rose, pursuant to notice, to propose a vote of thanks to the Marquis Wellesley, and to the officers and soldiers concerned in achieving our late successes in India. The noble lord accounted for the postponement of this motion to a period so long after the intelligence of several of the brilliant victories in that quarter had reached this country, by stating, that govt. waited for the full official details, in order that the name of no meritorious officer should be omitted; that in this mark of distinguished acknowledgment, the services of no man should be overlooked, who had any claim to participate of the honour meant to be conferred by a motion of this nature, a motion which he hogged to be understood as distinctly confined to the military transactions, from which he wished to separate every thing of a civil or political nature, every thing connected with the cause and origin of the war. This would form a subject for future discussion. Whatever might have been the policy which prompted to the commencement of the war, he felt it was due to the magnitude of the question, and to candor towards the hon. gent. on the other side (Mr. Francis), to make it the ground of a special examination, and not at all to blend it with the motion he had now the honour to submit to the house. From that consideration, therefore, he should confine himself, on the present occasion, to a military view of the subject; and he would not call upon the house to pronounce any opinion upon the other part of the transaction, which it was not at all his desire to prejudge. Although impressed with the persuasion, that nothing in his power to urge could advance the military merits of the several officers engaged, he would not attempt to chill the feelings of the country, which must have been so strongly excited, and so highly elated, by the narration of the brilliant exploits which had been performed; exploits which owed so much to the previous arrangement and preparation of Marquis Wellesley. Although he conceived the wisdom of the original contrivance, and the skill and bravery of the execution, to be much beyond the reach of any panegyric he could bestow, yet there were two or three prominent features in this transaction, of which he could not decline to take notice; and first, he observed that Marquis Wellesley, after haying made ample provision for the security of our Indian empire, and after having sent a considerable detachment to reinforce our troops in Ceylon, was able to bring into the field against Scindia, &c. no less a force than 55,000 effective men. This served to shew the vigorous exertions of the noble marquis, and the knowledge of the fact must be grateful to the country, as it afforded a proud display of the extent of our military resources in that quarter of the empire. Another meritorious point in the conduct of the govt. of India, was the prompt and judicious distribution of this force. Immediately after the rupture, the troops commenced their operations at different and opposite points of the enemy's territory. Every part of the plan of attack manifested such a degree of skill and arrangement on the part of Marquis Wellesley, as particularly entitled his lordship to the attention of parliament and the gratitude of the country: but such judgment and vigilance could not excite surprise, when it was recollected that they were evinced by the same personage who gave such signal proof of the superiority of his mind, in the detection and overthrow of that inveterate enemy of the British interests in India, the late Sovereign of the Mysore. Another distinguished trait in the character of this war, the noble lord, observed to be the time in which such important acquisitions to the fame of our arms and the security of our empire had been obtained. It appeared that all had been done in the space of three months, during which Gen. Wellesley had con- quered every thing from Scandia in the Guerra and the Dekan, while Gen. Lake had subdued an immense tract of territory in another quarter; and on the whole, those officers, with the other detachments of our force, had made more extensive conquests, and obtained more decisive victories, than could be found to have been achieved within the same space of time in the annals of military history. If the force with which our army had to contend consisted merely of the natives of India, formed and arrayed as they ordinarily are, our glory would not, he confessed, be by any means so high; but it was to be remembered, that the Mahrattas were a power materially different from the other native powers of India, and that in this instance they were not only disciplined but officered by Europeans. Having noticed the success and the length of the campaign, as matter equally of surprise and triumph, the noble Lord expressed his hope that the house would excuse him for detailing some particulars of its progress, although he felt it would be impossible to describe it altogether in terms of adequate justice. In the course of the war, there were eight places of great military strength and importance captured by our army, four of which were taken by escalade, and in a manner, he could venture to say, from the best information, not to suffer by a comparison with the most renowned attacks of the same nature which occurred on the Continent during the last war. The operations of our army, however, were not confined to sieges or storming parties. They had equally distinguished themselves in another species of warfare. They had fought no less than four pitched battles, in two of which Gen. Wellesley commanded; in the others Gen. Lake. To compare the nature of these victories, he felt was not the way to do justice to either of the gallant officers, for there was a peculiar merit belonging to each. Their cases, and the circumstances connected with them were distinct and separate. The victory of the 23d of Sept. was particularly honourable to the courage and skill of Gen. Wellesley. It was now known to be a fact, that with the 4500 troops he commanded, he defeated a force not less than ten times that number, and this defeat was the more astonishing, as this superior force was not only formidable from number, but from discipline it was acquainted with tactics, and, as it was capable of the varieties of military evolution, it actually changed its position five different times in the course of the engagement. In fact, the fate of that day was decided by the persevering bravery of our troops, and the result put us in possession of 100 pieces of cannon. In the battle of the 30th of Nov. the noble lord stated, that Gen. Lake also had to contend with a disparity of numbers, for the force of the enemy amounted to three or four times more than that which he commanded; and, in addition to this disadvantage, our army, within 48 hours before the engagement commenced, marched 65 miles. The house would feel the extraordinary merit which belonged to an army that, under such circumstances, could conquer; and particularly when it was recollected, that our troops left their artillery behind them, and owed their victory to their bayonets. The enemy's army, in this engagement; the noble lord stated to be quite familiar with regular discipline; that the greatest part of their battalions were under the command of European officers; and that their artillery was as well served as that of any of the powers engaged in the last continental war. In alluding to those two officers and their deeds in particular, he hoped it would not be supposed that he meant to throw the other officers and their troops into the back ground, as nothing could be more remote from his intention. Their achievements were such as, he had no doubt, would remain for ever impressed on the annals and the feelings of their country. When calling upon the house to proclaim and record its admiration and gratitude for such an army, the noble lord repeated that he did not mean to look for any thing that could have a tendency to justify the policy of the war, and, without entering into its merits, would congratulate that house and the country on one collateral effect of it—that it had produced the complete disorganization of the whole force of Scindia, which had been trained up and organized to annoy our possessions, to form a diversion in that part of our empire in favour of an old, jealous rival, and now an inveterate enemy, whose emissaries were employed to propagate their perfidious and envenomed views among the chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy, and to communicate a knowledge of discipline to the Maratha troops. Another salutary effect of this war, must be to advance the military character of our coun- try; a thing, by the bye, of the utmost consequence in the present times; for, in the military age in which we live, the high reputation of our army was essential to our security. It was a valuable part of our general character; and it must be matter of proud contemplation for the country that, growing as it was in wealth, and in that luxury which was its general concomitant, no national debility had followed; our people had lost nothing of the energy which uniformly characterized G. Britain; on the contrary, that energy seemed to improve as danger pressed, and the laurels which our troops had collected in the course of the last war, were, by such events as those to which he alluded on the present occasion, refreshed and invigorated. The monument of fame which was raised by the British army in Egypt, had been farther exalted by the British army in India. There was no part of the world that had not witnessed our glory; and was it to be supposed that, if any occasion arose, that glory would not be equally conspicuous at home? He felt that it would be a presumption in any individual to wish that such an occasion should occur—to express a desire for a contest with the enemy on our own soil; but he would say that, after all the pompous and insulting menaces of that enemy, he could trace nothing in the state of our preparations in the spirit of parliament or the people, which could lead him to wish that the enemy should not come. If he should come, sure he was, that there was no ground to fear for the result. It was obvious, that the genius of Englishmen, which could urge to such extraordinary exertions in distant colonies, when acted upon by all the important considerations which prompt to the defence of liberty, independence, family, and home, would rise to exertion and glory of a still higher nature. Should that day of trial come, he was confident that our army would not be contented with emulating even their countrymen who have fought in Egypt and India, but that the result of the contest would be the source of joy, exultation, and gratitude, not only in their own country, but throughout the whole civilized world. The noble lord concluded with moving the thanks of the house to the Most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Governor General of India, for the zeal, energy, and ability, with which the military resources of his govt. were applied in the late war with Scandia and the Rajah of Berar; also, that the house do attribute the result of that war in a great degree, to the vigorous and comprehensive measures adopted by the govt. of India, and to the system of promptitude and efficiency by which the armies were brought into the field.

.—Mr. Speaker; the motion made by the noble lord puts me under great difficulty, and if it prevails, I think, will reduce the house itself to a similar difficulty in its future proceedings on the subject of the war in India. I shall state it fairly as it strikes me, and leave it to the candid consideration and impartial judgment of the house. When I attended yesterday, in consequence of the notice given by the noble lord, it was with an expectation, well warranted by the terms in which he gave it, that nothing was intended but a particular vote of thanks, in which I should have heartily concurred, to parties and for services of which he cannot think more highly than I do. I believed and I expected that the motion would be confined, as I still think it ought to be, to persons and to actions, concerning which there could be no difference of opinion, I mean the eminent gallantry and skill with which all the military operations against the Mahrattas appear to have been conducted. The memory of the brave men who have fallen in these conflicts, is entitled to every mark of honour which this house has the power of conferring. The services of the survivors have an equal claim to the gratitude of their country. Whether so many valuable lives have been unprofitably lost, or in a quarrel which ought, or ought not to be avowed by parliament, or whether such great exertions have been made with a sufficient consideration of the policy, the justice, and the necessity of the war, are questions which it was not advisable nor in any shape necessary to be brought this day into debate. The noble lord's motion forces them to a discussion without necessity, and in effect decides them without knowledge. The merits of the war itself ought to have been left untouched and entire for future deliberation. By this motion that question is prejudged; or at least the use and effect of that deliberation is precluded. It is impossible for parliament to go with a free and unbiased mind to examine the wisdom or the justice of a war, to the author and director of which they have already returned their thanks in such exalted terms, first for the plan, and then for the success of it. The noble lord has been very cautious, as he says, not to confound the two questions. He has drawn a line of distinction between the merits and services of Marquis Wellesley in his military capacity, that is, for the plan and operations of the war, which cannot be too highly applauded, and the justice or policy of the war itself, which, he says, are still left open to the examination, and possibly to the censure of parliament, when the evidence comes before them. This I hold to be impossible in practice. When once this house has pronounced that the plan, the execution, and the success of a great measure deserve your highest approbation, you cannot tread back your steps; you cannot say to the same man, under another character, as if he played two parts in the same performance, that the principles on which he acted deserve your severest condemnation. I put the case as a bare possibility in argument, and not meaning to utter a word, or to breathe a thought in prejudice of that part of the question which the noble lord says is still reserved for a free discussion. On a former occasion, when this subject was first introduced, I flatter myself that the manner in which I urged an inquiry into the causes of the war in India, existing then, and indeed still existing, without the knowledge of parliament, had given general satisfaction. I said not one word in disparagement of Marquis Wellesley; nor shall I now. No other evidence of the merit of his measures is within our knowledge, but that his measures have succeeded. On that principle, in fair and honourable argument, if his measures had been defeated, we must have condemned him on the principle of his conduct. The noble lord, who extols the care taken, and the extraordinary provisions made by Marquis Wellesley to guard against defeat and to insure success, in one instance forgets himself: he says that one of gen. Lake's victories was obtained by a handful of men against an immense disparity of numbers. That, indeed, I allow, is saying a great deal for the skill of the general, and for the velour of the army; but it is not saying much for the precautions taken, and the means furnished by the civil govt. Whatever the event may be, no govt. has a right to expect, or to calculate upon the probability that a handful of men will succeed against a very superior force. In the first action under gen. Wellesley, on the other side of India, I know with certainty that his army was in the greatest danger, and that if that most gallant charge made by our cavalry, in the front of which col. Maxwell fell, had not succeeded, our army would in all appearance have been lost. I agree with the noble lord, that the dissolution of the French force under M. du Perron, which was attached to the service of Scindia, may be a considerable advantage. What ever it may be, it was collateral and incidental. It I am rightly informed, it was not reduced by force, but came over to us by private negotiation and agreement. The noble lord talks with triumph and exultation of the rapid progress of our arms, and the immense acquisitions of territory we have made in the Guzzerat and elsewhere. He forgets that the positive law of this country, founded on the best considered principles of policy and justice, and confirmed by the advice of every man in this country, whose authority deserves to be regarded, forbids any farther acquisition of territory in India. Prima facie, a British governor, who makes war for the acquisition of territory, offends against the law, and is bound to justify himself on the case before he can be acquitted.—On the whole, Sir, it is my opinion, that this motion of thanks to Marquis Wellesley, ought to be deferred. I have no personal object to obtain, or even wish to gratify, in the part I have taken on this subject, unless it is to preserve the consistency of my own character, and to adhere to the principles with which I set out in the govt. of India, and from which I never have departed. Thanks given without knowledge or deliberation, do no honour to those who give, is or to those who receive them. They have no root, and cannot live. Let the evidence come before us. Let the noble lord's conduct be examined, and then if it should appear that the war in which India is involved, was not voluntarily on his part, that it was founded in justice and necessity, I shall be as ready as any man to join in the thanks proposed by this motion. The thanks of the house of commons, se founded on due examination, and including all the considerations that belong to the question, will then proceed with dignity. Their impression will be deep, and or their effect lasting. I therefore think that the motion ought to be postponed.

agreed with the hon. gent. who spoke last, that thanks without a knowledge of their being deserved, reflected honour neither on the giver nor the receiver; but he contended, that sufficient grounds were laid in this instance to justify the vote proposed to the noble marquis. This motion, in fact, was sustained by the same principles upon which all similar votes of thanks rested. The house was fully apprised of the splendid exploits alluded to, and it was proposed to thank the noble marquis not in his civil, but in his military capacity; not as governor general of India, but as captain general of the forces. To his combination and arrangement in that capacity, it was known that the glorious issue of the campaign was, in a great measure, to be attributed. As to the allusion of the hon. gent. to what he called the imprudence of the governor general, in exposing Gen. Wellesley to fight the enemy with such unequal numbers, that fight was the result of an accident against which no foresight could have guarded; and Col. Stevenson was at the time within half a day's march of the general with a reinforcement of 10,000 men. The reference to the law, as restraining us from extending our territory in India, the right hon. gent. stated to be very incorrect; as the act which passed in 1794 prescribed only that we should not commence a war in India for the sake of conquest; but to maintain, that in the course of a war we should make no conquests that might tend to secure ourselves, or facilitate a peace, was a proposition too extravagant to be listened to. He professed his wish to abstain from any allusion to the legitimacy of the war, until the house should be in possession of the means of fully examining and fairly judging upon it; and called for the approbation of the house to the services of the noble marquis as a military commander, not as a civil officer.

was extremely sorry to have any difficulty in acceding to the present motion; but, in his opinion, it was in all reason and all argument, impossible that such a motion should be sanctioned He considered it a new principle to vote the approbation of the house to any but these actually engaged in the exploits which it from time to time had though proper to distinguish by that honour. It was, however, stated, that Marquis Wellesley had set the army in motion. He might have given commands to that effect, but if such connection with an army were to be admitted as a claim to parliamentary thanks, the commander in chief of this country would have a right to be included in any vote for any achievement performed by the British army; and upon the same principle the Admiralty should have participated of the thanks voted to Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent, for their glorious victories in the course of the last war. He hoped the two questions would be kept distinct, and that the execution would not be blended with the arrangement. It was, indeed, contended, that all this had been done in the character of captain general; but was it a matter of doubt that the title of captain general was, in this instance, entirely of a civil signification, and the person who filled it, however respectable in other points of view, was a person of a perfectly civil education, without any military experience whatsoever; a person who could not be trusted with the command of the army. The noble marquis must be sensible of all these things, and if the thanks of the house were voted to him on this ground, he would think tke house was laughing at him. He felt himself under the necessity, from a regard to the consistency of the house, and from motives of respect for the noble marquis, to protest against mixing him in this vote. He should therefore move the previous question upon this resolution.

stated, that the votes of thanks to the Marquis Wellesley, on the capture of Seringapatam, and the conquest of the Mysore, to Lord Clive, governor of Bombay, and Mr. Duncan, governor of Bombay, for their services in a contributing to these achievements, were proofs that the practice was not new. But whether there were precedents or not, he thought it impossible to contemplate victories, such as should animate every British breast, and to refuse to associate in the thanks which were bestowed on them, the men whose wisdom and prudence had contributed most to them.

said, the vote of thanks to Marquis Wellesley, on the occasion alluded to by the hon. gent. who spoke last, was founded on the sagacity with which he had discovered, and the promptitude and ability with which he had defeated, the intrigues of the French and Tippoo; merits belonging to his civil capacity, and distinct from a military character. He feared the Mahrattas would prove more dangerous enemies, now that they were dispersed, than when, by a mode of warfare unused to them, they were united in large bodies, and ventured on pitched battles: his apprehension was increased by the fact of there having been no intelligence from Gen. Wellesley for 20 days before the last dispatches left Bombay. Perhaps the dispersed armies, by cutting off his supplies in the hilly country into which he had entered, had compelled him to raise the siege which he had undertaken, and to retire with loss. If the house were in the alternative of voting its thanks now, or being precluded from voting them altogether, he should concur in the vote, though not acquiescing in all that had been said in support of it. But that was not the case now: the ancient and customary mode of voting the thanks of the house was not immediately on each victory, but at the end of the campaign, as was evident from a reference to the votes of thanks to the Duke of Marlborough. No mischief could arise from delay, while much mischief arose from haste. It sometimes happened, from too great precipitancy, that a person received a vote of thanks, whom it was afterwards thought necessary to remove from his command. He would not mention names, but the case of Copenhagen must be fresh in every one's memory. The expedition to Holland was also an instance of the rashness of voting the thanks of the house too hastily. On these principles, he should vote for the previous question.

expressed himself in the warmest terms of approbation as to the conduct of the British troops in India; but at the same time observed, that he confessed he did not like the question in its present shape. He could not possibly bring his mind to approve of the conduct of a governor general, at a time when the propriety or impropriety of that conduct was yet unascertained in the most material points. We had no knowledge whatever of his reasons for going to war in the first instance, and the campaign had not yet come to a termination, from which a general conclusion could be drawn. He was as far as any man from thinking to the prejudice of the noble lord, who had so far conducted our affairs in the East with such extraordinary success; but as there were no grounds before the house upon which he could be able to form an opinion, he could not say that the greatest crimes had not been committed in the course of that war, or in the provocation to the war. He knew that mankind were in general too prone to ambition, and too much gratified with adulation. As he was at present but groping in the dark, and had no means of seeing the whole of the question clearly before his eyes, he felt himself under the necessity of putting hypothetical cases. If it should turn out, which he was far from supposing it probable that it would, that the governor general's conduct was extremely improper, that he acted with injustice towards the natives, or in defiance of an act of Parliament, was it not possible that future governors general might be induced to adopt schemes of aggrandizement, with a view to obtain similar honours to those which were to be conferred, in the present instance, on a person of whose rectitude he had not the smallest doubt, but as to the propriety of whose conduct the house had not the smallest means of judging, otherwise than as to his direction of our military operations so far? War was one of the greatest evils that could befall mankind, and he trusted that the house would pause before they gave the sanction of their vote of approbation to a war, which, however splendid in its progress, might possibly afterwards appear to be unjustly forced upon those with whom we were contending. Supposing even, as he could do nothing else but conjecture on the subject, supposing that the resolution of going to war had been formed a long time previous to the commencement of hostilities, that would materially detract from the merit of the transaction; as a great portion of it consisted of the promptitude and alacrity with which the whole was executed. He had not the smallest hesitation in saying, that it was not only his hope, but also that it was his most firm belief, that on a fuller investigation the conduct of the noble lord would appear to have been most strictly consistent with justice and with honour, and that it would be such as was highly creditable to the nation. But as he did not like to thank by halves, as it was his disposition to be inclined to thank with his whole heart, he wished that the proposition of a vote of thanks had been postponed, until he had such an opportunity that he could feel himself most conscientiously justified in giving it his support.

declared, that he was ex- tremely sorry to see that any misconception should have arisen in the mind of the hon. gent. who had just sat down. He had supposed the war in India to be a war of aggrandizement, and he had spoken as if it had been in contemplation for some years. There were no such facts before the house, nor did any of the circumstances warrant such conclusions. The question before the house was only directed to the military operations of the war; and though he might lament the evils of war in the same way as the hon. gent. had done, yet seeing that neither the justice nor the policy of the war were involved in the least in what was submitted to the house, he could not at all find himself justified in withholding his vote of thanks from the persons who had achieved so much for the honour and glory of their country, The house had done the same or more in the vote of thanks to our officers and troops at Egypt; they had received the thanks of the house for the manner in which they effected their landing, and they were afterwards thanked by the same house of commons at the end of the campaign. The hon. gent. (Mr. Francis) who lately moved for the production of papers relative to the affairs of India, had then displayed his usual candour. He was sorry to see him now prejudge the question. He thought that there was a most strong mark of genius in the conception of such extensive plans, and in the direction of every part of the operations, in such a manner as to be most completely in unison, notwithstanding their vast distance from each other. He was always inclined to give praise where praise was justly due, and therefore he gave his most hearty support to the original motion.

, in explanation, said, that he had neither spoken of the war as having been many years in contemplation, nor had he said that it was a war of aggrandizement. Having no facts before him, upon which he might be enabled to argue, he had put these hypothetical cases, which he was sure the house would recollect that he had used with a considerable degree of caution.

said, that he was surprised to hear the interpretation that had been given to the words of his hon. friend (Mr. Francis). From the turn which the debate had taken, and from the length to which it had been extended, he should not have troubled the house with any observations upon the subject, were it not that he felt himself bound in justice to his hon. friend, to rise for the purpose of rescuing him from the imputation which had been thrown upon him by the speech of an hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Hobhouse). His hon. friend was not known at any time to be deficient in candour, and he denied that in this instance he had prejudged the question. In the course of a very long and able speech which had been delivered by the noble lord who opened the debate, he had dwelt for some time upon the circumstance of the great acquisition of territory which had been obtained by the late successes in India. He would appeal to the house, then, if it was not fair for his hon. friend to answer, that such wars appeared, prima facie, to be objects of suspicion. All wars in India, by which conquests may be obtained, are doubtful in their nature, and the house should see the justice of such wars before they proceeded to a vote of thanks. Another hon. friend of his (Mr. Johnstone) had also been misrepresented; he did suppose not intentionally, but certainly he was misrepresented. He had observed that it had been the ancient practice of the house to give a vote of thanks only when the campaign was ended, and when something was seen to have been established with some degree of security by means of the conquests which had been obtained; and he lamented that a different sort of practice had crept into the proceedings of that house, To that an exception was taken by another hon. member, and he had quoted the precedent of the vote of thanks to our troops in Egypt. That could hardly be said in a serious manner to be among the ancient proceedings of that house. His hon. friend had declared, that he thought it to be irregular for the house to pass a vote of thanks to the governor general of India, in his military capacity only, as abstracted from any idea of his civil situation, and in support of that the vote of thanks to Gen. Wellesley for his conquests in the Mysore was referred to. He here read the words of the vote from the Journals of the house, the substance of which was, that the house returned him thanks for the uniform wisdom and moderation of his conduct in opposing the enemy, and also for the penetration, ability, and vigour which he had displayed in counteracting the in-trigues of the French. This precedent was equally inadequate to the support of the position which it was called in to strengthen. Moderation must unquestionably refer to his conduct in his civil capacity. His penetration and ability in counteracting intrigues, which were also objects of the commendation of that house, could not be fairly reckoned among the duties of a soldier. It was therefore evident, that such a vote of thanks was not confined solely to the view of military conduct. The vote to Mr. Duncan might be said to be in some degree a precedent for the vote which the house was then called upon to pass; but even that was not completely applicable. In the present case, the house might give their thanks for conduct that was exceedingly meritorious, or they might, for aught they knew, express their approbation of conduct which they might hereafter be induced to censure. He thought that it would be a much more prudent line of conduct for the house to avoid the adoption of any resolution which might possibly create embarrassment in their future proceedings. Thanks had been voted to Mr. Hastings for the ability and vigour which he had displayed in a transaction, for the injustice of which that house had afterwards felt it their duty to impeach him at the bar of the house of lords. Though it was not the business of soldiers to think, but to execute, he should wish that the thanks of that house should not be given even to our troops, for their bravery in the performance of an action which, though it was a duty in them to execute with alacrity, and though it should have been achieved in the most splendid manner, might eventually be proved to be founded in injustice, and contrary to the written laws of our country. It was a painful task for him to dissent from a vote of thanks as the reward of valour; but with the scanty information that was now before the house, he thought that the most just, the most honourable, as well as the most candid line of conduct that he could pursue, would be to abstain from passing any judgment upon the case, and to give his support to the motion of his hon. friend.

agreed, that if the war was on our part a war of aggression or injustice, then there should be no vote of thanks, not even the shadow of thanks. As the hon. gent. on the bench below him (Mr. Wilberforce) appeared to him to have cast some reflections on the war, and as the hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Francis) had, on a former night, made use of the allusion of the tender wolf and the violent lamb, a figure better understood in India than in this country, he thought it necessary to say a few words in justification of the war. The constant intrigues of Scandia with the French, and the number of Frenchmen in his army, who kept up a constant communication with Paris, were alone sufficient proofs of his hostility to the British power in India.—[Here Mr. Fox called the hon. bart. to order, as it had been understood that the discussion of the grounds of the war was not now to be gone into. The Speaker stated this to be the understanding; but Sir T. Metcalfe claimed a right to state the reasons which justified his vote.]—The Marathas had always been our inveterate enemies. It was a fact, that for 100 years back, the Mahrattas had been the constant disturbers of the peace of India. Scindia, in pursuance of this plan, but with a particular spirit of hostility towards us, had entered into intrigues with the French, and his plans were ripe for execution—[Here the hon. bart. was again called to order by Mr. William Smith, who said he only wished it to be understood, that if the hon. bart. went into the general question, it was open to every one; but when it had been agreed not to go into it, he thought it wrong to deviate from that understanding. Gen. Maitland rose to shew that the hon. bart. spoke to order, but was called to order himself by Mr. Bankes, as going also into the general question.]—Sir Theophilus resumed. He referred gent. to a book published by the noble marquis, on the subject of the causes of this war, for a full and ample justification of the grounds on which it was entered into. This book was now in the hands of many individuals; he supposed the hon. gent. below him (Mr. Wilberforce) had seen it; it would soon be published here, and would form a valuable part of the library of every political man. He allowed that this vote of thanks was for services done in the capacity of governor general, not that of captain general. It had been said that Gen. Lake had an inferior force: the fact was, that the force was so well apportioned, that there was no where a man too many, no where a man too few. The extent of the country which was the scene of hostilities, was also to be considered; it was above 1000 miles square. There was not a voice in Indostan, civil or military, native or European, which did not give the first credit to the noble marquis. The hon. bart. then stated, as a proof of concert in the plan and operations, that the fort of Barrach was taken by Col. Woodington, at the same time that Gen. Perron was surrendering to Gen. Lake. As a proof of the high state of discipline of the seasons in our service, and their zeal and devotion, he stated that Gen. Lake's great victory was gained without any other European assistance than that of the 76th regiment, of which one half was lost in the action. As a proof of the decisive nature of the victories gained, he stated that 700 pieces of cannon were taken from the Mahrattas, and that they had not now 20 pieces in their possession; but what was of still more importance, the French power in India was entirely dissolved. All this, he said, was to be attributed, in the first instance, to the noble Marquis Wellesley.

, in explanation, disclaimed for himself and his hon. friends any intention of casting the smallest imputation on the marquis of Wellesley.

looked upon the vote of thanks for the conquest of the Mysore as no precedent for this; for the grounds there stated were of a civil nature, inclusive even of moderation, and the contest was terminated.

said, he should vote for the original motion, thinking that it would not prejudge the question of the justice of the war; while passing the previous question would cast a reflection on the marquis Wellesley.

did not consider an appeal to a publication made in India, even if it was in every member's hands, as a ground for a preliminary vote.

stated, that it was the wish of his noble friend in India, that every document which could facilitate inquiry into his conduct, should be laid before the house.—The previous question was then put, and negative without a division, and the original motion agreed to nem. con; as were also the following: "That the thanks of this house be given to the right hon. Lord Clive, governor of Fort St. George, for the zeal and energy with which he concurred to promote these successes — To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. governor of Bombay, for the zeal and vigour with which he had employed the resources of that presidency.—To Gen. Gerard Lake, commander in chief of his Majesty's military forces in India, for the eminent judgment, the active spirit, and invincible intrepidity which he had displayed, and which had so highly contributed to secure those brilliant victories, which would maintain the honour of the British nation, and give additional lustre to the glory of the British arms.—To Major Gen. St. John, and Major Gen. Wellesley, for their eminent and brilliant services; and also to the officers serving in the different regiments in the armies engaged, both European and native.—That this house doth highly approve and acknowledge the conduct of the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the different corps, European and native, and the commanders of the different corps are desired to signify the same to them."—It was ordered that the Speaker do transmit the resolutions to the Marquis Wellesley, desiring him to communicate them to the governors general, and other officers, referred to therein.—Adjourned.