are called on to undergo great sacrifices, we must bear in mind the interesting objects which these objects may enable us to defend and to secure. I need not remind the house that we are come to a new æra in the history of nations; that we are called to struggle for the destiny, not of this country alone, but of the civilized world. We must remember that it is not for ourselves alone that we submit to unexampled privations. We have for ourselves the great duty of self-preservation to perform, but the duty of the people of England now is of a nobler and higher order. We are in the first place to provide for our security against an enemy whose malignity to this country knows no bounds. But this is not to close the views or the efforts of our exertion in so sacred a cause. Amid the wreck and the misery of nations, our great object was that which we could look to with just exultation, that we had continued superior to all that ambition or that despotism could effect; and our still higher exultation ought to be, that we should provide not only for our own safety, but hold out a prospect to nations now bending under the iron yoke of tyranny, what the exertions of a free people could effect; and that at least in this corner of the world, the name of liberty was still revered, cherished, and sanctified. Viewing, then, the pressure to which the measure I propose may give rise, I contend these are fair considerations. What is to be considered then is, that what is unnecessary shall be removed, that what is oppressive shall be mitigated. On these principles my whole plan proceeds. Mitigated as it may be, still the pressure must be severe. But let it be remembered, that the object is not only to repel from our shores a danger that threatens our existence as an independent nation, but to restore to Europe the chance of regaining all that is most dignified in the condition and in the relations of civilized nations. To any question of pressure, I conceive then that is a most satisfactory answer to every reflecting mind. But having said so much on the subject of the pressure attendant on the plan I mean to propose, I shall now mention generally the number which appears to me to be necessary to complete the establishment, as the foundation of a regular, permanent, military establishment. I shall go on the supposition that 60 or 70,000 men should be kept up every year, according to the proportion of the different counties, regulated on the principles of the ballot for the militia establishment. In the detail of the system there must of course be a great deal of modification; but I would beg leave to state generally, that, in my opinion, the regular army would receive an addition of 14 or 15,000 men annually by voluntary offers. In the first instance, you would be sure to procure a large number of men who could not be otherwise obtained, and the same men would be induced to enter the army on the general principles of human nature, founded on habit and experience. The ordinary recruiting of the army would not be impeded or interrupted. All the means of a defensive and an offensive system would be united. By following the system, we should not only be secure at home, but be provided with the means of holding out hopes for the restoration of States now sinking under the most odious tyranny. It has often occurred to me, Sir, that the indiscriminate manner in which volunteering from the army of reserve has hitherto been allowed, is highly ruinous to the best interests of the army. By the plan which I wish to propose, a certain degree of shape and consistency would be given even to the volunteering from the army of reserve into the regular army. What I would in the first instance suggest would be, that the quota furnished by each parish and county should be attached to the corresponding regiment in G. Britain or Ireland. If this plan were once reduced to practice, and judiciously acted on, I have no noubt that one of the greatest obstacles to the recruiting would be removed. It is obvious, that by such a plan, all the influence of domestic feeling and local connection would be obtained, if those entering into the army of reserve were connected with the particular regiment for which they must feel a peculiar predilection. But this would not happen alone in the case of recruits attached to old battalions. If supplementary battalions were formed, the same effects would result from the same considerations. Similar feelings betwixt both battalions would be encouraged, and similar ardour would be created. But, Sir, the good effects of such an arrangement, would not be so limited. It will not be denied that the present system of indiscriminate volunteering from the army of reserve is extremely discouraging to the offi- cers employed in drilling the raw recruits. After he has wasted all his labour in bringing the men to some kind of perfection, I put it to the candour and the good sense of the house, whether it must not be painful to the feelings of any man to think that all his labour is to pass without reward, that those whom he has prepared to advance into the field, are to follow the banners of some other leader. It is not, however, Sir, as a painful consideration that this indiscriminate system of volunteering is to be reprobated. It is evidently calculated to undermine all discipline or attachment to officers. If soldiers are attached to officers, this feeling cannot be of long duration, because the connection is hardly formed before it is dissolved. If, on the other hand, soldiers are dissatisfied with their commanders they know that while indiscriminate volunteering is allowed, they have the speedy prospect of retiring from the control of men whom they may chuse to detest and to calumniate. But, Sir, if the system I recommend were followed, all these evils would be done away. Knowing that their connection with their officers was of a permanent nature, the men would learn both awe and regard; and the officers, firmly attached to their recruits, would spare no time to render them perfect in all the duties of a military life. The consequences that would result from this system are obvious. We should have the men in an intermediate state more efficient for the purposes of defence, and we should have them more disposed to enter into the regular disposable force of the country. If a thousand regular troops were wanted, we should have a thousand troops of the reserve perfectly qualified to supply their place for every purpose of internal defence. We might have men for limited service, but then they would be under officers of no limited views; men who had seen service in every part of the globe, and who knew most perfectly to qualify men to advance into the field of battle with that confidence which is the best pledge of success. Indeed, in a short time the whole of your defensive force would thus become as good and efficient as your regular force; by that means the men will, as it were, become worth double their number, with a view to the defence of the country; they will be changed in a short time to ready-made soldiers, while, at the same time, the plan of regular recruiting may be en- larged and made more effectual. It thus unites several advantages in every point of view, unless, in so far as the mode in which it is to be raised may increase a competition. Considering, however, the numerous benefits to be derived by the adoption of such a plan, perhaps gent. may consent to admit of a certain degree of competition, seeing that it will be materially narrowed. It appears clearly to my mind, that by the plan I have suggested, the disadvantageous competition in the recruiting of the regular army will be avoided. As the ballot is now regulated, if it falls upon a person whose engagements in life, or other circumstances, render it unfit that he should serve, he must find a substitute, and no limit is assigned to the sum he must give to procure one; he is to sacrifice, perhaps, 40l. or 50l. and expose himself and his family to numerous privations, not for the benefit of the state, but from the impolitic plan adopted to supply its exigencies. The effect is obvious; it has occasioned a species of subscription club, which convert the matter into a sort of parochial rate, by which the important military duty of recruiting is committed to parish officers, instead of being intrusted to officers who are competent to discharge it; and being in such hands, they bid against each other without limit or discretion, to the utter ruin of the service. What I have proposed, requires, that if the person on whom the ballot falls will not serve, he shall pay a certain moderate fixed sum; but if he serves, then he shall receive the same amount he would otherwise pay. Another precaution in the scheme is, that the substitute should be found by the parish, and not by the individual; and further, the person so provided, is to be taken from the hundred, and not from the great market towns, unless under the predicament I shall presently explain, The bounty given will also, according to these arrangements, be examined by the magistrates of the respective counties, who will prevent any deviation from the limits prescribed by law. It will immediately occur on the review of this plan, that there will be no possibility of surpassing the bounty and from the local limitation, that there will be no danger of interfering in places of extensive population, with the recruiting of the regular army.—The next consideration to which I request the attention of the House is, the supply of the vacancies, or to provide for those cases where the hundred can procure no substitute, which inability may accrue from a great variety of causes. In such circumstances, the bounty is to be made over to the Colonel, who is to pay the limited sum he so receives for the more limited service he requires; that is, that the recruiting parties he employs are to procure men for this particular service; and regulating the quantum of bounty to the nature of the duty, no pernicious competition will arise, as the larger bounty will always he given for enlisting into the regular army. There must, in a country like this, where the sources of comfort and enjoyment in life are so well understood, be a great variety of persons who will enlist for a much smaller bounty into a temporary service, but who would not, for any emolument whatever, engage for life in a military occupation. Thus, I conceive, I leave undisturbed the mode of recruiting now employed, and I add a new mode, which I will presume to be capable of doubling the supply from the ordinary sources.—Such, Sir, is the nature of the plan; the tendency, I flatter myself, is to improve and enlarge the regular army, by presenting novel expedients for the purpose, and then to conduce essentially to the means of internal defence, and external warfare. It has been justly complained, that the measures for this purpose lately resorted to, so materially interfere with each other, that they successively obstruct whatever is adopted: it has been my endeavour to avoid this error, and to combine the several parts of this extensive system in such a way, that a mutual co-operation may be produced, and that what is good and eligible in itself may be rendered better and more desirable by this connection. Objections have been stated to the introduction at the time, of any great scheme of improvement in the service; it is, however, true that the moment of public difficulty is often the crisis of public improvement; the sense of danger inspires men with a portion of zeal and enthusiasm which enables them to surmount the obstructions by which they are surrounded, and they are capable of performing what, under other circumstances, they could scarcely contemplate. What is now recommended, seems to me beneficial, whether the country be exposed to the horrors of war, or in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace. In the present circumstances of Europe, should hostilities terminate, the permanence of such a situation would depend upon the respectable state of your peace establishment, more than on any other circumstance: this I felt, and I recommended on a recent occasion, the necessity of preserving a competent force. By the present proposal, this advantage would be secured, a body of men, with liberty to recruit into the regular army would be provided, and, without any ballot, 10 or 15,000 recruits would be ready to supply the ranks in the troops of the line, and able to act with them on the most difficult service, without disgracing their companions in the field of danger. If all or any of these benefits be unavoidably connected with the measure, the house, I am sure, will be disposed to give it an attentive consideration; but I am far from having exhausted all its merits. By the plan it appears, that the officers attached to those provisional troops would be those who are most capable of bringing their discipline to perfection, and in consequence they will be much more ready to act with the troops of the line, than the supplies from the militia, or from the army of reserve. It will not be necessary to abandon the sound maxims of state policy, by which the militias of G. Britain and Ireland are confined to their native territory, and the disposable force of the country may be dismissed to those situations where its gallantry and conduct will redound most to the advantage and glory of the country. I have, Sir, on all these grounds, it right to resist your leaving the chair, to convert this house into a committee for the consideration of the propriety of suspending the bill of the army of reserve, and I hope it will not be thought that, on a question of this magnitude, I have intruded too much on your indulgence.

.—Notwithstanding, Sir, the respect I am always disposed to pay to whatever is suggested by the right hon. gent. who has just sat down, I must confess, after paying the most strict and minute attention to his reasoning, I have heard nothing to, influence my mind to postpone the consideration of the present bill. A few observations on the grounds of the measure will explain my meaning. I before stated that two objects proposed: 1st, to render the internal defence of the country complete, which was of the highest importance; 2dly, to augment the disposable force so far as to enable us to annoy the enemy in his own possessions. I have the happiness to say, that the first object is completed: the 2d is the matter now to be considered, and the plan proposed for this purpose, is a temporary expedient to increase the facility of the new levies for the supply of the troops of the line. The material means of promoting this appeared to us, to be by removing the pernicious competition, and by introducing into this country a certain proportion of the militia of Ireland. Objections have been made to the latter as diminishing the security of that part of the united kingdom, and interfering with the augmentation of the regular force there. The policy or impolicy in this respect, depends much upon the influence of powerful individuals to supply the deficiency thus to be occasioned; and after informing myself on the subject, by the assistance of those who are best acquainted with it, I do believe the means are competent to produce the end; and that the inconvenience to Ireland will be transitory, while the benefit to this part of the empire is permanent. Putting, then, that inquiry out of the question, it is to be considered, whether the suspension of the army Of reserve act for 12 months, will, or will not, render it more easy to raise the new levies, by taking away all competition. Withdrawing the operation of this act for a time, is no acknowledgment that it was, at the time it was passed, impolitic. Certain it is, that its effects have been to raise a much larger force in a much shorter period than could have been done by any other resource; and the right hon. gent. in the course of his speech, as I understood him, had the candour to make this acknowledgement. By this act, in the short interval of 6 weeks or two months, 30,000 men were raised in G. Britain, and 7000 men in Ireland; but, notwithstanding this success in the outset, it at this time barely supports itself, or supplies the deficiencies which are daily occurring from sickness, desertion, and other causes. Thus the benefit is only nominal, while the detriment is real, in obstructing the future levies on which the increase of our disposable force is to depend. It is not at all necessary that gent. should have made up their minds on the plans projected for those levies; but, in whatever way men are to be raised, this competitions must be destroyed, or the best concerted scheme will be disappoints. If ministers should persevere in the levies, on a principle objectionable to the house, the money necessary to the execution of the measure may be withheld, and thus it must be rendered abortive. Neither is it indispensable that the house should assert the inexpediency of the proposal of the right hon. gent.; his plan may be beneficial, and yet it may be right to adopt this temporary measure, and even as preparatory to his own. It is perfectly clear, that at least the plan of the right hon. gent. is not calculated to produce the immediate augmentation required. Thirteen or 14 thousand men are wanted to supply the deficiency, and, both on his scheme, and under the existing act, it is impracticable to obtain them. In this predicament, the present scheme is suggested, which alone seems competent to produce the desired effect. The right hon. gent. states two objections to the mode in which the levies are to be conducted. First, he says, they will be ineffectual, because low bounties will not procure men, when the larger remuneration is found unproductive: 2dly, he says, that the scheme of compensation by rank is inexpedient. His first difficulty, at least, seems equally applicable to his own proposal; for if we cannot procure men with the additional inducement of rank to the officers, how will he obtain them without this incentive? The bounty proposed for the levies has been announced to be 10l. 10s, and 2l. 2s. for levy money to the officers. Gent. may suppose that it is not sufficient; for the sake of argument, let it he so: but is this the proper time to discuss that particular? to the present question it is wholly irrelevant. The object of this bill is to facilitate the means of augmenting the army, and for this end it is proposed to destroy the competition in the market; this is the only subject of enquiry, and should not be rendered obscure by extraneous matter. I hope that the house will not be contented on this occasion, with the crude observations of gent. however distinguished for their general talents, who are not versed, from education and habits, in military affairs. It was the duty of his majesty's ministers, on a step of this kind to consult his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief on the quantum of bounty; and the Duke, in concurrence with other officers of the first rank, has considered no larger compensation should be offered in the present condition of the service. Of the same source of information, I have availed myself, as to the propriety of the compensation by rank, and, therefore, I may speak to this part of the objection with the same confidence. The duty is to be undertaken by officers of the line, who are to advance only one step in rank, and the number of men is to be completed within the period of 6 months; but if any further delay be admitted, the privilege of rank is to be withdrawn. Further, the bounty, on no consideration is to be exceeded; and any officer offending by such excess, is not only to forfeit his promotion, but is liable to be tried by a court martial for the offence. The present scheme of raising men for rank, must not be prejudiced by the supposition it in any respect resembles the mischievous system adopted under the administration of the right. hon. gent. which had nearly annihilated the British army. But the right hon. gent. says, if the bill be ineffectual, why not repeal instead of suspending it. The bill has been beneficial; it may be so again under new circumstances, and it does not appear to me prudent to abrogate it entirely, before the system for the regulation of the public force has received a fair, full, and solemn investigation. Whatever may be the sentiments of gent. on particular expedients, it is the universal opinion that to increase the regular force is a most desirable object. The right hon. gent. with that powerful eloquence he has always at his command, has represented the humble condition of continental Europe, and the probability that this country will be the foundation whereon the beautiful superstructure of European liberty and happiness will be erected; and it is in this flattering expectation he has dwelt with peculiar felicity on the necessity of maintaining on the most respectable footing the British army. The right hon. gent. has observed, that among the persons in this nation engaged in the pursuits of commerce and agriculture, great numbers would elect to serve in the army, if the time of occupation on that duty were limited. I readily admit this position, and it will be acknowledged that the plan of the army of reserve, and of the militia, is consistent with this principle. The right hon. gent. made many remarks, with which I am not disposed to quarrel. He considers the militia is too numerous, and deems 40,000 in England, and 8000 in Ireland, sufficient. He would have the supplementary militia also transferred to the army of reserve, and then with these assistances, instead of 40,000 for the latter, he would have it increased to 64,000. He says, he would not reduce the militia, but he would not fill up the vacancies; the vacancies should be carried to the account of the army of reserve. On these matters I shall not now advert, because they would lead me from the point under review; but, in respect to the objection of the right hon. gent. to call upon the counties for the men instead of the bounty, I must observe, the impossibility of pursuing at this time the design of the act of the army of reserve, which would put the whole scheme at a stand, and deprive the country of every benefit from provincial exertion. The right hon. gent. next adverted to the form and the situation of the public force; and many of his remarks were inapplicable, in this part of his speech, from his not being acquainted with what ministers have done in this respect. The national regiments have been very much dispersed in the countries where the men have been raised. The men raised in Scotland have been introduced into the regiment of the Marquis of Huntley, and what is called the Cameroonian regiment; the Highlanders to the former, the Lowlanders to the latter. Those raised in Ireland have been very generally assigned to the 42d and the 9th regiments. The men who were considered least fit for service have been thrown into the battalion of reserve. As far as possible the men have been apportioned among their native regiments, and in the English regiments they have been very much divided, so that the names of the regiments and the counties in which the recruits were raised, correspond. The plan hinted by the right hon. gent. and followed with so much industry under the administration of Lord Shelburne, has been adopted as far as circumstances would conveniently admit; but the colonial connections of this great maritime and commercial country, have obstructed, in a great degree, the measure. In the Austrian, German, and Prussian States, it can be carried into execution with more punctuality, where it is not frustrated by exterior causes. The right hon. gent. next proceeded to his contrivance for maintaining the force he projected, and this, he said, was to be done by ballot; a ballot, it is true, sui generis, but still it was to be by ballot. If the individuals on whom the lot devolved would not serve, they were to pay a fine; but if they served, they were to receive the same amount they would otherwise pay, as the reward of their compliance. The object of this proposal was to put an end to the competition; but I doubt very much if it would have that effect, or whether it would supersede the subscription clubs of which the right hon. gent. complained. I am confident nothing but an act of parliament could prevent the latter, and, if it were enacted, I very much doubt its utility: it would occasion many afflicting examples of private distress, and answer no valuable purpose, perhaps, to countervail their disadvantage. The right hon. gent. says no one shall be selected as a substitute, but a person provided from the particular hundred to which the lot falls. It surely must be well known to many members of this house, that this limitation would in many parts of the country be wholly impracticable. The other plan is feasible, which provides that no man shall be a substitute who does not belong to the county where the ballot takes effect, or in some adjacent district. It is, perhaps, a painful fact, that we are constrained in many cases to have recourse to the principal scene of recruiting to the great manufacturing towns of Leeds, Halifax, Manchester, and others, which it would be eligible to reserve as much as possibly for the regular supplies. Without entering more at large into the subject, what I have advanced will be sufficient to shew that the plan of the right hon. gent. however it might be remotely and ultimately effectual, is not calculated to answer the prominent object, which is, to augment the army to a considerable extent in a very short space of time. On the contrary, the expedient to be submitted to the House is considered by the highest military authorities adequate to the completion of this important design If it should be thought that we are too sanguine in the degree of success we anticipate, none will deny that in some degree the end will be obtained; and in proportion to this will be the capacity of his Majesty to apply the disposable force to offensive operations, I have troubled the house too long on a question which is reducible to so narrow a point; but it seemed improper to leave the right hon. gent.'s proposition wholly unanswered. On a question that regards the permanent system of the army, it may be very fit to enter fully into the merits of his plan, both in a partial and a collective view; but I have, at this time, reluctantly embarrassed the present enquiry with these considerations.

rose to explain an error into which the right hon. Sec. had fallen, as in the event of a difficulty from the locality of the levy, it was provided for in his plan. In certain cases, the bounty was given to the Colonel to procure the recruit, and all that was material to guard against was, that the bounty for the limited should not equal the remuneration for the unlimited service. This also was provided for.

said, he was glad that the right hon. Sec. in answer to the right hon. gent. under the gallery, had condescended to explain, in some respect, the bill which he now proposed to offer to the consideration of the house. By the explanation such as the right hon. gent. has been pleased to give, he has certainly justified the charge that had been so frequently brought against ministers, that they had adopted no fixed or consistent plan in their operations. By the measure now intended, he tells us that he means to suspend the army of reserve, as he calls it, though no misnomer could possibly be more glaring than the appellation applied to this species of force, as the result has proved. Have we not been repeatedly told in justification of the army of reserve, that it was one of the great means of recruiting the army? Have not comparative statements been given of the recruiting service at different periods; and have we not been told that the success of the recruiting service, such as it has been, has been owing to the army of reserve? Such are the advantages which that gent. has boasted of deriving from the army of reserve; and yet he now comes forward to suspend this act, which he has formerly stated to be productive of so many advantages. He comes forward to remove, by this suspension, the pernicious effects of that competition which has been so often complained of, but which has never been till now admitted by the right hon. gent. He could not, however, allow the acknowledgment of the right hon. gent. to be a sufficient answer to the objections offered to the present bill. He could not allow the acknowledgment of their past errors to be a sufficient proof of the incapacity of ministers to conduct the affairs of the country, particularly in such a crisis as the present; he would allow it to be a sufficient proof that they had no vi- gour nor consistency in their measures; but he could never allow the perception of past errors, so long and so obstinately persisted in, and still professed to be adhered to in regard to principle, to be a proof of greater wisdom in new arrangements, which were so closely connected with the former, that they must partake, in a very considerable degree, of their general complexion. The measure now proposed does not go to abolish the army of reserve, which, if that system has been found inefficient, it ought to do, but goes only to suspend for a time its operation. Either the army of reserve is a good or bad system. If it is a good system, and possessed of all the advantages which have been professed to be derived from it, why suspend it? And if it is a bad system, and by creating an unfair competition, operates in hostility to the increase of the regular army, can any reason be given why should it not be totally repealed? But ministers perhaps are afraid to confess their weakness. They see at last the inconvenience attending the present army of reserve system, but are reluctant to acknowledge, in proper form, the inutility of a system they have so often supported, and from which they have professed to derive so many advantages. They wish to abolish it, therefore, imperceptibly, and to avoid, under the pretence of a temporary suspension, the noise and eclat of a recantation. They wish to abolish it by a side wind, and at the expence of the people; as if the former system had not been sufficiently expensive, the present plan now proposed to be submitted to the house was no less calculated to empty the pockets of the people. That men could be raised in a short time upon any such system, was an erroneous idea. In the counties with which he was acquainted, he could say, from his own observation, instead of raising the men in a short time, they were obliged to act illegally in order to raise them at all. Had they acted legally indeed, they would neither have found men nor money. But if it is now allowed that men cannot be raised by the army of reserve, which was formerly stated to possess so many advantages, and which is still allowed to be efficient, inasmuch as it is not intended to be repealed, to what quarter shall we apply for the supply of men required? If govt. have not been able to raise the necessary supply of men by the operation of the army of reserve act, how shall they be able to raise the men wanted, if the field is so exhausted as to render that act ineffectual? If it was really necessary to go into a committee on this subject, it must be regarded as a proof, and a very undeniable proof, a proof which those gent. themselves recognise, that all former measures have been ineffectual. But if this be really the case; if the proper mode of augmenting our army be yet unascertained, upon what principle could the motion of his hon. friend (Mr. Fox) have been rejected the other night? Did not that motion go to the adoption of vigorous and adequate measures, and to the correction of past inadvertencies? Was it not the design of that motion to employ the collective wisdom of the House in adopting measures to the exigency of our present circumstances? But ministers, by rejecting the offer, had declared the present system to be complete, and yet they come forward to-night, and state it as necessary to go into a committee on one of the most important departments of the service, and what is still more, place this necessity on the very grounds urged by his hon. friend in favour of his motion. Had that motion been carried, they should now have been sitting as a committee, not only for investigating the best means of augmenting the regular army, but of the best means also of arranging and disposing of every species of our force. It would appear, therefore, from the arguments of those gent. this night, that they did not reject the measure proposed by his hon. friend, from a conviction of its impropriety, but merely to try their strength, and to ascertain whether it would be prudent for them to continue longer in their places. But now, having ascertained this important point, they come forward and tell us, without reflecting a moment on their former arguments, that it will be proper to go into a committee. There is certainly a gross relinquishment, both of principle and of duty, not to call it by a worse name, in the conduct of the right hon. gent. this day. But if you do not allow them to carry this measure into effect, they will tell you, you may was well deny them the supply, for in the present circumstance the one grant is as necessary as the other. Without raising men, they tell us, it is impossible to go on, and it is no longer possible to raise men on the old systems. It was for this very reason he was against the measure. If the army of reserve act was no longer useful, it ought to be repealed. He would therefore very willingly give his vote for its repeal, but would by no means encourage partial measures by voting its suspension, when, upon the declaration of ministers themselves, it ought to be entirely abolished. According to the statement so repeatedly made by ministers, they intended the army of reserve as a supply for the regular army. This admission was allows them, and they claimed no inconsiderable credit from it. If their statements then, in this respect, were true, why would they wantonly cut off those resources, and suspend a system which had for its principal object the supply of the regular army? A disposable force, and to a considerable amount, every mats will allow to be necessary; any measure, therefore, for the increase of such a force must meet with general approbation, though, at the same time, he, for one, should not wish to see any great disposable force in their hands, from a conviction that they would be very ill qualified to make a proper use of it. But if the army of reserve act was calculated to create this disposable force, why suspend it? And if it had a contrary tendency, why not immediately repeal it? But in suspending the army of reserve act, they propose, it seems, to create a number of inspectors in the different districts. What consequences could be expected from such an arrangement? The Lord Lieutenants of the different counties are certainly sufficient for all the purposes intended by inspectors, and even in most cases better qualified than supervisors of any description. But the gent. opposite, perhaps, wish at the present critical moment to create a greater number of places, and thus, independently of the general strength of the country, add at least to their own forces. Such an acquisition of strength was no doubt desirable, and at the present moment, perhaps, absolutely necessary. Inefficient, however, as the army of reserve act would now seem to be, its provisions had, not been carried into execution, which was a still farther proof that ministers were ill qualified either to adopt new measures, or to carry existing ones into execution. They enacted without thought, and were equally anxious to suspend without reflection. By the army of reserve bill, they had required the quota of men to be raised at a certain time, or a fine to be imposed, should any county or district he deficient in their number. He should not say at present whether this provision was wise or not, but he was certain it had not, and perhaps could not, with any propriety, be carried into execution. In the county with which he was particularly connected, the number of men had not been found, but at the same time no fine had been imposed by the quarter sessions, as it was found the men could not be got. In reply to this, they will tell us most likely, they could not know the precise circumstances of the different counties, and might therefore, in some instances, overrate them. But had not they the same sources of information which any member of that House had, and were they not supposed to have more, as they had access to the aggregate information of the house, when they thought it necessary to call for it? Nor could he think at all more justifiable the mode now proposed of imposing the fine, not as the old one, but on the county at large; as, according to this provision, those who had exerted themselves in any such county would be liable, and would, in fact, be subjected to the fine, as well as those who had not raised a single man. That such an arrangement would be unfair, required no demonstration. But another material objection he had to the measure arose from the idea, that should a man be balloted, and not have actually joined his corps before this bill passed, he shall be obliged not to find a substitute, whatever arrangements he may have made for that purpose, but a certain sum of money, or to serve in person. Would it be consistent, would it be suitable to the wisdom of Parliament to make the man, in such circumstances, find the money, when he might more conveniently find a substitute, when to find the one might be possible, and the other perhaps wholly impracticable? But suppose you demand 20l. as the price of his exemption? Ah! says the balloted man, this is a vast sum, and exempts me only for a year, I will not consent to it. But, says the govt. if you will consent, to pay more, it will exempt you for 5 years, and what is still more, from the militia also. What then must be the consequence of such measures? You thus cut up not only the army of reserve, but also the militia, and in the end will lock up the force of the country. Upon the whole, he would vote for delaying this measure at all events, that the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) might have time to bring forward his measure, which promised as a whole to be more satisfactory. He would therefore give his vote that the Speaker should not leave the chair. In regard to the plans proposed by that right hon. gent., the present was not now the time to go into them, even so far as he had explained himself. From the answer, however, of the right hon. Sec. to those plans, so far as they had been explained, it must be very obvious that they ought to be discussed before the passing of this bill, as the measure in the contemplation of the right hon. gent. held out advantages which we have not derived from any of the measures hitherto adopted, and more than this bill even professed to be calculated to give. He did not by any means conceive, that the mode of ballot suggested by the right hon. gent. could be attended with any inconvenience. It would not necessarily cut off our recourse to great manufacturing towns for the recruiting service. While others would be more productive, those sources also would be left equally open as at present. The right hon. Sec. he thought, had not sufficiently explained how the two battalions he had mentioned were to be officered, as there must be an influx of officers, as well as men. The right hon. gent. by prescribing the period in which the number of men were to be raised for the purpose of procuring rank, had defeated, in a great measure, the object of this arrangement; but it would still appear more ridiculous, when it was recollected, that they were not only obliged to raise them within a given time, but not permitted also to give them more than a certain specified bounty. The ministers by such means were certainly cutting the throat of their own plan. It a man is limited to a certain time, he must necessarily give the greater bounty. If you, therefore, tie up his hands in both respects, you go very far indeed to prevent any reasonable hopes of success. The hon. gent. then adverted to the subscription clubs that had been noticed by both the preceding speakers. In many respects, he acknowledged he was against balloting for men altogether; but in some instances also, he would admit it to be expedient. In agricultural counties particularly, gent. from the country must know, that there would be great inconveniencies without a system of this description. The hon. gent, then concluded by giving his negative to the motion for the committee, on the principle, that it the bill passes, the army of reserve act can no longer exist; that a repeal, therefore, was more proper than a suspension, and that the measure intended to be brought forward by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Pitt) was entitled to a previous discussion.

declared, that he thought the arguments of the hon. gent. opposite him could not, by any fair and dispassionate observer, be supposed in the least to militate against the provisions of the bill. One argument of his was, that the measure was not calculated to produce men, but money. Unless be considered that as an argumentum ad hominem, instead of the argument ad rem, he thought it could not possibly be considered as any argument at all; for in a subsequent part of that hon. member's speech, he admitted, that of 40,000 men which it had been proposed to raise by that bill, there were now actually raised and embodied to the full amount of 30,000 men; and it was admitted on all hands, that of all the measures for the increase of our military strength, the army of reserve had procured the largest possible number to our disposable force. Neither himself nor any of his right hon. friends wished to contend, that it would by no means injure the general recruiting for the line; on the contrary, they only said that it did not put a total stop to the general levy for extensive service, but admitted that it must, as all levies for limited service must, tend pro tanto to diminish the recruiting for the regulars. He had objected in such general terms, that while he condemned the operation of that act, he censured ministers for bringing forward any thing like a repeal of the law which he seemed to think obnoxious. He did not positively say which of the two he thought was best. Ministers, however, had not adopted either; they had taken a middle course, and only moved for a temporary suspension of the law, until the recruiting for other services could be completed. In his objections to the measure of suspension in itself, he had given it the mild title of a bill of false pretences. He could not see the propriety of the application of such an epithet. In this branch of his argument he seemed particularly to refer to the mode of raising money, which was provided for by the bill. When some of the counties in the West of England, for instance, had exerted themselves with the greatest alacrity, and perhaps with some degree of succsss, and had completed almost the whole of their quota, would any gent. stand up and say that it was an act of justice to put them on the same footing with other counties which had not displayed a similar cheerfulness of spirit, or raised, a proportionate number of men? The hon. gent. had also stated the inconvenience which must result to the house from a consideration of the two measures, that of the bill which was now before the house, and that of the proposition which had been made by a right hon. gent. under the gallery. He confessed that, for his part, he plainly saw that very great inconvenience must arise from the circumstance of entertaining two questions of that nature at the same time. The one was for a temporary suspension of an act already established, and which must be considered as a matter of experiment. The other was for the adoption of a new measure, which was so extensive in itself, and so ample in its detail, as to form sufficient grounds for the introduction of a new bill, which would require the most serious deliberation of the House. A particular provision in the bill he had regarded as a job. But really he could not see how any thing like a job could be likely to be made of such a regulation. The counties that were particularly deficient in the supply of their quota of men, were to be made subject to the penal provisions of the former statute. To ascertain the sum which they were to pay for such deficiency or neglect, it was necessary to make inquiries of different persons, no one of whom could have within himself the power of snaking a complete return from his own knowledge. Some might be dead, or others might have deserted between the time of their being raised by the parish district, and the time at which it was expected that they had entered on real military duty; others might have been discharged after they had been sent to join their regiments. For this purpose, he thought that it was absolutely necessary that some gent. of respectability should be appointed to a service which was so essential to the public interest, and so diversified in its functions. There was one question to which the hon. gent. appeared to attach the greatest importance; that was the payment of fines by the county at large. He evidently considered that the law was intruded to be the same in that respect as the militia laws. In the militia, the deficiencies were to be reckoned as so much fine upon the county, it was true. The army of reserve act also levied the penalty off the county in the first instance; but it provided that the money should be afterwards eventually paid by the parish which was deficient. The hon. gent. had stated some objections also to the instructions to officers, who had to raise a certain number of men for a certain rank in the army. That might be made a separate question, no doubt, if any hon. member should think fit so to do, but it surely had no connection with the immediate question before the house, namely, the house going into a committee on the army of reserve suspension bill. As to the justice of the case, considered on the score of propriety, raising a certain number of men within 6 months, that was an object for the officers themselves to look to when they saw the instructions. If they thought the length of time was not of sufficient duration, they could very easily avoid entering into such an engagement. The instructions, however, were not so rigidly adhered to, as totally to preclude ministers from extending the period in which any given number of men was to be raised, according as the circumstances of the case might warrant. If it appeared, upon the whole, that the army of reserve act stood in the way of those levies, or the general recruiting for our disposable force, that circumstance could not be fairly urged as an argument against the suspension of the bill. It surely must be considered as an act of justice to these gent. to remove an obstacle which stood in the way of their raising their quantity of men within the period limited; and above all, it must be a measure of the greatest utility at the present moment, to suspend the operation of any measure which, in the smallest degree, tended to lessen the general recruiting for our armies. In a very populous district in the country, he knew it for a fact, that persons in but moderate circumstances had paid 20l. sooner than enter into the army of reserve as substitutes, which they might have done at the time, and have received 40l. He by no means wished to state that these objections were generally to be met with, but it was sufficient to shew that some temporary suspension of the law was necessary. The proposition of the right hon. gent. could only be deemed, at present, a matter of experiment. Considering the present measure in the same point of view, it most certainly was entitled to some claim of priority; and the house would recollect at the same time, that nothing was now intended to be done which would totally destroy the good effects of the army of reserve act, but that the measure was brought forward as the means of accelerating the increase of our disposable force. If any other system was to be adopted, it might be the object of future discussion, without interrupting the progress of the present bill.

.—Sir; it is pretty extraordinary, after all the house has formerly heard in support of the army of reserve bill, in opposition to the arguments of those who resisted it, amongst other measures, as one of those which tended to impede the recruiting service of the country, that the right hon. gent. should now come forward with a bill to suspend the operation of the act; acknowledging it to have failed, in a very considerable degree, of the efficacy expected from it, and that it so totally ceased to be productive for its purpose; that it now becomes necessary to abandon it, and resort to some other measures. Considering therefore, the army of reserve bill completely and substantially deserted by those who were formerly its most strenuous advocates, and their palpable acknowledgement, that other measures were become necessary to give any hope of effecting the purposes to which that bill was directed, the resistance now given in limine to the plan proposed by the right hon. gent. under the gallery, is somewhat unaccountable. Notwithstanding the necessity so strongly urged upon a former night, by the right hon. sec. for deferring the bill to this day, in order to the preparation of certain clauses which he seemed to think of material importance, yet in the whole of his answer to the right hon. gent.'s plan, and in the general view he has taken of the objects of his own, he has not thought proper to say any thing of the nature of those clauses. Before I enter more minutely into the nature and tendency of the bill, I feel it necessary to say a word or two on the conduct of those who introduced it. From the exulting manner in which this bill was first brought forward, and maintained against all opposition, one would have thought that his Majesty's ministers, after having failed in every other attempt at recruiting the public force to the extent necessary for our security, bad discovered in this bill something like the philosopher's stone. According to them, the bill has done wonders unparalleled in recruiting the army: the repeal of it now is to effect still greater wonders; and the future revival of it is, I suppose, to produce the greatest wonder of all. At length, it seems, his Majesty's ministers have found out that the high bounty offered under the army of reserve act, does a little interfere with the recruiting of the regular army, for so the right hon. gent. who just sat down admits: I do not wish minutely to bind either him or his colleagues to any words that passed in former debates on this subject, "sufficient for the day is the folly thereof;" but I must remark, that when in preceding discussions, this observation was made to them, it was directly and explicitly denied. They hitherto have constantly maintained that the army of reserve was no impairment to the recruiting of the general army; and produced I know I not how many accounts to prove the validity of their assertion. Now, if this really was the case, it is obvious the suspension they propose, will, in fact and in truth, effect nothing at all; and if the suspension have no effect now, hitherto, it would appear, the act itself must have been of little or no use. But let us attend a little to that argument, and hear how they explain themselves. The army of reserve, they say, has produced great and beneficial effects, but it is now worn out, and has exhausted all its force. What is it they mean by this? Is the army of reserve act to be considered as analogous to animal nature? Is it like a horse, for instance, that after long labour finds its strength and power decay? If so, I perfectly understand what they mean, when they say all the force of the army reserve act is exhausted. I should rather, however, conceive this act would fall with more truth I under a different class and description of beings; that, for example, it would bear a greater resemblance to a pump or a well, which being exhausted, are of no farther use; not that the mechanism is rusty, or out of order, so that it will not work, but the water itself, which they have been accustomed to draw, is entirely gone, and completely used. What would be the natural step in such case? To stop the source of consumption and let the water flow in. But what do his Majesty's ministers do? They complain the source is exhausted, and yet they want it to be more productive. They stop this pump, indeed, the army of reserve, but immediately apply to the same spring another of larger draught, The army of reserve act is declares incable of completing its original quota, which it has reached within a few thousands, and yet, according to the views of ministers, its suspension is to open a source to supply 18,000 men, on terms far more unfavourable as to quantity of bounty and extent of service. This plan, according to them, is to restore the lost powers of the spring. The machinery is to work, and the water flow. But, says the right hon. gent. who has just sat down, let us consider the order of our proceeding. To this I certainly have no objection. According to this mode we shall observe, that the army of reserve act began with raising men for a limited service, at an almost unlimited price. Now, say ministers, it has done all it can, we have got 13,000 men. Its powers are exhausted, and we can get no more. Let us, however, see, if, by diminishing the bounty, and enlarging the services, we shall not be more successful. Now, in my apprehension, Sir, nothing can be more preposterous, and contrary to all experience than this process of order, so confidently appealed to. To minds otherwise constituted than those of his Majesty's ministers, it would seem the natural course of things rather to begin with small bounty and enlarged services; and when their efforts became unproductive, then to enlarge the one and limit the other. Ministers, however, have gone exactly contrary to this mode, and set all experience and judgment on this subject at defiance. On what is it possible that they can ground any hopes of success with respect to this plan? The army of reserve act has already produced 13,000 men. Ministers have all along, on every occasion on which the subject has been discussed, said that the bill produced more men than could have been produced by any other method. How then, and by what means, when this most operative act is suspended, are they to get 32,000 men? Is it by their new plan of giving rank? If this has any effect, it must be by a corresponding increase of bounty, which they profess to forbid; in what way can it otherwise have any effect, and if that is resorted to, then that competition, under another form, is introduced, which they think it so essential to the welfare of the general service should be abolishes? In fact, how can any thing else be expected? But, say they, we forbid any additional bounty to be given. Is it, however, likely, is it possible, that injunction will or can be followed by young men eager and ardent after rank, and who may have nearly accomplished their object? Within the time they allow, six months only, many active and enterprizing young men may have nearly got their quota. Can it be supposed that they will let all the expence and trouble they may have been at become of no use, for want of a few remaining men to make up their quota? Surely that conclusion can never enter into the mind of any one. Ministers themselves must know it is not likely. It is rather to be expected that officers will follow the example of an hon. friend of mine, who gave 500l. to men, half of which were rejected. With temptations so strong, it is ridiculous to say we shall order them not to increase the bounty beyond the stipulated allowance. Obedience is impossible. So inconsistent and contradictory to their own views and objects, are the plans and measures they introduce! Till this moment, when they propose to suspend its operation, the army of reserve act was always denied to have that effect on the general recruiting service for which they now contend, and on which assumption of fact, they have uniformly acted in spite of all admonition from us, until this late period of the war. With regard to the plan of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), on account of which it is proposed to defer the suspension of the army of reserve act, the right hon. gent. though he opened it with his usual ability, has not entered into so minute a detail of its particulars, as he probably will when he finally submits it to the consideration of the house. In what he has stated, however, I see many parts of which I highly approve, and perhaps some of which I may not think quite so favourably. Such as it is, ministers themselves say it is fit to be considered on some future occasion. If so, what pretence have they to proceed in their present plan of suspending the act, on winch it is meant to be engrafted? By suspending that bill, they at once cut down the plan under the feet of the right hon. gent. which aims at improving and rendering it more productive and effectual. Admitting, as ministers do, that this plan is worthy of consideration, they will not wait till it is brought forward, but proceed in another plan of their own to recruit the army, and draw from the right hon. gent. the very means of establishing his. They put the right hon. gent. in a whimsical situation, which reminds me of what I have lately seen advertised, "a speech intended to be spoken." Such will be the case with the right hon. gent. if you deprive him of the means by which his plan may be rendered effectual. That plan is one which I generally approve of. In one proposition I heartily concur, that in case of ballots, it would be fit to give a bounty to the person drawn, in case he came forward to serve in person. With regard to the objection made to clubs of persons subsuming money, as an insurance against being drawn by ballot, I know not upon what principle they should be done away. When a set of men wish to bear another man harmless, I can see no reason why they should not be allowed to enable him, by a small subscription, to procure a substitute, when the bounties for recruits are small, as they ought to be. I cannot see how clubs of this description are enabled to pay a larger bounty than certain individuals who may happen to be drawn. I know no reason why these clubs should be discouraged; I always thought they could not be touched, and I have always looked upon them as highly meritorious and useful. When a man is drawn by ballot, he has a right to send a substitute to serve for him, and money must be had for that purpose; but I never heard of an act which said five men shall not pay five pounds each to procure a substitute for one among the number who may happen to be drawn; but that they are to toss up in order to determine who among them shall pay the twenty-five pounds.—Now, Sir, with respect to the bill which has been offered to you this night, some of his majesty's Ministers tell us they wish it may be postponed for the present; that they will have no objection to its being brought forward at some other time; but they do not say when that time will be. They are afraid of it at the present moment; but when they contemplate the measure at a distance, they see nothing terrible in it. This, Sir, reminds me of the dialogue between Partridge and Tom Jones, in which the latter, with a view of removing the fears which his companion felt at the idea of going to battle, tells him that all men must die sooner or later; upon which the former replied, "that is very true, but I hope it will be many a long day first." In the same manner did the ministers appear not to dread this measure, any more than Partridge dreaded death; provided it may be put off to an indefinite period. The right hon. gent. proposes, that efficacious measures for recruiting the army should be made a general ingredient in the defence of the country. But ministers say, some time or other, such a plan may be adopted; but the present is not the time for doing so. The proposition now before the house, resolves itself into this question, whether you shall give credit to the declarations of those men who have exhausted the army of reserve; and whether you think the bill they have brought before the house, will be the means of increasing the force of the country, which the other bill could not do; or whether you will adopt the bill proposed by the right hon. gent.? I cannot conceive any other ground on which the bill now before the house can be supported, except that of confidence in ministers, who are the authors of it. A right hon. gent. has said, that we ought not to object to the suspension of the army of reserve, because we opposed the measure itself at the time it was introduced. This can be no argument against the line of conduct we now pursue; for although it is possible that every proposition coming from the present ministers may be wrong, it is not impossible that all they do may not be right. I do not say that every thing they do is wrong; but the great point in which they appear to me to be defective is, that they do not stand on any system, in any of the measures they have brought forward. With regard to the subject now before the house, they appear never to have examined the proper mode of recruiting the army; they cannot take in all the principles which may belong to the subject at different times. Ministers surely cannot think, that any good will come out of their bill; and, before we proceed any further in it, I think we ought to hear what the other plan is, in order that the best possible measure may be adopted. After what the house has witnessed in the conduct of the present ministers; after having seen them like conjurors, shifting from one thing to another, acting on principles of deception; at one time preferring an army of reserve, at another, raising volunteers, then checking them, &c.; I say, after all these things, I entertain no doubt but that the house, unless it thinks these ministers supernatural, must object to your leaving the chair.

said, he was sensible of the disadvantages under which he must rise to discuss any subject upon which the talents of the right hon. gent. who opened this debate, had been previously employed. He had attended to the plan which his right hon. friend had this night proposed, as well as to the arguments of the hon. member who had just sat down; and the principal difficulty he felt was, to offer any thing new upon a subject which had been so often previously and recently discussed in this house; but though he should feel it his duty to oppose the motion for the Speaker's leaving the chair, he felt no reluctance that those discussions should take place, which must daily teach his Majesty's ministers to feel more deeply the military exigencies of the country, and to sift them to the bottom, in order thereby to be the better enabled to meet them with effect. He was ready to admit, that the army of the country was now become the most important part of our system. His Majesty's ministers were at no time insensible to the principle so frequently urged from the other side of the house, that it was most desirable to increase that branch of the public force called the troops of the line; but so suddenly did the dangers of the country press upon them, and so forcibly did they feel the necessity of providing effectually for our security at home, in the first instance, that they felt it a duty indispensable to adopt, without delay, every measure that promised the most speedy effect in raising every branch of the public force to its highest pitch; and this they had effected to an extent heretofore unparalleled in the annals of the country. They had by no means lost sight of the necessity of providing a disposable force for external operation, our internal security being first provided for; but in doing this, they judged it advisable, before they proceeded to raise any new regiments, first to fill up the old. To this purpose, the measure of the army of reserve had been eminently serviceable, for in the short space of six weeks, no less than 13,000 men were added to the troops of the line by its operation. This purpose so far effected, the next step to which his Majesty's ministers proposed to proceed, was the raising of 18 new regiments. But though the army of reserve had already produced more men within a shorter given period than my measure that ever was projected, yet is it now ceased to be any further opera- tive, it was deemed advisable to suspend its operation, and try other methods. It might be asked, why not come to Parliament sooner with a proposition of this kind, and endeavour to release the recruiting service from the impediments thrown in its way by the present bill? The answer was, because they felt it would be unpardonable to propose any alteration in a measure which had received the sanction of Parliament, until they had tried it to the fullest extent, and had the most authentic documents to prove it unproductive: and having now those proofs duly authenticated, they felt it their duty to come forward with the application. His right hon. friend had this night come forward with the proposition of a system, not merely affecting the army of reserve, but affecting every branch of the whole military system of the country; a plan so widely extensive, and comprehending so many important topics for minute consideration and discussion, that he should feel it presumption for any man to say he could suddenly make up his mind on the subject. When his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Yorke) had only a proposition upon the mere branch of the militia to propose to the house, he thought it of too much importance to call upon the house suddenly for its discussion; and he therefore felt it his duty to have the bill printed and circulated through the country, in order that it might be duly considered by the deputy Lord Lieutenants of the several counties, and all persons concerned in its operation to have the benefit of their suggestions before it came forward for adoption. How much more necessary would it be, then, for the more extensive proposition of his right hon. friend this night, to have the most full, deliberate, and cool consideration, before it could be laid before the house in the shape of a bill. Considering the importance of so very extensive and complicated a topic, he was convinced it could not be brought into operation for several months; and if, in the mean time, the operation of this bill was not suspended, very depreciable consequences must necessarily accrue to the recruiting service, which he was confident it must be the desire of every member of that house to prevent. But it was scarcely possible, he was confident, that the measure proposed by his right hon. friend this night could undergo the necessary deliberation, and be shaped into an operative measure, before the expiration of the year, at the end of which time the army of reserve bill expires. Under the existing bill 32,000 men, it was true, had been raised in 6 months; but would the House think it advisable to continue a bill, no longer found effective, at the risk of not procuring 2,000 men in 6 months more? For his own part, he always preferred a force, of the nature of the army of reserve, much before one in the shape of the militia; and he was borne out in this opinion by authorities much more conversant than he was upon military subjects. He was decidedly of opinion, that an army of 64,000 troops of reserve, with 40,000 militia, was much superior to an army of 40,000 troops of reserve, and 74,000 militia. He differed materially from other parts of the proposed plan, and especially that of suffering the militia to decrease, before an adequate force was substituted in its room; and he thought the bill of his right hon. friend near him fully adequate to the purpose of effectually promoting the recruiting service for the line. He would have no objection to the measure of recruiting by parishes, if it could be done without embarrassing magistrates or creating frauds, but still he would rather preserve two strings to his bow, least one should fail. The hon. gent. who spoke last, towards the end of his speech had charged his Majesty's ministers with frequent changes of system, and alterations of their measures. It was true, they had felt the necessity, under the pressure of public exigency, to resort to a variety of measures for the prompt increase of the public force; but when they found those measures cease to have their original effect, they had modified them as experience produced occasion. It would be presumptuous to say those measures, separately, were not liable to criticism; but he would venture to assert, that the general system pursued by his Majesty's ministers was right, and had produced a force unparalleled in the annals of the country.

felt it necessary to declare his opinion upon assertions which had been made in the course of discussion on topics respecting the public force, in which it was maintained that militia troops might be rendered equal to troops of the line for home defence, and that great length of time was not necessary to give troops the necessary degree of disci- pline to fit them for real service in the field, for that raw levies had fought equal to veteran troops, and achieved splendid victories, particularly in Egypt, where so much glory was won by the forces of this country. He begged leave, however, to deny these arguments; from the nature of the service, it was impossible that the discipline of troops could be so well carried on in militia regiments, as regiments of the line, under veteran officers, who did not assume a military life merely for amusement, or the spur of a temporary occasion, but who embraced it as a profession, and made it the study of their lives. He considered it impossible to officer effectually an army of 60,000 militia from the gentry of the country, and thought it of the utmost importance to convert our militia soldiers, as far as possible, into troops of the line, for the effectual defence of the country, as it was not so much upon the number, as upon the goodness of our troops, that our security depended; and with respect to the behaviour of our raw levies in Egypt, he admitted that there were many very young troops from Ireland and Scotland, but that the principal part of our force was composed of veteran soldiers, of which the garrisons of Gibraltar, Minorca, and Malta, formed a principal part.

expressed the satisfaction he felt to find his opinion as to the policy of reducing the militia, seconded by an authority so respectable as that of the hon. officer who had just sat down, and his right hon. friend who proposed the amendment. It was an opinion which he had long since declared in that house, and it was among many opinions which he had heard highly censured at the time they were originally mentioned, but which afterwards made their way, and were adopted even by their former censors. With respect to the bill before the house, he confessed that it was of such a nature that, whether the object were to continue to modify, to suspend, or to repeal it, be could not give it his entire approbation. If it could be made out that men could not be had by any other means than by the ballots acted upon under this bill, then the case would be otherwise, and the continuance of it might be an advisable measure. But, if it was asserted, that though it had produced a certain number of men, it could produce no more, why then was it not repealed? As it was not even insinuated that it would produce any more men, the mere suspension of the measure struck his mind as the most unreasonable way of disposing of it. The noble lord had boasted of the accommodating spirit of ministers, that they had occasionally yielded to different principles and systems, and that to protect themselves from being condemned by any party, they alternately acquiesced in the recommendations of each; but, in the instance of the bill before the house, they seemed disposed to take a middle course—neither to abolish an act which was complained of, and justly, as tending to injure the recruiting for the regular army, by high bounties, &c., nor to continue that which other gent. stated to be the best mode of providing men. No; Ministers resolved that this army of reserve act should be suspended; that it should neither live nor die; but that it should remain as a kind of ghost, and remain like other ghosts in terrorem, for the purpose of extorting money. No one could be satisfied with the purpose of the ministers, and the public must be particularly discontented. It would involve a considerable injustice, for it was not proposed to make any distinction between the district which had furnished their quotas to the army of reserve, and those which had not: and it was still farther objectionable, as it would interfere with the plan of his right hon. friend who proposed the amendment. This bill of suspension was liable to another objection, winch would not altogether apply to a proposition of repeal; namely, that it would keep alive the memory, and encourage the hope of large bounties, an evil than which nothing could so materially injure any plan of recruiting for the regular army. What ministers proposed to gain from the future renewal of this bill, compared with this obvious loss, be could not imagine. But suppose they were determined to persist in the bill before the house, what argument of any force could they offer, against the delay proposed by the mover of the amendment, in order that he might have time fully to prepare the measure he had announced his intention of proposing in the committee on this bill; a measure which possibly might be such as even the supporters of the bill would be disposed, upon examination, to give way to? If the motion submitted by his hon. friend on Monday last, had been acceded to, the plan described in the course of this evening by the right hon. mover of the amend- ment, might have been, with every other proposition, connected with the defence of the country, discussed in the committee, which it was the object of that motion to institute, and there would have been no reason for pressing this amendment; but ministers, by opposing the former, had rendered the latter necessary, in order to examine the project of his right hon. friend under the gallery. In some parts of this plan, as he understood it from his right hon. friend, he agreed, and of others he entertained his doubts; but those doubts arose in part from this circumstance, that he took a different view of the subject, and that he agreed entirely with his hon. friend, (Mr. Fox) with respect to the plan of our defence. His opinion decidedly was, that the country should trust to a regular army principally, and, in addition to that, to what was termed an armed peasantry. This regular army, he was convinced, could find more than enough of recruits, to advance it to any necessary number if the impediments were removed which had been thrown in its way by the measures of ministers. Of this sentiment he was satisfied, that, notwithstanding all the various employments which our manufactures and agriculture furnished, sufficient recruits could be obtained without prejudice to either, and that our army might be rendered formidable in numbers, and respectable in character, particularly if the idea were adopted, which he had often mentioned in that house, and which the best military authorities recommend, of raising men for a limited period of service for a certain term of years.—The right hon. gent. repeated his recommendation, that the postponement required by the hon. mover of the amendment should be acceded to. The authority of his right hon. friend entitled his wish to the compliance of ministers and to the assent of. the house, especially seeing that no sensible inconvenience could result from the delay he required; seeing also, that in the committee there would be an opportunity of fully canvassing the nature of his right hon. friend's plan, to ascertain how far it could be engrafted on the stock of the army of reserve bill. It appeared to him that it would be an injustice to his right hon. friend to resist his motion for delay, and the house should concur in the amendment if it were only on this principle, that his right hon. friend was at least proposing something against nothing—that he was endeavouring to check in their meanderings, those ministers who were perpetually opposing themselves—the ends of whose measures came jolting against each other; those ministers who were continually reeling to and fro like drunken men—who in one measure generally counteracted another, as the line of argument they adopted on one day, frequently refuted that which they pursued on the preceding; always investigating, never deciding; there is scarcely one measure they resorted to, that did not involve a renunciation of their former opinions, and an adoption of those they had opposed. It might be now said by ministers, that they knew, at the time the army of reserve bill was enacted, that it would very much injure the recruiting for the regular army; that they were aware of the evil it would produce; but why did they not say so then? No, on the contrary they denied it; and now that the consequences were felt, they used a different language. They insisted that they foresaw, but they studiously concealed their foresight; and they reprobated those who ventured to prophecy that which they themselves were now forced to confess. They who foretold these things, were described by ministers as mere theorists; and it was asserted that, the practical effects would be found to refute their ideas; but who were found to be mistaken? The attempt made in this, as well as in other instances, to put down the opinions held by the hon. gent. with whom he acted, had only served to corroborate and justify those opinions; like certain plants, the more it was attempted to crush them the more they prospered and grew.—Recurring to the nature of Mr. Pitt's plan, the right hon. gent. contrasted some of its parts, particularly that respecting the regulations of bounties, with the provisions of the army of reserve act. The latter, he contended, had ceased to produce more men, not for the reasons stated, not because there was no more men to be had—for if that were the case, why expect to raise more by any other measure? No, in point of fact, the army of reserve act has met the fate that ever attends measures that are too rigorous; as it happens with penal laws, when they become too severe they lose their effect, no person being willing to execute them; so with the army of reserve act—it was so odious that no officer could be found to put it into execution. The people were adverse to it, the stomach of the country loathed it, and this was the cause of its failure. That failure, therefore, should not induce any apprehension that plenty of men were not to be had for the regular army, if the recruiting were to be unimpeded and properly conducted.—The right hon. gent. adverted to the frequent mention made by ministers of the gross amount of our public force, of the number of men in arms: but he would ask them, could they seriously mean to urge that as a claim to merit on their part? Were they aware, that they were by such mention pronouncing their own condemnation? for they had contrived by their conduct to put the country in such a state of desperation, that every man was forced to feel the necessity of struggling for his own protection—and in truth, independently of the impulse of patriotism, the alarming state of the country was such as to suggest to men the propriety of coming forward for the safety of their own lives, their family, and their property. Such had been the effect, and ministers, therefore, instead of talking of 400,000 men ready to stand forth for the country, might speak of so many millions—of in fact, every man capable of contributing any assistance to avert the public danger. But were they who created the danger, and who were incapable of directing the spirit it called forth, to repel, much less to destroy it, entitled to lay claim to merit? Certainly not.—The noble lord had stated that ministers had resorted to plans calculated to please all parties, and that they now said, "gentlemen; you have no right to complain, for we have given you all sorts of measures, and specimens of all sorts of systems." But then, added the right hon. gent. it did not follow, because ministers gave variety, that therefore they should satisfy; for though there might be good and bad in variety, it might happen that the whole of the variety would be bad—and so it did with respect to the measures of ministers. The right hon. gent. concluded with strongly recommending the adoption of the amendment, in order that his right hon. friend's plan might be examined, to see whether upon so bad a stock as the army of reserve act, any thing efficient could be grafted. At all events he was persuaded that nothing was likely to be worse.

.—Sir; I will detain the house but for a very short time. The right hon. gent. who has just sat down, has alluded to some opinions thrown out by an hon. general on the same side of the house, with respect to the militia; to the extent of which, although I do not fully subscribe, yet I think it in some measure necessary to advert to them, for the purpose of shewing that they are not precisely of that stamp and character described by the right hon. gent. on the floor. That hon. general, in speaking of the militia, has admitted that they were an excellent description of military force, at the same time that he asserted, that for active military operations, they could bear no comparison with the regular army. The right hon. gent. on the many occasions that he has had occasion to allude to that part of our national defence, has described it as insufficient, unmilitary, and ridiculous, (a loud cry, of No! No!) at least such was my conception of what he then said, and I am confident I am not singular in my opinion. Now, Sir, with regard to the present measure what does that right hon. gent. do? why, Sir, he objects to the postponements of it, for no other reason that I can collect from his long speech, but that he wishes for its repeal. Other gent. and a very considerable number, I fear, object to it upon grounds more consistent than that of the right hon. gent. and his particular friends; but I trust that a little consideration of the subject, will remove from their minds much of the doubt they entertain with regard to it. What, Sir, is the object or the suspension of the army of reserve act? Why, Sir, it embraces that most desirable of all objects; that object in the promotion of which men of all parties have concurred, the augmentation of your regular army. The right hon. gent. has frequently disapproved of the operation of that act, as affecting the regular recruiting of the army. I will not go the length of saying, that it does not interfere in some respects with it, but I can never admit that it impedes it, to the extent that is asserted by him. Sir, the country has experienced very great advantages from the adoption of that act, and the subsequent operation of it. The hon. gent. has even the candour to avow it. It has produced to the country no less than 37,000 men, among which is to be reckoned a disposable body of 12,000. These advantages it is our wish to continue to the country, and we think we cannot better arrive at that desirable end, than by a temporary suspension of what has ceased to produce the effects that it was originally formed for. My right hon. friend, the Sec. of State, wrote officially to the Lord-Lieutenants to encourage the purposes of that act, and notwithstanding all the recommendation it received from them, notwithstanding the spirit and disposition of the magistrates in every part of the kingdom to give it all the aid and advancement in their power, ever since the month of Nov. last, the inconveniences resulting from it, have by far exceeded the advantages,; although, previous to that period, the benefit derived to the country from its operation, out-balanced considerably its disadvantages, which, I admit, were neither few nor unimportant. It was not originally a measure of choice with his majesty's govt. but it was forced on them by the peculiar circumstances of the country. The immense number of volunteers, amounting to no less than 400,000 men; the 200,000 that were drawn from your population for recruiting of the army and navy, rendered it an act of necessity—of urgent, inevitable necessity, and such a measure as never would be resorted to but under the pressure of that necessity. I shall not attempt to follow the right hon. gent. above me (Mr. Pitt) through all the details of the complicated plan he has opened to you, but I have one great, and to my mind, decisive objection to offer to it, and that is, that it tenets to the creation of permanent military establishment. Sir, I for one, will never give my consent for placing a great portion of the community under the control and inspection of officers, who, however individually respectable, should not be vested with the power and the opportunity of continually teasing and soliciting the persons under their control, to engage for general service. There were also other causes which lately impeded the recruiting service. The time was happily unfavourable to it; I say happily, because the cheapness of provisions removed that necessity to seek for subsistence, that the lower classes of society always experience in time of scarcity, and the 200,000 omen that were enrolled into the army and navy, left scarcely a disposable person in the country. As to that part of the plan which proposes the connecting of regiments with particular counties, although I always speak with diffidence on military matters, yet I am obliged to dissent from it, because not sufficiently taking into consideration the varieties of character of the different manu- facturing, agricultural, and commercial counties, I think it is likely to produce extreme inconvenience, and scarcely one practical advantage. Upon the whole, I can discover nothing in the plan to induce me to give my consent to defer the present measure. Now, Sir, much has been said by the right hon. gent. on the floor, (Mr. Windham) and by those who co-operate with him, respecting the spontaneous zeal which has been manifested by the country, so much to its honour, and, I trust, as much to its advantage. Sir; my noble friend has well explained what our sentiments on that subject are. He has said, and truly said, that the zeal of the country was a voluntary aid afforded to the govt. at a critical period; and that the only merit that govt. claimed, was that of having given a beneficial direction to a great public principle. The zeal of the country, I confess, has amply conferred on ministers the means of providing for our domestic defence. But was it that spontaneous zeal, which enabled govt. to hold in blockade every one of the enemy's ports, from the Texel to the Adriatic? Was it that spontaneous zeal, which enabled the executive govt. to effect greater conquests within the first six months of the war, than have been achieved in almost the same number of campaigns in former wars? That zeal I will acknowledge, and acknowledge with gratitude, has given us that description of force, which that right hon. gent. holds cheap, the hearts and hands of 400,000 volunteers; but, at the same time, I will take the liberty to say, that zeal has not given us all the means that have been so successfully applied in maintaining, the honour and the interests of the empire. The right hon. gent. has often dwelt on the necessity of promoting the recruiting service. But does he, can he suppose that is to be accomplished by one mode only? Would he have been satisfied with the result of the means suggested by that? I am persuaded he would not. The right hon. gent. well knows, that it requires various measures to draw out the population of the country, and to induce a change in its habits; that the means which have been successful at one time, may cease to operate in the same way; and, therefore, that of necessity different means must be resorted to. At present, this country possesses a greater military force than any in the world, and much greater, I am happy to say, than the enemy we have most to apprehend from, can oppose to us. That force would never have existed to the extent that it does, if it was not diversified. The army of reserve act has operated a sufficient length of time, no present advantages result from it, and I therefore think it would be judicious to try what the temporary suspension of it may do, towards increasing the disposable force of the country.

explained, by declaring, that he had never applied the ridiculous expressions attributed to him, nor any thing like them.

.—I shall not detain the house by discussing the merits of the question at this late hour; but, Sir, the speech of the right hon. gent. who has just sat down, has so altered the ground on which the house is going to vote, or rather has so completely disclosed what ministers studiously concealed, that I cannot forego the opportunity of exposing the real objection of that right hon. gent. to the plan suggested by my right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt.) The colleagues of that right hon. gent. have admitted that there were some things in the plan of my right hon. friend worthy of consideration, and said they might be fit subjects to be adopted at some future time; but the right hon. gent. is quite at variance with his colleagues, and sees nothing in the plan but the greatest mischief. He wishes to throw every odium and obloquy upon it, and to endeavour to convince the people of England, that its object is to raise a regular force by ballot for foreign service, contrary to the manner in which it has been commented upon by every candid man, contrary to the manner in which it has been commented upon by his own colleagues, by the whole house. He would represent it as a plan hostile to the constitution, arbitrary in its principles, and in its operation oppressive to the people. And mark, Sir, by what candid and delicate traits he attempts to give it this colouring, and maintain this construction. He says, the act will expose men raised by ballot, to be importuned to engage in foreign service. The right hon. gent. he who has just proposed a bill to enable the militia of Ireland to extend their service beyond the terms upon which they were raised, and contrary to the original nature of their establishment, now comes forward and arraigns the proposition of my right hon. friend, as an unconstitutional mode of increasing the regular force by a modifica- tion of the army of reserve. Surely, after advising the extension of the service of the Irish militia, it is inconsistent for the right hon. gent. to condemn the plan of my right hon. friend, and to say in limine, that it is a plan to raise men upon unjust pretences. I ask, Sir, if this be decent? I ask if it be not a gross misconstruction of my right hon. friend's plan? The colleagues of the right hon. gent. have not said so. They say the plan is worthy of consideration, but that this is not the proper time. Nay, my noble friend (Lord Castlereagh) says he hopes the time will come when he can approve its adoption; and the reason he assigns is, because he wishes to have two strings to his bow, and I hope the time will come when the noble Lord will realize his wishes. My right hon. friend says, he wishes to take the skeleton of the army of reserve bill, to give it body and substance, and to infuse into it life and soul: but the Sec. at War says, "no; bring forward your measure, we do not want to undermine your plan, we only mean to take away the foundation from it." But the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer differs from them both. He dislikes the whole, whether as a present or a future measure, on the ground that it is hostile to the constitution, and adverse to the liberties of the people. Those who vote for the question must be convinced that the plan of my right hon. friend is bad, and that it is therefore necessary to hurry the business through the house, in order that they may take away the foundation which my right hon. friend says is essential to his plan, and without which he cannot bring it forward. But it is not merely of want of candour I have a right to complain. It is inconsistent, surely, in ministers to praise the army of reserve bill at the very time they wish to destroy it. Their conduct, in this respect, reminds me of the story of the goose that laid the golden eggs. A foolish boy was advised to kill the bird, hoping to get a quicker and larger supply of the eggs than usual. So with the bill. It is praised as having been productive, and this is the only reason assigned for wishing to destroy it.

spoke against the amendment. His only objection to the bill was, that it did not go far enough; that instead of only suspending, it did not repeal the army of reserve act entirely. There were many reasons for getting rid of it, which argued much more powerfully than the most persuasive eloquence could do for its continuance. He had seen fathers and mothers, nay, whole families, in the greatest agony and distress to procure a substitute for a child, or other near relative, drawn for the army of reserve. It was a measure only to be resorted to in case of necessity; but no necessity now existed in a degree commensurate with the misery which the measure induced. Instead of being afraid of invasion, it was the anxious wish of the people that the enemy should come, because they were confident of success. For his own part, if a greater force were necessary, he would rather increase the navy than the army; and he was sure the hon. gent. (Mr. Fox), from his constitutional principles, and the jealousy which he consequently entertained of a standing army, must be of the same opinion.—The question was now loudly called for from every part of the house.

endeavoured to vindicate, at length, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but was so much interrupted by the impatience of the house in calling for the question, that we could not collect the drift of his argument.—The question was again called for with much vehemence, on which

rose, and spoke to the following effect:—Sir; the pain that I feel in intruding myself upon an unwilling audience, can only be equalled by the pain I feel now, and should feel when I lay down my head, if I were to suffer the most unjust, the most uncharitable misinterpretation of my right hon. friend's speech to pass without notice. Had my right hon. friend used any expression that could have borne such a construction, instead of rising with eagerness, with vehemence, if the right hon. gent. has any recollection of former habits and connections, if ever he called him friend, he must have known that my right hon. friend could not have intended to use the expression in such a sense, and he ought in candour, in justice, and in fairness, to have given him an opportunity to explain, instead of taking him up with so much precipitancy, and pronouncing such a hasty and positive censure. But I did not understand my right hon. friend to have used any expression that could have borne the interpretation which the right hon. gent. has been pleased to give of his speech. My right hon. friend said, that one set of gent. opposed the bill upon one ground, and another set opposed it upon another. Surely, there is no odium or obloquy in this observation. Men may fairly oppose the same measure from different motives; and surely to say so, does not insinuate any thing unreasonable in their conduct, or imply censure. My right hon. friend says, he considers the army of reserve as a harsh measure, which he would not look to as permanent, and therefore would resort to it only in a case of necessity, and that he would not expose men to be importuned to enlist in the regular army, a situation in which they were placed in the army of reserve. But this was far from saying, as my right hon. friend is charged, that the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt) wanted to raise a regular army by ballot. I shall now, Sir, say a few words upon some observations that have been made in the course of the night. It has been said that ministers, by admitting the zeal of the country, pronounce their own condemnation. If the right hon. gent. and his friends should come into office, I fancy they would not have much of that sort of condemnation; I should rather think they would have a tolerably large share of acquittal. A right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) says, he will not dwell long upon the subject, as he does not wish to deface the impression of the beautiful variety of our arguments, and that we are reeling to and fro like drunken men; but if he is constantly following us in all these feelings, if he is constantly opposing every proposition that comes from ministers, I should be glad to know how he can be consistent, how he can avoid a participation in that beautiful variety for which he gives them credit? If opposition to every measure of ministers be consistency, I will allow the right hon. gent. is as consistent as it is possible for man to be.

.—I rise for the express purpose of saying, that I understood the words of the right hon. gent. to convey a direct censure upon my right hon. friend.

.—I rise to say, that there was nothing in my thoughts, nor in what I said, to warrant such an interpretation.

.—If I understand the English language, I must say that the construction is a fair one. But, Sir, I will not rely on my own opinion. I appeal to the house, whether the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech was not endeavouring to throw every odium upon the plan proposed by the right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt). I appeal to the house, whether—

.—I have always understood, that when an hon. member disavows sentiments imputed to him, it is not customary to renew the imputation.

resumed. He said, he conceived himself perfectly in order in mentioning what he did, as the right hon. gent. had certainly said that the measure was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and tended to dragoon men into the army. There might be a beautiful variety in the system of ministers, but there was something disgusting in their arguments. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Addington) had used the army of reserve act, as he had used the right hon. gent. (Mr. Pitt), he had used it as a boat to carry him safe over, and then deserted it.

forcibly described the evils of the army of reserve act in its operation, and supported the motion.

rose amidst a loud clamour for the question. He said, if gent. were not disposed to hear him, he had better not speak: but that he should have difficulty to bring himself to believe, that at a crisis like the present, when every thing that was dear to man was at stake, there should be any member in that house who was not willing to sacrifice another half hour of his rest to the furtherance of the urgent business which was before them. If, said he, by any exertions or labour of mine, I shall add a single file of musketeers to the army appointed to defend us, I shall think myself more than paid for all the trouble I have had.—But first, his lordship begged leave, in one short word, to animadvert upon what the King's Chancellor of the Exchequer had said on the speech delivered so many months ago by his hon. friend (Mr. Windham.) He (Lord de Blaquiere) was in the house, and treacherous as his memory at his time of life might be supposed, it would not, he trusted, desert him upon this occasion. He had the most perfect recollection of what passed, mid that nothing of what had been imputed to his right hon. friend, had ever been uttered from his lips, he undertook most distinctly to assert. That his right hon. friend had reprobated the mode with which the militia system had been arranged and conducted by the mi- nisters of the crown, he to the fullest extent admitted; but that any thing like a sentiment casting directly or obliquely any reflection upon the body of the militia of the kingdom, he did most explicitly and unequivocally deny. Gent. he said, ought maturely to weigh such charges, even when taken up at the moment, before these accusations were made; but under all the circumstances, lapse of time, party spirit, and other aggravations combined, he had no hesitation to say and to assert, and he appealed to the house and to the chair, that the charge was not only unfounded and indecorous, but unparliamentary.—He meant to oppose the bill, and upon these grounds. His Majesty's Sec. of State had observed, that the use of the army of reserve had gone by, they could get no more men: if so, if this was the fact, wherefore the necessity of bringing in this bill? The army of reserve could get no more men, consequently could not create the competition complained of.—To raise men for the disposable force of the country, and which plan would soonest and best effect that purpose, was the point at issue. By the statement of the right hon. Sec. it appeared, that sooner than 6 months not a single company of these new levies could be called into service. Was this the case with the plan suggested by the right hon. member (Mr. Pitt)? Was there a man in the house who would believe, that with the sense, spirit, and exertions of that right hon. gent. he would require even half that time for the purpose? The plan of the right hon. member (Mr. Pitt) was simple, expedient, and practicable. It required not his transcendent eloquence to enforce it. Something very like a majority of that house were already impressed with a due sense of its merits; many days could not pass without its being brought into effect. But, said the noble Lord, what I contend for is, that by the measure proposed you will not only fail in raising men for an augmentation to the regular army, but you will cripple that army, so as to make it far less equal to those great exertions in your defence, which at this moment you are so justly entitled to depend upon. Will you expect these levies are to be made under the present terms? Will it be possible to suppose that officers will get men, without giving money to the recruits? Is it not a mockery upon the understandings of men to suppose it? Is it not holding out a premium to the gallant soldier to disobey the orders under which he acts, when you tell him, he shall not obtain his rank, unless he gets his men, which we all know are not to be got without high bounties, and acting in the teeth of those orders which tell him he shall give none? That he shall not get a step in his profession, unless he violates those principles which have met the fullest reprobation of both sides of this house, and to the withstanding of which is not in the withstanding of human nature? You will, therefore, under the system stated, get no men. But this is not the worst. Have hon. gent. considered, that under the terms stated by the right hon. Sec. more than 400 officers of the line are to be taken out of the line, and locked up in villages, as recruiting serjeants, for the next 6 months to come? Four hundred officers, the best in your service, for the best they will be; the illustrious person at the head of our army, with the constant care and attention he has ever shewn to its welfare and discipline, will suffer none but the most experienced and deserving to avail themselves of the advantage, consequently upwards of 400 of the very best of the officers of your army are to be taken out of it, at the moment, perhaps, of all others, when their services could least be spared; and that for a period of 6 months it is not left in the power of the crown, under the conditions proposed, to supply the vacancies. Sir, this I look upon to be fatal to the scheme proposed, were there nothing else objectionable in it; but I will enlarge no farther.—Another word, said Lord de B. and I have done. From every corner of the house, listing for a term of years is pressed by every gent. who has spoken upon the subject. We, the only country in Europe who resist the policy—we, who boast of our freedom, will be served by nothing but slaves. Show me the law, he desired, which compelled the practice. He believed there was none; and as to its practicability, he begged the house to indulge him in the recital of the few remaining words he had to say. In the year 1760, his Majesty's 17th regiment of dragoons was raised. He was appointed a field officer to it, and on his shoulders was principally lain the levy of the regiment. It was raised in London, and having received from the Sec. at War, to whom he applied, no order to the contrary, he listed all the men for 3 years. In 1763, being with the regiment in Scotland, he re-inlisted them all again, with very few exceptions, and at very small bounties, for 3 years more; and in the year 1766 he re-inlisted them in the same manner again for 7 years more. The regiment was then sent to America, and he believed it to be perfectly well known, that no regiment in his Majesty's service was ever more distinguished for gallantry and conduct than the 17th dragoons. The house would make the application; it was too late to say more. He was thankful for the attention it had condescended to shew him. He should of course vote for the amendment.

defended the conduct of ministers. He gave the credit of the spontaneous zeal of the country, in a considerable degree, to ministers, who had shewn such wisdom, moderation, and love of the constitution, as to conciliate the affections of the country, which he was confident were in unison with their feelings and intentions.

requested to know, whether the plan proposed would tend to relieve parishes from the heavy burden of the army of reserve.

said, he had been so much misunderstood by several gent. and particularly by the learned gent. near him (Mr. Jarvis), that he hoped the house would permit him very shortly to explain one or two points. It seemed to be understood by some gent. that he meant to adopt the plan of the army of reserve, without any mitigation of its present hardships. He must have very much failed in expressing his meaning if he did not distinctly state, that it was one of his objects to mitigate the hardships of that bill, both as it related to individuals and to parishes; that instead of a ballot, which would compel a man either to serve in person, or to pay a large bounty, that the ballot should be so distributed, that the person drawn might be excused from serving, on paying a small fine, which was to be laid out in giving bounties for general recruiting; or if the person did choose to serve, that he should receive a bounty for it. The difference between him and his Majesty's ministers was this: he wished to establish a permanent measure, which should be less severe in its operation than the army of reserve bill, while-they wished to renew it on a future occasion, without, any mitigation whatever.—After a few words from Mr. Sec. Yorke, the House divided, when there appeared,