House of Commons
Wednesday, March 28, 1810.
Sir Francis Burdett—Breach of Privilege
said that his object in rising was to say a few words on one of the most important matters upon which that House had ever deliberated: he meant the resumption of the adjourned debate on the complaint of a breach and violation of the privileges of the House, alledged to have been committed by one of their own members (Sir Francis Burdett.) He should, therefore, in the first place, move, that the debate on that subject be now resumed by the House.
then stated to the House, what was the question before them for discussion, viz. a Resolution proposed as follows: "That a Letter signed" Francis Burdett," and a further part of a Paper intitled "Argument," in the paper called Cobbett's Weekly Register, of March 24, 1810, is a libellous and scandalous paper, reflecting on the just rights and privileges of this House."
then observed, that, though he considered this as a question of the highest importance, he would not, in the view he meant to take at present of it, detain the House above a few minutes. His desire was, as he was persuaded it must be the desire of every gentleman who heard him, that this question should not interfere with the other great subject before the House; and he thought that this must be equally the wish of both sides of the House—it could not but be the wish on all hands, that the discussion relative to the Scheldt Expedition should not be interrupted. But besides that very weighty consideration—if ever there was case in which precipitancy and rashness were to be avoided, it was the present. If, indeed, a complaint were made of a plain, a palpable and perfectly evident breach of a privilege, exactly defined and unquestionable, then it might be very proper that the question of privilege should take precedence of all others, unless there were other urgent matters pending which it would be of the greatest consequence to forward. But this was not a case of that description. It was not a plain and simple question, upon which the House could immediately decide. There were two distinct questions involved in it,—1st, as to the right of the House of Commons to imprison. 2d, as to the character of the terms with which the Argument had been accompanied, terms with respect to the precise import of which there might be a difference of opinion. If the Argument itself contained nothing but what had been delivered in the House, then another question arose, whether if there had been any thing in it contrary to the privileges of the House, it was likely it could have passed without notice by the Speaker, who ever presided in that House with dignity and impartiality. But he did not mean to enter into the details of the question now, because his proposition was that further time should be allowed to consider of it. He did not exactly know where the doctrine was to be found, that questions as to breach of privilege were to have precedence of all others, though they should not be of a nature to require particular dispatch. There was not, in his opinion, any pressing urgency in the present case to require the House to come to an immediate decision. He was not aware that such a practice with respect to the precedence of questions of privilege, had obtained in the best times of the constitution. At the commencement of every session, every gentleman must, know, that a standing order was past for the appointment of a Committee of Privileges, and regulating the times of its sitting, and, by the order it was specifically directed that to this Committee were to be referred all such matters as related to breach of privilege; that it was to report, from time to time to the House, and that when any such question was agitated respecting a member, he should withdraw, after being heard in his defence, till it was disposed of. This Committee was to sit every Monday, Wednesday; and Friday; all members were to have access to it; they were empowered to call for persons, papers, and records; and, lastly, to deliver their opinions to the House from time to time in reports. (Here the right hon. gent read the Standing Order.) This he apprehended was not to be considered as a mere formal and barren order. The subject under consideration was a case perfectly calculated for the Committee of Privileges, and he saw nothing in it that required such haste that it should be proceeded upon to the interruption of the other most important business before the House. The hon. gent who brought the subject forward was bound to hew that great mischief would result from delay—that greater inconvenience would arise from suffering the discussion on the new topic to be postponed for a short time, than from interrupting and retarding the other business, on which they were previously engaged. This had not been shewn. The proper and constitutional course, therefore, he contended, was to refer this matter to a Committee of Privileges. It was nothing to him that it had not been usual to refer these cases to a Committee of Privileges. He found a Standing Order commanding that line of proceeding, and the present instance was a most proper one for the reference which he proposed. He called the attention of the House to a case in 1779, relating undoubtedly to a person not a member but the circumstance of a member being the party concerned made the argument much stronger in his favour. The case was that of a person of the name of Mathews who had published in The English Chronicle, a report of a speech which was held out to be a gross violation of the privileges of the House. The paper was delivered in at the table, and ordered to be referred to the Committee of Privileges. This shewed that the practice of reference to this Committee had not been long discontinued; but that such a reference had been made at no very distant period, in a case very similar to that now under discussion. He concluded by moving, "That the Committee of Privileges should resume its sitting on that day sen' night, and that the paper complained of should be referred to it."
asked whether the right hon. member moved this as an amendment on the original question?
said, he thought that unnecessary, because he stood on the Standing Order, which must be enforced on the bare suggestion, without any regular motion.
observed, that the Standing Order was imperative only so far, that the Committee should sit at stated times, and not that any particular case should be referred to it; whether any particular case should or should not be sent to it, was a matter for the decision of the House, and the right hon. gent. might raise the question by moving it as an amendment.
adverted again to the Order, and still contended that it was mandatory not only as to the appointing of the Committee, but also as to the referring to that Committee all matters of privilege The words were, "they are to take into consideration all matters," &c.
again said, that in the way in which the Order had been understood, the House was to pronounce whether any particular case should or should not be referred to the Committee.
then moved, That the Committee of Privileges should sit on Wednesday next.
said, that this must be moved as an amendment on the original question.
rose to order, and begged before the question should be put in a regular shape upon the amendment, to suggest to his right hon. friend another course, by which he could more conveniently but not less effectually get at his object. In addition to the case which his right hon. friend had mentioned, there was one which occurred in 1701, respecting a letter written to the Speaker by a person of the name of Culpepper. This had been referred to the Committee of Privileges, which decided upon it in the first instance and reported thereon to the House. But then subsequently the House took the matter into its consideration and finally decided upon it. The best mode of proceeding, according to his view of the case, would be, that his right hon. friend should withdraw his motion for the present, and allow his hon. friend near him (Mr. Brand) to move an adjournment, which he understood his hon. friend meant to do. If the adjournment for several days should be carried, then the reference might be made to .the Committee, and its report laid on the table before the termination of the adjournment, when the question might undergo a full and deliberate discussion in the House. If a debate should arise on the proposition for an adjournment, he trusted he should be allowed to give his reasons for the course of proceeding which he had recommended.
rose, when the Speaker observed, that at present the debate rested on the merits of the original question, unless the amendment was distinctly put.
then proceeded. It was his intention to move the adjournment of this debate, after previously stating such reasons as appeared to him satisfactory and conclusive as to the propriety of some further delay. If the hon. gent. who had brought this subject to the notice of the House, had been aware of the interruption which it was calculated to give to the other important question now pending, he was convinced the hon. gent would not have lent himself to any such purpose. (Hear! hear!) It was obvious that no mischief could result from any farther circulation of this paper, and therefore there was no cause for precipitation from any apprehension of that kind; whereas there was great danger of serious inconvenience from interrupting the discussion on the Scheldt inquiry, as the public attention would be diverted from a subject in which the interests of the nation were most deeply concerned. But from that subject the public attention would be diverted, and very naturally, if this question was suffered to intervene. Great and important, however, as he thought that question to be, still he would acknowledge, that he considered every question in which the rights and privileges of the House of Commons, and the liberty of the subject were concerned, to be of the first rank in the scale of importance, and to be more interesting than twenty questions on Expeditions to Walcheren or to any other part of the globe, and their consequent failures and disgraces. But the question to be now discussed was not so much as to the right of the House to commit for breaches of privilege in certain cases, but as to how far the exercise of such right extended; what were its limits, and whether it applied to cases where redress might be had in the ordinary course of law. On these points, which were most, important in their nature and consequences, there might be much difference of opinion. These were not, therefore, questions to be determined upon in a rash and even impetuous manner. Though he was not called upon to say whether he agreed in the Resolution that had been submitted to the House; yet he had no hesitation in saying, that there was one passage amongst those pointed out by the hon. member (Mr. Lethbridge), which he considered as falling under every definition of a breach of privilege, and with the amendments and alterations which he should propose, he would vote for that determination; but, when he was called upon to say, that a paper laid before the House, was a libellous and scandalous reflection upon the just rights of the House, be must have time to consider what those just rights were. He bad, as yet, hardly had time to look over the elaborate argument of Mr. Hargrave on this subject. On a point of so much importance it was absolutely necessary for the due discharge of their duty that they should have time to resort to all the sources of intelligence which they could discover. Sir Matthew Hale had said, that no offence ought to be decided upon in that House, where a remedy was to be had in a court of law. A remedy for libel was open in the ordinary course of law. Mr. Reeves had been prosecuted by the Attorney General for a libel at the instance of the House. So far he referred to the great constitutional questions which would arise upon this paper. As to the passages marked, there was one, as he had already said, which might be soon decided upon; but the rest, he thought, required very grave and serious deliberation before gentlemen could pronounce a dispassionate and just judgment upon them. For instance, it must be first very maturely considered how far a member was entitled to tell his constituents what he had stated in that House. He could riot immediately make up his mind on that point—a point, the determination on which would involve many important consequences. Was a member not at liberty to tell his constituents what he had uttered in that House unreproved? Many of the points contained in the paper upon the table had been expressed by the worthy bart. in that House; nay, had even been enlarged upon, and supported by other members. If the worthy bart. had a right to give to his constituents what lie had stated in that House, and laid down to be good constitutional doctrine, then in the commencement of his letter he had not gone too far in the following paragraph: "Gentlemen—The House of Commons having passed a Vote, which amounts to a declaration, that an Order of theirs is to be of more weight than Magna Charta and the laws of the land, I think it my duty to lay my sentiments thereon before my constituents, whose character as freemen, and even whose personal safety depend in a great degree upon the decision of this question—a question of no less importance than this, whether our liberty be still to be secured by the laws of our forefathers, or be to lay at the absolute mercy of a part of our fellow-subjects, collected together by means which it is not necessary for me to describe?" If he had a right to convey to his constituents all he had stated in that House, in thus adverting to what he had openly complained of, and what had been admitted on the other side of the House, and defended only on the ground of its universality, it was abstinence and moderation in the hon. baronet to say no more. If a member was to be permitted to tell his constituents what he had said in that House unreproved, where was the breach of privilege in that passage? Upon this supposition the allusion had been made in language which evinced great forbearance and moderation. He could not help considering it as astonishing that this should have been so readily made a matter of complaint after the manner in which a celebrated charge of his hon. friend (Mr. Madocks), had been received, and after the charge had been dismissed, upon the ground that the practice was universal. The passage which he himself considered as a breach of privilege, was that in which it was stated that the members of that House "inflated with their high blown, fanciful ideas of Majesty, and tricked out in the trap pings of royalty, thought privilege and protection beneath their dignity—assumed the sword of prerogative, and lorded it equally over the King and people." This he conceived did amount clearly to a breach of privilege. [Hear, hear, from the ministerial side.] He knew not how exactly to take that cheer, but he had stated this fairly, because he was apt to be sincere. But with respect to other passages, there was not a word in them but what was synonymous with what the worthy baronet had said in discussing the question of Reform, both in that House and to his constituents. There was no point of view therefore in which time was not necessary, in order to arrive at a calm, just, and dignified conclusion. If he were a friend of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he meant a political friend—he would most strongly recommend to him to grant time, for all must think, as the matter was at present managed, and he himself most certainly thought, that this was a sop thrown out to an attentive House and an indignant people. [Loud cries of Hear! hear!] He really had some hopes that the hon. gent. who introduced this subject would, upon better reflection, second the motion of adjournment and he was convinced that the hon. gent. would regret afterwards that he had pressed the matter at this period. He concluded by moving as an amendment on the original question, "That the debate be adjourned till to-morrow se'nnight."
then rose and said that he should not second the motion. (A laugh.)
informed the hon. member that the amendment had been seconded.
again rose and said, that, as the mover of the Resolutions before the House, he could not consent to the proposition for adjourning the debate. He had most certainly, at the time when he brought forward the Resolutions, been sensible that he was entering upon a grave and serious subject; and it had never been in his contemplation to proceed in it with precipitancy. That had not been at any time his wish, and he conceived he had placed himself in the hands of the House, and that the House had determined for him. Further than that, he had nothing to do with the course, which had been pursued. But the argument of the hon. gent who had brought forward the amendment, appeared to him to answer itself, as it furnished the strongest ground against agreeing to it. The hon. gent. had stated that this question was of graver and greater importance than twenty expeditions, such as that to the Scheldt, or to any other part of the world. In this sentiment of the hon gent. he perfectly coincided; and if no other argument could be suggested for proceeding immediately with the discussion, he should, upon that alone, refuse his assent to the adjournment. He should not follow the hon. gent, through the various statements he had gone into, nor the able arguments, as he conceived them to be, which had been urged by him. He had but one word more to add, and he hoped the House would believe him as sincere in the declaration, as he believed the hon. gent. to be in all that had fallen from him. The hon. gent, had stated, I previously to his making his motion, that he (Mr. Lethbridge) had tent himself as an instrument in this business to his majesty's ministers. If he had so lent himself, he should never cease to regret it as long as he lived. He had not, however, lent himself to any man, nor to any set of men. The motion he brought forward had originated in his own mind, and he had been induced to engage in the proceeding upon considerations of his own.
was ready to avow that he should have deprecated the discussion of such a question as that under consideration and at such a moment. It was impossible that, at a time when the House was so wholly occupied with the consideration of another grave and momentous subject, that they could be in a state to pronounce a cool and deliberate decision upon this question. On a motion such as that, which the House was then discussing, it was highly desirable that neither individual feelings of partiality, nor party considerations should influence their judgment. That was not a moment to bring such feelings into a discussion upon a subject like that before the House; and he should call upon the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer to pause, and to consider the consequences that might result from adopting any precipitate course on the present occasion. It was impossible for that right hon. gent. not to see the consequences that must inevitably flow from any hasty proceeding upon a question arising out of a breach of privilege, which might alarmingly agitate the public mind from one end of the country to the other. For himself, he could most conscientiously state that he had not yet made up his mind upon the question; and if he should be compelled to vote on that occasion, he must say, that it was absolutely impossible for him to vote for the motion. Were he to vote for that motion, he should be bound to vote also for the strong reprehension of the House being expressed respecting the author of the paper upon which the motion was founded. But the matter would not rest there. The House would be obliged to resort to some strong ulterior measures; and before they should be driven to that awful necessity, it behoved them well and seriously to consider whether the paper complained of really contained matter calling for the adoption of measures, from which might arise such a feeling in the country, as he, for one, Would most sincerely deprecate. If forced to proceed, therefore, in this instance, it was his intention, nay, he had no alternative, he must be compelled to vote against the motion. If time, however, should be allowed to gentlemen to make themselves fully acquainted with the whole of the case, he was persuaded that in such a case there could exist but one opinion upon the subject, and that the decision of the House would be unanimous. As to the right of the House to commit them for contempt, that was a privilege which it necessarily must have; but it was also a privilege which should seldom be exercised, never except in cases where it was actually necessary to assert the dignity and to maintain the authority of the House. All he asked of the House, therefore, was, that he should not be pressed to a decision in the unprepared state in which he felt himself to decide justly. It would have been much better that this paper had never been noticed, as in that case, he conceived that it would have soon sunk into oblivion; but as it had been brought under the cognizance of the House, the honour of the House required that some step should be taken respecting it. With this opinion strongly impressed upon his mind, it was his wish not to be forced to a crude and premature decision. And if many other gentlemen were, like himself, ready to avow that they were not prepared to come to a vote upon the question, he would put it to the House whether it was consistent with justice or decency to force them to it Never had any question been discussed in that House which called for more temper, more consideration, or was more intimately and essentially connected with the honour and character of the House. He should again, therefore, conjure the right hon. gent. not to hurry on the question to a decision. A little time would clear away the difficulties with which it was at present enveloped, and lead to an opening to measures which might, perhaps, substitute conciliation for severity. In his own opinion, the hon. baronet was in some degree deserving of the reprehension of the House, but that might be so managed as neither to compromise the dignity of the House, nor transgress the bounds of justice and moderation. He would ask the right hon. gent. how he could answer, at a period when unanimity was more than ever desirable, for the irritation and heated feelings which any other course would be likely to produce in the country? If, notwithstanding, the right hon. gent. should persist in pushing on the decision, on him alone should rest all the responsibility for the consequences. He was well aware of the sound mind and good sense of the people of this country; and though he would allow they might be led astray by deception or passion, he was yet convinced that, if that House would shew that it was actuated only by a sense of its own dignity, without any regard to more partial and confined considerations, the nation would cheerfully acquiesce in its decision. But in order to produce this effect, it was necessary to prove to the public that, in the exercise of its power or privileges, that House was not influenced by any feeling against an individual, but really and sincerely consulting its own dignity and character. On every ground, therefore, it was his opinion that they ought to proceed calmly, deliberately, and dispassionately on this question. The House could not but recollect, that, in consequence of being led away by a contrary feeling, its Journals had been disgraced by proceedings which, though subsequently expunged by a succeeding House, would ever reflect discredit upon that which had sanctioned them. He alluded to the proceedings against Mr. Wilkes, in which, by giving way to the influence of feelings of hostility towards the individual, the House had been carried into a course of proceeding subversive of the fundamental principles of its constitution. Though parliament had afterwards expunged from its journals the record of these oppressive and unconstitutional measures, still the remembrance of what then passed survived, and should be a warning to all future parliaments, not to give way to such feelings, or precipitately to decide upon questions of a similar description. He had been one of those, who voted against all the arbitrary measures which had been resorted to on that occasion; and, on the same principle, now besought the right hon. gent. not to press precipitately forward the ultimate decision upon a question of so much importance to the reputation and honour of that House. He trusted the example to which he had alluded would never be imitated. If the House were to come to a decision upon this question it should be such a decision as would be consistent with justice to the individual and a proper regard to the dignity of the House. No such decision however, could, in the present instance, be impartially or dispassionately pronounced. As a member of that House, therefore, who, since he had the honour of a seat in it, had never been influenced by any feelings of private attachment, or party interests—who had uniformly, on all occasions, and under all circumstances, given his vote to the best of his judgment, and according to the dictates of his conscience, with a view to the common interests of the country—who felt himself unprepared at present to give any vote satisfactory to his own mind, but who was anxious to pronounce judgment on the real merits of the case, he called upon the House of Commons to allow a small portion of time for the more mature consideration of this most serious and important question.
hoped that the House would decide, and that without further delay, upon the question under discussion. The real question now was, whether the House was to suffer it self to be intimidated, whether any man should henceforth be at liberty to reflect most grossly upon its rights and privileges? He trusted, therefore, that the House would have the courage to assert its unquestionable rights, and not compromise its character by deferring the decision of the question before them. He felt astonishment at the amendment which had been moved: but he had been still more astonished at hearing the right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), whom he had been accustomed to listen to with respect upon all constitutional subjects, represent the present as a question of no urgent nature or importance. (Hear, hear.) He could assure gentlemen that he was not to be intimidated from doing his duty. The right hon. gent. had certainly said that the question was not of any urgency. The hon. gentleman who followed, had however on the contrary stated, that in his opinion this question was of much more moment than the discussion of the merits of the Expedition to Walcheren. The question, in his mind, whether his Majesty's ministers were culpable or not in the conduct of that Expedition, was not to be put in competition with a question, whether the House of Commons was to remain independent, whether it was to preserve its privileges and authority, or to be beat down by personal intimidation. Whether such attempts were to proceed from members of that House, or persons out of it, he trusted the House had courage enough to repress them. He agreed that this question was of ten times the importance of the discussion respecting the Expedition. But the argument which had been urged for delay appeared to him extraordinary; as if indeed the delay of a few hours, before they should come to a decision on the discussion respecting the Expedition, would let the evidence out of the minds of gentlemen. The statement in the paper, which was the foundation of the charge, that the Bill of Rights was made a bill of wrongs, was sufficient to justify the House in proceeding. But that was not all; the paper stated that the exercise of the privileges of the House of Commons was subversive of the laws and constitution of the country. Was that a proposition to be passed over with impunity; was that a question, which they should not seize the earliest opportunity of deciding upon? It would have a very injurious effect upon the minds of the people, if the House of Commons should imprison a person not a member, for a libel, and not dare to notice one of its own members for the same offence. The decision upon this question would, he was confident, increase those sentiments of attachment to the constitution, which he knew to exist in the different parts of the country with which he was acquainted. He thought the passage in which it was asserted, "that that House lorded it over the king and the people," was a gross libel upon the House of Commons. He trusted, therefore, that the House would do its duty, and neither be intimidated by a fear of the people, nor influenced by feelings of respect for any individual, to defer the consideration of so important a question.
begged pardon of the hon. gent. who had just spoken, if he could not, in the outset of what he had to say, express himself with the same clearness in his own words, as by adopting the language of his right hon. friend (Mr.Sheridan) and saying, that he had never risen to speak on a subject of greater importance. Such were the words of his right hon. friend, which that hon. gent. had greatly mis-stated, when he said that his right hon. friend had represented the question as one of a light nature. It was because the subject was not light but momementous that he rose then to ask, as he had done last night, for some delay before he should be called upon for his vote. In justice to the hon. member who originated the motion, he must say that it was not his wish at first to proceed precipitately with the question. But to the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was mainly interested in the question already under discussion, a question, which the hon. gent. who had just sat down, considered comparatively light, was to be ascribed the precipitancy with which the discussion was pushed forward. The question which had so long occupied the whole attention of that House, so far from considering light, he regarded as one of the greatest moment, as well to his majesty's ministers as to himself. (Hear, hear, from the ministerial benches.) He despised such feelings as appeared to give rise to the cheer, and would repeat that the question was of moment to him, because it was desirable to every honest man to be allowed time to be in full possession of every thing that could enable him to form an impartial judgment. The House would give him credit, he was sure, when he said that the question before it was momentous though not pressing. He saw no reason why the same time should not be allowed now, as when the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the lord viscount Castlereagh were last session charged with a breach of the privileges of that House. The right hon. gent. would recollect, that when that charge had been first brought forward, he rose in his place, and after stating that he was taken by surprise, made his bow, and retired; after which a delay of five days was allowed before he made his defence. He had voted in the minority on that occasion; and to the decision of the House in that instance, and the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, they were to look for the degration of the House of Commons in the opinion of the people. The House would, also recollect the case when viscount Castlereagh was charged with bartering for a seat in that House, and was sheltered by the amendment of a right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) not then in his place. That proceeding, coupled with the resolution of 1779, which made such a practice a breach of the privileges of that House, had mainly contributed to the lamentable degradation of parliament. He begged also to remind the House of the threat respecting the dissolution of parliament, thrown out by the same right hon. gent. shortly after he came into office, and of the realising of that threat soon after by the actual dissolution of parliament; and then to ask, to whom was the degradation of parliament to be attributed? On the present question then, of so much importance to the independence of that House, and the interests of the nation, he asked for time to consider it sufficiently. The same application he had made 24 hours before, and in the period that had since intervened, he had not had time to consider the subject. In this respect the hon. gent. opposite, and his hon, friend, had the advantage of him. He had marked the passages specified by the hon. mover, but had not yet been able to look into them. In this situation, he could not think of deciding upon extracts made by any gentleman however honourable, without being able to refer at the same time to the context. The House would recollect the nature of the speech of the gallant general (Craufurd) last night, who had produced a campaign of his own instead of the imaginary campaign of the noble lord, and concluded with an amendment expressive of the approbation of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, without any one document or argument produced in their justification. Whilst the honourable and gallant general was proceeding through the details of his campaign, he could not but think that every hon. officer who had served on the Expedition would hare wished for mountains to cover, or seas to overwhelm him, in order to escape the indignation of the public. When charged with a wish to delay the discussion on the conduct of the Expedition, the right hon. gent, (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) opposite had referred to his conduct during the whole of the investigation to prove the contrary. He was ready to admit, that the noble lord, not then in his place, (lord Castlereagh) had conducted himself with great propriety throughout the whole of these proceedings. But when the right hon. gent, referred to the papers not yet delivered from the printer's as furnishing, if he were so disposed, a cause of delay, he must observe that whatever might be the abilities of that right hon. gent., he could do but one thing at a time. It was the opinion of a great man, that that was the manner in which all things were done. As they were not pressed for time as to the present question, there was no ground for interrupting that in which the House had been previously engaged. When the notice of the motion had been given by the hon. gent., it was suffered to lie over for twenty four hours. Why, then, not lie over for a longer period He gave the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge) credit, when he said that he had not lent himself to any man in the course he had taken; but he must be allowed to add, that the hon. member had allowed himself to be influenced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had taken advantage of his facility. The hon. member was willing to allow time, but the right hon. gent. had availed himself of this question as a Godsend, in the same manner as a drowning man would catch at a straw, in the desperate hope that it would afford him a short respite from the impending decision upon his conduct. It was an old saying, that many things happened between the cup and the lip, so also did many things happen between the halter and the gallows. (Hear, hear!) He did not mean to say, if he was to go to the extremity, that the right hon. gent. was entitled to be beheaded, neither had he meant to apply the allusion to him. Gentlemen might recollect the case of a soldier, who, on the retreat in Spain, had been tried by it court martial for some heinous offence, and sentenced to be shot. The detachment of cavalry was drawn up for this execution; but, fortunately, the enemy came in sight; the cavalry escaped, the culprit was put on a horse, and fled with the rest, and so the whole ended.—As he trusted the House of Commons would never shew any fear, so also he hoped that it would not manifest either favour or partiality to any person. He thought the House, by acquitting the right hon. gentleman last session, had shewn such partiality, and thereby contributed to that degradation into which some persons supposed the public to consider it as fallen. The right hon. gent. had certainly not been charged with a breach of the privileges of that House. Lord Castlereagh, however, had, and if not for the gentlemanly terms in which he made his excuse which disarmed the resentment of the House, and the amendment of a right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) which gave rise to a coinage of a new word, in the language of the right hon. gent. "lest a mistakeable record should appear upon the journals," he must have been convicted. But the right hon. gent. desired that the House should not suffer itself to be intimidated. For himself, he could say, that he had never at any time been afraid to avow his sentiments. Yet at the same time that he would not be intimidated from expressing his sentiments, he would not be intimidated to act with a false courage, or to do a thing in order to shew that he durst do it; nor to do anything, which, in his best conviction, he should not think right.—If he were the only one who was not, and had not, an opportunity to be, acquainted with the paper, then he might be the only one who should vote far adjournment, and on a ground which to him appeared unanswerable; but he had another ground, arising out of the good feelings of the hon. mover and seconder. When lie heard these hon. gentlemen, in stating their sentiments, allude to combinations in that House, and the spirit of jacobinism out of it, he could scarcely believe that he was not listening to the organs of the late Mr. Yorke; (he begged pardon) of the late member for Cambridgeshire. This was the legacy bequeathed to that House by the Teller of the Exchequer. (Hear, hear!) That right hon. gentleman had made a complaint against John Gale Jones who made a respectful apology at the bar. (No, no!) As he was informed that person had conducted himself with becoming propriety and decorum at the bar, and on that ground it was his opinion at the time that he should be discharged. Every thing that had since been done on the subject tended, step by step, to make Jones a greater personage than he could other wise have hoped to become.—It was not his intention then to give any opinion as to the right of the House to commit for contempt; that opinion he had before stated, and it was not necessary for him to repeat it. He begged here however to return to what he had been drawn off from longer than he had intended; the allusions of the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge) to combinations in that House. The hon. member had said that on hearing certain statements in that House, he was so affected that his hair stood on end. (A laugh.) Now that the House knew that he had the gift of language (though indeed he had heard that hon. gent. before make a motion respecting double-barrelled guns) he trusted that he would not hereafter remain silent; but when he became sensible of this visible effect, suffer his moral to overcome his physical impressions, and move that the terrifying words be taken down. I would certainly be on every account Desirable that he should not suffer the agitating words to remain in oblivion for three weeks, and then make the unfortunate utterer of them become the object of another charge, by bringing them in judgment against him. (Hear! hear!) He should appeal to that bench of lawyers whom he saw before him whether such a practice would be allowed in any court of justice: whether, on a trial for one offence, it would be tolerated to give in evidence a previous act which had never been questioned? He was bold enough to differ from the honourable baronet, though he must admit that he had not read his statement. He had heard the speech of that hon. baronet with attention, but without being convinced. That speech appeared to him an able one, but the great fault he found with it was, that, his proposition would not, if agreed to, advance the object of the hon. baronet, one step. He also found fault with his having published in his Argument anything which he had not stated in his speech, when he brought forward his proposition.
Another complaint he had to make against the hon. baronet was, that when he published his Letter and Argument, he professed to publish the substance of his speech. He had read the Letter, and thought that there was nothing in it which any county member might not have addressed to his constituents. Having read the Letter, he put the Argument in his pocket, supposing it to be the same as the speech which he had heard. On coming down to the House, however, he was informed that a notice had been given, of the motion by the hon. member When he heard this, he thought that the matter would soon be over, as he did not think there was any thing exceptionable in the speech. But he was afterwards informed that there were many things in the Argument which were not in the speech; and it was upon the ground that he was not prepared to give an opinion upon any one of these new passages, that he wished for the adjournment of the discussion. It was impossible to to say that any one passage was a libel, without considering the whole, and ascertaining how each might be explained or modified by the context or other passages in the paper. That he should do, if allowed time to consider the paper; but if not, he should not be driven to vote for the Resolutions of the hon gent. As a juryman, and he looked upon the House as in that instance called upon to perform the functions of jurymen, he should, in case of any doubt feel himself bound to pronounce the party innocent. Others were no doubt in the same situation with him; and he had no hesitation in saying, that any hon. member who felt a doubt upon the subject was bound to say not guilty.
What detriment, then, he would ask, could result from agreeing to the adjournment of this discussion? All gentlemen were not so highly gifted as the right hon. gent., to comprehend the details of two important subjects at once. They had not, as that right hon. gent. seemed to have, cells in their brains for the reception of different kinds of evidence, nor that constitution of intellect which enabled him to cast shades over one description of evidence, whilst he applied his attention to another, and then to withdraw these shades at will, for the purpose of proceeding to the consideration of the temporarily secluded subjects. When the right hon. gent. therefore, called upon the House, not possessing the same advantages with himself, to divide their attention between two questions, he was doing an injury to the House, to each individual in the House, and to to the nation. But whatever effect the right hon. gent, might have expected from this interruption, he trusted he would be disappointed as well within as without the trails of that House. He might suppose that the public would be distracted by this question from paying the same attention, which it would otherwise devote to the question in which that right hon. gent. was so deeply and personally interested. But the public he believed to be too wise to give into that delusion. The right hon. gent. would gain but a Short respite before the decision should be pronounced upon himself. The hon. baronet too had strong claims on the House not to proceed precipitately in this question. The House of Commons, whose rights and privileges were interested no less than the freedom of the people in the Decision, had claims upon that House to proceed, calmly and deliberately, not rashly and precipitately. When the honourable baronet had made his motion for the liberation of Jones, he was not convinced by his speech, but had voted for the discharge of Jones, because his previous confinement appeared sufficient punishment, because his offence was light, and because he had conducted himself respectfully when at the bar of that House. He was sure if the right was not consistent with law, that the House of Commons was too liberal not to relinquish it; but if on the contrary, the right was legal, that House would always be bold enough to maintain its rights and privileges.
unaccustomed as he had been to address that House, still did not think it would require much ability to refute the arguments of the hon. gent. who had just sat down, and who had so freely criticised the conduct of every member whom he had thought fit to advert to. The hon. gent. among other criticisms, had alluded to a legacy which had been bequeathed to that House by the Teller of the Exchequer, the late member for Cambridgeshire. He could assure that hon. gent., that whatever legacy was bequeathed by the late member for Cambridgeshire, would be remembered with respect by that House. Certain he was, that it must be as good as any that proceeded from a brewer of bad porter. [Here a general cry of Order, order! Chair, chair! continued for some minutes; several members of the opposition benches at the same time standing up in their places to speak to order.]
as soon as silence could be obtained, rose and declared, that whatever might be the emotions felt by his honourable friends, as to the language which had been used, he could assure the House, that he was in no other way affected by it than as a tradesman, and in that capacity he thought the hon. gent. had no right to hold him out as a brewer of bad porter. He only hoped, that, as the hon. gent. conceived so bad an opinion of him in supposing that he had so far deviated from the precepts and practice of his father, that he would do his porter the justice to make a trial of it. If the hon. member should order a cask of it, he would undertake to furnish him with the best, and all he should ask in return was, that he would give it to the electors of Cambridgeshire to drink the health of their late member. (A laugh.) The cry of Order, order! Chair, chair ! was again repealed, when
rose. (The calls upon the chair were renewed.)
then observed, that unless any other honourable member rose to order, the hon. gent. (Mr. Croker) was in possession of the House.
then rose and said, that in order to preserve that decorum which ought to prevail in the discussions in that House, he felt himself bound to move that the hon. gent.'s words be taken down.
— I wish, as I am sure I feel perfect good humour on this subject; and the hon. gent. as I perceive by his countenance, is restored to tranquillity, the House would not call for any apology: I require none on this occasion—(Hear, hear!)
, who had before offered himself to the attention of the House, then rose and being requested by the Speaker to proceed, observed, that the fraternal feelings of the hon. gent. (sir J. Yorke) afforded a sufficient apology for the language he had made use of, considering the manner in which his hon. relative had been alluded to by the hon. gent. (Cries of question! question!) He had expected some indulgence from the good humour of the gentlemen opposite, and asked them if they had called as clamorously for the question, when the hon. gent. had so evidently wandered from the subject before them? In deviating from the question, that hon. member had used as rude and unparliamentary language as had been employed on this side of the House. One would have imagined, from the speech of the hon. gent., that the question now before them was of such a nature that nobody could decide upon it without the utmost difficulty. He was sure it must be otherwise with the hon. member, if he only consulted his own library. What in fact was the question? Whether this publication was unconstitutional or not? Whether it was allowable for any member of that House to arraign its proceedings, and to appeal from their authority to the opinions of the public? The question did not require a moment's deliberation. The hon. member had said, that he was not to be intimidated from stating his doubts or opinions on this subject, however those opinions might lean; "nor am I (said Mr. Croker) to be clamoured into silence by any outcry or monosyllable, unaccompanied by any argument." The question was one of the most important, he admitted, that ever came before the House, but it was important with respect to the privileges, the existence, and dignity of that House.
The hon. baronet had spoken in the House on the subject of the commitment complained of, but he had not dared to utter those sentiments, nor to employ those expressions that he had since sent forth to the public. He had published, however, in the shape of an Argument, what professed to be a speech spoken in the House of Commons, and which from its nature he dared not have uttered in his place. Had he spoken such a speech in his place, he was confident that he would have been immediately called to order, and convicted of a violation of the privilege of parliament. Were they to be told in 1810 that a privilege that had been claimed and enjoyed from the most remote period was a transgression of the constitution, or a violation of the rights of the people? What he would ask, was the proposition stated by the hon. baronet? That we cannot commit strangers for contempt. He had stated, that what was done unanimously, in a very numerous meeting of the House, where all the talent and weight of the House was combined, when both sides of the House were agreed, he had stated that that act was an illegal one, and contrary to the rights of the people.—There was a want of taste as well as of judgment on the part of the worthy baronet. He set at defiance the unanimous decision of that House; he condemned it as a violation of the constitution, and, instead of openly and candidly avowing this sentiment in the House itself, where he ought to have sought his redress, he libels their proceedings before the public, and declares that proceeding to be a violation of the rights of the people—a sentiment which he dared not have avowed in that House. The passages that had been objected to were so clearly libellous, that no comment was required to prove them so. He should not enter minutely into a detail of those expressions or sentiments. The gentlemen opposite were not unaware of their libellous tendency, and he should leave them to fight it out among themselves, which were constitutional, and which not. "I appeal" (said Mr. Croker) "to you, Mr. Speaker, without entering into any laboured argument; I appeal to you, whose authority and signature he has traduced, whether if he had dared to have made use of such expressions before you, you would not have felt it your duty to have called him to order, as you did once before this session, when he was proceeding to indulge in invective against the dignity and character of this House. He has so far degraded the dignity of the House, and the authority of the chair, as to represent your warrant, Sir, as a piece of unsealed paper, with your name affixed, denying it any weight or authority. He has called it an unlawful instrument. I appeal to the House, if I uttered any such language within these walls, whether you would not have deemed it not only highly irregular and unparliamentary, but a libel on the House. But I appeal further to the House, if the sentiments of the hon. baronet on this subject are not well known, and if they are not such as require no attempt to prove the application or tendency of the language he employs (Order, Order, from several members.) I insist that we do know his sentiments, because they have been avowed beforehand therefore I am not to be called to order: While humbly supporting the dignity of the chair, and the privileges of this House, I am not, I contend, out of order. I say humbly, for I do not think either the dignity of the chair, or the honour of the House, stand in need of such defenders." There could be no doubt of the question, unless the forms and privileges of the House were wholly changed. Whatever the principle of the commitment might be, there could be no doubt of the illegality of the Argument, and the conclusions adopted by the worthy baronet; there could be no doubt, that the paper was a most audacious libel. It would be tiresome, and still more offensive than tiresome to the House, to read all the objectionable passages. The gentlemen opposite admit that their minds were made up on the subject; they admit that the publication is a libel, and yet they wish for delay; they wish for further time to inquire into it. If the libel was admitted, what occasion was there for farther time to consider? The hon. bart. did not merely excite opposition to the proceedings of the House, but he endeavoured to entail upon it contempt and dishonour.—Here the right hon. member quoted the passage in which the House is represented as inflated with their high-blown, fanciful ideas of Majesty, and tricked out in the trappings of royalty, thinking privilege and protection beneath their Dignity, assuming the sword of prerogative, and lording it equally over the king and the people. He also read the passage in which scripture language was employed, God shall smite thee thou whited wall," &c. (a laugh.) Gentlemen might laugh, but the hon. baronet could use scripture language when it suited his purpose, and that those gentlemen who were disposed to laugh might feel the full extent of its design and application, he should read the paragraph preceding. The evident purpose of the passage was, that unless the House should revert to its old practice, it must draw down upon itself that sentence of St. Paul alluded to. If the House was to revert to its ancient practice, was not that a condemnation of its present conduct? Was it not a libel on the House to state, that their practice and conduct would lead to such consequences? Such, however, was the spirit and tendency of the whole of the pamphlet. If the hon. gentlemen opposite wished for time to consider and criticise this pamphlet for the purpose of doing away it libellous passages, a week, even a month would be too little for that purpose, so numerous and so pointed were the obnoxious passages. He did not speak from any feelings of hostility to the worthy baronet, but from an affection for the constitution and the dignity of the House. The original discussion had been a month ago before the House, yet no one had ever doubted of the right of the House to exercise the power it had done on this occasion, with the solitary exception of a noble lord opposite (lord Folkestone) to whose consistency, therefore, on this account, he gave some credit; and were they then to postpone the present question, on which, judging from the former decision of the House, so little diversity of opinion could possibly subsist? He would therefore give his vote against the amendment.
thought the House called on, out of respect to its own character, to deliberate longer before they should come to any decision in this case. Though they were here judges from necessity, yet let them not forget that they were judges in their own cause. This was a time, at which they were called on not sharply to catch at every supposed or apparent violation of their privileges, but to protect them with temper and moderation, never over-stepping the liberal and substantial rules of justice. With all the pains he had been able to bestow, in the short period he had it in his power, on the reading of the publication in question, he had considerable doubt in declaring that it was a libel. If he should be compelled to come to a vote on it that night, he must, on every principle of law, and from considerations of substantial justice, as practised in the courts in which he had been educated, say that it was not a libel, because so long as he remained in doubt he must, of necessity, incline to the side of innocence. He was not a person to come to the decision of a question of this kind with that sharp retort, and with that heated temper, which some gentlemen seemed to have brought along with them. He begged of them to come to the decision of the question now before them with temper and moderation. There was not a man who wished more than he did to hold a high check over attacks on the privileges of that House. So far, however, from protecting their privileges, by acceding to the proposed Resolutions, he was satisfied that to do so would have a contrary effect. He was told that the House was not to listen to the language of intimidation. He confessed that he had not courage, considering what had lately passed at the numerous great meetings throughout the country, in which opinions, in many instances, unanimous ones, on grand public questions, were declared contrary to the decisions of that House, to contend that the majority of that House must be correct, and the great body of the nation wrong, or to set up his own opinion, had he originally formed one in those majorities, against the voice of the nation.
The House was now proceeding, however, to dispose of the present question without being accurately acquainted with the true nature and real bearing of it. He thought he should be able to satisfy some gentlemen, who seemed anxious to come to an immediate decision on the question, that this was the case, and that if they were at this moment to decide it on the facts as they understood them, they would decide contrary to the true import and meaning of the very passages on which their decision was built. An hon. gent. under the gallery had, as the ground of his opinion, cited a particular paragraph from the Argument in question, giving it an interpretation which it would not bear, and without weighing the import of it, after a cursory reading, asked was not this and this libellous? The hon. gent. (Mr. Owen) had construed the passage to which he alluded as if it charged the House with converting the Bill of Eights into a Bill of Wrongs; whereas, if the hon. member had perused the passage attentively, he would have found it stated that no one member agreed with Mr. Yorke in imprisoning Mr. Jones under the sanction of the Bill of Rights. If the House had agreed with the hon. gent, under the gallery, however, in his interpretation of the passage, they must have taken it for granted that this was the decision of the whole House. This was a strange and extravagant construction to have given the paragraph, as, he was convinced, the hon. gent. himself would admit after again perusing it. Now, surely, after seeing this egregious error into which he had fallen, the hon. gent. would agree that the consideration of the question should be postponed. He was convinced that the hon. gent., having for some years been of the same profession with himself, would deplore what might have been the effect of so rash and precipitate a judgment.
He begged to call to the recollection of the House what was in reality the proposition they were called on to support. It was not that sir F. Burdett was guilty of a breach of the privileges of that House, but that the publication in question was a libel, and then it went on to state, that it was a breach of the privileges of the House. The honourable and learned gent. would not pretend to say, that the publication was not a libel, but he confessed he entertained a doubt on that point. A publication might be a libel in its matter, next in its manner. Any man has a right to discuss every great constitutional question, whether of original power or of constituted authority. He might shew his folly in arguing a point in which no other man would agree with him, but still he had a right to do so. There might be inflammatory language in the paper in question, but, at the same time, it was reasoned with great ability, and all the great authorities and precedents on the subject were given and argued on with much learning. This was a grave argument, and God forbid that any man should be precluded from discussing, such a subject. The question then was, if there were not in that paper offensive paragraphs? He agreed that there were; but, then, did they amount to a libel? [A sort of laugh from the ministerial bench.] He dared to say that gentlemen much better acquainted with the nature of a libel than he could pretend to be, would be prepared to answer this question, and he should be obliged to some of them to favour the House with an opinion on this subject. The paper said that the right assumed to themselves by the House was contrary to Magna Charta; and gentlemen objected that many parts of it were conceived in strong language. Why should there not be strong language in arguing a question of great consequence, involving at the same time the rights of the public and the constitution of the country? Was the House called on to interfere, and to measure out the nature and quality of the language to be used in every such discussion? Surely it was not on such nice matters as these that the House should be called on to judge? He hoped the House would not suppose that he meant to enter into a defence of this paper. He only meant to state his doubts, whether that House ought to take up this paper as a libel on which they were to judge. It rarely fell to his lot to sit in a judicial character; but so far as he could judge on this matter, he was not prepared to vote in support of these Resolutions. There were, as he had already said, offensive paragraphs in the paper; but he could not view them in the mischievous light in which some gentlemen had been induced to conceive them. The paragraph in which the House was stated to "assume the sword of prerogative, and lord it equally over the king and the people," had been particularly dwelt on, as containing matter highly objectionable. He could hardly view it in this light. The hon. baronet might perhaps take offence at his observation, but he could not help conceiving the paragraph altogether nonsense. As to mischief, he could not conceive how it could arise. It, was impossible that the idea of that House lording it over the King, could produce any injurious effect. Could any person, not an ideot, or fit to be sent to a mad-house, be deceived by such an idea? Where had that House ever encroached on the royal prerogative? There were other passages objected to, such as an allusion to the "manner in which that House was constituted," and that they were. "collected, together by means which it is not necessary for me to describe." He would ask the gentlemen opposite as learned lawyers to say, if the hon. baronet were to be indicted for those objectionable paragraphs, how the charge would be laid? Where was the inuendo? He recollected a case of this kind, where an hon. gent, on the opposite side was an the side of the prosecution, and he (sir S. Romilly) for the defendant, and there, because there was no inuendo, the case was dismissed.—But there was another matter to which he wished particularly to call the attention of the House. They were called on to vote this paper a libel, in a very singular situation. For if this was the law of the House of Commons, a man could be punished by this House when he had not been heard in his defence. This doctrine was not the law in any court in the kingdom. In any of our courts, when a man was indicted, after the mischievous tendency of the libel was pointed out he had an opportunity of shewing, that such was not the meaning of it; he was allowed to shew what its meaning actually was; and that, though it might admit of the meaning given it on the part of the prosecution, still that was not the meaning he intended it should receive. Here the person accused had no such opportunity. The paper was read, and then he was ordered to withdraw without being heard.—He did not mean to say that this was not the law of parliament. He was not so much acquainted with its practice, as with that of the courts in which he was accustomed to practise. He did not even mean to say that this was not the proper course; but, if they were to pursue this mode, when they themselves were the party, they should at least, act deliberately; and if they could not call the hon. baronet before them, to hear his explanation of the objectionable passages, they should take care at least, that all justice was done him. It was admitted yesterday, that time should be given for deliberation. Now, they were to consider what had been done since, and what time had intervened, which could enable the House to have made themselves more complete masters of the subject? Would gentlemen venture to say, that those passages which had been objected to, might not admit of a very different interpretation after the House had had sufficient time to consider them? He had already proved, in the person of the learned gentleman under the gallery, (Mr. Owen) that there were gentlemen ready to decide on the paper in question, as being a libel, while at the same time, they were under a complete misapprehension of the meaning of the passages on which their opinion was founded. This, he submitted, was a sufficient ground on which to postpone the discussion of the question. It was impossible to say that a fair opportunity had already been afforded for considering the paper in question. It would be useless in him to point out the ill consequences of precipitation in such a case as this; and notwithstanding the courage of some of the gentlemen who had spoken on the other side, he hoped the House would take some little time to deliberate before they came to a decision on a question of such importance.
could not conceive how any one possessed of the sense and information of his hon. and learned friend could doubt that the paper in question was distinctly a libel. Although he might not have selected the passage quoted by his hon. friend under the gallery as the strongest in that production, still that passage was unquestionably a libel on the House of Commons; for the inference from the assertion that Mr. Yorke, in arguing from the Bill of Rights, had converted it into a Bill of Wrongs, by which argument the House had been induced to act, was that the House had done wrong, and violated the privileges of the people. All who had spoken seemed to agree that this was a highly important question. Some indeed might think that the inquiry into the application which his Majesty's ministers had made of the forces of the country at Walcheren was of still greater importance; but although he was willing to admit that this inquiry was of great importance, he did not believe that the House would feel it to be of such importance as the investigation of a charge against them, that they had been guilty of a gross violation of the law of the land.
Various gentlemen had called on him, some in a friendly, and some in a hostile tone, not to expose himself to the imputation of interposing the present discussion to divert the public attention from the Walcheren inquiry. For the purpose of declamation, or of casting odium on ministers, such an insinuation might be very convenient; but it was impossible that any one could reasonably believe that the intervention of a day before the decision of the inquiry was a matter of personal importance to the members of his Majesty's government. An hon. gent. had said that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) calculated upon some such circumstance in the chapter of accidents as that which happened to the condemned Soldier in the retreat; and that with a halter about his neck he looked around for some such fortunate event as the present discussion to avert his impending fate.
In this assertion he could not suppose that the hon. gent. was serious. For his part, he was as anxious for the result of the inquiry into the Expedition to the Scheldt as any man. Anticipating that result as he did with the most perfect confidence, he looked to it as the means of doing away those false impressions which had prevailed with respect to a measure, the wisdom and policy of which he was persuaded would appear more evidently the more the measure itself was examined. His hon. and learned friend had very justly said in considering a libel, a distinction ought to be made between the matter and the manner. Now, both the matter and the manner of the paper in question were as libellous as it was possible to imagine. He allowed that any individual was perfectly at liberty to canvas any act of authority; but he had no right to decry the decision of the House of Commons, and to appeal from that decision to his constituents. The manner of the document was most offensive, and with respect to the matter, it was neither more nor less than a call by the hon. baronet on the people to resist the authority of parliament, if he could prove the proposition by a mere reference to the Letter of the hon. baronet (without saying any thing of the Argument by which it was followed), he should shew a case of libel, which it would become the House not to pass unpunished; The Letter of the hon. baronet began as follows:
"Gentlemen; The House of Commons having passed a vote, which amounts to a declaration, that an order of theirs is to be of more weight than Magna Charta and the laws of the land, I think it my duty to lay my sentiments thereon before my constituents, whose character as freemen, and even whose personal safety depend in a great degree upon the decision of this question, a question of no less importance than this, whether our liberty Ire still secured by the laws of our forefathers, or be to lay at the absolute mercy of a part of our fellow subjects, collected together by means which it is not necessary for me to describe?"
After a few sentences the Letter proceeded thus:—
"It is therefore now the time to resist the doctrine upon which Mr. Jones has been sent to Newgate, as it is high time to secure all pretensions to those liberties which were acquired by our forefathers after so many struggles And so many sacrifices."
The statement of the hon. baronet, therefore, began by an allegation that the House of Commons had set up an order of their own against Magna Charta and the laws of the land; that personal safety was thereby endangered, and that now was the time to resist the doctrines upon which they had sent Mr. Jones to Newgate. But, perhaps, it might be contended, that by resistance was meant resistance by argument. What said the succeeding paragraphs?—"Either the House of Commons is authorised to dispense with the law of the land or it was not."
A passage in which it was clearly inferred, that in the instance complained of the laws of the land had been so dispensed with.
"If the constitution be of so delicate a texture—so weak a frame—so fragile in substance that it is to be only spoken of in terms of admiration, and to be viewed merely as a piece of curious but unprofitable workmanship; if Magna Charta and all the wholesome laws of England be a dead letter, in that case the affirmative of the proposition may be admitted; but if the constitution lives, and is applicable to its ends; namely, the happiness of the community, the perfect security of the life, liberty, and property of each member, and all the members of the society; then the affirmative of the proposition can never be admitted; then must we be freemen, for we need no better security; no more powerful protection for our rights and liberties, than the laws and constitution. We seek for, and we need seek for nothing new; we ask for no more than what our forefathers insisted upon as their own: we ask for no more than what they bequeathed unto us; we ask for no more than what they in the testament which some of them had sealed, and which the rest of them Were ready to seal, with their blood, expressly declared to be the birthright of the people of England; namely, the laws of England. To these laws we have a right to look with confidence for security; to these laws the individual now imprisoned has through me applied for redress, in vain. Those who have imprisoned him have refused to listen to my voice, weakly expressing the strong principles of the Jaw, the undeniable claims of this Englishman's 'birthright.' Your voice may come with more force; .may command greater respect; and I am not without hope that it may prove irresistible, if it proclaim to this House of Commons in the same tone as the tongues of our ancestors proclaimed to the Kings of old—'Nolumus leges Anglia mutari;' or in our own more clear, and not less forcible language, 'The laws of England shall not be changed."
As far as he had gone, was this the proper mode of treating such a subject? But what followed?
"The principles, fellow citizens, for which we are now contending, are the same principles for which the people of England have contended from the earliest ages, and their glorious success in which contests are now upon record in the Great Charters of our rights and liberties, and in divers other subsequent statutes of scarcely less importance. It was this same great principle which was again attacked by Charles I. in the measure of Ship money, when again the people of England, and an uncorrupted House of Commons renewed the contest; a contest which ended in the imprisonment, the trial, the condemnation, and the execution of that ill-advised king. The selfsame principle it was that was so daringly violated by his son, James II."
And again, towards the conclusion of the same paragraph,
"Volumes have been written by foreigners, as well as by our own countrymen, in praise of that part of our law, which in so admirable a manner provides for our personal safety against any attacks of men in power. This has indeed been in all ages the pride of our country; and it is the maintenance of this principle which enabled us to escape that bondage in which all the states and kingdoms in Europe were enthralled, by abandoning and yielding it up; and we may be assured, that if we now abandon it, the bright day of England's glory will set in the night of her disgrace."
Could any thing be more distinct than the mode of resistance here recommended by the hon. baronet to the decision of the House of Commons? Was it not evident that he wished the people of England to resist in the same manner as they did in the instances which he had quoted? But to set this matter in a clearer light, the hon. baronet proceeded:—
"But I would fain believe that such is not to be our fate, our forefathers made, stern grim-visaged Prerogative hide his head; they broke in pieces his sharp and massy sword; and shall, we, their sons, be afraid to enter the lists with undefined Privilege assuming the powers of Prerogative."
Was it possible, after hearing these passages, that any one could refuse assent to the proposition, that the hon. baronet had called on his constituents to resist, the doctrine by which Mr. Jones had been committed by the House of Commons, as the only mode by which they could preserve their liberties; that he shewed them how their forefathers had fought for those liberties, and that he then asked them if they were now afraid to enter the lists in a similar, contest? In a succeeding paragraph the hon. baronet observed,
"That a power such as this should exist in any country it is lamentable to be obliged to believe; but that it should be suffered to exist, and that its existence should be openly and even boastfully avowed in a country whose chief glory has been its free constitution of government, is something too monstrous to be believed if the proof were not before your eyes."
The hon. baronet concluded by telling his constituents,
"The argument by which I have endeavoured to convince the gentlemen of the House of Commons that their acts in the case of Mr. Jones were illegal, I shall now lay before you in a more full and connected way that it could possibly be done by the parliamentary reporters, and in doing this I shall do all that now remains in my power towards the correction of this, as I deem it, most enormous abuse of power, and most dangerous of all encroachments upon the rights and liberties of Englishmen."
He put it to the, House, whether any thing could have been written to Englishmen more calculated to excite their resistance to the authority of parliament, and to bring the character of that House into disrespect and contumely? Could any thing have been written that bore more completely the character of a libel on the rights and privileges of the House of Commons? Could his hon. and learned friend, after his attention had been thus directed to those passages, have any doubts on the subject? If he had, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was persuaded that an adjournment of the discussion for a week, or for any longer period, would not remove them. With respect to the objectionable passages in the Argument, they had so frequently been quoted in the course of the debate, that he would not enter into them minutely. The House were in possession of passages in which the hon. baronet distinctly stated that the proceedings of the House of Commons were systematically against the laws, and in complete subversion of the constitution of the country. Some of the hon. gentlemen who had spoken had no doubt the paper was a libel, but wished to know something about the law; others did not dispute the law, but wished to know something about the libel. He was anxious to satisfy both, parties. As to the fact, he trusted that what he had already stated was sufficient; and with respect to the libel, if a public reflection on the proceedings of that House was not a libel, he did not know what was Let the House consider the following passage in the Argument:
"They (the House of Commons) have become the proprietors, by burgage tenure, of the whole representation; and in that capacity are inflated with their high-flown fanciful ideas of Majesty, and tricked out in the trappings of royalty, think privilege and protection beneath their dignity, assume the sword of prerogative, and lord it equally over the King and the people."
His hon. and learned friend declared that he did not understand this, and therefore that it could not be libellous. This much however was perfectly intelligible, that it declared the House of Commons had assumed a power which by the constitution it was not allowed to possess.
The main business of the Argument was to prove that the House had not a right to commit a stranger for a breach of privilege; for the hon. baronet admitted that they had a right to commit a member for such offence. Now, this was a case of doubt, on which the hon. baronet had a right to argue as fully as he chose in the House; but it behoved him to take cave in what manner he spoke or wrote on the subject out of the House. It did not follow that that which it was lawful to say in the House, before a decision it was lawful to say out of the House, after a decision; and still less lawful was it to recommend a resistance to that decision. Supposing that he considered the conduct of the House in the case of Mr. Gale Jones as illegal, the hon. baronet had certainly a right to endeavour to induce the House to rescind their proceedings; but when he failed in that attempt, he had no right to call upon the people to resist their authority.
He would now address himself to remove any doubts with respect to the law of the case. The right of the House to commit strangers could be traced as far back as the reign of queen Elizabeth, in which Mr. Hall and Mr. Trower were to committed (on farther consideration, the Chancellor of the Exchequer observed, that Mr. Hall was a member not a stranger). Selden had decidedly asserted that privilege. The reign of Charles I comprised an accumulated mass of authorities to that purpose. In one particular instance, the Kentish Petition, a Committee resolved, that to deny the right of the House of Commons to commit strangers was a gross violation of their rights and privileges. Between the years 1701 and 1774, there were no less than thirty instances of such commitments. In the cases of Oliver and Crosby, the court of Common Pleas and the court of Exchequer both decreed that the House of Commons had a right to commit a stranger for a breach of privilege. There was also the authority of the court of King's Bench for the existence of an analogous privilege of the House of Lords. Lord Kenyon observed, on a motion of Habeas Corpus, to bring up the body of Mr. Flower, who had been committed by the House of Lords, "that if ever a time should come when factious men would attempt to overthrow the government, they would begin by calumniating the courts of justice and both Houses of Parliament."—I solemnly call on the House, added the light hon. gent., to consider whether that time has not arrived.—Where would be the impartiality of the House, if after committing Mr. Jones for a breach of privilege, they should treat a member who, with a better knowledge of those privileges, had violated them, with more indulgence? If they adjourned that on which it was impossible to have any doubt, he did not conceive that they would support their dignity or evince their impartiality and justice. The House was called upon to decide by an imperious duty. If they hesitated to pronounce that against the hon. baronet which they had not hesitated to pronounce against a Fess distinguished offender, they would sink low indeed in the public estimation. Let the offences of the two individuals be compared. Grossly libellous as the proceeding of Mr. Gale Jones had been, it was trifling and contemptible, compared with that of the hon. baronet. If the House, from an apprehension of doing that which the hon. baronet might perhaps wish, and in which he Blight perhaps triumph, were to abstain from doing their duty, they would indeed afford him cause of triumph, and would indeed deserve to be triumphed over and trodden upon. In asserting their own rights, they were asserting the rights of the people of England. The only way to maintain their dignity, was to do their duty—to do it temperately—but to do it firmly and impartially. It appeared to him that the House could not hesitate in concurring in the motion of his hon. friend, and he was persuaded that they would not hesitate in doing so.
contended, that the precedents referred to by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were either misunderstood or misrepresented by him. Indeed the course he recommended that night for the adoption of the House was both extraordinary and inconsistent. In an affectation of candour, he appealed to the grave, the serious, the solemn deliberation of that House. But how did his practice square with his professions? By endeavouring to obtain this sober and solemn determination in the most premature and precipitate manner. An hon. and learned gentleman (sir S. Romilly) entitled to every deference for his unlimited legal and deep constitutional knowledge, had declared that night, that he entertained many doubts upon the nature and tendency of the publication then under discussion. When such a character doubted, were the majority of that House prepared to assert that their minds were satisfied, that their conviction was decided? The right hon. gent. had gone but shortly into the subject, but even in the short excursion that he took, he proceeded every step under the most mistaken views. It was contended by him, that because the House had committed Mr. Gale Jones, there could therefore be no doubt of the right of the House of Commons, and there being no doubt of the right, that therefore the publication of sir Francis Burdett was a gross violation of its privileges. What said the right hon. gent.'s learned friend near him (Mr. Croker)? He told the House that the case of Gale Jones had nothing to do with the present question, and should not be admitted into the contemplation which the House was bound to give that particular question. But he (lord Folkestone) begged to say, that the question at present before them not only comprehended the propriety or impropriety of sir Francis Burdett's conduct, but the truth or falsehood of his doctrine. Upon those points he would ask, was the House conscientiously prepared to say, that they were free from doubts? Were their minds so fully convinced by the arguments and precedents of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer? As to his precedents, he could easily point out their total misapplication to the inference which he wished to deduce. Indeed the right hon. gent. Was so wholly ignorant of the precise facts of the case he stated with respect to Hall, that at first he contended that Hall was not a member of parliament, and in a few sentences afterwards he contended that he was.
There were other cases referred to by that right hon. gent. which were rather extraordinary, drawn as they were from periods of our history, which he trusted even that right hon. gent, would not propose for imitation. There was the case of the Kentish gentlemen, who, for the language of their petition, were sent to prison by the order of that House. Was there a man to be found in the present times who would recommend such a punishment for the expressions introduced into that petition—or rather, was it not such, as in these times, would be more a subject to be approved, than reprobated? It was however resolved that the petition be referred to a Committee of that House to make their report on. Upon the adoption of such a resolution, lord Harttington moved that the rights and privileges of the people should be considered by, the Committee, as well as the privileges of that House. It was to be recollected that the period when those events occurred, was one of great political heat and much public agitation. The consequence was, that in the Committee to whose consideration the petition was referred, great divisions and jarring sentiments prevailed. Such a state of things, therefore, led to a report from that Committee, which could now be only considered as a mere compromise between the conflicting parties. But the history of the transaction proved, that at the time when lord Hartington moved that point, the legality of the power of that House to imprison for a breach of its privileges was considered in an extensive degree doubtful. Numerous able and well written tracts were published in support of the doctrine which pronounced such a power illegal, and had even in that period considerable effect in corroborating the assumption, that the exercise of that right was considered by many an usurpation.—But the right hon. gent. not satisfied with his precedents from a more remote period of our history, had thought proper to allude on the present occasion to that assertion of lord Kenyon, namely, that when factious men wished to subvert the government, their first effort was to calumniate the courts of justice, and to entrench upon the privileges of parliament. Really (said the noble lord) above all men I did not expect to hear such an allusion, much less such an application of it, from the right hon. gent. Does he, or can he believe, that because; he conceives this House to have the power of restraining the communication of the popular opinion, upon the conduct pursued within its walls, that he therefore can deprive the people of these kingdoms of the faculty of thinking or of recollecting? Does he believe, when he cites the violation of our privileges, as a proof of disaffection and of treason, that the people of England have forgotten the transactions of the two last sessions of parliament? Can they forget the spectacle exhibited to their view, of two cabinet ministers, charged, and I will say morally convicted, of a gross and heinous attack upon the privileges of this House—privileges for which, forsooth, one of them now affects to feel such sincere solicitude? Can the people of England forget that though such violations were not denied, still that the conduct of the accused was not only not censured, but almost not questioned by a British House of Commons? When then the country recollects such events, and when this House cannot forget them, what attention can be paid to such application relative to its privileges, proceeding from that very man who was a few short months past arraigned before that very House as a culprit for the violation of them, and who, though rescued from punishment, has still no claim to acquittal? It is idle to say that the people of this country have no very anxious feelings upon the present subject. I for one never can wish that their voice should be stifled. And therefore it is that I appeal to this House for that postponement of its decision, which will allow the fullest investigation of this most important question, and which must ultimately settle the legality or illegality of this power. There remains one observation of the right hon. gent, upon which I wish to remark. He has in his general condemnation of the paper published by my hon. friend, laid no inconsiderable stress upon that sentence, which as he assumes tends to invite the people to a resistance of the decision of the House of Commons. He cannot have read the paper fully when he ventures to draw such an inference. Had he taken the context into his contemplation; had he reverted to preceding passages, he would have found that the term resistance was coupled with the word legal. It was conveyed in such a manner as must convince every impartial mind that such was the fair and candid interpretation of the passage. If therefore such a difference of opinion as to the nature and to the interpretation of the publication does exist, it is, with many others, a very strong reason with me to vote for the adjournment.
said, he had no intention of entering into the merits of the question, but would confine himself strictly to that of adjournment. He said he had never hitherto been present at, or taken any share in the commitment of Mr. Gale Jones, which had given rise to the question under consideration; and that he could not approve of the discretion which dictated it. He should add, however, that there was not an individual in the House, more sincerely anxious to uphold its constitutional and recognised privileges than he was. Actuated by a desire to support them, he then ventured to trespass upon its attention. When, therefore, a question was brought before it, complaining of a violation of these rights, he must esteem it as most consonant with the character of that House, to have, upon such an occasion, its proceedings regulated by the principles observed in all places were justice was administered. With such feelings, he wished to impress upon the House, that in all judicial proceedings it was a main ingredient, not only that the Court should deliver its judgment, but that, in such delivery, it should state satisfactory reasons for such judgment. I was that principle which made him feel it a duty to request the House, not only to declare its decision upon the publication of the hon. baronet, but that it should also impress upon the people o the country the propriety of that decision In order, therefore, to produce such impression, it was not alone necessary that the House should decide justly, but it was bound, in regard to the country, to declare that decision in the most satisfactory and intelligible manner, and, therefore with all due deliberation. How the could it be expected that such an effect could be obtained from the precipitancy with which they were called upon to act that night? The House must be aware, that the accusation brought against the hon. baronet, was not one recently agitated. It was now 20 years since a member had been called upon to answer in that House for misconduct, by publishing a libel on the House or any of its members, and thereby committing a breach of its privileges. This was the case of major Scott in the year 1790. What course did the House of Commons pursue, upon that occasion? Did it hurry and almost compel members to the declaration of an opinion, without being able fully to investigate the merits of the case? The House made no such improper exaction. It allowed an adjournment for a week, to enable its members fully to understand that upon which they were called to decide. Though a professional man much practised in professional habits, he (Mr. Adam) was ready to confess, that upon the Resolutions now submitted to them, he had not the opportunity of stating his grounds and reasons for the judgment which he should think himself bound to deliver, on this great question of privilege. In the case of major Scott, to which he alluded, the single act of publication constituted the criminality; yet time was allowed for full and mature consideration. How much more forcible was the claim for postponement now, when the publication complained of, contained long, prolix, and disputed arguments, connected with references extracted from the common law of the land! The case of alderman Oliver, in 1771, also received the most comprehensive discussion, when brought before that House. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with professional habits, and surrounded as he was by so many others qualified to arrange for him the necessary information, might be prepared to go to a decision. But far different was his case; he had nobody to furnish him with materials, he must himself investigate the sources that may enlighten him; and it was impossible that he could apply himself to that full investigation which such a grave and serious charge warranted. He had, however, even after the late hour that morning, endeavoured to acquire some necessary knowledge on the subject. He had referred to the precedent of alderman Crosby, as in some degree analogous. But when the various arguments and references of the present publication were taken into view, he defied the most informed lawyer to encounter, on a sudden, the discussion with real advantage to the case of privilege, which was now so boldly questioned by sir Francis Burdett. To do this with satisfaction, due time must be given to collate, compare, and refute the matter asserted. It was that course alone that would be satisfactory. That alone would enable the House to give a judgment, which would not only overturn the doctrine of the hon. baronet; and would establish by clear, cool consideration, the libellous nature of his work; but would be such, as the public would approve, by the deliberation with which it would be given. For what was he anxious? Only that, as the hon. baronet had quoted lord Coke to support his interpretation, so he (Mr. Adam) might have the opportunity of also citing lord Coke to support his view of the privileges of parliament; that as the hon. baronet had brought forward the case of Ashby and White, to corroborate his inferences, he (Mr. Adam) might be able to communicate his interpretation upon it; and in doing so, that he might show, that sir Francis Burdett had quoted lord Coke's works, in which he was treating of civil rights, and of the common law of the country, and not of the law of Parliament.—He was well aware that individual inconvenience was no ground for delaying the proceedings of the House; yet he could not help thinking, that the defect under which he laboured, was felt by very many members of the House; and if there was a general feeling of that sort, surely that was a reason for adjournment, because it was a proof, that though judgment might be given, it could not be given satisfactorily. As to himself, he was not prevented by indolence or want of interest in the question; but as he had before said, it wat absolutely impossible for him then to state his views of the question in a manner either useful or creditable; as, from the moment it was first brought before the House, until the period when he rose, he was engaged by either public or professional duties. Until three o'clock that morning, in the House of Commons, and after the ordinary refreshment which nature required, being kept, if he might use the phrase, in harness all day, it was not too much to ask of those whose situation afforded them the means of being assisted with a variety of opinions, to allow others not so provided, at least a short time or ulterior consideration. If this request was denied him, he would be then reduced to the dilemma, in common with many members of the House, either that he must surrender the privileges of that House, or agree in the condemnation of an individual, without being able to state, in a satisfactory manner, his conviction of his guilt. He hoped, therefore, that the motion of adjournment would be acceded to.
had many reasons for thinking that the discussion ought not to be postponed. He retracted the proceedings on the subject, and contended that if an adjournment took place, it might perhaps be attributed to the influence of motives, to the imputation of which the House ought never to expose themselves. He could not understand the grounds on which the hon. and learned member who had just spoken wished for an adjournment. The question had been treated as if it were a new point, and as if the House in many former instances, and recently in the case of Mr. Gale Jones, had not determined it; for let it be recollected, that the argument of the hon. baronet was against the power of the House to commit strangers, he admitting that they had the power to commit members for breaches of privilege. The House, therefore, would not have committed Mr. Gale Jones, had they not been fully satisfied of their power to do so. If his hon. and learned friend was not so satisfied, why had he not attended the motion for the commitment of Mr. Jones? And farther, when the hon. baronet made a motion for the discharge of Mr. Jones, why had not his learned friend then attended if he entertained any doubts upon the subject. He had abundant opportunity to consult authorities, for the hon. baronet had given a week's notice of his motion. The question however had been discussed in a very full House on this sole ground—not whether the House had a right to commit Mr. Jones in the first instance, but whether his having expressed his contrition at the bar might entitle him to be discharged without a petition. The question at present before the House was—not whether the House was vested with the right of commitment, for that was fully established, but whether the paper of the hon. baronet was a libel or not? If any doubts could possibly exist on that subject, he should be perfectly disposed to concur in the adjournment of the discussion; but it appeared to him that it was only necessary to read the paper, in order to be convinced that it was a libel, and a gross violation of the privileges of the House.
observed, that when the business was before the House on the preceding day, he was of opinion, from the nature of the Paper under discussion, that it would be the preferable course that the consideration of the question should be postponed to a future day. He was still of the same opinion, in which he was not guided by the same motives which had influenced the opinions of many hon. gentlemen. He did not think that either with reference to tenderness to the object who was the subject of the discussion, or from any apprehension of the consequence of the result, should the House be induced to pause. On the grand principle of giving the Paper a full and candid perusal, so as that the House might come to a just decision, and not throw discredit on the debates, would he agree to the adjournment. With respect to the particular parts of the Paper, on which much difference of opinion prevailed, some gentlemen pointing out passages which they deemed libellous whilst others were of a different opinion, he thought it was not a fair line of argument to draw such inferences from insulated passages, because the Paper should be taken together. On the other hand it had been urged, that if the House did not consent to delay, the people might be excited to discontent. Without entering into an examination of those topics, he thought it would be better on a question of a doubtful nature not to precipitate the decision of the House. Between these difficulties he would wish to steer a prudent course, and though he would not go the length of the Amendment, yet he was of opinion that at least the discussion should be postponed till to-morrow.
in explanation, stated that he certainly did understand the passage to which he had alluded as conveying a charge against the House of having imprisoned Mr. Jones under the sanction of the Bill of Rights.
then proposed to move an amendment to his motion; but the Speaker having intimated to the hon. member, that he could not in point of form,
moved an amendment to the following effect: "That a great question being depending before the House, respecting the Expedition to the Scheldt, which so fully occupies and engages its attention, it is fit that the consideration of the motion now under discussion be adjourned till to morrow se'nnight." The right hon. gent. challenged the gentlemen opposite to deny that the Resolutions last night moved against sir Francis Burdett were of treasury manufacture; (hear, hear!) he would go farther and challenge the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to deny if a meeting was not convened at his house, to consider, discuss, and decide upon these Resolutions, which in the person of an independent county member were to be offered to the consideration of that House.
, the mover, rose to utter the monosyllable "No!" to the right hon. gent.'s assertion; and further, said the hon. gent., I declare upon my honour, that the Resolutions which I had the honour of moving are not of treasury manufacture.
observed, that there was an understanding upon the subject, for the seconder, as he was informed, was there.
, the seconder, arose, and denied the assertion.
was not surprised the hon. gent. who brought forward the motion of adjournment should have said that the question was one of great importance. Although he should object to the adjournment, his objections were much stronger to the amendment now proposed. With respect to the paper under discussion, his objections to it were not so much to the matter as to the manner in which the hon. baronet had chosen to discuss the subject. The simple question for the House to decide was, whether the hon. baronet had discussed it in such a mode, and in such terms, as were not an infringement on the privileges of this House. As to the assertion, that the Resolutions before the House were prepared at the treasury, he could declare for himself that he knew nothing about them until they were read in the House; nor did he believe the assertion; and he was still more warranted in his disbelief from the declaration of the hon. member himself, by whom these Resolutions were brought forward.
declared, that no man was more firmly convinced than himself, that the privileges of that House ought to be maintained; for he thought those privileges highly essential to the benefit of the people. But he did not think they were to be blown away with a breath; that they could not withstand an attack without adopting sudden and precipitate means of defence. He therefore saw no danger in acceding to the proposition of delay upon this occasion, in order that the House should have the fullest opportunity for deliberation. This was, in fact, a case in which that opportunity ought to be afforded, "because it was desirable that those who completely and substantially agreed a principle, should be able rightly to apply that principle, and satisfactorily to state the grounds of that agreement. Such a statement was due to the case, and was absolutely necessary in order to satisfy the minds of the people. The people ought to be satisfied that the privileges of that House were only enjoyed and exercised for their advantage. Upon such a question, the feelings of the people ought peculiarly to be consulted; for it was only in connection with the people, that the constitution of that House could be really strong. For this reason, it became the House to proceed with the utmost seriousness, and gravity, and therefore he was determined to vote for the adjournment. To that vote indeed, he was the more determined, in consequence of the declaration of several members of high character, that they felt themselves unable, from the pressure of time, to make up their minds upon the subject. When a gentleman, for instance, so distinguished for legal knowledge as the learned gent, on the floor (Mr. Adam), and from whom the House had heard to night such sound constitutional doctrine, expressed his inability to determine upon the merits of the paper under discussion, not having had time to consider it, it was surely but proper to grant him that time: but that grant was not only proper with regard to him, but to others in similar circumstances, who concurred in opinion as to the privileges of the House, while they required time to examine, whether the paper under consideration involved a breach of those privileges, or was a proper case for the exercise of the power, which the House possessed, for the preservation of these privileges. He therefore deprecated any hasty proceeding. On this occasion he would, in favour of the principle of his recommendation, quote the authority of his right hon. friend, now no more (Mr. Pitt). It was uniformly the maxim of that tight hon. gent., that, on all constitutional questions, he should take such grounds as would serve to separate the really well-intentioned from those who appeared to be of a contrary character. It was really much to be desired, that the House should come to a decision of this case with a cool mind, which was more likely to prevail, by allowing of the intervention of a few days. He wished the House to consider the publication rather as matter of history, and to determine upon it as such. There were many who looked to it with, no doubt, an honest warmth, but that was a disposition ill suited to sober judgment. Let the House consider how their conduct in this transaction should appear in the page of history, even to themselves in a year hence, and so considering, he was persuaded they would cautiously avoid pronouncing any sentence under the warmth of the moment, or proceeding with any precipitancy. If such a proceeding were taken in opposition to the sentiments of those gentlemen of weight and consideration, who called for the adjournment, he felt that the House would be sacrificing the substance to the appearance. While he fully agreed with the right hon. gent. Who spoke last, as to the necessity of upholding the privileges of the House, he must still support the adjournment, as the best means of consulting the character of these privileges. Indeed, he could not conceive how any thing could be gained by the advocates of the Resolutions, from a perseverance in resisting the motion of adjournment. For even though it were negatived, it would be impossible for the House, at that late hour of the night (nearly one o'clock) to go into the discussion of the other questions, which must necessarily occupy a considerable time. For these reasons he recommended it to his right hon. friends on the Treasury bench to proceed in the case with peculiar temperance and candour, and above all to avoid any thing that should expose the House to the charge of being actuated rather by passion than by judgment.
was of opinion, that whatever decision the House might come to upon the principle of the motion immediately under consideration, it was obviously right that the other question should not even appear to be determined prematurely. Whatever opinion the House might express upon this question, it was extremely desirable that it should go forth accompanied by the fullest grounds of justification. Nothing equivocal or hasty should, appear in such a transaction. Let it be recollected that the judgment of the House was liable to be impeached; and he should be sorry to witness any proceeding that should seem to sustain such impeachment Therefore he most earnestly deprecated precipitancy, and more particularly as so many respectable members were heard to state that they were unprepared to pronounce any decision upon the subject. He declared, that had he been aware last night that the debate upon the business was likely to extend to such a length, he would not have voted for the short adjournment. There was no reason to doubt, that several gentlemen might have been unable from their various avocations, as yet, to examine this paper, and to decide upon its character. The hon. gent. who spoke last, had put the question under discussion upon the fairest grounds. Gentlemen might be fully agreed in their opinion as to the privileges of that House, and yet unable to determine whether this paper involved a breach of those privileges. Time sufficient for all due consideration ought therefore to be granted. He had read the paper this day, and he was of opinion, that it was a clear libel upon that House. Many who required time for consideration, would, he had no doubt, entertain the same opinion, if that opportunity were afforded. After this motion should be disposed of, it would be remembered that another question would arise for discussion, into which the House could not at that hour be in a state to enter. He therefore, without wishing to influence any other person, would vote for the adjournment. By that course, it appeared to him that the end in view would be attained with more satisfaction to the House and to the public. Whatever the House felt in this case, gentlemen must be aware that they were acting as judges in their own cause. If he were to frame a constitution anew, he was satisfied that he should feel it necessary to invest the House with the privileges it now possessed. Of course he was an advocate for those privileges. But still it must be borne in mind, that the House, in asserting such privileges, were judges in their awn cause, and therefore he always thought that, although those privileges were never to be formally relinquished, they were yet to be very discreetly exercised. This case, however, was forced upon the House. He should have been glad not to have heard any thing about it. But it was now impossible to give it the go-by. He was sorry, because he never knew any good to arise out of such contests that could counterbalance the disadvantages. But the House was brought to the alternative, either that it must give up its privileges, and perhaps incur the imputation of timidity, or assert those privileges with manliness. He would have been happy, he repeated, if means could be devised of getting out of such a contest. But that was now impracticable, and in order to bring to the decision as much weight, and authority as possible, he would support the proposition for delay, required by those to whom so much weight and authority belonged.
said he would confess fairly, that, after what he had heard, particularly from his learned friend who had just sat down, it would appear obstinate and pertinacious in him to press an opinion, to which, however, he still unfortunately adhered, and refuse to accede to the repeated calls which were made for a further adjournment of this question. At the same time, he begged leave distinctly to state, that upon examining his mind, the last motive which could induce him to yield was any thing like timidity or fear. He believed, indeed, that that was the last ground upon which the House would yield in such a case. The House, he was persuaded, must be alive to the necessity which called for its interposition on this occasion, and that if it declined to assert its privileges, the most serious consequences were too likely to follow. In agreeing to the adjournment, he protested against the ground laid for that proceeding in the amendment, nor could his objection be overruled by the assertion that the other question alluded to in that amendment was of more importance than that under discussion, and that therefore it was entitled to the precedency. (Hear, hear! from the Opposition bench.) He wished it to be understood, that his only reason for assenting to the adjournment was that delay was required. One word as to the cheers of the gentlemen on the other side. Those gentlemen professed a wish for unanimity, and yet when that disposition appeared, they exulted in it as a species of triumph. With this short remark he would leave those gentlemen to enjoy their triumph.
asserted, that the right hon. gent. was not justified in the language which he had thought proper to apply to his side of the House. It would be remembered, that he had yesterday distinctly maintained that time for deliberation ought to be afforded upon the very grounds precisely which the learned gent. on the other side had urged in the course of this night's discussion. It did not therefore become the right hon. gentleman to impugn the conduct of the gentlemen on his side of the House. But as to the right hon. gentleman's allusion to our triumph, said Mr. Ponsonby, he really rates himself too high and us too low, if he supposes that there is any thing in his conduct or character which should make us feel elated by any triumph over him.
The Amendment was accordingly withdrawn. Upon the question being put for adjourning the debate till to-morrow s' ennight, some Noes were heard, but the Speaker declared that the Ayes had it. Mr. Lethbridge declared the contrary, and a division was called for. Before, however, the whole of the strangers had withdrawn from the gallery, Mr. Lethbridge was induced to withdraw his opposition.