House Of Commons
Tuesday, February 16.
Mediation Of Russia And Austria
rose, pursuant to notice, to move for certain Papers, which there was a necessity for having before the house, previous to the discussion which he intended to introduce on Monday se'nnight. All these papers were so obviously necessary to come to a right understanding on the subject of the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of ministers, relative to the proffered Mediation of Russia, and Austria, and he was so much at a loss to conceive any inconvenience that could result from their production, that unless he had received intimation that some of the motions would not be acceded to, he would not have thought that, in the present instance, there was any occasion whatever for his entering upon the question at all. But, as the matter stood, he should be wanting in his duty to the house and to the public, if he did not say something in support of the argument so ably maintained the other night, that publicity was the essence of the British constitution; and that parliament had a right to call for, and demand, all information which it was consistent with the public safety to give. Publicity might indeed be emphatically termed the essence of the British constitution, and to withhold important information was therefore a violation of its most essential principle. —Having said this much generally, he would now advert to the particular object which he had in view, in the motions which he was now about to submit to the house. Ministers, after the various transactions in which they had been engaged last summer, had laid upon the table notes, dispatches, and extracts of dispatches, explanatory of their conduct. These he considered deficient, and his design was to call upon them to supply the chasm which they had left. His first motion was for "Copies and Extracts of Dispatches from the secretary of state for foreign affairs to our ministers at Vienna relative to the proffered Mediation of Austria." As he understood that this was to be granted, he would say nothing further upon that point. The second, he considered as of paramount importance. It was for the "Substance of any communication made by his majesty's minister at the court of Petersburgh, to his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, of a conversation held between the emperor of Russia and lord Hutchinson, on the 23rd of Aug. 1807, relative to the Treaty of Peace concluded by Russia, and the offer made by that power to mediate a peace between G. Britain and France."—When he had given notice of this motion on a former day, the right hon. secretary had said, that he thought it improper to lay before the house any communication of an accredited minister with a foreign sovereign. After that, he must give up in despair all hope of convincing him that this document ought to be granted. But as his colleague, the fight hon. the chancellor of the exchequer, had modified that opinion, and said, that he did not go quite to the extent of the right hon. secretary, he would address himself to him, in the hope that he would not be altogether so inaccessible to the reasons which he might be able to urge for the production of these papers. But, addressing a few words, however, in the first place, to the right hon. secretary, he said, that one would think, from what the right hon. gent. had stated, that the communication of a conversation of a minister with a sovereign, was a thing which had never happened. The right hon. gent. thought that policy compelled our ministers to hold conferences with sovereigns, on account of the system to that effect introduced by the French ambassadors, with whom it was necessary that the British ambassadors should be on equality; and this he made an excuse for concealment upon the point of delicacy to these sovereigns. He spoke in high terms of the British ambassador being compelled to stand in the anti-room and witness the conduct of the French ambassador bearding the sovereign. By that the right hon. gent. meant, perhaps, to insinuate, that our ministers, ought to copy the example of the French, and claim an equal privilege on that head. With this spirit he might, perhaps, think that our ministers ought not to remain at the court. Now, he would ask him, whether our ministers had been required to proceed in this manner? He believed he could not be so indiscreet as to say so. He insinuated that it was a breach of duty in an accredited minister, to mention the conversations he might have had with a sovereign. This was not the case in all circumstances; but, at any rate, the noble lord (Hutchinson) was not an accredited minister; but a most distinguished individual—a hero, in this age of European heroes—one who was renowned all over the world for his military talents, and no less celebrated for his high sense of honour, than for his skill in his profession. One who, as a private individual, maintained a communication with the emperor of Russia, with the knowledge of our accredited minister. The conversation which he held with the emperor on the 23d of Aug. was well known at the time, and had been conveyed to this country in a dispatch from lord G. L. Gower. It had, he knew, been communicated to lord G. L. Gower, with the intention of being sent to our ministers. Why, then, should it not he communicated to the house? It was already known to all, and why should the house of commons remain without the knowledge of it in a regular and authentic form. The emperor, confiding in the judgment and integrity of the distinguished individual alluded to, asked him whether, considering the situation of affairs, peace ought not to be concluded? That noble lord asserted that it ought. The emperor then said, that he had offered his mediation for a peace with England, stating, at the same time, that from what he knew, peace might be concluded on honourable terms. Was not this document necessary, in order to enable the house to form its judgment? Was there any thing indiscreet in the communication made on this subject? No—the noble lord was prevented by no obligation whatever of duty or of expediency to conceal the conversation. It was not done rashly. He knew well what what to do ought to be concealed and what not. There were some parts of the conferences which he had not detailed, which shewed that he had weighted the matter well, and withheld what he thought it improper to disclose.—The hon. gent. then proceeded to state instances in which communications of conversations with sovereigns had been laid before the house. He mentioned, first, the confidential conversation between the first consul of France and lord Whitworth, which had been made public, in his opinion, most indiscreetly. The next instance was the communication of the public conference of lord Whitworth with Buonaparte, the publication of which he considerable as manifesting a still greater indiscretion. He also adverted to the dispatch of lord Strangford, who talked of taking upon himself to forgive the paccadillo of the prince regent. Where was the delicacy of the right hon. gentleman when he published this? He might at least have spared the humbled prince this mortification. But there was a prince who was not ashamed of giving his conversations to the world—he meant the Crown Prince of Denmark, who, on Mr. Jackson's adverting to the asperity of his language, said, that no wonder if his reply was marked by asperity, when such propositions were made to him; who, on our offer of what we called advantageous terms, replied, "what will you give me as a compensation for the wounded honour of Denmark?" The ministers had been very liberal of their communications after the death of Mr. Pitt, and laid the treaties with Austria, &c. &c. on the table, together with a dispatch mentioning the sentiments of prince Charles, which, though very proper to be communicated to them, ought not to have been made public.—It might, perhaps, be said, that he went to the extent of claiming all information. But he disclaimed any such intention. Whatever it might be prejudicial to the interests of the public to produce, he did not want; but when information was refused, merely because it would be prejudicial to the interest of ministers, he would put it to the sense of the house of commons whether it ought to be withheld. It might be said that he might argue on the paper in question as a matter of notoriety. Why, so he might, but he thought it more decorous to have it in a regular way before the house. Did such a paper exist? If they said—no, he should then know what to do. If it did exist in an authentic form, the house would decide whether it ought to be refused.—On these grounds, he trusted the house would decide in favour of his motion for this paper, and that they would compel the right hon. gent. opposite to produce it. There were other papers for which he should subsequently move, and to the production of which he did not know whether any, or what extent of objection, existed on the part of his majesty's government. They were as follow: "A copy of the answer that had been made by his majesty's minister, at the court of St. Petersburgh, to the Note from gen. Budberg, dated the 30th June, 1807; or any Instructions that he had received on that subject, from his majesty's government." it was scarcely possible to suppose, that the British ambassador had not returned an answer to a Note, containing such heavy charges against the British government. If he had not, let it be said so; if he had, let the answer be produced. 2. "A copy of the dispatches from the British minister to the court of St. Petersburgh, transmitted to his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, containing a confirmation of the assurances alluded to in the Note from lord G. L. Gower to gen. Budberg, dated Memel, 28th June, 1807, referring to a declaration made by his Imperial majesty at Tilsit, to the British ambassador, that no circumstances had occurred to weaken his attachment to Great Britain, satisfied as he was of the honour and fidelity of his Britannic majesty." 3. "A copy, or the substance of any assurances from this country, communicated to the court of St. Petersburgh after the commencement of the Russian war, with respect to any diversion on the continent by G. Britain, and particularly of the dispatches communicating the assurances alluded to in his majesty's Declaration; assurances, to which his majesty states, that his Imperial majesty had received, and acknowledged with apparent confidence and satisfaction."
was desirous of speaking to two points, mentioned by the hon. gent. The first was with regard to the answer which he was supposed to have sent to gen. Budberg's Note of the 30th of June 1807. That Note contained charges of so heavy a nature against the British government, that he had thought it his duty personally to state, with respect, but at the same with courage, such reasons as occurred to him in their justification. He had done this not merely from respect for the character of the late administration, but from the principle that, whatever party differences might exist at home, they ought not to influence the conduct of diplomatic agents at foreign courts. He had therefore put the emperor of Russia and his ministers in possession of the best defence that he could at the moment make. Subsequently, he had received from England copies of the correspondence between M. Alopeus and his right hon. friend. M. Alopeus's Note contained charges similar to those conveyed to him in the note from gen. Budberg, with this difference, that M. Alopeus entered into a detail from which gen. Budberg had abstained. To M. Alopeus's note an elaborate answer had been sent by his right hon. friend, which contained a most able defence of the conduct of his majesty's late government. At the first conference which he had had with the Russian minister for foreign affairs, after the reception of this answer, he had called his attention to its contents, but had not thought it necessary to add any thing of his own. As to any copy which he might have sent to England of the conversation enjoyed by lord Hutchinson with the emperor of Russia, the fact was this: during the period that lord Hutchinson had been with the Russian army, he was in the habits of constant and familiar intercourse with the emperor. It was therefore with great satisfaction he found that lord Hutchinson was induced, from motives of curiosity, to visit St. Petersburgh; for, knowing that that noble lord would have many more opportunities of private interviews with the emperor of Russia than he, in his official situation, could possibly expect, he flattered himself that the result might be highly advantageous to the two countries. Lord H. had communicated to him confidentially his conversation with the emperor; but certainly he did not understand that the noble lord meant this conversation to be the subject of a public dispatch. He had looked upon it as the confidential communication of a confidential conversation. He had therefore inclosed it in a private letter to his right hon. friend, not thinking it proper that the confidential conversation of the emperor of Russia with a private individual should be entered on the records of a public office.
said, the account given by his noble friend of the circumstances connected with the two topics to which he had alluded, made it hardly necessary for him to trouble the house on these points. The argument of the.hon. gent. however, who had made the motion, seemed to go to this, that a communication by a crowned head to an unaccredited agent of another country was equally proper to be produced, as if such communication had been made to an accredited agent. In this respect, he thought the hon. gent. had in some shape abandoned the motion of which he gave notice yesterday, and which stood on the Journals of the house. If, however, the hon. gent. after the statement of the noble lord had driven him from the one argument, should be inclined to maintain the other, he must contend, not only that communications made to accredited agents of this country, but even to travellers led to any foreign country by curiosity, and by them transmitted in a private letter to a person holding any official situation in this country, were proper evidence to be submitted to this house. He expressed his sorrow, that a right hon. gent. (Mr. Grenville) was not present. He might have suggested to the hon. mover the proper mode of rendering such private letter a good public and official document. He could have told him to what Board, to apply for this purpose, whether to the Admiralty, Victualling, or Transport. If he could only have laid his hand on some obsolete Note, that right hon. gent. would have instructed him how to make it official: he would have put him in the proper way to intreat—
Lord G. L. Gower had already explained, that he (Mr. C.) had, to the best of his ability, vindicated the late ministry from the charges made against them by the Russian government, and had also stated substantial reasons why neither the Note nor answer could be produced. He was convinced the hon. mover was satisfied on that head, and would not insist on the production of a paper which might do a treat deal of injury, merely with a view of making his own argument a little better or a little worse. Worse, he could assure him, after all, would it undoubtedly be made, were the Note produced. By sonic of the hon. gent.'s other motions, he seemed to have it in view, to ascertain, whether the cause of the country, as administered by the late government, had been defended by the present government. He appeared to think, that enough had not been done by the present ministers to maintain what had been done by the late ministers. When the hon. gent. asked for any assurances of military assistance that had been communicated by his majesty's present government, in confirmation of the assurances that had been communicated by the last government, he supposed that he alluded to the discussion in that house, in which it had been stated by himself (Mr. C.) and his colleagues, that on their coming into office, they found the expectations of the allies of G. Britain of military assistance, raised to a great height, but that they found no means provided of satisfying those expectations. He now repeated, that those expectations had been stated by foreign courts, more particularly and with greater precision than the distinct assurances and instructions which he had found recorded in the foreign office, seemed to warrant. But it was well known, that with respect to assurances of this nature, much passed in personal communications, which was not transferred to paper. With some of the motions he should comply most willingly; because when the papers were produced they would show that great expectations had been entertained of British assistance, by the continental powers; they would spew that the noble lord to whose authority the gentlemen opposite were so fond of referring, and for whose authority on military subjects, and on subjects connected with his situation, he entertained the highest respect;—that lord. Hutchinson had distinctly stated to the emperor of Russia and to the king of Prussia, that he knew his government intended to make a continental diversion in their favour; that he was authorised to make them the strongest assurances on this subject, although he could not particularize the point at which the diversion was to be effected. By some of the papers it would appear, that at the commencement of the late war between Prussia and France, dispatches had been sent to the courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm, calling loudly on those powers to make the greatest exertins, and to march an army to the assistance of Prussia. He did not mean to contend that that exhortation was a distinct and particular pledge on the part of G. Britain, but surely G. Britain had no right to require such exertions, unless she meant bonâ fide to imply that she would hear her share in them. After this call however, a great interval elapsed without any specific promise of assistance on our part, and the whole correspondence between Russia and G. Britain consisted of applica- tions and reproaches from the former. The court of Petersburgh was unquestionably entitled to suppose that they would receive support from this country, either by military diversion or by pecuniary assistance; they had neither. A proposal made by Russia to negotiate in this country a loan for six millions had been refused. He did not state this as attaching blame to the late ministers, for he fairly allowed that the negotiation of such a loan must, in effect, after the experience which this country had had, be considered as entailing a great risk, if not ultimately a burden, on us. But, there was a wide difference between refusing that loan and doing nothing. We might have declined making so considerable an exertion without disappointing Russia, by leaving her altogether without help. Had we agreed to raise 4 millions, or 3 millions, or 2 millions (for which of course provision must have been made as for a subsidy), we should at least have gratified the feelings of his imperial majesty; but of such an intention on the part of the late government no trace existed in the records of the foreign office. This complete refusal was the more censurable, as no power on the continent had been so uniformly faithful to its pecuniary engagements as Russia. When the wants of the Russian army were so pressing, towards the latter end of the last campaign, lord Hutchinson, in the sound exercise of the discretion with which he was invested, had advanced the miserable sum of 30,000l. to relieve them from their embarrassments. Since the war between the two countries that money had been repaid. With respect to the charge brought by the Russian government against the late administration of this country, for disturbing their commerce by unnecessary detentions, the present administration had refuted it in the face of Europe, with as much anxiety and decision as if it had been preferred against themselves. Though he thought it had been sufficiently refuted, he had no objection to the laudable desire expressed by the hon. gent. of vindicating his friends by the production of papers on the subject. The hon. gent. was desirous to obtain the dispatches from this country, containing those assurances of support and co-operation, which it was stated in his majesty's declaration, that his imperial majesty had received and acknowledged, with apparent confidence and satisfaction.' The hon. gent. implied, that in that passage of his majesty's Declaration, a distinction was meant studiously to be taken, between the list and the present administration; and that the assurances referred to, as having given such lively satisfaction to his imperial majesty, were the assurances of the present administration alone. The hon. gent. was mistaken: the Declaration referred to the assurances communicated to Russia in March, by lord Hutchinson, from the last, government, as well as to those communicated in April from the present government. How could his majesty's ministers more fairly defend the conduct of their predecessors, than by their identifying that conduct with their own? On the accusations by Russia, of our interrupting her commerce, of our withholding from her pecuniary and military aid; as those accusations were stated in the Russian Declaration, he did not see that there was any thing that would be deficient in the information, which would be produced, by the hon. gent.'s motions. But, there was a specific charge brought by Russia against this country, namely, the Expedition to Alexandria, which the hon. gent.'s motions would not sufficiently elucidate. In the correspondence of his majesty's existing government with the court of St. Petersburgh (without any reference to their private opinion), that expedition had been defended against Russia, on the ground that the war with Turkey had been undertaken by this country on Russian instigation, and for Russian objects. That in the course of that expedition, it was diverted from a point where it would have been successful, to a point where it could not, was a part of the subject which could not be entered into with minuteness in his majesty's Declaration. In moving for the correspondence respecting the offer of mediation between Great Britain and France, made by Austria, the hon. gent. thought that the chasm which existed from the month of April to the month of Nov. in the official notes between prince Starhemberg and the British secretary of state, an extraordinary one. It was easily to be accounted for. The proposal of mediation was made in April, while the campaign on the continent was proceeding, and before Prussia and Austria had made a separate peace. Under those circumstances, it was cheerfully accepted by this country, subject only to the condition that we must not be expected to depart from our good faith with other powers. Mr. Adair was then at Vienna, but it was a matter of general knowledge, that when a negotiation was carrying on between two courts, that the correspondence from the court where the negotiation was carrying on, to the minister at the other court, consisted only of a transmission of the official documents; lest a cross negotiation should be produced. Lord Pembroke soon after that time, was appointed the British minister at Vienna. Had his lordship found the terms of mediation accepted by the other powers, he would have communicated that acceptance to his government at home; but his voyage and journey had been so delayed by unfavourable circumstances, that he did not arrive at Vienna, until the latter end of June. A few hours afterwards the fatal news of the battle of Friedland reached that capital; and of course no more was heard of Austrian mediation; nor had government received any other political communication of importance from the continent, until that offer (at the desire of France) which was then on the table."Oh, let my little Note attendant sail."—
felt a good deal of astonishment at the conduct of the right hon. gent. who had just sat down. His observations seemed all to be stated from the question, rather than to the question, and to have been prepared more in contemplation of an accusation against the late ministers, than to have presented themselves on the motion of his hon. friend. First, the late ministers were culpable in having held out assurances, or exciting hopes of co-operation to the continental powers. Again, they were wrong in not granting a subsidy under the description of a loan. In one point he was perfectly ready to agree with the right hon. gent. that it would be highly improper, that any communication should be made which could at. all go to affect any districts, the inhabitants, of which were now subject to the emperor of the French. He was certain his hon. friend would agree with him in thinking, that nothing could be so wrong as to put the French in possession of any information which could enable them to wreak their vengeance on persons in this unfortunate predicament. But, the right hon. gent. said the communications made by the emperor of Russia to lord Hutchinson cannot be produced, because they are verbal. He believed there never was an instance of a crowned head making any other but verbal communications to those who were in his confidence. Did the right hon. gent. expect that the emperor should have sent, or delivered, a dispatch to lord? H.? He would wish to know, however, why the communication had been made to lord H. but that he might impart it to his government? Why it had been by him communicated? Why it had been by him communicated to our ambassador but for the same reason? And why the ambassador had thought it of such consequences as again to communicate it to the secretary of state of foreign affairs? It was said however, that this last communication was made by a private letter. He did not ask for the private letter, but for the genuine purport of the communication. When the chief of a government, offering to us his mediation, condescended to communicate on that subject with a native of this country, and that communication was transmitted to our official servants at home, was not the house entitled to know that such mediation was not improvidently slighted? As to the right hon. gent.'s observations on a member of this house, but not now present (Mr. Grenville) that was all a joke; the observation was below him. At least it was below the house to listen to it. He, the king's minister, received from the king's ambassador, and for the people of this kingdom, a letter, the very essence and quality of which proved it to be of a public and important nature. Did the right hon. gentleman deny it was so? Did he allege that his friend lord G.L. Gower had sitten down to write him a letter of pleasure; that he had entertained him with an account of a concert or dance; that it, contained an account of all the beautiful ladies of St. Petersburgh; or that it was a letter facetious and entertaining? He could say no such thing.—Would the noble lord stand up and say that it was a private correspondence by one individual, not connected with the king's service, to another individual not connected with the king's service, and on a subject not connected with the king's service? On the contrary, would he not say, that it contained communications from the emperor of Russia on the subject of his mediation between this country and France? How the letter was addressed to the right hon. gent. was of little consequences, its contents must shew whether it was in its nature public or private. He should suppose that the right hon. gent. were to be impeached for neglecting a favourable opportunity of concluding a peace, and that he should say he was indeed perfectly aware of the fact, but that he did not chuse to treat because the communication which had been made to him was of a private nature, to which he did not think himself entitled in his public capacity to attend. Would that be esteemed a sufficient vindication of his conduct? Would it not be said to him, 'It is not sufficient for you to allege that the information you had was private; you knew well it was authentic?' If lord H. was once the confidential agent of this country, and the emperor chose to send for him, and communicate his intentions to him, was it not the same as if he had done so to the accredited agent of this country for the time, and he had again made the communication to our ambassador? Was not lord H. to be entitled to the same degree of belief as if he had been the accredited agent of this country? Had the letter been in a different form, still it could have contained no more than it now did; and if these contents were important, there was no reason why the form of the letter should prevent the substance of it from coming before the house. The house had a right to know what it contained. As to the other papers connected with this subject, to the production of which the right hon. gent. said he had no objection, what would they enable the house to do, farther than just to form a conjecture of the tone, frame, and temper of mind which actuated the emperor of Russia in the mediation in question, as to which the letter alluded to would have afforded a complete proof? The right hon. gent. refused to the house the thing itself, but he granted them something else, which would enable them to form a conjecture as to what was refused them.
rose to state his regret that the right hon. gent. who had last addressed the house, should have shewn himself totally ignorant of the question before the house. He had discussed the propriety of giving all the information required, while the question now before the house was, the propriety of granting information on the proposed Mediation of Austria alone.
called the right hon. secretary to order; but, at the remonstrance of the Speaker, sat down.
said, he had only taken the right hon. gent. at his word. The right hon. secretary had said, nothing could be given of information to the house on the subject of Austria; he was, therefore, disinclined to attempt to fix the atten- tion of the house on nothing—a subject on which, however, the right hon. gent. could display his abilities: he, unfortunately, never found himself so much at home. —The first motion was then agreed to.
begged Leave to alter his second motion, by substituting 'the Substance' for 'a Copy' of the communication from lord Hutchinson.
opposed the motion in its amended from, because the substitution of the word 'substance' for copy,' in no way changed the merits of the question. He begged to be understood as putting the individual merits of lord Hutchinson wholly aside. He professed to have a high respect for the character of that noble person; but contended that the question ought to be discussed without any regard whatever to his character. When a person was, delegated by the crown to represent it at a foreign court, he conceived it to be invariably meant, that the interests of the country were confided solely to this individual, and that all communications of a public nature, in as far as they tended to influence the conduct of the government at home, ought to come through this channel. If it should he argued, that the communication, for the production of Which the hon. gent. had now moved, came through this channel, still he would maintain, that an ambassador at a foreign court had a discretionary power of judging what communications he should transmit to his government in a public and official shape, and what he might think proper to make in a private and confidential manner. To the latter of these descriptions, the communication alluded to by the hon. gent. belonged; and on that account he did not judge it a fit paper to be produced. If the hon. gent. imagined that this was the only instance in which accounts of conversations which certain individuals had held with the emperor of Russia, and of which his majesty's government were in possession, he was under a great mistake. He was in possession of minutes of conversations which other persons, for whom he had as much respect as for the noble lord, had held that sovereign, and the purport of which was certainly very different [a cry of hear! hear! from the opposition bench]. The hon. gent. might refuse to rely on such conversations; but he was equally entitled to refuse his confidence it that in which they trusted; and the simple fact was, that his majesty's government did not find it- self, under all the circumstances, warranted in changing the line of policy which they had adopted, and were determined to pursue, in consequence of lord H.'s communication. He deprecated extremely the present motion, not only because it was calculated for the invidious purpose of creating misunderstandings, but because he conscientiously believed that if the present motion was agreed to, it would countenance the idea that if any British traveller [loud cries of hear! hear!] happened accidentally, from affability of manners, or any other cause, to recommend himself at a foreign court, so as to have frequent opportunities of communicating, in private with the prince, he might institute a cross correspondence, calculated to shake the confidence of the government of his own country in the communications which it received from its own accredited agent. He might, for example, put a possible case, which he stated simply as possible, from having read the history of former times—should a young man (he would not say connected with any party, for parties were not supposed to exist), but should a young man while abroad on his travels, happen, accidentally, to go to a foreign court white an important and delicate negociation was pending between that court and his own, should he insinuate himself into the confidence of that court, and in his communications with his friends at home, give information directly the reverse of that transmitted by the king's plenipotentiary, and by these means perplex the councils of ministers, and introduce confusion into the measures of government,—it would be a natural effect of that principle for which the hon. gent contended in his present motion. It would, he contended, be recurring to the system of double diplomacy, which had been acted upon in the reign of Louis XIV. when some young man was generally sent along with the accredited representative of the sovereign to foreign courts, who insinuated himself into the confidence of the prince, the minister, or the mistress of the minister, and who was employed as a check upon the correspondence of the ambassador, a system which he was convinced the house would not be of opinion as proper to adopt, in conducting the affairs of this country.
replied, that the right hon. gent. had alledged, that the motion of his hon. friend was calculated to produce cross feelings [Mr. Canning said across the table, that he had applied the word cross, not to feelings, but to correspondence]; well, said Mr. P. a misunderstanding between two noble persons. This, he was sure, was an insinuation to which the house would not listen fur a moment. But, was the right hon. gent. serious when he talked of putting aside the character of lord Hutchinson, and if he did this because it happened to suit his purpose, did he suppose that he would acquiesce in the attempt so to do? For this he must have the consent of two parties, and certainly he never would have his. He might wave the consideration of the noble lord's character for himself, but he should not do so for him. Nor would he admit the puerile comparison which he had thought proper to institute between that noble person, and any young man who might be abroad on his travels. The communication now moved for, was considered of sufficient importance to be transmitted by his majesty's ambassador to his government, and as it was necessary to enable the house to judge of the conduct of government, he could not see upon what grounds it could be reasonably withheld.
expressed his surprize, that the right hon. gent. should have represented the motion of his hon. friend, as made for the invidious purpose of creating misunderstanding, at the same time that he himself introduced an allusion into his speech to air affair which had happened many years ago, at which time inquiry was challenged into all the circumstances, and in which a, gentleman was implicated, who since that time had held an official situation under his majesty's government, and from whom the right hon. gent. himself, he believed, could not withhold the tribute of his approbation. At the very time too, that he professed to discuss the question upon its general merits, he had substituted for the character of lord Hutchinson, that of a young man who was a creation of his own fancy. If the right hon. gent.'s argument had any meaning at all, it was art attempt to quibble away the constitution of his country; for he maintained, that if his doctrine of the obligation of secrecy was admitted to its full extent it would be in the power of any minister, by a private understanding with a foreign agent, to keep the public completely in the dark respecting the whole foreign relations of the empire. It would be sufficient for a foreign minister, in corresponding with the secretary of state, merely to begin his dispatch with 'dear sir,' or 'dear Canning,' entirely to defeat all inquiry. He contended, that there was no analogy whatever between the case in question, and the double diplomacy of Louis XIV. because the communication to which it referred was transmitted by the accredited agent of government; and he put the right hon. gent. in mind, that it was only now called for in consequence of the system of misrepresentation, which he bad been the first to introduce into debate by reading partial extracts from documents, for the purpose of giving more effect to a brilliant speech.
contended that all precedents were against the production of papers relating to confidential conversations with sovereigns. He commended the resistance made by the secretary of state in the present instance. It was only by a reserve of this kind that the dispositions of sovereigns and their ministers, to hold confidential communications with us, could be preserved. He was ready to vote for the production of all papers necessary to the justification of the late ministers, from the charges preferred against them throughout the country. But he would not consent to the production of any papers, not in themselves proper to be produced and called for, only from mere party motives. He professed a great personal esteem for the noble lord, who was particularly interested in the production of the paper principally alluded to, and he therefore lamented the more, that the noble lord had disclosed as much as he had done.
hoped, notwithstanding the general cry of question, that the house would permit him to make one or two observations, in reply to what had fallen from the other side. The right hon. secretary, with his usual ingenuity, had contrived to favour the house with two speeches upon the same subject; but had, whether from design or inadvertency, wholly departed in his second speech from the line of argument adopted in his first; at one time a paper called for was objected to as unofficial; and at another, the substance of that paper was refused, because the source of the intelligence was not at that time duly accredited. The right hon. gent. set out with requiring to be understood as speaking to the general principle, and then proceeded to state the particular case of Mr. Adair. This was certainly a very curious way of speaking to a general principle, without any reference to individuals. The right hon. gent. had talked a good deal on the contusion that would arise in the public business, from the consequences of a double diplomacy; and had taken great pains to impress upon the house the meaning of cross-dispatches, by the pantomimical gesture of crossing his fingers—(a laugh). He was resolved, it appeared, to tale his stand by the accredited, and the accredited only. He would not look at lord Hutchinson, but the general principle; and in the same breath, the right honourable secretary, spoke of English travellers passing through any continental court, &c. How was he to understand the right honourable secretary? Did he mean to say, that lord H. was merely in an ordinary character? Was his lordship to be considered merely as one of the heedless, gay, young travellers that occasionally sojourn at a continental court; whose intelligence must have been as unimportant as his observations were superficial? It was not a trifling familiar communication of court scandal from any of the buffoons or parasites that flutter about the person of the minister, the mistress, or the crowned head, that was demanded. What he asked for was the information which the right hon. gent. in his capacity as foreign minister, received from our accredited minister at the court of Russia, ld. G. L. Gower. And what was the avowed source of that information communicated by the noble lord, to the right hon. gent.? No less a-source than lord Hutchinson; who had at that time but just ceased to be an accredited minister himself. What had been the character of lord H.'s mission? Had he not the confidence of the Prussian court to such a degree, that he felt himself warranted in advancing on the part of this country, 30,000l. for the immediate service of the Russian army? And yet they were to be told, that his lordship was to be loooked upon, in discussing the present question, merely in the light of an ordinary English traveller; if so, he would ask the noble lord why ho thought it expedient to lay such stress upon the communication made to him by lord H. as to forward it with his other dispatches to the foreign minister of this country? if he did not so forward it on account of the individual, he must have forwarded it from a just consideration of its importance. But this importance was coupled with no necessity of secrecy, or mysterious apprehension of disclosure: and why not, then, give it to the house and to the country? The question of the propriety or impropriety of ministers rejecting the proffered mediation of Russia might depend upon that information. And yet, in answer to a demand for such information, they were told forsooth, that it was most important to be sure, both in its own nature arid in reference to a great question of continental policy, but that, unfortunately, though it had flowed through the customary channel of accredited agency, it had not sprung from it; for that lord H. happened not at that time to be accredited, and therefore that this information, however otherwise desirable, must be withheld, rather than the etiquette diplomatique should be violated. But, it seemed, an hon. baronet had done him the favour of imputing the present motion to party motives; the hon. baronet was rather unfortunate in his selection, for out of the nine there was not one less liable to the imputation, than that alluded to by the hon. baronet; for, it did happen that on that very question relative to the Russion offer of mediation between this country and France, he and his right hon. friends did not so entirely agree as on the other subjects. The hon. baronet had commented upon his inability to preserve the gravity of his countenance, during a certain part of his speech. He (Mr. W.) could not avoid smiling, when the hon. baronet had said that he would vote for the production of those papers which he knew ministers had already acceded to the production of; and according as ministers assented or resisted, it was not difficult to divine the vote of the hon. baronet. In a word, he asked for information; he asked for official documents of the last importance, and to the production of which no objection of secrecy or confidence was set up—it was public property, and as such he demanded it. He feared that its intelligence would but serve to confirm what at a future day he should have to bring before the house, that his majesty's present ministers were guilty of a fatal error in rejecting the proffer of Russian mediation. He wished before he sat down, to ask the noble lord, whether there was not some error, probably of printing, in the dates of some of his dispatches? There were three, for instance, dated 2nd Sept. thought it was evident from the tenor, that all could not have been written on the same day. There were two more dated the 9th Sept. in which that same inconsistency appeared.
said the first of the three notes now dated the 2d Sept. was written on the 1st, but by an error of the secretary dated as the others. Of the two under the date of the 9th, one was written on that day, and the other on the 19th. This date was altered in printing. The assurances alluded to in the Note of 28th June, addressed to gen. Budberg, were given in a private conference by the emperor of Russia at Tilsit, in which his Imperial majesty assured him (ld. G. L. Gower), that nothing that had happened should alter his friendly disposition and attachment to England, satisfied as he was of the fidelity and justice of the principles of his Britannic maj.—Mr. Whitbread then withdrew his first motion; the second, calling for Extracts from lord G. L. Gower's Dispatch, containing the assurances referred to in his Note to M. de Budberg, 28th June, was negatived; the one for Copies of all assurances of co-operation given to the courts of Russia and Stockholm, was acceded to, with some modification, as were all the others.
Papers Relating To Military Co-Operation On The Continent
The following are Copies of the Papers presented to the house of commons in pursuance of the above motion: viz.
Papers
Relating To Military Co-Operation On The Continent
No.1.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Ch. Stuart esq. his majesty's of St. Petersburgh, dated Downing Street, Oct. 28th, 1806.
Sir; The accounts of the unfortunate opening of the Prussian campaign have been received here. The most powerful and the most immediate succours are become indispensable for the support of that government, and if the Russian armies should not yet have moved, you will use the most pressing instances to the court of St. Petersburgh, to give orders for their advancing without a moment's delay.
HOWICK.
No.II.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to the hon. Henry Pierrepoint, his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the court of Stockholm, dated Downing Street, Oct. 28th, 1806.
Sir, The melancholy accounts of the first events of the war between Prussia and France, and of the unfortunate Battle of the 14th inst. have been received here. The effect of these disasters would indeed be most fatal, if it should induce the neighbouring powers from a despair of maintaining a successful resistance to the power of France, to endeavour to purchase their security by submission; a policy which the history of all countries that have pursued it, has proved never yet to have been effectual to its purpose.—The common danger which is now become so much more imminent than at any former period, has animated his majesty with an increased conviction of the necessity of using his most powerful efforts to avert it; and you will continue, in pursuance of your former Instructions, to urge the court of Stockolm to the most effectual application of all its forces in aid of the continental war, winch its own security as well as the general interest now so imperiously requires.
HOWICK.
No.III.—Extract of a Dispatch from viscount Howick to Chas. Stuart esq. dated Downing Street, Nov. 4th, 1806.
It is indeed a matter of the deepest regret that the war between Prussia and France should have commenced under such circumstances as to preclude the co-operation and assistance of those powers who might have been disposed to join against he common enemy. Under the present uncertainty, whether the disastrous events which have attended the commencement of hostilities may not have compelled Prussia to submit to such terms as the French may impose, nothing can be added to your former Instructions; but you will continue to give the most positive assurances to the court of St. Petersburgh of the steady determination of his majesty to resist, to the utmost of his power, all pretensions injurious to the honour of his crown, and inconsistent with the general interests of Europe. The increase of the danger will animate his majesty to increased exertions for the sake of the common cause, and dispose him more than ever, to cultivate the good understanding which so happily subsists between the king and the emperor of Russia, and which presents the only hope for the preservation of the liberties of mankind.
No. IV.—Extracts of a Dispatch from Charles Stuart esq. to visct. Howick, dated St. Petersbusgh, Nov. 4th, 1806.—Received Dec. 1st.
General Budberg in the course of the conversation which took place this day, represented to me the inconvenience and the difficulty of impelling the payment of the troops stationed beyond the frontiers, as highly unfavourable to the efforts of this country, and told me that he had already consulted with the minister of finance respecting the possibility of raising a Russian loan in England to a considerable amount. His exc. requested me to state if I thought his majesty's government would be disposed to encourage and facilitate the undertaking? I replied, that although G. Britain had sufficiently proved a desire to forward every measure connected with the common cause, it was impossible for me to give a satisfactory answer, unless I knew the amount of the security, and terms upon which it is proposed to raise the sum required. Baron Budberg assured me he had hitherto so little considered the subject, that it was impossible to reply to these questions, though he begged I would mention the wish as expressed on his part, to the king's government; observing, when I mentioned the circumstances respecting the former Austrian Loan, that the present proposition differed widely from that of the court of Vienna, because it is not the intention of the emperor to demand a subsidy.
No. V.—Note from Baron Nicolay, Chargé d'Affaires from his majesty the emperor of Russia at this court, to viscount Howick, dated 5th Nov. 1806.
Baron Nicolay presents respects to lord Howick, and has the honour to transmit to to his exc. a copy of a dispatch which he has just received from his court. He acquits himself at the same time, of the order which it contains, to inform his exc. the secretary of state, "that his majesty the emperor, not having made any prohibition with regard to the commercial relations between Russia and France, each individual of the Russian nation has the right of freighting vessels for the port of France, and of importing its merchandize."—Baron Nicolay flatters himself that this new declaration, if indeed it were still necessary after the frequent communications which he has already had the honour to make to his exc. upon the same subject, will contribute to accelerate the restitution of the Russian property detained here, on account of which baron Nicolay has had the honour of addressing himself to lord Howick on the 22nd ult. He embraces this opportunity to intreat his exc. to be so good as to enable him to return an answer to his court, upon the different subjects, which he had the honour to submit to lord Howick at the same time, and particularly upon that which relates to the imperial gymnasium at Volhvnia, and he is anxious to renew to his lordship the secretary of state the assurance of his most high consideration. London, 24th October (5th November,) 1806.
(Inclosure referred to in No. V.)
Sir; In pursuance of what I wrote to you on the 11th instant, respecting the claims of the merchants Glouhoff, Kelmund and company, it will be necessary for me to speak further to you on a subject, upon which I have just received instructions, and relative to which you also will equally have to explain yourself to the English government, for the purpose of removing every pretext which could be resorted to for the purpose of retarding the decision of those proceedings. The court of admiralty in London, requiring that the Russian merchants should give some proof of the trade with France having been allowed them, during the rupture between the two countries, you will represent to the British government, that his majesty the emperor not having made any prohibition with regard to this point, each individual of the Russian nation has the right of freighting vessels for the ports of France, and of importing its merchandize, especially as during the whole course of the late events the commercial relations between the two powers have not been interrupted, which is proved by the residence of the respective agents and consuls. I am, &c. A. DE BUDBERG.
No. VI.—Note from viscount Howick to baron Nicolay, dated Downing Street, Nov. 10th, 1806.
The undersigned lost no time in referring to the king's advocate the several representations made by baron Nicolay, with respect to the Russian vessels trading to the enemy's ports, which had been detained and brought into the ports of G. Britain. The answers were only received this morning, and are transmitted herewith.—The undersigned has already, in his personal interview with baron Nicolay, explained to him the principle upon which these vessels have been detained.—By the general law of nations, all commercial intercourse between belligerent states is interdicted by the very nature and existence of war; and the property of persons engaged in such a trade is liable to confiscation, unless they have the express licence and permission of their own sovereign to cary it on. This rule has been applied hitherto by the British government equally to its own subjects, and to those of its ally, presuming that Russia would do the same; and it being uncertain whether any or what permission had been granted to the subjects of Russia to catty on a trade with the enemy, Russian ships coining from the enemy's ports have been detained by the British cruizers.—It appearing, however, from the baron de Nicolay's note of the 6th instant, that the subjects of Russia are excepted from the operation of this general principle, by the declaration, that his imperial majesty had not thought proper to interdict the commercial relations subsisting ,between Russia and France, and considered his subjects as authorized, under this permission, to freight vessels for the ports of France, and to bring back merchandize in return, immediate orders will be given for the release of all Russian ships which have been brought into the British ports, and which appear to have been freighted with articles of an innocent nature.—All articles of a contrary description, and particularly naval stores, the British government feels confident that it could never be the intention of the emperor of Russia to suffer his subjects, in the present war, to transport to the ports of France. In a war in which those two powers are engaged as allies, it never could be wise or just for either to, suffer the enemy to be supplied with those means of offence which could only be directed against their common interests.—The undersigned, therefore, at the same time that he is commanded to express his majesty's readiness to afford all reasonable facilities to the subjects of Russia, in carrying on a trade with the enemy in innocent articles, (so long as such trade shall be continued to be sanctioned by his imperial majesty), is also instructed to request, that an express interdiction may be issued by the Russian government, against sending naval stores to the ports of the enemy, as by furnishing such supplies, the greatest injury must necessarily be occasioned to the common cause in which the two powers are so happily united.—With respect to the particular cases represented in baron Nicolay's notes of the 22 of October, the undersigned refers hint to the accompanying report from the king's advocate. The undersigned, &c. HOWICK.
No. VII.—Extract of a Dispatch from Charles Stuart, esq. to viscount Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, November 19th, 1806.
I have not ceased to press general Budberg to communicate to me, such details respecting the loan which it is proposed to be raised in England on account of the Russian government, as may enable his majesty's ministers early to decide whether it would be possible to comply with the wishes of the court of St. Peteraburgh. In a conversation which took place yesterday his exc. informed me that he had spoken with the minister of finance, and it is calculated that six, or if possible seven millions sterling will be the amount of the sum which they desire to raise by this method; that the capital shall bear an interest of five per cent. secured in whatever manner may be deemed most eligible, though he said that the Russian customs will, he hopes, be deemed an adequate security in case the proposition should be encouraged in England.—His exc. did not state the term or the mode of repayment, but said, he would very shortly send a messenger to England with further particulars, and suggested that some person versed in financial affairs should ,be authorized to settle the further details with this government. Though the amount of the sum may perhaps appear considerable, I must observe that the customs offer full security for the regular payment of the interest.
No. 8.—Extract of a dispatch from Charles Stuart, esq. to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Nov. 28th 1806. —Received Jan. 2d, 1807.
General Budberg lately told me that his imperial majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coast of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves.
No. 9.—Dispatch from Charles Stuart, esq. to vista Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Nov. 28th, 1806.—Received Jan. 2d, 1807.
My lord, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a note I received yesterday from general Budberg, upon the subject of the loan which this government purposes to raise in England, together with a copy of the answer which I thought the most suitable, as the determination which may be adopted by his majesty's ministers can be no way biassed by mere civil assurances on my part.—In addition to the particulars communicated in my dispatch, No. 55. I have since learned that to insure the repayment of the money at the cud of twenty years, a Caisse d'Amortissement or sinking fund will be established, and an adequate branch of the Revenue will be set apart to accumulate as soon as the two governments shall have arranged every difficulty.—General Budberg appears desirous that this matter shall be brought to an early conclusion, and has repeatedly assured me that the remittance of specie rather than bills will be a great convenience to the Russian court. I am, &c. CH. STUART.
(First Inclosure referred to in No. 9.)
The very critical state to which the disasters of Prussia have reduced the affairs of the good cause, far from abating the energy with which his imperial majesty is resolved to maintain it, has caused him to take the resolution of employing all his efforts to check and repel that torrent, the progress of which will meet with no further obstacle on the continent, but in the power of Russia. The extraordinary expences which the vigorous, measures in which his imperial majesty is engaged for the support of the present war, will impose upon him, requiring sums which cannot at this moment be drawn from the resources of Russia with that promptitude which circumstances demand, his imperial majesty has charged the undersigned to propose to his Britannick majesty's government, by means of his minister plenipotentiary, that a loan should be opened in England upon the following basis: 1st. The sum to be borrowed is six millions of pounds sterling. 2d. Of this stun one third shall delivered in gold, either in bullionor coined; another third in silver, either in bullion or coined; and the other in hills of exchange. 3d. If the British government will not undertake to convey this gold and silver to the ports of Russia, the remittance of them may be made in England to Messieurs Harman and company, bankers, accredited by the court of Russia. 4th. The account of the loan shall be kept in pounds sterling; the payment of the capital, as well as of the interest, shall he made in the same money. 5th. The term of the loan shall be fixed at twenty years, at the same time agreeing that Russia, during the first twelve years, shall have to repay as much of the capital as the balance of her commerce amid the state of her revenue will enable her to discharge; and that during the last eight years, the remainder of the capital shall be reimbursed in equal portions. 6th. The interest of the sums which shall have been delivered in virtue of the loan, shall be at five per cent. per annum, and until the said loan shall have been filled up and compleated, three or four periods in the year shall be fixed upon for the payment of the interest.—It would be very desirable that the imperial treasury should receive on account of this loan an advance of one million of pounds sterling, either coined or in bullion, which may be sent as soon as possible, and before the navigation is shut up.—The undersigned, in acquitting himself of the duty with which he is charged to Mr. Stuart, flatters himself, that aware as he is of the magnitude of the interests which are to be decided by the efforts of his imperial majesty, he will appreciate the importance of the propositions just communicated to him, and that his acknowleged zeal for the interests of the good cause, and for the principles upon which the strict alliance of the two courts chiefly rests, will lead him on this occasion to concur in the views of the emperor, by making known, as soon as possible, to his government, the proposals contained in the present communication. He seizes this occasion, &c.
A. DE BUDBERG.
(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 9)
The repeated proofs of his Britannia majesty's attachment to that cause which protects the liberties of Europe, are sufficiently notorious, to remove all doubt as to his sincere desire to concur in and even to anticipate the wishes of his only ally in the glorious struggle which the two powers continue to maintain.—The sentiments, expressed in the note of his excellency general Budberg, are perfectly analogous to the invariable principles of the British government, and unless there exist serious considerations with which the undersigned is unacquainted, he has only to perform the duty of reporting them to his government, in order to ensure a favourable result to the desires announced on the part of his imperial majesty. The undersigned, &c.
C. STUART.
No. 10.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, his majesty's ambassador at the court of St. Petersburgh, dated Downing street, Dec. 4th, 1806.
This dispatch I hope will find your lordship safely arrived at St. Petersburgh, and enjoying good health after the fatigues of so long a journey at so bad a season.—Mr. Stuart's dispatches to No. 47 inclusive, with the exception of No. 43, which has not yet been received, have been laid before the majesty has seen with great satisfaction the resolution expressed by the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, in consequence of the accounts which lead been received there, of the unfortunate battle of the 14th Oct. It is by such a spirit alone that the affairs of Europe can be retrieved, and your lordship will not fail to express in the most emphatic manner, the entire concurrence of his majesty in the generous sentiments entertained by his imperial ally—These assurances I have already given to Mr. Nicolay, who has made a confidential communication to me, of the contents of the dispatches received from his court, of the same date as Mr. Stuart's.—Among other things he is instructed to invite this government to a frank and explicit communication of its views with respect to the present crisis. To this I could only answer generally, there being at this moment no question of any particular military operation, that the same opinion is entertained here as at St. Petersburgh, of the necessity of combined exertions to resist the increasing danger, and of a full and unreserved confidence on all points connected with the interests of the common cause.
No. 11.—Extract of a dispatch from Charles Stuart, esq. to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, 18th December 1806.—Received Jan. 22d, 1807.
At court this morning his imperial majesty urged in the strongest terms the expediency of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe, by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland.
No. 12.—Extract of a dispatch from Charles Stuart, esq. to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, 2d Jun. 1807. —Received Feb. 6th.
I did not fail to press on general Budberg, the sentiments of his majesty's government: I can however only draw from that minister a repetition of the language I formerly detailed on this subject, accompanied by a complaint that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia at a moment when Great Britain does not shrew any disposition to diminish the danger, by a diversion against France and Holland.
No. 13.—Extract of a dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated Downing Street, 13th Jan. 1807.
With respect to the Joan proposed to be
raised here for the use of Russia, upon which I gave your lordship reason to expect further details, I have nothing very satisfactory to state to you. The information sent to M. Nicolay with a view to the accomplishment of this object is very insufficient, at least he professes to have received nothing more than the mere copy of the note sent to me by Mr. Stuart.—It must be obvious that this paper could not furnish that minister with the authority which was necessary in so complicated and difficult a business. In fact M. Nicolay has met with so many difficulties in his communications with the monied interest in the city, that he has found no other resource than that of applying for the guarantee of this government, without which it is stated that no loan can be raised for the use of Russia, except upon terms extremely disadvantageous to that country.—To this proposition, which is not even hinted at in the Russian note, your lordship will at once see the obvious and insurmountable objections. It is impossible that his majesty's government should make itself responsible for so large a sum as six millions, the annual taxation for the interest of which, combined with any adequate sinking fund, if it should ultimately fall on this country, would amount to little Jess than 500,000 l. sterling. The examples of the Austrian loans are too recent to allow any one to doubt that a loan thus secured, must in effect be considered as a subsidy; and would be so regarded by parliament were such a proposition brought forward there. —It may indeed be said that the resources of Russia are greater than those of Austria, and her credit, from the punctuality with which former loans have been discharged, better established. But here we must remark the difference between a loan negotiated with individuals, and one borrowed, (for such would be the effect of the proposed guarantee) from another state. In the one case the hope of raising future supplies in the same way must depend on the faith which is observed in the engagements entered into respecting them. Where the debt is to fall on another power, in the event of any interruption of friendship between the two governments, and still more in the possibility, (I trust very improbable case) of an actual rupture between them, the desire of distressing an enemy may be felt more strongly than the obligations of good faith; at the same time that the violation of that principle is not so certainly pro-
ductive of future disadvantage.—An individual who has no object but pecuniary profit will not again trust to promises which have been broken; but it may not unreasonably be presumed that as a government does not contract engagements of this nature, without having some political interest of its own involved in them, the recurrence of a similar interest may induce it no overlook the failure of former engagements. In addition to all this, on a general principle of national policy, it would not be wise, whatever may be our reliance on the honour, the good faith, and the steady friendship of Russia, to implicate ourselves in an arrangement, which if our present good understanding should at any tune cease, might enable that power in a moment of great difficulty to throw upon us the additional burthen of so large an annual taxation, as that which I have already stated. —I have dwelt so much at length on the reasons which must operate conclusively against a compliance with this request, in order that your lordship may be fully apprized of the propriety of the determination which has been adopted, and of the necessity of its been steadily adhered to. Every facility that can be given to any use Russia can make of her own credit, in this the only remaining money market in Europe, will be afforded. In the negotiation of the loan formerly raised by that power in Holland, similar difficulties were experienced, and they are understood to have been obviated by obtaining the security, for which a large price was paid, of merchants of well established credit, such as Alexander Hope and Co. of Amsterdam, and others. There seems to be no reason why a similar expedient should not be resorted to now, and if the terms should be worse than is to be wished, this is an evil which must be submitted to; nor is it reasonable that, in order to avoid this difficulty, the finances of this country should, after fourteen years of unparalleled exertion, be subjected to so great an additional burthen.—The pecuniary embarrassments of the moment, are the unavoidable result of the present unfortunate state of public affars, and even this country itself, great as its credit and its resources are, is not altogether exempt front them.—In the course of the discussions which have taken place on this subject, it has been suggested that an additional facility might be afforded by some arrangement for better securing to the creditors the receipt of the interest in England; and
an idea has occurred, that by a suppression of the customs on British merchandize imported into Russia, and the imposition of an equivalent export duty here, this might be effected; a separate account being kept of the duties so raised, and their strict application carefully provided for, by paying over the whole of them as fast us they are collected, into the hands of commissioners or trustees, who might be compelled by law faithfully to apply the whole to those purposes only, to which it would be so appropriated. Though it does not seem probable that the present plan of raising a loan will be pursued much farther, it may be useful to make some enquiry upon this subject, with a view to any future demands of the same nature, and to throw out the idea to M. Budberg, as one which has been suggested by an extreme desire to find some mode of facilitating the object which is in view, without subjecting this country to sacrifices which cannot, in justice, be expected from her. Your lordship will therefore endeavour to obtain the most accurate information of the amount and sources of the Russian revenue, of the made of its collection, of the amount of public debt to which it is pledged, and on what branches of the revenue the payment of such debt and the interest is secured, and particularly of the possibility of any such transfer of duties as that which I have above suggested.—The arrangement which I announced to your lordship in my last dispatch for the immediate transmission of 500,000 l. in specie, on account of the late subsidy, has been completed. The necessary declarations were this morning exchanged between M. de Nicolay and me; and the money will be immediately shipped for Gottenburg, on board the Quebec frigate. It is to be expected that Russia may make some complaints of what may perhaps be considered as an unwillingness on the part of this government to come to her assistance. M. de Nicolay indeed, in a conversation this morning with lord Grenville and myself, thew out some hints to this effect, and even asked if it was no longer the intention of this country to make common cause with Russia? To this the answer is obvious and easy. A refusal to comply with a request unreasonable in itself and injurious to this country, ought not to give rise to any such suspicion.—Your ldp. will find no difficulty in producing abundant proofs from the king's past conduct; and you will repeat, in the strongest manner, fresh assurances of his majesty's earnest de-
sire to contribute to the utmost of his power to the support of an ally, with whom, whether in peace or war, the king finds his own interest so closely connected; but it is not to be supposed that so great and powerful an empire as Russia can fail to find in its own resources, abundant means for its own defence. Should an inability to do this be avowed, it would leave little hope of success in a war, the whole burthen of which must then rest upon England.—His maj. has at no time shown a backwardness to second the efforts of the continental powers; but the case is not now of an auxiliary force which this government is endeavouring to draw out for purposes of offence, and the expences of which are to be defrayed at a great distance from the resources of the power which furnishes it. —Russia, attacked on her own frontiers, is become a principal in the war, and his maj. will be ready to afford her all the succour, which in that chaarcter, she can justly claim, and which the common interests may require.—But in looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes, and above all the inveterate enmity of the French government, must oblige this country to provide, his majesty fells it incumbent on him to preserve as much as possible, the resources to be derived from the tried affections of his people. HOWICK.
No. 14.—Extract of a Dispatch from C. Stuart, esq. to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburg, Jan. 14th, 1807.—Received Feb. 27.
I must not conceal from your lordship that the apparent silence of his majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favourable effect on the opinion either of the ministers or the public of this country.
No. 15.—Extract of a Dispatch from the marg. of Douglas, to visc. flowick, dated St. Petersburgh, Jan.26th 1807.
Before I conclude, I must inform your lordship that baron Budberg complained of the situation in which Russia was now placed, being left to combat alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other.
No. 16.—Extract of a dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 4th, 1807.
During this interview general Budberg seized every occasion of complaining of the Russians being left without military assistance on the part of Great Britain. An attack on any part of the coast of France, or even the alarm of an attack promulgated with confidence, would tend to relieve Russia from the concentrated forces of the French army.—Was any measure of this kind to be adopted I am persuaded I should no longer hear any arguments against the ulterior guarantee; not that I omitted to remind the general that after what had been done in Italy, and what was ready to be done at Constantinople, Great Britain could never be considered as a negative co-adjutor whether in reference to the common cause or in reference to her immediate friends and allies.
No. 17.—Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 8th, 1807.
His excellency said, that the court of Petersburgh being now abandoned to her own resources, was entitled to expect some efforts which may divert the attention of the French government, before they consent to enter into any engagement which is likely to create future differences with that power upon a subject not immediately interesting to Russia.
No. 18.—Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 15th, 1807.—Received March 8th.
I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by G. Britain to divert the general concentration of the French troops from the banks of the Vistula.
No. 19.—Extract of a Note from gen. Budberg to the marq. of Douglas, dated Feb.1st, 1807.—Transmitted by the marq. of Douglas and received March 8th.
The undersigned has already had occasion to observe to the ambassador the marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale, that partial and separate expeditions cannot influence the general operations in an impressive manner, and that a vague assurance, such as, "We shall soon see what England will do," cannot be sufficiently satisfactory in circumstances so imminently critical as the present. The emperor is therefore desirous, that the British government should make known to him with the greatest possible detail, the plans which it may have hi view, in order to effect a powerful diversion upon one or any of the points of the coasts subject to the enemy; and that in general it should communicate to his ministry, such views and projects, the execution of which it may judge capable of contributing to the success of the common cause. His imperial majesty thinks himself the more justified in expressing this wish, as at all times he has prescribed it as a duty to his cabinet to communicate to that of his majesty the king of Great Britain, every thing that might interest it upon this subject, and as, in point of fact, the British government has been regularly informed of all the measures which, in the course of events, have been adopted by Russia, and has been acquainted with the forces which she has employed on such points where their presence has been judged useful to the interests of the allied courts.
No. 20.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated Downing Street, Feb. 20th 1807.
With respect to military diversions, your exc. must at once have been prepared to state to the Russian government the extreme difficulty of any maritime operations at the present season. The difficulty and danger indeed at all seasons of landing in a country such as France, where the means exist of collecting, in a short time, a much larger force than any that can be sent from this country, and from whence there can be no secure retreat, must be sufficiently apparent. All that can at present be said therefore on this head is, that if a favourable opportunity should arise, his majesty will be desirous of exerting his utmost efforts to distress the enemy upon any point which may present an advantageous opening to assist the general operations of the war.
No. 21.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated, Downing Street, March 7th 1807.
I have nothing to add to my former dispatches (to which I beg leave to refer your excellency) with respect to the renewal of the commercial treaty, the proposal of military diversions by this country, and the suggestion of further pecuniary assistance.
No. 22.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated Downing Street, March 10th 1807.
The messenger Vick, with your excellency's dispatches, arrived on Sunday last, and I have it in command from the king to lose no time in expressing to your excellency the lively satisfaction with which his majesty has received the account of the battle of the 8th ultimo. Your excellency will take the earliest opportunity of offer- ing to the emperor, the king's congratulations on an event so glorious to the Russian arms, and so advantageous to the cause in which the two sovereigns are engaged.—It is painful to me to pass from this to a less pleasing topic; but I am under the necessity of expressing to your excellency the increased disappointment and regret which his majesty has experienced in learning that so many unforeseen objections are still urged against the renewal of the commercial treaty. The proposed extension of this treaty for two years, upon the conditions annexed to this proposal, is by no means satisfactory; nor does there seem to be any good reason for not coming to a definitive arrangement, which his majesty is willing to conclude without any alteration in the terms of the present treaty. Had any new proposal been made on the part of his majesty, there might have been some pretence for delay; but in a case where the interests of the two countries are so well understood, and in which experience has proved the advantage to both, of the treaty which is now about to expire, his majesty feels himself entitled, upon all the grounds of mutual interest and friendship, to renew his instances with his august ally, for an immediate compliance with so equitable a proposal. Though your excellency will urge this in the strongest terms, you will however consent to the offered extension for two years, it being understood that the advantages at present enjoyed by the British commerce are to suffer no diminution, rather than allow the treaty to expire. I cannot, however, dismiss this subject without some remark upon the manner in which this concession, as it is termed, on the part of Russia, is made to depend upon an immediate assurance of a powerful military diversion being made by this country. The insinuation conveyed in this part of the baron de Budberg's note, is so little justified by the former conduct of this government, that it cannot be passed over without notice. It is unnecessary to state the obvious tendency of such language to produce mutual discontent, and excite adverse pretensions, destructive of the harmony and confidence which ought to prevail between the two governments. In renewing your representations, therefore, upon the necessity of a speedy conclusion of this treaty, which your excellency will remark is no less advantageous to Russia than to England, you will protest against any attempt to make use of it in this manner, either as an inducement or a threat, with respect to measures with which it is wholly unconnected, and which must depend upon considerations, of a totally different nature. —I have already explained to your excellency the difficulties which have hitherto prevented any attempt at military diversions. A more favourable, season is now approaching; and you may assure the Russian minister, that this government is sedulously employed in preparing the means of still more active co-operation.—I hope soon to be able to communicate to your excellency something more specific on this subject; but the Russian government must be aware how much the force of which his majesty can dispose for continential operations is necessarily limited, both by the extent of his naval exertions and the necessary support of his distant colonies; and how much the difficulty of employing it advantageously is increased by the present situation of the north of Germany, where his majesty can neither look to the junction of his army with that of any ally, to any established magazines to enable to advance, nor to the possession of any considerable fortress to secure its retreat.
No. 23.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Alex. Straton, esq. his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the court of Sweden, dated Downing Street, March 10th, 1807.
Sir; Your dispatches have been received and laid before the king.—Though the king of Sweden does not appear to have renewed with you the question of an additional subsidy, that subject has been pressed upon me in repeated conversations by M. Rehausens.—From the communication which that minister has made to me of the instructions he has received from his court, a good deal of dissatisfaction appears to be felt there at our supposed backwardness in assisting the exertions which the king of Sweden is willing to make.—There certainly is no ground for such an imputation. In the instructions of your predecessor you will find that he was uniformly directed to state the importance which his majesty attached to the undertaking of offensive operations on the side of Pomerania, and that he was even authorized to give assurances of pecuniary assistance from the moment the Swedish troops should have passed their own frontier: But it was added, that before any thing could be conclusively arranged, it was necessary that his Swedish majesty should communicate generally to this government his plan of operations, and more particularly the amount of force which it might be in his power to employ.—M. de Rehausen has urged the impossibility of stating in detail all the measures which it may be necessary to arrange with a view to a future campaign. No such thing however was required, The information asked for, was only what was necessary to enable his majesty to judge of the general expediency of the measures proposed, with respect to which it is evident that no satisfactory opinion could be formed without a knowledge of the force destined to execute them, and of the time when it would be ready to act. Even further details, when they could be conveniently communicated, his majesty, considering how largely lie is expected to contribute his support, would have a right to expect; and such communication would be obviously necessary to enable his majesty to direct any efforts, which on his side he might have an opportunity of making, to the advancement of the common objects of the two powers.—In order to come to a right understanding upon this point, you will, with as little delay as possible after the receipt of this dispatch, request an audience of his Swedish majesty. You will state the sincere pleasure with which his majesty has seen the king of Sweden's steady resistance to the common enemy. You will repeat the opinion already expressed on the part of this government, that a diversion by a Swedish force on the side of Pomerania, would be at the present moment of the utmost importance, and with a view to bringing the discussion to a point, you will request particular information on the three following heads:—1. What is the amount of force which the king of Sweden could employ, exclusive of the garrison of Stralsund? In addition to which information, it is desirable to know, where it is now stationed, and how soon it could be ready to act? 2. Whether any, and what addition of British troops would be required? 3. What amount of subsidy the king of Sweden would demand in proportion to the number of troops employed? Should the Swedish government be willing to enter into this discussion, you will state upon the two first points, that it does not appear to his majesty that any effectual operation could be undertaken without a force amounting at the very least to twenty-five thousand men.—From M. de Rehausen's statements to me, it appears that the chief deficiency of the Swedish army is in cavalry. This is certainly the description of force which his majesty could best spare from his own army. If a brigade of dragoons would enable his Swedish majesty to bring into the field a force of the amount above stated, you may state that this proportion of cavalry might probably be furnished from hence.—With regard to the last point, viz. that of subsidy, you will state that his majesty will be disposed to contribute to the support of the proposed operation, by a subsidy regulated according to the proportion of that which was given to Austria in 1805; but that this proportion cannot be exceeded, except as to a sum usually furnished as a "premiere mise en campagne," which, as soon as the measures in contemplation shall be conclusively agreed upon, may be advanced to the amount of two, or at most three, months subsidy.—Having communicated these proposals to the king of Sweden, you will request his majesty to authorise his ministers to enter upon the immediate discussion of them; and to prevent the loss of time, you will suggest the expediency of sending to this country sonic confidential military officer, fully instructed upon all the points above-mentioned, who might assist Mr. de Rehausen in giving the necessary explanations, and in bringing this business to a prompt termination.—I know it is unnecessary for me to recommend to you the utmost diligence in the execution of these instructions, and in obtaining and transmitting to me the most accurate information respecting the present state and disposition of the Swedish government, and the condition and numbers of its army.
HOWICK.
No. 24,—Extract of a Dispatch from lord Hutchinson addressed to visc. Howick, dated Memel, March 9th, 1807.—Received April 18th, by Mr. Secretary Canning.
I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian government, with whom the Russians have also co-operated, to write to your lordship on the subject of a diversion to be made by the British troops, which might occupy the French essentially, and force them to withdraw a part of their troops from this quarter. M. de Zastrow made me yesterday a formal proposition. —Marshal Mortier now blockades Stralsund with about twenty thousand men; it is therefore proposed that the British and Swedish troops should in conjunction force them to raise that blockade, and moving on the left bank of the Oder, threaten the communications in the rear of the French army. They might besiege Stettin which is a large place with a small garrison, and in a bad state of defence; were it taken, the communication with Berlin; the Elbe, and the rest of Germany would be at once open.—If the French remain in Poland, a considerable force acting in this manner on their rear would create the most serious embarrassments, and probably three them to evacuate Poland, or at least oblige them to detach such a number of troops as would soon leave them inferior to the allies.—Should even the French occupy the line of the Oder, this diversion would be of the greatest importance, as the Russians would in that case probably march with the greater Part of their army into Silesia.—This proposed operation would be attended with little danger, as the British Army would always have a retreat upon Stralsund open to them, and from thence into the Island of Rugen, from whence they might he re-embarked. Stralsund in summer, is, I believe, a very strong place. —I have informed Monsieur de Zastrow that I would undoubtedly make the proposition; that I was convinced the British government meant to make a strong diversion in favour of the allies, and was empowered to give them the strongest assurances on that subject; but that I could not exactly pledge myself as to the quarter in which it would be made. The one now proposed appeared to me to be highly advantageous, and only attended with the ordinary risques of war, as in every event the retreat of the troops employed in that service would not be an hazardous one.—Your lordship will probably receive a communication on this subject from baron Jacobi; lord Douglas has also, I understand, written to you on the subject from Petersburgh.
No. 25.—Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas, dated Saint Petersburgh, March 19th, 1807, addressed to visc. Howick.—Received by Mr. Secretary Canning, April —
There is reason to suppose that it has been forcibly put to the emperor by some people here, little partial to England, that Russia is abandoned by her friends; that the whole contest is left to her, and that that even her intimate ally, G. Britain, neglects to support her at a crisis when any reverse of fortune might endanger the empire itself.—It is the more painful to me that such insinuations should appear, for a moment, to be justified by fact, because I know how little they are deserved, and how different they are from those feelings that both actuate, the government and the country at large. It is for his majesty's government to decide what are the objects of their present policy, and what are the means most likely to secure those objects: but I should neglect my duty if I did not observe, that should no effort be made this spring by the British troops, it is more than probable that the above observations will recur in full vigour to his imperial majesty's mind; if so, I need not point out what will be the probable result. England, I am aware may secure herself; but I am convinced that his majesty's government feels to much for the honour of the country, and the future happiness of Europe, to compromise for partial views a prospect of general and permanent welfare.
No. 26 —Extract of a Dispatch from the marquis of Douglas, dated Saint Petersburgh 22nd March (3rd April,) 1807, addressed to viscount Howick.—Received by Mr. Sec. Canning, May 13th.
The activity of England I have frequently expatiated upon; but I must not conceal from your lordship that this court, alive to the embarrassments that surround her, is determined, in spite of every argument, to consider no act as directed towards their particular support, that does not, by occupying a part of the French forces, relieve her from their concentrated attacks.
No. 27.— Extract of a Dispatch from the marquis of Douglas, dated Saint Petersburgh, April 27th, 1807; addressed to visc. Howick.—Received by Mr. Sec. Canning, June 1st.
I am thoroughly convinced of the sincere and honourable intentions of the emperor; and yet as it is impossible that I should be deaf to the murmurs that surround me, to the expectations of thousands, to the intrigues of a few, all more or less beginning to seek the same object; so I cannot without some jealousy look to the possible consequences. Should any diversion however take place on the part of G. Britain, or assisted by her troops, there is a great probability that in that case the emperor, from a point of honour, would consider himself bound to act with all possible energy.