The Temple Bar and Snowhill Lottery bill, on the motion of alderman Combe, was passed, and ordered to the lords.—An account was presented, on the motion of sir J. Newport, of the additional duties on taxes, stamps; and wares and merchandise in Ireland, from the year 1801 down to the present year.—Mr. Vansittart moved, for an account of exchequer bill issued for the year 1805, outstanding; which was presented accordingly.—Sir J. Newport said, he should, on Wednesday, submit, a preposition to the house, to establish a free and unrestrained intercourse of all sorts of grain between Great Britain and Ireland.—Alderman Combe obtained leave to bring in a bill to repeal the Additional Force bill, as far as related to the city of London.—The house having resolved itself into a committee of ways and means for Ireland; sir J. Newport moved, that there be a duty of 1s. a barrel laid on all malt in Ireland, to commence from the 2d of June next; and also a duty of 4s. on every barrel of malt converted into spirits in Ireland; which motion was agreed to.—Mr. Alexander brought up the report of the committee for granting salaries to the West-India commissioners, and other commissioners, auditors, clerks, &c.; which was agreed to, and provision was ordered to be made accordingly in the auditors' bill.—Mr. Bankes brought up the report of the committee appointed to examine the buildings erected at the British Museum; which stated, that the buildings would be finished in the course of three or four months; and that the estimate voted amounted to 2240l; and that an extra sum was necessary to finish the buildings, amounting to 6OOl. Ordered to be laid on the table.—Mr. Rose presented a petition from several West-India merchants, against the American Intercourse bill.—Sir C. Price presented a similar petition from the owners of several British ships. Both petitions were ordered to be laid on the table.

said, he rose to move for the papers of which he had given notice two days ago.—That, having been prevented, by an afflicting distress in his family, from attending in his place during the last week, he had not had an opportunity of hearing the observations which an hon. member had permitted himself to make, to the disadvantage of a near and dear relation of his, a member of that house, who was absent, through infirmity. From what he had since heard and read of those observations, he did not hesitate to say that they were unfounded; and that the house would find, in the papers to which he had alluded, the most distinct and pointed contradiction to what the hon. gent. had asserted. That the transactions, to which those papers related, had reference to a proceeding in which the government of Madras, and the superior government of Bengal, were the principal parties, and in which the hon. bart. was an active and efficient instrument. The inferior government of Madras had recorded, in strong terms, their disapprobation of the conduct of the hon. bart.; and this record had been adduced to the house, as the ground and warrant for the imputation which the hon. gent. had thought proper to cast on his hon. relation. The superior government of Bengal, with this record before them, pronounced, the conduct of the hon. bart. to have been highly meritorious, and, in consequence, they gave it their strongest commendation. That it was not his intention to trespass upon the time of the house, by going into the controversy between the two governments; but that he appealed to the justice of the house, and to the honourable feelings of every man in it, whether the proceedings of the hon. member in adverting exclusively to the opinion that was expressed by one of the parties, and thereupon founding a judgment, could be justifiable in any case, but particularly in that of a member absent through illness?—That the misery and desolation that overspread the Carnatic in the years 1780 and 1781, and the reduced state of our military force and resources at that time, were historical facts, to which he only referred, as they gave rise to a proposition out of which the transaction in question arose, namely, a proposition for ceding to the Dutch company, in perpetuity, the Southern provinces of the Carnatic, upon condition that an immediate military aid, of 1000 European soldiers, should be furnished by that company.—The news of a rupture with Holland was received in India before the arrangements upon this proposition could be carried into effect. But the alarm, which it had excited in the mind of the nabob of the Carnatic, was not the less strong; nor were his doubts and apprehensions to be appeased by the interposition of the temporary authority which then prevailed at Madras, the government being held by devolution, and the gentleman so holding it not possessing the confidence of the nabob.—The exigency of the public affairs had become still more pressing, in consequence of the rupture with Rolland; and the nabob was urged, by the temporary government of Madras, to assign the collection of his revenues into their hands. The nabob resisted the proposition, and want of confidence increased the difficulties of our situation.—At this time the hon. bart. held the office of secretary to the government of Madras, and, from his knowledge of the Persian language, he was enabled to communicate directly with the nabob; that he availed himself of this advantage, not to betray the secrets of government, as the hon. gent. had thought proper to state, but to impress upon the mind of the nabob, the necessity of his making the great sacrifice that was required of him for the general safety.—The nabob, seeing the public danger on one side, and his personal risk on the other, was some time before he could bring his mind to decide; at length he signified his disposition to concur in the proposition, provided the hon. bart. would undertake to negociate the terms of the assignment with the government-general, and to obtain a formal assurance from that superior authority, that his just rights should be restored to bins upon the return of peace. The hon. bart. did not hesitate between personal responsibility, and what appeared to him an object, upon the attainment of which our political existence in the Carnatic might depend. He therefore accepted powers from the nabob, to treat with the government-general for the assignment of all his, revenues during the war, subject to certain conditions and reservations. A treaty was, in consequence, executed at Calcutta, in March 1781; and the government-general, with a view of confirming in the nabob the fullest confidence in the good faith which they intended to preserve towards him, thought proper to invest the hon. bart. with powers as their minister at the court of the nabob, to see that the terms of the treaty were observed. Before the hon. bart. arrived at Madras, in the character of a public minister from, the superior government, lord Macartney had assumed the reins of that government to, which he was regularly appointed by the company, with the approbation of the crown. The hon. bart. immediately delivered his dispatches to lord Macartney; and observed to his lordship, that, as the situation of the Madras government was so materially changed by his being placed at the head of it, he (the minister) was persuaded, that the government-general would approve of his suspending the executive duties of his commission, until his lordship could receive answers to any reference he might think proper to make to him upon the subject of his mission, and he accordingly confined himself to the act of delivering the treaty to the nabob.—That it would be an unnecessary intrusion on the patience of the house, if he were to go further into this subject. That he only begged it might not be inferred, from what he had said, that he considered the treaty of March 1781 as a perfect arrangement. All he meant to say upon that point was, that it was better than any thing that had preceded it; and that it was the object which the temporary government of Madras endeavoured, but without effect, to obtain; that it was obtained through the representations of the hon. bart.; that the government-general considered it as an object of, great importance; and marked their approbation of the hon. bart. in the most distinguished manner, by vesting him with the character of their minister. That lord Macartney, in a letter to the chairman, of the 15th of December, 1782, calls it a "considerable step towards remedying the defects of past transactions." That in a letter of 1st December, 1781, to the secret, committee, adverting to it under the Modifications he had introduced into it, he calls it "that rock of strength upon which you stand in the Carnatic;" and that the treaty of 1792, made by lord Cornwallis, was formed upon the basis of this assignment. —He begged again, that it ,might not be inferred, from what he had said, that he considered any of those measures as free from objection. He had long since published the opinion he entertained on this subject. That opinion had not varied; and he had no difficulty in now stating, that he thought the zeal of my lord Wellesley, for the public service, had carried him too far, in the arrangement which was made under his authority in the Carnatic. Had his lordship made his arrangement in the Carnatic, upon the principle upon which his arrangement in Oude was formed, it would have had his hearty concurrence, as that measure had, upon the fullest consideration he had been able to give it. He explained, that he now adverted to the cession of the frontier provinces, as a full compensation for the military protection of the dominions of Oude.—That the hon. member was represented to have implicated, in his censure, another hon. friend of his (Mr. Laurence Sullivan), who, after a long life, thirty years of which were passed in the chief management of the affairs of the India company, had reposed in his grave full twenty years. —That there are still living many persons, some perhaps now in that house, who must remember the plenitude of power with which Mr. Sullivan directed the affairs of India, with little intermission, from the year 1757 to 1786. The hon. member might, himself, possibly recollect the contest for supremacy, in 1768, between lord Clive and Mr. Sullivan: that contest was sustained with warmth, and an exertion of interest that seldom had been equalled in the party-struggles of this country. The law which had since rendered it necessary that India stock should be held a year before a proprietor could be qualified to vote, did not then exist. Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Vansittart, who had united with him (he alluded to the father of a right hon. gent., now an ornament to the house) extended their interest, by entrusting stock amongst persons who were attached to them respectively: that in the number of persons of this description, were Mr. William Burke and Mr. Lauchlin Macleane, who had, each, been under-secretaries of state; that those gentlemen became, in consequence, largely indebted to Mr. Sullivan; that they both went out of the world without having discharged this debt. That each of these gentlemen had become agents to native princes in India. Mr. Macleane was lost on his return from that country, in 1782 or 1783, being at that time in the service of the nabob of the Carnatic. That the executor of Mr. Macleane, Mr. Stuart, who was secretary to the mission, had a knowledge of this long-standing debt to Mr. Sullivan; and, in urging the claims of Mr. Macleane upon the nabob, he represented it to him, and recommended that provision might be made for the payment of it, as Mr. Sullivan, in his old age, was in embarrassed circumstances. The bond to Mr. Stuart, in trust for Mr. Sullivan, was the consequence of this representation. It is dated February 5, 1785. Mr. Sullivan was informed of this transaction in the summer of that year. He immediately wrote to him (Mr. John Sullivan), desiring that he would take measures to have the bond cancelled; for though the transaction was fair and honourable, yet, as he was a public man, it was open to misconstruction. That letter was on its way to India, when he was on his passage to England; had he received it there, entering fully into the honourable and high feelings of his friend, he would have acted upon it. That Mr Sullivan died a short time after his arrival in England. Upon his death, his son called on Mr. J. Sullivan to assist in the arrangement of his father's affairs. They found them to be involved beyond the extent of all the property he left. Under these circumstances, they could not consider themselves at liberty to act as the high spirit of that distinguished man had directed. The bond was, in fact, the property of his creditors, and they could not, in justice, deprive them of any benefit that might arise out of it.—They had also considered, that the man whose influence had rewarded the services of colonel Clive, by appointing him to the government of Bengal, had placed Mr. Vansittart in that high office; had put the British interests in India under the care and guardianship of Mr. Hastings; the man who had been the friend and patron of Lawrence and Callaird; through whose influence lord Macartney had been appointed to the government of Madras (and here he availed himself of the opportunity to express the strong sense he entertained of the talents and probity that distinguished that noble lord): that they had considered, that the man who had selected such characters, as the objects of his patronage, could not be in danger of having his good name lightly brought into question.— That he had now described the origin of the bond that had been alluded to; let it be investigated, but let not the breath of calumny be employed to taint the well-earned fame of his revered friend. He observed, that the characters of public men were the property of his country, and, after their decease, that house should be their sanctuary. He would not trespass further on the patience of the house; but moved, "That there be laid before this house an extract of a letter, from the governor-general and council of Bengal to the court of directors, dated October 20, 1783." Also, "That there be laid before this house a copy of a letter, from the governor-general to the court of directors, .dated November 28, 1783."

said, on looking over the list of the debts of the nabob of the Carnatic, he referred merely to what was inserted in the papers, which had an effect on his mind, and on which his former observations were grounded. He was concerned if he gave pain to any gentleman.

said, after what he had Stated to the hon. gent., he trusted he would have done justice to his brother; instead of which, he aggravated his former remarks.

contended, that when an individual was criminated, he had a right to bring forward the best evidence he had, and agreed thoroughly with what had been stated by the hon. gent. who made the motion.—The motion was then put and agreed to.

at War moved the order of the day, for the house going into a committee on the Mutiny bill. Previous to the Speaker's leaving the chair,

wished to know from the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), as being a material point in judging of the estimate of the probable expence of his new system, whether he had yet made up his mind on the subject of granting bounties .to soldiers on their entering into then second and third periods of service? Also, whether it was his idea that, on the expiration of the 14 years, those who retired were to have the half of the allowance of 1s. per day, and the whole on 21 years service?

said, the questions put to him by the noble lord were matters merely of regulation. He might entertain an idea that it would be much more useful to give some bounty for the second and third periods of service, but it was impossible for him to conceive what; at the end of 7 years, such bounty might be; as to the other question, he was inclined to think that an allowance at the rate of 4d. instead of 6d. per day might be sufficient at the expiration of 14 years, and that the full allowance of 1s. per day should be given on the expiration of the 21 years service.

repeated his wish to know the idea of the right hon. gent. as to whether any and what proportion of bounty should be given to those re-enlisting on the expiration of the first 7 years.

said, when the rate of bounty had been so often changed during the present war, how was it possible for him to say what it ought to be at the expiration of 7 years from this date?

observed, that the right hon. gent. seemed not to conceive the question of his noble friend. The noble lord did not ask what the amount of the bounty then to be given would be, but if any bounty was intended to be given for the second period of service, and what proportion it was purposed it should bear to the original bounty?

had no difficulty in saying, that it was likely bounties on re-enlistment would be found necessary; but he could not state the probable amount of such bounties, nor the proportion which they should bear to each other. He was not yet aware what bounty would be necessary on the first enlistment, and still less could he know what might be requisite on the second and third.

observed, that the import of the question put by his noble friend was, whether the right hon. gent. had such confidence in the superior allurements of his plan, that he looked to recruiting without a bounty; or whether it would be necessary to have recourse to the ordinary mode of bounties? This question he conceived went to the very essence of his plan; and it was of importance that the house should know the right hon. gent.'s intentions on this head.

replied, that: he could not at present state what bounty would be given on the first enlistment, nor what proportion would be observed in the bounties at after-periods. He did conceive, however, that some bounty Would be necessary; for if a bounty was given on the first enlistment, why not also on the second and third? But the amount of these bounties must necessarily vary according to the circumstances of the times, and it would be impossible now to say what bounty might be necessary 7 or 14 years hence. Nothing that might be now settled on the head of bounties could be unalterably fixed, but must vary according to the change of circumstances. But he had no hesitation in saying, that some bounty might be necessary to induce re-enlistment at the end of the first and second periods.

thought, that government should always have it in their power to regulate and proportion the bounties, and either to give or withdraw them. They should be proportioned to the period of service for which every man was inclined to enter, whether limited or permanent, and thus adapted to the wishes and inclinations of individuals.—He was proceeding farther on the subject, when the Speaker spoke to order, observing, that the only question before the house was, whether it should resolve itself into a committee. The house then resolved itself into a committee on the bill. In schedule A, however, it was moved that the common oath should be omitted, for the purpose of substituting another in its place.

submitted, that it was not regular to call on the house to vote that certain words should be omitted, without their knowing what was to come in place of them.

read the alterations, which it was his intention to propose in the form of the oath. After specifying the age of the recruit, and that he did not belong to the militia, he proposed that it should proceed to declare that he engaged to serve his majesty for years, which he would fill up with time word "seven;" and also for such further period as his majesty should please to direct, not exceeding years, which he proposed to fill up with the word "three," but which should terminate at the expiration of a period of six following months of uninterrupted peace. That if the recruit should happen to be under 18 years of age, so many years should be added to the period of service, as should prevent the term of 7 years from beginning to run till he was actually 18 years of age. That every soldier abroad, at the period of the expiration of his service, should be sent home free from expence, and, on his arrival in Great Britain, should receive the usual allowance of marching-money, to Carry him to his particular parish or place. If in Great Britain at the time he was entitled to his discharge, then also that he should be entitled to the allowance of marching-money. These were the only alterations he had to propose, and with what the house was already in possession of, from what he had formerly stated on the subject, and any other alterations he might have to propose in the course of the business, formed the general system by which he submitted that the army might most properly and successfully be recruited at the present time. He had to submit that it should be left open to the executive government, to vary the terms of the bargain in future years, as they should see cause. It was impossible, in a case so varied, to provide for every contingency which might possibly present itself, by legislative provision. In saying this, he wished to be understood how false and unfounded the clamour and alarm were which had been sounded, of our resorting to a measure which was irrevocable; that we were now binding ourselves up by an irrevocable rule, from which we could not at any future period recede. The measure was, no doubt, irrevocable as to the army which it might raise, and to them the good faith pledged was irrevocable; but still it was not an irrevocable measure, but one which might be abandoned at any time. It was necessary to keep in view the reasons for, as well as against such a step. There must be involved in every measure something like a sacrifice, something to he given for something else to be received. It had been said, that the present measure was not pressed on us by necessity; that we were hazarding an experiment which we were not called on to make; that we were parting with men when we were not obliged to do so. All agreed that we would not willingly part with men in time of war, but the question was how we should most effectually induce men to enter into a service where they would be useful during war? We were not ignorant that advantages were not to be procured without proportionate sacrifices. And would any man say that we were not at this moment in a situation in which we were pressed to the adoption of some extraordinary remedy? Look at the measures which had been adopted for 15 years last past, on this very subject; one would have thought us an extraordinary set of projectors, on observing this scene. Look at our projects since the beginning of the late war, or rather take a period some- what earlier. It was resolved to increase the militia, by means of calling out the supplementary part of them, to 100,000 men. If the ordinary recruiting had answered the purpose, it is not to be supposed that a Mode of procuring men, so oppressive to individuals, and so prejudicial to the future interests of the service, would have been resorted to. But it was tried, however, and tried till it could do no more. And yet it did not fully effect its object, for it stopped short at about 80,000 men, and further it could not be carried. Peace ensued. After which, the war came, and found our military establishments low; and this scheme was again resorted to, with an addition which rendered it still more oppressive than before, and that was the quarterly penalties which were imposed on the counties. This was a measure of a most compulsory nature, and yet, notwithstanding this, the effect was, that it did not altogether attain its object, while it very materially injured the ordinary recruiting service. Then came the Army of Reserve act, with the same compulsion, and in the same form, with this aggravation, that the penalty was raised from 10l. to 20l. a man. Now, this measure was not adopted merely in preference to the militia. The right hon. gent. over the way (Mr. Yorke) had indeed said, that this would have the additional advantage of providing men for the regular army; but still it was not adopted on that account, but because the former measure had failed. He would not say that this Army of Reserve act had totally and completely failed. It certainly did do something, the effects of which we experienced at this moment. But yet it fell considerably short of what it was intended to produce, and then it was at an end. It went as far as it could, and indeed it did not even profess to be a permanent measure. It advanced to a certain point, and there it stopped. The ballot was perfectly worn out, and could do no more till a certain interval had expired. There we were left when the Additional Force act came into operation. Now, he would not say of the authors of that scheme what had been. said of the present, that it was brought forward because the administration stood pledged to bring forward something, though certainly, if a pledge could be supposed in either case, it was much stronger in their case than in ours ; for the former administration had been removed on the pretence or the inefficiency of their military mea- sures. But we were said to be guilty of adhering to our former opinions, and put in mind that we were now the sworn servants of the crown, and therefore that we ought to set aside our former notions, and adopt others. But the right hon. gent. was not the sworn servant of the crown, and yet he claimed the privilege of not adhering to his former opinions. This might be very well, but consistency was more necessary in our case than in his, where the witness was not sworn [a laugh]! Now, on the principle stated by the right hon. gent., however, we were not pledged to any thing; but the former administration certainly was pledged to do something; and indeed the scheme with which they came forward looked very like one which had been rashly framed, without touch consideration. He mentioned this, not with the view at present of entering into an investigation of the nature of that scheme, but merely with a view to spew that that administration properly enough considered themselves as pledged to do something—they must either go backwards or forwards; as the former measure was at an end. They must either have resorted to the ordinary recruiting, backed by such aids as must make it more productive, or they must have found out some original scheme, as they in fact did. And it was rather a whimsical thing that the gentlemen on the other side argued, that, if this measure was not continued, something ought to be substituted in its stead. But here they said there was nothing. This was very odd. Was there not the ordinary recruiting? "Yes," said they, "but then that is nothing; and therefore if you take away this measure, you leave nothing." Why, you left the original foundation clear, and had the old mode of recruiting. This was something; that it was not sufficient he readily allowed; for though it could not be called absolutely nothing, yet it had been brought much nearer to nothing by these measures. But still it was something, and it was on account of its not being altogether sufficient in the old way, that he was now proposing some variations in it which might render it more efficient; but most of the late measures were professedly in their nature temporary, and some of them, such as the Additional Force act, which had been represented as permanent; was, in fact, temporary, or, at any rate, inefficient. He would not now draw that measure from the grave, "its frailties from their dread abode," although he might dis cuss it at present on the same principle that they had resorted to such a variety of topics when engaged in the discussion of it. He only referred to it merely as having failed to answer its purpose, with a view to shew that we were left exactly as before, and therefore that there was a necessity for something new. An hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) had said, that if he (Mr. W.) had read that act, he did not understand it. He would have been satisfied with understanding it without reading it, if that were possible; but the hon. and learned gent. seemed satisfied with reading without understanding it. He maintained what he had before stated, that the, nature of the act was such that its quota would be reduced to 9,000 men; and, when it came to that, the whole that it would do would be to supply the casualties upon this number. He had, indeed, heard of 58,000 men annually; but in 8 months it had only produced 15,000 men. It was constantly falling in arrears, and in this way lost ground as it advanced. It was like those racers which, the further they ran, the more they were left behind. It began with a deficiency of 16,000 men, and ended with a deficiency of 26,000. Even supposing, however, that it had completely succeeded in doing all that in its nature it was capable of doing, still it would have failed to answer the purpose intended by it. In the production of a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Sheridan), whom he did not see in his place, it was stated, That a constitution that was always ailing, and yet never was positively in very bad health, sometimes lasted longer than one which was strong and robust. This remark might be applied to this act. It would soon come to its minimum, which was the quota of 9,000 men; and then it would go on supplying the deficiencies on this quota, and leading men through this gate to the regular army at a bounty of 6 guineas more than could be obtained by the ordinary recruiting. It would do little itself, and would prevent other means from doing what they might otherwise do. Men would naturally wait till they could get into the army through this gate, and this mode would be attended at the same time with an additional expence, and with great injury to the interests of morality, and to the ordinary recruiting. This measure, then, was completely inefficient. But if the right hon. gent. could prove that it had done all that was requisite, why, then, he must confess that there was no use for the present plan; or of any other; but, if he could not prove this, and if the measure was utterly inadequate to the purposes intended, then let it not be said that there was no necessity for any thing further. Now, in this case, the question was, what were we to do? Why, some aid must be given to the ordinary recruiting, or had any body any new scheme to propose? But any expedient which would exhaust the future resources of the country, was one which he would not recommend. When the gentlemen on the other side said, that we were not to confine our views to the present moment, but were to look to the future consequences of measures, he was very glad to hear all this, although it came rather oddly front those, whose projects had been almost all of a temporary nature, and who were even now calling out for some temporary scheme. He had no confidence in these projects however. He had no similar project of his own to offer, and thought that the good sense of the thing lay in a very small compass. The only option we had was, either to procure men by voluntary or forcible means, or we might have a combination of the two. The forcible means might procure us some men for the present, out then it destroyed our future resources. Yet force might on sonic occasions assist and quicken the operations of the bounty. This was the ease in our navy, but here the man himself was taken. But in the land service this was impossible, and such means only raised the bounty to 40 or 50 guineas, or perhaps to more, by the competition which it excited. Such was the effect in the case of the provisional cavalry, of the supplementary militia, and so forth. Seeing, then, no good either in the theory or the practice of such schemes, but finding that they rather operated like ardent spirits, opium, or substances of the like nature, which roused the constitution at first, but afterwards relaxed its power: allowing that though they were in themselves bad, there might be cases in which they might be proper; having stated this so often before, and been charged with stating the exact contrary, he would now say, that such schemes ought not to be resorted to till every other possible means had been tried and found ineffectual. He therefore would now try the effects of voluntary enlistment, and would use no means but that of making the article of proper value to the purchaser, All that could be done was, to bring the advantages of the service home to the feelings and undertandings of those who might be disposed to engage in it. If, after all this, after making the condition of the soldier thus eligible, men could not be found, then there was no alternative but to have recourse to compulsory means, with all the evils attending upon it. Now, it might be made a question, whether it was possible to make the situation of a soldier eligible in comparison with the situations of other classes in such a country as this? It was true, you could not change your population, but then you might change the nature of your service. This was certainly in the power of government. But there were things which you could not do even in the service. You could not make the situation of a soldier a very safe, a very comfortable and easy, or a very profitable one. But there were advantages which might be offered to the soldier, advantages which, in every age and nation, had been offered with success. In the present plan, he would remove an impediment to the recruiting service, by limiting the service to a shorter period than a man's life, and leaving his discharge somewhat independent of the person who employed him. But then a question had been asked, if a service is eligible for seven years, why should it not be eligible for life? There might certainly be men who would choose to serve for life, but at the same time could it possibly be contended that men, generally speaking, would not be much more willing to enter into the service when they were assured that, in case they did not like it, they might leave it at the end of 7 years? If they did like it, they might still continue in it till they had served 21 years. He should think that there was scarcely any one who would insist much upon that argument when it had so often been the practice to give men this option with a view to induce them to enter the service. The thing was consonant to the feelings of mankind. The change in the terms of the service must, in the nature of things, have a most powerful effect in rendering the condition of the soldier more eligible, and consequently in inducing men to enlist. It might, therefore, be confidently expected that this measure would produce men. Now, an hon. general (sir James Pulteney) had argued that, as we had already a mixed kind of force, we must procure more men than if there was only one single kind: and this, he said, no one could deny. He did how- ever, deny it. For though you might get inert between the two, which you could not get for one sort of service, it did riot therefore follow that you could get more. He said that the soldier, by means of our mixed force, had an option given him either to engage for limited or unlimited service; and that thus every one who chose to serve at all, might do so in either of these ways most agreeable to himself; and, consequently, that many were induced to engage who would never have entered the service at all, had there been no such option. He said, that we offered the man one sort of service, limited both as to time and place, and another sort, unlimited in both cases. Did he consider this as all we had to offer? The men might say that they liked limited service in point of time, but that they did not like one limited in point of space. Unless men disliked limited service in point of space, what induced them to enter the regular army at all? Yet men did enter the army, and that too from the service said to possess so many attractions. Yet it might be said, why does the person who would wish a limitation in point of time, dislike a limitation in point of space? Why, he might think it disagreeable to stay at home. He might wish to go abroad; he might wish to be a real soldier, to engage in such actions as those of which he had heard so much, and., to see those heroes who entitled themselves to the applause and the gratitude of their country. But, though he desired no limitation in point of space, yet it might be a most valuable object to him to have a limitation in point of time, instead of entering upon a service of which he could not see the end. He might eagerly desire to come back to his own country, after a certain term of service, in order to describe what he had done and what he had seen, in order to talk of "Antres vast and deserts idle." He might have some rustic Desdemona, to whom he would wish to detail his "hair-breadth scapes i'th' iminent deadly breach," his "moving accidents by flood and field," while Desdemona, the daughter perhaps of a village landlord, after hastening to serve a customer with a tankard of ale, would return, and "with greedy ears devour up his discourse." This was a natural and the service would by this means be rendered much more attractive to multitudes. Why, then, when you bad these motives to offer, it was in the highest degree impolitic to stop and counteract their operation, by rendering the service, which was unlimited in point of space, also unlimited in point of time. The hon. general would, therefore, perceive that his alternative was deficient, for unlimited service in point of space might be a boon, while unlimited service in point of time was a check. The effect of this plan then, sooner or later; would be to rouse- that feeling of ardour and heroism, which undoubted existed in great numbers of the people of this country. It was our duty to put no bar in the way of the full effect of this spirit, by rendering the service unlimited as to time; for the ardour of many must be very much damped by the circumstance that they can see no end to their service. He would not dwell any longer on this point, which must be so plain and obvious to every one. Of the effects of this plan of limited service in point of time, he had the fullest and most confident reliance, as a permanent resource for procuring supplies of men for the army. Then, the next point was to enquire into the inconveniencies and evils which it had been said would attend this measure. These might be comprised under 3 general heads; 1st, the effect which it would produce on the character of the army; 2dly, its effects with regard to the colonial service; and 3dly, the loss of those numbers that would be discharged at the end of the terms. Now, as to the first of these heads, namely, the character of the army, it was one to which we must be disposed to listen with seriousness and attention, not from any belief that there was any thing in the argument, but merely on account of the high importance of the subject. After a view of all the services to which his attention bad been directed, and of the particular distinctions in the character of this country, he must say, that the objection, as to the effects of this plan on the character of the army, had no foundation. But then, how did this couple with the .other objection relative to the discharge of the men during a war? The expedient to cure this was to make the men serve for a term of years, or during the war. But how did this relate to the character of the soldier? If a man knew that he was to be discharged at the end of 7 years, it appeared be could not be a proper soldier; but if he served 5 years, or during the war, he might retire at the end of the 5 years with the character of the most efficient soldier! But the fact was, that this uncertainty, for which some were contending, was the thing which would strike at the very root of the military character. In considering limited service, as it had existed among different nations, the hon. general had left out the monarchy of France. Now, why a monarchy should be omitted, which had lasted 1400 years; which existed in a military and populous country; which, in point of military regulations, had been a model to Europe; he could not conceive. If he left that out of the account, it put an end to all authority on the subject. The effects of the institutions of that monarchy were as well known as if the French revolution had not put an end to it. That it enlisted for a term of years, there was no dispute. The only question was, whether it enlisted men with .a view to serve during the continuance of a war? Now, he was prepared to say, that he had no doubt whatever that the men were to be discharged even during war; and when they were not discharged, it was prevented by a direct order issued by the government; and of such an order, an arbitrary government might readily enough avail itself on particular occasions. This had been done during the American war. Now, he had always thought that a breach of a law was an evidence of its existence. Before the year 1765, the term of the French service was 6 years. In that year, the term was increased to 8 years. No mention whatever was made of peace or war, and so it stood on the ordonnance. But when war came, the government said that it wanted soldiers, and the men were retained. Though this abuse had been occasionally resorted to by an arbitrary government, yet, from the nature of the regulation, it appeared that the retaining of the men during the war was not considered as essentially necessary. But as far as the regulation went, it distinctly confirmed the statement which had been made by him. That the government followed its convenience in breaking through its engagements, as many governments did, but as our government could not do so, was certain. Now, as to the discharge of the soldier during a war, nobody could deny that this must often be inconvenient. So likewise it was often inconvenient to pay money at the exact time at which it was due, and some would not pay at all; but it would be very odd if persons were to argue from this that there ought to be no regulations for enforcing the payment of just debts. The whole experience of the European services was against the hon. general, and those who thought as he did. In the Austrian service there were various modes of recruiting, and at short periods. He would ask whether gentlemen had ever heard of such a people as the Swiss? There never were better troops, and yet all the regiments were engaged only for a term of years, and were discharged even in time of war. What then became of all that we had heard about the military character? But then the gentlemen argued in a curious way, for they said that the Swiss were not English; and if the instances had been taken from the French or the Swedes, or any other people, they would have exactly the same objection. They said that we were theorists. If they understood the term theory, as applying to any thing which had never before, under exactly similar circumstances, been tried, then all governments must be theorists, more or less, in every thing that they did. If, indeed, he had been talking of the Chinese, the Tartars, or the Negroes, they might indeed, with some justice, say that the instances did not apply; but in the great family of Europe, where the degrees of civilization were nearly equal, and where the military character was nearly the same, the difference was not so great as to prevent the justice of the comparison from being sufficiently striking. If they called this theory, they must call every thing so where the example was not exactly similar in point of circumstances, situation, and every thing else. But the truth was, that the resemblance was sufficiently obvious to answer all the purposes here intended. He must therefore say, that the whole experience of the different military regulations in Europe was against their notions of the effect which limited service would have on the character of the soldier. He might, therefore, consider that point as set completely at rest. He had many direct authorities in his favour on this point, which, however, he would not at present particularly mention. Now, as to the inconvenience that would attend the discharging of men during war, he could not help complimenting the gentlemen on the other side on the extension of their views in the contemplation of distant evils. Because when he looked back on their measures, he found them all of a temporary nature. He would ask, whether they were not merely calculated to answer the purposes of the moment without any regard to the future? Compulsion might, perhaps, have been proper in the circumstances of the case. He meant to say nothing as to that; but certainly the expedients were entirely temporary. He could not look back without recollecting how often he had lamented in that house the evident disposition which constantly appeared in it to adopt temporary shifts and expedients. Its language had been, "Oh! save us just now; save us from this present danger, and pay no regard whatever to the future, let that provide for itself." This was imitating certain philosophers who enjoyed the present too much. But now the gentlemen said, "For God's sake! take care that your measures do not prove mischievous 7 years hence." They abandoned their former feelings, and were now wondrously apprehensive of what might happen in future: but at all events posterity could not be injured by this plan; because, among the advantages of it, one was, that in this view the possible evil could only arise in exact proportion to the actual good. If many men were not got, then there would be but few to discharge—[a laugh from the opposition]. This was a proposition so plain, that he could not conceive what the gentlemen found in it so highly diverting. And here he had heard very singular reasoning, which shewed the nature of the objections and the want of consideration on the part of the objectors. This was particularly apparent in the arguments used respecting the effects of the periodical discharging at the end of 7 years. The fact was, that this would have no effect that could justly cause the smallest alarm before a very distant period, so that he could scarcely give the gentlemen any credit for their fears. What did they suppose we should lose by this plan? Fifteen years must elapse before we lost one-twelfth of these men, supposing that they took their discharges as early as possible. From this he had gone with his calculation to 28 years, and this period must elapse before the loss could amount to any thing that was at all alarming. He might have calculated farther, as this was a mere matter of calculation; but having taken so considerable a portion of a century, he thought it very needless at present to carry the calculation any farther. This he said on a supposition that the period was to be 7 years only; but when we took in the additional guard which was now provided on this point, they must be very anxious indeed who could feel any apprehensions. Now, be had said before, and would say again, that the discharge of the men at end of these periods, must be considered as a sacrifice. This was following the improvements of modern life. As reason and civilization advanced, men saw the advantages of such sacrifices. All the improvements in our agriculture, in our commerce, and in many other things, proceeded upon this principle. What distinguished the merchants of this country from others? What distinguished our agriculture from others, but that enterprising spirit which taught them to sacrifice a present advantage for the hope of a greater future one? The opinions of military officers had not so much weight with him in this case as in many others. An officer looking at his fine regiment, his grenadiers, with none under five feet ten in the front ranks, could not, perhaps, bear to think of parting with them, and this feeling would be stronger in proportion to his attachment to his profession. The same feeling, too, would be felt by a planter, when he saw the axe applied to some of the finest plants, though this was absolutely necessary for the benefit of the grove. If an instance might be taken from agriculture, he might mention that of the turnip husbandry, which, though introduced at the beginning of the last century, had made very slow progress, and even as yet was by no means general, because it involved a sacrifice on the part of the owner. The advantages, however, were ten-fold greater than the sacrifice. First feelings, therefore, on this subject were nothing. What had prevented the rapid progress of this husbandry, and many other improvements, was the vulgar maxim of saying, "Get all you can, and keep all you get." This was the conduct dictated by first feelings, till experience and more extended knowledge taught mankind that, by keeping all they got, they did not get what they might. This was precisely the state of the present question, and he exhorted gentlemen not to look to what we lost only, but to consider also what we might gain, and that this measure was substituted instead of those temporary efforts, under the evil effects of which this country was at this moment labouring. He advised them to consider the nature of the limited service, and the extent of the periods; but he exhorted them to take counsel from those who favoured the doctrine of limited service generally, rather than from those who were enemies to it altogether. It was impossible that the terms could be absolute during the existence of any war; for the fact was, that wars now came so fast in succession, that arrangement on these terms would scarcely be any boon to the soldier at all. If there was no limit to the service but that contingency, it would be impossible for the soldier to calculate upon any time for his discharge, and on going abroad he would be almost as much deprived of the hopes of returning home as he was at present; and upon this principle the plan would do nothing, for the advantages to be derived from it would be lost. But now, by fixing the discharge at a certain period, the advantages would be clear, and the danger, even supposing that all who were entitled to it should demand their discharge at the earliest period, so inconsiderable, that the sacrifice would be prodigiously overbalanced by the benefits to be derived from it.—Now, as to the other point, which was that of the colonial service, the inconveniences here would not, by any means, be so great as might be supposed. This point might be reduced to a narrow compass. The inconveniences might be met by different regulations for that service, by appointing troops of a different description for it, and by other means. The danger was trifling, while the period was only 7 years, as it was before; and when, as now, the period might be 10 years, the danger was greatly diminished. Here the instance of the East-India Company's troops was peculiarly applicable, and it was of the strongest sort, on account of the distance to the East being so much greater than that to the West Indies: besides, in that service the men were only enlisted for 5 years. The most perfect good faith was kept with them, and the India Company found the benefit of recruiting for this period. They continued enlisting troops on this condition, till the government put an end to it on account of its interfering with the ordinary recruiting of the army. Had he not experience on his side then? Could he despair of success in an instance where the adverse circumstances were not by any means so strong? These were the heads of the inconveniences that were set against the hopes which might, upon the soundest principles of reason, be drawn from this measure. This was the only change from which he could see the least chance of procuring the proper numbers to supply the army. This change too would so much enhance the value of the service, that multitudes who would not before have entered the service, would now resort to it. The character of the service would thereby be raised, and a prodigious facility given to our, recruiting. The great objection to the army, amongst persons who had a regard to character, or to the respectability of their situations, was, the people of which it was in some measure composed, in consequence of our recruiting it with convicts and persons of bad repute. It had been denied that distress principally drove men to our ranks; but this was a resource which it was unfit for this country to depend upon. By these things the army had been brought into disrepute, and the person who had engaged as a soldier, was considered as having degraded himself, and as gone for ever. From the description of people that was introduced into the army, the discipline was necessarily more severe: and this very severity itself prevented respectable people from enlisting, when otherwise they would have done it. These were the evils that called loudly for remedy. The experience of our own service was against the gentlemen on the other side, when they said that limited service would lower the character of the army, for they might have witnessed many instances to the contrary. As to the inconveniences of the colonial service, these ought not for a moment to be put in competition with the advantages which would be derived from the plan of limited service. Then came the parting with them in time of war. He had, by calculation, clearly found that the inconvenience in this respect would be very trifling; besides that the evils, small as they were, must be at a great distance. These were the considerations which had induced him to resort to this plan; and he was, in some measure, driven to it from necessity, by the failure of all other expedients. We could not change our population, but we might change the nature of our service; and this was what was proposed. Now, one word as to the present situation of the army. It would be observed, that this plan was only doing that generally, which partially had existed for many years back. He protested against the argument, that because little effect was produced on this small plan, little could be expected on a larger. The plan of limited service, as it stood at present, had little effect, merely because it was partial. The effects to be expected from such a. measure as this must arise from its notoriety and solemnity. It must be rendered generally interesting and impressive, and, in order to be so, it must be universal. We are not to consider whether each individual is to calculate accurately for himself what may be the advantages of the service; the point is, in what estimation the service may be held by others. At present the soldier was sometimes considered as a person gone, as one who was completely lost. Now, the point was to raise the character of the soldier and of the service; and in order to do this, in addition to the limited period of service, it might be matter for future consideration, whether some civil privileges might not be granted to the soldiers who had served a certain time. Even the elective franchise, though it could not properly be given them in boroughs, or in the counties in Scotland, which were much on the same footing as boroughs, might be given them in the counties in England. Individuals, perhaps, might not calculate on these advantages, but then all these things went to raise the character of the army in the general estimation; and this would always be a powerful inducement to enlist. He had only stated these advantages and disadvantages very generally. It was first to be considered that the character of the service was to be raised, in order to procure the proper supplies for it. He had stated how this was to be done. He had then adverted to the necessity of discharging the men at the end of a certain period, even during a war, and had mentioned the instance of the East-India Company's troops, which proved that there was no great danger in this, nor in the influence of this plan upon our colonial service. He thought this of no great magnitude. The whole, in short, proceeded upon the enlightened principle of sacrificing a smaller good at present, in order to receive a much greater at a future period. It proceeded upon that enlightened avarice, if be might say so, which overturned the whole maxim, to which he had before alluded, and taught us that, by keeping all we got, we did not get all we might. Having thus generally stated the nature of the object in view, and the means which it was proposed to employ, he would conclude with moving, that the clause be added to the bill.

in rising to reply to part of what had fallen from the right hon. gent., meant to confine himself strictly to those points which the right hon. gent. had done him the honour to notice from his speech on this subject on a former occasion. He had formerly argued, that the plan repealed by the right hon. gent. was preferable to that which he himself had proposed, in so far as it was likely that more men would be got for a service limited both in space and time, then for a service limited in point of time only. The right hon. gent., however, had contended, that the love of glory, mid a desire to see the world, and to visit different climes, were such powerful inducements to prefer service limited in point of time, as must greatly preponderate in favour of that service. It might be so with a few, but he was sure that, generally speaking, most men were partial to that service which was limited as to space, particularly from a dread of colonial service in the West Indies. Bounty, he was fully persuaded, was a greater inducement with most men than a love of glory. He was far from wishing to underrate the courage of our countrymen. We must take men, however, as they were, and the inhabitants of the country were but men. He had formerly stated, and he now repeated it, if the right hon. gent. was so conscious of the superiority of his plan, let him try its effects on the second battalions, and see what it would produce. Another point much insisted on was the experience of other countries, and particularly France. He had formerly stated, and he again with confidence repeated, that it was not at this moment the practice of any one great power in the world to enlist for a limited time of service, at least during a war; and, except the Swiss, it had not been attempted to be argued that it was. If he were to take an instance of the evils to follow from such a practice, he would quote the very one which had been dwelt on by the right hon. gent.—the instance of France. He would wish to know, why he should take up that system at the very time that France had abandoned it, abandoned it, too, from dear-bought experience, from the seven years' war, in which they had been utterly unsuccessful, and during which their armies had been held in contempt through the whole world, most probably from being formed on this system. He could not agree, that the limiting the period of service would have no had effect, in changing the character of the soldiery. Limiting its endurance at all, would unquestionably produce this effect; whether for 7 or 10 years would make little difference. When he came near the period of his discharge, and contemplated his return to private life, it would be found that he was more of a citizen than a soldier. In the opinion which he formerly gave on the subject, he had an inclination for a service for a limited number of years; but he by no means then contemplated the idea of discharging them during a war. The right hon. gent. had gone into a calculation to shew, that the evil of discharge was less than had been supposed. However this might be added to the evil which must attend the colonial service, he was convinced that the number, whether more or less, must be severely felt; and it was not in the number only that this would be seen, but in the fact of their being our best troops, who had served 7 or 8 years, whom we were called on to discharge; those to whom the rest of our soldiers looked up; and that they were to be discharged, too, during a war. As to the general amelioration of our army, the right hon. gent. seemed .to expect, that they would be a different sort of men from those of whom the army was now composed; no such change, he was well assured, would take place. Nothing had been proposed by the right hon. gent. which would induce mere of a different kind from the present army to enlist. Nothing could be more theoretic, or more unfounded in fact, than the idea that limiting the period to a term of seven years, would make a great change, either in the kind or number of those who inlisted. If, however, government were resolved to try the measure, he hoped they would allow the regular recruiting to go on at the same time.

said, he had given way with pleasure to his hon. friend, because, as he differed himself so entirely from the right hon. secretary, he thought that it would be desirable to hear an opinion from such an authority. The house, he was sure, ought not to decide on this important question, without hearing and attending to the opinions of all the experienced officers that were members of it. He had listened with great attention to the able and eloquent speech of the right hon. gent. without being convinced, or induced to alter any part of his former opinion. The discussion then pending was a question to leave out an usual clause in the Mutiny bill, for the purpose of introducing an innovation that was not likely to produce any practical good effect, and might be attended with much mischief. He was one of those who thought, from the delays that had occurred between the opening speech and the production of the measure, that his majesty's ministers had abandoned the project, or resolved to put off the consideration of it for the present, because he thought that otherwise they would not, upon what appeared to him shallow pretences, have refused to the house such lights as could be derived from the written opinions of experienced officers, one of which, if he was rightly informed, had been given in lately. He had hoped, that they had re-consulted those general officers, and were disposed to act upon their opinions. But as they had not, he, upon a feeling of duty, felt himself called upon to enter his protest, in that stage, against this dangerous innovation. He did so, not according to the distinction made by the right hon. gent. relative to the sworn servants of the crown, and those on the side of the house on which be was speaking. He, as a member, sworn of his majesty's council, was bound, if called on, to give his advice to the best of his judgment, as he gave his opinion there as a member of that house. A great objection which he felt to this measure was, the manner in which it was attempted to be ingrafted on the mutiny bill, because it was wholly unnecessary in the first place, and unconstitutional in the next place, for his majesty's ministers to attempt to introduce it in this manner. It was unnecessary, because, as the right hon. secretary had observed on another occasion, that house ought not to legislate on subjects that did not require legislation. He should ask that right hon. gent. why introduce the matter into this bill, if the undoubted prerogative of the crown were sufficient? On what pretence, then, engraft this clause on the Mutiny bill? The measure now in agitation might be done by an order of his majesty, without any interference of the kind. Was there any fear or doubt of government? Was there any doubt on the part of the soldiers of his majesty? Then why introduce any thing respecting their service into a legislative act? There were within his knowledge, and not in the very best of times, but two instances of similar attempts; one in the reign of queen Anne, under the administration of lord Bolingbroke, and the other during the American war, in lord North's administration. It was taking advantage, both of the parliament and of his majesty. It was like packing extraneous matter into a money-bill, which must pass, As to his majesty, it was depriving him of his prerogative. He had a right to exercise his prerogative, and to withhold his consent to the measure; but how could he do so, when it was engrafted on a bill, which, in the nature of things, must pass? There were, besides these, many objections to the measure itself; some of which he should state. He had no very confident expectation, that any thing he could say would have much effect with the present ministry, after the instances he had witnessed of their taking up measures in a crude and undigested manner, and pertinaciously persisting in them, contrary to the opinions and remonstrances of so many members of that house, and of the country. He did not even expect, that they would agree to any delay in the business, notwithstanding the declaration which the right hon. gent. himself had made, that he did not look to it as of immediate necessity, but as a permanent benefit. In this situation, and as great doubts were entertained on the propriety of the measure, he could not see why it might not just as well, stand over till next session, when it might be in their power to bring it forward in a more complete and less objectionable state. Though he did not expect, that any thing he might say would have great weight with ministers; he did not, however, despair that he should be able to persuade some of the committee to pause, before they should adopt a measure of such mischievous tendency to the army; before they would sanction an innovation in the system of that army, to which, in these perilous, alarming, and critical times, they were, under Providence, to look for security and protection, and that, at a time, too, when the army was admitted to be sufficient for the occasion. This subject, he insisted, depended upon fact and experience. Though he had heard the ingenious speech of the right hon. gent. with attention, he had not been able to discover a single fact, or a single calculation, on which his measure was to be grounded. It was not sufficient for that right hon. gent. to say, that he expected his measure would be successful; he ought to have produced facts to justify that opinion. There were documents upon time table to which he should refer for facts, as to the measures that had been taken, at different periods, to remedy the defects in the army. The object of his majesty's ministers was, not to improve the state of the army, which never was in a higher state of discipline, nor more respectable in amount. The cavalry and infantry, including 14,000 or 15,000 men for limited service, amounted to 150,000 men. The number wanted on the 26th of June, 1805, to complete them to their full establishment was 44,846. But, as the establishment varied often, and many men had been added by the Additional Force bill, he thought that the number now wanted could not be above 30,000, to complete the establishment of the regular army. There must, of necessity, be a large floating deficiency in an army of such an amount. The casualties, on an average, of the years 1803–4–5, were 17,000 on the whole military force, which, after deducting for casualties in the militia and local corps, left for the regular army, casualties to the amount of 13,000, or one-twelfth of the whole. Any measure that should be brought forward, ought to be such as to provide for the existing deficiency and the casualties; and could the right hon. gent. suppose, that his measure would raise 33,000 within the year? From the Revolution to the present time, the army had been recruited, as it was now, by inlisting for unlimited time and space, except in the two instances he had alluded to; and that, he contended, was the true principle upon which the army ought to be kept up. The attempt now proposed had been made in the year 1713, the year before the accession of the House of Hanover, by the introduction of a clause into the Mutiny bill, giving the soldiers of the existing army, and those who should afterwards inlist, the right to demand their discharge after 3 years' service, upon giving 3 months' notice to the colonel in the former case. This system lasted, then, but 2 years; for when the Whigs were in power, after the accession of the House of Hanover, they left the clause out of the bill, which was a strong proof of the notion our ancestors had of fanciful theories. He should not impute to the right hon. gent. any disorganising views; but certainly, if lord Bolingbroke, as had been said, and as he believed, had any design of defeating the succession of the House of Hanover, he could not have taken a more effectual step for that purpose, than to disorganise the army that had fought under king William and the duke of Marlborough. The same system had been introduced in 1775, and continued to the end of that war. The men were raised for three years, or during the Rebellion. In 1779, the recruiting, which had, till then, been carried on under the authority of the king's prerogative, was sanctioned by the introduction of a clause, similar to the present, into the Mutiny bill. What the effect had been, he should shew from a comparison of three different periods. The first period he should consider was, the three first years of the present war, and that he should consider in three distinct views: 1st, the effect of the ordinary recruiting; 2d, the effect of the ordinary recruiting, combined with the numbers that had volunteered from limited service; and, 3dly, the whole number of men that had been raised for limited and unlimited service. The first view gave an average of 12,780 per annum; the second, an average of 19,310; and the third, of 28,470 men per annum. He took this occasion to deny that the measures taken to raise these men had cut up the regular recruiting. He admired the wit of the right hon. gent.; but the subject under discussion ,was no joke; and, when the house ought to look to that gent., as secretary of state, both for information and argument, they had to expect something besides lively and witty flashes of imagination. The right hon. gent. ought, according to the humble saying, to be "witty and wise." The next period he should consider was, the three first years of the last war, when his majesty's ministers had acted upon a much wiser system than lord North, by raising the men in the usual way. The average of men raised per annum by the regular recruiting was 25,955. In the three first years of the American war, when the whole number raised were for limited service, the average of the three first years was 11,631 men per annum. By these statements it appeared, that the greatest number of men had been raised in the three first years of this war, when the regular recruiting had been backed by subsidiary measures; that the produce next in amount had been obtained when the recruiting had been made wholly for unlimited service; and that the smallest number had been obtained when, in the first years of the American war, the limited service was exclusively resorted to, insomuch, that 50,000 more men had been raised in the three first years of the present war, than in the correspondent period of the American war. He had great respect for the talents of the right hon. gent.; but, unless he could state some facts in support of his plan, he could not accede to it. In point of effective men, those raised during the present war were, in general, better men than those obtained last war, and, in all cases, than those in the American war. If the right hon. gentleman's argument was worth any thing, if he meant any thing in his statement, he must have meant, that his system would be sufficient to keep up the army to its establishment, and to supply the ordinary casualties; but the right hon. gent. ought also to look to the extraordinary casualties that might take place in the event, which he hoped would not happen, of the enemy being to be met here or in Ireland, by the loss that would be the consequence of a great battle lost, or of a great and bloody victory gained. That should be in the contemplation of his majesty's ministers. It the measure which they now brought forward had failed in the American war, why, in die name of God, were they then called upon to sanction it? The right hon. gent. had stated some of the inconveniencies of the measure; many of which he could not get over. But what had been the state of the army in the American war? He proposed to consider that question in three views: first, the state of the army in North America and the West Indies, in 1779; 2dly, the casualties therein in the years 1778, 1779, and 1790; and, 3dly, the amount of all the troops that bad been sent out to supply that army. The army 1779 was an establishment of 25,299, in America and the West Indies, wanting 11,249 to complete it, being nearly one-third. The casualties, including desertion, &c. amounted to an average of 17,855; and, with all the efforts that could have been made with the system in full activity, the number of troops sent out, including 13 new regiments, did not exceed 19,161, leaving a balance, after deducting the casualties, of 1296, been only as a supply for an army that was fighting for the brightest jewel of the British crown, and for the dearest interests of the nation. When they had such an experience, therefore, of the system, he asked gentlemen, who might not have made up their minds, previously, to vote on one side of the question, whether they ought not to pause, before they should again consent to adopt it? He came then to consider a paper that had been presented that day, which, when it should be printed, would give gentlemen much useful information. By this paper it appeared, that the numbers wanted in 1781, to complete the army to its establishment, exclusive of cavalry, which at that time did not exceed 5,000, was 25,279; in 1782, was 22,000; and in 1783; was 26,000, being one-fourth of the whole, then 101,116 men; whereas, the number now deficient, of a force of 150,000, was only one-fifth; a circumstance for which they were indebted to the salutary operation of those measures that had been so much abused. He would ask any man, whether the system proposed would afford a prospect of supplying the ordinary and extraordinary casualties of the army? In the debates on the peace in 1783, it had been stated, in that and another house, in justification of its terms, without a contradiction, that the army wanted 30,000 men of its complement. But this was not all: the limited service occasioned a mutiny in the army, which exposed the country to the most serious dangers: the expectation of being released from military duty occasioned discontents; and most gentlemen would know, at least as a matter of history, that, at Portsmouth, a spirit of this destructive kind prevailed in the 77th regiment, and that important garrison was placed in the most alarming situation. Such was the state of the army at the conclusion of the American war. The navy and the finances were disorganised after the American war; and when party spirit should subside, justice would be done to that great man who had brought both back font their disorgarnised state. As to the right hon. gentleman's assertion, that the measure would have no effect on the character of the soldier, he was convinced, when the soldier had a definitive time to look to for his discharge, he would feel uneasy, and, consequently, not perform his duty with alacrity. That had been the case with the militia, when inlisted for three years, until, in the year 1781, a change was made in engaging them during the war, which made them look to the service as to a profession. He was surprised to find, that the right hon. gent. stated only, as he had before opened, his plan, without any explanation of the mode in which he expected to get rid of the inconveniences of it. The next object to be taken into our view was, the particular inconvenience in our colonial service, which must inevitably result from this plan. His majesty's ministers, however, had not stated to the house, or to the committee, with any degree of precision, what were their dreams on this subject. The right hon. gent. had stated, in his opening speech, that in case of a regiment entering on foreign service, the men whose terms were near expiring, might be drafted into second battalions. There would, however, be numberless inconveniences resulting from this plan in the minutiæ of every regimental ar- rangement; and the right hon. gent. migh depend upon it, that if men had about 6 or 8 months to serve, and that they were ordered out to India, that circumstance would occasion a considerable degree of discontent among them. The army in the East Indies presented another obstruction. By the time the men had arrived, and had been seasoned to the climate, and prepared to face the enemy, so considerable a portion of their time would be expired, that they could be of very little use to the service. He should have considered it a dereliction of his duty, if he had not called upon the house to pause before they agreed to a measure that was not supported by a single fact. He might ask the right hon. gent. to state the means by which he expected to supply the casualties of the troops even in India, where the peace establishment cannot hereafter he less than 25,000 men. He was not able, he confessed, to follow the calculations of the right hon. secretary; but this much he observed, that the casualties of our army, from the discharges that would take place under this clause, would, in a few years, be so great, that our military force would not be sufficient to maintain our position among the powers of Europe, and that some other plan should then be resorted to for the purpose of recruiting our army. Could the right hon. secretary suppose, that, if a serjeant said to a man that he would inlist him for only the term of 7 years, and that he was afterwards kept for 2 or 3 years longer, in the service, could he expect that, in such circumstances, more men would be got for the army than at present; or even could he think, that so great a number of men could be obtained, as were induced to inlist under the present system, by which all idea of quitting the service was banished from their minds? He really had no hostility against his majesty's ministers; but he thought that he should ill discharge his duty, if he did not deliver his sentiments, whatever they might be, on so important an occasion as the present. Government must, of course, have better information on the subject than he had; but, for his own part, he did not know of any expedition that was now going forward against the enemy; and if the fact was so, that there were not, at present, any great military exertions in the contemplation of his majesty's ministers, he would advise them to try the ordinary means of recruiting for at least another year; then, if it was found that those means failed, it would be competent to ministers to come down to parliament, to state the fact to the house, and to bring forward any plan which they might, by that time, have more deliberately weighed in their minds. Having thus conscientiously delivered his sentiments, and having entered his protest against this innovation on our military system, he washed his hands of the measure; and, whatever might be the dangerous consequences of it, ministers would be responsible for their own impolicy and precipitation.

rose, principally for the purpose of replying to that part of the speech of the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, which regarded colonial service. He would admit that it would always be necessary to keep a considerable part of the regular army in the East Indies, perhaps not less than 21,000 men. The waste of that army he would calculate in the proportion of one to seven, so that, upon the average of seven years, about 3000 men would be requisite to make up for the consumption. It would be necessary to send frequent supplies of men to keep up the strength of these corps. The expence, therefore, of sending home the men who chose to take the benefit of the conditions under which they entered would be very inconsiderable, neither would the inconvenience be so great as the right hon. gent. seemed to imagine it was. For his part, he could not say that he very much admired the humanity of gentlemen who would not allow the men who were fighting the battles of their country, who were risking their lives daily by the severity of a climate to which they were before unused, and by the dangers which are inseparable from a soldier's life; he could not really have the most favourable opinion of the minds or dispositions of gentlemen who would not allow one-fourth of these men to have a chance of returning to their native country. The number to be sent home would never amount to more than something from 700 to 1000 men annually. Should men be banished for life like felons merely because of some trifling inconvenience, after they had honourably served their country? Some regiments had been, to his own knowledge, 20 years abroad: should none of these be allowed to return, unless they were sent home as cripple, for the remainder of their days? Of the West Indies he should say but little, everyone one knew, that some alteration was necessary in that quarter. It had been asked, what would be done with men who might be sent out on any sudden emergency to repel any attack of the enemy, on our islands for instance? The shortness of the term for which it would be necessary to continue their service there, however, was so obvious, that he could not think it was any thing like a serious objection to the proposed plan to say, that it would occasion any considerable degree of inconvenience with respect to these regiments. Some of the other points in the speech of the hon. gent. had been answered on a former night, or else had been anticipated in the speech of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) that night. He should, therefore, avoid taking up the time of the house by any repetition of the answers to those points. But this much he would say, that, for the honour, the glory, and the safety of the empire, some great permanent change in our military system was necessary. The: ordinary means of recruiting were inadequate to furnish the necessary supply. Comparing the army as it stood in July 1804, with its amount in March 1806, there was an absolute decrease in the infantry, and of that a very large proportion was not applicable to foreign service. If at this time last year, government had had a disposeable force of 100,000 men, would Buonaparte have dared to quit the coast. and march across the Rhine? With such a force, what was there to prevent us from landing at Boulogne, burning the flotilla, and becoming masters of that particular part of the country? It was to make up for this lamentable defect, that the present government was endeavouring to create a disposable army. The principle of limited service was not that innovation that was supposed. In the two administrations, in which the noble lord (Castlereagh) was concerned, it was distinctly recognized, first in the Army of Reserve act, and next in the Additional Force bill. The unlimited service was one of the chief objections to entering into the army, and the frequency, the severity, and, above all, the publicity of corporal punishment was another. So far from apprehending any relaxation of discipline from a less frequent use of corporal punishment, it was his opinion that the moral character of every regiment would be much improved by it. There was also another objection to entering into the army, which would be in a considerable degree removed by the plan detailed by his right hon. friend. The service, as it was constituted at present, was the most arduous, and at the same time, the worst paid. The proposed pension would obviate much of this objection, for there were but few situations in which a poor man could hope to sit down with a certain income for life after 21 years' service. What a miserable system was that of the noble lord and his colleagues, by which the military strength of the country was tied hand and foot, and we suffered the enemy to do every thing in our presence without punishing him; but that, however, was nothing to the purpose. There was a great difference produced in the soldier's character, by enlisting for 7 years, or for the continuance of the war. In the latter case, he would naturally be anxious for peace, the very worst quality a soldier could possess. But that even this mode of enlistment would not produce the mischiefs the opponents of the principle of limited service seemed to apprehend, he had only to refer to the American war, in the progress of which no less than 78,000 men had enlisted only for the time it should continue, and the moral qualities of the severity regiments into which they had enlisted, were fully equal to those of any of the regiments of which the present army was composed. Every one who heard him was acquainted with the brilliant details of that glorious campaign in Egypt, in which British gallantry was as conspicuous as in the proudest period of our history, and yet he could appeal to many officers now in the house, whether a considerable part of that army was not enlisted for limited service? It had been. asserted that the practice of enlisting for limited service did not prevail among any of the great military powers of Europe. Were he not fearful of fatiguing the house, he would read the ordonnances which had been from time to time published in France, and he would prove from them, that from the year 1684 down to the French revolution, the principle had been recognized, and resorted to in that country. Indeed, the great marshal Saxe, no ordinary authority on such subjects, had expressly recommended that no man should be enlisted or more than five years. It was true, as it had been observed on the other side, that when general Washington took the command of the American army, the period of service was only for a year; but it was not to that, short as it was, that he attributed its want of discipline, but to the notions of equality that it had imbibed; notions, perhaps, inseparable from the cause for which they were contending. It was these notions which made the men disobedient to their officers, and not the limited service. To those who apprehended danger from discharging the men in case of invasion, he would observe, that in that event not a single man would be discharged. So far from it, his majesty would be entitled to call for the services of every man in the kingdom capable of bearing arms. The right hon. gent. appeared to rely much upon the mutiny which broke out about the end of the American war in a regiment enlisted for limited service; but that mutiny, he would contend, was produced by a gross and flagrant breach of faith in the government. See the facts of the case. The men were enlisted during the, war. Preliminaries of peace had been signed, and yet, in the interval between these and the ratification of peace, the regiment received orders to embark for the East Indies. How was it possible for men, so circumstanced, to receive the benefit of the terms upon which they entered? It was also to be observed, that it was not so much a vast increase of numerical strength, as an addition of military character that we wanted; for while other nations had occasion to send almost their whole army into the field, our history shewed that at all times of foreign war we fought only by detachments, and. wanted, for that reason, but a small well-chosen band. If the safety of the country should come to be at stake, we had a most powerful resource, more than any nation of slaves could have, namely, that of the exercise of the royal privilege, calling on a nation of free men to rise in arms for the defence of their privileges, their own liberties, and every thing that could be dear to men. Another consideration seemed to be urged with particular confidence by the right hon. gent. as to the difficulties in which the country would be placed, in the event of not having a sufficient army for the defence of the country, in case any material part of our force should come to be discharged under the operation of this clause: but the right hon. gent. should have in view, that we had other means of defence more than sufficient to counterbalance any evil of that sort. Before, however, he described these means, he would tell the right hon. gent. he ought to know that we had it not in this country in our power, at any time, to collect a sufficient force for our military wants without the aid of volunteers—[a cry of hear! hear! from the opposition]. The hon. officer proceeded, and begged to set gentlemen right upon the point to which they appeared to refer. He never was by any means hostile to the volunteers, however much he might have been, like his right hon. friend, misrepresented; although he objected to many of the details of the volunteer system, he never was or could have been so preposterous as to object to a volunteer force; for what man could suppose, that in a country like this, its defence could be sure, unless a great part of its population, who were not likely to enter into the regular army, were not forward to form themselves. into volunteers in aid of that army? But to return to the plan under consideration; he conceived that great good would result from it, even if it were capable of doing no more for the army than to supply the casualties; for the men who should leave the service on the expiration of the time specified in the clause, would be of great utility: scattered through the country, they would serve to augment our efficient military strength, and might, at a future opportunity, be most usefully employed as recruits and drill serjeants. In the present state of Europe, it was highly desirable to diffuse the military spirit accompanied by military knowledge; and what instruments were so likely to accomplish this end as the men he alluded to? The prospect of such advantages was enough in his mind to entitle the plan of his right hon. friend to the acquiescence of the house. As to the objection grounded upon the omission of his right hon. friend to apply this project to the present army, he thought it of no weight whatever. But if he had contemplated such an application, his objections would have been very serious indeed; for it would expose the country to much mischief, to alter the conditions of men who had already engaged upon understood, and settled terms. If, for instance, the change of those terms now were to commence, the country would, at the expiration of the time prescribed, be exposed to the danger of having all the present army entitled to claim their discharge at once. But no danger of any such magnitude could possibly arise upon the application of the proposed condition to an army gradually accumulating. Pos- terity, therefore, would not be liable to the mischiefs which the vivid imaginations of some gentlemen were so fond to dilate upon; and what inconveniences could result to us? At least, for ten years we were safe from any of those inconveniences which gentlemen on the other side professed to apprehend; and what greater advantage could we confer on posterity than to carry the country through the difficulties and dangers in which it was at present involved? That the operation of the project before the house would materially contribute to this effect, he was perfectly persuaded. For what could conduce more to maintain the efficiency of our military strength, than that which had an obvious tendency to diminish desertion? Upon, some of the notions advanced in the course of this discussion, with regard to the motives which operate upon the minds of the soldiery, it was impossible to argue, for they rested upon no foundation whatever. To those gentlemen who were fond of ridiculing theories, he would say that no theory was more untenable, or more absurd, than that which assumed that any soldier, with the apprehension of punishment operating upon his mind, would, by desertion, expose himself to that punishment, when he had the prospect before him of a release from the service, if he chose to leave it within a limited time. They must be much mistaken in the character of the soldier, who supposed that such a prospect would have no influence upon them. Indeed they must be quite irrational, unreflecting persons, if such a prospect had no effect. But the lower orders of the people who entered into the army, seemed to be much misunderstood by some gentlemen in that house. Those people were by no means the thoughtless, insensible, mere animals, which those gentlemen seemed, from the nature of their arguments, to assume. On the contrary, his firm belief was, that the calculation which this project served to encourage, would reconcile many to enlist who would not otherwise have endured the idea. And when once men got into the military life, he had not much fear that a desire would arise to any extent among them to leave it. The probability was, indeed, that but few would quit the service at the end of the first 7 years, when, from their efficiency, it would be most desirable that they should remain. Those however, it was to be remembered, who wished to leave the army after 7 years, it would be in the power of their officers to retain for 3 years longer, if they thought fit; and was it not likely that such men would rather prefer enlisting for a bounty for 7 years more, than remain for 3 years without any bounty? With respect to the discontent and uneasiness said to exist among the army in consequence of the agitation of the proposal before the house, he could assert that nothing could be more unfounded. He therefore had no hesitation in saying that it was extremely unbecoming in any member to offer such an assertion. Before such an assertion was publicly made, the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning), who so confidently used it, ought at least to have taken the trouble to enquire into the fact. Even if the, thing did exist, it would have been unadvisable to notice it in the way the house had heard; but as it was untrue, the assertion was highly reprehensible. The right hon. gent. had stated. that jealousy must naturally be expected to prevail among the present soldiery, as the benefit of this plan was not to extend to them. But no such jealousy did, or could exist; for the advantages which the alleged cause of jealousy proposed to confer upon the present army were many and important. What! was it nothing to hold out to the old soldier, after leaving the army, a more comfortable subsistence than he had heretofore enjoyed, or had any reason to calculate upon? and the additional allowance to the men who had already served the time of 7 or 14 years would be important in a soldier's estimate. The pot of beer at the end of the week would be to the soldier an acquisition of value, although so insignificant and so much the subject of ridicule with the right hon. gent. The situation, then, of those soldiers who had served 7 or 14 years, would be improved by the plan under consideration; and such as had served 21 years, he understood it was in the contemplation of his right hon. friend to have immediately discharged, and granted, during the remainder of their lives, a shilling a day for subsistence. Could it then be rationally supposed that such a project was likely to excite discontent in the army? or rather was it not natural that they would feel the warmest wish for its success, and the highest gratitude for the benefits it was meant to confer? The case quoted from the American war was not, in his judgment, applicable to the proposed plan for limited service, at leant not for the object quoted to discoun- tenance this plan. And as to the difficulties likely to arise from the adoption of this plan to the supply of our army in India, he thought them extremely overstated. To be satisfied of this, gentlemen. had only, to reflect that, according to the arrangements at present, a regiment seldom returned from India within less than 20 or 25 years, and the soldiers generally remaining, of course, until such return, many of them came home cripples and invalids. What encouragement did such spectacles hold out to recruiting? But in the proposed change, the soldier would come home at the expiration of his time of service, whether the regiment to which he belonged returned or not. The same observations would apply with regard to the West Indies. And as to both, no inconvenience could arise in the conveyance of soldiers, when our commercial intercourse with the colonies was considered. Merchant shipping could never be wanted for the purpose of such conveyance either to or from this country; and from our second battalions at home, which he would always recommend to have kept up, substitutes for the soldiers coming from the colonies could be immediately sent out. If, however, the proposed change should be found productive of any disadvantage with regard to our colonial force, regulations might be made to remedy it. It was not pretended that this project would, not serve to provide for the ordinary casualties of the army. But how, said a right hon. gent. (Mr. Yorke), are the extraordinary casualties to be provided for in case of actual war in this country? Before, however, this question was answered, suppose the right hon. gent. were asked, what provision did former ministers make for these extraordinary casualties? None whatever, unless it was pretended that the Additional Force bill, which was now happily about to be repealed, and which did not actually produce 6000 men in the year for the army, could supply those casualties. But was it not in fact a prominent part of the able system the house had heard stated by his right hon. friend, to make a provision in case of war in the country for the casualties alluded to by the right hon. gent? Independently of the right which his majesty in such a case possessed, of calling out every man for the public defence, was it not proposed by his right hon. friend that 200,000 men should be previously trained and fitted to fill up any vacancies that might occur in the army, and provide for extraordinary casualties? Such was the force meant to be in reserve, and certainly nothing of the kind was devised before, nor was any ever proposed for the purpose, excepting the Levy en Masse act, which was brought forward by the right hon. gent. and which, in fact, was. quite an impracticable scheme. Under the fullest consideration which he had been able to give to the subject, the hon. officer concluded with declaring, that the system of his right hon. friend was, in his opinion, the wisest that had ever been proposed to this country;—that it promised to be effectual for all the objects it professed to have in view;— and that it would furnish the necessary supply to our present army, while it would provide an efficient army of reserve for our future security.

thought it necessary to correct an error, into which the hon. officer seemed to have fallen respecting the army which served in Egypt. The greatest part of that army consisted of men who had enlisted for unlimited service. There was not above a regiment or two, whose constitution was otherwise.

said, that most of the 20th, 40th, and 80th (Irish) regiments were composed of men who had enlisted for limited service, limited as to space and time only.

said, that he had listened with the greatest attention to the right hon. secretary for the war department, and that he thought it but right to give the plan a fair trial. He originally had great objections to enlistments for limited service, but the clause by which it was proposed to retain the men for 3 years, if it should be necessary, after the expiration of the first period of service, reconciled him, in a great degree, to the measure. His objections to it were greatly diminished, if not entirely removed by this alteration; and he would, therefore, decline making any opposition to the clause which it was intended to introduce.

said a few words in a low tone, the purport of which we understood to be in opposition to the measure. He thought the question already sufficiently understood and discussed, and he wished to come to a decision at once.

and said:—I cannot reconcile it, sir, to my sense of duty as a member of parliament, to suffer a question of such magnitude to be hurried to a decision in this extraordinary manner. Instead of that precipitancy which now appears to be intended, we surely ought to proceed with more than usual caution in a case which involves so important an innovation in one of the most important establishments of the country. Ministers must either have a most extraordinary confidence in themselves, or expect an unlimited confidence from others, if they imagine that the house can be prevailed upon to concur in a measure of such magnitude, and to sanction changes so hazardous with no better reasons than they have yet assigned, and no more satisfactory explanation than they have yet condescended to give to the objections which have been stated. I cannot but consider the manner in which this subject has been brought forward, as being, almost as great an innovation in the constitutional practice of parliament, as the measure itself is in the system of our army. This, I believe, is the first instance in our parliamentary history, in which it has been attempted to introduce a fundamental change in an established system, merely by a clause introduced in a committee upon a bill, and that bill one which must of necessity be passed within a limited time, at the hazard of leaving us without an army. The mutiny bill has already been renewed three tunes in the course of the present year: the last which we passed will expire on a given day; and we are plainly told, that we must abridge our deliberations on this bill which is now before us, in order that it may receive the sanction of the legislature, before that which it is to replace expires. I desire the house to consider, whether this was a fair and fit situation in which to place us, for the discussion of a question requiring so much caution and deliberation. I have always understood it to be the practice of this house, when any matter of great importance, and especially any matter that goes to affect the fundamental establishments of the country, was to be submitted to its consideration, to multiply the stages of discussion, by originating the subject of the bill in a previous committee of the whole house. In that committee, it may be matter of debate, whether any measure upon the subject shall be received for discussion; and after that question has been deliberated and affirmed, then remain all the ordinary stages in which the bill itself is liable to discussion. But I am confident that this is the first instance in which the opportunities of deliberation have been diminished in proportion to the novelty, magnitude, and doubtful policy of the measure; in which a project for effecting a complete revolution in one part of our national defence has been proposed to be passed into a law through fewer stages of deliberation than a turnpike bill. I beg pardon the first it is not; my right hon. friend (Mr. Yorke) has already referred to the solitary and disgraceful precedent of the last year of queen Anne, when a clause of similar purport was introduced into the mutiny bill, apparently without the notice or knowledge of the parliament of that time. But with this exception, the right hon. gent. will not easily find any thing in history to countenance his practice; and I am sure he will not find any thing to justify it. The right hon. gent. has reduced parliament to the dilemma either of foregoing the due exercise of its deliberative functions on a measure so momentous in its consequences, or of suffering the army to disband, while we are considering on the best mode of maintaining it. And if this observation applies to this house, where we have the bill now before us, and where, I trust, we shall persist in keeping it as long as we continue to entertain doubts of its policy, how much more forcibly does it apply to the House of Lords, where, in exact proportion to the difficulties which are felt here, and the time which is taken to remove them, the, means and opportunities of that discussion which the lords are equally entitled to give to every subject of national interest, must necessarily be abridged and taken away! How much more forcibly does it apply to the third power of the constitution, to the crown; to whom it is probable that this bill, changing the whole tenure by which the army of the crown is held, must be presented for that approbation which is to pass it into a law, within a period so near to the expiration of the present mutiny bill, that the king can hardly have a moment to pause, much less to exercise his judgment and discretion! I admit that this last objection would not generally apply to a measure introduced into the house by the king's ministers, because the introduction by them would generally imply the approbation and recommendation of the crown:—that this is not the case in the present instance, we have but too much reason to apprehend—I should rather say perhaps we have great reason to hope; because I should trust that there might be a chance of some interposition on the part of the crown, if not in the legislative enactments, at least in the practical execution of this measure, such as might remedy, in some degree, the consequences, if it could not entirely prevent the first effect of the rashness and precipitancy of ministers;—I say I should hope this, if it were not that the clause which we are discussing, is so framed (and I must say I think must improperly so framed) as to take away all discretion from the crown hereafter, in the executive regulation, no less than in the legislative provision; to curtail and abridge the royal prerogative, in that particular in which it has been the practice (and I think the wisdom) of all states to leave the executive government in possession of the fullest control, namely the discipline and internal economy of the regular army. I am not now arguing the expediency or inexpediency of the limitation of service; I am not talking of the merits or demerits of the project I shall come to that by-and-by: but I am at the outset protesting against the course which ministers have followed, which is such, that even if the measure itself were in my judgment unexceptionable, I should still object to the mode of its introduction. If limited service be ever so desirable an experiment, still why incorporate it in the mutiny act? Why make it the subject of legislative enactment at all? Why not pass the mutiny act according to its usual form, for the purpose of giving to parliament the constitutional control over the crown and its army? (which the mutiny act alone enables the crown to raise and maintain), which it alone enables the crown to pay; and under that controul, why may not the mode of raising and maintaining the army be safely left, as it has always hitherto been, to the executive government? If there be one political truth more undeniable than another, it is this, that no good has ever arisen from the interference of public assemblies with the military force of the state. Any attempt on the part of such assemblies to become popular with the army, is sure to lead to difficulty, and in the end, not seldom to confusion. The plain proof of this is what we know to be historically true, and what we feel at this moment in our own instance, that every such act of interference must be accompanied with a donative or largess, as a sort of compensation for our intrusion; we have at this moment an estimate on the table, of an additional charge of 300,000l. annual expenditure—the first fruits, and, we may depend upon it, the very least part of what 'we may expect from restless and meddling spirit of regulation; and this price we pay for liberty to confer what is represented as a benefit to the army—the change of the term of service. How, if some years hence, when this device shall have failed, and it shall become necessary to repeal it, how shall we find funds sufficient to accompany and alone for such an alteration? I think, sir, we have seen symptoms that this truth is felt, and that its consequences extend beyond the army even, to the other services of the country. I grudge .nothing that is given in bounty or in kindness; but I think the recommendation to such acts is best and most safely lodged with the crown; and I am not willing to purchase, at an unnecessary expence, a right of interference which I think dangerous in its exercise. The right hon. secretary (Mr. Windham) has contended, that in new-modelling the army according to his plan, parliament, will be doing no more than it has been accustomed to do at all times, but especially since the beginning of the present war. What, he asks, has been the business and occupation of the administration which preceded the present, but to frame measure after measure, and to propound law after law, for the augmentation and regulation of the military force of the country?—Undoubtedly for the augmentation and regulation of that part of the military force, which is more immediately of the cognizance of parliament; which cannot otherwise be raised than by parliamentary measures; which is obtained from the country by different modifications of a compulsory process, none of which the crown could possibly be enabled to originate or to apply, without the specific authority and detailed regulation of parliament. The militia, the army of reserve, the additional force, are all of this description; constituting the defensive and limited force of the country, and that which may fairly be called the parliamentary army, in contradistinction to that regular army of the crown, which the crown has at all times raised for itself, subject to the controul of the annual mutiny bill. All these measures therefore which the right hon. gent. cites as precedents, are in fact directly in contrast with that which he now recommends. They were in fact enabling statutes in aid of the prerogative of the crown; to give to the king a power of doing that which was necessary for the safety of the state, but which he could not do without the direct assistance of parliament. This is, to limit or take from him a power which he already has, and to subject him to restrictions and disabilities, at once encroaching on the prerogative, and prejudicing the service of the country. The right hon. gent. opposite appears to doubt the truth of this construction. I ask, in what possible way any statute can operate upon the prerogative of the crown, except in one of these three;—either as giving some power, which the crown had not before; or as explaining and confirming some doubtful or obsolete prerogative (as was the case in the bill for calling out the levy-en-masse), at the same time prescribing the mode of its exercise; or, thirdly, as directly limiting, restraining, or abolishing some power, which the crown had hitherto been in the habit of exercising without dispute? In which of these three ways does the present measure operate? Does it give to the King, as a new power, the right of raising men for limited service, or has not the crown always had and often exercised that right of limitation? Does it revive or explain any prerogative of doubtful construction? Does it even leave the power and prerogatives of the crown as it finds them? Has not the crown at present, and has it not always had, in addition to the power of limiting the service, that of enlisting men for an indefinite time, subject to discharge at its own pleasure? and will not the clause now under consideration, if sanctioned by the legislature, take that power completely away? And for what object, and from what necessity is this alteration of the constitution projected? Cannot the experiment be tried as well by that authority which has always hitherto exclusively regulated the terms of enlistment and the internal economy of the army; leaving with that authority the discretion of trying it at such times, and to such extent as may be most favourable to the experiment; (leaving the discretion also of suspending that trial, if its result should be found less beneficial than is expected):—cannot, I say, this experiment be made in this way, wish as much advantage, and with much less danger, than by pledging the whole legislature, not only to try it, but to abide the issue of that trial, without any alternative, and without the possibility of retreat? Does not the right hon. gent. feel, that a regulation by the crown would be equally effectual; while, if necessary, it could be recalled, without inconvenience? Does he not feel that a partial experiment in the first instance, will be amply sufficient to ascertain the merits of his plan; while, if unsuccessful, it might be abandoned or suspended, without difficulty? Does he not feel, that by making this great change, the work of the whole legislature, and the rule of the whole service, while he adds nothing to the facilities of experiment, he enhances incalculably the dangers of failure? And if this be the case, I do not ask what necessity, but what pretence, what decent apology can the king's ministers offer, for laying the foundation of their plan for remodelling the army, by dismembering the ancient prerogatives of the crown? These, sir, are the grounds on which I should object to the mode in which the measure is brought under our discussion, even if from the measure itself I entertained sanguine expectations of good, instead of anticipating, as I confess I do, abundant evils and dangers. I object to establishing that as a system, which is confessedly to be tried as an experiment: I object to limiting the king's prerogative, for the undesirable purpose of putting the management of the recruiting and the detailed economy of the army into the hands of parliament: I object to this, even if the experiment is to succeed and the system to become permanent: but if there be the remotest chance of failure, and of a necessity for recurring to the old system again, I object doubly to a pledge on the part of parliament which must embarrass, beyond all calculation, the difficulty of a retreat. But the right hon. gent. and his friends are confident that the experiment cannot fail. One of his friends, indeed, the hon. colonel (colonel Craufurd) is much more sanguine than the right hon. gent. himself, and rebukes the right hon. gent. for having admitted that no immediate good was to be expected. The hon. colonel is of a very different opinion; and, with an estimate upon the table, of 330,000l. annual expence, to be added at one stroke, immediately,—with the admission of the right hon. author of the project, that he looks for no immediate advantage,—the hon. colonel has the boldness to contend that the advantages are immediate, and the inconveniences and burthens, if any, contingent and remote. I can hardly presume to decide between such great authorities, especially when I find them differing upon. a point which they might be supposed to have settled in the course of their daily official communica- tion. But I confess I am inclined in this, though perhaps in no other single instance, to adopt the opinion of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham), and to give him credit for the remoteness and precariousness of any possible advantage from his plan; while the paper on your table, containing as it does but one item of the expense to be incurred, is of itself a sufficient proof that some part of the burthen at least is to be felt immediately. The right hon. gent. very ingenuously told us, that he wished he had looked a little more narrowly into the calculations of expence: I wish he had—perhaps it was in some degree his duty to do so; and he would at least have been enabled to make good his argument against his hon. friend (colonel Craufurd) and to correct his inaccuracy in one instance, as he disclaims his sanguineness in another. But as to the powerful effects and inducements which belong to the limitation of the term of service, there is no difference of opinion between the right hon. gent. and his friend. It is to fill the ranks of the army, and to fill them with a better description of people. To this we presume to answer, that if limitation of service be so alluring, we have already tried the force of that allurement, by limiting not the term only, but the space; by inviting men to serve not for a few years only, but for those few years at home: the trial has been not wholly without success; far from it;—but it has not had such striking and splendid success, as (compared with the general term of enlistment) to prove, that the limitations are so all-powerful as the hon. gentlemen represented them; and above it has not, according to the hon. gentlemen themselves, produced a materially better description of men to the service. "Oh!—but," say the hon. gentlemen, "that is because you limited too much. The men that we want to get at, are those who wish to serve for a short time, but to serve abroad. You have no receptacle for men of that sort."—Well, then, let us have one; with all my heart—but do not let us make up our minds to have no other sort: for, assuredly, however possible it may be that a reasonable proportion of such men may be found, it is a little too much to expect, that with an army to such an extent as we have at present, with an auxiliary force for home defence, in great part consisting of volunteers, (not one man of either of which establishments has required the inducement of this peculiar species of limitation),—it is, I think, a little too much to expect us to agree, that no other than this limitation can possibly be effectual. But I suppose it is amongst this bettermost description of men only, that the peculiar taste prevails. It is amongst them that we are to look for the persons who, according to the right hon. gentlemen, like very little service, but choose to have that service foreign; like the, man who, describing the sort of weather that best pleased him, declared that be would have "but little wind, but that little high." These are the persons whom the right hon. gent. describes as likely to enter into the army for the sake of seeing the world; who, leaving their village Desdemonas at home, would embark for the West Indies, for the purpose of returning like so many Othellos, with a collection of stories to woo them with upon their return. Unquestionably this theory, is a most delightful one; but I still have my doubts as to the extent, at least, of its possible operation. I cannot help thinking that that class of society, from which the ranks of our army have hitherto been chiefly supplied, must, even after the refinements of the right hon. gent., and all the lectures of the hon. colonel, on the necessary and practical operation of those refinements, still continue to be the only very efficient source of the supply. Upon this class—I mean the lowest and labouring class of the community, the peasant and the inferior artisan, I suppose it is not contended that these fancies will work very powerfully: and as to mounting higher, in order that you may obtain a more numerous recruitment, it seems to me that that notion proceeds upon a false estimate of the relative proportions of the different classes of society. Society has often been compared to a pyramid; but I never yet heard that the point was nearest the earth, and the broadest surface at the top. If that were the true view of it, the hon. colonel would be right, and the higher you mounted, the larger superficies you would have to act upon; but if the lowest class be, as it is, infinitely the most extensive, I do not see that much would be gained by looking in preference to a higher level for your supply. I really believe, sir, after all, that even when this system is in its fullest operation, the hon. colonel must still be content to draw his recruits from the plough, and from the fair, rather than from St. James's Street and the Royal Exchange. But if, after all, we are wrong in this supposition; if there be such a race as the right hon. colonel supposes, of such peculiar and characteristic disposition; of such small, and at the same time delicate stomachs for military service; whom none of the modes of service hitherto invented, have been able to satisfy; I am far from, contending, that this variety of the military species may not be worth comprehending in any general plan of military establishment. By all means, let us have all that we can get; but do not let us, in attempting to catch this rare and non-descript creature, weave the meshes of our laws too close to answer any more useful or general purpose. But by all means let there be a class of this sort of service; let there be certain regiments raised with this particular term of enlistment; let the second battalions, as has been more than once suggested by the hon. genral (sir J. Pulteney), be appropriate to it. For this, no act of parliament is necessary, no new .power need be given. The crown may raise regiments, or appoint battalions for this purpose; and wherever these singular individual; are to be found, wherever the right hon. gent. or the hon. colonel has heard of them, in whatever part of the country they are latitating and circumcursitating, there the king's recruiting writ may run and secure them, if they are to be had, for his majesty's service. But where is the necessity of sacrificing every other chance to try this one, which may as well be tried without it? The right hon. gent. meets this question with an argument the most singular and the most hardy that can well be conceived. He admits that the trial of this principle has been made; and he admits, or rather contends, that its success has not been all that could be desired: "but," says he, "this failure has proceeded from its having been tried partially: make it the general rule of your service; recruit solely on this principle; leave nothing in competition with it; rely upon it alone, and be assured it will not fail you." Why, sir, this might be very well, if the interests hazarded upon the issue of the experiment, were any thing less than the safety and existence of the empire; and I could understand the argument, if its application were to circumstances directly the reverse to those which are now under our consideration. If the principle of our service had hitherto been the limitation of the term; if the innovation now proposed were to enlist for a term indefinite; if this new method had been tried partially, and had not answered, I could perfectly understand any advocate for indefinite service, who should say: "No wonder this experiment has not yet succeeded; it has not had fair play: and so long as the limited service is suffered to bid in competition with it, its complete success cannot reasonably be expected."—But it certainly is not an equally obvious truth, that the existence of the indefinite service affords a competition which must be fatal to the trial of the experiment of the limited term. I therefore cannot conceive a more unreasonable demand than that of the right hon. gent., that we should consent to abolish a mode of enlistment, which, if not so alluring in theory, has been found effectual in practice, in order to try, with better chance of success, (for which we have nothing but his word,) an experiment which, having failed when we risked but little upon it, he contends we ought now to risk every thing upon it, and try it again. Such being the only temptation which we have, according to the right hon. gent.'s acknowledgment, from the experience of our own country; we have naturally been desired to look abroad for the encouragement which was not to he found at home. Here, I think, however, the assertions of, the hon. gentlemen have been somewhat, mitigated, and their tone, of confidence somewhat lowered since the last discussion upon this subject. We no longer hear the general and sweeping declarations that all the great military powers have uniformly acted upon the system which the right hon. gent. recommends; that we have stood alone among nations, and that it becomes us as soon as possible to conform to the general example. Ancient France is, I think, tonight, the solitary instance upon which the hon. gentlemen rely, to which indeed is added the example of Switzerland, with respect to the troops which she has been in the habit of hiring out to foreign powers. As to the Swiss, it requires, I think, but very few words to shew that the mode of raising troops (however brave and valuable those troops may be), to be employed in the service of other powers, cannot fairly be cited as a precedent for an army upon, which the defence of their native country is to depend. It is perfectly manifest that it might be utterly impossible to induce men to quit their country for life, especially men amongst whom the love of their country exists in so strong a degree; and as to the foreign power in whose pay they served, it is equally manifest that the acceptance of their service for a limited term, proves no predilection or partiality on the part of that power for such a species of service, inasmuch as the troops were to be had on no other. The example of ancient France has been as confidently relied upon by the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) as before; but the remarks of the hon. general behind me (sir James Pulteney) have, I think, not a little diminished the force of the argument; and the illustrations of the hon. colonel (Craufurd), who intended, I suppose, to sustain the proposition of his right hon. friend, have done what little was left undone by the hon. general, to demolish it. It is allowed on all hands that faith must be kept with the soldier; that whatever period you fix for the termination of his engagement, at that period when it arrives, under whatever circumstances, under the pressure of whatever necessity, the soldier must have his discharge if he claims it. It follows that no example can fairly be stated in favour of this plan, which does not chew not only that such engagements were made, but that they were kept sacred and inviolable; and one instance, even one solitary instance, of the violation of such an engagement on the part of any government which is held out to us as an object of imitation, ought, in my opinion, to operate not as a light to guide us, but as a beacon to alarm and warn us of our danger. How then stands the example of ancient France? It was stated on a former night by the hon. general, and then sturdily denied, that the engagement of the French government with their soldiery had been violated at the beginning of the American war; that by an ordinance then published, the right of claiming discharges was suspended. Tonight this fact has been admitted; but the admission was accompanied by the right hon. gent. with a whimsical sort of triumph, because forsooth there was but this one instance to be found of such a violation of faith, and because this was a formal ordinance; as if the formality with which faith was broken in this instance, was a sort of proof how sacredly it had been kept before. But the hon. colonel has not been contented that the matter should rest there, and in order to satisfy us how unwillingly the government of France ever consented to the violation of its engagements, he has quoted the indignant expressions of Marshal Saxe against officers who did not keep their engagements with the soldiery. Marshal Saxe's indignation, virtuous as it was, pro- bably was not without cause. So here is another instance of the same breach of faith; or rather, in all fair reasoning, a complete proof that, even in Marshal Saxe's time, it had grown upon into a practice. What then is the true result of this single example of ancient France? why, surely, that if in that extensive and populous country, a country at all times capable of affording a great proportion of its population to the profession of arms, the government has nevertheless found it impossible to keep its word with the soldiery, it is wild and hazardous in the extremest degree to act upon the supposition, that in a country comparatively, limited in population, and that population called upon as it is to supply such an extent of manufactories, such a prodigious commercial marine, and a .navy which absorbs alone such numbers as bear no small proportion to the armies of the continent, it would be possible in all instances to keep faith with the soldier, if unfortunately this clause should pass into a law. That if we foresee the smallest probability of being driven by any necessity to a violation of our engagement, we ought not to enter into it: that we ought not to run after the example of France in her policy, at the risk of being obliged to imitate her bad faith, is surely not necessary to be argued in a. British house of commons. Having succeeded no better in his history from abroad than in precedent at home, the right hon. gent. has betaken himself, as usual, to analogy, and derives his analogies, as usual, from objects which at least amuse, if they do not enlighten. He admits in some degree the hazard of diminution to the army in the first instance, by keeping faith with the soldier; but this diminution is to be repaid with interest. He is not surprised that a colonel of a regiment, or the captain of a fine company of grenadiers should feel loth to part with any number of his men at the expiration of a limited period. Just so, says the right hon. gent., it goes to one's heart to thin a fine grove of young and growing trees, till we reflect that, by taking some away, the remainder will grow finer and taller. The right hon. gent. hardly needs be informed that this simile is not perfectly accurate, unless he means that the remaining grenadiers are to increase in height and corpulence in proportion as their comrades are removed. Still more unfortunate is the right hon. gent. in the field of turnips into which he has wandered, though led there by an apparently happy ambiguity of words, which might have misled a less ingenious speculator. Does not the drill husbandman hoe his turnips, says the right hon. gent.; and what should prevent the drill serjeant in like manner from hoeing his battalion? The remaining turnips thrive and swell—but here again unluckily is the same mistake of size for number; and I cannot help fearing, that the right hon. gent.'s system of husbandry will turn out nearly as unprofitable as that of the theorist, of whom the story is told in La Fontaine, who contrived to have nothing but the leaves of his turnips to carry to market. I very much fear that the right hon. gent., when, at the eve of any war, or in the middle of any campaign, he is fulfilling his engagements with the soldiers whose services are. expired, will find that he is depriving his battalions of all that forms their substance, their solidity, and their strength, and that what he suffers to remain will be comparatively but the leaves of the turnips. To this apprehension, however, the right hon. gent. opposes the confident persuasion that the men will not claim their discharge when due. The hon. colonel, to be sure, rather differs from his leader in this, as in other respects, and thinks. that they will; but he thinks, that being discharged, they will do a good almost more than equivalent to their military service, by instigating others to take the places which they have quitted, and that their precept will countervail their example. It would really be a great advantage to us in these debates, if the right. hon. gent. and his friend would argue a little more precisely as to their own objects, and would agree upon the expectation which they would wish us to entertain; especially when they are so eager in rejecting the imputation of theory, and desire to be considered as reckoning upon nothing which has not experience and example in its favour. But I am willing to take the hon. colonel's view of the subject as that which their own examples go nearest to establish. The Swiss, I presume, did return home at the expiration of their service; and that the prevailing habit in France was to claim the discharge which became, due, is fairly to be inferred; as well from the ordinance of 1788, as from what the hon. colonel has informed us of Marsha] Saxe's opinions many years before. What do we learn from the hon. colonel to have been Marshal Saxe's opinion upon this subject? He prescribes that faith shall be inviolably and invariably kept with the soldier, that the discharge when due shall be given to every man that claims it; and does he then reckon upon their not claiming it? No such thing; on the contrary, he follows up this recommendation with a proposition, which shews at once his persuasion that the discharges, will be claimed, and his sense of the difficulty which will arise from granting them in time of war. And what is that proposition? The hon. colonel tells us that he suggests something very like the present system of conscription in France. This I confess, sir, is the very thing which I have all along apprehended as the ultimate and-most undesirable end of the right hon. gent.'s refinements and theories. The right hon. gent. is offended by the word theories as applied to his system. He will permit me at least to class them with the meditations of Marshal Saxe: and, as the Marshal was not ashamed to characterize them by the name of reveries,.I shall, unless I am positively, prohibited, take the liberty of applying the same term to the speculations of the right hon. gent. If that may not be, let us contrast, the whimsical, fanciful, visionary reveries of this same speculative marshal, with. the solid practical judgment and profound military knowledge of the right hon. gent. Marshal. Saxe did not reckon upon the re-enlistment; the right hon. gent. does:—but I think the right hon. gent. must at least agree with Marshal Saxe, that if the re-enlistments do not. take place, and if, good faith is kept as to the discharge, and if the mere prospect of that discharge has not been found sufficient here, as it was not found sufficient in France, to keep up the army by voluntary enlistment to the establishment requisite for war; the right hon. gent., I say, must see, as Marshal Saxe did, that some other means then must be resorted to; and in the state of things which the right hon. gent.'s system will have produced, after it has been a few years in full operation, I should be, glad to know what expedient for that purpose the right hon. gent. himself has in view. short of conscription. The right hon. gent. has told us very truly, that there are but three ways by which a military force can be raised; either by voluntary enrolment, or by compulsory; or by a mixture of the two. The compulsory enrolment he deprecates; cuncta prius tentanda; he would resort to it only in the last extremity; but my complaint against the right hon. gent.'s system is, that it tends directly and inevitably to bring this extremity upon us. It is against all experience that voluntary enrolment alone should suffice for all the military purposes of a great nation; there is no instance in the world in which it has been found sufficient. Recognizing this truth, we have in this country had recourse to a mixture of compulsory service; we have applied compulsion in its most mitigated form, and to borne service only; for foreign service we have recruited by voluntary enlistment, but finding the difficulty of filling our ranks by those means, we have not hitherto thought it wise to increase that difficulty by multiplying threefold the opportunities of quitting the service. This the right hon. gent. now proposes to do. He proposes, in addition, to discourage, more or less,—in some instances he has suspended, and in some he has abandoned, the modes of compulsory enlistment. I ask him, if his theory should fail, what refuge has he left him but conscription? I say that his attempt to square every thing to a theory will lead to the necessity, at some time or other, of employing rude force; that his delicate and fastidious refinements will be the parent of a severe and undiscriminating necessity. It will be too late to retread our steps when the hour of that necessity arrives. In God's name, let us not precipitate it; at least, let us not be persuaded to do so, by such arguments as we have heard this night! What argument in fact have we heard upon this subject, to solve the obvious difficulties which are in every body's mind, but more especially that difficulty which of itself is conclusive against the adoption of the right hon. gent.'s system, as a general system, and which I have reserved to this period of what I had to say, as that which distinguishes the case of this country from that of any other; and as that to which, unsatisfactory as the answers from the other side of the house have been upon every other point, they are so peculiarly and singularly unsatisfactory, as to provoke not remark only, but indignation! The house will readily apprehend that I allude to the colonial service. It is plain, that if the example of all other countries, if the example of France, were as distinctly encouraging as they have been shewn to be the reverse, till the extensive colonial possessions of this country, and the great proportion of our army which it is necessary to employ in their defence, would alone be sufficient to discourage the adoption of the system by this country. I will not take up the time of the house by pointing out the obvious difficulties and dangers arising from this system to the defence of our colonies;—but mark the answer, and the only answer which has been attempted to be given to them!—The right hon. gent. expressed a hope, in which the hon. colonel faithfully followed, that the danger might not be quite so great as it appeared; and that before it actually occurred, means might be found to remedy it: and this is all!—After so many years debate, after so many months of official deliberation, the right hon. gent., in bringing forward a plan for the complete alteration of the established military system of the country, is no otherwise prepared to meet the objection which every man in this house, and out of this house; which every man who has either written, or spoken, or conversed, or thought upon the subject, has had uppermost in his mind, than by a vague and distant hope, that at some time or other, somebody or other may, in some way or other, discover something or other, which shall, some how or other, remedy someone or other, of the manifold inconveniences and dangers which we all concur in apprehending!—As to the right hon. gent. himself, he washes his hands of it: it is not to him that we are to look for the solution of the difficulty; and with this explanation parliament is to be satisfied! Sir, to such a plan as this, introduced in such a manner, supported by such arguments, fraught with such difficulties and dangers; a plan unnecessarily invading the prerogative of the crown, and unadvisedly committing the faith and discretion of parliament,—I cannot but give my most decided and unqualified opposition. I do not thereby mean to pronounce any opinion against the expediency of trying the experiment of limited service.—The crown has already the power to try it. Let the right hon. gent.—let the king's ministers exercise their constitutional right to advise the crown to make the trial, if they shall think fit: but let them not insist upon making parliament a party to their experiment. No practical advantage is gained by our interference; and by abstaining from interposing, we shall at least avoid many practical disadvantages which may result from it.

rose, in reply to the right hon. gent. He said, that before he entered into any discussion of the principles of the bill, he must first answer some interlocutory objections that had been made. As to the complaint of its being hurried forward with such precipitation, just as the mutiny bill was going to expire, he must remind that right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) and his friends, that, a few days ago, they had contended that the discussion should be delayed two days longer, as they had wished the discussion not to come on before Monday next. If he and his friends persisted in fixing it for the present night, and not putting it off, it was merely that parliament should have as much time for the discussion as could be given before the expiration of the Mutiny bill. If they had fixed it for Monday, the complaint would have been, why did not you bring it in sooner; why did not you give us more time to discuss it? This was a tolerable sample of the general style of the right hon. gentleman's arguments. If the measure had been introduced in the Mutiny bill, it was because such was the constant usage of parliament. The right hon. gent. next found fault with popular assemblies, and parliament's meddling, with the army of the crown. Where was it that he made that objection? In a house where the Mutiny bill is annually, passed, for the avowed purpose of subjecting the army of the country, in some measure, to parliamentary controul. "But," said the right hon, gent., "we spent our time much better when we were in administration; we never interfered with the army of the crown; but we provided a constitutional and a parliamentary army to be a balance to it, and at the same time to assist it with recruits." For his part, he must say, he never heard of a parliamentary army before, except in the year 1641; and as for the distinction which had been made, of royal army and parliamentary army, it was what no writer, no speaker, nor no man at all acquainted with the principles of the constitution, had ever taken notice of. Every army in this country was royal, and every army was also parliamentary. The right hon. gent. seemed to consider the disposable force as the king's army, and every other description of force as a sort of balance to it. The militia, indeed, from its composition, and the description of its officers, might be, in some degree, considered in that light; but as to the additional force raised by the parish bill, nothing could be more ridiculous than to call them a parliamentary force, which was to be a balance to any other, as they were offered by persons appointed by the crown, and taken from the king's army. An hon. general (sir J. Pulteney) had, on a former night, roundly asserted, that no other nation in Europe had ever adopted the limited service recommended; but that night he was pleased to retract something from his assertion, and only said, that the general practice of the European nations, was against it. The hon. general had not stated the case fairly, when he represented, that, if old France adopted the system, her armies were the worse for it, and that in the 7 years war they had been every where defeated. The hon. general should not have confined himself to the 7 years war, but should have also taken the war preceding it. In that war he would have found, that though the French lost the battle of Dettingen, they won that of Fontenoy, and were, in the whole of the war, most conspicuously successful. Even in the 7 years war, the conduct of the French armies was by no means treated with that levity in the writings of the king of Prussia, that it had been by the hon. general. As the ordonnance subsisted from 1710 to 1787, it was not fair merely to take 7 years of that period as a criterion, when for 77 years they had acquired and supported a high military reputation. The argument which his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) had drawn from the Swiss, was, in his opinion, a very strong one, and completely unanswered. If it were said, that the moral excellence of the soldier's character was destroyed by the thoughts of leaving the service and returning to his home, he should ask, do not the Swiss also feel a strong desire of returning to their native country, and have not the Swiss been at the same time good soldiers? Has not even the circumstance of their joyful return to their homes and families, been made a means of encouragement to others to inlist? When the young men of the country saw the soldier return to his borne with more reputation, more happiness, more of every thing that could give satisfaction to mankind, they wished to embark in the same career. As for the measure proposed being a novel theory, he should only say, that it had been urged in that house 25 years ago, and it was no less than 16 years since his right hon. friend had stated the advantages which might be expected from changing the term of service. In the system proposed, he thought great advantages would be derived, both from the soldiers who stayed after their term was expired, and from those who left the service. Every one who left the service would show to his townsmen, or neighbours, the liberty that was granted to soldiers to return to their homes, and this, he thought, would immediately have a strong effect in recruiting the army. It was strange, that those who had so often argued that there was something in real service, and in the regular army, which attracted persons who inlisted for home service, should, upon the present occasion, contend that it had no such attraction, and that every one must prefer the home service. It was no wild speculation or theory, to calculate upon the common sense and common feelings of mankind. There was no doubt but, that any body who had a horse to dispose of, would rather sell him for twenty guineas than for ten; and there could be no doubt, but that the military profession must be rendered more attractive by being made more eligible. A right hon. gent. (Mr. Yorke) had asked, was it necessary to extend our military system? Had we not an army which, both in discipline and in numbers, was every thing that could be wished; which was fully efficient for every purpose? For his part, he could not allow that we did possess an army efficient for all the purposes of the country. It must be remembered, that in the unfortunate campaign on the continent, the country was placed in such a situation, as to witness the defeat of its allies, without a British soldier having an opportunity of striking a blow in their defence. If it be said, that the country had, at that time, an army fully efficient, what must be thought of those ministers who did not apply the means they were possessed of for the annoyance of the enemy, and the support of our allies? That most disastrous campaign was decided without a British arm being raised, or a musket fired, in defence of the continent of Europe. What would the great duke of Marlborough have said, if the ministers of that day had told him, "you are certainly the best general in Europe, and our army is very fine, and efficient to all the .purposes of the country; but we cannot give you any force, either to protect our rallies or to attack the enemy?" It has been often said, What occasion has this country for a great army, when its fleets ride triumphant in every sea? He felt considerable confidence in our navy, and shared in that pride which every Briton must feel at the brilliant victories our fleets had obtained over the enemy; but at the same time he must say, that by our naval superiority alone we should never be able to prevent France from extending her conquests over the continent of Europe. O! but, say others, we have plenty of money; we can afford to subsidize nations, and hire foreigners to fight our Cattles. In answer to that he must observe, that all history shewed that such are not the means by which greatness and national honour are to be defended. This country had, at many periods, made great and astonishing exertions. When William III. was at the head of the confederacy of Europe, this country acquired considerable renown. Again, in the reign of queen Anne, when the duke of Marlborough commanded our armies, although the native British troops that he commanded were a small portion in number to their German allies, yet they ranked high in military reputation, and contributed powerfully to the common cause. In the seven years' war, a few British regiments, under the command of prince Ferdinand, contributed essentially to the victory at Minden. It was this way the country acquired renown, "Sic itur ad astra." It was by the valour of her troops, and not merely by the power of subsidising foreigners, that, in the best times of her history, she had gained so high a character among the nations. These wars had been undertaken, in a great measure, to preserve the balance of power; and, however this idea might be ridiculed, our ancestors saw, what we have felt, that this balance of power could not be destroyed without the most serious evils resulting to Europe, and without our being exposed to the domineering influence of France. The situation in which the country was placed was this: it must either trust entirely to its navy, its commerce, and its ships, and patiently submit to see the power of France extending over every nation in Europe; or else, it must think, at some future period, of being able to afford some relief to nations that are oppressed, and of preserving its connection with the continent of Europe. If this was the determination of the house, it was evident, that the only means of accomplishing these things was, to improve our armies; but if the country should prefer what he considered the ignominious alternative (which he, for his part, would never consent to) of separating itself from the interests of other nations, and endeavouring to preserve an insulated greatness, he conceived that such a conduct would be still more dangerous, than it would be to follow a more generous policy, and one more befitting the character of the British nation. He should also have an objection to the alternative, even upon constitutional grounds. It was known, that the character of the House of Brunswick was to resist every attempt that might be made against the constitution of this country, and especially any attacks which might be made by France, or with French assistance. The character, however, of any other family which had reigned in this country had been very different. If, then, it could ever be supposed, at some remote period, that any sovereign of this country could act on the principles that sonic sovereigns had acted on, when there was a compromise between England and France, that one was to rule by sea, and the other by land, the assistance of France might be requested against the liberties of the subjects of this realm. Although he did not state this as a case very probable, yet he thought the bare possibility of it made it an object worth consideration. As to the navy, he bad such a high opinion both of the skill of its officers, and of the great reputation it had gained (a reputation which would do more than any thing else to preserve its superiority), that he felt confident that France and Spain could never equal it. He therefore differed much from some of his honourable friends on the subject of invasion. He by no means dreaded invasion. He thought we had, in the first place, a powerful security in the superiority of our navy; and, in the second place, in the spirit of the British nation, which, he was convinced, was abundantly sufficient to triumph, ultimately, over any army that could invade this country. When he was asked, then, why do you want a greater army? have we not soldiers enough to defend the country? he should answer, "we have enough, and more than enough." So far from thinking the number too few to defend the country, he would state most distinctly, that if he saw any prospect of recovering for Europe what had been lost in the late unfortunate campaign, he should have no objection to risk a part of the army we possess in the attempt. He thought, that we should think of acting offensively in the war, as far as our powers extended. Although the disposable force of this country bore but a small proportion to the French armies; yet, it did not follow, that we should not be able, at some future period, to give a powerful and effectual assistance to some of those nation which France, in her ambition for extending her power, may hereafter choose to attack. He was always an eager and ardent friend of peace, and he was still a friend of peace. He indeed wished for such a peace as could be made on tolerable terms; but then the character of the peace he wished for was, that it should preserve our connections with the continent of Europe, and not give up any thing which the point of honour forbade us to give up. If such a peace were made, he hoped the nation would not uselessly retain the passions of war in a time of peace. As to what regarded the point of honour, he considered it still, as he had often stated it, as a matter of the highest importance among nations, and one of the few legitimate grounds of war. In the consideration of the force that the country required at the present time, it would not be sufficient to talk of what it was in the time of king William and queen Anne, and say, that it is now double or treble what it was at that time. The question was, what was sufficient for the circumstances in which the country was now placed, and for the objects it had in view? If its objects were, us he conceived they ought to be, to be able to render, at some future day, important services to the continental nations, it was evident that our army ought to be increased; and he knew no better means of doing it, than by adopting the system which was proposed by his right hon. friend. The military measures which had been proposed in the course of the war, were merely temporary measures. When a great alarm of invasion had been spread, it was natural to call upon all hands to repel it. The object, at the present day, was not so much to repel invasion, as to recover for the country that military rank and influence which it had, till very recently, preserved in Europe. He was more sanguine in the immediate advantages of this measure, than was his right hon. friend, who introduced it, although, perhaps, not quite so sanguine as the hon. colonel (col. Craufurd): he did conceive, that the great obstacle to the recruiting service, at present, was, the prejudices of parents, who conceived that their children were utterly lost and ruined, if they entered into the army, whether in the cavalry or infantry. If this measure could remove this prejudice from the minds of fathers or mothers, it would remove the greatest obstacle that now stood in the way of the recruiting service. It would not only get a better description of recruits, but would make the recruiting service operate on a much more extensive description, by taking in the inhabitants of the country, as well as the population of the manufacturing towns. He was sorry the navy had been at all mentioned; but, with respect to the allusion which had been made by the hon. gent. to a late regulation, upon a principle similar to that now proposed, namely, inlisting them, instead of for life, only for a term of years, or during the war, he was surprised that the hon. gent. was not acquainted who were the authors of that arrangement; he would, however, inform the hon. gent. that it was made by his own friends, the late administration, as the last act, of their official authority, and it certainly was the best of their whole administration; and, so far, as it, went, it was an irrefragable proof of the efficacy of the principle, as well in procuring a numerous and rapid supply of recruits for the marine service, unparalleled upon any former, occasion, as in obtaining them from a better order of men. In answer to the arguments of the hon. gent. Against extending the same principle to the army in general, he could only say, the principle, so far as it had been tried in the case just alluded to, and according to the most general opinions of persons whom he considered the first military authorities, not only in the present day, but some years back, he considered, was a good and an eligible one; and having heard no other plan, as yet proposed, at all likely to produce similar effects, he should, therefore, adhere to and, support this. Much clamour had been raised against this principle, as new and untried; and the alarm was loudly sounded, to warn his majesty's ministers, against its adoption, lest, they should render themselves unpopular to the whole country; but, highly sensible as he was of the excessive solicitude of those who used such arguments for the popularity of those ministers, he must beg leave to say, that however unwilling they were to oppose their, own opinions against those expressed by the majority, or any great portion of the people of England, still they felt it their bounden duty, at a crisis so ardent as the present, not to temporise upon a measure of such vital importance to the security of the, country, under any apprehension of risking a temporary unpopularity; for, if they were to suffer their conduct, in concerns of such importance, to be swayed by such considerations, they might do that which would be popular with one party to-day, and unpopular with another to-morrow, and, in the mean time, sacrifice to popular caprice, or selfish considerations, the real interest and security of the empire, instead of doing that which was their indispensable duty, independent of all minor considerations; namely, adhering firmly to those measures which appeared best in their conviction, regardless of any risk to which their popularity might be exposed: nor did any man, in his mind, deserve the name of statesman, who would not, under such circumstances, firmly adhere to this principle. On the contrary, that minister who would abandon it under such circumstances, would swerve from his duty, and act the part of fool and a coward. In times like these, they ought not to temporise. If they were to be content to go on from day to day, from expedient to expedient, trusting to chance, and consulting every fluctuation of popular opinion, their task would be easy. The course was before them, like virtue and pleasure in the Grecian writer: the path, to which the one led, arduous and difficult; the other, smooth and easy. But, if they wished to be really useful to their country, they must often risk both their power and their popularity. Holding a firm and systematic attention to public good, they might sometimes find it necessary to act against the momentary influence of both; but, if they hesitated to do so, they would be political cowards. They would violate their duty, both as the servants of the crown, and as members of parliament, if they were deferred, by such considerations, from giving their opinions, and pursuing what they, thought right.

after apologising for an attempt to trespass on the house at so advanced an hour, promised to do it very briefly, and to confine himself to the question: in doing this, it would be impossible for him to follow the right hon. gent. through the wide and desultory field of argument he had adopted. To some points of his speech, however, it would be necessary to advert. Nobody, at least that he had heard, had made any such assertion, as that it was not necessary to increase the army. The question was not about the necessity of increase, but the mode of effecting it; and the point now for the house to consider was, whether the measure proposed was not much more likely to diminish than to increase the public force, Such was the effect, however, which, he was convinced, it was most likely to have. He was glad to hear from the right hon. gent, such a declaration as, that it was necessary, even in time of peace, to keep up a considerable force, under the existing circumstances of this country and of Europe, considering the kind of enemy with whom we had to contend; and he was the more glad to hear this declaration, because it was so diametrically opposite to an opinion formerly declared by the same right hon. gent., who said that our army ought to be reduced to the lowest possible peace establishment; and that we ought to consider Buonaparte merely as a rival in commerce. He complained much of the predicament, into which the introduction of the proposed measure into a mutiny bill would throw the legislature, .as by the introduction of a clause, having for its object the disposal of public money, if the other house of parliament should exercise a privilege with that clause, which they had been often it, the habit of assuming, the inevitable consequences would be, that the bill would be thrown out by this house, the existing Mutiny bill would expire, and the army of the country be, de facto, disbanded. The house, then, was pushed to the unfair alternative, of either adopting those propositions without discussion, or, in taking time to discuss them properly, incur the risk of disbanding the army. He was, therefore, of opinion, that the Mutiny bill ought not to be clogged with those clauses; but that they should be the subject of a separate bill, and thereby ample time allowed for discussion. The right hon. gent. had affected to ridicule the arguments of those who had before complained of delay in bringing forward those propositions, and now complained of the precipitancy of urging them to a decision: but he would ask, was it not much more ridiculous for those who had so tardily protracted their own proposition, to endeavour to atone for their delay by an unwarrantable precipitancy, in hurrying the house to a decision upon a measure without time to discuss it. Such was the consequence of that miserable botchery of legislature, so disgraceful to ministers, in twice successively coming forward with a Mutiny bill for a month, instead of taking, as he had advised the secretary at war, two months for the last Mutiny bill at once, which would have afforded ample time to discuss those propositions! But he not only complained of the precipitancy with which the house was pushed to a decision; but that they were called on to decide, without being allowed that light upon the subject, which the opinions received from military officers of distinction, by his majesty's ministers, would have reflected. He argued, that the great majority of those officers were decidedly against the discharge of men in time of war; and that the opinions of marine officers, and still more especially of artillery officers, had not been consulted; although it was their unanimous opinion, that the discharging men at the end of seven years would be the ruin of their corps, who would only have completed their training by that time. The hon. and learned member then proceeded to compare the expences at which the country would derive the services of the soldier for a hinted period, with those which it now paid for the services of the soldier for life. In the latter case, the highest bounty was but 16 guineas; upon the former, though the hon. gent. had not condescended to name any rate, yet it could not be presumed less than 12 guineas; and then 5 guineas for renewal of bounty at the expiration of 7 years. The weekly sixpences on the second 7 years, would amount to 9l. 2s.; then the renewed bounty for the last 7 years, reckoned at only 3 guineas; the weekly shillings would add 18l. 4s. more. The soldier, then, supposing he inlisted at twenty, would be aged forty-one years when he would be entitled to his discharge and pay for life, at per day; which, reckoning it only at eight years purchase, and adding it to the former sums, would amount to a bounty, or bonus, altogether, of 230l. per man; while, at present, the country derived the unlimited service of the soldier, for life, at a total expence of only 16 guineas; and supposing the soldier, in the former instance, to claim his discharge at the end of 14 years, he would then have stood the country in 80l, or 90l.; considering, therefore, the comparative expence as enormous, and the adoption of such an expence wholly unnecessary, as the country already possessed ample means of recruiting its armies without, he should oppose the motion,—The committee then divided on bringing up the clause: For the clause 254; Against it 125; Majority 129. Upon our return into the gallery, we found the house in debate, which lasted till half past six o'clock. The ministers wished to have the clause read a second time. No less than seven divisions took place; four of which were upon a repetition of the motion, "That the chairman do now leave the chair.". The business terminated by the speaker's suggesting, that an amendment should be proposed on Monday, pro formá, so as to admit of a further discussion on the principle of the clause.