moved the order of the day for the third reading of the Irish Revenue Regulation Bill; and the question having been put that the bill be now read the third time,

rose to resist a clause in this bill, to which he thought it impossible the house could give their final assent, if they were aware of its object. It was no less than a grant of full amnesty and indemnification to all the excise officers in Ireland, who had for a series of years past, in direct violation of their duty and their oaths, been plundering the revenue of that country (as appeared from the Reports of the Irish committee of inquiry) of no less a sum than 850,000l. a year, by taking bribes from the distillers for conniving at their evasions of the duties upon their manufacture, and thus combining and colluding with them to defraud that revenue of which they were the sworn and confidential officers. If such a clause were allowed to pass, he was sure it would so far operate as a sanction and encouragement to fraud, as to create a necessity for another clause of indemnity in a year or two hence.—The reasoning upon which the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland supported this clause upon a former night was, that the salaries of the excise officers in Ireland were inadequate to their maintenance, and therefore exposed them to the temptations of bribery to betray their duty; but that their salaries being now raised, there were of course to be no more frauds in future. But he (sir J. Newport) could not admit for a moment that fraud could be justified upon any such plea in a revenue officer, guilty of a violation of his oath and his trust, which would be scouted in any court of criminal judicature, if offered in excuse by a highway-man, or a housebreaker, where no trust was reposed. The right hon. gent. pleaded the notoriety of such frauds in almost every branch of the revenue, as a necessity for this indemnification; and a recent instance had occurred in the house, by which it was shewn that an officer in high situation (Mr. Hill) was not only indemnified for past offences, but sanctioned and encouraged by still higher promotion, though his guilt was established by his own confession: and now came this clause to extend indemnification to the whole corps of such delinquents. With such a clause the bill would be a statute of pains and penalties against the public, and of protection to malefactors; for one clause in the bill denounced the most enormous penalties against any person who should offer a bribe to a revenue officer; and yet it concludes with a clause to indemnify all revenue officers who had taken bribes in the most flagitious way for betraying their trust, in direct violation of a bill which had passed the house so recently as the year 1806, expressly to prevent such frauds. No parliament, he declared, had ever passed such an amnesty as the present; and if the house should now sanction by its protection a class of men, guilty in numberless instances of such flagrant transgressions, such proceeding must be fatal to the public interest, and highly in jurious to the public morals. The right hon. baronet concluded by moving, "That instead of now, the bill be read a third time this day three months."

hoped, that as the objections of the right hon. baronet were directed solely against a particular clause in the bill, he would be content to take the sense of the house upon that clause, instead of opposing the whole bill.

had no wish to defeat the whole bill, and was satisfied to rest his opposition upon the final clause.

denied that the clause was intended for such a purpose as that of screening defaulters. It was merely a clause in compliance with a conditional promise made to certain officers, of whose guilt there was no practical proof to be obtained, but who, on the condition of indemnity, had fully acknowledged the facts, and explained how a repetition of such fraud might in future be prevented. He had himself repeatedly stated to the house, that the pay of the excise officers in Ireland was too small for their maintenance, and consequently exposed them to the temptation of bribery from brewers and distillers, over whose works they were placed in the way of their duty. Such were the temptations held out to them, that they had not the fortitude to resist: and so universally and notoriously did the traffic prevail amongst every description of excise officers in every part of Ireland, that the frauds upon the revenue were to an incalculable amount. This appeared upon examination before the Commissioners of inquiry in Ireland. It was, in fact, so generally the usage, that the excise officers conceived there was no crime, or breach of duty, in a matter at which they supposed their superiors connived in consideration of the known inadequacy of their salaries to their maintenance. It was recommended by the Commissioners of inquiry, as the best means of rendering those officers honest and faithful for the future, that their salaries should be increased; and as the defalcations were almost universal, and committed almost without the consciousness of criminality, it was proposed, that an amnesty should be given for all that had passed, upon the strong assurance that under the increased salaries, no such acts should take place for the future: or if they did, that they should be instantly followed by dismissal and the severest penalties. What would be the obvious consequence of rejecting this clause? Why, that these men would be placed in the power of those very brewers and distillers, at whose frauds they had heretofore been induced by bribery to connive, and who might again drive them to new connivances and frauds by the threats of prosecutions, fines, and penalties for former acts, the proofs of which were in their power, and thus render the bill nugatory, and expose the revenue to a repetition of all those frauds it was intended to prevent.

expressed his astonishment, that a British house of commons should be called upon to pass such a clause; but he was still more astonished at the motives for it urged by the right hon. gent., namely, the universality of the offence in every department of the revenue of Ireland; but, most of all, at the circumstance of continuing in their places, and remunerating by advance of salaries, the very officers who, in breach of their trusts and of their oaths, had been one and all, avowedly and for a series of years, defrauding the revenue, and combining and colluding with others to defraud it. Was there no possibility of finding any other men in Ireland with honesty and ability enough to fill the place of these men? If such a fact were possible, but which he could not believe, then there should be men sought in some other part of the united empire.

explained, by saying, that these frauds were not. chargeable on all the branches of the revenue, but merely on the excise; that the act of 1806 limited the time of prosecution for all crimes designated there, to three months after the fact; that the indemnity proposed by this bill came down no lower than January 1808; and that for all such offences since committed, the parties would still be liable to a prosecution.

was astonished at the introduction of the clause before that house, so contrary as it was to every principle which a British parliament had been used to respect and maintain. He regretted that it should have the support of his right hon. friend the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, and begged to ask what the house would think if such a clause were proposed in that house, to indemnify and protect the excise officers of this country, if it was known that they had entered into combinations to defraud the revenue? These latter would have been instantly dismissed to a man, and others found to fill their places. He was surprized to hear from the Chancellor of the Exchequer of Ireland, that persons who had been guilty of these frauds, were not only retained in their situations, but even their salaries had been raised, in the hope of securing their honesty and fidelity for the future. This he conceived to be a project totally hopeless; and he should have preferred, for the public advantage, their instantaneous dismissal, and the filling up their places with other men, however simple or moderate their abilities, against whom at least government had no experience of their dishonesty, to the continuance of men whose crimes for a series of years were avowed and even vindicated, and sanctioned by those whose peculiar duty it was to watch over the revenues of Ireland. Of the affairs of that country he was sorry to say, that the more they were investigated the more loudly they seemed to call for the correcting hand of that house. It was not wonderful that the people murmured at the increase of taxes, if that increase arose not from any necessity founded on the inadequacy of the taxes already imposed, but to make up for the frauds of revenue officers, who, instead of being dismissed and punished, were retained and indemnified.

expressed his wonder that such a clause should receive the sanction of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, contrary as it was to all the principles usually respected in that house. It was unsupported by any precedent in former amnesty bills; for it went to extend pardon not only to the comparative few who appeared to have acknowledged their guilt, but to the thousands who never make any acknowledgment at all; so that the house had no mode of measuring the indefinite extent of criminality which they were called on to vote. It was a direct attack on public morality, and held out encouragement to the revenue officers in England, to commit the like offence, for surely it was quite impossible the right hon. gent. would follow up with pains and penalties, the same class of persons in England for frauds on the revenue, in violation of their trust, or even against poor wretches defrauding the revenue, otherwise having no place of trust, but equally pleading the inadequacy of their incomes to the support of their families; while the revenue officers of Ireland, notoriously, and for a series of years, guilty of such frauds, were to be indemnified, protected, retained in their places, and ameliorated in their circumstances. He trusted that house would never disgrace itself by the adoption of such a clause.

was somewhat surprized at the indignation assumed by his hon. and learned friend at this clause, after the explanation which had been given; and spoke at some length in support of the clause upon the same ground as Mr. Foster. No man, he said, could for a moment seriously suppose that the clause was intended to sanction corruption or criminality, but merely to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses, without that inconvenience to the public service which the immediate dismissal of all the excise officers in Ireland must occasion.

spoke of the clause in the strongest terms of reprobation, and asked, would the right hon. gent. venture to propose such a clause to that house in protection of the revenue officers of England, if they had been guilty of such crimes? He was a good deal astonished at several of the measures which had passed that house in relation to Ireland, since the administration of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for that country commenced; but he owned this proposition surprized him more than all the rest, supported as it was by the speech and vote of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Perceval). To continue those fraudulent officers in their places, not only indemnified and protected, but rewarded and encouraged, was beyond every thing he had ever witnessed; and this, too, upon the pretence that men could not be found in Ireland to fill their places. He could not credit the assertion; he knew of no extraordinary talents it required to do the duty of an exciseman. But if no men fit to do these duties were to be found in that country, they should be imported from some other. It was ridiculous to suppose that men in the habit of living by their frauds, at four or five hundreds or thousands a year, could be rendered honest by the addition of thirty or forty pounds to their salaries.

gave ministers credit for the best intentions in supporting this clause, but thought they would be woefully disappointed in the result. In relation to the continuance of those fraudulent officers, with the hope of reform, he should be guided by the old proverb; "Never trust a reformed drunkard with the key of the cellar."

said, that the doctrine in support of the clause went to libel the country. If it went abroad, it would give an idea that there were no honest men to be found there; and if the members for Ireland did not condemn it, they would deserve the reprobation of their countrymen.

defended the clause, and said there was no alternative but an immediate dismissal of all the excise officers in Ireland, and the abandonment of the revenue. He would not have voted for it, if it was to defend corruption.

said, if he thought the clause would prevent corruption, he would vote for it; but could it be supposed that men who had been in the habit of receiving large sums from the distillers, and living up to it, would leave their habits for the advance of their salaries? It was contrary to all human probability, and was not to be expected; he Should therefore give the clause his negative.

was ready to admit, that if the fraudulent officers must necessarily be retained, the clause ought to pass of course; but he denied the necessity, and consequently must oppose it. Not only did he reprobate the idea of indemnifying men who had so grossly betrayed their trust, and defrauded the revenue, but that of retaining those men in their places, after the avowal and proof of such fraud. It taught those men to laugh at government, to set them at defiance, to believe that government could not do without them, and, of course could not dismiss them; and, under such feelings, was it to be expected such men would, for a trifling increase of salary, forego the temptation of gaining five times as much by fraud? and what sort of picture was this to hold out for their brother revenue officers in England?

said, that it appeared from papers on the table that the Storekeeper of the Magazine in Hyde Park never filled any military office, and he also understood that he was in possession of a sinecure office. He trusted that he would be removed before the next session: if not, he should feel himself obliged to make a motion to that effect.

rose, to submit to the house a motion for papers which he had made the other day, but which had been withdrawn upon a point of form. As he had before explained himself sufficiently upon the subject, he saw no necessity for entering into it at any great length at this time. He maintained that his statement had not been overturned by any thing that had fallen from the hon. chairman (Mr. Grant). He had stated the law and applied it to the fact, and on both points he was perfectly correct. The hon. chairman had said, that he had derived his information from a memorial of some interested persons. He denied this, and observed, that he had not seen that memorial till after he had given his notice. The hon. gent. then entered more particularly into a statement of the grievances under which the Private Trader laboured, from the conduct of the Directors. He read the Order which they had sent out to India, in 1803, as to the rates of freight with which the private merchant was to be charged; which were, 11l. per ton during peace, and 14l. per ton during war. This rate was acted upon by the merchants, in their arrangements. No other order had been made on this subject till the 10th of August 1805. The hon. chairman had said, that this was the rate fixed during peace, but that a period of war altered the circumstances; and that an order had been immediately sent out to fix a higher rate. This the hon. gent. denied, and asserted that on the contrary, an order had been published, in l805, confirming the same rates of freight that had been established in June 1803. The merchants, considering these as binding upon the Company, had made their arrangements accordingly. The hon. chairman had stated, that no extra ships had arrived in India in the years 1805–6, because these ships had been turned aside from their destination, for political purposes, over which the directors had no controul. But this was one of the hardships of which the private merchants particularly complained. They were unable to procure a supply of ships independent of the Company. They made their arrangements in reliance upon the Company; and then, when they most wanted vessels, the ships were taken away for political purposes, leaving the merchant completely in the lurch. This was an extreme hardship, and one to which the private merchant ought not, in any view, to be subjected; but more especially when the Company, by the act of 1793, was bound to afford every facility and accommodation. The hon. gent. next stated, that in 1806 it so happened that the Company had some spare Tonnage in their regular ships, and in these, therefore, the property of private merchants was conveyed from India to this country. The private merchants of course thought that as they had no alternative, they would only be subject to the rates of freight which the Company had promulgated. But when the goods arrived in this country they were charged with 44l. per ton, which as the directors had the power of exacting in their own hands, the merchants were forced to pay. He had before called this injustice and oppression, and he would now add that it was fraud likewise, because the directors had employed the power which they possessed to violate their own agreement, and to disappoint the just expectations of the private merchants. Mr. Prendergast proceeded to observe, that from 1805 till July 1807, no other advertisement had been published; and consequently in the year 1806 and part of 1807, the private merchants naturally concluded that they would be permitted to convey their property at the old rates. But to all this the hon. chairman had replied, that a specific bargain had been made by the merchants with the government of Bengal. He (Mr. Prendergast) himself was on the spot; he was a good deal interested, and yet he had heard nothing of any such bargain. He then remarked, that the directors had written to the governor-general in 1807, fixing the rates for the previous three years. The hon. gent. read the rates; season 1804, 30l. per ton in regular ships; season 1805, 32l. per ton in regular ships, and 22l. in extra ships; season 1806, 26l. per ton in extra ships, and 30l. 10s. in regular ships. Not satisfied with the agreement which they had made with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for the accommodation of the Private Trade, they had sent out orders to their government in India to charge these high rates of freight there, while here, by the strong arm of power, they charged treble the rate which they themselves had fixed. An hon. gent. below (Mr. Wallace) had, on a former occasion, characterized his conduct as unjust; but when the house considered the facts which he had now stated, he was satisfied it would allow that he was fully warranted in retorting the accusation, and in saying that the proceed- ing of the hon. gent. was not only unjust, but marked by a total ignorance of the subject on which be had spoken.—Mr. Prendergast then adverted to the propositions which the Directors had made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in which they had stated their readiness to afford the private trader every accommodation, and to allow him freight on the most reasonable terms. This obligation they had violated, and had subjected the private trader to the consequences of the prodigality with which they managed their concerns. But he maintained, that they had no right thus to waste the property of their constituents, and of the public, upon whom their debts must ultimately fall. He had laid before the house facts which it was impossible to controvert; and his statement, he contended, was in no respect either unjust or erroneous. He concluded by moving, That the copy of the Memorial of the Directors to the Treasury, in 1797, some time ago presented to the house, should be re-printed, &c. &c.

observed, that the observations of the hon. gent. were premature, as the act of 1793, and the other matters, would come under consideration, when the house was furnished with all the requisite information on the subject. These papers would not comprehend the whole of the question, and it was not therefore upon them alone that it ought to be discussed. He blamed the hon. gent. for censuring the conduct of the Directors, before the necessary documents were before the house.

maintained, that though the principal facts stated by the hon. gent. were correct, the inference which he drew from them against the directors was wrong. The hon. chairman had stated, that after the extra ships had been diverted from their intended destination for political purposes, the merchants themselves had requested to be allowed to ship their goods on board the regular vessels, upon payment of the same rate of freight as the Company paid, which was 44l. per ton; and yet this favour was converted into a charge of oppression and injustice. He wished the hon. gent. had condescended to explain one fact. The private merchants themselves, as ship owners, had let their ships to the Company at from 19 to 21l. per ton. How then could they expect that the Company should be able to re-let their own ships to them at 14l. per ton? The real state of the case was, that as to the charge in 1804, orders had been sent out after the advertisement to raise the rate on account of the war. The orders did not arrive in proper time, and the result was, that the directors had settled the account at 14l. according to the original advertisement.

repeated what he had formerly said, that the house could not properly come to a decision upon these points, till the whole of the circumstances came before it. The agreement in 1793, he observed, went no further than furnishing the private merchant with 3,000 tons of shipping. He next gave a short history of the transactions between the Company and the private merchants. The Company had resisted the project of carrying home produce in India built ships, but in 1802 an arrangement was made by which the Company engaged to furnish the private merchants with English built ships, subject to the regulations of the Company, at the low rate of 14l. per ton. But when the war commenced, it was necessary to raise the rate of freight, and orders were, sent out to raise it to 20l.; but it having been stated that it had been already signified to the private merchants that the rate would be only 14l. for the year 1804, the directors acceded to this. As the war continued the expences rose, but still the charges were within what the Company themselves paid. His hon. friend (Mr. Wallace) had truly stated that the merchants themselves had charged the Company at the rate of from 19 to 21l. in 1803; and how could they expect to be supplied cheaper? As to the want of shipping at a particular period, he repeated that this had arisen from the vessels having been detained at Cork, Madeira, &c. for political purposes; and it was impossible that the Company could either controul this; or be ready with vessels to meet such an accident. In the year 1805 the private merchants had been furnished with tonnage, in the regular ships at the rate paid by the Company, and what more could they expect? There was no law or convention in this case that could give the character of injustice to these transactions. As to publications in the gazettes in India, he could not answer for these; but he could aver, that here the extra ships, in 1805–6, were charged at only 14l. with some exceptions from particular circumstances.

As the state of the India Company must soon force itself on the attention of parliament, not- withstanding any attempts to conceal facts, or suppress the evidence, I am not aware that any other benefit will result from the present motion, than that general information, which naturally arises out of such a discussion: With respect to the India Trade, undoubtedly, Sir, the restrictions and interruptions which have been imposed on the free merchants, and the extravagant price of freight demanded of them, have produced the effect of diverting the legitimate trade of India into clandestine courses, by forcing a great part of British capital to pass under foreign flags. But I think it rather unfair to charge the honourable Directors with making this exorbitant demand for freight, for whatever blame may attach to the expensive system under which they act, it surely could not be reasonably expected, that they should give facilities to the free merchants and promote their objects, by charging a lower rate of freight than the Company were paying, at a certain loss to themselves. Whenever a corrective shall be applied to the abuses of the Indian trade, it will probably be found to consist in this, in enabling the British merchants to bring their own goods upon their own ships, subject however to the supervision and controul of the East India Company, to be freighted and refreighted, to be imported and exported through their offices, the goods and merchandize to be deposited in their warehouses, in short, in a system, which will enable the British merchant and natives under British protection, to trade upon equal terms with the merchants of every other country: Do this, and you will bring the whole trade of India into the Thames, and for this plain reason. If the terms were equal, the security would be infinitely greater. Sir, I shall take this opportunity of adverting to a circumstance, which though irrelevant to the present motion, is not altogether unimportant. In May 1808, a Report was presented to this house by the Committee appointed to consider the affairs of India: in that Report an account current was stated between government and the East India Company, by which account it appeared that a balance was due from government to the Company of 1,500,419l. This account was signed by Mr. Wittwer, an authorized agent on the part of government, and by Mr. Wright the accomptant for the Company. In consequence of this Report it was moved by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the sum of one million and one half should be paid to the East India Company in liquidation of this debt, leaving a balance of only 419l. due from government to the Company. In the annual account of the East India Company just printed, I find inserted as part of the Company's assets, a statement of, "By what due from government 960,000l." It is true this charge is stated with this comment "that the Committee in their report having suspended for further examination such parts of the Pay Office demands as have been objected to on the part of the Company, the account is still open for further investigation." Sir, the fact is this, in the account signed by the authorized agents of the parties, two Items are admitted upon estimate, which necessarily is subject to revision; and one charge was suspended altogether, and very properly suspended, because the Pay Office accounts were not in that state of correctness necessary to conclude them, leaving that head of course open for further adjustment: But, Sir, I well remember when the million and half was voted in liquidation of the debt from government to the East India Company, an hon. friend of mine (Mr. Whitbread) put a question to the right hon. the President of the Board of Controul, Whether that account so settled was to be considered as final, and conclusive? and he was answered in the affirmative. I have taken this opportunity of mentioning this circumstance, lest such a paper suffered to remain upon the table unnoticed, may hereafter be taken advantage of. Another circumstance, I would mention, is, that various letters which I have received from India, concur in stating the discontents of the Company's officers, and the disaffection of the native troops. This is principally attributed to a system of foisting king's officers into the native corps, persons unacquainted with their language, and unused to their customs. At Bombay it was intended to mount additional cavalry, and it was ordered to be officered by king's officers from Madras: this excited such resentment on the part of the Company's officers, and such discontent amongst the native troops, to whom their officers were endeared by long services, and with whom for their gallant conduct at Bhurtpoor, they had received the thanks of lord Lake; that Mr. Duncan, the governor of Bombay, prudently withheld the publication of the order, and remonstrated with the government of Bengal on the subject. It has also been stated to me, that an order has been issued for drafting off annually from every grenadier battalion 12 picked men, in order to form a crack corps. To the hon. Chairman (Mr. Grant) it will be unnecessary to expatiate on the mischiefs which may result from such measures. I had hoped that the mutiny at Vellore, at the same time that it afforded an aweful, would also have afforded an instructive lesson, of the absurdity of inforcing British regulations, upon Indian armies. On that occasion the lives of near a thousand men, of whom upwards of two hundred were British soldiers, were sacrificed to a turban and a whisker; if that pernicious folly had not been stopped, your whole native army would have been lost by it: If such a lesson and such an example be disregarded, are you equally indifferent about the consequence? I am sorry to observe, that in this house very few know what is doing in India, and I fear very few care.

admitted that he had allowed that the account between the Company and the public had been closed, with respect to the articles which they had under their consideration. Still, however, the Company might prefer a claim, but there might be also a claim on the part of the public to meet it, and till the Indian regimental accounts were audited, it was impossible to say how the matter exactly stood. As to the practices respecting the troops, he had good reason to believe that the hon. gent. was mistaken.

contended, that every paper ought to be laid on the table that tended to throw any light on the state of the India trade. He strongly objected to the notion, that the question was not to be discussed till the Company came to the house for a renewal of their charter. If no information was to be given till then, the private merchants would be left completely in the dark, and very hardly dealt by.

observed, that he stated facts from unquestionable authority. The hon. chairman had said, that the Company was by law obliged to furnish only 3,000 tons of shipping. He had understood, however, they were obliged to furnish as much as the private merchant might find necessary to carry home his produce. He always understood that the quantity was to be regulated by the demand. The act on that point spoke for itself. He was surprised to hear the hon. chairman say, that the extra ships were only charged at the rate of 14l. per ton, at the very time that he himself had stated them to have been carried away upon some political expedition. He denied having ever heard of the bargain with the government of Bengal, to which the hon. chairman had alluded, and remarked, that no reply had been attempted to his statement of the rates of freight, that had been ordered in 1807.

afterwards, alluding to the circumstance he had mentioned on the former night, of the dismissal of Mr. Samuel Middleton, a servant of the Company, for being concerned in the trade of indigo, while the chairman of the Court of Directors (Mr. Grant) was allowed to bring that article home from India, in violation of the bye-law, that no Director should be concerned in any trading speculation, and considering what he conceived a partiality, as likely to produce an ill effect on the respect which ought to be kept up for all the transactions of the Company, moved "That there be laid before the house a copy of the Oath of office taken by the Court of Directors; the bye-laws of the Company, prohibiting any trade being carried on by any director; the bye-law making an exception in favour of Mr. Grant; and the Minutes of the Resolution of the governor and Council of Bengal on the subject."

made a short explanation of the circumstance, as far as he was concerned, of the establishment of the trade in indigo, from India to this country, of which he was the original promoter, and in the manufacture of which he had embarked a very large capital. Upon his return from India, he had been elected into the office of Director, when no law existed against that board being concerned in trade; afterwards, in 1795, that law was enacted, and he upon that occasion stated his case to the Company, and the consequence was, that, upon two general courts it was agreed, that he did not come within the spirit of the regulation. If he were compelled to choose between his situation as director, and the giving up of his property, he should be compelled to elect the former. He, however, had no objection to the motion.

saw no ground for the motion, as there was no charge against the hon. chairman: and, if there was, it did not come under the jurisdiction of that house. The whole of it was, that the hon. chairman having promoted a most important branch of commerce, was allowed to retain his property in it; this was no circumstance to induce a supposition that he would act contrary to his duty as a director; and it would be a bad reward for his past services, to deprive him and the Company of his future exertions.

concurred in the same sentiments; and said that the Company had a right to make what regulations and what exceptions they pleased. The case was this: Samuel Middleton, a judicial servant of the Company, had, as such, taken an oath he would not be concerned in any trade whatever; in breach of which he had entered into a trade in the article of indigo; for which he had been dismissed their service. Where, then, was the resemblance between his case and that of the hon. chairman? He was decidedly against the motion.

declared, he had taken an active part in promoting the bye-law, which excluded all concerned in trade from the directory; if any one arraigned that, it should be in the India house, and not there. The fact was, the hon. chairman was not concerned in trading, but merely brought home the produce of his estate, like any other property. He advised the hon. mover to withdraw his motion, and apply himself to the India house, where he would find justice.

in consequence of what had been stated, consented to withdraw his motion, which, after a few words from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who objected to it, as wishing it to be negatived, was agreed to without a division.

moved, that the word "express" should be left out of that clause. The effect of leaving that term in the bill would be to augment the baneful influence of the crown in parliament, by throwing into the patronage of the Treasury all the boroughs of the kingdom. But the bill had been so mutilated in all its parts, and was so ill calculated to effect its professed objects, that although he might succeed in persuading the house to leave out the term to which he objected, he should still feel it his duty to vote against the bill.

contended, that if the word objected to by the noble lord were to be left out, the clause would be monstrous, and no person who might be returned after a contested election, could have any security, if he had at any time within the preceding seven years procured an office for a friend, that it might or would not be charged upon him as having been obtained with a view to the election. He was therefore of opinion that the word should stand in the bill.

thought that nothing could be more puerile, or preposterous, than the bill with this expression in the clause. He contended, that neither a jury, nor a committee of that house, on their oaths, would put any but the fair construction upon such grants as those alluded to by the right hon. gentleman. It was, in fact, required of them in this instance, to give that confidence to ministers, which they were not to give to the courts of justice, or to committees of that house. If they should adopt the clause with this word in it, what would the country think of them, but that they gave not only a pre-emption but an exclusive right to the Treasury, and that, too, at a time when they professed it to be their object to do away the practice of disposing of seats altogether? If they should not get rid of the word, he thought that they ought at least to get rid of the clause.

argued in support of the clause as it stood. He did not think that any very serious danger could result from its operation, because the administration could not possibly have at their disposal places enough to barter for all the seats for boroughs; but if they had, they could not do better than to give them to the friends of their opponents, and then they might get rid of them altogether. On the whole, he thought the particular wording of the clause absolutely necessary to the efficiency of the bill to its object; because the great purpose for which it had been brought in was to prevent the wholesale disposal of seats in that house for money.

thought the bill itself so nugatory, that he felt no interest for its success; but he thought the zeal of the learned gentleman who spoke last had got the better of his prudence, as a member of the government. While he was arguing so strenuously against the amendment, he was always supposing such a corrupt state of things to exist, as absolutely made it necessary for something to be done. The whole effect which his speech had produced upon his mind was to make him think that the amendment against which he had argued ought to be adopted. He seemed to take for granted that the existence of administration was only to be preserved by corruption, which was precisely what this bill proposed to counteract. As to the distinction which had been taken between giving money and giving an office for the purpose of obtaining a seat, he was so far from agreeing with it that his opinion was directly on the other side. The learned gent. had said, that offices might be given innocently, but money never could, and the guilt must necessarily attach to the person giving money. He would allow that giving money was now prohibited, and therefore it was illegal; but if it was not that it was prohibited by law, he could not see how more guilt could attach to giving money, than to giving an office, or to any other species of corruption. He thought that of all species of corruption the giving of money was not only the least injurious, but the most innocent. If those boroughs must be still kept open for the purpose of traffic, it was the least mischievous mode of trafficking. He knew that it was a common saying, "the man who buys supposes that he has a right to sell," but he also knew many instances of persons who purchased their seats with the intention of acting independently, and who did so act. A member who came in as representative of his own money might act independently if he would; but those who were returned by the corruption of office, come into the house bound, as it were, hand and foot, and had not the power of acting independently. As to the pensioned parliament of Charles II. that had been so often thrown in the teeth of the Tory administration of those times, the excuse given was, that such was the modesty of those times, that many would accept a pension secretly, who would be ashamed to hold an office. In the present times it was also known, that many would accept a bribe when gilded with the name of an office, who would be ashamed to take a bribe in money. He, therefore, thought, that, of all manner of corruptions, corruption by offices was the worst and most dangerous. As to the influence of the crown, he always thought that the monopoly of the borough mongers was as injurious to the legitimate rights of the sovereign, as to the interests of the people. The argument of the learned gentleman had been defective in supposing that it had ever been represented that all the seats in parliament could be purchased directly by offices. What had been said was, that the patronage of the ministers would, when all competition was taken away, have a preponderating influence in the boroughs. Every body, however, knew that the patronage of ministers went much further than the word offices expressed. Government had patronage enough not only to purchase a majority of seats in that house, but to purchase almost the whole of them if they thought proper. It was from the speech of the learned gentleman, that he was convinced that the amendment was proper.

said, that the inconveniences which would follow from adopting the Amendment, appeared to him to be far greater than those which would follow from rejecting it. If this word, "express," were inserted in the bill, then it would be found impossible to convict any body under the strongest and clearest circumstances, to prove that guilt, which the object of this bill was to guard against. By leaving this word in the bill, they would be doing nothing less than proclaiming to the people, that offices, titles, situations and contracts, might be used secretly for the purpose of procuring seats in parliament; for unless it should appear to a jury, a judge, or a committee, that an express contract or agreement could be brought forward, no punishment should follow. He thought that when money was excluded from the market, offices, titles, and other favours which ministers had to bestow, would be more operative. If it were once laid down, that money might not be given, but that offices, contracts, and such like might, it could not be denied that these considerations were equally corrupt, and ought equally to be guarded against. He did fear that this one word "express" would do more to increase the influence of the Treasury than the rest of the bill would do to diminish it.

was ready to agree to any measure for reforming the existing corruptions, but must unquestionably vote against the clause, if the word "express" were retained.

thought that the adherence of gentlemen to this word, did call very much into question the sincerity of their offers of supporting the bill. From what he had observed of the administrations of the country, the government appeared rather inclined to rule by numbers than by the affection which must result from promoting the happiness of the people. It appeared to him that this word would defeat the main object of the bill, which was to rescue the character of the house, and gain the confidence of the people. He thought the people would construe this clause as a mode of protecting that corruption, which it was intended to destroy. He certainly did think that the corruption of money was of all others the most debasing, but he contended both against the corruption of money and of office. If he could, however, remedy only one of them at present, he thought it was an object gained of too much importance to abandon the bill, even though loaded with clauses and provisions of which he did not approve.

said that there was a double disadvantage in the corruption by office. The office was badly discharged, and the country had neither an independent member, nor a good officer.

agreed entirely with his hon. friend, in wishing for the adoption of the bill. The rejection of it might insure ministers a corrupt majority in parliament; the adoption of it would afford the people, at least, a chance of independence. He declared his intention to vote against the insertion of the term "express," although it was his determination to support the bill were that term even admitted to stand part of the clause. There were defects in the bill, which did not arise from the hon. mover, but were introduced from a quarter not equally interested in its success; still, however, he would support it, because it appeared to him to be a declaration of the common law of the land, and a reassertion of the constitution. By the common law of the land, any minister who procured by money seats in parliament was guilty of a breach of the constitution, and punishable by impeachment. He would suppose a consequence of that bill, which he was not inclined to admit in fact, that the entire monopoly of the purchase of seats would be exclusively confined to the ministers. If any minister did act upon such a principle by taking advantage of his exclusive possession of the market, he (Mr. Grattan) was certain that the notoriety would be enough to remove him. He would rather that the whole clause should be expunged than the word "express" should be retained but at all events, he should vote for the bill, as he considered it the restoration of a constitutional principle; the common law was now practically repealed, and it required to be revived by statute. The bill (owing to its modifications) might not immediately produce the benefits intended; but it might operate slowly, and in the end produce such happy consequences. He was in favour of the oath; there were many other clauses which he considered advantageous, but so great was his attachment to the principle, that he would take it even destitute of those provisions.

agreed with what had fallen from the right hon. gent. who spoke last. He thought that it was of the utmost importance to the house and to the country, that this bill should pass. Compared with the advantages of passing such a bill, he thought the objections to any particular clause or amendment were unimportant. The principle of the bill was of more value than the details, and yet it appeared to him that the attention of the house had been this night distracted from the principle, in the consideration of the wording of this Amendment. If they were to look at the history of the bill, they would find that it originated in considering the broad fact of persons obtaining seats in that house by the payment of a sum of money. Another case afterwards arose in the course of the debate, of offices being transferred for seats. If, then, the house were now to provide remedies for the two cases which had been so stated, it appeared to him that they would have fully discharged their duty. The whole object of the clause introduced by his right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer,) was, that the house should take care, while they punished the guilty, not to spread a net which might catch those who had disposed of offices with the most innocent intentions. He could not agree with those who thought that this clause, having the word "express" in it, so vitiated the whole bill, as to make it useless. He was sure that his right hon. friend who introduced it could not have intended it as a screen or protection to himself, for no one man could be freer from suspicion of such practices; but the danger of punishment was not so much for those who gave offices as for those who asked for them and obtained them. If this opinion of implied contracts were to prevail, a minister must no longer consult his friends upon appointments to office, but must go among the ranks of his political enemies, to consider who had been so decidedly hostile to him either in private life or in public, that he might venture to give him a place without suspicion of looking for a vote. We should soon see it in the papers that on such a day a gentleman went over to the other side of the house, and made a furious attack upon ministers, for the purpose of qualifying himself to hold a high situation. Suppose, for the sake of argument, his hon. friend, the member for Yorkshire (Mr. Wilberforce), should be asked to recommend any voter to a vacant place, say that of receiver general, why his catechism must be this:—"Did you vote or procure any vote for me at the election, or did any person in affinity with you, or any person connected with you, vote for me"? and if the voter answered in the affirmative, why his hon. friend must in prudence say—"Then I cannot recommend you, Sir, for there is a case in which the suspicion of an implied contract might arise, which, under the provision of Mr. Curwen's Bill, may expose me to the loss of my scat." [Hear! hear!] This would be the aukward situation to which members would be reduced. It was impossible that any minister could be personally acquainted with all the men that it was necessary for him to place in offices. He could only take the recommendation of his friends, and of those gentlemen, who, from their local situation, were acquainted with the persons, or their fitness for the offices to which they recommended them. If local influence was to be altogether abolished, it would be necessary in every office as well as in the Excise, to transplant men from Lancaster to Cornwall, or the most distant parts of the kingdom, in order that they might have no local attachments, nor the power of obliging any one by a vote. He hoped that notwithstanding the paternal feeling which the hon. gent. (Mr. Curwen) might be naturally expected to entertain for his bill, he would not altogether abandon it on account of this alteration.

said, that if the object of the right hon. gent., was merely to entertain the house, and display his great command of the English language, he certainly had accomplished that, object, as he had amused the house, and shewn his power of words; but if he expected to convince any single member of that house that the word "express" ought to be suffered to remain in the clause, he had completely failed. He had concluded by saying, he hoped the hon. gent. (Mr. Curwen,) would have too strong a parental feeling for his bill, to abandon it in consequence of this alteration. Although the original bill might be called the child of the mover, yet if that child had been changed, and another put in its place of very different features and complexion, he did not see that any parental feeling called upon him to adopt what was not so much his own child, as the child of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He thought light and darkness were not more opposite than the principle of the original bill, and the clause which was now proposed to be amended. As to the history of the bill, he must beg leave to set the right hon. the Secretary right. It did not originate from a discovery that seats had sometimes been obtained for a sum of money, but it was at the time that the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer was bringing in his Bill against brokers trafficking in places and offices, that his hon. friend had proposed to introduce a clause against trafficking for Seats in Parliament, which it was afterwards thought better to bring forward, in the shape of a separate bill. The necessity of some sort of a bill to prevent this corrupt traffic was made most evident by the specific and unmistakeable transaction of lord Castlereagh. He considered that that decision would remain on the records of the house, a lasting memorial of the intention of the house to screen delinquents. After that transaction, it was impossible that his hon. friend (Mr. Curwen,) should not have the corruption by the grant of offices, fully as much in his contemplation, as the corruption by money. If the right hon. Secretary would now lay aside all the fanciful suppositions and extravagant conceits with which he had amused the house, and come to sober reasoning on the subject, he thought it was impossible for him to say, that such a case as he had supposed for his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce,) or such topics as he had urged, could by any possibility have the least weight before any committee of the house, or any jury, or any man upon oath. He would indeed appeal to the right hon. gent. himself, dropping the extravagance of his conceit, whether he could seriously believe that any committee of gentlemen, upon their oaths, could possibly decide that such a case came within the purview of this clause, or whether any jury could so determine? Sure he was, that it would not require a tenth part of the ingenuity to guard against any such decision that was this night employed to palliate the proposition of ministers. The apprehension was quite fanciful, and the bill would, in fact, be nugatory, if this word "express" were not omitted. If it were retained, his full persuasion was, that its effect would be to protect the corruptions of government, and to deprive the people of any advantage which the bill was otherwise calculated to afford.—A right hon. and learned gent. (the Solicitor General) had stated, that if this word "express" was not to stand in the clause, the table of the house would be covered with petitions, which would have no other foundation but some of these implied contracts. Now, he would tell that right hon. and learned gent., that if he happened to argue professionally against the petitioners under such circumstances, he need not exert much, of his zeal, or much of his eloquence, to persuade the committee that such petitions should be rejected as frivolous or vexatious. This being the case, the evil so much feared, of the table being covered with frivolous petitions, would be able to correct itself. As for the supposition of the ministers ever being obliged to go to their political enemies to recommend them persons to fill offices, that supposition could have been only made to produce a laugh: for he would venture to say, that if any of the opponents of the ministers were to recommend a person for a place, ministers would always shew sufficient firmness to resist such a recommendation. The alterations which had been made in the bill were in its most important and efficient parts. In the first place, the house could not bear that its members should be obliged to take the oath with the penalties of perjury annexed to it. Those who elected them were, however, obliged to take such an oath, and therefore it appeared that it was not intended that there should be any equal justice between the electors and the elected. The people must believe, that the reason the oath was left out was, that the house wished to screen corruption in its own members, and were afraid of their incurring the penalties of perjury. After they had thus got rid of the most operative part of the bill, they introduce this word "express," which they did not borrow from any act of parliament in existence, and which would effectually protect all corrupt proceedings of theirs in the disposal of offices. He would ask whether had this bill passed some time ago, gentlemen would not have been found to defend the traffic of lord Castlereagh with Reding, upon the ground that it was not an "express" contract? [No, said Mr. Perceval across the table.] Mr. W. declared his belief of the contrary; and, if the right hon. gent. thought otherwise, why did he defend the act of lord Castlereagh, which, according to the undisputed authority of the chair, was a violation of the law of parliament, and which law the preamble of this bill declared to be the principle of the constitution? But he valued not that declaration of the law of parliament as much as other gentlemen did. What availed the recognition or a principle, if that recognition was accompanied by a palliative for its violation? If ministers were provided with a protection which would enable them to violate the law with impunity, the law would be utterly useless. Indeed it would be worse than useless—it would be mischievous; and, however the house might be deceived by such a measure, they might rely that the public would not be deceived by it. The public would see that a bill originally introduced to guard against the operation of undue influence in that house was so contrived in its passage through the house, as to aggravate the evil complained of by giving a predominant influence to government. In fact, such a bill, with the insertion of this word "express," promised no good, and threatened much harm. The people of England would naturally enough believe that this word had been introduced as a shield for all manner of corruption on the part of ministers, and to take away all protection from it on the part of the country. He had so strong an objection to this word standing part of the clause, that if it were to continue in it he should find himself obliged to vote against the bill.

said, that in the case alluded to, with respect to the barter of a writership for a seat in parliament, it was determined that the intention of the agreement had not been carried into effect, and that was the cause of the transaction not being punished, which was an acknowledgment, that if it had been carried into effect it would have been punished, and this implied acknowledgment ought therefore to be satisfactory on that head.

said, he was a friend to parliamentary reform being brought about by moderate means, and as such hailed the present bill with pleasure; but the alterations it had undergone had changed its character, and reduced it to a mere nullity. He had expected much from this bill at the outset, but it had since been so mutilated, and would be so totally changed if the word objected to were retained, that he could not think of supporting the shadow when the substance was gone. He lamented very seriously the conduct of ministers, who were pursuing a course calculated to disappoint the reasonable expectations of the country, for that moderate reform which he would prefer to any violent change.

declared, that not expecting to be present at the third reading of the bill, he took that opportunity of declaring his most decided disapprobation of it as it now stood, as considering it at once scandalous and disgraceful.

declared his determination of supporting the bill even in its present shape, under the hope that it still would be productive of some good, for he could not believe that any ministers would dare to abuse the principle so openly acknowledged by it.

conceived that the bill as it stood, if disgraceful to the house, as asserted by his hon. friend, would at least not be so to the bringer in of it. But he considered that the effect of it would be to narrow the entrance into that house, between the Treasury and the popular boroughs.

though unwilling to accede to the bill in its present mutilated state, yet would not oppose it for the little good it might effect.

declared, that in the present state of the house, after members had gone away, he would not delay the public business, by dividing it on the question.

had no idea of gentlemen retiring from their duty as a reason for not taking the sense of the house, where he felt his duly required if, and determined to do it on the present occasion.

said that under the understanding general on these occasions, he would be better pleased not to divide the house; but if it took place, he would give the same vote he meant to give on the passing of the bill. He was never better satisfied of any thing than of the purity of the hon. member who brought in the bill. But when he found the bill as it now stood contained only three lines and a half of that which was originally brought in, it would do more to destroy the Constitution than any act passed since the Revolution.