, pursuant to the notice he had given, rose to lay before the house, the plan which he had in contemplation for maintaining a permanent additional force, and addressed the house as follows:—In entering upon the subject which it is now my duty to bring forward, I feel Sir, a peculiar satisfaction in being enabled to state, that the principle of the measure which I shall have the honour of proposing, seems to be pretty unanimously agreed on. Not only those gentlemen who have hitherto appeared to have turned their attention most to the military defence of the country, but gentlemen on every side of the house, have expressed very plainly, that it is their clear and decided opinion that it is now important and necessary to devise those means which may be the most effectual for increasing, not only our internal strength and security, but also for considerably augmenting our regular army. It seems to be the unanimous wish of the country that we should have such a regular army as would be sufficient to take advantage of any favourable circumstance which might occur in the course of the war, and which now, and at all times, might be sufficient for preserving to the country that rank which it has hitherto held among the nations of Europe. Being, then, so unanimously agreed upon the general principle, we have now only to direct our best efforts to carry it into execution, and to consider by what means this necessary augmentation of our regular army can be effected with the least possible inconvenience or hardship to individuals, and without weakening those measures which have been adopted for the internal defence and security of the country. Without entering at large into the principle of the measures which have been already adopted for the defence of the country, I shall observe, generally, that the object of the plan which I propose is, in the 1st place, to do away those obstacles which are in the way of the recruiting for the regular army, and which, in a great measure, owe their birth to that competition which now prevails among those who recruit for the regular army, and those who recruit for a more limited description of service, from which competition the bounties are now so high. In the 2d place, I propose not only to do away those obstacles which now exist to the recruiting for the regular army, but to create a new additional force, that may be a permanent foundation for a regular increase of our army. And the third object is to adopt a mode for creating a force which, whilst it will produce the desired effect of furnishing recruits for the regular army, will also so far partake of the benefits of a regular army, as to render our troops of the line a more disposable force for military services out of the kingdom, which they cannot be, whilst chained down, as at present, for our home defence. What I have further to suggest, may be comprehended under three heads: first, as to the amount of the force to be raised; secondly, the description of that force, including its limitation of service; and thirdly, the mode by which it is proposed to be raised and maintained. First, with respect to the amount of the force; and here my object is only to propose some new regulations, with the view of rendering more productive those regulations which the legislature has already made. My first proposal is, that; in addition to all the force already raised by the act of reserve, measures be taken to enforce the completion, and make good the deficiencies in the amount of the quota enjoined to be raised under that act. The amount of this deficiency may probably be between 8 and 9,000 men. Some difficulty occurs in ascertaining the exact amount; but by every information and return, I am persuaded it does not exceed 9,000 men. My first object then is, that such deficiency shall be made good; and that under such regulations as I shall afterwards detail. My next proposition is founded on a desire of reducing the militia to its ancient establishment of 40,000 men for England, and 8,000 for Scotland, exclusive of the supplementary militia; not that I mean to propose any immediate reduction, but only to interfere so far as that force is not complete. My idea is, that what remains due should be raised forthwith, and carried to the additional force now proposed to be created. I understand there are about 7,000 men wanting to complete the establishment of the militia of England to the number of 60,000. What I propose is, that this deficiency should be raised and transferred to the army of reserve. I would also propose, with regard to the vacancies in the militia, now existing, or that may occur, that instead of their being supplied, no means should be taken to fill up these deficiencies till the scale be reduced to the number of 40,000. So, far, then, my plan goes to the extent of 9,000 men remaining to be raised for the army of reserve, and 7,000 for the militia. My plan proposes to transfer a portion of that force already voted to this which is to be raised; and that this force shall be completed, subject, however, to a change in the mode of completing it. Supposing, then, that we have succeeded in raising the whole that is now due to these two sorts of force, I wish also to add, what was not contained in the original act of reserve, but which appears to be necessary in order to render this force available, so as to set the regular army at liberty, and to render it a disposable force, and fit to act in a manner suitable to the station which this country ought to maintain amongst the powers of Europe. I would propose, then, that in proportion as any of this force shall enlist into the regular army, whatever be the number of vacancies thus occasioned, they shall be distributed in order to their being filled up amongst the several counties—and by the same quotas which are already fixed, according to the population of the respective counties; but with this proviso, that the number thus to be raised, shall, in no case, exceed one-sixth part of the whole of the force so to be created. This, I calculate, would produce a supply of recruits for the regular army, of not less than 12,000 men. It appears from accounts which have been received, that the number of those who have thus recruited into the regular army from the other forces, has been about 13,000 men. It been thus found by experience, that many will afterwards embark in the regular service, after being need to a military life who, what would not at first engage in any other than a limited service. Thus, if, by transferring what is due to the militia for G. Britain (which, if complete, should amount to 74,000, this being the number parliament has already agreed to raise) to this new-created force, may not a considerable number be reasonably expected to accrue from thence to our regular army? And thus, may not the proposed plan not only prove advantageous, in the first instance, to increase our national defence, but also be adopted with a view to forming a permanent, and efficacious system, for the recruiting our regular army? If so, I flatter myself that this measure will appear one that answers the description I have given of it, of being likely to afford an important additional means of augmenting, to a considerable extent, the disposable force of the country?—The other point to which I referred in recommendation of this plan is, that of its removing the present existing obstacles to the regular mode of recruiting. These obstacles are those which arise from the competition between the several species of force, and from the high bounties which are now given to raise men for the army of reserve. As long as the system shall be allowed to prevail, of calling upon any person to serve either by himself, or by paying a heavy fine, as individuals are liable to under the existing laws, so long it is impossible to hope during a time of war, to reduce the bounties within moderate terms. Any person not finding a substitute is liable to a fine of 20l. and that during every succeeding year the parishes also are liable to a fine of 20l. at each quarter sessions till the vacancies shall be supplied. The powerful motive thus pressing both upon individuals and parishes to free themselves from such a burden induces them to offer high bounties to obtain substitutes. I do not mean, however, to call in question the original policy of the act of the army of reserve, under the existing emergency; but I cannot consider it as one intended for a permanent measure. My wish then is, that we may possess the advantage resulting from the original measure, but that we may guard at the same time against the inconveniency which has been collaterally introduced. I wish, therefore, to propose a mode of ballot less burdensome, by imposing a moderate fine, and excluding those on whom the ballot shall fill from every temptation to offer extraordinary bounties. But, at the same time, my proposal maintains the principle, that the person shall either serve or fine. If the person declines to serve, it is proposed that the ballot shall go on; but if no such person willing to serve, nor substitute can be found by the individual, then the parish shall be bound to provide, but guarding, at the same time, that no higher bounty shall be offered than that which is already fixed by law. I propose that the call to be made on each county for the supply of this force shall be in proportion to its population, and according to, the regulations already framed in the acts for raising the militia and the army of reserve, and that the deputy lieutenants shall arrange the numbers to be raised in each division. But where individuals are unwilling to serve personally, then the parishes shall be obliged to raise the specified number. I mean to suggest, that the means of recruiting be referred to the parish officers, to those who may be supposed to have acquaintance, and a degree of influence in their respective parishes; and I would propose that in the event of individuals being fined, such parishes shall incur no pecuniary burden whatever, and I wish this fine not to be considered in the nature of a tax, as it is called for only as the price of service. It is by no means my desire to convert this inaptitude for service into any medium of taxation, nor to call for public contributions. Therefore, if persons, in their respective parishes, can be induced, throughout every part of the kingdom, to influence their neighbours to come forward, I consider that it ought to lie with the state to find the means of paying the men thus to be brought forward, and that the receiver general of the land tax be empowered to advance the money. It is only in the event of default, and the parish not finding recruits in proportion to its population, that I propose the fine shall fall upon it; but at the same time, that the certain and moderate fine which they shall be required to pay shall be carried to the general recruiting fund. The effect of this measure, I think, will be to afford a strong inducement to parishes to procure men, if men can be found; and there can be no doubt in my mind, that the local acquaintance, the exertions, and influence, which parish officers may be supposed to have, will be found a much better means of producing the force wanted, than a general, loose system of recruiting. Add to which, that whatever be the advantage gained by the method now suggested, it will be gained without any sacrifice of the other means of general recruiting, either of those now in use, or which may hereafter be adopted. The benefit accruing from this measure may be fully expected to result from it, whilst we are assured that the bounties to be granted will not be so large as those given to recruits for the regular army. I confess, therefore, that I feel sanguine in my expectation that the general outline of this measure must receive the general approbation of all who are anxious to improve our means for establishing and increasing our regular army, and must particularly meet with the approbation of every gent. who is convinced that it is needful that the obstacles to the recuruiting service ought to be removed, or at least diminished. This plan furnishes a considerable prospect of increasing the army, and at the same time of diminishing the hardships which the country has already suffered from the present method of recruiting. At all events, the trial ought, in my opinion, at least to be made, because it can be done without hazard to any other system, on which, I am apprehensive, we must exclusively rely, if this plan be not adopted. I have no doubt, but that by rigidly enforcing the provisions of the army of reserve, an addition might be raised; at the same time, I believe, that the measure I wish now to propose is as likely to be effectual, and with less hasardship, whilst it appears to me better calculated to increase our regular army, and remove those heavy fines, high bounties, and other inconveniencies, which result from the present system of recruiting. 3dly, If, however, the case should happen, that the parishes should not be able, with the bounty found them by govt., to raise their proportion of men, the next question will be, how is the quota to be supplied? I propose that, in this case, the commanding officer of the district shall be empowered to raise the deficiencies, by means of regular recruiting, and that he shall pay the same bounty to the men thus raised as the parishes were to have done, but less than what is allowed to recruits for the regular army. In this case, I think it is probable that, in large manufacturing towns, there may be found a number of persons willing to enlist for a limited service, and who may be afterwards induced to go into the regular army. As this part of the recruiting service will be under the direction of the officers of the army, with the bounty fixed, and less than that allowed for recruiting the regular army, it cannot induce persons to enter into this species of force, who might otherwise be disposed to enter the regular army; but it may induce persons to enter, in the first instance, for a limited service, who, after being accustomed to the habit of a military life, may afterwards feel disposed to volunteer into the regular forces. Thus, this part of the plan proposes one great advantage; whilst, if it should fail, it can produce no disadvantage. I think that my plan will afford a considerable alleviation to the hardships which the country has suffered since the war; that it will render the call effectual, which has been already made upon the country; and, at the same time, that it will enforce the measures already adopted, but by modes more clement than those before thought of. With respect to those parts of the country which base become liable to heavy fines for not having made good the entire complement of men required of them, it is to be considered that, as the law now stands, every parish is liable to be assessed for every quarter of a year; and, for every man that is found deficient, to suffer those penalties to be exacted, and judgments inflicted, I think would be an act of considerable severity; at the same time, it will be more cheerfully submitted to, if it be stated that they may free themselves from these fines, by raising the men required according to my plan. I think that where there is an accumulation of fines, and these fines not enforced when they took place, it would be unfair on the part of the public to enforce them, if it be found that there is any difficulty in the act for enforcing the payment of them as soon as they become due. But it appears, that in the practical execution of the act, various difficulties have occurred in the way of enforcing the penalties. The commanding officer has been unable to make out the necessary certificates in time to shew the justices at their quarter sessions. Therefore we are not to wonder, nor be discouraged, if the act should not have reached its full effect. And when it is considered, that since the war, we have had to raise both the army of reserve, and also to make a considerable increase to the militia, no argument can be brought to prove that a more successful call may not be made upon those parts of the country that have hitherto been found deficient, and that, by measures less oppressive, and at the same time more calculated for giving it effect in a summary, expeditious, and effective manner.—I have now farther to propose, that the forces to be raised be subject to the same limitation of service as the army of reserve is, namely, for five years, or during the continuance of the war, and for six months after the termination of it; and that, whilst they continue in corps of such a description, they shall not be liable to be called out for foreign service. Then, as to the manner of arranging this force, nothing appears to me better calculated to render it serviceable, as a medium of recruiting for the regular army, than the plan of annexing the whole of it, in the form of second battalions, to the regular army. The house, Sir, are, I am persuaded, sufficiently aware of the sort of connexion that must be formed between the two battalions attached to each other in the manner I propose. The promotion of officers must, of course, be reciprocal and indiscriminate. The consequence of this will be, that a constant interchange between the two battalions will be taking place. The officer in the second battalion, while he is employing his labour to complete his men in discipline, thinks that he may soon meet them in another situation, and reap the reward of his labour by leading them with honour against the enemy. The soldiers, on the other hand, are animated to the discharge of their duty by this reciprocity of services. They cannot hope to escape front their present commanders, who, perhaps, may have been the witnesses of their negligence, their carelessness, or their want of spirit. They have before them the prospect of being under the command of the same officers, under other circumstances, and, therefore, they are anxious to avoid that sort of unmilitary or criminal conduct which may subject them to the censure of their officers, or expose them to the contempt of their fellow soldiers. It is to be recollected, too, Sir, that a certain degree of affection and attachment must arise out of the system which I am now endeavouring to recommend. It is in the very nature of things, that the intercourse arising out of such a Connection must be followed by attachment. The interchange of habits must beget some degree of affection. A kind of family feeling must be created in the whole body. We have seen that out of 30,000 men raised last year, 10,000 were induced to join the regular army, though scattered and disjointed over the whole mass of the regular troops in this country. How much more powerful, Sir, most such a feeling be, when the connexion between first and second battalions is so close and animating as that which I have now described? In the one case there was no previous tie of attachment. In the other, there will be all the influence of known habits, feelings, and manners.—The plan which, with the leave of the house, I wish, Sir, to submit to their consideration, will, I trust, appear to have this additional advantage, that whilst it furnishes the means of recruiting the regular army, it will also render your internal force more complete, respectable, and capable of answering the end in view—the defence of the country. Here then it stands recommended, on the ground of its being the best in point of economy and national policy, for it will improve the quality of your internal force, and make one man equal to what two were before. This plan has the farther effect of rendering your regular army much snore capable of being a disposable force than what it would otherwise be, whilst we should have to depend, not only upon the numbers, but on the quality of our troops.—Whatever aid we may justly expect to derive from the various species of our present existing internal force, and from none more than from the numerous and highly respectable body of volunteers; yet it is agreed, on all hands, that it would not be safe to trust the defence of the country entirely to those, who, whatever loyalty and zeal they have discovered, and even training they have had, yet have never had an opportunity of seeing actual service, and who agree in thinking, that some portion of experience, and prime military service, are necessary to give effect to their laudable exertions. But adopt the plan, which, with the leave of the house, I mean to bring forward, and you will not then be under the necessity of chaining, down any great part of the regular army.—The explanation which I have now given to the house, nearly comprehends all that appears necessary for me to say at present, by way of the first developement of my proposed plan for the better defence of the country. My object then is to reduce the militia, which now consists of 74,000 men, to its former establishment; and the new force about to be created, will be a most important accession to the country, and will become a great source for the recruiting service. It will also have the effect of rendering the army completely disposable; nor can it obstruct any improvements which may be thought necessary in our military establishment. Now, as to the proposition with respect to the ballot, the only way in which it is to be jest rained, is, that it may give us the chance of having the personal service of the individual to be ballotter for; and who, if drawn, may consent to take the bounty and enter into the service. And if he does not enter, he will have but a moderate fine to pay. I am very confident, Sir, that this part of the plan will have the effect of procuring a great many men on moderate bounties, by making it the interest of men drawn by ballot to enter. At least there can be very little doubt but that a great many more of them will enter than those who have hitherto entered. I very lately had the means of seeing an account of the number of those ballotted men who came personally to serve in the force I am speaking of; and I can assure the house that, out of 30,000 the number of to in Great Britain is not more than 2 or 3000; a number so trifling, that every body must feel how little benefit was likely to be derived front the ballot, as it has hitherto been constituted. Besides many inconveniences arose from that mode of ballot. Some persons who were drawn, could not pay the fine; others had subscribed sums of money to ensure themselves against being drawn. The whole sum was sometimes given to the man on whom the lot fell, who then either found a substitute, or served in person. Here no such inconvenience will result, but the effect of the ballot will be much more productive. With all the defects, the expenses, and the inconveniences of the system I am speaking of, I would still be ready to recommend it to the house, if I thought it was material towards raising men for the public service. But when I see the effect it has produced, and when I know how few men, out of those drawn by ballot, entered, I have no hesitation in saying, that I gladly avail myself of such a plan as may relieve the individual from great hardship; I therefore think myself justified in proposing the present plan. It is my intention, therefore, to move for leave to bring in a bill to carry it into effect. If the house will permit the bill to be brought in, I will move to have it printed for the use of the members of the house, and fix on some convenient day, suppose Friday next, for taking it into consideration; and, in the course of next week, the house may enter into the details of the measure. I do not wish to do any thing more at present than to state to the house those points in which the plan I have now stated, differs from the ideas I threw out some time ago upon the subject. There are some other circumstances, connected with our military system, on which I will take another opportunity shortly to address the house. I mean to bring forward some regulations with respect to the state of the army in general. I intend also to bring the subject of the volunteers before the consideration of the house, and to call its attention to that part of the general defence act which relates to the enrolment by classes. But as none of those points are connected with the present plan I am about to offer, I shall for the present confine myself to this plan alone. I therefore move, "That leave be given to bring in a bill for establishing and maintaining a permanent Additional Force for the defence of the realm, and for supplying his Majesty's regular forces, and for the gradual reduction of the militia of G. Britain."

rose, and spoke to the following effect.—I perfectly concur with the ideas of my right hon. friend, so far as they regard the necessity of increasing our regular army, but I cannot help thinking, that the means which he proposes for that purpose, are very far from being likely to prove effectual. His plan, in this respect, resembles too closely the measures which have been pursued for some time past in this country. In many respects I confess that it differs from, and is much superior to, that hitherto acted upon. It is, notwithstanding, liable to considerable objections. Upon subjects of this kind nothing is more natural than that there should be differences of opinion. The plan proposed this evening is very different from that which was announced by my right hon. friend some time since. This serves to spew, that even within a short space of time my right hon. friend himself has changed his mind upon the nature of his own project; and unless he can change his mind still further upon this question, I can hardly flatter myself that I shall be able to support him. Indeed, I much fear that our sentiments are fundamentally different, and that I must be one of those who will be compelled to resist the project which he has to offer. What the points are on which I must oppose it I may more particularly explain upon a future occasion. At present I shall only state, and with as much brevity as I can, the general fundamental principles which urge me to refuse my concurrence to some parts of this proposition. I say some, because there are many parts which to resist would be to resist myself—would be inconsistent with the sentiments I have repeatedly delilivered in this house, and which I hold at present. I mean that particularly which relates to the reduction of the militia. This is an idea which I threw out long since, and which I must be proud to find seconded by the authority and talents of my right hon. friend. Although it must be recollected, that when first mentioned it was very much censured, yet now it appears to be generally recognised as a wise and eligible expedient. Another point of the plan of which I approve is, the rejection of the principle of substitution. I should have been very glad to have got rid of this principle upon the condition of commuting service for a fixed fine; in which way certainly the evils of exhorbitant bounties would have been avoided: but I am much better satisfied to have compulsory service put an end to altogether. Both of these alterations therefore, namely, the reduction in the amount of the militia, and the abolition of compulsory service, I heartily approve of, and either expressly or by implication have long since recommended. I am also happy to understand, from my right hon. friend at the close of his speech, that it is his intention to bring forward a motion for a change in the condition of service in our regular army, by which I conceive him to mean, that men shall be enlisted for a certain term of years in lieu of the present custom. This, I think, and have always thought, a thing so desirable, that it was my determination, if it had not been taken up by any other member, to submit the question to the consideration of this house. I am glad to find that the idea seems to be adopted by an hon. gent. who is so capable, from his situation and ability, of carrying it into effect.—Having stated those parts of my right hon. friend's intentions of which I approve, I now come to the less pleasant part of my duty, that of stating the points of which I disapprove. In the whole of the proposed proceeding for raising men, there is introduced an injudicious mixture of the voluntary and the compulsory, of which the latter strikes me to be much too strong. This was one motive of my resistance to the army of reserve bill, the principle of which is preserved in the plan under discussion; and I remember, that in the course of the arguments offered in favour of that bill, the principal ground relied upon by its advocates was, that it would go to raise a body within a short time more effectually than could be done by any other method. This argument, as to expedition, which was founded on the circumstances of the moment, and which was made to overcome every consideration of future advantage, cannot be used with any effect now. We now find ourselves in a state, in which what is called present emergency, can no longer operate to remove from our minds what is due to the consideration of consequences which may take place at subsequent periods. We are not now called upon to consult for the present only. We are at least in circumstances in which we have a little pause and breathing-time to consider what is good for the country permanently, as well as for the present moment. If we were not, the plan proposed by my right hon. friend, must be given up altogether, for with a view to present defence it does not promise to effect any thing. On the other hand, its provisions are, as I before observed, in a very considerable degree compulsory. If the danger to be guarded against were imminent, and that a levy were necessary immediately, unquestionably a compulsory proceeding to obtain that levy might be the most effectual. Measures of that sort are undoubtedly in their own nature the speediest and most certain in their operation. Nothing seems to be so sure and direct in a case where men are wanted, as to pass a law, by which men shall be forcibly taken. But here care is necessary, to consider the nature and constitution of the country in which such powers are to be exercised. What is good for Russia or Prussia may not be good for Great-Britain. It is not that the power of enacting such laws is wanting in Great-Britais. In every country, free or otherwise, there is a power that is supreme; and that supreme power must, by the very description and name of it, be capable of enacting whatever laws it pleases. Whatever the King does in Prussia, or the Emperor in Russia, or the Grand Turk in Constantinople, or, what is still more, the Emperor of the Gauls in France, that may the King, Lords, and Commons, legally enact in Great-Britain. But the question then comes not merely as to the propriety of such enactments, but as to the means of carrying them into execution, and according to those means will be the advantage that is to be expected from the measure. In a free country, therefore, in a country like this, where nothing is to be done but by regular authority, where every thing must be conducted according to law and even according to usage, where there must be a constant regard, not only to men's rights, but even to their feelings, measures of compulsion will often fail of their effect, and show themselves to be ill-chosen, when the same measures, in countries of a different description, would be confessedly the most advantageous and judicious. Where the constitution of things is such, that the power of the state can go straight to its object; where the sovereign, as in Russia, or as in old times in this country, can call upon his great lords, and they again can call upon their vassals; where, as in Prussia possibly, he can send forth his recruiters, and with little ceremony take whatever men are fitted to his purpose, there compulsory measures, as they are unquestionably the most simple, so they probably are the most certain and efficacious: but the reverse may possibly be the case, where they are to be loaded with all the restrictions, exceptions; provisos and modifications, which must be charged upon them in this country. In such a complicated system of movements, half the power of the machine is lost in overcoming the friction.—These are the reasons why we must not conclude that a measure which is good in one country must be equally, or proportionably, so in another. A country and constitution like this is not good for measures of this description. Our compulsion is not good compulsion. It has not the strength and flavour of that which is the growth of more congenial climes. It would not follow necessarily, even if it had, that it would be equally beneficial with us as in other places. Inquiry must always be made, agreeably to what is the fact in the present instance, how the compulsory measure is likely to operate on measures of voluntary exertion that are to be going forward at the same time. Inquiry must likewise be made whether the voluntary measures will not render the compulsory unnecessary; for nobody, I suppose, wishes to have recourse to, Compulsory measures if you can do without them.—In the present instance, it happens both that the compulsory part, as there is all reason to think, is unnecessary, the voluntary being sufficient without it; and that the voluntary will not be able to do its work, if the other is persisted in. All the parishes are to be called upon for a certain number of men, to enforce their production of which (so much is their inclination doubted) a fine is to be levied upon such as fail to furnish their complement within a certain time. It is understood also, that the militia is to be suffered gradually to waste itself to a certain number, and that this difference is to be made good by men raised, in succession, in the way proposed, and who are to be transferred to this new army of reserve; so that for the regular army, which is professed to be the main object in view, the stock which will be left for direct recruiting, will be those who remain after deducting the amount of the present militia. A hope, however, is entertained (and this is the great strength of the measure) that men when once detached from their original habits, and engaged in military life, will enlist in great numbers from the force thus to be created. The fallacy of the arguments which make the foundation of this hope is obvious, for it may quite as well happen, that after men have so far caught the military spirit, (or rather so far lost the civil one) as to resolve to continue soldiers, they, should remain in the corps from which they derived this feeling, and continue on the home service, as that they should enlist into regiments destined to serve abroad. If, however, some men should so enter, as it is to be presumed that many will, there is no reason to expect the number to be greater than will be necessary to compensate those, who having originally been disposed to a military life, and being persons who, if no such limited force had offered, would have engaged for general service, will now be satisfied with the experiment they have made, will have sown their wild oats, and either return to their former employments, or, at least, continue in that species of service in which they find themselves placed. I am not an advocate, therefore, for providing in greater abundance such species of force. I do not want to multiply the opportunities by which men, having a military turn and disposed to betake themselves to a soldier's life, may be drawn into services in which that propensity will be only half-indulged, and in which, in quite as small a proportion, the public service will be promoted. I have the strongest objections to this new fangled scheme of dividing our public force into two parts—of crippling that part which is disposable, and increasing that which is not, in the ill-grounded hope of providing, through the latter, an augmentation for the former. This is the modern, indirect, circuitous, and fallacious mode of recruiting the army.—It appears now, that the propriety of abandoning the balloting system is admitted, and, in lieu of a ballot, my honourable friend proposes to raise men in another way; he means to commit the recruiting to parish officers. I will not say that this is not an improvement compared to the mode pursued of late, which, besides being so grievously oppressive to individuals, interfered so materially with the supply of the regular army by high bounties, &c.; but yet I would not be understood to believe that the plan before the house, will not operate considerably in the same way. For although the amount of bounty to be paid by the parish officers is limited in form, we can have no security that that bounty will not be generally exceeded. Those officers could have no particular motive for economy, and they must have a strong wish to save their parishes from the proposed fine. This wish will naturally render them anxious to procure men, and ready, if necessary, to give an advanced bounty. From this, all the evils complained of under the army of reserve act respecting high bounties are, in their degrees, likely to recur; for no sum short of the fine will of course be scrupled, so as to avoid the penalty, by raising the complement of men: Some parishes may, from pride, even exceed the fine in the allowance of bounty, rather than not bring forward their quota.—A great deal has been said, now and upon former occasions, about the hopes to be formed from individual exertion; but this appears to me to be altogether imaginary. Nothing can be conceived more helpless than an unfortunate countryman, who, in the midst of his day's work, or at his return home tired in the evening, is told that a ballot has taken place, and that he is one of the unlucky number upon whom the lot has fallen. If he does not happen to be insured, by being a member of an association club, he is as much struck down by the news, as he would by a stroke of the apoplexy. His first resource is probably to vent his complaints among his neighbours: but finding that this is but of little avail, and being told by some one of a substitute that has been heard of in a parish not far distant, he sets out on his mission, roaming about, like David Simple, looking for a true friend. In this way he wanders on, from house to house, and from village to village, spending his money, losing his time, tiring his horse, (or his neighbour's horse, as the case may be) filling the alehouses with his complaints, but helping to empty them of their beer, till good fortune or good advice directs him to one of those obnoxious, but, in these cases, necessary personages, called a crimp. There, at least, his labour ends; and, by the help of some 40 or 50 guineas, he is enabled to procure a recruit for the service, and an exemption for himself; at least, until the recruit shall happen to run away. The same thing, with circumstances in a slight degree varying, must happen in the case of the parish officers. What means upon earth have the parish officers to get men but those which they ought not to have? This measure, therefore, which among its other professions professes to abolish crimping, will go, if I am not mistaken, to extend and establish that system. I may almost say, it is to be hoped that it will: for if the parish officers do not supply themselves in that way, it is to be feared that they must have recourse to more exceptionable methods. What is the description of persons to whom they will first apply? and what will be the situation of any of those persons should the application not be successful? A man dependent on the parish, or in a situation of life to be charged with petty offences, will not fare, it is to be apprehended, very well, should the officers and principal proprietors of the parish have deemed him a fit person to serve his Majesty, and he by chance not be disposed to concur in that opinion. Let him take care how he applies, on his own account, or that of any of his family, for parish relief: how he is seen after dusk stepping aside from the foot-path, near any of his worship's plantations. Without saying to what degree these powers will be abused, it is sufficient to know that the bill holds out the strongest temptation to such abuse; nay, that its very hopes of success seem to be founded on that supposition: for if the parish officers are not to avail themselves of the power which their office gives them, what advantages, I must again ask, have they for recruiting beyond what are possessed by all other men? For what purpose then, it is to be inquired, are these consequences incurred? For increasing the regular army? Not a man in the first instance is obtained for the regular army. All these compulsory means produce nothing but soldiers for home service. To engage them afterwards for more valuable service, we depend on the operation of bounties. Our forcing pumps will carry the water only to reservoirs of a certain height: from thence it must be removed, to the level at which it is wanted, by machinery of another kind.—The idea comes then to be considered, founded on the supposition that a force of this limited nature is to exist and to be made the instrument of recruiting the regular army,—of attaching particular regiments of one service to particular regiments of the other, so as to give to each regiment of the line a peculiar and appropriate source of recruiting, in the battalion of the army of reserve that is attached to it. From this arrangement great advantages are expected, such as we have heard set forth with all the embellishments of my hon. friend's eloquence. It is the great foundation on which our hopes of giving effect to the plan of a stationary force as a means of recruiting the regular army, are made to rest. But of this arrangement it must be observed, that while it affects by its form to be something positive, and to confer powers not before possessed, it is in truth nothing but restriction and prohibition, principles merely negative, and by which, in the first instance, powers must always be taken away instead of being given. When you say that all who shall enlist from the army of reserve shall enter severally into such and such regiments, it is the same as to say, that they shall enter into no other,—a regulation of which the prohibitory part is far more extensive than the enacting, and which, in the first instance, therefore, is calculated rather to diminish the numbers of those who may enter than to increase them. There is little doubt that such will be its final effect. By establishing that connexion which this plan has in view, such a provincial character may, it is possible, be imprinted upon certain corps, as may create motives for entering into the service which would not otherwise exist, and by which men will be gained who would otherwise remain in the home battalions, or would not enter the service at all. But against this must be set, the chance that this provincial character will in innumerable instances never be established; and that when it is, it will not by any means produce effects, equal to the disadvantage of the restriction, by which alone it can be brought about. To make a corps provincial, you must secure to it exclusively the recruiting of the corresponding battalion; in other words, you must deny to the men of that battalion, the privilege of chusing the corps into which they would wish to enter. When you have done all this, such may be, from various causes, the necessity of supplying this corps from other quarters, of making good its losses by other means than those of its own recruiting fund, that its provincial character may be wholly lost, or, at least, but very imperfectly traced: and after all it is to be considered what this character will do, estimating its effects according to the present state of society, and the motives which in general influence those who enter the army as soldiers. The bond of local or county connexion is far less strong than it was in this country 40 or 50 years ago. A thousand motives will operate with men in the choice of a regiment more powerful than their attachment to the name of their county, or even than their desire of finding in the regiment those provincial properties which it may really possess. A man would be disposed to enter, but that the regiment to which he must now be confined is abroad, and he wants to stay at home; or is at home, and he is desirous of seeing the world or has an ardour for service, and would wish to go abroad. The regiment is in Canada or Nova Scotia, and he wishes to go to Gibraltar; is in a hot country, and he wishes for a cold one, or vice versâ. For county connexion he cares nothing, having left the county when he was a boy; but by entering with the recruiting party now in town, he shall go where he may hope to see again his old sweetheart, Bet such-a-one, or be in a corps with the comrade, with whom he worked in London, who is now a serjeant, and may have the means, perchance, of making him a corporal. Such are the motives that dictate the choice of particular regiments among private soldiers; and, so far as they operate, this regulation will prove injurious. It will prove injurious, too, in the case of another class of men, be they more or less numerous, those whom my right hon. friend has particularly dwelt on, with a view to the discipline which he hopes to establish in these second battalions. If, says he, a man by idleness or misconduct should incur the displeasure of his officers, he cannot hope to escape them or to secure impunity, by enlisting into the regular army. He will go into a corps where his character will be sure to accompany him, and where he will meet, or be followed by, those very officers to whom, his good or ill conduct will be known. It is amazing that my right hon. friend did not see, that this was a reason why he would not go into the corps at all, and not being at liberty to take any other, would remain to the end of his term where he was. In this instance therefore at least, the regulation in question will not do much: whatever advantages it may have with respect to discipline, it will not advance much the recruiting for the regular army. I see on the whole nothing in this plan, for which so many fair promises have been made, that is likely, to have any other effect than to produce a large stationary force to be confined to this country. With respect to expense, considering that the measure does, in the first instance, fix the rate of bounty higher than has ever yet been known as paid by government, that the parishes will not be restrained within the rate so fixed, and that, Whatever is ultimately given by the parishes, more must of necessity be given to men entering for general service, it will be impossible not to see, that in this view also, the measure must produce effects the most injurious, and that it holds a distinguished place in that system, which in less than forty years has raised the price of a recruit in this country from a guinea, to the enormous amount at which we now see it. Such have been the glorious fruits of a system of balloting followed up by the principle of commuting personal service for service by substitute! — Much has been said by my right honourable friend and others of the influence of a general military spirit in the country, and the propriety must promoting it. Upon this point I must say, that my opinion has always been, however paradoxical it may appear, that to put a nation in a state in which every man was a soldier, was not the way to make a military nation, or to carry the military strength of a country to its greatest height. A country in which every man is a soldier, is a country in which no man is a soldier. A system, such as is now proposed, would rather serve to damp and deaden than to encourage and animate the military spirit. It is a great mistake to suppose, that the military spirit of a country is cherished and kept alive by those only who appear in the military character themselves. The un-military part of the community contribute quite as much to this, and in a manner hardly less direct. They are the spectators or audience, without whom the piece would no more be performed than it would without the actors. We need go no further for a proof of this, than to inquire what the influence is, in promoting the military spirit, of that half of the community, which certainly takes no part in the service, namely, the women. In France formerly, a man would hardly have been spoken to, in the female world, who, not being engaged by some other profession, had passed his youth without service in the army. What more was necessary? A country in that state is a military country, let its military establishments be what they may: And the fact, in this instance, perfectly corresponds with the theory; for if we look round the world, it will be found that the military countries are not those in which, by the constitution, every man is enrolled as a soldier; but the contrary. France, the most military country, has nothing but its army. Prussia, Russia, Austria, in like manner. Even Switzerland, if it may be considered as military, was not so in virtue of its militia, but in consequence of the number of its inhabitants, who had served in foreign armies. On the other hand, in America, and in the little state of Geneva, if that may be reckoned, though neither certainly were considered as military states, every man was in some way or other a soldier. The reason of this is not difficult to be traced; and may be considered as two-fold: 1st, states not much engaged in wars, and with whom, therefore, on this very account, the military spirit is not likely to run high, will resort to the system of militia, town guards, provincial enrolments, and other establishments of that sort, in which numbers are to make up for quality; and 2dly, the very existence of such establishments, instead of exalting, will tend to abate whatever military feeling there might otherwise be. It can never be of advantage to that feeling to familiarize men to the contemplation of soldiers separated from those conditions which make the character respectable. An army merely defensive, and that can from the nature of it but rarely see danger, is deprived at the outset of that which forms the real and vital principle of those sentiments which the military character is calculated to inspire. It will, moreover, rarely be found to be a good army. Yet, upon these all the military distinctions, insignia, and decorations, are lavished in as great profusion, as upon troops in which the military character is complete. We may see how the fact is in that respect at the present moment in our own country, but we do not seem to be at all sensible of what are likely to be the effects. The volunteers have cloaths as fine, feathers as high, music of as martial a character, decorations of all sorts as captivating and imposing as those of the regular troops. If we continue to pursue this course, diffusing this lustre of military distinctions on that which is not military, and obscuring and eclipsing the regular army, there is danger, that the real military character may not only be enfeebled but destroyed. If you will resort to a contrary course, the true military spirit may again revive, and operating generally and powerfully, like the air we breathe, resume before long its proper influence, and produce its natural effects. If, in thus objecting to the plans submitted by my right hon. friend and others, I should be asked, whether I had any plan of my own to propose, I should answer, none; nor do I think any necessary. The only change I desire at present, is, to abolish the plans lately adopted, and, in the system of the army, to enlist men for a certain term of years, instead of the practice which now prevails of enlisting men for life. Let things, in other respects, go on as formerly, and there will not, I apprehend, be any reason to complain. I cannot see why all the machinery of law should be set to work upon our established military system. My only wish is to have it released from that machinery—to have all the obstructions in its way removed. A great medical writer, of the last century, has laid down a maxim for the conduct of the understanding in matters of science, which may be applied with little variation to the regulation of men's conduct in civil and practical life. Vera cernit qui aliena rejicit. Truth will appear as soon as you get rid of error. Affairs will often proceed perfectly well, if you will only remove the impediments and obstructions that are turning them from their proper course. Something analogous to this idea is what I should recommend upon the subject before the house. With good management, I am quite sure that men enough could be found in this country for the ample recruiting of our regular army. There is no scarcity of population. On the contrary, it is far more considerable than at any former period; and there can be no doubt that with the aid of proper encouragement and countenance, by the grant of certain privileges and immunities to those who had served in the army, such as are granted with sufficient liberality to all who have served in the militia, (viz. the right of setting up trades in corporate towns, &c.) in general by securing to the army its proper proportion of the benefits attached to other modes of life, a supply would be found of men willing to become soldiers, as ample and as well proportioned to the demand, as of men ready to engage in any other trade or calling. I cannot believe it possible that there should not, when I reflect that the poors' rates of this country amount annually, according to the account on the table, to 5,000,000l. and when I recollect the extraordinary measure lately taken in Scotland, the policy of which by the bye I very much doubt, of granting such a large sum of money for the construction of a canal, in order to give employment to the poor of that district, and to prevent their emigration to a foreign country. This idea of laying a tax for the purpose of providing employment for a particular class of persons, I cannot but consider as a real poor rate. It is accordingly liable to all the objections chargeable upon measures of that description. I mention it here for the purpose of showing, that the prospect for recruiting our army is by no means discouraging, either on the score of our population or, (unhappily), of the state in which a great part of that population is placed. But I am then told of our trade, and the numbers employed in various branches. I have, however, no hesitation in saying, that trade is favourable to recruiting, and not less so perhaps in its flourishing and growing than in its declining state. It is rarely that trade can advance rapidly without great fluctuations, the trade receding in one channel as it flows into another; and thus numbers are successively left out of employment, and glad to betake themselves for subsistence to the provision which the army offers. From these considerations I can see no foundation for the endeavours so often made to ascribe to scarcity of population the difficulty which recruiting for the regular army has met with for some time back. Let us try to strip that recruiting of the impediments which have hitherto surrounded it; and there is no reason whatever why we should despair of seeing it go on well. At all events let the experiment be fairly tried. No one surely would wish to have recourse to measures of compulsion in the first instance. When measures of another sort have been tried and failed; when we have employed, without effect, the plain, obvious, and ordinary methods, then will be time enough to resort to the harshness of compulsory measures, and such strange, wild, and new fangled projects as that which is now proposed. — Upon the whole I cannot persuade myself to assent to a proposition that has no immediate object but to form a stationary and half military force; and no tendency to increase our regular army but through the medium of a process from which I have no hopes—by a kind of double distillation, of which no one has hitherto shown either the use or the necessity. A notion seems to prevail, that a soldier is a thing that cannot be produced by one continued act. That there must be a second operation. We create this army of men for limited service, as a kind of false stomach in which the aliment is to be lodged for a time, till it can be removed to its proper receptacle, and there finally elaborated for the use and sustenance of the state. Of the whole of this plan the house has heard enough before. Experiments have been already made upon many parts of it, and certainly not with such success as to encourage a perseverance in the system. But nothing will deter us. There is a perfect passion for legislating upon this subject, and for effecting every thing by the most complicated and circuitous means. My hon. friend seems to be actuated by the same sort of feeling as that of the lover in the Apprentice, who when he is to escape with his mistress, will not suffer her to go out by the street door though he is told it is open, but insists upon her descending from the window, by the means of his ladder of ropes. It is in vain that the maid protests that the door is open, and her mistress has nothing to do but to walk down the great stairs. Oh no! says he, but what then becomes of my rope-ladder? Such is in truth the language of the present moment. In all this multiplication of plans I repeat, that very little is to be found congenial with the true military system of the country. Every thing that has yet been brought forward on the subject has proved to be extravagant, and calculated to produce the opposite of good towards the substantial defence of the country; and of the same nature I am persuaded will the plan be which the house has just heard. I am ready to say that no man is more competent to devise a plan requiring great combination of parts, than my hon. friend; but my persuasion on this subject is, that no such plan is necessary; on the contrary, that it must be injurious, particularly when founded on the principles of the system for some time back acted upon; and therefore I feel it my duty to express my disapprobation of the project he has submitted to the house.

said, that after the country and the house had been so repeatedly told of the incapacity of his Majesty's late ministers, for upwards of a month past, he could not refrain from expressing his surprise to find the proposals of the right hon. gent. were nothing better than carrying into effect the very plans of those who were styled inefficient ministers, by suspending the army of reserve, and raising an additional militia. He thought that the recruiting by parish officers would be found wholly ineffectual, and that it would interfere with the recruiting of the regular army, notwithstanding that the bounty was intended to be lower for the one service than for the other.

rose, and said, that be differed considerably with the right hon. gentleman who had brought forward this bill. The strong objection he felt originally to the plan proposed was, that it was of a compulsory character; and under the free constitution under which we lived, we ought not to expect that which only belonged to despotic governments; they must make up their minds not to expect to ingraft upon that constitution, anomalies which were wholly foreign to it. The present plan, however, was not in every respect similar to that last proposed by the right hon. gent., but at the same time, with respect to the augmentation of the militia, he still remained of opinion that it was a wise measure, and he was sorry to hear of any proposal for a reduction of that description of force. It was also to be observed, that the militia had been chiefly kept up by means of substitutes drawn from volunteer corps. This force was altogether of so advantageous a nature, that he could not consent to its reduction, unless something better was proposed in its stead. An unexampled force had been raised since the commencement of the war, and yet the difference made in recruiting for the army, and during the last year, amounted only to one fourteenth, and therefore experience did not prove that there was any pressing necessity for a measure to expedite the recruiting service. Out of the army of reserve 13,000 had already entered into the regular army, and of the remaining 17 or 18,000 men, they might look for a large proportion for the same service. Under these circumstances, he should hope that the house would not agree to the measure proposed by the right hon. gent., at this season of the year; but if the house determined that the bill should be brought in, and he, for one, should not object to it, he hoped, after it had been read a first time, that the 2d reading would be put off to next Session. He was the more inclined to press this, as there was no immediate necessity for its adoption, and there was much reason to apprehend that the measure might prove either nugatory or vexatious and oppressive. It appeared something similar to the quota act of last war, which caused a very large expense, without producing any real advantage. He concluded by observing, that he should defer, till the second reading, any farther objection which he might have against the bill.

said, he was inclined to support the measure upon those general grounds on which he thought the house ought to decide. The precise military situation of the country ought, upon such an occasion, to be particularly taken into view, as well as the degree of necessity for military efforts. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) appeared on this, as well as on all former occasions, to found his opinion, that the security of the country at home, and its efforts abroad, might be trusted to the ordinary recruiting of the regular army, which recruiting he himself had once thought was to be considerably assisted by a small and limited militia. It had been long since thought expedient to raise the militia to its present height, and besides that species of force to raise an army of reserve, which had in one respect equalled the expectations that were formed, by the great proportion which hart entered into the regular army. The country was now however in a different situation; and though parliament and the spirit of the people had already done much, yet something more was still necessary to be effected. Although it appeared so necessary to cease adding to the force for a limited service, yet he was doubtful as to the propriety of allowing the militia to decrease. No man could say that parliament would be warranted in the abandonment of all limited service in order to adopt other measures rendered necessary by the exigencies of the country. Whatever might be argued against the convenience of the measure, he thought it was impossible to object to the plan as being severe. It was in general much more mild in its nature than some acts lately passed, and which he had supported. As far as existing vacancies in the army of reserve were concerned, it certainly must be reckoned efficient in its, nature. It was men and not money that we were in want of, and there- fore individuals would be relieved of the effect of this bill by the mere exertion of finding a recruit, the state being prepared to relieve them of all expenses whatever. It was a valuable object in point of policy that our limited force should be officered by gentlemen brought up to the profession of arms from their early years, which was not a circumstance much attended to in the militia. His right hon. friend (Mr. Addington), had suggested the propriety of putting off this bill to another session of parliament, after it had gone through a first reading, but there did not appear to him to be any reason for such a postponement.—It had been said that the parish-officers would in this case become as it were a recruiting serjeant; but every one must feel that it is the interest of every individual in a parish to lend his exertion, towards raising men, so as to prevent the exaction of fines in lieu of the army of reserve. It was hard to complain of the measure, both on account of its severity and of its mildness. If it would do no great good, gentlemen must admit that it would do no great harm. He did not see that, as far as the proposal went, it was to be reckoned onerous upon the parish. He concluded with giving his cordial support to.

said, that he considered the proposed measure unjust, when he heard it said that individuals must either find men or pay fines, while at the same time it was well known, that parishes could not find their proper quota of men. The proposed bill was, therefore, to be looked on as one to raise a fund for recruiting the regular army, which he conceived would not be conducive to the objects in view. The real cause of the army not being recruited was the increase of that species of force which the proposed bill went to augment. The disposable force of the country had rather lost than gained by means of the army of reserve. It was a disposable force which we now stood in need of, and not that kind of force proposed by such a bill. He maintained that the country did not at present stand in need of a greater number of men in arms for our defence, than what we already had; all that was now necessary was to render those we had more efficient. He was convinced that 400,000 men were amply sufficient to bid defiance to all the force our enemy could bring against us; and he thought that we were in such a situation that our fleets might now be otherwise employed.

said, he did not rise to give any opposition to the bringing in of the bill moved for by the right hon. gent. He did not know whether he should gain any credit from the house, or from the right hon. gent. in what he was going to say; but he could assure them, that he had endeavoured, by every effort and consideration he was able to apply to the subject, to impress his own mind with a favourable idea of the bill, and to drive away all prejudices which, from his own slight view of the subject, when it was first opened by the right hon. gent., or from the arguments or opinions of others, he might have conceived against it. Another reason which he had to dispose him favourably towards this bill was, that he was decidedly opposed, in principle and in judgment, to all the various plans which had antecedently been brought forward on this subject. He remained, however, confirmed in his disapprobation of the present bill, because he could not conceive it was calculated to fulfill those ends and purposes which it professed to do. In all the Objections which had been urged against the various plans proposed by the last ministry for augmenting the regular army, and thereby the disposable force of the country, one of the strongest and most generally urged objections was, that very fundamental one, indeed, of endeavouring to make a limited force a foundation for a general force. He was clearly of opinion that none could be a more defective mode of defence for the country; and he had uniformly given the same opinion on the subject. He could not help objecting to the mode of enlisting men, first for a limited force, and then, by various artifices, endeavouring to prevail on them to go into a service or force of an unlimited nature. He thought it never could be a good foundation for an unlimited army to be drawn from a source, which, in its origin, was supposed to be decidedly and altogether limited. His objection to the present bill was fundamental; and therefore, though he was extremely desirous to lend his aid towards increasing the force of the country, he could not in the present instance do so. If, however, the bill should, on consideration, be deemed by the house to be a good one, he saw no reason whatever why it should not pass during the course of the present session. It there was any thing essentially wrong in it, there could be no doubt but it would either be totally rejected, or modified in such a manner as to meet the approbation of the house; but if it was found to be absolutely good, in the opinion of a majority of the house, it ought surely to pass as soon as possible. He thought it his duty to make these preliminary observations in the present stage of the business, and should reserve his further opinion till he had an opportunity of reading and considering the whole of the bill, during the future progress of which he should have many opportunities of delivering his sentiments to the house.

said, that as the introduction of the bill was not opposed, he did not wish to trespass on the house at the present moment, by entering at large on the subject. There were, however, some points to which he must entreat the indulgence of the house, till he delivered a few observations. With respect to the question, how far ballots were intended to be continued in any parish, he did not say any thing very decisive as to the mililia, because the indirect manner in which the bill referred to that force rendered it unnecessary. No vacancy in the militia was to be filled up when individuals were transferred to another corps. There could be no competition as to the militia and the regular army. There was another point alluded to, as to the possibility of other regulations concerning the constitution of the army, distinct from this bill, which, therefore, was not to be considered as in the most remote degree excluded by the operation of this bill. What he particularly alluded to was, the limitting the time of service in the army. On general principles, he must confess, it would certainly appear that such a mode would be wise and judicious; but it required the opinions of the wisest and most eminent military characters applying themselves to the consideration of the peculiar situation and system of this country, distinguished as it is from all other countries of Europe, with regard to all its internal regulations. If with a full regard to all these distinguishing circumstances, it should appear that such a mode could, with perfect safety and propriety, be resorted to, he, for one, should consider it as an important addition to the strength of our military system; but should it not be adopted, it would not be from any indisposition in his Majesty's ministers to attend to any advantages it might possess. The objections stated to the proposed bill of the hon. gent. opposite, were perfectly fair, candid, and explicit. But he felt himself completely at issue with that hon. member on this fundamental principle in our military system of defence; namely, that an intermediate army would not only be productive of no possible evil, but would prove the best mode of increasing and perfecting the regular army. The object in view was to have a number of men to spare; and if this bill furnished the men and improved the quality of the soldiers; if it was a mode of recruiting the regular army, then it answered the object of the hon. gent. opposite, and of his hon. friend who commenced the opposition to the bill that night, both of whom had declared themselves in favour of an augmentation of the regular army. It had been said that, in his plan, there was nothing proposed that was new; but he would certainly contend that it contained a mode of giving a discipline and an advancement to military perfection, not to be obtained in any other scheme of arrangement for military purposes, by all the ardour and perseverance, and honourable emulation of the officers of the militia; who do all that can be possibly expected from their patriotism, loyalty and volour, but who cannot perform that which can only be attained by military experience. When the army of reserve bill was first introduced, the right hon. gent. objected to it as being calculated to do no good to the army. If recruiting was to be allowed from the reserve to the regulars, his right hon. friend had contended that the discipline would be entirely lost. Every argument urged in its favour was by him considered as only making the measure worse and worse. Now, in the present bill, the only method for preventing the evil was adopted, still his right hon. friend exclaimed, worse and worse, in a new climax, and for no other apparent reason than that it prevented the recruiting of the army he had himself reprobated. In his fund of imagination, which never for a moment left him, but in which it was difficult to follow him, he seemed to forget some of the principles which he himself had laid down. He had contended, with great ingenuity and reasoning, for limited service in the regular army; but here, if we gave limited service, we were told we should spoil the soldier; young men would go in and sow their wild oats, and then quit the profession altogether. In truth it did appear, that the right hon. gent.'s receipt and nostrum for making a regular army was actually to destroy it altogether. He seemed to apprehend something most terrible and tyrannical in the operation of the bill, and conjured up the most alarming phantoms, if parish officers were transformed into recruiting officers; and it was thus attempted to throw a species of ridicule over the measure. So far, however, was be from feeling the force of such misplaced ridicule, that he was well disposed to consider the parish officers as in the way proposed by the bill, and to make the resemblance more perfect, should we propose to them a bounty per head on those recruits they raised under the provisions of this bill. There are, in truth, no material grounds of opposition to the measure stated. It was whimsical to observe the contradictory nature of the objections that had been urged. At one time the parish officers were to be so tyrannical, that all which the house had heard, a few nights ago, was likely to be realized in this country. We were to have the harshness of slave-masters and the tricks of kidnappers practiced among us. At another moment every thing was to be fruitless and unavailing: the parish officers were to be careless and negligent, and the fines were to be paid in preference to raising the men wanted. A great part of his right hon. friend's speech consisted of a metaphysical, moral, and political dissertation on the various modes of raising an armed force in different counties. From all these various lectures and lessons upon compulsion, a plain man would suppose that an attempt was making to introduce some great, new, compulsory system, which was far different from the real state of the business.—Mr. Pitt then proceeded to make a few observations upon what had fallen from the right hon. gent. below him (Mr. Addington) and the hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Johnstone); he said, that a considerable part of the annoyance which he should have felt from the attacks of these gentlemen, was diminished by their cross firing; though directed against him, they constantly hit each other. The hon. gent. opposite to him complained that this was nothing more than the measure proposed by the last ministers. The right hon. gent. below him contended strenuously that this measure was by no means like the one proposed by the late administration, but that it was much more severe. Both these observations appeared to him to be groundless. The bill he now proposed to bring in was much more efficacious than the plan proposed by the late ministers, and at the same time it was less severe and oppressive upon individuals. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Addington) had contended, that it was not necessary to make any addition to the regular army; but, surely, he forgot, that almost the last act of his administration was to prepare a plan to augment the regular army very considerably, and it was not contended, on any side of the house, that there was not a strong necessity for the augmentation.—There were some other points upon which he intended to have said a few words, but he did not now think it necessary to trespass more upon the time of the house, as there would be ample opportunity for discussion on the same stages of the bill.—Mr. Addington and Mr. Windham said a few words in explanation; after which the bill was brought in and read a first time.