rose to reply to the speech delivered on a former night by general Craufurd. That hon. general had described the horrors of campaigns that, never existed, and entered minutely into the particulars of assaults, ambuscades, stormings, and other miseries of war, so much that it was enough to deprive members, who were not military men, of their sleep. He had then gone into a disquisition on the fallibility of man, illustrating thereby the fallibility of ministers; and, he really believed, that a more fallible set than the present, in war, never existed. The hon. general then examined the chances, and explained the probable hardships of a contest, supposing 40,000 troops had been transported to the north of Germany, to act between the Ems and the Weser. But this was, not required, for all that Austria asked of this country, was, detachments, of cavalry and artillery. From Germany, the hon. general travelled into Spain; and here he agreed with him, that from the season of the year, nothing could have been done in that quarter. From Spain, he went to Italy, and contended, that to this point an Expedition would have been too late. He (general T.) did not think so. As ministers were in possession of information of what was passing between Austria and France, so early as December, 1808, they might have had an effective force joined to the 20,000 men already in Sicily, ready to act, where alone the enemy was vulnerable, in time sufficient effectually to co-operate with Austria. But they would have the Scheldt, and nothing but the Scheldt; and an Expedition, to waste our resources, must be sent somewhere. He was firmly convinced that, haying now overcome all opposition on the continent, we must expect that the greatest warrior of this or other times would gratify his ruling passion, by an invasion of this country. It became us, then, to husband our means of defence, and not squander them in such a manner and upon such fruitless enterprises as the calamitous Expedition to Walcheren and the Scheldt. He denied that this Expedition was any diversion in favour of Austria; as before it sailed, ministers knew of the battle of Wagram, and the conclusion of the armistice. Whenever they were informed that Napoleon had entered into negotiations, experience ought to have taught them to anticipate the complete triumph of France, and the certain prostration of Austria. Such had been the consequences to the powers who treated with him after the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Friedland. A noble lord (Castlereagh) had told them, that the general officers, with whom government chose to consult, were not, when they delivered their opinions, in possession of the facts on which government decided. These officers were rash in declaring their opinions, without a perfect knowledge of the grounds on which they stood; and as no data had been given them, he considered the consultation of government to be one of the greatest mockeries and insults ever offered to the military profession. The hon. general opposite (Craufurd) had commented somewhat too severely on the evidence given by a worthy friend of his (sir W. Erskine,) in whose answers so much accuracy, information, skill, judgment, and intelligence was displayed, as to make him almost believe that the soul of his illustrious father again lived in him. There was no similarity between the late campaign and that of 1746, for then we were masters of the country, and able completely to invest the fortified places; while in the last campaign the relief every day to be expected from their friends, would induce the besieged to hold out to the last extremity. He then proceeded to remark on the evidence of gen. Brownrigg, for whose professional knowledge he professed very high veneration. That general had given it, as his opinion, that the Expedition might reach Santvliet, and land in divisions, on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August; and in 13 or 14 days, accomplish all the objects in view and be on their return home. This was a mere visionary opinion, upon which government was so much buoyed up, as to undertake this impracticable Expedition, where every thing depended on the veni, vidi, vici.

He should now take a view of the campaign, and see how different to these pleasing speculations, which the planners of it indulged in by anticipation so confidently, every thing turned out. After an unaccountable and culpable delay of nineteen days, the army obtained possession of Flushing. With regard to the capture of Walcheren, their operations were as slow and clumsy as any he had ever had occasion to contemplate in the whole course of his military observation. Instead of proceeding in the way they did, as time was their object, they ought to have marched down at once a single column of 6,000 men. By these means they would have cut off the reinforcements thrown into Flushing from the country, prevented inundation, and, if the garrison came out to fight, terminated the affair, by defeating them, and entering the town with the flying enemy.

As for the operations against Antwerp, there appeared some contradiction between the, evidence of general Brownrigg and the other officers who had been examined, as to the state of its fortifications. General Brownrigg appeared to have paid more attention to the suburbs and outworks, than to what in general more occupied a soldier's attention—the height of the ramparts, and depth of the ditch. In his opinion, respecting a landing at Cadsand, he was also at variance with other officers. Having animadverted upon gen. Brownrigg's opinions, on this point, the hon. general also argued against the opinions of gen. Mac Leod, that a bombardment of Antwerp would have had any effect, and of gen. Sontag, that it might be easily compelled to surrender; and contended, upon the whole, that the fall of this place could not be expected so early as ministers were led to calculate upon. The noble lord (Castlereagh) had brought before the House many instances of failure, as if all the failures in the world could ever exculpate him from his share of responsibility upon this disastrous Expedition. He had gone to the Dardanelles, to Egypt, to Buenos Ayres, and when the winds failed, had tried the waves, and steered to the Baltic. After endeavouring to excuse his failure, he had tried to make them believe that the expence was no more than 800,000l.; but surely they must be blind and lame who could give credit to this. He would mention a few of the extraordinary items in which the expence incurred must have been very great. It must have been very great in transports; in the additional ships of war placed in commission; in the great and expensive changes in these ships, taking out their guns and taking in horses; in the hospital ships, fitted up in the peculiar way they were; in the commissariat department; in the expenditure of ordnance; in the medical department; in the new staff appointments; in secret-service money; in materials for building, bricks, lime, &c.; in the flotilla; in the carrying out of general officers; in the miscellaneous charges; and in the loss of 7,000 men, the expence of recruiting whom, estimated at 40l. per man, in itself would amount to little short of half a million. Upon all these items the expence could not reasonably be taken at less than 3,000,000l. When our force arrived at Bathz, then it was that the officers, so sanguine in England, discovered that the object of the Expedition was impracticable; that Lillo was not to be taken; that Antwerp was not to be approached, and that the shipping, the great end of their equipment, were moved entirely out of their reach. He would not go into arguments on the unhealthy season selected by ministers for this Expedition, and the cruel detention of the men at Walcheren, after the ulterior objects were given up. The whole transaction, for absurdity of design, and profligacy of expenditure, among all the vacillations of ministers, stood preeminent for folly and ignorance. He must therefore give his vote against the Amendment.

explained. It had never been said that government kept back information from the officers they consulted, but that the information that resolved them was received after that consultation, and induced them to determine upon a measure, to which they had previously inclined, but upon which they had not already made up their minds.

said, he would not undertake nor was he competent to follow the hon. general through all his military details and observations, particularly as all his arguments went against the operations in Walcheren, in approbation of which a vote of the House had passed. He contended, however, in opposition to the hon. general, that the Expedition had operated as a diversion in favour, of Austria, and had drawn troops from the north of Germany, which would otherwise have been brought to bear upon the, Danube. The Expedition was prepared and in readiness, before the news of the armistice was received; and would the hon. general and his friends have, merely on that account, laid it aside, without doing any thing? By being sent to the Scheldt, it had drawn general Gratien, with 7000 men, from the north of Germany; it had brought the garrisons from Stettin, Custrin, &c. and the whole Westphalian army was on its march to oppose it. But, even stripping the affair of its merits as a diversion, after the hopes of assisting our allies were over, the British object was worthy of the Expedition, and the taking of Flushing alone, could it have been retained, was worth the whole expence. This was not his opinion alone; it was the opinion of men, to whose sense and skill the country would ever bow with deference, and not expressed privately to him, but publicly, to public men. Lord Nelson, when employed against Boulogne, had declared it to be his opinion, that the conquest of Flushing was the most important object this country could achieve. In his letter to lord St. Vincent, on the subject, he stated, that to get to Helvoet or Flushing, and destroy the enemy's shipping, would be the greatest service that could be rendered to the country. He offered to undertake the task, stating, that it would require a week's time, and 5 or 6,000 men. This shewed that lamented hero's opinion, that the greatest danger of invasion to his native land was from Flushing, and that it would be of no difficult conquest. The same was the opinion of commodore Owen; than whom a more skilful, discerning, and excellent officer did not grace the British service. Here the right hon. gent. entered into a handsome eulogium on the distinguished officer whose name he had mentioned, and who from his gallantry, activity and promptitude, in every emergency, had attracted the peculiar notice and friendship of lord Nelson. He entertained similar opinions as to the importance of Flushing; and it was from such authorities as these that he (Mr. Rose) drew his argument, that the conquest of Flushing alone (could it have been retained) was a sufficient object to justify and indemnify us for the expence of the Expedition. By the possession of that port, where 20 sail of the line could lie in the basin, fully equipped, and ready to come out with an east wind, we would avoid the great expence of keeping two fleets, on different stations, to watch the enemy. It would also have been more effectual than even destroying the enemy's shipping. For, though, we destroyed his ships, they could be replaced, while the forests supplied the timber; but, by possessing Flushing, we utterly annihilated Antwerp, and all the fleets in the Scheldt. The right hon. gent. then went into an examination of certain parts of the evidence, to shew that sir R. Strachan, capt. Cockburn, and others, from 13th August to 29th Oct., continued to think Flushing of such importance, that it ought not to be given up. That it ought not to be given up, on account of the security retaining it gave to this country, as well as with an eye to future operations against the enemy on the continent. There was another consideration attached to this subject. Even though we were unable to have kept possession of Flushing, could we have destroyed the navigation of the Scheldt? Such a service would have justified the Expedition.—He shewed, from an extract from a letter of sir R. Strachan, that, on the 13th Aug., he had considered that as practicable. Ministers also were therefore justified in having thought it attainable. The hon. gent. had accused them of being the west fallible ministers that ever this country saw, and a noble lord (Porchester) had described this as the most disastrous of all expeditions; a review of our history however would shew that these assertions were not well founded. He would not go back to the great failure of prince Eugene and the duke of Savoy; but take a short retrospect, from the end of the reign of queen Anne, and from thence prove, that other ministers had been as fallible, and other expeditions equally unsuccessful. He did not mean to throw a shade on the enshrined virtue of those distinguished men; but it was impossible to look into their history without finding that they had, in their zeal for England and England's glory, sometimes attempted projects which they were unable to accomplish. He looked to the celebrated attack on Toulon, by an army under prince Eugene, and a fleet under the command of a great British admiral. That attempt, conceited with wisdom, and prosecuted with bravery, proved abortive. An allusion had been made to the attack on Rochefort, and the force employed there stated as holding no comparison in point of numbers to that employed in Walcheren. But draw the comparison of those separate forces from their proportion to the whole force of the kingdom as it stood at the periods of those two Expeditions, and they would be found close upon an equality. The Rochefort Expedition was undertaken with all advantages in its favour. Accurate information had been obtained; the Expedition itself had originated in the memorial of a most able officer; and yet the whole service done was the capture of the little isle of Aix. Lord Howe, in the Magnanime, with a pilot on board, better acquainted than any man in England with the French coast, was run aground within two miles of the island.—On the return of the Expedition, the public expressed no displeasure, until a clamour was gradually excited, when sir J. Mordaunt, the commanding officer of the Expedition, was brought to a court martial. Much ridicule had been thrown on the idea of taking Antwerp by a coup-de-main; but without attempting to set himself up as a Judge of military matters, he had strong authorities for his belief of what might be done by a coup-de-main. (He then read some extracts from a military work, in which general Ligonier's opinion was given on the nature and uses of the attack by coup-de-main, and a narrative of the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom by general Lawendahl by a sudden attack.) It was, said he, by a coup-de-main, that this fortress, then the strongest in the world, was taken. Ismael, with a large army within its walls, was taken by the same rapid and bold assault. But to revert to the Expeditions of which he had been previously speaking. Lord Anson, when first lord of the admiralty, sailed with an array on board, commanded by the great duke of Marlborough, on an expedition to the coasts of the Bay of Biscay. That expedition returned, re infectâ; the Duke went to command in Germany; and general Bligh, at the head of the forces, landed to destroy Cherbourgh. He could there do nothing more than burn a few merchant ships, destroy a basin, and Carry off a few brass guns. He marched a short distance up the country, and was attacked; his return to the shore was impeded, and on the embarkation at St. Cas, his rear-guard were taken prisoners or slain. Thus ended that expedition. He (Mr. Rose), now turned to another instance, in which nothing but accident could have prevented a total failure. It was on the expedition under general Barrington against the French West India islands. After a two months resistance, Guadaloupe was taken; but the general, in his dispatches, acknowledged himself deeply indebted to fortune that it was not lost to the country, as count Beauharnois, the father (said Mr. Rose) of, I believe, the vice-king of Italy (a laugh)—appeared off the island at the moment of its capture with 2,600 men, whose arrival, a few hours earlier, would have foiled the whole Expedition. He then turned to more modern times, and hinted at the Dardanelles, Egypt, and other miscarriages of the last administration. He did not state these things in order to throw any censure on any administration, but to disprove what had been asserted; and to shew that if nothing was ever to be undertaken but With an absolute certainty of success, nothing worthy a nation would ever be done. After enumerating some additional cases of unavoidable failure, Mr. Rose proceeded to reply to other points, which had been touched upon in the course of the debate. It had been asserted that the expence of this present Expedition must have been understated at 800,000l. The calculation of an hon. general (Tarleton) ingeniously swelled it up to three millions, but the idea was absurd. The estimates were all before the House, and it was idle to suppose public officers capable of putting so low and unartificial a trick on the common sense of the House; 246,000l. had been charged for ordnance transports. This was the charge not of the ordnance, but of the transport board, with whom those matters lay, and whose peculiar province and duty it was-to collect all transport services, which were formerly separate, into one system and direction. He still felt the most perfect conviction that the retention of Flushing was a wise measure; and when the country had given itself time to consider its value, and calmly estimate the dangers which menaced it from that quarter of the enemy's force, he was convinced that their judgment would be altogether in favour of the wisdom which planned the Expedition, and the policy by which its great objects were endeavoured to be retained.

(in a maiden speech) said, he should not venture to deliver his opinion or trespass upon the attention of the House to night, when he was aware the time of the House might be so much better engaged, did he not feel it to be his duty on a question of such importance, not to give a silent vote. The question, as it struck him, was, whether ministers in the Expedition they had undertaken had made a wise and judicious use of the means entrusted to their care? After a result which had so little satisfied the expectations of the nation, an inquiry seemed generally to have been required, and that inquiry had taken place in that House, where alone it could satisfactorily proceed. After an attentive perusal of every part of the case, it did not seem to him that the evidence was calculated to excuse, but, on the contrary, that it went wholly to condemn the ministers, by whom the Expedition had been undertaken. The invasion of Holland in the year 1799, should have shewn them what chance they had of success in adventuring on similar enterprizes in future. Even after the Expedition was ready, ministers should have looked to the state of the country they were about to attack, before they sacrificed the army. They should also have looked to what the shoulders of the people of this country would bear, before they added six-pence to the expences, which already pressed on them so severely. It was alledged, that we might have taken Antwerp by a coup-de-main. He agreed we might have got possession of the town in this manner, but he contended, that ministers could never have expected, if at all informed on the subject, to possess themselves of the citadel, or of the shipping, without a regular siege. On whom then, he asked, did the blame lie? On ministers. Nothing could have been expected, but what had happened; disgrace. But this was not all. Ministers were responsible for the lives of the soldiers who had been left there to perish by the contagion of the climate. Not only were ministers without information as to the nature of the diseases incidental to that inhospitable climate, but it appeared from the evidence on the table, that they had not even taken the trouble to apply for information on this important head; it appearing in evidence, that the surgeon-general was not consulted till after the Expedition sailed.

observed, that, in addressing the House after the long and able discussion which had been had on the policy and conduct of the expedition now under consideration, he should think he trespassed unpardonably on the time of the House, had he the vanity to think he could throw any new light on the subject. In a question of so much importance, implying or not implying crime against the Ministers, he assured the House he rose with great diffidence. He was not in the House on the first night of the present discussion, to observe how fondly the noble lord (Castlereagh) clung round the instance of the expedition to Rochefort, as being a precedent intirely analogous to the present case. The noble lord, however, would pardon him for not being able to discover either in the geographical description, or in the result, any of those striking features of similitude which seemed so forcibly to have occurred to his lordship. He begged leave to read an extract from a Narrative published on that occasion under the sanction of earl Chatham (then Mr. Pitt) Secretary for Foreign Affairs at that period.—From that Narrative it appeared, that the original design of the expedition had been suggested to the commander in chief by a capt. Clarke of the Engineers; the commander in chief approved of the plan, and recommended it to the Secretary of State for adoption. It, therefore, was undertaken after previous inquiry, at a time when our resources were flourishing, and the French were reduced almost to the last stake; its failure, too, did not seem to call for parliamentary inquiry against the ministers, but the commander, sir Jo. Mordaunt, was tried by a court martial, and dismissed the service. Here however, the case was very different. The Expedition was undertaken without investigation, for, so far as the opinions of the general officers were taken on the subject, they were against the attempt. Here a parliamentary inquiry had been judged necessary; the army here employed was almost the last remaining army of the country; the period was that in which the strictest regard for economy had become indispensably necessary, and in which the utmost care to prevent a single shilling of unnecessary expenditure was the incumbent duty of the guardians of the public purse. Such were the circumstances and such was the period when the Expedition to the Scheldt was undertaken. As a diversion in favour of Austria, it could have no effect. Previous to its sailing, the last blow had been struck against her, and she had sunk at the mercy of France. If he could point out any one part of this Expedition more desperate than another, it was the retention of Walcheren, after success was seen to be impracticable, by which step we had become the laughing stock and jest of all Europe, particularly of our enemies.

rejoiced that it was agreed on all hands that no imputation rested on the naval and military commanders of the Expedition, and that their conduct might be set out of the consideration of the subject which must be discussed solely with reference to his Majesty's government. He contended that it had been distinctly proved by the evidence of the quarter-master-general and the adjutant general, that our military means would not allow the formation of any prior expedition. With respect to the risk the knowledge of that possible risk accompanied not only the progress, but even the contemplation of the plan. Government, however, satisfied of the advantages which the Expedition was intended to produce, by the destruction of the accumulated naval means of the enemy, hazarded their own responsibility and left wholly out of view the minor consideration of the tenure of their official situations. The gentlemen opposite at one time contended, that the force at Antwerp was so great, that it was impossible successfully to attack it; and at another time that the Expedition had not created any diversion by the recal of troops from the Danube, for that the garrison of Antwerp was in an efficient state. One or other of these assertions must be true. The fact was, that the Dutch army had been recalled from Stralsund solely for the defence of Holland.—The noble lord by whom the debate had been opened had assumed too much, when he said that the opinion of every military man who had, or might have, been consulted on the subject, ought to have deterred government from the attempt. To refute this position the hon. gent. entered into an examination of the military opinions in evidence, and contended that that of general Brownrigg particularly, whose sentiments (without making an invidious comparison) were as worthy of attention as those of any officer whatever, thought favourably of it; he having declared, that even on the 25th, had it not been for the sickness of the army, he should have recommended their advance in the confidence that they would have done much to meet the hopes of the country. There was another question also which mingled itself with the consideration of the possible surrender of Antwerp to a bombardment, and that was the probability that that town might be indisposed towards the present dynasty of France. As to the melancholy consequences of the retention of Walcheren, he assured the hon. gentlemen opposite, that they did not monopolize all the feelings of sorrow for the valuable lives which had there been lost by the pestilential effects of the climate and the diseases incident to it. The question was, however, whether the importance of the object (an importance acknowledged by several successive administrations) would have justified his Majesty's ministers in the peculiar circumstances of Europe—in the balanced state of the war between France and Austria, to relinquish such a possession, whilst the retention of it could possibly operate in favour of Austria. Walcheren was evacuated in October; how much sooner would the hon. gentlemen opposite have had it evacuated? Would they hare had it evacuated when lord Chatham urged its retention, and when sir Richard Strachan wrote home, conjuring ministers not to take any hasty step on a subject of such importance, both in a naval and in a military point of view? Before it was evacuated when that measure was determined upon, it was incumbent on us to render it less available to the enemy as the means of menace and annoyance. Orders were consequently given to that effect as soon as the treaty between France and Austria was known, and as soon as those orders had been carried into execution the evacuation was effected. If all the arguments which he had used were well grounded—if there was no doubt of the policy of the Expedition,—if no Expedition could have been undertaken at an earlier period—if no other Expedition could have been undertaken with so fair a prospect of success, or indeed with such combined hopes of advantage—if the naval and military execution of the enterprise were free from blame—if no dishonour had tarnished his Majesty's arms, then he thought the House bound to concur in the amendment of the hon. gent., to which he unaffectedly declared, that he agreed with greater satisfaction than on any former occasion of a similar nature.

declared his reluctance to enter into any contrast between the military enterprizes of his Majesty's government, and those operations of military policy conducted under the administration of the great lord Chatham. He would at once proceed to the immediate discussion of the great question before them, and try it upon its merits as detailed in the evidence collected at their bar. It was idle to assert that, in viewing the policy of the late Expedition, much was obtained by the conquest of Flushing. Would the right hon. gentlemen opposite contend, that for that acquisition alone such an armament should have been sent out? If they did, he would in answer tell them, that for such an object, the sacrifice of so many lives and of so much treasure was unwarrantable. (Hear! Hear!) But it had been averred, in defence of the detention of that pestilential island, that sir Richard Strachan had conjured the government not to issue orders for its abandonment, until he should have a personal communication with them. Let us for the purpose of duly estimating the authority of that officer upon that point, take into our consideration the whole of his expressed opinions. It was true, that he did write to the admiralty in the manner specified. But what was his final impression upon that subject? Did he not tell you, at the bar, that if he had calculated the incidental expence, and the increasing sickness he would not have thought the detention advisable? That information the government must hare had in their possession when they received the letter of the gallant admiral, and therefore it was a most idle paradox to fortify, their conduct in continuing a British army in that scene of contagion, upon the unexplained desire even of such an officer.

A right hon. gent. (Mr. Rose,) had endeavoured to establish the inference, that it was wise to have attempted the conquest of the isle of Walcheren, because it had been recommended by lord Nelson to make such an attempt at a former period with 5,000 men. Now, it by no means follows, though to make an attack upon it with 5.000 men should be proper, that therefore it was wise, under the present circumstances, to retain it with an army of 20,000 men. Besides, what were the admonitions of sir Eyre Coote and general Don? Did they not tell his Majesty's government, that it was absolutely necessary to send out a new force, not alone to defend the unprofitable conquest, but to protect from the enemy your dying army in their hospitals? The noble lord (Castlereagh,) late Secretary for the war department, had argued upon the propriety of that policy, which, in the state of Europe, during the late struggle between Austria and France, recommended an armament from this country to operate as a favourable diversion for the former power. In compliance with the dictates of that policy the late armament was prepared. It was prepared before the Armistice concluded between the two armies in Germany was known in this country, but it did not sail until that event was undeniably certain. Then, was it to be contended by the minister, that the course which was right to pursue before such a state of events was known in this country, was also right to be carried into practice after it was fully ascertained that a most lamentable change had taken place in the situation of our allies—such a change as left no chance for the success of that object, to accomplish which this very Expedition was originally planned. That was, in other word, that you should follow up that very course in the event of peace, which you have just decided upon as applicable to a state of war. So much for the strength of that part of the defence, which rested upon the proposed diversion in favour of Austria. There was also another observation of that noble lord, in which he argued that the Expedition was justifiable, because the disposable force of the country happened at that period to be extensive. Now to what length did this argument extend? It extended to this, that because we chance to have unemployed a very large portion of our army and our navy, it is necessary that we should be doing something. No matter how hazardous the enterprize; no matter how unauthorized our policy; the defence of the minister is, that we had such a force, and therefore we ought to get rid of it. Ministers cannot now shrink from the whole responsibility of this great failure, inasmuch as it has been the sole offspring of the inveterate adherence to their own views. Had they been inclined to accede to the intelligence and information of the officers whom they consulted, it was impossible that they could have ever determined upon such an injudicious and fatal enterprize. Those generals had given no dubious, undecided answer; there was nothing equivocal in their inferences; but one and all exclaimed against the insanity of the proposed project. It was, however, not to be overlooked, that even those answers had the effect of rescuing the country from a more Aggravated calamity. The House must recollect that lord Chatham had stated in his evidence, that it was one of the projects of the Government to make the attack upon Antwerp by the route of Ostend. From the mischievous consequences of such an attempt, the country had the good fortune of being protected by the unanimous protest of the five general officers with whom the government advised. They mitigated the temerity of the minister, by the decided firmness of that protest, and at the same time, that they saved the whole of the army from absolute ruin, afforded the most convincing illustration of the doctrine, that upon military objects, your best dependence is upon the advice and intelligence of military men.

Contrasted With the ruinous project of commencing operations by Ostend, the combined operation in the Scheldt had only the comparative advantage of being less impracticable. Such was the opinion of all the generals almost, who were consulted or employed. Some who had their doubts before the sailing of your armament, found, when they arrived upon the spot, when they were acquainted with all the local circumstances, those doubts fully confirmed. Lord Rosslyn had stated, in answer to a question, whether the failure was the consequence of the delay, that he did not think this formidable expedition would have at any time succeeded. Sir Wm. Erskine told you, that within a week Antwerp could have been secured against a siege; whilst lord Chatham, the officer selected by the government to command that expedition, stated not only that he had his doubts, which were borne down by the admiralty, but that he did not place the fullest confidence in the intelligence which had been communicated to his colleagues. The naval officers also afforded nothing that did not tend to discourage any prudent or circumspect government from embarking in such a hazardous and desperate project. But ministers had intelligence of a secret nature from abroad, which had the effect of multiplying this objections of the general officer, and of confirming themselves in the propriety of the policy with which they were originally impressed. What has the Report of the Secret Committee communicated respecting that intelligence? It has given, first, a memoir of the state of Walcheren in the year 1803; secondly, another memoir of the state of the same island, in the year 1805, drawn up by a Dutch officer, with notes by captain Owen. The third is a return of the enemy's forces in that island, anonymous and without any date. And, lastly, a return of the enemy's forces in the vicinity of Antwerp, extracted from a printed French army list, of the year 1808, found in the possession of a French officer, who was taken prisoner in Catalonia. Besides, there were some suggestions from a secret person, that for the defence of Antwerp in case of attack, no reinforcements could be spared from Holland; and on the side of France supplies could not be forwarded before the expiration of a week. Here, then, was the great inducement which engaged ministers to dispatch their formidable armament to the Scheldt. For the attainment of their object, they had the chance, that if they did their business in a week, the French would not be on them; but if not within that time, they must be ruined. Aye; but such stimulating inducements received a considerable increase of influence from an occurrence of mighty promise, which had a short time before taken place at Rotterdam. Before he should relate that occurrence, it was necessary to state, that it was furnished by his Majesty's government, to prove that they had justifiable reasons for expecting that there existed at that period, in Holland, a strong inclination to actual resistance against the tyranny of France. What then was this event so replete with public hope? It was the rescue by a mob, of some boys brought up in a poor-house in Rotterdam, from a party of French soldiers, who were hurrying these boys to the army. Was it possible that any government could think of sending out an expedition of forty thousand men upon the futility of such intelligence as that? There was also some comments in the Report of the Secret Committee upon the information received from a person described to be a young man, of the state of Antwerp, in the year 1803. There was one proof of the accuracy of that source of information; for the same individual, though he acknowledged to have passed through Breda, upon an inquiry whether any works had been newly erected there, stated, that if there had they had escaped his observation. Was it, he would appeal to the House, consistent with the duty which statesmen owe that country whose interests they are bound to protect, to hazard its honour and its security by equipping a powerful armament, and destining it to a most unfortunate point, upon such intelligence as has been described?

It might be perfectly true, that, on the 17th of July, Antwerp might not have had a very considerable garrison; but that on the 7th of the succeeding August, such a force might have been collected from nineteen garrison towns in its vicinity, as would have insured the complete defeat of your army. This was an inference not founded, as the noble lord would have it, upon the nature of the project, but resting upon the nature of the evidence elicited at the bar. For what confidence could that House now place in the communications upon which ministers acted, when every stage of the Expedition confirmed their falsehood. Cadsand, they were told, was without troops, and Lillo not in a state of defence. Lord Huntley found in Cadsand 2,000 men to oppose his debarkation, and heard that the whole force of the enemy amounted to 7,000. What said sir Richard Strachan at the bar? He told you that with respect to the state of both, he found himself deceived. It was true that with respect to Antwerp, general Brownrigg had endeavoured to prove the project practicable, by shewing, that under certain assumed circumstances he could have carried it into execution. But in answer to this alledged practicability, he would ask why, if the attack upon Antwerp was thus easy and obvious, was not lord Chatham brought to trial for the failure? How was it that if 17,000 men could succeed against the fortified town of Flushing, containing a garrison of near 10,000 men, an army exceeding 20,000 men, could fail in their attempt upon Antwerp, without a garrison, with guns dismounted, and perfectly unaware, as ministers say, of the invasion of an enemy? Was it to be understood that the local difficulties were to swell into importance, when they were to justify the retreat of the army, but were to dwindle into trifles when brought forward to exonerate the minister? Upon what fair presumption then can the minister call upon that House to regulate its decision by a reliance upon evidence, which it knows to be false, and to neglect evidence which it must feel to be true? It must feet that it has been proved that in every part of the proposed arrangement, the result falsified the intelligence upon which the attempt was made. But whilst it falsified the grounds upon which the minister rested, it realized every prediction of the men who foreseeing the failure had foretold the fatal result.

The history of that Expedition, though short, was lamentably decisive. It sailed at the period, when, as predicted by sir Home Popham, the foul weather begun, and the elements were in hostility. It sailed after the armistice had been concluded between Austria and France; at a time when the fortune of war had decided the fate of your ally; when, if she had had the calamity of lending an ear to your recommendation to renew hostilities, the measure of her miseries would have been filled up, and the hopes of her recovery blasted for ever. Why should this country have put to hazard even the accidental revival of her unfortunate ally?—With what consistency can the right hon. gentlemen defend this diversion, which they say afforded to Austria the chance of recovery from its misfortunes, at the same time, and in the same breath, that they argue against the propriety of having sent a force into the north of Germany, with a view of assisting the numerous insurgents then in arms? Why, say they, should we here encourage those to an ineffectual resistance to the power of France, only to subject them to more aggravated oppression? Why then endeavour to allure Austria after her fall to the renewal of a struggle which would have for ever sealed her subjugation? Behold then, the prospects under which this most calamitous armament left your ports. The season changed; the elements adverse; your ally, for whom the diversion was to be made, discomfited and ruined; and suing for terms of peace with the conqueror in her capital, whilst pestilence and plague were awaiting the arrival of your armada, to commence with ravenous appetite their contagious warfare against your gallant defenders. But the authors of these calamities contend, that this House should not try, by mechanic rules, the unmeasurable spirit of the British heart. They appeal to the feats of our ancestors, and to the glories of our history, to palliate the effects of ministerial temerity and ignorance. Do they forget, that when that spirit was excited—when those glories were displayed, they were directed against the ancient enemy of their name? It was in the hard-fought battles with battalions of France or Spain, that Britain obtained her proud pre-eminence, not in the inglorious struggle with pestilence and plague. Shall then a ministry, responsible for such calamities, find excuse in an appeal to the history of our courage? Is this excuse to be allowed to men who continued, amidst disease and putrefaction, an army of twenty thousand men, at the very same period that they had advices, that in another quarter of the world, in Spain, the ranks of our heroes were hourly thinning by the progress also of an epidemic malady?—In my conception of public delinquency (said Mr. Grattan), there can be no conduct more reprehensible than that of his Majesty's ministers, except indeed the conduct of this House, if it should be so forgetful of its duties, as not to condemn them. (Hear, hear!) This House has lately censured lord Chatham, for an attempt to set aside the responsibility of ministers; let it then take care, that its conduct upon this occasion does not tend to establish ministerial impunity. Decided as I feel upon their misconduct, I give my most sincere support to the Resolutions originally proposed by my noble friend.

then rose and said: The right hon. gent. who has just sat down, has concluded his speech with a declaration, that the calamities brought upon the country by the failure of the Expedition to the Scheldt, ought to be visited with exemplary severity upon the heads of those, by whom that Expedition was planned and advised. Now, Sir, as one of the advisers of the Expedition I rise, not only to speak in justification of it; but to contend, and I trust I shall be able to contend successfully, that in advising that measure his Majesty's ministers were actuated by a just sense of their public duty; that they proceeded upon motives and principles, such, as, if I were not myself a party concerned in the transaction, I should not scruple to assert intitled them to the approbation of their country; and such as they may confidently recommend to whoever may be hereafter their successors in office. They are principles, which, in whatever hands the administration may be placed, must necessarily be adopted and acted upon, if the cause of the country is to be maintained.

For, Sir, in estimating the merits of the great public measure now under our consideration, we must not be contented to look upon it as a mere insulated question, we must regard it as a branch of that general system of policy and action which has been pursued throughout the whole course of the present war, and which has been invariably directed to the twofold object of preserving other nations from the domination of France, and insuring the integrity and independence of the British empire.

It cannot, I apprehend, require any aid of argument to prove to this House the deep and vital interest that we have in the latter object; neither do I think it difficult to shew, that in the former though our interest may be less direct and immediate, we have nevertheless an interest sufficiently strong to keep that object constantly in our view, and as strong an obligation to employ all the means in our power for its accomplishment. While Great Britain stands so preeminently high amongst the nations of Europe, she owes it as a duty to her own dignity and character to assist and protect weaker nations against oppression, not only so far as that can be done consistently with her own interests, but, I would rather say, so far as is not absolutely incompatible with her own security. True it Undoubtedly is that of those nations, winch in different periods of the war, manifested a spirit of resistance against the encroachments or oppression of France, and to whose support this country has contributed generously and promptly every aid and effort in her power; true it undoubtedly is, and not more true than it is deeply to be, lamented, that the course and consequences of the war have been such as to place many of those nations, in successive periods, at the mercy and under the controul of the enemy.—We have been in the situation of fighting not against the power of France alone, but against those countries, to which we have heretofore furnished our assistance, but which ranged by conquest on the side of France, have, whilst their hearts must be for us, been compelled by a dire necessity to raise their hands against us, It does not therefore follow that the principle of continental co-operation is unwise; or that our generosity has been detrimental to our interest. The destruction of the efforts of the enemy, the suspension of immediate danger to ourselves, and the chances afforded by the protraction of that period, at the expiration of which we may probably have to contend for our own safety on our own soil,—These are sufficient advantages to be derived from our efforts in behalf of other nations, even if we were to put out of account the higher considerations of national reputation and national faith. But considering at the same time that the period of this separate combat may arrive—that the successive wars of the continent may probably enough, (if the power of France continues unbroken)—be extinguished and swallowed up in one great war of the continent against this country—that this consummation (though it may be deferred, and though to defer it be worth every practicable exertion) yet cannot perhaps ultimately be avoided; I do admit that in all measures of co-operation with the powers of the continent we ought not to lose sight of our own separate security.

The prospective apprehension of these distant and contingent dangers to ourselves ought not to induce us to withhold or to relax our efforts for others: their speedier downfall would but hasten the crisis to our struggle. It ought not to make us distrust the sincerity of their efforts in their own cause: They may be, it is true, hereafter (as many of them already have been) found to act against us; but their hostility to us must be preceded by their own ruin; and we may well believe it their desire to avoid an extremity which cannot be hurtful to us, till it has first been fatal to themselves. But we may naturally and justifiably endeavour, nay, we are bound on every principle of sound policy to endeavour, to comqine in all our continental measures, with the consideration of what is immediately useful to others, that of what way be ultimately not prejudicial to ourselves. It is good to be generous to others. But to ourselves also we owe a duty of self preservation, and that measure is the most prudent, the most suitable, and the most advantageous, which, while it advances the common cause, in the first, instance, does so in a manner consistent with our own permanent security, which gives strength to the combined efforts of our allies, and at the same time fortifies us for the separate contest which we may have to carry on hereafter, unaided and alone. Upon these grounds the king's ministers acted in advising the late Expedition: and by these principles I desire that measure may be tried. The House then will see that I must disclaim altogether one mode of argument by which the Expedition has been condemned, that of estimating it solely by its utility as a diversion in favour of Austria. That it had that effect, that it was calculated to have that effect; and that that was of itself a most important object is true. It is true that when Austria had taken up arms against France and was likely to furnish employment for the great mass of the French army, this country was bound to afford every possible assistance to that power, not only from the recollection of past alliance, but from a strong sense of common interest. But the question still remained in what manner that assistance could be afforded most conveniently for us as well as most advantageously for Austria: how the application of any British force might be rendered at once most beneficial to the cause of Austria, and conducive, or at least not detrimental, to the permanent security of this country. The Expedition to the Scheldt therefore, as it is not to be considered on the one hand, as having been undertaken for an object purely selfish on our part, so is it not to be judged in its result by considerations exclusively connected with the cause and the interests of Austria. It must be viewed with reference to both these objects; and when so viewed, I am persuaded, that it will appear to every reflecting mind, to have been not only wisely planned; but the very best measure that, all things considered, could at the time have been undertaken.

It Appears by the papers upon the table, that the project of an Expedition to the Scheldt did not originate in the Austrian war. Undoubtedly it did not. An attack upon Walcheren was not a novel project with the government of this country. It had been frequently for many rears past in the contemplation of the British cabinet. It neither grew out of he Austrian war therefore, nor did it originate with the particular administration by which it was undertaken. The measure had been meditated and discussed by several successive administrations, when the temptations were much less, and the difficulties much greater than at the period now in question. The importance of the object had grown with the growing naval strength of the enemy in that quarter; and never had any occasion at once so favourable and so urgent presented itself for such an enterprize, as that, which occurred at the time when the late armament was fitted out. Nothing can be farther from my thoughts, than any intention to apply the circumstance, which I am now to mention, in the way of recrimination, against the hon. gentlemen on the opposite side of the House: but I am almost sure that it must be in their recollection as it is in mine, that the noble lord, whom I had the honour to succeed in the office which I lately held in his majesty's government, and to whose talents and sagacity I am disposed to pay every imaginable respect, did, in a debate which took place very soon after the change of the administration, of which he formed so distinguished a part, (a debate which, from one of those circumstances that sometimes prevent our discussions from being known without our walls, was never made public) did strongly recommend to the government, then newly come into office, a vigilant attention to the growing naval means of the enemy in the Scheldt, that he described the accumulated facilities of annoyance afforded to Buonaparté by the possession of the mouths and the course of that river, and particularly pointed out the arsenal at Antwerp, as the most desirable and advantageous object of attack on any favourable occasion. In giving this advice, in leaving this legacy, in bequeathing this testamentary sanction for such an operation to his successors, that noble lord discharged a solemn duty, and gave a proof of his patriotism as well as of his wisdom. Even in the then state of the enemy's naval resources in the Scheldt, he considered it as an object of wakeful and anxious jealousy and alarm to the government of this country. I have therefore that noble lord's authority; I do not say for the precise detail and plan of this Expedition; but for the principle and object of it,—for seizing the earliest opportunity to effect the destruction, if possible, of the enemy's naval force and arsenals in the Scheldt. I have the authority of that noble lord, who had successively filled the two departments of the state that best qualified him to judge of this question, the admiralty, and the office in which I had the honour to succeed him; first, for the importance of the object; and, in the second place, for the practicability of the undertaking, or, at least, the justifiableness of the risk. And, if such were the noble lord's opinions at the period to which I refer, I will ask any hon. gent. what was then the state of Antwerp; what was its real importance, at the time when that noble lord bequeathed this warning to his successors, compared with its condition and importance at the period, when the Expedition was actually undertaken? It must be quite unnecessary to recal to the recollection of the House the active and unceasing attention, which Buonaparté had, during the whole of the intervening time; paid to his navy, and the boasts which he uniformly held out to Europe of his growing naval power. To check the growth of that power was surely an object well worth every effort; and worth, that which must attend every effort upon a large scale—the hazard of failure. It was an object, the success of which, if viewed in its effect, upon the general scale of the war, would have been important in the highest degree as lowering the pride and naval power of the enemy: viewed in its relation to the maritime war between this country and France, it was equally recommended by every consideration of national pride, of safety, and of economy The destruction of the arsenals in the Scheldt might have spared us the necessity of a fleet in the Downs or of a flee at Yarmouth, and either left that amount of naval force disposable for other services; or enabled us by such retrenchment the more effectually to aid our allies, or the better to support the burden of a protracted warfare. Independently therefore of any consideration of the Austrian war, an Expedition to the Scheldt was perhaps the effort best calculated to, promote the essential interests of Great Britain.

I have thus briefly stated the genera grounds upon winch the Expedition was first resolved upon, and by which of themselves that, resolution, would in my opinion, be altogether justified. Then came the Austrian war, and then came urgent applications from Austria for assistance.—Applications which indeed were scarcely necessary; because we were called upon by every principle of the most obvious policy, and every consideration of the strongest self-interest, to afford to her in her arduous and critical struggle all the succour and support in our power. With this disposition, the question which first arose was, how the assistance which we were both bound and willing to afford, could be rendered most effectual in support of the cause of Austria. And I can confidently aver, that if, in the state in which our determination then was in respect to the Scheldt, any other destination could have been pointed out for an Expedition, more obviously serviceable to Austria, and affording an equal or a reasonable prospect of success; the superior interest which this country had in the success of an attack upon the Scheldt, would not alone have determined us against a change of destination. If other considerations were equally balanced, the obvious and essential interests of this country might fairly be allowed to turn the scale. But not only was there no other destination pointed out in which Austria might be more effectually aided, and which it was necessary to sacrifice to our pre-conceived partiality for the Scheldt: but I will venture to say, that after a fall and fair consideration of every suggestion which was offered to us, there was no one point to which an Expedition could have gone, which, exclusively of the separate interests of this country, could from its general importance, policy, and practicability, be placed in competition with the capture or destruction of Antwerp. There are obviously two modes of aiding the efforts of an ally; the one to support him by direct co-operation with his armies in the field; the other, by a formidable diversion to distract the attention of the enemy and to relieve our ally from some part of the pressure of the vast military force concentrated against him. I should certainly not have thought it necessary to establish by argument the impracticability of a direct military co-operation with Austria in the situation to which the continent was at that period reduced, if I had not heard some of the hon. gentleman opposite contend that we should have sent our Expedition to the bottom of the Adriatic, to Trieste, in order to act in conjunction with the Austrians; I know net exactly where, but I suppose by penetrating through the Tyrol to Suabia; an idea so utterly extravagant and absurd, that the mention of it has filled me with amazement Have the hon. gentlemen, who expressed their approbation of such a plan, reflected upon the difficulties and dangers of sending a fleet of transports, crowded with troops, upon such a voyage, through the streights of Gibraltar, along the Mediterranean, and up the Adriatic; to a destination, at which it might arrive three or four months after it sailed, and two or three months after the junction for which it was sent out, was no longer either useful or attainable? Have they considered the enormous preparations, the immense tonnage, and the inordinate expenditure which it would have required to place an army in a situation to take the field after such a voyage, at such a distance, and in countries so little prepared to receive us? With respect to the other mode of direct co-operation, the landing with a British force in lower Italy, it is only necessary to state, that that experiment was tried to a certain extent. And was only desisted from, when it was incontestibly found, that the further prosecution of it was useless in consequence of the retreat of the archduke John: with whose operations alone those of sir John Stuart could have been combined, and how would this same retreat have operated upon the notable expedition to Trieste, if unfortunately it had been adopted? Why, the consequence it appears would have been, that our armament, on its arrival at Trieste, would have found the French in possession of that place, and no Austrian army or military force within 300 miles of it. And then what mercy should we have found at the hands of our present accusers, if we had pleaded that when the Expedition sailed forsooth, we had every reason to think that it would be in time?

I must, however, beg leave in this place to state, in justice to the Austrian government, that the idea of requiring us to send out a British force to Trieste, never entered into their contemplation. Austria unquestionably did, as was naturally to be expected, point out several modes, by which the force of this country could be employed; but never hinted at, still less recommended, the impracticable scheme of an Expedition to Trieste.

The points, to which Austria did propose to the British government to direct its attention, were distinctly and specifically these—1st, That attempt should be made by a British force upon Italy,—2dly, That our operations in the peninsula should be continued,—and3dly, That we should endeavour to operate a diversion in her favour by landing an army in the North of Germany. These were the propositions actually made and strongly urged by the Austrian government. With respect to the first, an attack on the side of Italy, I have already stated that such an attempt was made, and that it was only desisted from when a perseverance in it on our part could no longer be productive of any benefit to the cause of Austria. As to the second proposition, the continuance of our efforts in the peninsula, I need scarcely observe, that the British government has fully complied with the desire of Austria in this respect, because every gentleman who hears me must be aware, that our operations in the peninsula, so far from having been slackened or suspended, were pursued with unremitting earnestness and exertion.

It remains only to consider the 3d and last point recommended by Austria for the employment of a British force, namely the North of Germany. Gentlemen have dwelt with much emphasis, upon the great advantages which would have been derived in aid of such an Expedition from the insurrections then known to exist in that quarter, and from the spirit of disaffection so prevalent throughout the whole of the population of Germany, which the first success of the British arms would have called forth into active and universal hostility against the common enemy. But, I have always been of opinion, and have had occasion, more than once, to declare that opinion in this House, that to excite such insurrections, without having the means of affording effectual permanent protection to the insurgents, is an act of the greatest cruelty as well as impolicy.

Undoubtedly such insurrections, however temporary, might possibly have operated for the moment as a partial relief to Austria, by drawing off a portion of Buonaparté's troops, or detaining the reinforcements destined for his army on the Danube. But that advantage would also belong to the Expedition to the Scheldt. So therefore the two rival destinations might be considered as equal. They were then to be compared as to their respective probabilities of success. Supposing these probabilities equal also; then and then only would be to be considered the balance of advantage to this country in favour of the Scheldt. But supposing the failure in Germany the more likely, how would the evil of that failure be aggravated by the miseries which it would bring, upon the unfortunate people who had been induced to join us! Gentlemen declaim against the Expedition to the Scheldt, merely because the objects of that Expedition, the capture of ships and the destruction of naval arsenals, fix upon it the suspicion of a selfish motive. They appear to me to carry a principle, good in itself, much too far. Whenever any partial or temporary interest of our own clashes with a permanent and vital interest of an ally, our temporary interest ought certainly to give way; but to put our own interests of any description altogether wit of view, merely for the purpose of avoiding a possible imputation of selfishness from a perverse, construction of our motives, would be absurd and romantic in the extreme. At all events let those who feel such an extreme delicacy in this point consent to carry that delicacy a little further, and apply it where it is at least equally applicable, to the case of those districts of Germany which the approach of a British army would have roused to insurrection, and which its retreat would leave to the vengeance of their oppressors, and let them consider whether a temporary success to our own arms, or a partial relief to Austria, would have been legitimately purchased by such a sacrifice of those whom we pretended to deliver, but should, in truth, by such a course betray.

If indeed we could have hoped to effect their permanent deliverance, the case would have been widely different. In that case the North of Germany would unquestionably have been the chosen scene of our exertions. But what was the chance of such success?

No long period has elapsed, since a British army was actually sent to the North of Germany to co-operate against France, and it has been attempted to be argued, that those, who were parties to, or who approved the sending out that former Expedition (which arrived in Germany just in-time to learn the issue of the fatal battle of Austerlitz), could have no possible justification, for not having sent the late Expedition to the same destination. But here I must beg of gentlemen, to consider the difference in the situation of affairs at these different periods: and to compare the state of Europe at the time, when the former armament was sent to the north of Germany, with the situation to which it had been reduced at the period, when the Expedition to the Scheldt was undertaken. On the former occasion a formidable Russian army was combatting, in support of the Austrian monarchy; and, with the emperor at its head, was already participating in the main operations of the campaign:—another Russian force of 15,000 men was advancing in the north; and with a corps of 15,000 Swedes was ready to take the field in conjunction with our Expedition. Denmark was neutral; the power of Prussia was whole and unbroken; and though, her neutrality was cold, perhaps it was not a mere profession; the strength and character of her armies made her policy respected, and preserved her territory from French violation. Compare with this description, which every hon. member must admit to be just, the situation of the north of Germany last year, when we were invited by the Austrian government to make a diversion there in its favour: Russia, instead of being leagued against France, was now her most obsequious and devoted ally; Denmark our enemy; the military power of Prussia no longer formidable even by reputation, but broken down in one disastrous battle, the sequel of a disastrous policy. And the whole face of Germany, once covered with independent and respectable states, now strewed with the fragments of her antient institutions; and, presenting nothing in their room, but enfeebled or usurped governments, all leagued with, or subservient to France, Such was the state of things, in which we were invited to send an army to the north, of Germany. Let us consider a little the detail of such an operation. Could we have sent our army upon any other condition, or with any other view, than that it should return to England in the winter? No one of those who have most, strenuously contended for the policy of a diversion in the north of Germany, has ventured to go the length of stating that it would have been politic to risk the fate of a British army during the winter in that part of the continent. The times are indeed long passed, when foreign armies, moving in great masses, could maintain themselves like a separate state, a nation among nations, in the heart of Germany, for many successive seasons: the circumstances of Europe are completely changed since any such comprehensive plan of continuous operations could have been practicable; and, at all events, the force we could spare for such an undertaking must have been so small as to be wholly inadequate to the accomplishment of it. With whatever good fortune, therefore, it might have commenced its career, it must have been finally withdrawn, before the winter. And I shudder at the calamities, that would have been brought upon the unfortunate inhabitants, who, having been induced to take up arms upon the faith of British protection, must have been left exposed to all the vindictive outrages of exasperated tyranny, whenever the progress of the seasons, independent of military disasters, should render it indispensable for the British army to retire.

But this is not all. It is not alone a humane consideration for the sufferings, that might have been entailed upon the wretched inhabitants, nor even a regard for the ultimate security of the British army, that rendered an Expedition to the north of Germany, in my opinion, inexpedient and impolitic. There were other considerations, which could not be safely overlooked at a time when such an Expedition was in agitation. Broken down and humbled as Prussia was, she still had an army, which, though unable to make head against France, might yet have been very formidable against the limited force, which we could have sent out to Germany. With that army the British army, in the course of its operations, must have came in contact; and, if that were likely, (nay rather if it was impossible to avoid it,) I will ask, whether, under all the circumstances of Europe, it would have been prudent in us to have involved ourselves in active hostilities with Prussia, or, on the other hand, if any thing like an understanding should appear to have existed between Prussia and us, would it not have furnished Buonaparté with a plausible pretext for wrestling from the monarch of that country the bauble of a sceptre, and tearing from his head the mockery of a crown, which he is still allowed to wear? If then these would hare been the consequences that would have resulted from an Expedition to the north of Germany, need more be said to shew, that it was the bounden duty of his Majesty's government to pause before they should undertake it; nay, that they are fully justified in having declined the undertaking after the most grave and mature deliberation?

All this would be true, even on the supposition that the insurrections in Germany had risen to such a height without our interference, as to hold out some temptation to an enterprize of this kind. Without such a temptation, to be sure, the hostile invasion of Germany would have been madness. But after all, what wag actually at the time the state of these insurrections? What progress had they made, or what assistance were they likely to afford to our efforts, if an expedition from Great Britain had been sent thither? A bold and adventurous soldier (Schill) impelled by loyalty and national zeal, though unauthorised by his sovereign, took up arms against the common enemy, and having assembled a few followers commenced an intrepid but short lived career of active hostility and daring enterprize—The Prince of Hesse, seeking the recovery of the dominions of which he had been tyrannically deprived by Buonaparté, was employed in raising a corps of partisans—and the gallant Duke of Brunswick, anxious to revenge the wrongs sustained by his illustrious house, had placed himself at the head of a small but chosen body of troops, and was enabled, partly by the bravery of his followers, and partly by the good will of the people, to traverse the whole of the north of Germany unmolested, defeating several corps of the enemy, his superiors in number, on the way.—This was the sum of the insurrections in the north of Germany. The little obstruction given to the different bodies of troops in arms, was undoubtedly a proof of the disposition of the mass of the inhabitants; but that disposition though friendly was inactive and quiescent. Splendid as they were as instances of individual heroism, these partial and detached exertions surely did not amount to such an expression of national will, nor hold out such assurance of general concert, as would alone have justified a landing in the north of Germany, in reliance upon the co-operation of the people. It was surely incumbent upon us before we embarked in such a momentous enterprize, to compare our means with the end; to weigh against the possible advantage the certain sacrifice; and to keep ever uppermost in our contemplation the dreadful sufferings, that its failure or even its partial success would draw down upon the population of Germany. The feelings of humanity no less than considerations of prudence were against the measure, nor could Austria justly expect, nor could we consistently afford her, that temporary relief, which it is admitted she might have gained, at the expence of so much certain and permanent injury to others.

The course which his Majesty's government, on the contrary, did actually take, was calculated to promote alike the interests of our ally and our own, to a degree in all probability much greater, and in a manner free from the objection of injustice.

Sir;—I understand that in a French newspaper, published immediately under the eye of the government at Paris, in an account of some former debate in this House, expressions have been imputed to me importing that, when the Expedition sailed for the Scheldt, I looked for and expected an active co-operation from the people of Flanders and Holland. The words of so insignificant an individual as myself could hardly be worth the trouble of misrepresentation—nor should I think myself warranted to take up the time of the House in setting such misrepresentation right—were it not that, from the official situation which I had the honour to fill, when this enterprize was undertaken, I might be supposed to speak from some ascertained knowledge of the dispositions of the inhabitants of the countries in question: and a declaration, taken to be official, might be used to their wrong. I think it right, therefore, to avail myself of this opportunity to deny that I ever uttered such an expression; I will go farther, and fairly and truly state that no expectation of the kind was entertained, and that one consideration which mainly recommended the Expedition to the Scheldt to my mind, was the absence of any such view or expectation. I knew we had not a force, and I did not think it was our policy, to engage in a system of continental operations. The same objections which I felt to the North of Germany Would have weighed with me against Antwerp, if it had been proposed to me to go in search of insurrections. I agreed to the Expedition to the Scheldt as a military, not a political, enterprize; as an enterprize of destructive hostility, not of conciliatory co-operation. I had no hope of conquering through Flanders; or of keeping Flanders against France; or of liberating Holland by penetrating its frontier from the Scheldt. Bat I did think, and do think still, that a great blow was to be struck against the pride and power of Buonaparté, by the destruction of his fleet and arsenals. I wished for no longer occupation, than might be sufficient for this purpose, and this I expected to gain, not by the connivance of the inhabitants, but by force, and by taking them unprepared. Indeed, if I were to lay my finger upon that spot of subjugated Europe, which has suffered the least from French tyranny and oppression, and where therefore co-operation was least to be expected, I should point out Antwerp. Before the French revolution, Antwerp was in a state of comparative desolation; her former greatness had vanished; her prosperity was extinguished; her trade annihilated: her population was dwindled; and the grass growing in her streets, formerly the crowded haunts of industry and commerce. To this wretched state had Antwerp been reduced, not by nature but by treaty, not by any moral or physical defect, but by the arts of the diplomatist and the dash of a pen; and, from the destructive effects of a restriction so imposed, was she liberated in consequence of her annexation to France. Neither was there any thing of attachment to her former government to counteract the natural influence of her present prosperity; and it was against the sources of that prosperity, her growing maritime greatness, that this blow was aimed. From the population of Antwerp, therefore no aid or co-operation was to be expected. They alone, perhaps, of all the inhabitants of the continent would suffer by being replaced in the situation, in which they had been previous to the French revolution. On what then did we ground our hopes of success? I have stated on our own means and their want of preparation. Undoubtedly we had expected to be able to take Antwerp by surprise; and we had every reason to suppose it would be found in such a state from all the information which had been previously collected upon the subject. That the information, upon which that expectation was founded, Was correct, has since been unequivocally proved. I refer, as the most satisfactory proof on this point, to certain articles which were published in the Moniteur, at the time when the destination of the Expedition was first publicly known at Paris, purporting to be the official correspondence between Buonaparté and his minister of war; and manifestly published with a view to make the people of France believe, that Antwerp had not been incautiously neglected. This correspondence set forth, that our Expedition had been originally intended for Spain, but that, in consequence of the conclusion of the armistice between France and Austria, its destination was subsequently changed. An assertion which we know to be false, and which could have no object but to excuse the not having made timely preparations at Antwerp. This is a construction of itself sufficiently evident, but is made still more so by the order with which this correspondence was followed. An order, commanding the gens d'armes and the garde nationale to march to Antwerp, immediately, and to put that city in a perfect state of defence. Most unquestionably if that city had been previously secure against attack, it would not have been necessary to issue an order calling for the services of comparatively irregular troops for the purpose of putting it into a proper state for defence. Such a measure is a victual admission, that Antwerp was in an unprepared state; that the enemy was taken by surprize. It is an evidence derived from the enemy himself, of the wisdom of the original plan of the Expedition and of the Original probability of its success.

But it has been urged with a great apparent triumph against his Majesty's ministers, either that they had not foreseen the difficulties encountered in the progress of the Expedition, or that having been aware of those difficulties and dangers, and having yet sent out the armament under all these discouragements, they are more deeply responsible for all the consequences of it. Undoubtedly his Majesty's ministers did foresee difficulties in the course which they were pursuing, (and what great military measure can be expected to be wholly free from them) but the difficulties which they foresaw were not of a nature to preclude a rational prospect of success. If I am to judge by what I have heard in the course of this discussion, gentlemen think that, before any expedition should ever sail from our shores, his Majesty's ministers should not only have en absolute certainty of ultimate success, but should also trace out to the respective commanders every step, by which they are to proceed in the execution of the service intrusted to them. In that case no Expedition would ever be undertaken: for what mortal foresight can take, in all the possible casualties that may occur to defeat the object? or who would undertake to furnish a general with a detailed plan of all the operations which he may have to execute, without leaving him any discretion to depart under any circumstances from the strict line of his instructions; considering how much must always depend upon contingencies which cannot be foreseen, as well as upon observation made, and information collected upon the spot. A man engaged in a game of chess, may, without any question, by taking certain moves on the part of his adversary for granted, insure his own success. But then if his adversary should vary from the course which he assumes for him, all his hopes would be frustrated, and all his plans would fall to the ground. All that can, upon this point, be required of a government, is, that they should in the first place select a proper object to justify the attempt by its importance, and where there may be a probable prospect of success: that their views, respecting such object should be communicated without reserve to the generals commanding, to whom at the same time should be left a certain degree of discretion as to the means of executing the service; and that they should provide adequate means for carrying any plan that may be determined upon into execution. Much has been said as to the insufficiency of the means provided for the regular siege of Antwerp: but in this objection it is assumed that a regular siege was necessary for its reduction. The expectation of the government certainly was, that it would be taken by surprise and carried by bombardment, or by an assault. Much censure has also been bestowed upon his Majesty ministers for having undertaken the expedition at all in opposition to the declared opinions of the commander in chief and of colonel Gordon, and much stress is laid upon a particular expression of the latter officer, viz. "that it was a desperate enterprise." It appears to me that this expression does not bear out the interpretation which has been given to it. It is clearly used by colonel Gordon in a colloquial sense, but hon. gentlemen extract from it more than its strict etymological meaning; and insist, that according to colonel Gordon in the enterprise was so diffi- cult and hazardous, as, if undertaken, to preclude all hope of success, and to include every ground of failure.

Great efforts, I observe, have on the other hand been made to disparage the opinions of general Brownrigg, and with this view particularly it has been urged against him that he had not stated the authorities upon which those opinions were founded. I observe indeed, that those gentlemen who seem to set so high a value on authorities, never once thought of calling for the authorities upon which the opinions of those officers were founded whose testimony appeared in any degree to bear against the government. But so minute, so anxious are they in scrutinizing and sifting every thing that favours his Majesty's ministers, that if general Brownrigg had quoted authorities for his opinion, I am convinced they would have called for the authorities of these authorities, and so on, until at length they should arrive at some point where they could make a stand and withhold belief. An old Indian mythology affirms that this globe is supported by an elephant: a question arises, what supports the elephant? the answer is "a tortoise;" well, and upon what does the tortoise rest? to that question the mythologist affords no answer. And in like manner general Brownrigg's authorities must have had some end, and so the hon. gentlemen would find at last some ground of doubt, and some excuse for incredulity.

It has been much insisted upon as a ground of charge against the government, that the opinion of lord Chatham had not been taken upon the policy and practicability of the Expedition; but upon what ground does such a charge rest? As a cabinet minister lord Chatham was a party to the principle, and by having accepted the command in chief he rendered himself more particularly responsible for its execution. There is a story which I remember to have heard more than once from an hon. member of this House now no more (Mr. Fox), of two generals in the French service, one of whom addressing his troops at the commencement of a battle or an assault, used to say, "allez mes enfans;" the other "allons mes enfans," The latter was the more popular commander, as he shewed his confidence in the enterprise and his expectation of success, by his willingness to share in the perils and the glory of the attempt. Upon the same principle the hon. gentlemen may infer lord Chatham's approbation of the Expedition, from his consenting, by the acceptance of the command, to associate himself with its operations and its success.

In reply to all that has been said, as to the impracticability of taking Antwerp by surprise, the noble lord on the bench behind me (lord Castlereagh) has very appositely quoted the case of Copenhagen: that case unfortunately however, "was not to the taste of the hon. gentlemen opposite:" For, say they, "Copenhagen was taken too much by surprise: And besides, the inhabitants of Copenhagen were filled with such indignation against us for the unprovoked attack;" that—what? why "that they surrendered the city, without making all the resistance which the state of its defences would have allowed." This was, certainly, the oddest effect of indignation that I have ever heard of; that it should diminish energy, and facilitate surrender; instead of animating and exasperating hostility, and determining men to defend themselves to the last extremity!

But, if instances are necessary to prove the practicability of carrying such a place as Antwerp by a coup-de-main, they present themselves to recollection in abundance. We cannot forget how the strong fortresses of Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and the other fortified places in Dutch Flanders, and Brabant, fell without a struggle before Dumourier in the infancy of the French revolution. These instances, however, will perhaps be set aside by the hon. gentlemen as easily, and certainly with more plausibility than Copenhagen. Their fall was the effect of revolutionary principles, it will be said. They were half conquered before the enemy appeared under their walls. Let us go back then to former wars, when no such extraneous principles, operated upon the fate of fortified towns, and we shall find a regular fortification, Prague, surrendering upon a bombardment of seven days. We shall find Schweidnitz in Silesia, a fortress deemed impregnable, yet taken and retaken by surprize, I think three several times, between the year 1747 and 1761 and a fourth time, I believe, in 1762, but then to be sure by a regular siege. The three former captures were by coup-de main. If I were to go farther back still, I might refer to the case of Lerida in Catalonia, before which the great Conde failed in a regular siege, and yet, when afterwards invested by the, duke of Orleans, the place was carried by assault in a fortnight.

It is not my object to prove by these instances out of the numberless cases of a similar description that could be quoted, that, because places deemed secure against such a mode of attack have sometimes been reduced by a coup-de-main, therefore every impracticable attempt upon a strong fortress, may prudently be hazarded! No such thing. The inference that I draw from the cases alluded to, is simply this, that, as in the progress of wars, fortresses of the highest military description, fortresses generally deemed impregnable, have been reduced by summary means, it does not necessarily follow, that an expedition fitted out under peculiarly favourable circumstances, for the attainment of such an object, should be justly condemned as rash and absurd, because the place against which it is directed may have been, in other times, considered as not liable to be taken without regular approaches; I do not mean to say, that a positive dependance ought by preference to be placed on improbable contingencies, but that war never has been nor ever can be carried on, without incurring some danger, and leaving something to hazard? Undoubtedly means should be diligently proportioned to ends, every practicable foresight should be exercised, every attainable security taken, and as little left to chance as may be. But when, after all that human wisdom can do, to chance something must still be left; when after all physical and material means are provided, spirit and enterprize must after all turn the scale: I am not prepared to condemn an expedition because I cannot beforehand demonstrate that it will succeed. The general who surrendered without a blow, because the enemy outnumbered him, in a certain given proportion, may have acted according to all the rules of war. When lord Peterborough took Montjuich, he sinned against all the principles of military calculation. But I read with more delight of lord Peterborough's romantic achievements, than I do of the sober and regular movements of his successor, who proceeded with the most scrupulous regularity, to lose back all that his predecessor had so irregularly won. A book came out some years ago in France on the subject of a, carriage or some such vehicle, which had been contrived in this country, I believe, for a wager at Newmarket, to go a certain distance in a given time. The author of the book undertook to prove very learnedly that the project could not possibly succeed: He formed a most elaborate calculation, according to the most precise rules, which gave the greatest satisfaction to all the scientific of Paris. A was to represent the carriage; B the horses; C the driver; D the resistance of the air; E the friction of the earth; and F the utter impossibility of success. And A plus B plus C plus D plus E was equal to F, and therefore the project must fail. While the book was publishing, however, the wager was won: but the lovers of science contented themselves with affirming that, though the project did succeed, it ought not to have succeeded. Now, Sir, I am ready to admit that hon. gentlemen came forward with their mathematical reasoning under very great advantages; the Expedition, upon whatever grounds undertaken, has failed. But, whatever may be the reasoning on their part I must ever contend that this failure has arisen from causes, which it was utterly impossible for human wisdom or power to controul. It was chiefly to that state of the winds by which the Expedition was compelled to go into the Room-pot, and to the consequent impossibility of capturing Cad-sand that this failure is to be attributed. I will ask any hon. gent, whether, if Cadsand had been reduced in the first instance, and the passage up the Scheldt at once opened and free, there would not, have been good reason to expect complete ultimate success?

From the countenances of some of the hon. gentlemen opposite, I collect that there are judges in this House before whom the accused appear under great disadvantage. I feel sensibly, that I labour under considerable difficulty in arguing this case before those gentlemen by whom his Majesty's ministers have heretofore been called on not only to defend themselves for failures, but to exculpate themselves for victories, and to make atonement for success. From those gentlemen undoubtedly I am not sanguine enough to look for any very favourable decision. Such, I trust, however, is not the disposition of the whole House. The House will not make his Majesty's ministers responsible for disasters which they could not prevent; nor censure them because the weather proved unfavourable; it will not, I am persuaded, regard with a prejudicial harshness and severity the conduct of men, to whom the utmost stretch of human malice could impute no motive but that of having desired at great risk to their own situations to render a great service to the country.—They had but to be still to be safe: but it never did and never could, escape them, that in an undertaking of such magnitude and hazard the discredit and unpopularity to be incurred by failure infinitely counter balanced any credit that would be given to them by their opponents for success.

For, Sir, in all discussions upon the events of the war, I observe that some gentlemen mete out a very different measure of judgment to the actions and undertakings of their own government, and those of the enemy. They uniformly find room for panegyric in the successes of the French ruler. Nor do I recollect to have ever heard one of them censure the conduct of Buonaparté for his oversights or his failures. The injudicious and unsuccessful attack upon Acre, the defeat at Aspern, and the shutting himself up after that defeat, in the island of Inder-lobau, a measure universally condemned by military men, as an egregious error, and one which afforded to Austria an opportunity of decisive and destructive success, if happily advantage had been taken of it—these acts of rashness and misconduct have passed, so far as I have observed, without animadversion. But while they overlook the blunders of the enemy, and give him the fullest credit for his successes, they disparage every advantage and exaggerate every misfortune of this country. According to their just standard any success on the part of the British government is invariably the result of accident, but failure is evidence of ignorance and incapacity. But let us suppose the course of the campaign which we are now discussing to have been inverted, suppose the enemy to have been the assailant—suppose that instead of having to justify themselves for having captured Walcheren, his Majesty's ministers had now to defend themselves for having suffered the Isle of Wight to be occupied by the enemy; for having allowed a French army to remain for three whole months in possession of a station menacing and overawing our principal naval arsenal at Portsmouth? What would be the severity of the charges which their accusers would then have brought against them; what admiration would have been expressed of the enterprize of the enemy, and what epithet of disgrace left unapplied to the ministers who had thus been taken by surprize? And yet, extravagant as this supposition may sound, the continued occupation of Walcheren by a British army during so many months had precisely the same effect with respect to France, to which the Scheldt is not less important as a naval port and arsenal, than Portsmouth to this country.

The continued occupation of Walcheren would have been not less a blow to the maritime power, and to the pride of Buonaparté, than that of the Isle of Wight, by France, to the power and pride of Great Britain. In that view; in contemplation of its moral effect upon the minds of' the people of France as much as in respect to its solid advantages, I concurred in the destination of the Expedition of the Scheldt. I think it would have been of incalculable benefit that the people of France should see that he could not strip his coasts and country of troops, and draw the whole strength of his army into the breast of distant kingdoms, without subjecting to insult and invasion his own immediate territories, and the dearest interests of his empire.

That these and other objects have been blasted by the ultimate failure of the Expedition, I do not attempt to deny. But while the magnitude of these objects aggravates the regret which its failure naturally occasions; it offers to the discriminating justice of the House what will be deemed, I trust, a sufficient justification of the undertaking.

Having said thus much upon the general question of the policy of the Expedition, in which I feel myself involved in a common responsibility with all those who were at the time of its being undertaken members of his Majesty's government, I come now to that part of the question in which I am no otherwise concerned, than, that as having concurred in advising the Expedition, I may be, to a certain degree, responsible for all its consequences; but in which I had no personal share—I mean the period of the evacuation of Walcheren. Upon this subject the resolution of censure proposed by the noble lord, appears to me immeasurably severe. No man can, in my opinion, think conscientiously, that his Majesty's ministers, with the island of Walcheren in their hands, with so many strong reasons for retaining it if the retention were possible, could reasonably be expected to come to an immediate decision upon a point involving so many considerations of infinite importance, and embarrassment.

I have already stated, among the grounds for attempting the Expedition, the commanding position of Walcheren; the curb which it put upon the maritime strength, and I might add, upon the commercial greatness of the French empire. The customs of Antwerp are at least one third of the whole custom revenue of Buonaparté. Add to this considerations of economy: if (as was at least the opinion of some of the most competent. judges) the possession of Flushing would have enabled us to diminish the amount of the fleet destined to watch the Scheldt: add, too, the military triumph of wresting and retaining from the enemy the key of this naval arsenal upon the creation of which he had rested so much, too of his glory. Against this was to be put the afflicting sickness and mortality which prevailed among our troops: a calamity of which it is as absurd as unjust to pretend that the ministers did not feel all the weight and poignancy as much as those who affect to be the loudest in deploring it. But neither the original plan of the Expedition, nor the prolongation of the stay of the army in Walcheren, are fairly censurable on this account, in the manner and to the degree to which the noble lord proposes to inflict his censure.

If an Expedition is never to be sent to aclimate less healthy than that in which we have the happiness to live, the circle of warfare will undoubtedly be much contracted. If the authority of the very eminent physician, (sir John Pringle) which has been quoted, with so much confidence, is to be conclusive upon this question, that same authority proves a great deal too much; for, if taken in its full extent, it would follow, that no Expedition ought ever be sent to any part of Dutch Flanders. It would condemn retrospectively most of our former Expeditions to the continent, and specifically all those campaigns of which sir John Pringle himself has written the History.

Every man, who has read the papers on the table, must feel and deeply feel for the miseries unavoidably incident to war; but though these, miseries have been brought nearer to our view than in former instances, and though it may possibly suit the particular purposes of some gentlemen to dwell upon them, yet I must beg of the House not to suffer themselves to be so far biassed in their judgment by the impulse of a very honourable feeling, as to imagine that the instance of this Expedition, however striking, is singular in the history of the wars of this country—I beg them not to imagine that they are at liberty to exhaust the whole of their compassion on Walcheren alone; nor to deceive themselves as to the tenure by which our West India islands are held. No man can deplore more than I do the waste of life that results from the acquisition and retention of such possessions; but, it must be considered at the same time that no important national advantage is to be gained without some kind of sacrifice, and however we may lament the price at which it is purchased, a government would betray its trust, which should precipitately abandon a great and essential object of national acquisition, or national glory, even from such a laudable impulse.—Happy, indeed, would it be for mankind, if the slaughter of the battle was the only evil of war. But there are, it is too true, various other sufferings consequent upon a state of war, besides those that are produced by engagements in the field; sufferings which have not the animation of effort, or the consolation of glory: but let it not be supposed that they were incurred in so much greater proportion for Walcheren as to require the exaction of a vindictive retribution from ministers in this case more than in any other. Walcheren had often been an object of British desire, aye, and of British, possession too. We have won it; we have held it in former times. Its importance to this country is now increased tenfold; surely its climate is not in the same proportion become more pestilential.—It has been confidentially asserted in this debate, that a clause existed in the capitulation of the regiment of Berne when in the service of the Dutch government, stipulating that these troops should not be employed in Walcheren. This assertion I cannot take upon myself positively to contradict, but I can affirm from very good authority that this very regiment of Berne has, in point of fact, more than once within the last twenty years made a part of the garrison of Walcheren. And I have further been assured, too, that after the most diligent search no such clause is to be found in any published treaty or capitulation of the Cantons; though there is in some of the capitulations published in Dumont's collection, an article providing that the Swiss auxiliaries shall not serve in Batavia or the other Dutch colonies. This stipulation is, as we know, not unusual; the foreign troops in our own service are not bound to serve in the British colonies.

Still, however, the whole point thus at issue is merely a question of degree. I admit without hesitation that the miseries incident to an unhealthy situation may overbalance many and considerable political advantages. But the question to be considered is, what were the nature and extent of the advantages to be derived from the possession of Walcheren, and were these advantages such as to justify the retaining it, could it have been retained at any moderate sacrifice? This is the calculation into which gentlemen should enter, before they make up their minds to pass censure upon his Majesty's ministers for having kept the island so long. The result of such a calculation, I firmly and conscientiously believe, will be that such was the importance of Walcheren to this country, that very great efforts ought to have been made to retain it, and that his Majesty's ministers were perfectly justified in having hesitated as long as they did, before they finally determined to abandon so very valuable a possession; my doubt, I confess, is whether they ought to have abandoned it at all.

If, indeed, his Majesty's ministers had previously resolved to evacuate the island, I am not ready to affirm, or even to admit, that they were in that case justifiable in retaining it so long merely with a view to the destruction of the works at Flushing, or in compliance with the wishes of Austria. The destruction of the basin at Flushing, a mere temporary mischief to the enemy to be repaired by money, ought not, in my opinion, to have been purchased by any avoidable expence of British life. It was not an advantage worth such a price; and as to Austria, though I would do much, and sacrifice much for an ally in the war, yet in the actual situation of her affairs at that period, so long after the armistice, with so very little reasonable probability of the renewal of hostilities, if our army was exposed to ten days unnecessary sickness, upon the supposition of affording any effectual aid to Austria, then I must say, that there does not appear to me to have been any just proportion between the advantage expected and the sacrifice actually made.

Such, however, do not appear to have been the motives of the delay. It appears, that his Majesty's ministers received successive reports, which went so far to encourage the hope of being enabled to retain Walcheren, that I must take it for granted they were induced really to look to that object, that they did not unnecessarily expose the army to the influence of disease, for a day after they had finally resolved on abandoning the island, and under this impression I shall certainly vote against the second resolution of the noble lord; though I shall at the same time feel it necessary to move or to suggest an amendment to the counter resolutions of the hon. and gallant general (general Craufurd). The object of my amendment will be to omit the specific grounds of justification arising from the circumstances of Austria, and from the destruction of the basin at Flushing and to leave that justification on the plain and obvious ground of the necessity of collecting the materials for an opinion and the danger of deciding precipitately on so great and important a question. I am perfectly ready to concur in the conclusion that no blame attaches to the government: but I cannot concur in the hon. general's statement of the premises from which that conclusion is to be drawn.—These, Sir, are the grounds upon which I as cordially join in acquitting the ministers upon the second of the noble lord's propositions, in which I am not myself, personally implicated, as I confidently expect, from the reflecting justice and temper of the House, an acquittal fop myself, in common with my former colleagues, upon the charge contained in the noble lord's first Resolution.

Something yet remains to be said upon one topic on which much stress has been laid by our accusers—the policy of marking with extraordinary severity a failure so disastrous, as this is represented to has been of an enterprize (as it is averred,) so rashly undertaken.

Sir, of this policy—as a matter distinct from justice—I take the liberty to entertain great doubts. I doubt whether the vice of the British constitution and government be a too great proneness to undertake splendid and daring enterprizes—or its main perfection and uncommon facility for conducting the operations of war. There is enough already (as it appears to me) both of difficulty to impede and of responsibility to daunt any administration in this country, to whom the conduct of a war is intrusted: and when that war is to be carried on against such an enemy as him with whom we have to contend at present, it is not (in my humble opinion,) politic to go one step beyond what justice may prescribe to enhance that difficulty, and press the weight of that responsibility upon the government. Possibly I might think that even to stop something short of an extreme and rigorous account, might be the more politic alternative of the two. We have to contend against an enemy who, with whatever qualifications he may be endowed by nature, has full scope and play given to all his faculties and views, by the unlimited power, the irresponsible freedom with which he acts. He asks no consent, he renders no account, he wields at will the population and resources of a mighty empire, and its dependant states. His successes are magnified with enthusiasm, his failures silently passed over. And against this unity of counsel and this liberty of action, we have to contend under the disadvantages of a mixed and complicated government. Disadvantages in this respect they are, though happily and gloriously redeemed and compensated by the great and manifold blessings of a constitution unequalled by any other system of human policy in the history of the world! Secrecy of design, celerity of execution, a boldness of adventure arising from fearlessness of responsibility for ill success, are the qualities the most useful for the vigorous prosecution of military operations. They are advantages which our despotic adversary enjoys in the most eminent degree. They are those which a free government necessarily wants. I doubt whether it be politic to aggravate the inequality of such, a contest, by a severity of scrutiny, and a hardness of animadversion upon failure, which, by making responsibility too heavy to be borne, has a tendency to make all enterprize too hazardous to be attempted.—Neither again, while I admit and lament the failure of this Expedition, can I agree with those who consider the disappointment of a great object of national policy as synonymous with national disgrace, and as pregnant with national ruin.

Disgrace happily there has been none. Our arms are not only untarnished in this enterprize, but have been crowned with signal success. It is not by military defeat that we have incurred political disappointment.

And as to national ruin, or any real danger external or internal to the state from the failure of this undertaking, and from the judgment of acquittal which it is anticipated the House may pronounce upon the authors of it, I confess they appear to me to be visionary apprehensions.

That the enquiry which has taken place into this subject was proper and necessary; that it was due to the magnitude of the case and to the feelings of the country I admit, as willingly as any man.—I think it will be generally agreed that the inquiry so instituted has been conducted throughout with as much indusdustry and impartiality, as temper and moderation.

I hope it will be felt that those who were implicated in it have not shrunk from the investigation; but have courted it with all becoming deference, and now await the result with all humility, but with all confidence in its justice.

When that result shall be pronounced, I trust that it will meet the dispassionate acquiescence and approbation of the country. Nor do I fear any shock from the failure of the Expedition to the Scheldt (disastrous and afflicting as it has been) or from the conduct of this House upon it, either to the substantial and magnificent fabric of the British constitution, or to the sound and solid foundation of British greatness and prosperity. And so, Sir, upon every ground of feeling, reason, and principle I expect from the justice of the House a vote in opposition to the Resolutions of the noble lord.

said, that much as he had been surprised at many things which had been uttered in his elaborate speech by the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, he was still more surprised at one omission, which that right hon. gent. had made:—the omission of any attempt at his own vindication in the very peculiar circumstances in which he was placed. To supply that omision, he had a right to call upon that right hon. gent. on the part of that House and of the country. He looked upon him as a man beyond comparison more responsible than the noble lord (Castlereagh) for the failure of the Expedition; he considered him too, not less deeply responsible for having done that which, in the history of the country, no other man could be found to have done That right hon. gent., knowing what the interests of the country required; knowing besides all those measures which were in contemplation and actually going on, and having information of the Expedition which was in preparation, did nevertheless on the 16th day of April last, go and declare to the duke of Portland, then at the head of the government, that the minister who was to have the conduct of that Expedition was not competent to his situation; that the man on whom the duty devolved of conducting one of the most important operations ever attempted by this country, however he might esteem him in private, however he might value him for his good qualities and virtues, was not competent to the arduous and growing difficulties of his public situation; that the man with whom he was in habits of friendship and confidential intercourse was so unfit for his office as to be incapable of conducting the Expedition. Not satisfied with this proceeding the right hon. gent. went to his Majesty to make the same communication, for fear of any mistake. Yet to the noble lord himself he never communicated his opinion, that he thought him incapable of performing the duties of his situation, but suffered him to originate and conduct to a close that Expedition, which had terminated so eamitously and disgracefully for the country.

Though the right hon. gent. was thus diffident of the noble lord, it did not appear that the noble lord himself was troubled with any distrust of his own talents. It Would be recollected that the noble lord on a former occasion, in a speech, which was said to have produced much impression and effect, but which had certainly produced no impresssion on his mind, used an expression as applied to the government, which he should have occasion to notice by and by. In that instance the noble lord had the confidence to state, that the administration was founded on a rock. Little did the noble lord on that occasion suspect that the rock was mined. Little did he think that he was in momentary danger of being blown aloft in the springing of the mine. But as it often happens to him who kindles the train, the right hon. gent. who laid it was also blown up with him. It was the wish of the right hon. gent. to place the noble lord in another situation, a change which the generous feelings of that noble lord, and he was ready to give him every credit for these generous feelings, could not be brought to brook or submit to. It was not his intention to impute improper motives to the right hon. gent., but he was sure that he was bound, both as a public man and as a minister and a statesman, to preserve his character free from such imputations. If it appeared from history, that ministers frequently engaged in wars with a view to preserve their situations; if they were told of Louvois, that having incurred the anger of Louis XIV. he induced his master to embark in a war which was to bring destruction upon thousands of the human race, in order to divest his attention from his own disgrace. These instances should be a warning to the right hon. gent., and make him careful how he should suffer himself to be influenced by similar motives.

It was neither his intention nor his wish to enter into the consideration of the personal feelings and peculiar circumstances of the transaction between the right hon. gent, and the noble lord; but the right hon. gent. had himself twice appealed to the public upon the subject, and once again by his friends. As one of the public, he, leaving both the noble lord and the right hon. gent. at the thresholds of their offices, and passing over every thing private or personal in the case, had a right upon public grounds to demand from the right hon. gent. some satisfactory explanation of his most extraordinary conduct. With regard to the whole of this proceeding, he professed himself to be the sincere partizan of the noble lord, not the abettor of the right hon. gent. So far as regarded the public, he would ask the right hon. gent. how he could answer the question which he then called upon him to answer, and which had been put to him before a month since, without obtaining any reply?—He would ask the right hon. gent. how he could answer to his sovereign, how to that House, how to the country? The right hon. gent. had had on that occasion oral communications with his sovereign, which he had concealed from his colleagues. After he had confessed that by his vote he had condemned the secret transmission of written communications to his Majesty, how was the right hon. gent. to defend his own conduct in that instance? He was aware that the right hon. gent. had on the former night attempted to put a distinction between oral and written communications, which to him was not intelligible. It would remain, therefore, for that right hon. gent. to shew in what that distinction consisted, if the question could possibly be reduced to a shape in which the House could touch it? Had not the right hon. gent. pronounced a noble person guilty for making an official communication to his Majesty with a request of secrecy, and in what did the case of the right non. gent. himself, differ from that when he ventured to make oral communications to his sovereign which he concealed from his colleagues?

The right hon. gent. however, told them with a view to disarm the accusations against him and his late colleagues, had that those gentlemen who brought forward the charges, never found fault with Buonaparté. He had told them that they had often found fault with his Majesty's ministers, and asked whether they had ever, in any instance, blamed the conduct of Buonaparté for having been foiled and defeated at Acre? But what had that House to do with Buonaparté? Their business was not with Buonaparté, his projects, or his failures, but with the right hon. gent, and the noble lord; but, above all, with the right hon. gent., for the manner in which he had conducted himself, in leaving the management of the campaign in the hands of a person whom he had denounced to his sovereign as incapable. The noble lord had undertaken and conducted the Expedition, supposing himself competent to it: the right hon. gent. on the contrary, suffered a person to undertake a measure of so much importance to the interests and honour of the nation, whom he looked upon as incompetent. The noble lord was responsible simply for the failure of the Expedition: the right hon. gent. on the contrary was responsible for having suffered it to be conducted by one whom he thought incapable, and in whose management it had ultimately failed. The right hon. gent. had entered into a long and fanciful detail of observations respecting the balance of power in Europe, a system which had altogether vanished from the political world, and that to justify the policy of a measure which might aid in regaining that balance. But there was no longer any possibility of such a combination in Europe, as in these times could be looked to with any good prospect of restoring the lost equilibrium. After ridiculing in unqualified terms the idea of an Expedition directed to the Adriatic and Trieste, and bestowing nearly equal ridicule on the notion of an expedition to the north of Germany, the right hon. gent. then took credit to himself, and the government of which he had been a member, for their humanity and forbearance in not exciting or encouraging an insurrection in any part of the continent, which they had not the means of supporting; as if any such considerations had influenced their conduct in abstaining from such a proceeding. Oh those tender lambs of Copenhagen! Oh those humane and merciful souls, who so compassionately shrunk from the cruelty of exciting to insurrection those unfortunate persons who may have been disposed to rise against their ruler, but who could not rise with effect! What an overflow of human kindness it must have been which could make them abstain from the atrocity of stirring up to fruitless efforts an unruly population, even though for an object which they themselves looked upon as important?

It could not however be denied that the moment was favourable for an attack upon Buonaparté at a time when his forces had been withdrawn from the coast and the interior, and when his fortune had been balanced, and his fate suspended on the Danube. Both the noble lord and the hon. general (Craufurd) had asserted, that the people in the north of Germany would rise; they had also stated, that Buonaparté had lost 50,000 men at the battle of Aspern. Could it then be doubted, could it admit of a doubt, that an army of 40,000 British troops landed in the north of Germany, would have turned the fortune of the campaign, if there was any ground for expecting an insurrection in the north, an expectation which he for one, had never entertained? But if there had been any reason to calculate on such an insurrection, he would ask whether a British army of 40,000 men, landed at that period, in that quarter, would not have afforded the best prospect of overturning the fortune and power of Buonaparté?

The noble lord had talked, in a strain of boasting, of his projects, and the operations which had been in contemplation. But after the evidence gentlemen had heard at the bar, they must be sensible, that notwithstanding all this empty vaunting, it was their poverty alone that kept their forces at home. To this fact they had the conclusive evidence of Mr. Huskisson—evidence to which he begged to call the most serious attention of the House, but which the right hon. gent. from the nature of his observations and the general tenor of his argument, seemed neither to have heard nor read. It was of no signification Whether the King's government had 100,000 disposable troops or not; whether an opportunity presented itself for employing them with effect on the continent or not; whatever opinion might be entertained of the practicability of particular operations, the want of money was an insuperable bar. It had indeed been said, by the right hon. gent. that the government of which he was a member, had considered the relative circumstances, advantages, and prospects of an operation in Italy, in the north of Germany or elsewhere, before the fiat had been issued for directing the Expedition to the Scheldt. But we must contend, that before the war had broken out between Buonaparté and Austria, the Expedition to the Scheldt had been decided upon. Amongst other facts produced by the right hon. gent. in justification of this Expedition he had alluded to a speech delivered by a near and dear relation of his (lord Grey) a short time after he quitted office, in which his relative recommended to the attention and consideration of the ministers who succeeded him, the importance of keeping a constant and vigilant eye upon the Scheldt and Antwerp. Whether the right, hon. gent. took up the idea before or after his noble relation had been said to have suggested it to him, he did not know; but this he could well recollect, that in a speech of that right hon. gent, a short time after he came into office, he solemnly declared, that whenever a measure of policy was recommended to him by his predecessors in office, wherever he could trace their Steps in any system of national interest or public conduct, it would be a warning to him not to follow in the same track. In calling the attention of the House, however, to what had been said on the former occasion by lord Howick (now earl Grey) upon the subject of Walcheren, he had forgot to state that the same subject had successively occupied the attention of the government of Mr. Pitt, of lord Sidmouth, of Mr. Pitt again, and of the succeeding administration, as well as of the present; and that after the most mature consideration, all idea of an attempt upon Walcheren had been wisely abandoned by each until the fatal resolution of the administration of the duke of Portland. The Expedition thus undertaken then had failed, and he therefore had justly and urgently to call upon the House of Commons to avenge the public upon those ministers who had subjected the nation to the ruinous consequences of this calamity; but, above all, upon that individual who had declared to the duke of Portland, and afterwards, for fear of mistake, had gone to declare to the King, that the minister entrusted with its conduct was wholly incompetent to his situation.

The right hon. gentleman had favoured them with an explanation of the grounds of the vote which he intended to give, and taken credit to himself even for voting against the Resolution censuring the policy of the Expedition to the Scheldt. But where was the merit in that? Was not the right hon. gentleman, in giving that vote, promoting his own defence, he having been one of the prime movers and abettors of the Expedition.

But it should never be forgotten, it should be always borne in mind by gentlemen, that on the day when the intelligence of lord Chatham having abandoned the further prosecution of the ulterior objects of the Expedition had been received—on the day when the accounts were brought of the retreat of lord Wellington's army; and that, notwithstanding the battle of Talavera, it could not maintain its position,—on the day, when we were informed of the abortive result of the foolish and unprofitable expedition against Ischia and Procida, a result which any man of sense must have anticipated,—on that day, when the cabinet was overwhelmed with an accumulation of disastrous intelligence, and grievously perplexed about the best means of extricating the country from the difficulties in which, it was involved,—on that very day the right hon. gent. called upon the Duke of Portland to fulfil his promise respecting the removal of the noble lord, offering in, case of refusal the peremptory alternative of his own resignation. At a time when the right hon. gentleman should hare been aware that the noble lord who had planned and conducted the Expedition, must be the most proper person to superintend the measures necessary to be taken respecting the retreat and security of the army, one might have supposed that the right hon. gent. would have had some more considerate regard to the situation of his colleagues, and for the emergency of the country. But no; the right hon. gentleman had no mercy for colleagues; in the pursuit of his own views of personal ambition, he cared not what embarrassment he brought upon them or upon the country.

"Hot, cold, wet, and dry,

"All contend for mastery;

"But he threw chaos in."

The right hon. gentleman ardently sought the highest official station in the administration, in which object he was disappointed; and the intrigues that followed brought the marquis Wellesley into the office which that right hon. gentleman held at the time when he wished to introduce that noble marquis into the office of the noble lord, whom he had endeavoured to supplant. When the right hon. gent. had so conducted himself, he was not surprised at the vote which he meant to give. On the contrary, he should have been much surprised if he could have been tempted to vote against his former colleagues. The right hon. gent. had triumphantly quoted some passages from the Moniteur, to shew that Antwerp was not in a state of defence at the time the Expedition sailed. He had also told them that this town was the darling object of Buonapartés attention; that it had been made by him a grand emporium of commerce, and a great naval depôt; and then winding himself up to an hyperbole, the right hon. gent. asserted, that one-third of the customs duties of France were collected in the port of Antwerp alone. If it were true, that so much support was derived to the tyranny of France from that city; was it credible then that Buonaparté would have left so important a place without adequate means of defence? Antwerp had been acknowledged by the hon. general, the noble lord, and the right hon. gent., to have been the best object for the Expedition; and yet the right hon. gent. had in nearly the same breath stated, that the Antwerpers were, perhaps, the only people in the dominions of France that had most reason to bless the accidental circumstances that made them prosper under the government of France.

It had been contended that the Expedition had, or might have effected a powerful diversion in favour of Austria; yet the evidence shewed that it could never have led to protracted operations. The evidence of Mr. Huskisson proved clearly that the Expedition could not have been sent to Germany or Italy for want of money. So that after all it was only Antwerp, and the arsenals there, and in Walcheren, that could have been the object of practicable attacks by the Expedition. What diversion then could arise from such operations in support of Austria? The right hon. gent, had indeed asserted, that we were not bound to give assistance to Austria; but when that power had determined to make an effort against France, it was clear that she ought to have been supported—But, no, the right hon. gent., still acting upon the principles of a narrow and selfish policy, would direct the force of England for British objects to the Scheldt, where no diversion could be effected in favour of Austria. When the bauble of the sceptre to which the right hon. gent. had with so much levity and so little feeling alluded, and the military force of Prussia, had been wielded by Frederick the Great, they were successful in every part of Europe, and it was not the fault of the Prussian soldiers, but the want of mind to command them against Buonaparté, that caused the annihilation of the Prussian army. The British troops, the brave British army, would also prove a bauble, if as badly commanded. Let the right hon. gent. then abstain from calumniating the brave soldiers, but attribute, as he ought, all the sufferings of the Prussian monarchy to the incapacity of their rulers and commanders.

The right hon. gent. had quoted some passages from a speech of his extracted from a London print into the Moniteur, as if some terrible punishment should be inflicted by the French ruler on his subjects in consequence of the observations they contained. But the hon. gent. need not be apprehensive. Buonaparté had hitherto done, and would continue to do what he pleased, without that right hon. gent. being consulted. In the irruption of the French, under Dumourier, into Holland, all the towns alluded to had opened their gates, except Williamstadt. Both the noble lord and the right hon. gent. however had said, that they had not expected so much resistance as had been encountered. He was sorry so often to couple the noble lord with the right hon. gent., but in answering an argument urged by both, however reluctantly, he was obliged to couple them. He must deny that the success of the Expedition had been frustrated by the whole having been driven for shelter into the Roompot. The whole on the contrary was mismanaged both in the parts and in the progress, both in the particular and in the general design. Why did not the marquis of Huntley disembark at Cadsand? Because there were no boats. Provision was not made by the most ordinary resources to procure success, but fail it must unavoidably; it was ill-concerted and impracticable, and from first to last there was no just ground of expectation, no possibility of any beneficial result. The noble lord, in the course of his speech, made use, in his usual manner, of several set phrases which succeeded each other, and again recurred in much the same order in every speech of that noble lord. He must have, however, made an exception of his Talavera speech, for that infinitely surpassed any thing he had ever heard from that noble lord on any other occasion. But in his ordinary speeches, they constantly heard of military means, military resources, military expedients, and the rest of them, but at last the noble lord far outdid himself and had recourse to a new expression, conditional pleasure. He (Mr. W.) had heard of a reward proposed by a certain ancient monarch, for the invention of a new pleasure, and he began to believe that the noble lord would be entitled to it. Whatever it might be, even with the noble lord's assistance, he had not yet made the discovery: though it would appear that by conditional pleasure the noble lord meant simply the King's pleasure.

In the extraordinary defence set up by the noble lord, it was somewhat surprising to find him, bottoming himself for a justification of his calamitous measure upon every illustrious name and glorious atchievement, that had in modern times advanced the interests and the character of the country. Was it to be endured that the author of the disastrous Expedition to the Scheldt, should seek for a defence by bottoming his ill advised and ill executed operations upon the precedents of sound policy and corresponding success, to be found in the wise measures of the immortal Chatham? From bottoming himself upon the example of the great Chatham, the noble lord proceeded to a height, at which he continued to think himself elevated, like the poor weak monk upon the summit of Pompey's pillar. He should not disturb the noble lord in his imaginary elevation, but leaving him to enjoy his ideal ascension, advert briefly to the other grounds upon which he had endeavoured to bottom his defence, and in so doing should find it easy to drive him from every hold, and shew him to be completely bottomless.

When the noble lord bottomed himself on the Expedition to Rochfort, he told them that there was not a murmur of dissatisfaction in the nation on that occasion. To be sure, the noble lord was on his defence, and he must be allowed to take every reasonable license: bnt in this point he had asserted more than he was borne out in by the fact. He thought, at the time the noble lord made the assertion, he could have contradicted him; but, on consulting the history, he was astonished to find so directly the reverse to have been the case. He read that the expectations of the nation were wound up to their highest pitch, and that their disappointment at the failure was equal to their sanguine hopes of signal success. The enemies of Mr. Pitt called it Mr. Pitt's vision. General Mordaunt was tried by a court-martial, and his acquittal created great dissatisfaction throughout the country.

The noble lord had, however, tried to bottom himself on lord Chatham, the great lord Chatham! Why, if the talent of the whole administration were united, and compared with its collected aggregate, the single intellect of that one man, would look as "Ossa to a wart." Lord Chatham dislodged a wretched and intriguing cabal; he was dismissed from office; he rose superior to his difficulties, gained strength from the fall of the mean administration which superseded him, and raised England to the pinnacle of glory on which she stood proudly at the commencement of the present reign. On such a man's acts, he was confident the noble lord could establish no precedent for his conduct. Failing here then the noble lord next bottomed himself upon General Wolfe! General Wolfe went to Quebec, most probably ignorant of his ultimate destination; but he succeeded in his designs, and general Wolfe stands both for us, and for future times, a model of vigorous enterprize and sound discretion. The next person to whom the noble lord had recourse was lord Nelson! Lord Nelson had a foresight peculiarly his own, to which he must remark the present attempted parallel was but ill suited; at Aboukir he depended on himself; he saw that his ships could sail where those of the enemy swam, and accordingly made an attack on them; only one ship of as gallant a captain as any in the navy went on shore; and Nelson said he was glad of it, as it served the others as a buoy; he succeeded in his attack, and attained a glory, in the comparison of which the imbecility of the Expedition under discussion sunk into contemptible insignificancy and nothingness. At Trafalgar he improved on the expedient of Clarke; and at Copenhagen he confirmed all his former successes, and established his transcendant glory. On this immortal hero, either, it was to be seen, the noble lord could find no bottom. The next precedent chosen was the Expedition to Egypt, that Expedition first was intended for Belleisle, and had actually proceeded to Ferrol; it went, however, to Egypt, and the event covered Abercrombie and his brave coadjutors with glory. On this also there was no bottom.

Had these triumphs been introduced on the other side, to place in contrast with them the defeat and disgrace of the late attempt, he should not have been surprised, but he could not suppress the astonishment he felt when they were employed by the noble lord, in the way of eulogy upon the motives by which that project was dictated. He did not know, indeed, where the present ministry could find a parallel. He would remind the House, however, of the expressions of the great Frederic, relative to the men who had preceded lord Chatham. The House might apply them. "They were" said he, "a batch of wretched little lawyers, presuming to compare themselves with prince Eugene, whom the great lord Chatham, ousted."

Having in vain tried to bottom themselves, then, upon great precedents, they had recourse to such authority as existed among themselves; and the right hon. gent. consequently declared that general Brownrigg gave an opinion in favour of the Expedition. The fact was, however, he did no such thing. The right hon. gent. then said, the Dutch were sluggish and would not rebel. The general was here too against him; but the right. hon. gent. used his evidence most conveniently; affirming it where it made for him, and totally disregarding it where against him. It was said, however, that the gentlemen on his side wished to discredit the evidence of this gallant officer. They certainly did not; they merely contrasted it with the evidence of others, and finding three to one against a gallant general, and the gallant general against the right ton. gent. himself, they drew the obvious inference. But an attack of this kind came badly from those who thought proper themselves to disregard col, Gordon. But it had been found out that Col. Gordon was a young man without experience. Now, really he would much sooner be a young man without experience, than an old man in the same situation. He meant no disrespectful allusions, but he certainly had no fear in putting the experience of col. Gordon against that of lord Chatham. By way of an excuse for the appointment of lord Chatham to the command of the Expedition, it had been said he had served in America. This was not the case; he never had served in America. He had served, indeed, in the disastrous campaign in Holland; and, as sir D. Dundas had said, he had no doubt he had behaved very bravely there; but still that was no reason for now giving him the command of 40,000 men. The noble lord, however, had chosen to rely on his own judgment in all his appointments; he disdained military opinions; they were, in the noble lord's language, like lawyers' opinions;—lawyers, who would first deny the validity of the title deed, and then run and purchase the estate themselves. Why, what rogues of lawyers must the noble lord have associated with! What an aspersion did he cast upon his old companions! The noble lord disdained to be influenced by military opinions. There was an anecdote related of Buonaparté on this subject, when he went to take the command of the army in Italy, which was well worth attention. He brought with him a detailed plan of the campaign, which had been digested in Paris: this plan he read to his general officers on taking the command, and after reading it, he tore it. He had a plan of his own, and so had the noble lord. The only difference was, that the one produced victory, and the other calamitous disgraces, for which an indignant country was now demanding vengeance. There was another anecdote recorded of Buonaparté, which would shew his respect for military opinions, and the description of persons from whom he chose to derive them. After, a failure in one of his campaigns, he did not choose, like the noble lord, to depend upon himself, nor did he choose to depend either upon his generals or his other captains, but he assembled his non-commissioned officers together, collected their opinions, and abided by their decision. The noble lord had, however, not only thought proper to reject military opinions in the first instance, but even now the Common vocabulary could not supply him with a phrase strong enough to express his ridicule of them; he had absolutely coined a new word to express his disregard of the evidence of sir W. Erskine: it was (said the noble lord) "grotesque" and "chivalrous." Grotesque was a term applied to testimony not very intelligible and certainly not familiar in the courts. It might be dullness of comprehension in him, but he really did not comprehend the meaning of it. "Chivalrous," however, as might be sir W. Erskine, he was content to take him as commander of his army, he would give gen. Brownrigg to the noble lord, and they would take the field thus arranged—he had no fear for the issue; and he saw by the noble lord's smile, that he was willing to fight him on his own terms. The evidence of his general he must defend from the imputations cast on it; and he had no hesitation in pronouncing it as clear, distinct, and erudite, as any he had ever heard. It was now most consistently discredited, because it was true; and all his predictions were ridiculed and denied, because every one of them had been calamitously realized.

The noble lord had very freely condemned gentlemen who differed from him on this most important question for conceiving speculative campaigns, and then insisting that they should have been acted on. He was content, however, to take the campaigns of the ministers themselves and to try them for their conduct by the test of their own absurd projects. They were two in number; the first was the campaign of the noble lord and general Brownrigg. They commenced most valiantly. On they went, fighting side by side, and bearing down every impediment. Nothing could withstand them, until at last, unfortunately, the noble lord advised the gallant general to take firebrands, proceed up the Scheldt boldly, and burn the ships—"Indeed (said the gallant general) that is impossible, I am tired," and so ended the exploits of the combined commanders, and the glorious hopes which they had originated. The other campaign was that of gen. Craufurd: and most valiantly did that hon. general cut and dash at every thing which carne before him, and a most noble issue had he conjured up; when, unhappily, the vision vanished, and the army appeared at a stand, perishing in the pesti- lential marshes of Walcheren! The campaign of the noble lord, indeed, disdained any limitations of time; he "was not bound to a day." There was a slight difference in this respect between the plan of gen. Brownrigg and his; the gallant general was bound to a day—all his success depended upon being in such a place on ft certain day; and most dismally for his campaign, did it fall out that he could not in the nature of things by possibility, arrive at that place on that day. He would fur instance, in the ardour of his fancy, buoy the river and convey the whole fleet up the Scheldt channel in a few hours. This it required fully a week at least to accomplish; and thus the general's famous plan fell to the ground, and for this simple reason, because it was impossible. Little mistakes in time would not appear surprising. When the whole channel was to be buoyed, the general said one day would finish the business; but when the pilot was consulted, he required a week for this purpose, He was not disposed to deny gen. Brownrigg's integrity; but he could not avoid suspecting the deficiency of his judgments. Even in attempting to bear up before Flushing, the two admirals' ships ran ashore; and had it not been for the panic of the enemy, might have been instantly consumed with red-hot shot. Who would believe then, that the gallant general, enterprising as he was, could, possibly, in a few hours, convey up above one hundred ships, through the more extended, more intricate and consequently more difficult navigation of the whole river.

There was, now that he had disposed of the gallant general's most chimerical and fanciful campaign, one circumstance in the evidence which he must allude to, and which, in his opinion, subjected the noble lord to the most severe account and the heaviest responsibity. It appeared that lord Chatham did not know the situation, of the arsenals at Antwerp. Now, from intelligence laid before the secret Committee, it was proved that the noble lord did. What was the reason that he did not, as in duty bound, inform lord Chatham? How would he answer to the country for this most culpable neglect. How could the right hon. gent. avert the still more serious responsibility of allowing his incompetent colleague (as he conceived him) to remain in office, and to commit so flagrant a breach of his public duty? He did not wish, indeed, to pro- duce any comparison between the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman. The noble lord had most unquestionably through the entire progress of this question, conducted himself in the most can did and manly manner; he had declared he did not shrink from responsibility, and he had consistently voted for inquiry. The right hon. gent. on the other hand, had affected candour, and acted with duplicity; he had pretended that he sought investigation, and yet he voted steady and staunch against inquiry. He now, indeed, talked of the benefits of this inquiry, when he could no longer avert its prosecution, and pretended to panegyrise that which could have no good result, unless it involved him in merited condemnation. Since this inquiry had proceeded, he had only to regret that the names of the different members did not go forth coupled with the questions which they had separately asked the witnesses: considering from whom many of the questions had come, the effect would have been extremely diverting. The noble lord, for instance, had asked captain Woodroffe (who had surveyed the whole country from the top of a church steeple,) what good he could foresee from the Expedition? The witness answered, "none at all." Foiled in this, the noble lord begged of every one to tell what a desperate weapon Congreve's rockets were. Now, this was hardly fair; it was like a tradesman puffing off goods in which he had a concern: but in the end, the noble lord made no use whatever of these destructive instruments, in his speech. But what was the answer of Mr. Woodroffe with respect to them?—Why, that these rockets were deemed very troublesome things; but that of their effects he knew nothing whatever—and who did? Of this evidence, however, the noble lord made no use, and no one could see his object in introducing it. The noble lord, indeed, seemed to have forgotten the greater part of the evidence and documents which he had adduced himself. It did not suit his interest to refer to them, and therefore he had most prudently abstained from touching upon that irrelevant part of the evidence.

He begged pardon of the hon. gent, opposite (general Craufurd), but he really was led away from his campaign by the noble lord; but to tell the truth, he had indulged in a gentle slumber during part of its fatigues. I have indeed wondered, Sir, (said Mr. W.) how your vigour was able to stand it, though my surprise is much abated, when I consider the exertions which you are ever ready to make for the general interest. I really, however, had sunk into a slight oblivion during some of the sieges; though, in truth, few of them took much time. And, when I awakened to resume my services, happening to ask from a friend near me, how far we had got—"Oh, (said he) our general says, by God, he has just taken Bergen-op-Zoom.' This oath would, he hoped, never rise in judgment against the gallant officer, but be forgotten by the generosity of the angel alluded to by that interesting writer, whose pictures from nature the gallant officer's speech was strikingly calculated to call to one's recollection. The gallant officer, whose services he knew and respected, was no doubt as tender, as he professed to be of the blood of the soldier, as he was known from his conduct upon service to be prodigal of his own. The gallant officer however, might, like Mr. Shandy, be anxious to mount his hobby horse upon military tactics. The siege of Bergen-op-Zoom might be as familiar to his imagination as that of Namur was to Mr. Shandy. But neither the gallant general nor his friends, the ministers, were fit to cope with Mr. Shandy. Mr. Shandy had plans of all the towns be had to invest, but neither the gallant officer nor his friends had a single plan. The gallant officer, however, expressed a readiness to forfeit his head if he could not accomplish his whole project. But his head was perfectly safe, for he might rely upon it, that he would never be sent to put his project to trial. No, the country had too much of such trials to accede to another, and he trusted the House was too sensible of the nature and consequence of the trial which had taken place, to accede to the gallant general's amendment. What, after the farce and the tragedy which marked this Expedition, was it possible that the House could adopt the proposed amendment, which would go to take away the very substratum of his noble friend's resolutions? What, after the noble minister of war's frequent exhibition of an immense army, on paper, illustrated by the slow difficult preparations of a comparatively small force.—The noble lord, could not therefore so easily get rid of his responsibility. He gave him the credit, indeed, of not shrinking from it; he gave him also the credit of affording a full and complete pre- paration to the Expedition. The soldiers were well equipped, and the staff quite completed. "Even (said Mr. W.) even the city staff was perfect. The good city of London was represented by the jolliest of her aldermen. (Loud laughing.) To him the noble lord paid the most marked attention. He went to Deal. He was the last person he saw. Oh! how tenderly affecting was the interview! The fleet sailed—how sad was the parting! The noble lord stood on the shore saluting the jolly alderman, and catching his last sigh—when the worthy baronet, in the words of the ballad:

—"Waved his lily hand,

"And bid his noble friend adieu."

But at last the envious winds interfered—the Phœnix spread her wings, and wafted the turtles and the alderman to the destined port. Last night (said Mr. W.) I looked about for him, when an allusion was made to the expence at which the city estimated the Expedition. The jolly baronet was away, but another kissed the rod. He is also a baronet, but that is not sufficient to describe him, there are so many of them; he may be known, however; his face is less round and less ruddy than the other. There were no less than three of them there huddled together on the same bench—three baronets, all elevated for unheard-of-services. But he must leave the aldermen, however reluctantly, and return once more to the noble lord. The army, it must be allowed, when it did go, was fully completed in every thing; the more therefore the guilt of the noble lord and his colleagues, to send it to a place where so many were certain of perishing, and consigned to a premature and inglorious grave. They might have saved them from that calamity, had they attended to the advice and opinions of the officers they insulted, by asking in mockery for their opinions, upon which they were predetermined not to act. But the noble lord dealt hardly by his witnesses, for when they gave evidence, such as he wished, he would have them believed: but if they did not do that, he impeached their; testimony. After the production of such witnesses as Mr. Coke, and Mr. Pole, to attest in fact, nothing at all, and the document found upon the dead French officer in Catalonia, to furnish satisfactory proofs of the noble lord's accuracy of intelligence—after the melancholy catastrophe of this ill-concerted and ill-executed Expedition, was it possible that the House could agree to the gallant officer's amendment? This document from the French officer was indeed a curious article of information for the noble lord to rely upon. It was casually formed in 1808, and described the positions of the French army at that time. Yet this document was adduced to justify a great military movement in 1810; because from some loose intelligence since obtained, it was inferred that nearly the whole of that army had gone to the Danube. Such was the nature of the intelligence upon which the noble lord set our military resources in motion. But the noble lord would, it seems, call over the French emperor to bear testimony in favour of his character and the policy of his arrangements. This call, however, the noble lord must expect now to be answered according to the old adage, "that he was married, and could not come." And may that marriage, said the hon. "gent. be productive of general felicity, by leading to that peace which France has so often attempted, in vain, to establish with this country.

He had, perhaps not very consistently, indulged in some farce on this subject: alas! he was now come to pure unmixed tragedy: he was now come to a melancholy estimate of the prodigality of human life, and the wanton extravagance of human happiness: he was come to consider the cruelty of men who had sent our troops to perish unnecessarily and ingloriously in the most unhealthy climate in the world, at its most pestilential season! It had been said by way of extenuation of the conduct of ministers, that the last season was remarkably rigorous: he had to state, from good authority, that it was one of the mildest ever known in Walcheren.—As to the question of the gallant general, whether the nation would consent to give up the West India Islands, because their climate was unfavourable to the health of our troops, he would declare for himself, that he did not know whether he would wish to occupy so many of these islands. Certainly he never would consent to retain St. Domingo, at the expence of so many lives as the attempt to obtain it had cost this country. Nor would he assent to the detention of Walcheren, however important it might be deemed in any point of view, even at the hazard of such sacrifices as that island had occasioned. The retention, indeed, of this island was from the beginning evidently impracticable. Our troops had not been long there when they actually became, from the progress of disease, quite unfit for active operation, even had the ulterior object of the Expedition been attainable, and required their aid for its accomplishment. In fact the unhealthy character of this island was not to be doubted. Let the House look to the evidence of captain Puget, and to that of many others; let them look to sir Lucas Pepys, to him, who made such a curious exhibition before the House, who, at first, stated that he did not know any thing of hospital diseases, and came back again to explain his meaning, that he did not know any thing of the internal arrangements of hospitals, as if that could be considered his original meaning. As, well, indeed, might a man be supposed to look into a pair of empty jack boots to ascertain the state of the legs which once wore them. But, yet sir Lucas Pepys, as well as Mr. Keates and Mr. Knight, still asserted, that the misfortune attached to the Expedition owing to the progress of the disease at Walcheren, was not attributable to them. Surely then, this case ought to be inquired into, in order to ascertain the guilt. For what guilt could be greater than that which led to such calamity?

But the noble lord, with his usual singularity of phrase, called this a speculative disease. What did he mean by this? Was there any medical man so ignorant, as not to know that the disease certainly awaited our troops, and was not that certainly soon experienced and fatally ascertained? The House had many returns before it, as to the progress of this disease; but did the noble lord know any thing of the state of the troops at this moment? how few of them were now, or even likely to become, fit for service? One fact alone which had come to his knowledge was sufficient to demonstrate the mischievous effects of this distemper. Out of 128 men composing the light company of the 3rd regiment of guards, all picked men, which went out to Walcheren, not one man was flow fit for duty, it being necessary, that those who survived should be nursed like children. Such then was the consequence of an Expedition, the main object of which was to be achieved suddenly; was to be done, as the noble lord termed it, by a coup de main. But the noble lore had quite a peculiar conception of that military phrase, instead of regarding it as a prompt decisive effort of courage, he really seemed to consider it as tantamount to a siege; to the slow progress of pro- tracted operations and suspended attacks.—Whatever might be said of the capture of Fribourg and Ismael, that of Copenhagen was not surely a coup-de-main, although so denominated by the noble lord. As well, indeed, might the attack made by his friends and himself upon the ministers, if victorious upon this occasion, be considered a coup-de-main. They had opened their trenches upon the 23d of January, against ministers; they had frequently mounted the glacis, been victorious, and been repelled, but he hoped they would on this discussion finally triumph for the benefit of their country, still their triumph could not be deemed a coup-de-main, unless in the noble lord's singular construction of the phrase.

Now, as to the retention of Walcheren he declared that he considered that unfortunate proceeding attributable principally to the right hon. gent. who spoke last. He was to blame, for it was he, who, by throwing the apple of discord among his colleagues, produced a degree of confusion and disorder in their councils, which unfitted them for some time for almost any measure of government. In fact, as soon as they recovered from that confusion, that ill-fated island was abandoned. The hon. gent. felt that much more might be said upon the subject; but from the late hour of the night, he was unwilling to trespass farther upon the attention of the House.—Exhausted as he then was, and as the House was, he should conclude by demanding their unanimous and prompt decision. The nation demanded their decision; the wreck of our brave army demanded it; the martyred thousands whom we had left to rot in Walcheren demanded it.—There is, indeed, (said Mr. W.) from the centre to the circumference of the, empire, one, united, universal, heart-rending cry for justice. Give it then to the supplications of the people; give it to the sorrows of the army; give it as the last consolation to the widows and orphans of the dead; Give it as a pledge of the honour and integrity of the living. To the people of England, and to the cause of humanity, the punishment of those who have created such enormous evil is a necessary act of duty. The memory of the dead, and the honour of the army call for vengeance upon the authors of this Expedition, and I trust in God that the House will attend to the call.

said a few words in vindication of the Expedition; after which the House adjourned.