rose, pursuant to the notice he had given, to call the attention of the House to a measure which had been adopted by them, involving materially the rights and the liberty of the subject [see vol 15, p. 502.] he meant the Resolution of the House, by which John Gale Jones was committed to New gate for a breach of the privileges of the House. He lamented exceedingly, that in consequence of indisposition he had not been present at the time that resolution was past, because he was aware, that he stood in a worse situation to persuade the House to recal an act after a decision upon it, than he should have done to prevent its commission before it was adopted. He knew it was at all times much easier to prevent the adoption of a measure, than to induce the House to retract a resolution after they had come to it. When he considered, however, the vast importance of the question, and how highly, the public interest was involved in it, he was satisfied he would not discharge his duty, did he not still endeavour to induce the House to retract a step, which, according to his view of the ease, they were not authorised to take.

With regard to the privileges of that House, he knew there were persons who carried their fanciful notions of them to a very extraordinary length, But if they were possessed of privileges, such as that which the House had exercised, they must be such as could only be discovered by men of much more lively imaginations and of minds far more acute, than he could lay claim to. He professed only a plain mind and understanding; and when he wished to ascertain what were the privileges of that House; he could only go, where he felt inclined, in the present instance, to go, to the law of the land and the principles of the constitution, to ascertain, whether such privileges did, or did not, exist. If he, at any time; found what was claimed as a privilege to be above the law of the land, he must feel himself reduced to the necessity of saying, that no such privilege could legally or constitutionally exist. The law of the land he must always consider to be the standard by which the privileges of every individual, and of every body of individuals in this country, were to be measured. But it would be necessary, for the purpose of ascertaining, whether the right of imprisoning individuals, not members of that House, was one of their privileges, to look to the origin of those privileges; this circumstance being always kept in view, that the House of Commons was not the Parliament of the country, but only one of the branches of that Parliament; that, in fact, as it appeared to his mind, the House of Commons was, though a constituent member, yet the inferior branch of the legislature, (Order! order!)

here interposed, and felt himself in duty bound to inform the hon. baronet, that it was not orderly to designate that House as the inferior branch of the legislature.

continued. This, at least, he might be allowed to say, that that House, and Parliament were different; and he contended, that there must consequently be a difference in the extent of the privileges which they might, separately, or jointly with the other House of Parliament, be supposed to possess. On this ground, be maintained, that the imprisonment of John Gale Jones was an infringement of the law of the land, and a subversion of the principles of the constitution. He hoped that gentlemen would throw altogether out of their minds that this was a question regarding their own privileges, and that they would come with calmness and dispassionate feeling to decide on their own case. If they were to take the consideration of the question only as connected with the law of the land, he should undertake to persuade them, and he hoped successfully, that nothing could be more consistent either with the law of the land, or with common sense, than that they should retract the resolution they had come to. The question was, if the House of Commons had a right to imprison a person not a member of that House, for an offence punishable by the ordinary course of law, and by a vote for that purpose, deprive the people of their imprescriptable rights? As to those privileges which should be possessed, because necessary to enable the House to carry on its own proceedings uncontrouled and without interruption or impediment, that was a question which he was not called on to argue.

He begged to call the attention of gentlemen to this circumstance, that there were involved in this question the consideration of two distinct qualities, privilege and power. The one, privilege, the House possessed for its own protection; the other, power, was a right to be exercised over others. Privilege they were to exercise to prevent the Crown from molesting them in their proceedings. They were to use it as a shield for themselves, but they were not to allow it to change its character, to be converted into power, and to use it for the destruction of others. The real nature of this privilege was to be collected from the very earliest periods of our history. It was recorded in Spelman, so early as the time of Canute, that the persons of members, in their way to and from Parliament, should have protection. This was the first mention on record of privilege of Parliament. The law of king Canute was, "Omnis homo eundo ad Gemotum, vel redundo a Gemoto habeat pacem." That every one going to, or coming from the Witenna gemotte, should have protection. This, therefore, was the ground work of all the privileges of that House. Nothing seemed to him so absurd as the notion of an undefined privilege; it was a solecism in language; and he had the highest authority for saying, that such a privilege was not known to the constitution.

The next notice of privileges of Parliament was to be found in two writs of supersedeas of Edward the second, to privilege members from being sued in any court, (sitting the Parliament) and which are still extant. But the extent of these privileges cannot be better set forth than in the following order of the House of Commons, of the 1st of June 1621, supposed to have been drawn up by sir Edward Coke, then a leading member of the House:

"Ordered, upon question, That if any arrest, or any distress of goods, serving any process, summoning his land, citation or summoning his person, arresting his person, suing him in any court, or breaking any other privilege of this House, a letter shall issue, under Mr. Speaker's hand, for the party's relief therein, as if the Parliament was sitting; and the party refusing to obey it, to be censured at the nest Access."

The privileges asserted and defined in this order, were all in the nature of defined for the members; had reference to nothing but their own proceedings; and could not apply to others, surely, at all events, not to sanction what was contrary to the law of the land. It may reasonably be concluded, that all the privileges the House of Commons then thought itself in titled to, were enumerated in the order of the 1st of June, 1621, as sir Edward Coke, so well acquainted with, and then contending for, them against the undue prerogative of the crown, claimed no more. Whenever these privileges, so modestly and reasonably claimed, and so necessarily complied with, were infringed, they were as modestly and reasonably maintained by an appeal to the tribunal of the laws; which was apparent by reference to all the cases of privilege which occurred up to the time of the civil war. As for instance: In 1427, one Richard Chedder, a menial servant, attending upon sir Thomas Broode, one of the knights for Somersetshire, who was assaulted, beaten, and cruelly maimed, was content to seek redress by law. In his case the House acted with such moderation as to order application to be made to the law of the land, and a new law, not an ex post facto one, was passed for punishing assaults against members or their attendants in future.

In 1430, William Larke, servant to William Mildred, one of the members for the city of London, was committed to the Fleet on an execution of debt, and delivered in due course of law. And in 1433, an act of Parliament was made, affixing a heavier penalty for the assaulting a member, than the law had previously inflicted. The act is entitled, "An act against assaults made upon lords or others coming to the Parliament." In 1456, Thorpe, the Speaker, was arrested at the suit of the duke of York, on which the Commons appealed to the whole Parliament, who referred the case to the Judges, whose opinion was in favour of Thorpe's being entitled to privilege: notwithstanding which, the Parliament decided otherways, and the Commons acquiesced and chose, another Speaker. What was remarkable in this case was, that both the Judges and the Parliament appealed to the same maxim: both applied the same argument as conclusive, viz. "That the party aggrieved could have no redress, and that there could be no wrong without a remedy." The Judges determined from this maxim and from this reason, that no general writ of supersedeas could lye, "because" (say they,) "if it could, the high court of Parliament from which all justice and equity ought to flow, would seem to stop the course of justice, and leave the party aggrieved without remedy." And the Parliament yielded to this same reason, set forth by the duke of York, in the argument against Thorpe's being allowed privilege, viz. "That in case it was granted to Thorpe, in this instance, the party aggrieved could have no remedy." So that they had in this case, the opinion of the Judges and the decision of the Parliament, equally determined by that sound and characteristic maxim of British law and constitution, "That there can be no wrong without a remedy."

The hon. bart. Then proceeded to quote a variety of other cases in illustration of what he contended to be the legal and constitutional limits of perogative, claimed and exercised by that House up to the period of the civil wars.—In all the cases he observed that members, when their privileges were violated, and their persons arrested, were content to appeal to the law, and had such tenderness and respect for other men's rights as well as their own privileges, as to make provision for the interest of creditors, when affected by their privileges, and to indemnify officers against actions for escape, to which they were legally liable for giving up their prisoners. Never did the members of the House of Commons presume to overleap the bounds of the constitution, and take the law into their own hands, till the days of the Long Parliament; when, from the peculiar circumstances of the country, in order to resist the arbitrary encroachments of a despotic prince, the House of Commons found it absolutely necessary in the struggle, not only to extend their privileges, but to assume powers, the exercise of which abolished the House of Lords, brought the King to the block, and ultimately dissolved the whole frame of the government. If these usurpations of power were not only acquiesced in, but strenuously supported by the people at that period, it was because they were supposed to be indispensably necessary to enable the House of Commons to stem the torrent of tyranny which was sweeping every thing before it to destruction; and as the only means of wresting from the grasp of despotism, the expiring liberties of the country.

But these, surely, were not sources sufficiently clear, nor times sufficiently analogous to justify our drawing thence instances, miscalled precedents, to countenance similar proceedings under a legal, settled, and established system of government. But as every day's experience would inform them how reluctantly all men relinquish power and authority, which they have once exercised, even after having experienced its mischiefs, so was the House of Commons, after the Restoration, unwilling to yield up its usurped power and authority, submitted to in times of trouble and commotion, but incompatible with the return of order and the laws.—Accordingly they would find in the cases of Dr, Carey, Mr. Fitten, sir Samuel Bar nardiston, Shirley, and Stoughton versus Onslow the pretensions to power under the name of privilege still clung to by both Houses of Parliament, but as constantly denied by each House to the other in its turn; the one always denying the usurpation of the other, and the parties aggrieved the authority of both consequently no power or authority of that description could be acknowledged or allowed to belong to either. But the following case, which occurred about the same time, and which having been argued at a conference between the two Houses was entitled to more particular notice, it was that of the four counsel in the appeal of sir Nicholas Crispe versus the lady Bowyer, Dalmohoy and others, who were taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, for pleading before the Lords contrary to an order of the House of Commons to forbid them; at which conference, the lords asserted "That the House of Commons was no Court, had no authority to administer an oath, or to give a judgment; that it was a transcendant invasion of the liberty of the subject; that it was against Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights and many other laws, which had provided that no freeman shall be imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty but by due process of law; that it tended to the subversion of the government of the kingdom, because it was in the nature of an injunction from the lower House, which had no authority or power of jurisdiction over inferior subjects, much less over the King and Lords. These arguments had been answered by the Commons only by retorting upon the assumed jurisdiction of the Lords, advancing empty assertions of its own authority.

Having thus briefly adverted to some of the less important cases, to which, he found it necessary to call the attention of the House, he proposed next to submit to its consideration, the very remarkable case of Bridgeman versus Holt in 1696–7. The duchess of Grafton having claimed under a patent of Charles the second, a right to appoint the clerk to the King's Bench, lord chief justice Holt contested the claim. The case was solemnly argued in a trial at bar, and was decided against the duchess in favour of lord chief justice Holt. Upon which, the counsel of Bridgeman, who had been nominated as clerk by the duchess, tendered a Bill of Exceptions, which the justices refused to seal. In consequence of which, a petition, complaining of the conduct of the judges, was presented to the House of Lords, accusing sir Wm. Dolben, sir Wm. Gregory, sir Giles Eyre, justices of the King's-Bench, of acting illegally in having so refused. They were in consequence of this charge, summoned by the House of Lords to appear before them, and answer to the complaint made in the petition. This the judges refused to do: and they, in a solemn, profound, and well digested argument, denied the jurisdiction of the House of Lords, insisted upon their undoubted right as Englishmen, to a trial by a jury of their equals, in case they in any thing were accused of having done wrong, and claimed the benefit of being tried according to the known course of the common law—they relied upon Magna Charta as freeborn Englishmen, which they said, was made for them as well as for others; that all powers and privileges in the kingdom, even the highest, are circumscribed by the laws, and have their limits. In the courts of Westminster (said they,) the law is determined by one, and the fact ascertained by another; here, both the law and the fact would be in the same hands. If the House of Lords should punish, could such order stop or bar the legal process hereafter? or be used below as a recovery or acquittal?—as an autrefois convict? or autrefois acquit? Would the proceedings in the House of Lords save them from the trouble of answering to an information or indictment for the same thing elsewhere? And here it was to be remarked, that when the judges of the land were attacked by an unwarrantable power, they sheltered themselves behind the broad shield of Magna Charta and the trial by Jury, well knowing the value of such a protection, and they concluded with these memorable words: "some persons have, perhaps from a diffidence of success, or from a slavish fear, or private policy, forborne to question the power of, their superiors, but the judges must betray their reputation and their knowledge of the laws, if they should own a jurisdiction which former times and their predecessors were unacquainted with." Whereupon the petition was dismissed. If then these reasons were conclusive against the House of Lords, they applied much more forcibly to the House of Commons; for the House of Lords possessed the judicial power of parliament, being the supreme court of appeal in the dernier resort; whilst the House of Commons, having no judicial function to perform, was no court at all, and consequently could not possess the power exercised in the commitment of Mr. Jones.

Let the case of Mr. Jones now be measured by the arguments of the judges before cited: which arguments were held by the House of Lords as conclusive against its pretentions.—The judges claimed and insisted upon the benefit of the Common law, Magna Charta, and trial by jury, for any thing in which they might have done wrong; not because they were judges, but because they were commoners of England. They denied and rejected the jurisdiction of the Lords, and assigned their reasons: "Because in that case, the fact would be ascertained, and the law would be determined, by the same party; and that if they should be punished by the Lords, that would not prevent their being called to answer again in the courts of Westminster-hall, where they could not plead an autrefois convict, or autrefois acquit: and so, they might be punished twice for the same offence."

Let the House then apply this reasoning to the case before them. He had already shewn, that the common law, Magna Charta, and trial by jury had been violated. They found Mr. Jones imprisoned For an act, the illegality of which had not been proved—the facts not ascertained—nor the law determined. Yet was he then undergoing such a sentence as had been shewn. And, as to the other part of the argument of the judges: what was there to prevent Mr. Yorke from preferring a bill of Indictment, according to law, against Mr. Jones for this same act, as he understood had been done by a noble lord not then in his place (lord Castlereagh) for a similar act? And if they could suppose, that any twelve lawful men in England could be had to find a Verdict of Guilty, then would he be punished twice for the same offence? He could not prove his former conviction, because he could not produce the record of his former sentence; because, the House of Commons is no court of record, therefore incapable, by law, to furnish a copy of the record; because the law did not allow that House to try and determine any cause. To determine was beyond its limits, as had been shewn: its incapacity was clearly proved by the legal circumscription of its powers.

But suppose that a jury could find no injury to have been sustained by Mr. Yorke, and should return a verdict of acquittal: then would Mr. Jones have been sentenced to undergo the most severe punishment short of death, that of indefinite imprisonment, by an order of the House of Commons, for having done an act not proved to be a crime; which on the contrary, would have been determined by a jury of his equals, not to have been an offence, as in the case of Reeves; with whom the minister dealt more tenderly by giving him, his creature, the benefit of the law; when a jury contradicted by their legal verdict the predetermined judgment of the House of Commons; but, if a jury were to do the same in the present case, Mr. Jones could have no remedy for the wrong done to him—he could not bring his action for false imprisonment against Mr. Yorke, nor against the House of Commons, nor the serjeant at arms, nor the sheriffs, nor the jailor: that is to say, if the courts of law should tell him, as they had told others heretofore, that they could not interfere with the House of Commons.

A great variety of cases could be adduced where the House had interposed, but not one in which it had gone to the extent it had proceeded to in the present instance. Many pamphlets had been published since the Revolution reflecting on that House, the authors of which had only been reprimanded or proceeded against by the Attorney-General.—But it was unnecessary to multiply cases, they must all be acquainted with the case of the Middlesex Journal in 1771 when the messenger of the House of Commons was sent by their order to arrest the printer; instead of which, the printer took up the messenger, and brought him before Crosby, lord mayor, and aldermen Wilkes and Oliver, who committed the serjeant. Not withstanding this outrage which the House of Commons sustained by the attack upon its officer, it presumed not to touch any of the offending parties, except its own members, the lord mayor and alderman Oliver; passing over the printer, the journalist, and alderman Wilkes, who, at that time, was not a member of the House—than which disaffirmancc of its power a stronger proof cannot be conceived. It would also be recollected that when the libel in the North Briton, No. 45, and the gross publication, "the Essay on Woman" published under the name of a bishop (Warburton) of course a member of the upper House, came under their cognizance, they merely addressed to have the delinquent prosecuted by the Attorney General. In adducing further authority on the point, sir Francis said, that he felt it too like trifling with the understanding of the House to expend their time. It was a doctrine clearly laid down by lord Coke, that no man could be fined or confined, but in a court of record; no court but that in which forty shillings damages might be given could be a court of record; the argument came into the form of syllogism, and the necessary conclusion was, that the power of fine and imprisonment was not in that House. But no right to fine was assumed. Why then was the greater power retained, when the smaller one was admitted to be illegal? Why was the maxim of law and reason violated? "Cui minus non convenit, cui majús non convenit."

The warrant of committal too, he must contend, was illegal in all its parts, but eminently so in its conclusion. A legal warrant must conclude with the words, "till the party be delivered by due course of law; this warrant ends with the words during the pleasure of the House." He (sir Francis) highly valued the rights of that House; but from whatever part of the constitution an exertion of arbitrary power came, it was his duty, it was the solemn and sacred duty of every Englishman, to avow himself hostile to it. There were, in a matter of this kind, two obvious questions to be considered with a view to justice. The first, "crime, or no crime?" The next was, if a crime, was the party accused guilty of it? The House, by such a proceeding as it had resorted to, involved the assumption of the judicial, executive, and legislative powers; but this was in the very teeth of law. In the due administration of the law, it was wisely provided that the same men shall not take two steps together; one set find the hill, another decide on the fact, another the law; but that House, which administers no oath, which squares itself by no form, which makes no previous examination of the fact, jumps at once upon its dangerous and most alarming conclusion, and finds the accused guilty.—And for what?—for their privilege. Then let gentlemen who said this was the privilege of the House, point out where it was so laid down. To his mind such a doctrine was untenable and contrary to the law of the land, which declared that no man can be condemned without trial. Lord Coke laid it down explicitly that no man could be sent to prison without trial and judgment. This privilege talked of resembled the bye-laws of a corporation, sufficient to bind themselves, but which could not overturn the law of the land, as laid down by the father of it. This was to shew the House to be as great as King, Lords and Commons. It was besides an encroachment on the prerogative of the crown, whose privileges it was to see that no unlawful restraint was laid on the liberty of the subject. He might be told this was a privilege of parliament. He answered, No; it was only a privilege assumed by one branch of the legislature; and he contended that the House was not entitled to take that arbitrary rule to themselves. If gentlemen should shew resolutions favourable to the exercise of this right as a privilege of the House, he could be at no loss to shew others of a contrary principle. Sir F. Norton had said, that he would pay no more attention to a resolution of the House of Commons than to that of a set of drunken porters at an alehouse. The observation was coarse, but it was just. If gentlemen, therefore, were of opinion, that a resolution of that House was equal to that of all the branches of the constitution, they would agree in rejecting his proposition. But, if with him they thought that they could not overturn the law of the land and the acts of parliament solemnly passed, by any assumed power exercised by that House alone they would agree with him that John Gale Jones must be discharged. The hon. bart. concluded by moving that John Gale Jones be discharged.

said, that he felt himself embarrassed as to the course proper to be pursued, in consequence of the manner in which this subject had been submitted to the consideration of the House. If a motion had been brought forward for the liberation of John Gale Jones, upon the grounds of his contrition for the offence which he had confessed at the bar, he should not have objected to it; but the proposal of that liberation was so interwoven by the hon. bart. with other topics, to which he could by no means subscribe, that he really was a loss how to proceed. He could never be persuaded to go the length of the hon. bart.'s doctrine, that the committal by the order of that House of any person who was not a member, was contrary to the principles of Magna Charta. This certainly was the first time when such a question was mooted in parliament, or any doubt professed as to the right of the House to commit any person guilty of treating it with contempt. But the hon. bart. contended that such a right had not the sanction of any ancient practice, and that no instance of its exercise could be found, previous to the existence of the long parliament. Here, however, the honourable baronet was under a mistake; for, so far back as the reign of Henry the 8th, there were two cases on record of the assertion of this right—the one arising out of the arrest of a member, and the other out of an assault. In the former, that of Ferrers, the House, without any appeal to the courts of law, interposed its own authority, and actually committed the sheriff, with all those concerned in the act of arrest; and in the latter case, that of Monington, the parties guilty of the assault were also committed to prison. Many other instances of commitments prior to the Long Parliament might be cited with which he would not now fatigue the House. With regard to libels, no instance of a committal upon such a charge, was, he admitted, to be met with prior to the reign of Elizabeth; but the fact was, that in the periods alluded to by the hon. bart., which immediately succeeded the invention of printing, there was no such thing as the liberty of the press, which now existed so happily for the country; as he believed lo that valuable privilege our present preeminence above all other nations was in a great measure to be attributed. The right of printing, and the liberty of publication, was so completely under the restrictions of the Star Chamber, and so liable to be limited by the king's proclamation, that there was no probability of any libel appearing against that House, In fact, no such, thing having occurred, no precedent could be cited of any committal for that description of offence. But the principle contended for by the hon. bart., was sufficiently negatived by the two precedents to which he had referred; That House, indeed, had been possessed of many other privileges, beside that under discussion, which it had itself thought proper to abandon;—for instance, the lands of a member were formerly secure against legal process, but in this case, that House acted as he trusted it always would—considerable inconvenience and injustice being found to arise out of such an arrangement, it was done away. But the principle upon which the existing privileges of that House rested, still remained untouched; indeed, the principle upon which the protection of members from arrest, lest by such arrest they should be prevented from attending their duty in that House, was clearly indisputable. And it appeared to him equally clear, that libels, or any other means of interfering with the due performance of a member's duty, should be equally provided against. The same reasons which justified a court of law, in punishing any contempt or in terruption of its proceedings, pleaded in favour of the privilege exercised by that House in the case which gave rise to this discussion. Any offence to a court of law was deemed not only personal to the individual immediately presiding, but to the whole tribunal of justice, or according to the older language of the law, to the king's person, which was considered as perpetually present there. So in this case the libel was not treated so much as an offence to the member attacked, as to the whole House collectively, which therefore for the vindication of its dignity felt it expedient to punish the offender. A charge brought against any member, for a motion which he had made in the House, would naturally be considered a contempt of the House itself, which had entertained, and perhaps affirmed the motion. The individual who had been imprisoned, was justly considered out of the question by the hon. baronet. He wished indeed that he had waited till the discharge of Mr. Jones from prison, and then the question could be more delicately discussed. As it was at present, however, there was this inconsistency; the motion had nothing whatever to do with the speech, by which it had been prefaced. He wished even now that the worthy baronet would propose a declaratory resolution, on which to found his present motion; or, perhaps, indeed, then the motion now made need not follow, as the release of Jones must be the immediate consequence of the House agreeing in the resolution. He confessed that, even then, he for one would vote against the resolution, as tending to deprive the House of a privilege, which it had enjoyed for above 300 years—that of guarding its dignity against libels.

highly panegyrized the character of the worthy baronet; who brought forward this question, to no part of whose conduct in that House, or elsewhere, was it possible to attribute any personal or selfish motive. But while he bore full testimony to the hon. bart.'s rectitude, he could not concur in the opinion he had advanced, that that House did not possess a privilege, which he found to have been so long exercised, and to have been uniformly recognized by all the courts of law. The court of law Bench was known to have interfered with a sacred privilege which materially interested that House, namely, the right of election; and to act in contradiction to the decision of a committee of that House, upon questions connected with such right; and was it to be supposed that the same court would hesitate to interfere with the exercise of the privilege under discussion, if such interference were conformable to law. Under these impressions, and from these considerations, he felt himself bound to vote against the worthy baronet's motion.

contended, that the two cases quoted by the hon. baronet since the Revolution, and particularly that with regard to Knollys, who claimed to be earl of Banbury, had no analogy to the question at issue, for in neither of these cases could any contempt of the authority of either House of parliament be fairly made out. Indeed, the words of chief justice Holt before the House of Lords fully justified this assertion in the case of Knollys; but if that House did not possess the right of committing any person for a contempt or breach of its privileges, the way was clear for trying the legality of its exercise, by moving for a habeas corpus on the part of any person so committed. The court of King's Bench, upon such a motion, would first be called upon to decide as to the right, and he should have no doubt as to its decision, because he had no doubt as to the right. That court must, in fact, feel that it was no more warranted to interfere with the right of that House to commit for contempt, than with the right of the court of Common Pleas, or of any other court. In fact, the question to which this discussion referred had been brought into a court of law, in the case of Crosby, the lord may or of London, for obstructing a messenger of that House in the execution of its order. There, although the lord mayor was a member of the House, he was committed—not, however, as a member, but for the obstruction alluded to as a municipal officer, and on an application for a writ of habeas corpus the court of Common Pleas decided, that it could not interfere with the exercise of a right which belonged to that House. The hon. bart. had thought proper to quote the observations of sir F. Norton, comparing "the Resolutions of that House to the resolutions of a set of drunken porters at an alehouse, "and likened its privileges to the bye-laws of a corporation. Now he wished to know where the hon. bart. could find an instance where any corporation possessed the right by a bye-law, to arrest one of its officers at a distance, as that House had done, with regard to the lord mayor in the instance alluded to. But, returning to the decision of the court of common pleas, the learned gentleman read an extract from the words of lord chief justice De Grey, upon pronouncing that decision, which included a quotation from Coke's Institutes, stating, that the right in question was legal, because it was necessary—that the privilege of that House to commit persons in certain cases, was a part of the law of the land—that in such cases, its adjudication was conviction, and its sentence execution—and that no court was entitled to interfere with the execution of another. As to the words of the warrant of committal "during the pleasure of the House" so particularly dwelt upon by the hon. bart., these words were also the subject of considerable discussion in the case of Crosby, but the result was, that they were found to have been those usual in all similar cases, and so had been decided to be correct. There were many other cases, which he could cite to shew the indisputable right of that and of the other House of parliament to commit for any contempt or breach of their privileges; But he thought it hardly necessary to mention any more, as the sentiment of the House appeared almost unanimous, against the hon. bart.'s motion. He would not, therefore, trespass upon the attention of the House further than by alluding to the case of Flower, who was committed by the House of Lords for contempt The opinions of lord Kenyon and Mr. justice Grose, delivered upon the application in that case for a writ of habeas corpus to the court of King's Bench appeared to him quite conclusive, as to the right of committal in cases of this nature.

declared his inability to concur in the sentiments of his hon. friend who originated this discussion; for in his opinion, the right of committal in such cases as had been referred to, justly and necessarily belonged to that House. Indeed, it was highly essential to the performance of its duty. He quoted the case of lord Strafford, when by gross misrepresentations and the most libellous publications, such a degree of outcry and odium was excited against the minority, (among whom was Selden), who opposed the infamous bill against that nobleman, in order to shew, that such a power was necessary to maintain the authority and independence of that House. Recollecting the treatment of that minority, and comparing it with the conduct for which they were so abused, he should always feel himself bound to resist those who should by libels or other means attempt to excite popular vengeance against any individual or any number of individuals for their conduct in that House. Therefore, although he felt disposed to vote for the liberation of John Gale Jones, he could not agree to the proposition as founded on the general doctrines laid down by his hon. friend.

vindicated the statement of his hon. friend from the disingenuous manner in which the learned gent. (the Attorney General) had applied some of the cases and authorities of which his hon. friend had in his very able Argument, happened to make use. It must be in the recollection of the House, that when his hon. friend alluded to the comparison between the resolutions of that House and of a set of drunken porters in an alehouse, he only quoted the words of a grave and well known authority. Therefore, his hon. friend had not been fairly interpreted by the learned gentleman. Indeed the interpretation had been equally unfair with regard to his hon. friend's allusion to the bye laws of a corporation as compared with the privileges of that House. But the eloquent and forcible address of his hon. friend was not to be easily answered, and therefore it was not fairly met by the hon. and learned gent. His hon. friend's position was simply this, that that House did not possess a legitimate right to commit in a case of this nature—[Here there was some cry of question! question!]—The noble lord observed, that it might perhaps not be pleasing to some gentlemen to enter into any argument upon this case; but he could not help thinking it rather ungracious in any gentleman to display that feeling, when it was considered that the discussion related to the imprisonment of an English subject for an in definite period and for an undefined offence. Upon such a subject he thought it his duty, before he should make up his mind, carefully to examine the Journals. He had done so, and entirely concurred with his hon. friend (Mr. Creevey) in the expression of regret, that the motion was so framed that he could not support it to the whole extent. Indeed, he found no precedents for the exercise of this right of committal on the part of the House at a very early period; the practice was not of long duration; but, so far from the fact being as stated by a learned gent. (Mr. Wynne), that there were no libellous publications punished by that House, previous to the Long Parliament, that he found the case of Hall, who was committed for a libel, 1580. This Hall, was, indeed, a member, and expelled the House, because he would not retract his book, and the book itself burned, by order of the House.

As to the power now claimed, the House appeared to have derived it from precedents in the time of the civil wars; but yet even then the instances of its being exercised were uncertain, and differing from each other in the various modes of offence, of proceedings thereon, and of punishments. They ought therefore to be very cautiously taken for precedents. The House ought also to recollect, that though at the time alluded to their predecessors had assumed almost the whole executive power of the government: they however proceeded with more deliberation even then, than they did now, for they were wont to refer the consideration of the offences to a committee of privileges, and have a formal opinion thereon before they committed the, person, and when they did commit any one, it was only to be proceeded against in due course of law. It should be recollected too, that at the close of the last century; it was decreed, that all alleged libels against that House should be referred to the examination of a committee of privileges, before any decision was pronounced upon them by the House. This solemn course was, however, of late years dispensed with, and the House determined for itself with a promptitude that was too liable to error, and too likely to be influenced by passion. The revival of the former, and the better course of proceeding, seemed therefore desirable. As to the reference of libels on the House to the attorney general for prosecution, he did hot mean to question its propriety; but would maintain that the House was competent, by its own authority, to punish any contempt or interruption of its proceedings. He denied, however, that the publication of a libel was to be regarded as a contempt. For, if a libel and a contempt of court were held to be tantamount, how came Hart and White to be brought to trial, for a libel upon the court of King's Bench. If a libel were tantamount to a contempt of court, the court could unquestionably have committed these men at once, without a trial. The noble lord concluded, with expressing his disposition to vote for the liberation of Mr. Jones, although he could not go the whole length of his hon. friend's proposition.

observed that the question was now reduced to a much smaller point than it was at first presented, since the supporters of the motion had explicitly abandoned the principle originally maintained, that the House had no right to commit any person but their own members, in any case whatever. This was the principle for which the hon. baronet had contended, and for the support of which, every argument used by him was directed. The noble lord, who spoke on his side, had, nevertheless, declared himself of a directly contrary opinion, and acknowledged that the exercise of the right was consonant with the law of parliament and the law of the land. The question then was, whether this was a case of contempt or not? That is to say, whether this person, convicted on his own confession by the unanimous vote of the House, of a gross breach of privilege, (which contained in itself a gross and scandalous contempt,) and punished for his offence in the way that appeared most fitting to the House, was guilty or not? As far as the present practice could be traced, it was found to be legal and, constitutional, and he could therefore see no objection to its exercise. It was open to Jones to apply by the other mode, that of petition, and he (the Solicitor general) might agree to his discharge in this way, the next moment after disposing of the question as it now stood; but he would not, and he trusted the House would not, relax now, after hearing the kind of arguments adduced by the hon. baronet. If they did, what would be the consequence? It would be said, that they yielded, because they doubted their own right: that when it came to be questioned, they were glad to compromise the matter by liberating the individual. On these grounds, he must give his vote against the motion, and he called on the House to pause before they adopted a course which would subject them to much misrepresentation.

had heard a great deal during the whole night, of cases in the earlier periods of our history, in the reigns of the Tudors and the Plantagenets: and of the Henries, and the Edwards; before the Reformation, and previous and subsequent to the Revolution—now he wished to draw the attention of the House to one simple and obvious case—the case of Mr. John Gale Jones. It had been said by the hon. and learned gent. who had just sat down, that it would be wrong to think of releasing Mr. Jones, on account of the principles contained in the speech of the honourable baronet, lest the act of liberation might seem a consequence of the doctrine, or a concession to its validity. Now he should certainly vote for the release of Mr. Jones, but he should not do it by any means on the principles contained in the honourable baronet's speech; and he did not see indeed what the abstract arguments of that speech had to do with the actual liberation of Mr. Jones. Why should he be sacrificed to a theory with which he had no concern? Why should he fall an unwilling martyr to doctrines, which he never propagated, nor perhaps ever entertained? Did he ever say, with, the hon. bart. that the House had no jurisdiction over any persons except its own members? To this indeed, and to this in its full extent, went the arguments of the hon. baronet. It was in vain to deny it. What! said he, condemn a man without a trial, examination, or the intervention of a jury—imprison a British1 subject without the verdict of his peers! This was indeed, the whole tenor of his speech, but with such tenor the motion under consideration had nothing whatever to do; it merely went to propose the release of Mr. Jones, in consequence of his having been confined long enough for the offence he had committed. With regard to the general doctrines of the hon. baronet upon this occasion, he confessed, that he could not subscribe to them. Indeed, there were some of them which he heard with surprize—When the hon. baronet in talking of that House described it as the inferior branch of the legislature, he really must suppose from the hon. baronet's principles, that he must have made a slip. What, that that House which contained the representation of the people, even such as it was, should be set down by the hon. bart. as the inferior branch of the legislature? If the House were reformed, no doubt it would be so much the better, but whether or not, made no difference as to the description which the hon. baronet gave of it, he must believe, by mistake.

The hon. baronet recommended a reference to the attorney general to prosecute for any libel upon that House, in preference to the course which had been pursued in the case under consideration. But on this point he differed decidedly front the honourable baronet. This was a practice he never could give his sanction to; and by the adoption of which, he had no hesitation in saying he thought the House would be dishonoured. It never could delegate into any other hands than its own, the maintenance of its privileges, without a degradation of its dignity and a dereliction of its duty. He well knew the consequence of confiding such a trust into the hands of an attorney-general. He knew it from experience. He had once the honour of being appointed chairman of a committee appointed expressly in order to ascertain who was the author of a certain gross and scandalous libel against the dignity of that House. The libel proved to be the, production of Mr. Reeves, a friend of his own, for whom he felt a very high degree of personal respect, and went the length of stating, that the monarch was the chief prop and strength of the constitution, the root and trunk on which its vigour depended, and which might remain fresh and vigorous, though even the other members of the legislature,—the branches, were demolished. This he in the House had moved to be a gross and scandalous libel, and was proceeding to take further steps in consequence, when one of the gentlemen opposite though proper to suggest, that the further prosecution should be handed over to his Majesty's attorney general. The suggestion was unfortunately adopted, and the author of what had been unanimously condemned in the House as a gross and scandalous libel, was acquitted in the court below. This was the consequence of transmitting the defence of their insulted privileges into the hands of an attorney general. The recollection of this case, which could never escape his memory, held out no inducement to that House, in his mind, to transfer to any court the preservation of its privileges and dignity. No, he would rather prefer the increase of their own indisputable right to guard against and punish the violation of their own undoubted privileges.—But, as to the nature of the offence committed by Jones, and the imprisonment he had suffered in consequence, he must again express his hopes that gentlemen, who seemed disposed to release him, would not allow that disposition to be affected, by coupling his case with any argument advanced by the honourable baronet. The offence of Mr. Jones ought to be candidly considered, and the extent of the punishment regulated by the merits of the case. What then in reality was the nature of this offence, of which it seemed he was unanimously considered guilty, though now, indeed, the entire feeling of the House appeared in his favour, provided he could be abstracted from the arguments by which the motion had been preceded? Why, he had merely proposed as a subject to be mooted at a debating society, whether certain conduct of two members of that House had been or had not been offensive to the liberty of the press; and in case of condemnation, which had been most criminal. Now this was a question proposed merely to be discussed at the debate of an evening society. He begged gentlemen to consider how far this case then was worthy of serious attention, much less deserving of severe punishment. For himself, he was free to say, that he hated all extremes. While he differed from the honourable baronet's doctrine, that that House had no right to commit any person but one of its own members, for any attack upon its privileges, he could not, on the other hand, agree with the principle laid down by the new Teller of the Exchequer, when he originally brought forward the case of Jones. To have heard the opening of the accuser, one would have thought it a case aggravated in the extreme:—"Read me," says the hon. member for Cambridgeshire, turning to the clerk, (he is not now, indeed, member for Cambridgeshire, said Mr. Sheridan, and I hope, for the honour of the people of England he will never again be returned to this House by any portion of that people) "Read me a certain page of a certain chapter in the bill1 of rights." Now the passage which he had desired so pompously to be read, merely directed that no proceeding of that House should be questioned in any court or place out of doors. Was this meant to bar all public discussion, all consideration of politics out of parliament? Unless it meant this, it could mean nothing; it must prevent the publication of any report of any of their proceedings; it must carry the order to its utmost extremity. Now to prove how conveniently this principle might be occasionally relaxed, he would merely state the contents of a requisition which an hon. baronet had just shewn him, as having been served on him, requiring his attendance at a court of common council—he did not think it would be disorderly to mention the name of the hon. gentleman, not certainly as a member of that House, but as an alderman—he was a very constitutional man; it was sir William Curtis: The requisition desired his attendance at a court of common council to "consider of the prodigal and profligate expenditure of the public money by the House of Commons, in the late grant of an annuity of 2,000l. a-year to lord Wellington." Now if the bill of rights was to be so closely adhered to in every case, why was such a notice as this made public with impunity? What! shall that House thunder its vengeance to batter down a poor debating club, when it would not dare to raise its arm against a wealthy corporation? If this distinction was to be practised and endured, let there be an end then of all that gives our constitution value—repress all discussion—prohibit any county meetings—silence every controul over public men on the part of the people,—and by that act deprive parliament of the great stimulus by which it is forced to do its duty. If this principle of the bill of rights was to be acted on at all, common justice required that its extension should be general; and if that were once the case, they would rob the people of their only consolation under suffering— their best prop and champion—their chief resource under all the miseries of misrule and misgovernment,—a free press; An attempt of that description had been made some time since. He had not then the honour of a seat in that House, but it was at the close of the American war that the experiment was tried. Lord. North attempted to exclude the public from the House of Commons; he had the power, and exercised it for above a session and a half. What was the consequence? every county had its parliament, and every village in the empire its delegates: clubs assembled, and societies sprung up for the discussion of their rights, and the examination of their grievances. The result however was, that the minister seeing his mistake, restored the usual opportunity of communication between the people and their representatives. If he had not done so, what might have been the consequence? He remembered well that much mischief was apprehended, but the danger was dissipated by the restoration of that freedom which was the most effectual foe to danger. Therefore he saw with pain every act of hostility against the freedom of the press, particularly at the present crisis. The House ought not at such a period to betray any thing like that hostility. It was inconsistent with the safety of the country, and peculiarly so with their own interest. But in the case under consideration their interest, their principles, and their pride should restrain the House from engaging in such conduct. There was something so silly, so small, so ignominous in the contest in which the House was involved, that he could not think of it without pain, and therefore must feel anxious to rescue it from its warfare with the British Forum. Upon these grounds he would take leave to move an Amendment, that John Gale Jones should be discharged in consequence of the contrition he had expressed for his offence against the privileges of the House, and the period he had been imprisoned in Newgate. The right hon. gentleman expressed a wish to know from the chair, whether this mode of applying for the discharge of Jones, or his own application by petition, was the more regular or ordinary course in such cases?

The Amendment having been delivered to the Speaker, he observed in reply to the inquiry of Mr. Sheridan, that an application to the House by petition from the prisoner, would be more consonant to the ordinary mode of proceeding in such cases.—The Amendment being read,

said, that he could not agree either with the original motion, or the amendment. In, the first instance, the argument of the hon. baronet had altogether failed; it had been shewn in the course of the debate to have been wholly unfounded: a noble lord (Folkestone) had taken great pains and mainifested no inconsiderable portion of ingenuity in reconciling the statements of the honourable baronet, with principles which those statements went to upset. It had, however, been admitted, even by that noble lord, that that House had aright of committal in cases of contempt, and that one concession, immoveably founded as it certainly was, at once went to the root of the whole argument of the hon. baronet. It had been said by a right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), that Mr. Gale Jones was not to be made a martyr to the mode of reasoning adopted by the hon. baronet. But he would ask if the House was to sacrifice their sense of their own dignity to principles which they utterly denounced? He could not see why the House should be called upon on the very day on which they had heard a doctrine avowed that went to the existence of their privileges, to discharge a person whom they had unanimously declared as guilty of a breach of their privileges. The right hon. gent. had reasoned as if every attempt on the part of the House to assert their privileges must necessarily involve them in discredit, and put them in a situation out of which they were unable to deliver themselves with either address or dignity—Yet it appeared, that when the right hon. gent. had preferred an accusation himself it necessarily became important; then to be sure it originated in sound reason, and was deservedly matter of grave consideration. It appeared, however, from the result, that a jury of dispassionate men, happily removed from the resistless influence of the right hon. gent.'s eloquence, had pronounced Mr. Reeves not guilty of that atrocious libel which the right hon. gent. in the vehemence of his eloquence had attributed to him. If, then, the House never came well out of such causes, the instance mentioned by the right hon. gent. in which that gentleman was himself the mover, was certainly one of the aptest illustrations of the truth of that assertion. He thought that the House should be extremely cautious in admitting the influence of any new doctrine, without tracing that doctrine to its source. The corporation of the city of London had been confounded with a spouting club—the one was a, legal constitutional corporate body, and the other was utterly unknown—it was nothing. He had no hesitation in saying that that House ought to pause before it would interfere with the legal exercise of a constitutional body. They were convened by legal authority—they met to exercise a constitutional right—to petition parliament, and in that petition to comment upon the proceedings of their constituents, so that the analogy did not at all hold. He called upon the House to weigh well the consequences of making the case of Mr. Gale Jones a precedent—and a precedent it must be if hitherto the uniform practice was that every offender should, previous to his enlargement, send in an humble petition to that House, acknowledging his offence and avowing his contrition; and if, in the present instance, Mr. Gale Jones should be absolved from that hitherto indispensable preliminary. Some stress had been laid upon the expressions of contrition made use of by Mr. Gale Jones at the bar; but such expressions had been made previous to his, commitment. The House agreed, after, that confession unanimously, to commit him; therefore, some subsequent acknowledgment was necessary; at the same time, he had no hesitation in saying, as far as he himself was individually concerned, that if the person in question should, according to the ordinary and regular course, submit his acknowledgments to the House in the shape of a humble petition, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) should be the first to accede to any proposition for his enlargement; but if that individual should be so ill advised, as to refuse such acknowledgment, the House, in his opinion could not enlarge that person without a compromise of its dignity.

in explanation said, that he had distinctly stated that that House had pronounced the Pamphlet of Mr. Reeves to be a gross, scandalous, and malicious libel.

, if he could not concur in the motion of the hon. baronet, should not consent to the attainment of the same object by a side wind, in agreeing to the amendment. He thought the confinement already suffered by the individual a sufficient punishment for his offence; but would not consent to his discharge till he should by a petition express contrition for his offence. The Bill of Rights was not intended to prevent constitutional meetings, legally convened for discussing the conduct of public men. But he could not consider self-called meetings as entitled to the same consideration as corporation meetings, or county meetings legally convened by the Sheriffs. He should therefore vote against the original motion and against the amendment, at the same time distinctly stating, that if a petition were to be presented, he should vote for the discharge of the individual.

was sorry that the hon. baronet had brought forward his motion in a shape, which, whatever way it should be decided, would not attain his object. He could not but agree that the House had the right to commit persons for a breach of its privileges; but he must also add, that in his opinion that House very seldom got well out of such proceedings. It was clear that the honourable baronet had gone the whole length of denying that the House had the right to commit any person, but one of its own members; for he had put his argument in the form of a syllogism; a court of record only had such a power of commitment; that House was not a court of record, therefore that House had no such right of commitment. He should therefore vote for the amendment.

declared his intention to vote for amendment, because he thought the confinement already suffered sufficient as a punishment for the offence.

replied to the various arguments which had been urged against his motion. He had endeavoured to guard against the confounding the simple proposition, which he had stated, with the exercise of the inquisitorial functions of that House. He could never have had it in idea to assert, that the House had not the power, in the exercise of its constitutional functions, to remove nuisances, that is, obstructions to judgment, a power which every magistrate possessed. All courts had that right, because without it they could not proceed in the administration of justice. What was the legal meaning of contempt? That which throws obstructions in the way of the proceedings of any court, is a contempt of that court; therefore the privilege of the court in such instance was the right of removing such obstruction; but how were the proceedings of that House affected, or at least obstructed, by a libel? Did it follow that, because it could commit for direct obstruction, it could likewise imprison for constructive contempt? The former was a power necessary for the performance of its constitutional functions, and had not been denied by him. But he did deny that they had legally the power to call a man to their bar for the purpose of charging him with an offence, and then to inflict upon him imprisonment, the highest punishment, not capital, recognised by the law of this land. In doing this, the House appeared to him to have greatly transcended its constitutional prerogatives. The hon. bart. then proceeded to review the cases that had been adverted to in the course of the discussion, and the comments made upon them. He shewed that not one of them applied to the case under consideration. If any hon. member could shew to him that such a prerogative was necessary to the constitutional functions of parliament, he would submit. They had already abandoned all the privileges which were formerly thought necesary for them, because they had been found obstructions to justice, and they now retained only freedom of speech and from arrest. He had hoped that the learned gentlemen opposite, those luminaries of the law, would have thrown more light upon the subject; but the only case they had produced, that of Ferrars, in the reign of Henry VIII, went to shew that the House in such cases had no separate authority. the learned gentlemen had mistaken all his cases, and misconceived the object for which he had cited them, and the arguments with which he urged them. But the hon. and learned gent. (the attorney general) had not been able to shew that it was consistent with the law of England—that law, which, according to Plowden, was founded upon pure reason—that an English subject ought to be questioned twice for the same offence. The cases he had cited, he referred to only as illustrative of his argument, and in order to shew, by the well digested and able paper of the Judges in the case of Bridgeman and Holt, that the judges acknowledged no legal tribunal in this kingdom but the courts established by the law of the land. The lex parliamentaria that had been so much talked of, was binding upon their own members, but not upon others. It did not give that House a power, not possessed by the Sovereign—the power of committing a person for an offence cognisable by the legal tribunals. What was the answer of chief justice Morton to Edward the Fourth, when asked by that monarch "whether he could arrest a particular person", "No, Sire, that would be an act for which you could not be questioned, and the party, if aggrieved could have no redress; you must make an arrest by an officer who will be responsible for the consequences." It was likewise a most material objection against this right claimed by the House, that they, could not proportion the punishment to the offence; as an individual may, by possibility, be confined seven years, or only five minutes, if a dissolution was to take place. Much had been said of the dignity of that House; but if dignity was to be measured and supported by punishment, Jack Ketch must have more dignity than any other individual in the kingdom. If strong powers were to be given any where, he should prefer giving them to the King. He had ever been an enemy to the exercise of arbitrary power in any quarter, and on the same grounds was led to oppose what he looked upon as an usurpation of an unconstitutional and arbitrary power on the part of that House.

The Amendment was then negatived without a division? but upon the original motion the House divided—For it, 14—Against it, 153—Majority, 139.

rose to make his promised motion for copies of the correspondence between the foreign secretary and the ministers of foreign powers, resident in London, upon the subject or the abolition of Slave Trade. The hon. gent. requested the indulgence of the House while describing the object of his motion, and the nature of the papers he intented to move for. He disclaimed all sentiments of hostility to the present ministers as influencing him in the motion he was about to make. He then proceeded to advert to the resolution of 1806, and lamented that, as a general measure it should have proved so inefficacious; more especially with respect to foreign powers. Sweden had carried on the Slave Trade in the island of St. Bartholomew; that island from its proximity to those of the West India islands belonging to us, afforded ample means for supporting an illicit trade in slaves with many of our colonies in that quarter. The Slave Trade, with respect to Sweden, was merely a nominal trade, not exceeding six or seven slaves a-year for that island. He trusted, however, that such facilities of intercourse existed between the courts of Stockholm and London, as that any evils resulting from the illicit trade at St. Bartholomew might be remedied. Next, with respect to Portugal and Spain, their flags could not certainty be used to any great extent in protecting the illicit trade. When he was at Lisbon in his Majesty's service, he was astonished and concerned to find that from one district of Africa, there were annually exported to the Portuguese settlements in America, not leas than from 15 to 16,000 slaves, and this he was then told amounted to but one half of the whole trade for Portugal. He trusted that our representations upon this head would be found to have had weight in the councils of Portugal; as we might justly be supposed to have some influence in a country in the defence of which we had voted money for the support of 30,000 of its native troops. With respect to Spain—Spain he had no doubt traded in slaves to the amount of nearly two thirds of the Slave Trade of Portugal; the principal part of this trade as carried on by Spain, was carried on between Cuba and the Havannah; and it was but too justly apprehended, that in the intercourse between both the illicit trade was supported by landing the slaves upon the British isles. With respect to America—the Americans had abolished the Slave Trade, yet much of the illicit trade was carried on under the flag of Sweden; this was a topic peculiary interesting to the Americans, and the House had seen in the American correspondence respecting Mr. Erskine, that they shewed their willingness to open a negociation upon this subject; they had said that they could not make any concession affecting their right of sovereignty, yet that, if their ships should be detected by our cruizers in that illicit trade, the owners of those ships would not make any representation to their government, in the violation of whose laws they had so suffered. He apologised to the House for the few observations he had taken the liberty to throw out, and concluded with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to order, that there be laid before the House, copies of all communications made by his Majesty's secretary of State for foreign affairs, to the ministers of foreign powers resident in London, with their answers thereunto."

complimented the hon. gent. on the ability with which he had stated the subject. With regard to Portugal, the hon. gent. would find that every thing had been done to induce the Brazil government to concur in carrying the abolition into effect. But though no doubt Great Britain had reason to expect that the Portuguese government would pay considerable deference to its recommendation, yet it would be recollected that Great Britain had no right to dictate to that government. When the abolition had advanced so slowly in this enlightened country, with all the aid of popular feeling, and all the weight of the two great authorities (Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox,) who concurred in this point, though hardly on any other. When this measure had been 20 years in agitation here before it was carried, it could not reasonably be attributed to a want of zeal or humanity in the Portuguese government, which has removed to the very land of slavery, that it had not in the space of one year done any thing decisive. But he believed that when the papers should be produced, it would be found that there was an article in the treaty with the Brazil government, providing if not absolutely, at least much more effectually for the gradual abolition than the article contained in the abortive treaty with America. With regard to Spam, the Slave Trade of which had perhaps been too highly estimated at two thirds of the amount of the Portuguese trade, the hon. gent. would find that the object had not been neglected in that quarter. But if considerable management was necessary with respect to the Portuguese government, the hon. gent. would be aware that good management was also necessary with regard to that of Spain. There was hardly time to enter into any stipulation with that government with respect to its colonial policy. But it would be found that the most earnest recommendation had been made to the Spanish government, to take the subject into its most serious consideration. As to Sweden, it would be found that no return could be made to the address on that head—unless something had been done with that power since he had been in office. His object, he confessed, had been to obtain from the different governments a distinct abolition of the trade—and not a convention to prevent an illicit trade by trade by the subjects of this country, under their flags. He confessed he had not been aware, till lately, that the illicit tirade in slaves by British subjects had been carried on to so great an extent under the Swedish flag. As far as Sweden herself was concerned, the advantage she herself derived from that trade was certainly very little—and he had heard with extreme regret that her flag had been lent to our own traders to carry on this commerce in direct defiance of the law. He suggested that some effectual steps should be taken by the legislature and the government to suppress this gross infringement of the law by British subjects. With regard to America, he differed altogether from the hon. gent. as to the mode of proceeding with that government, although he perfectly agreed in all the principles he had stated. The hon. gent. thought that America was anxious for the abolition. His information led him to a contrary conclusion. His belief was that the Americans had no inclination to abolish the trade effectually, and that they only wanted to take advantage of our abolition. Under that government it would be kept in mind that there was a greater slave population than under any other, and that the popular feeling would not therefore go so effectually along with its government in the abolition. The substance of the article in the abortive treaty to which he had alluded, was, that the two governments should, mutually communicate to each other the steps taken to carry the abolition into effect, which was hardly doing any thing. But the hon. gent. thought he saw from the correspondence some reason to think that there would be no serious opposition on the part of the American government to an agreement permitting the capture of their slave vessels by our cruizers; because as such vessels would be acting in opposition to the American law, they would have no ground of complaint to the American government. But the hon. gent. had not read the correspondence with his usual accuracy. An agreement on this point was what they particularly objected to, as contrary to their sovereignty, although at the same time they had said that if the power of capture should be exercised, persons taken in an illicit trade could not be intitled to redress. But, in this, there was nothing, like a convention; it was merely saying, that any one might kill an outlaw. If this country had legislated upon the idea of any such right of capture, the American government would certainly have complained; another consideration was, that this would be liable to abuse. The only way of proceeding would be by the admiralty, at their risk, giving directions to our cruizers, or rather privateers. But what assurance could there be, that this discretion given to privateers, would not be abused; and when vessels were found to have been improperly seized under such a system, to what perpetual complaints would it not give rise. There must also be a reciprocity in the conduct of the system, and the American privateers, would be let loose; and under the pretence of seizing slave-ships might be an intolerable annoyance to our whole trade. He did not say they would actually do this: but certainly the experiment would be most dangerous. Nothing could be done upon a ground like this. In all the principles and objects of the hon. gent. He most perfectly agreed. He had only risen for the purof briefly stating the principles upon which he had acted, with reference to this subject, when in office. He concluded by seconding the motion.

wished that his hon. friend had not thought it necessary to preface his motion with any remarks, but had spared his observations till the production of the papers. But as the American government had been represented as unfriendly to the abolition, he was anxious to say a few words on that point. There was a great deal of slave population in America; but still there was evidence to shew, that the American government was as friendly to the abolition as it could be, in consistency with a due regard to popular feeling. To prove this Mr. Stephen mentioned, that a slave ship had been brought in by a British cruizer, and condemnation applied for in the prize court. It turned out that the ship was American property, and there was no doubt but she must be restored. Mr. Monro, the American minister, stated at that time, that the American government wished to give no protection to the claimant; but if the ship was to be restored then he claimed her for the government, on account of her carrying on a trade contrary to the law. He also instanced another case of the same kind. Among the commissioners under the treaty the majority were Americans, and consequently almost all the disputed points were carried in their favour; but when a claim was made for a slave ship it was rejected with indignation. These things went to prove the Americans were not unfriendly to the abolition. He thought that a distinction might be made between the slave trade and other branches of commerce, and an arrangement made on that particular point; but the article in the abortive treaty could never have answered any very good purpose. It ought to be kept in view, however, that at that time the slave trade had not been altogether abolished. He believed that there was a disposition in the American government to concur in this object, and he thought it but just to state that opinion.

was aware, that in order to effect the object, there must be some arrangement with America, because otherwise, there could be no proceedings in the prize courts; but what he submitted was, that there appeared in the correspondence a disposition in the American government to concede so far as to afford hopes, that some arrangement might be made on this particular point. The right hon. gent. in his opinion had dealt harshly with the American government. They had given proof of their disposition to abolish the slave trade. It ought to be recollected that they had set us the example of abolition, a pretty strong proof that they were sincerely anxious for the success of the measure. And yet the right honourable gentleman had said—and so grave and serious a charge had seldom been so lightly made, that the only object of the Americans was to get possession of a part of our slave trade! He did not believe that this was the case; and if he had believed it, he would have been cautious how he stated it. He would humbly recommend to the right hon. gent. who had so lately been secretary of state for foreign affairs, and might, perhaps, be very soon called to that office again, to be cautious how he preferred so grave and serious a charge.

had always been of opinion, that unless the trade was abolished by other governments it would soon revive in our own colonies. It was only by treaty with other powers that the trade could be effectually abolished.

expressed his great satisfaction that whatever little differences there might be on minor points, there was one universal concurrence in the desire to carry the object of abolition into complete effect. On that object he himself, and those who had taken a particular interest in the measure, had constantly kept their eyes fixed. He thought the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) had gone too far when he said that the American government was unfriendly to the abolition. It had been well stated by his hon. friend (Brougham) who had out of the House done so much for the cause, and who now exercised his great talents in its favour in the House—that the American government had been before us in the abolition. There was, he firmly believed, a general disposition in America to abolish this traffic—and it ought to be remembered that they had done more than ourselves on this subject; for a great many of the slaves there had been emancipated—a most favourable omen of their future exertions in the cause. He hoped the attention of the House would be fixed upon this great object, and the great benefits which it was calculated to confer on human nature.

The motions were then agreed to.