moved for several additional papers relative to the proceedings in the prize courts upon the vessel called the Two Sisters, and various others, and gave notice of an intention to move that the subject be referred to a Committee. These papers were necessary for the elucidation of those which had been produced by the gentlemen on the other side. He repeated some of his former statements respecting the convoy taken in the Baltic, and as to the injurious effects which the abuses in the court of admiralty had upon the energy of the navy, and affirmed that greater exertions could be made with a far less number of ships, and a much less expence if these discouragements were removed. He added the revenues of France from her customs, that, which flourished under the present system, would by the correction of the abuses in prize proceedings be almost destroyed, and our own revenues augmented in proportion.

had no objection to the production of such of the papers as were now in the admiralty court.

observed, that the person to whom the noble lord alluded as having derived a very large share of the profits of the condemnation of several vessels, had been properly rewarded in this manner, because it was by his means that the evidence was obtained which caused their condemnation. He had been employed in neutralizing many of the enemy's ships, and offered, on terms, to secure evidence, not only of their being enemy's property, but also to discover several that had been neutralized by others. He accordingly went to the continent, and very ingeniously drew the French minister of marine into a correspondence which brought the truth to light. He wished the name of that person should be kept as secret as possible. He saw no use in calling for these papers, as the matters to which they referred were explained by the papers already on the table; but he would not object to the production of them. Even if the noble lord, howeven, succeeded in proving his allegations the judge of the admiralty would not be affected because overcharges and such matters of practice did not come regularly under his cognizance. He then passed a high eulogium on the character and abilities of the judge of the admiralty court, who, by a course of decisions which were published, had established a system of maritime jurisprudence, that shewed the world that we were not the tyrants of the seas, but that our proceedings were founded in justice and moderation. Notwithstanding the interference of his duties with the interests of the people of other nations, there was no man whose character stood higher either in Europe or on the other side of the Atlantic than that of the judge of the admiralty. He hoped the noble lord, therefore, would see the propriety of abstaining from indiscriminate censures upon the court of admiralty, as this might be extremely injurious to the public service.

stated, that he had a paper in his hand from a person whom the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Rose) had accused of charging more than the king's proctor, representing him as having charged 50 guineas for a memorial. The paper stated that this person had never charged more than two guineas for any single memorial. If he had made a charge of 50 guineas, therefore, it must have included a variety of items in several causes.

Said, that he had spoken from an account given in to the register of the admiralty on oath, where a memorial was set down, 50 guineas. This, however, might admit of explanation. He maintained, that if the business carried on by the king's proctor should be thrown open, the consequence would be extremely injurious to the navy, and to the interests of commerce, as the ships of innocent persons would be almost perpetually brought in for adjudication, to the detriment of the captors and merchants. He now, however, had almost daily before him cases of charges in prize proceedings, and he pledged himself to the navy and to the country, to bring these, where they seemed improper, before the admiralty court, and procure redress and a steady system of charge for the future. He would either do justice to the navy on this point, or prove that the complaints of the noble lord were unfounded. He also paid a high compliment to the ability, industry, and integrity of the judge of the admiralty court, who was highly respected all over the world—even by the enemy. A near relation of his having been lately in America, had remarked on his coming home, that it was singular that notwithstanding the great number of American vessels brought before the admiralty court, there was no man more esteemed in that country than his hon. friend near him (Sir W. Scott.)

observed, with reference to what had fallen from the hon. gent. opposite (sir John Nicholls), that it was improper that the navy should be obliged to pay spies. They ought to be paid by the government. Another hon. gent. (Mr. Rose) had admitted that there were abuses in the admiralty court, and, he trusted therefore, he would not oppose the going into a committee to correct them. He repeated his assertions as to the excellent effects which the correction of these abuses would have upon the energies of the navy, and affirmed, that in the way of capture, a well manned frigate, under proper encouragement, would do more than the whole channel fleet did at present.

observed with some warmth, that the noble lord had taken merit to himself for having brought forward the accusation at the end of last session. He could not concur in the opinion that the noble lord deserved approbation on that account. It was brought forward at a time when it was impossible that the necessary means could be used to repel it; and thus the accusation hung over him for six months, and as his friends could not be all aware how very unfounded these charges were, the accused was in some measure in the situation of an excommunicated person. He could not therefore agree that the noble lord had treated him in this business with candour or justice. In the early part of this session, the noble lord had taken an opportunity of repeating all the invectives before the time came when they could be answered. He had now however, brought, his facts before the House in the papers laid on the table; and the result was, that though they should be all proved to the utmost extent, the character of the judge and of the court of admiralty would not be in the least affected by them. They were circumstances for which the judge was not at all responsible. The judge was only responsible for his own conduct and that of those acting under him, when regularly brought to his notice. The king's proctor and advocate were officers of the crown like the attorney and solicitor general. The court was not responsible for their conduct or charges, nor for the charges and conduct of any of those practising in it, except complaint was made to the judge. He had no more knowledge of these things than the noble lord himself. If any improper practices of this nature, supposing them to exist, (which he was far from believing to the extent stated by the noble lord) had been brought to his notice, and he had refused to do justice, then, indeed, ought he to hear the thunders of that House about his head, as he had heard the noble lord's invectives. As to the confining of captors to the king's proctor, he believed it to be a wise and prudent regulation; but still he had nothing to do with it. That did not in the least depend on him. This was an ordinance of the king in council, for which he was not responsible. For himself he would not object to the production of the papers now called for, though he did not well see what good purpose they could serve. The noble lord had before called for all the papers relative to the matters of prize, which was in fact calling for all the records of the admiralty, which could not be examined. With all due respect for the noble lord's talents, and talents like his must ever be respected, however appreciated, he could not help wondering that he had ever proposed such a motion. There might possibly be some objectionable facts relative to proctor's bills, but what could the court of admiralty have done on that point, unless brought to its notice? The hon. judge then observed, that he did not mean to claim any particular respect for the admiralty court, but he submitted to the noble lord and the House, that it was necessary to the due administration of justice in that court, that it should be respected; and that no court could stand against these general imputations, which might produce an injurious impression non vi sed sape ea-don do. These acts, as he said before, did not at all apply to the court, but even if they had done so to a certain extent, there was a respect due to a court of justice, which ought not to be forgotten. The noble lord would recollect, that it was the province of that court to maintain the maritime rights of this country, and that this could not be done without exciting a good deal of irritation in neutrals. But if these imputations were perpetually thrown out against it, neutral nations would not submit with any degree of patience. The profession the noble lord had chosen was most honourable, and he (sir William Scott) had, in his humble sphere, been as attentive as possible to its interests. But such imputations as these might produce dangerous impressions in the lower orders, for he could not suppose that the officers could be misled by them. What would be their feelings if they were really to believe that there was a general conspiracy in the admiralty court against them? The honourable judge concluded by repeating that even if the noble lord made out his case to the full extent (which he could not), the court of admiralty would not be at all affected.

explained.

had no doubt of the personal integrity of the judge in his public and private capacity; but, he stated, that he believed it to be the practice, when a vessel was brought in and proved to belong to a friendly power, and was consequently discharged by the court, if an appeal was lodged, and war broke out with that power, pending the appeals, to condemn the vessel as lawful prize. He knew of nothing more like public robbery and piracy on the high seas, than such a practice. This perhaps was also the practice of other nations, but it became this country to set the example of a more liberal system. He did not, however, mean to blame any particular judge or minister.

said, that with regard to the papers moved for, he would not object to their production, although he did not think that this House ought to be called upon in the first instance, to sit in judgment upon attorneys' and proctors' bills. When the papers should be all before the House, it would be then fit to consider, whether to refer them to a committee, or remit the matter to the admiralty court.—There was another point also, to which he particularly begged the attention of the noble lord. He seemed to imagine that the French custom-houses were an ample source of revenue to that nation. But it appeared, from a statement of the French minister of finance, that the case was far otherwise, —for he stated, that, in consequence of the French decrees and our consequent orders in council, the produce of the French customs had experienced a very serious diminution indeed, and the minister consoled the nation for this, from the consideration of the vast diminution which they supposed must have taken place in our exports.

After some further conversation, the motion was put and carried.

, in submitting to the committee a proposition for granting to his Majesty a sum not exceeding 980,000l. to be applied in providing for the defence of Portugal, should have thought that vote so consistent with the feelings professed by the House on former occasions (had it not been for the observations thrown out on his notice), that he should not have expected any opposition to the motion. If the House was still influenced by that noble sympathy, which had hitherto so strongly interested them in the cause of the Spaniards suffering under the perfidy, atrocity, and usurpation of France, he was persuaded, that there could exist no disposition in the committee to resist his motion. He was well aware at the same time, that it might be said, that the measure he had to propose related not to Spain, but to Portugal. He must contend, that the interests of both could not be separated; that whatever should be done to give strength to Portugal, would add to the means of Spain; and that to provide for the defence and security of the former country, would be to promote the general interests of the peninsula, and the particular success of the Spanish cause. It was incumbent upon him, however, to admit, that, if France should ever succeed in establishing a secure and tranquil government in Spain, it would be impossible for Portugal, with even the assistance which this country could afford, effectually to resist the attempts of France. But if this country should still continue to hold Portugal, pending the straggle in Spain, and thereby menace the French forces in that country, he was sure it would be admitted, that we should by that means effectually promote the cause of Spain, and consequently the interests of all parts of the peninsula. He begged in this place particularly to refer to the feelings which had been excited in this country by the first burst of Spanish patriotism; and here he did not mean that general and ardent spirit of enthusiasm which glowed in every British bosom on receipt of the intelligence of the congenial efforts of the Spanish people, but that more deliberate judgment which was contained in the recorded opinion of Parliament. In the Address of that House, at the commencement of last session, he found the following paragraph: "We congratulate your Majesty on your receiving from the Spanish government, the strongest assurances of their determined perseverance in the cause of the legitimate monarchy, and of the national independence of Spain; and that, so long as the people of Spain shall remain true to themselves, your Majesty will continue to them your most strenuous assistance and support."—These were the sentiments which that House entertained last year upon the subject. In the Address, at the commencement of the present session, they had said, "We cannot sufficiently express our satisfaction, that the Spanish government, in the name and by the authority of Ferdinand VII, has determined to assemble the general and extraordinary cortes of the nation. We confidently trust, this measure will give fresh animation and vigour to the councils and the arms of Spain, and successfully direct the energies and spirit of the Spanish people to the maintenance of their legitimate monarchy, and to the ultimate deliverance of the Spanish nation."—When the House therefore had expressed such sentiments in their recorded votes, it was not too much to expect, that the committee, with a view to confirm the principles upon which those sentiments were founded, would not oppose the measure he had to propose—a measure taken in direct conformity with the wishes of the nation, and the votes of Parliament. He was persuaded even, that, if the House were now, for the first time, called upon for an opinion upon the subject, so far from regretting their former opinion, they would be actuated by the same sentiments and feelings, which were not more congenial to the character and honour, than conducive to the best interests of the nation. If they were to look at the question in this point of view, then, they would find the measure proposed not alone due to the honour and character of the British name, but upon considerations of sordid interest, find it equally consistent with sound policy as with national honour and reputation: no less dictated by maxims of prudence and interest, than consonant to every principle of public faith, national policy, and liberal conduct. It would not be doubted, he was convinced, that the cause of Spain was now the cause of this country; and that the longer we could make or enable that country to resist the strength, and exhaust the military resources of France, the more we should promote the interest of this country in the existing war. As long, therefore, as there should remain a hope of success in Spain, it was obviously the best policy of this country to keep up the spirit of resistance to French usurpation in the Spanish nation. The power of France could never be completely confirmed, or really secure in Europe, until that power should be established on the ruins of the independence of Spain: because, so long as the Spanish nation should continue to resist the usurpations of France, it would be necessary for that power to direct a great proportion of its strength and dispose able force against Spain. It was, consequently, the duty as well as the policy of this country, to foment and keep alive in the peninsula that spirit, which alone could hold out any hope of success to the cause, which might thus perhaps eventually become the germ of the liberty and independence of the world.—It was not then a question to consider, what where the best points of the peninsula to which our succours should be directed, or whether Spain was under any circumstances to be supported. The fact was, that we were at present not only in possession of Portugal, but that we were in great strength in that country. The real question to be considered therefore was, whether, in possession of Portugal, under such circumstances, the House should adopt the proposition, either to support those, who were disposed to continue the struggle in that country, or by withdrawing the British army to leave them to their fate, and abandon their cause altogether. The question he should repeat, really was, whether that House should determine to sustain the cause of the peninsula in Portugal, or by deserting it, leave that country to be over-run by the enemy; in doing which, they would surrender to France the most convenient station, and the most important instrument of hostility against this country. Was that a question which gentlemen were prepared to accede, to? Would the Committee deem it prudent or politic to leave the British army in that country, and not avail itself of the support and additional strength which was to be derived from the Portuguese army intended, by the measure he had to propose, to be taken into British pay? If they should be of opinion that the English army could answer-any useful purpose by remaining in Portugal, surely it must be desirable to take advantage of any accession of force which the means of the country afforded, and which would consequently enhance the ultimate prospect of the cause. But if they should now think to withdraw their army—if they should, in this instance, not feel those sentiments, which made them express to his Majesty their approbation of his having entered into a treaty with Spain after her reverses—if in the contemplation of the present difficulties, and without a just regard to the prospective interests of the cause of the peninsula, they should determine to abandon Portugal altogether, sure he was, that it would be in effect to abandon the cause of this country, as well as to tarnish the character and honour of the nation. When he looked back to that feeling, which induced parliament to approve of a perseverance in support of the Spanish cause, after the difficulties and reverses which had been sustained in Spain, he could not bring himself to suppose that any indisposition would be shewn on this occasion to maintain still the cause of the peninsula. At a period, when the hopes of Spain were so reduced; when the cause of that country was to be sustained almost within the walls of Cales, was it, he would ask, either for the interest of the surviving energies of the Spanish cause, or for the immediate advantage of the cause of this country, that we should withdraw, or profess to withdraw, the British army from Portugal? What consequence could result from such a course, but the inevitable subjection of Spain and Portugal, and the necessary augmentation of the enemy's means of hostility against this country?—But it might be said, that by still retaining possession of Portugal, we should only be able to occupy 30, 40, or 50,000 French troops in that country. Even if that were the true state of the case, he would ask, whether that would not be a material object, at a time, when the French army was likely to be fully occupied in Spain? Was it nothing, that, if the French should think of invading Portugal, they should, in order to give them any hope of success, bring an army of at least 100,000 men to act against that country? Or, should Portugal be left, by withdrawing the British army, in such a state, that 10,000 men would be amply sufficient to over-run and subjugate that nation? Such a sentiment he did not expect to hear expressed in that House. Indeed, so convinced was he of the wisdom and policy of the measure he meant to propose, that he should not have felt it necessary to make any observations to recommend it to the adoption of the Committee, if it had not been for the manner in which his notice had been received by the gentleman opposite, and which led him to think it would possibly meet with opposition. But it might be asked, whether any person could be sanguine enough now to hope, that the Spanish cause could succeed? If he were not sanguine enough to entertain such an expectation, still, it was his opinion, that the cause ought not to be abandoned. But what were they to think of the sentiments of those gentlemen, who were always of opinion that it was impossible for Spain to hold out so long—they, who told the House so often, that the cause was hopeless—that it was vain to send out British troops to sustain it—that if Spain was to succeed at all, she must succeed at once—and that she could never maintain a protracted contest against the disciplined armies and enormous resources of France? Spain had continued the struggle hitherto, however; and whatever might be the gloomy aspect of her affairs at present, the cause of the peninsula, according to his opinion, ought not to be abandoned. He was sanguine enough thus far to think that it would be extremely difficult for France to establish a tranquil dominion in Spain, unless Great Britain should separate herself from the cause of that country. But a secure or tranquil government France could not erect in Spain without much difficulty, nor easily make any effectual application of the means of the peninsula in her hostility against this country whilst we continued to assist its efforts. She might occupy Spain with an army, but her power would be confined within the limits of her military posts; and it would require nearly as large an army to keep possession, as to make a conquest of Spain. There never had existed a nation capable of subduing a population possessing the mind, and heart, and soul of the Spaniards. They might sustain reverses; but the very victories, and the triumphs of their enemies, would teach them discipline, and infuse into them a spirit which would ultimately be the ruin of their oppressors. Under these circumstances he should put it to the House, whether it would be prudent or wise to abandon Portugal. The last Austrian war had arisen, in a great measure, out of the contest in the peninsula. During the progress of that war, however calamitous its result had proved, it would be in the recollection of the House, that one other day's successful resistance of the French army by the Austrians, might have overthrown the accumulated power of the enemy. That such events might again take place, it, was not impossible. No man could anticipate what might arise of this description in the course of a short period, and under all the circumstances of the world; but as long as the contest was, or could be, maintained in the peninsula, he considered it the best policy of this country to support and promote it. Under this impression, therefore, he should move "That the sum of 980,000l. be granted to his Majesty, to enable his Majesty to make advances to the Portuguese government in support of its exertions in that kingdom, by taking 30,000 Portuguese troops into the British pay." He had only to add, that it was proposed to make these advances pursuant to an arrangement made with the Portuguese government, and not by a treaty which would be binding on the country, or take the expenditure out of the controul of parliament.

observed that the latter part of the right hon. gent.'s statement had relieved him from much difficulty, as the advance was not to be made in pursuance of any arrangement that could fetter the judgment of that House. He was surprized that the right hon. gent. could have supposed that such a motion would be agreed to without opposition. If any question could provoke opposition, it must be that which would make them continue efforts in a cause, which every one but the right hon. gent. considered hopeless. The hon. baronet then referred to the documents, to shew that the Portuguese levies had not been expedited as they should have been. He did not think the embodying of 30,000 Portuguese troops, at the expence of nearly one million, could prop the hopeless cause of Spain, now confined almost within the walls of Cadiz. The right hon. gent. had relied much upon the recorded opinion of parliament. Whilst the Spaniards were true to themselves, parliament was pledged to support them. But he denied that they had been true to themselves. If they should be obliged to embark the British army, as he supposed they would, what was to be done with these 30,000 Portuguese troops? Were they to be brought to this country, and added to the already enormous foreign army in its service, or were they to be sent to the Brazils, or to be left fully equipped and ready to add to the military force of Buonaparté? He trusted, whatever the right hon. gent. might say of the difficulty of establishing a tranquil French government in Spain, that the means and resources of this country would not be wasted in encouraging an intestine desultory warfare in that kingdom. As the contest was now hopeless, he would not trust any more men to the disposal of ministers, all whose measures, down to the present hour, had been characterized by a wanton waste of blood and treasure.

said, that in promoting the transactions which had been pressed upon his attention by the government, he had used all the energy, warmth, and activity which his frame was capable of. He had laboured with all the zeal and industry in his power; and had the satisfaction to add, that he had laboured with effect. As to the question under consideration, it was, in his opinion, not a question whether one million was to be expended upon this service, but whether they were to leave the British army in that country without availing themselves of all the assistance which Portugal could afford in support of it? He could not think that any gentleman would be of that opinion. With respect to Portugal itself, he could assure gentlemen, that the government of that country was administered with great energy and vigour. Large supplies of money had been raised to meet the public exigencies—the old military constitution of the country had been restored—the finances of the country were ably administered and well collected—and the war department conducted with much energy and ability. As to Spain, he must say, and it was his deliberate opinion, that if Spain had done its duty equally with Portugal in supporting the efforts of this country, its cause would have triumphed, and there would not now be a Frenchman on the Spanish territory. He could not conceive why any gentleman could think, that the British army should remain in Portugal, without taking to its aid the important accession of the Portuguese army, or rendering the spirit with which it was actuated available to the common cause. The Portuguese army had been greatly improved; and that was owing principally to the spirit, industry, exertions, and activity of marshal Beresford, whose indefatigable efforts and attention, under the direction of his very superior talents, had raised up a most respectable military force in Portugal.

should not have taken any part in this discussion, if not convinced of the very serious importance of the question. He had listened throughout with the greatest attention to the hon. gent. who had just sat down, because he expected to have heard something from him, which might induce him to continue of the same opinion as heretofore respecting the Spanish cause. No man would be ready to go farther for Spain; but when ministers themselves said, that there was scarcely a hope remaining, what thinking man would wish to continue the struggle? When they heard the hon. gent. say, that Spain had not done its duty, that was no time to think of hazarding a gallant army in the peninsula. He could have wished, that in enumerating the vigour of the government and of the departments, the hon. gent. had made some mention of the energy of the people. As the Portuguese people had suffered a French army to over-run their country, without any resistance, he was not for placing much reliance upon the Portuguese troops; and he really should think our gallant army in an alarming predicament, if exposed in that country, under such circumstances. He could not imagine that there was any rational hope of success. Since we had first undertaken to support the cause of the peninsula, a great alteration of circumstances had taken place and considerable additions had been made to our burthens. If the enemy could point out what he would prefer that we should undertake, he was convinced that his first wish would be, that we should undertake to defend Portugal.—It had been argued in the beginning of the session, by an hon. gent. (Mr. Huskisson,) that retrenchments in our financial expenditure were necessary, and he (Mr. Curwen) was perfectly convinced of the truth of that position, but he war sorry that the hon. gent. had not entertained the same opinion when that subject was brought forward last session by the hon. member for Oakhampton (Mr. Wardle). If the hon. gent. had then stood forward with those plans of retrenchment which he had so ably recommended since, he verity believed we should not have had to lament the disgraceful Expedition to Walcheren, and the profuse and lavish expenditure of blood and treasure that accompanied it. He assured the House that in uttering these sentiments, he spoke from no party feelings whatever. He spoke the plain genuine sentiments of a man most anxious for the welfare of the country, which, if great care was not taken by that House to check the profusion and extravagance which had so long prevailed in all the departments of the government must be soon reduced to such a situation that he trembled for the consequences. He begged the House to recollect that the constitution had undergone a very great and extraordinary change, and that the situation of that House had become very different from what it formerly was. When the present family came to the throne, that House was universally looked upon with the highest and most unqualified respect—its members were then considered as the real representatives of the people, and no minister would have dared to think of keeping his place one moment after he had lost their confidence; but now ministers, in defiance of repeated and considerable majorities, kept their places, and seemed to look for an acquiescence in their measures, notwithstanding they had been so repeatedly told that the House was afraid to trust them any farther.—He could see no reason why the House should be called on to vote so large a sum of money as was asked for by the present resolution for the purpose of taking into our pay an army of Portuguese soldiers, when the country was already so heavily burdened. But he was by no means one of those who despaired either of the exertions, or the finances of the country, provided they were administered with prudence and frugality. Neither of these qualities, however, were possessed by his Majesty's present ministers. They had long been too much confided in by the House; and it was now high time they should pause before they carried their confidence any further. If ever there was a moment that called on every reflecting and independent man to make that pause, and to consider seriously what they were doing, this was the moment; and if now neglected to be made use of, he feared the consequences would be most dreadful and ever to be regretted. Bounaparté could not receive more cheering hopes of his ultimate success in the struggle in which he was engaged, that he would derive from learning that the present ministers were to continue in office, and that the House of Commons still persisted in placing a blind confidence in them, and thereby enabling them to enter upon measures which in their inevitable result could not fail to answer all his purposes. Buonaparté knew this country; was acquainted with our resources; and he was afraid he depended more on the prodigality which now prevailed, as more certain to work our downfal, than upon all the efforts he could make against us. The right hon. gent. opposite had talked of not forsaking our allies the Spaniards, and of driving the French out of Spain. No man could more sincerely wish success to the Spaniards than he did; no man could be more anxious to assist them, whilst there was a probability of doing it with any effect. But as to our driving the French out of Spain, he was afraid the notion was absurd; and he thought the vote of the House this night, against the measure brought forward by the right hon. gent. if the House should decide against it, would be more important than if we were to take half the French army prisoners. Under these circumstances, convinced as he was of the absolute necessity of retrenchment, he should certainly vote against the motion.

rose and said: My right hon. friend has, I think justly, connected the present proposition of his Majesty, with his past conduct towards the cause of the peninsula. It is but a continuance and extension of the same spirit of British assistance. it is now, however, open to the reprehension of two classes of politicians, of those who think we never ought to have committed ourselves for the salvation of Portugal and Spain, and of these who, although they approved of that committal, whilst the event appeared at least to be ambiguous, think that the over-whelming power of France, has at length brought this tragedy so nearly to a close, that nothing is now left for us, but to escape, if possible, from being sharers in its catastrophe. In support of these opinions they now appeal to events. Hope, they contend, has vanished, and that there is no longer room for prediction, but that history has already recorded, and that in letters of blood, the fate that awaits our perseverance. They admit, indeed, that the consideration of what plans we are to pursue, is inseparably connected with the policy of what we have hitherto adopted. And that to Portugal alone, we cannot confine our view, but that it is for the peninsula we have fought, and that it is on the prospects of the peninsula we are now to deliberate.—It is easy to pass over a country, and to say "it is all barren," it is easy for a gentleman from Waterford, to characterise the Spanish nation as freebooters and plunderers, and for others to pronounce them in a mass, to be soldiers in disunion or patriots in disgust. To me these wholesale opinions appear not merely unfounded but unsafe; to me I confess the aspect of the peninsula appears nothing less than an enigma, which it is no reflection on any ministers not perfectly to have understood; a revolution bursting out at a period the least expected, exhibiting events in its progress, the most singularly contradictory and pregnant with results, which I still think no man living can foresee.—If on the one hand we are referred to the apathy of Gallicia during the retreat of sir John Moore, if we are denied to remember Ocana and Tudela, and all the other scenes of the defeats which the Spaniards have endured, and endured without despondency, must we not in candour remember that there was a battle of Baylen, and a battle of Valencia? are we to shut our eyes to the extraordinary phenomenon, that in Catalonia, the very next province to France, the French, at this hour, appear to be as often the besieged as the besiegers; and can we forget Saragossa and Gerona? Sir, they never shall be forgotten; but above all, shall we not do justice to that singular obstinacy, to give it no more glorious a character, which has sustained their spirit under two hundred defeats, and which in every period of the history of Spain, has formed its distinguishing characteristic? It is the boast of Englishmen, that they inherit and exhibit the spirit of their ancestors, who fought under our Henrys and our Edwards. In candour we should remember that during the same period, the forefathers of those Spaniards were engaged in a contest which is without a parallel in the history of the world. It is the assertion of their historians, and I remember, that it is repeated by Dr. Robertson, without an expression of their disbelief, that the expulsion of the Moors, which took place so late as in the reign of our Henry 7th, was the fruits of seven centuries of fighting uninterrupted, and of 3,600 battles, and in most of which I believe the Spaniards had been defeated.—In the beaten but persevering Spaniards of these days, I think we may trace the descendants of these peculiar warriors, as easily as we recognise the sons of the conquerors of Cressey and of Agincourt in the English who fought at Talavera. We may trace the same individual fortitude, and patience, the same enthusiastic superstition, the same persevering insensibility of failure, and, I will add, the same absolute indifference as to liberty, constitution, or cortes that distinguished the expellers of the Moors. It is too much, (because we feel and acknowledge that freedom is the first of blessings) it is too much to say that other nations are to be raised in arms by no other motives than its influence. The history of Europe and of England should have taught us, that there is another spirit prompting men to war, and which once poured all Europe forth in the Crusades; and however we may pronounce on the motives of our ancestors, the fact we cannot deny that the greatest spectacle of embattled nations ever exhibited on the theatre of war, was under governments and systems which indeed were not worth the defending. But because we can look back with wonder on the conduct of our ancestors, is that a reason why the Spaniards, who are to the full as ignorant, and far more barbarous, should not be actuated by similar motives?—Sir, I believe, we might more accurately consider the inhabitants of the peninsula, first, as a multitude of hardy and patient peasantry, buried in ignorance and superstition, and peculiarly accustomed from their cradles by the traditions and the songs of their ancestors, to consider the sword as the natural companion of the cross; and almost inseparably to connect in idea the defence to their religion, with the slaughter of their enemies; and with these predispositions goaded into madness by sixteen myriads of ecclesiastics, as ignorant almost as their flocks; but without an idea or a wish for freedom, with Fernando Settimo in their mouths, as an unmeaning watchword, and fighting, if you will, for the continuance of the inquisition. And with these qualifications it is my most firm conviction, that they would have overwhelmed all the armies of France, but that it was their misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all respects the opposite of the peasantry. I have described, differing from them, not merely in their moral qualities, but even in their physical appearance; a nobility of various degrees of worthlessness, but with a few brilliant exceptions, generally proportioned to the rank of their nobility, and further cursed by a government, (I speak not of their kings but of the Junta,) both in its form and in its substance, the most abominable that ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a nation. Hence desperate from repeated treason, destitute of confidence not in themselves but in their commanders, unable to stand before the French in battle, but still more unable to abstain from fighting. A very serious task it was for England to determine what to do with such materials. One rare and unquestionable feature they presented, a nation that would fight with France, and however some may deplore the events that have taken place, certain. I am, that if we had not, at least, tried the experiment of fighting by their side, these very men who now most loudly condemn the course we have pursued would be calling for the impeachment of these ministers who had neglected such glorious opportunities; who in the crisis of the fate of France had shrunk from the only field where there was a prospect of contending with success; who had coldly refused our aid to the only allies who were ever worthy of British co-operation. Sir, I think it is too much an habit to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly assuming that nothing but the absolute and complete attainment of our object can justify having fought them. I confess I take a different view of this subject; that men should foresee events and command fate is impossible: it is enough for me, if under the circumstances when the decision was adopted, there were grounds sufficient to decide fair judging men to resolve on assisting with a British army, the cause of the peninsula; and if that resolution being once taken, there was enough to decide a prudent commander to advance from the sea shore, and share the fortune of our allies. I cannot therefore subscribe to the phrase of the 'barren laurels' of our victories: yet white I never can agree to measure the justification of a battle by the mere fruits of victory, yet even on this ground I must contend that never were there laurels the more opposite of barren, than those which we all admit to have been reaped by our countrymen in Spain. We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced, that our army, equally as our navy, equalled in science and exceeded in courage, that of any other nation in the world; but if we have any anxiety for our character with other armies, if reputation is strength, and if the reputation of a nation, as well as of an individual, consists not in the estimation in which it holds itself, but in the estimation in which it is held by others, is a false vanity, to cause us to shut our eyes and ears to the opinions of other nations, Sir, I say, without much fear of contradiction, that in the beginning of these events, Spain at least had been convinced by the exertions of her government, misrepresenting our failure at Buones Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, that Great Britain, omnipotent by sea, was ever ridiculous on land. So much so, that when the army of general Spencer was landed near Cadiz, than which a finer army never left the English shore, it was the wonder as well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such noble-looking soldiers should be so absolutely incapable of fighting; the "beautiful" army was even the emphatic denomination by which the British forces were distinguished; and when sir John Moore was known to be at length on his march, that the beautiful army, the "hermoso exercito" was actually advancing, was a subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much of spanish exultation; but when that army had commenced its retreat, old impressions were revived with tenfold force, 'hermoso' was no longer the epithet bestowed on it, but one which it is impossible for me to repeat. Nor let it be said, that Corunna was a full vindication of its fame. We, indeed, know that British heriosm never shone more conspicuous than on that day, but the ray of glory which illuminated that last scene of our retreat, was but feebly reflected through the rest of Spain from that distant part of the peninsula; the French returned in triumph to Madrid, and boasted they had 'driven us into the sea,' it was certain we were no longer on the land, and under such circumstances it is not surprising that a nation, which like Spain, must feel conscious that it is in the daily habit of assuming victory to itself on the lightest grounds, should have declined to have given to us all the credit which we really deserved. Some gentlemen, I see, are of opinion that is no great matter what the Spaniards thought about us, but are we equally indifferent to the opinions of the French? Let us not too hastily conclude that they did full justice to out merits. We are told, indeed, that at Maida and in Egypt we had set that point at rest. Of the first, I shall only say, that it is within the last month that it has been, for the first time, mentioned in any newspaper of France, and that I believe nine tenths of the French soldiers have never heard either of the battle, or of the existence of such a place; and as to Egypt, surely every gentleman who has conversed in France upon that subject, must have found that their opinion is universally that which general Regnier in his most able, but untrue representation, of those events has laboured to impress, namely, that the treachery of Menou, and the detestation in which the army held the service in Egypt, and their anxiety to return to France, were the real causes of their expulsion; and that an overwhelming force of ninety thousand men, of English, Turks, and Indians, which he says, and which they believe, we brought against them, furnished a decent excuse for their surrender. Let us remember too, that it was after these proofs of British military excellence, that Buonaparté, on me heights of Boulogne, parcelled out in promise to his soldiers the estates of the 'nation boutiquiere'; let us remember also our own opinions in those days, how general enengagements were to be avoided; how as system of bush fighting was to be adopted in Kent; and our hopes that England Blight be saved after London might be lost, or what inundations we should make to protect it. Such language was then termed 'caution,' but on the proud eminence on which we are now placed, we may afford to acknowledge there was in it some mixture of distrust in the good old bayonet of Britain. Where are the promises of Buonaparté now? The very ridicule of such assertions; ridicule, perhaps the only restraint of such a despot, would render it impossible for him to repeat them. Sir, it is these guilty ministers who have taught to him, and what I think of much more consequence, have taught to England, another stile of conversation. They have fairly tried that point, so carefully avoided by their predecessors, and have brought our armies to a meeting with the finest armies of France; and after lamenting the heroes that have fallen, may we not reflect that the heroes who survive, by the mere Consciousness of their own excellence, form a more efficient strength than while their numbers were entire? This sentiment will be communicated to their comrades who shall join them in arms, and justifies me, I think, in concluding, that the present ministers have added more to our strength, as well as to our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors by abstaining from it in Poland.—Such is the view which I take of what is past: With respect to the second point, whether the time is indeed come, when our further assistance can only be destruction to ourselves, without being I serviceable to our allies? I cannot but express a more hesitating opinion; but this, I say; a very little time must shew us that; and if there are indeed good grounds of hope, any premature expression of our despondency will certainly extinguish them. The Junta is at length fortunately demolished. The French are again dispersed over every part of the peninsula, the people are still every where in arras, and peculiarly unsubdued in those provinces, the largest in possession of the French. Let us not damp that spirit which may still effect much, and which must effect something, which must at least give long employment to the forces of oar enemy.—On this subject of thus employing our enemy, I confess I agree with the hon. gent. who has last spoken, that, if indeed it depended solely upon us, whether our allies should continue that sacrifice of blood, which they have so profusely shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing our quiet at such a price; but convinced as I am on the contrary, that whether we stand by them, or whether we forsake them, those gallant nations will still continue to bleed at every pore. I say that under such circumstances, our assistance assumes a new character, and that independent of the advantages to be derived to ourselves; independent of, I believe, 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen; independent of not less than 300,000 more required even to preserve existence in the peninsula; independent of Brazil and South America, for ever severed from our enemies; and independent of the fleets of the peninsula, I trust rescued from their grasp; independent of these gains to ourselves, there is another feeling binding upon a nation, as well as upon an individual, not to forsake our friend because he is in his greatest danger.—Still, however, I acknowledge a limit there must be, beyond which we cannot go, and whenever we can agree in declaring that

Funditus occidimus neque habet Fortuna regressum,

then, indeed, the first laws of self-pre-servation will call on us to discontinue the contest. But surely Great Britain will not utter such a sentiment until her allies shall be disposed to join in it. They do not despair, and I will never despair of them so long as they do not despair of themselves, so long as I should leave it in their power to say to us at a future day, "whence these chains? If you had stood firm a little longer, if you had not so soon fainted, we should not at this day be in the power of our enemies."

rose to make a few observations upon the subject under discussion. Much had been said by the right hon. gent. who brought forward the Resolution, of the importance of taking 30,000 Portuguese troops into British pay. As he had been in that country, he thought it his duty to tell the House what he had reason to believe on the subject. In the first place, then, he did not think there were 30,000 soldiers in Portugal: those that were there, had, certainly, by the exertions and skill of general Beresford, and other British officers, attained an appearance of discipline; but he feared that an army adequate to the task of now defending Portugal, must be able to make a stand in the first instance, and if obliged to retreat, must still, as opportunity offered, return to the charge, and thus make resistance after resistance. He was decidedly of opinion, from what he had seen and heard of them, that on the very first defeat, the little discipline of the Portuguese army would vanish, and a dispersion would be the consequence.

said, that with respect to the character of the Portuguese nation, he agreed with the gallant general who had just sat down. If they were insensible to loyalty, religion, and the love of country, when that country was first invaded by the enemy, he would have no opinion of them even under British officers. This very circumstance must shew them that they had not a man in their own country who could lead an army. He begged to ask the right hon. gent. where he meant to remove the Portuguese troops in case of ill success. He should be glad to know, whether he meant to bring them here, or to send them to Ireland. Was it wished to send Roman Catholic soldiers there? If so, it was only in the extremes of bigotry that ministers could find security? He would ask ministers whether they had employed transports, to carry away our cavalry from thence? In this service our money would be better employed. If we sent an army to Portugal, it must be able to take the field independently, and without occasion for assistance. When he saw ministers going to commit extravagancies like the present, he thought that that House should interfere to prevent the effects of such insanity. As to any benefit to be derived from these levies against the common enemy, he fully concurred in opinion with the gallant officer who had just sat down. He had, indeed, never heard of any achievement performed by the Portuguese, with the exception of that in which 2,000 men, headed by the bishop of Oporto, entered Oporto and took 24 Frenchmen prisoners. The idea of retaining Portugal, therefore, appeared to him to be quite chimerical; while our keeping up a force there would be attended with enormous expence. Indeed, he had lately seen a military memoir, presented to Louis XIV. at the time of the contest for the Spanish succession, from which it appeared, that our maintaining a force in Portugal, without advancing into Spain, was the very course of policy which it was considered for the interest of the French that our government should pursue; and it would not be denied that there was a considerable analogy between the conduct of that war and of the present.

thought he should not do his duty, if he silently passed by a disparagement of the bravery and exertion of a nation, which, if we did not assist, must be reduced to the necessity of having its troops disbanded. The hon. gent. then mentioned the connection which the emperor of France was about to form, and which he thought could not fail to affect the politics of Europe: and this surely was not a time for us to abandon a faithful ally. He should therefore vote for the motion.

had approved of our original interposition in the cause of Spain; but he disapproved of the conduct of the war, and particularly of the system now proposed, Which would convert us into principals, instead of acting merely as auxiliaries. In fact, if this system were acted upon, the Portuguese must rasher consider us as fighting for ourselves than for them, and what degree of efficient zeal were they likely to feel in such a contest? But, with what prospects of success could we in the present situation of affairs upon the peninsula, any longer persevere in such a contest? With the French under the walls of Cadiz, and with all the circumstances of the peninsula in view, how could any reasonable man be reconciled to vote a million of the public money for the purpose referred to in the motion? But if success were even practicable, was it wise to vote such a grant for such a purpose? It had often been the practice of this country, to subsidize foreign troops; but, he believed, that it never before entered the head of any English statesman, to grant subsidies to a Portuguese force, to those, in fact, among whom the materials for an army could not be found.

spoke against the motion, and proposed an amendment, That the chairman should leave the chair, report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

vindicated the character of the Portuguese people, among whom, he contended, there had been many noble displays of genuine patriotism and military spirit. In proof of this, he could refer to many officers who had had opportunities of observation, and particularly to sir Robert Wilson, for whose conduct at the head of the Portuguese troops, it would be recollected that there was before the House a notice of motion for a vote of thanks.

approved of the amendment; and if it had not been put, he should not have hesitated to give a direct negative to the original motion. He lamented the state of difficulty and embarrassment in which the House was placed by this motion—but that state was owing to the conduct of ministers. It must be in the remembrance of many gentlemen who heard him, that this project of a Portuguese levy was first formed in November, 1808; yet not a word about it was mentioned in the subsequent sessions, nor until very lately, when the project was, it appeared, but very imperfectly carried into execution. In fact, the House was called upon for a vote to provide for 30,000 men, before any of that body appeared to have been raised. But he could never persuade himself to assent to such a motion; and, among many other reasons, for these two, which were obvious; first, mat we had not a million of money to spare; and secondly, that if we even had, this was not the way in which we ought to dispose of it. For any efficient purpose of war, he really believed that 3,000 British soldiers would be of more use than 30,000 Portuguese, and why, then, should the country be burthened for the support of such a force? He very much doubted whether our conduct towards both the Spaniards and Portuguese, was not calculated to induce an opinion among those people that every thing was to be done for them and nothing by them. It would probably have been better if not a single British regiment had been sent to the peninsula, and that means had been taken to excite these people to struggle for themselves, than to take so much of the struggle into our own hands. Too much money, perhaps, had been furnished to them. They ought to have been urged to look to their own exertions, and if an adequate spirit had existed, they would have found gold themselves, or created a substitute for it, as was the case in the popular struggles of America and France. Throughout the whole of the contest he thought that the people of Spain and Portugal had been encouraged too much to look to this country, and too little to themselves. This was a mischief which, as far as was practicable, ought to be remedied. But for this purpose the present motion wag ill calculated, because it proposed that we should become principals in the war, and take the Portuguese people into our pay. Where, however, he would ask gentlemen, were the means to be found of advancing this payment? He begged it to be considered that only 125.000l. in gold and silver could by any means be procured to pay our troops in the Expedition to Walcheren; and it should be borne in mind, that money must be sent to Portugal; for that alone, particularly in the event of invasion, could serve for the payment of our military force. Paper would not answer. In the prevent scarcity of bullion then, he requested the particular consideration of the committee to this point. The enemy were now, perhaps, in the possession of Cadiz, which in fact escaped immediate capture only through an accident. All the calculations of ministers had been disappointed. All their predictions were falsified; even that of which they held out an assurance so late as the 23rd of January last, was dissipated. The Cortes, which were to be immediately assembled, had not even a town in Spain to meet in. The Expedition to Walcheren had failed—totally failed, and was there an individual in that House who would not wish that that Expedition had never taken place? In fact, nothing that ministers promised was fulfilled—nothing they speculated upon was successful; and was it then possible, that the committee, with such ample and recent experience, could consent to invest ministers with the means of engaging in any farther hopeless speculations?—That which we had learnt from past experience, we should now adopt prospectively for our future policy. It appeared to him quite romantic to expect, that a British army of 20 or 25,000 men, even with whatever co-operation Portugal could give, would be able to maintain a war on the Spanish peninsula as principals against France. He should therefore recommend to the committee and to his majesty's ministers, to husband the resources of the country for our own defence, and looking upon that as the soundest line of policy, he felt himself bound to oppose the motion.

denied that France bad any complete occupation of Spain, either civil or military. If he were to look over the map of Spain, arid begin from the northern province of Catalonia, he would there find the French by no means masters of the province; and would at a loss to say whether there whether there were at this moment more Spanish towns besieged by the French, or towns occupied by French troops besieged by the Spaniards. The communication were so completely cut off, that the French could not send a letter from Barcelona to Gerona, without an escort of at least 500 cavalry to protect it. In the next province of Valencia there was not a French soldier, but the Spaniards had at least 50,000 men, armed with different Weapons. The French had obtained but little footing in Murcia and Grenada; and, generally speaking, those towns only were surrendered to them which were under the influence of the nobility and gentry of large estates; but the mass of the people were patriotic, and the villages were stilt defended against them after the towns had been betrayed. He believed that among the nobility and gentry, where there were two brothers, the loan of great possessions was always for submitting to the enemy; while the other joined the patriotic standard. Not only the villages but the mountains were still obstinately defended, so that the communications of the French were never secure; We had been accustomed to consider civil wars as the most horrible of all kinds of hostilities, but he believed that there never was a civil war so horrible as that which was now raging in Spain. He believed the massacres, the pillage, and the violence offered to women were unparalleled. He had lately been witness to dreadful atrocities of this description committed by the French in that country. The town of Puerto Ruel surrendered on certain terms, and Victor, upon entering it, published a proclamation, promising the most perfect security to all the inhabitants. Nevertheless, he had hardly taken possession of it, before he ordered the men (who were most of them artificers at the docks of Cadiz) to be imprisoned, and the females were marched down to St. Mary's, to be violated by his army. No one could wish so dreadful a state of things to continue; but still the patriots of Spain preferred this horrid state to absolute submission. Every part of the country was inspired with the utmost hatred of their oppressors, and Gallicia and some other provinces had, by their own exertions, driven the French out of their country. Spam was still far from being conquered by Franch, and Buonaparté could have derived far greater advantages from that country by governing it as formerly by his influence. He could not separate the cause of Spain from that of Portugal, and thought the best way we could act for its defence would be to make use of the co-operation of the Portuguese. He hoped sincerely that there was no ground for despair; but even if Spain was to be lost, it was probable that the fleet would be saved. Whenever the period for despair should arrive, he trusted that proper measures would be taken to meet it. It would then remain for the wisdom and policy of whoever should then be the ministers of this country, still to protect the distant but valuable portion of the Spanish empire in America, and prevent those rich colonies from falling into the hands of France.

spoke in faovur of the resolution. It had been said that the cause was hopeless. He denied it—it could not be hopeless, for while there was life there was hope. He asked, if it became a generous power like England to abandon a friend in the moment of distress? Gentlemen had argued, that our assistance could do no good, but would not our refusal of that assistance do considerable harm? The Portuguese troops had been greatly abused, as men unwilling or incapable of defending themselves. Put them under sound British officers, and he would warrant they could be made something of. Let such men as the victorious lord Wellington, or the gallant marshal Beresford, have but the leading of them, and he would pledge his existence that under such men they would never run away. The grant of itself was wise, but at such a critical period it was indispensible, and he should therefore vote in support of it.

spoke in complimentary terms of the characteristic fervour and spirit so becoming his youth, and his profession, that breathed throughout the speech of the gallant officer who last sat down. He could have wished, however, to have seen that spirit more profitably exercised. An allusion had been made to sir Sidney Smith, the ornament to his profession and the glory of his country. He certainly was willing to do justice to the services of that distinguished officer at Acre; and he believed had it not been for the check the conqueror of the world then and there met with, that, bad as the present condition of Europe was, it would have been materially worse; but Buonaparté, it seemed, knew, to use the language of an hon. gent. (Mr. Jacob), the period of despair, and proposed to meet it. We should profit by the lessen—fas est ab hoste doceri—let us know when every further effort will be a fruitless waste of blood and treasure, and cease to continue to make them. That hon. gent. had entered into a detail of shocking atrocities, alledged by him to be committed by the French in Spain. Was he an eye witness to them? And if he was not, or if he were, why were they detailed to the committee, unless to inflame them upon a question where their judgment only should decide. Abuses, no doubt, must have prevailed; but were gentlemen aware of none committed under circumstances of less provocation, where the clergy received the mandates of power, to ascend their pulpits, and issue from them falsehoods not more rank than they were notorious! But if there was this spirit in Spain that had been contended for, where were its effects? Were they visible in suffering the French troops to pass over the face of their country like light through an unresisting medium? Where they manifested in the defence of the Sierra Morena—a pass that 500 resolute men might have defended against an army? They had been, indeed, gravely told, that the post could not pass unmolested. No doubt this was a most serious calamity, and a conclusive proof of the energy of the popular spirit! only unfortunately they had the same proof in another way in a neighbouring country. At the time of the troubles in Ireland the post was conveyed throughout that country under constant military escort. But what, in the name of common sense, was the object in keeping up these troops in Portugal? Was Portugal chosen as the arena in which they were to fight over again the battles for the liberties of Europe? Or what they had been refused under better auspices were they to hope to gain under those that were less favourable?—The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had talked of the benefit of an Austrian war, but he seemed to forget that the situation of Europe was changed—that the new idea of marriages and fetes drew the connection between France and Austria closer arid made it firmer: that what Austria lost by the war she was likely to gain by this marriage, an event so fortunate for her broken down condition, that it might well be said, as it had in a former instance of the Austrian reigning family,

"Et quæ Mars negat aliis, eadem dat tibi Venus."

But with respect to this transaction relative to the Portuguese troops, the House had hot been treated fairly. He must condemn the practice of advancing money for such a purpose without the consent of parliament, and it appeared that on the 28th of February bills were drawn for the money which was not voted till the 8th of May following. Why had not the House been informed of those bills, which were at that time drawn, by the foreign secretary? They had heard a good deal of English valour, and how far it might be relied on in restoring the cause of Spain. He, too, thought highly of English valour, but he thought as highly of English patience; but patient as the people of this country were, that patience, like every thing human, had its limits. The vigour of the vigorous administration, might wear it out at last. But, if they were to vote this million of money, he wished to know where it was to be had? —Here the hon. gent. adverted to the evidence of Mr. Huskisson before the Scheldt Committee; the substance of Mr. Huskisson's answers going to shew, that if an army of 40,000 men had been, in July last, landed in the north of Europe, it would have required 500,000l. to set them in motion for a given time, and 300,000l. to subsist them for that time—one month; and, that this country could not at that time have contributed that extraordinary supply of 800,000l. Did not a statement of this nature require examination? Did not the question, after such a statement, call for further consideration? It was for this further delay he now contended. Spain had not done its duty—no matter from what cause—the people, had, however, some excuse—they had been under the selfish sway of an aristocracy, that only wanted to use them as an instrument to effect their own narrow purposes; their implicit confidence had been abused by the blind bigotry of an intolerant priesthood—a priesthood, that whatever it preached, practised not the gospel it ought not alone to preach but practice; they had had the sword in their hands as often as the crosier—and that they had had, he feared, in their hearts any thing but the meekness, Humility, charity, and peace that their blessed master had inculcated by his pure precepts, enforced by the example of his apostle's life, and sealed by the last sufferings of his all atoning death! While he (Mr. W.) valued those precepts and that example, he never could take pleasure in setting man against his fellowman in a hopeless struggle. He thought the present cause hopeless, and as such, He never would consent to its being uselessly and cruelly protracted.

did not conceive that to watch the struggle of the Spanish and Portuguese nations, and if triumphant alone, to plant our banners with theirs, would be either a wise or an honourable policy. Certainly, Portugal was not the place that we should purposely select for the arena on which to fight the last battles of Europe, but this was not the question. The question was, whether we were to withhold from his Majesty's ministers the means by which the contest might be rendered more likely to be successful in its termination. The vote of this million did not impose on ministers the necessity of expending it in Spain or Portugal; it gave them merely the power of doing so, and on them would rest the responsibility of a due exercise of discretion on the subject. Adverting to the observations made by the hon. gent. on his evidence in the Committee, he observed, that the calculations into which he then entered were founded on the supposition, that our expenditure in Spain and Portugal would be upon the scale on which it now was. It was unfair to infer from his evidence that he did not believe sufficient specie for this purpose could under any circumstances be obtained. He was satisfied, that if a proper time were allowed, and a good price given, specie would rapidly flow into the country.

not only deprecated any further delay, but thought that ministers ought sooner to have called for the decision of parliament upon it. Whatever might be the blame due to the conduct of the campaign in the peninsula, it was enough for him to know that an alliance with Portugal had been concluded, and that Portugal, in virtue of that alliance, demanded our assistance. He conceived that it would be highly dishonourable for this country to desert a cause which he could not characterise as absolutely hopeless, and he expressed his conviction that the Portuguese troops, when disciplined and commanded by British officers, would form a very efficient army.

The question being now loudly called for, a division took place—For the postponement 142; Against it 204; Majority 62. The original motion was then carried without a division.