explained that it was not he who moved for the paper alluded to by the hon. baronet as explanatory of the wishes of Austria; nor did he vindicate the Expedition on that ground of continental diversion.

said, that he had listened with the same degree of attention to the hon. baronet's speech as he had to all that had been advanced by the hon. gentlemen who had previously spoken upon the present important subject, and was convinced that the more this subject was discussed, provided it was with that temper and patience that had hitherto, so much to the credit of the House, been manifested throughout the debate, the more the country would see that ministers were bound to undertake such an enterprise as that which had been undertaken against the great and growing force of the enemy in the Scheldt. But to consider the important question fairly, they must look to the actual situation of Europe at the time this Expedition was undertaken, particularly to the situation of the French and Austrian armies on the Danube, and the severe check the French had met with, which obliged Buonaparté to lay upon his arms for such a length of time, waiting for reinforcements from the interior of France, from the interior of Holland, from the Netherlands, and from the very banks of the Scheldt. Therefore, if there ever was a time for this country to make a great exertion, it was at the time this Expedition took place, which was not only a great diversion for our ally, the Emperor of Austria, but also was that, which we were called upon to make from our own situation, cost what it would.—Besides it was the bounden duty of government not alone to provide means of preservation in case of attack, but to destroy those means of attack, which the enemy was known to be preparing, and by that enter prize to remove altogether the danger of our having to contend for existence upon our own soil. The hon. general then desired they would look to France with all her gigantic powers at present—to look at her in possession of the Netherlands—to look at her in possession of the Flemish ports, and then to look at the Narrow Seas, and to recollect that Holland was not now that Holland that once could and did preserve the balance of Europe, and then fairly to lay their hands upon their hearts and say, if a government consulting the security of the country were not bound to undertake such an enter prize as that which had been undertaken against the enemy's alarming and growing force in the Scheldt? It must have long since been seen that if France was allowed to keep possession of the Netherlands for any length of time, it would not be in the power of all Europe to set any bounds to the progress of her arms. We had seen the United Provinces fall under her power, and France had the command of all the means and resources of that power, at present she had carried her arms into Germany, and extended her conquests there as far as she pleased. Her great object now was, to possess herself of the command of the Narrow Seas, so that our trade should neither go out nor return, but at her pleasure. It was almost fatal to England, that France should be in possession of the Flemish ports, for if any accident was to befal our fleets at sea, that great extent of coast, our north-east coast, would be exposed naked and open to the enemy. The failure of the Expedition led him to call upon ministers to pay attention to that north east coast, particularly to Yarmouth and the neglected batteries there, also to the neglected batteries at Lowestoff; for if the enemy possessed himself of these positions it would be difficult to remove him from them. They were both in situations full of resources, and among the strongest positions in this country, but which had been feast thought of, and the most neglected. The hon. general then desired to draw the attention of the House to what had been advanced as to the impression an army might have made upon a fortified town, fully inhabited, and shewed that the great duke of Marlborough, after the battle of Ramillies, appeared before Antwerp, then in a strong state of defence which had hi it twelve regiments; but that the duke being in possession of the avenues to the place, the inhabitants induced the general to surrender rather than risk the destruction of the town. That in the same campaign the duke of Marlborough appeared before Ostend, one of the strongest towns in the Low Countries, which after three days siege, surrendered by the influence of the populace. He now drew conclusions from these historical facts, that, government was justified in undertaking such an Expedition as that which had been undertaken against the Scheldt, and against Antwerp, even if there was only a single chance of success, the object being So great; but he maintained, that had Cadsand been possessed according to the original plan, and had not the admiral been obliged by the weather to carry the fleet into the Roompot, the Expedition must have succeeded; that the enemy not being able to defend the important post of Bathz, was a proof of the weakness of their force in Antwerp, for had they been strong there, they never would have given up Bathz in the manner they did, and which opened the whole West Scheldt to our fleet on the 2d of August. This picture was so strong a one, so strongly impressed upon the commander in chief of the land forces, that he early detached that gallant and excellent officer sir John Hope to-secure that fort, and had the wind-allowed of the transports getting up the West Scheldt, the hon. general maintained that the Expedition would in all human probability have succeeded.

felt it impossible for him to refrain from offering his sentiments on this question, though he doubted whether he should be able to do it the justice which its importance demanded. If any thing could have astonished him, after he had read the papers on the table, the sort of defence setup by ministers would have had that effect.—For what did that defence really amount to, but simply this, that because it was an object of vital importance to destroy Antwerp, we should therefore have undertaken it with means inadequate to its execution. He had thought, that in proportion to the importance of the object ought to be the means employed for its accomplishment. Surprized as he was at this, however, he confessed his astonishment was increased in a tenfold degree at the cool indifference with which the noble lord opposite had affected to argue on calamities which had been derived to the country from his auspices—calamities more disastrous, more disgraceful, and more dreadful than had arisen from any other expedition in the whole history of the war down to the present period. The noble lord indeed, with a phraseology peculiarly his own had expressed a wish to have this Expedition tried by the experience of the fact. In his opinion, that was precisely the ordeal by which, in order to suit the interest of the noble lord it ought not to be tried; because there was not one single fact which did not militate directly against its adoption. The right hon. gent, opposite had, on last night, entered into a long and laboured defence of the Expedition; and in order to distract the mind of the House from the only point to which it should be directed, took a survey of the situation of the whole world; and argued that in such a state of things, an expedition ought to have been sent somewhere.

The right hon. gent, seemed to think that his best mode of defence would be ingeniously to attempt to distract the minds of his judges, and turn their attention from the contemplation of the real merits of the case (hear! hear!) You could not, said the right hon. gent. go to the north of Germany, for there you would come in contact with the broken army of Prussia; you could not go to the Mediterranean, there was no good to be done by landing at Trieste, for there you would not find any Austrian force to cooperate with you—then think of the horrors of treading, as the right hon. gent's phrase was, the Gut of Gibraltar—think of the dreadful dangers of the Adriatic, with the navigation of which this maritime nation was so little acquainted—think of the storms you might there have to encounter.

——Auster Dux inquieti turbidus Adriæ!

He was not disposed to deny that every one of those expeditions might have been abortive in their conception and ill-advised in the adoption, but he would deny that any one of them could have met with more complete failure, or entailed upon the country more calamitous consequences, than did the one which was acted on.—(Hear, hear!) Neither the menaced Prussian army, nor the Straits of Gibraltar, nor the Mediterranean Sea, could be more frightfully fatal than the mandate which sent our brave and patient troops to fall before an invincible enemy, the plague, in the marshes of Walcheren; where, as a right hon, gent. (Mr. Windham) had said with a felicity of expression almost peculiar to himself, they were extinguished like a candle in a vault (hear! hear!) Ministers, however, did not think so; they determined to send out an Expedition, and out they sent one, without having obtained one particle of information as to how it should proceed, or taking one single precaution against the many perils which were likely to impede their progress. In March last the noble lord conceived the idea of this campaign; he thought he had a disposable force, and since he had it he was determined to waste it; and so he sent to the Commander in Chief for his opinion on the subject. The Commander in Chief sent back for answer, that he could not spare 16,000 men for the purpose! Sixteen thousand men out of the enormous establishment paid for by the country! The Expedition could not therefore sail in March. No; necessity and the prudence of the ministry prevented it. The fever was not then to be met with, and the ships might then have been taken; and so the Expedition was deferred until the raging of the disease rendered the destruction of the troops certain, and the advanced period of the season made the safety of the armament precarious. In July then they set out to carry the fever, Antwerp, and the fleet, by a coup-de-main—(Hear)—a coup-de-main! and yet it appeared by the orders of the French emperor, to his officers, that he was apprised of their intention even so far back as March. If he had not this certainty, such were the cabals and vacillation of the ministry, that he would not believe they had themselves conceived the project at that period.

He could not help here making one inference, however, from our poverty of force in March last; which was, that the House and the country had been most grossly deceived it the estimate of our loss during the preceding campaign in Sp in, which had been laid before them by ministers. If this estimate had been true, it was impossible that we should not have had forces enough to send the Expedition early in the spring to Walcheren; but the estimate was not true. We had lost much more than the ministers chose to disclose, and the country was duped into an opinion, that its situation was more prosperous than it really was. At length, however, the noble lord undertook the Expedition with what disposable force he could muster, against the great skill of the French emperor, and the great power of France, which was now, in effect, all Europe. The noble lord then wrote his most curious letter to the commander in chief, pointing out the advantages of the Expedition, and declaring, if it was not undertaken at that time, that Antwerp would soon be impregnable. After this, what he did do? Why, commenced this important Expedition without one single iota of information! He sent out an immense armament, merely to see whether a blow might not be somewhere struck against the enemy. The noble lord then dispatched the Expedition at last without information on which to proceed, without a plan to guide it, or even the apprehension of any opposition, or a supposition of any danger, until it reached Batz, where all its operations terminated! From the departure of the Expedition, till its arrival at Batz, there was not one step which did not demand enquiry. It was sent out without an idea of danger till it came to Batz, and yet at that very place did this great army, conducted by greater folly than ever had been exhibited on any similar occasion, ends its catalogue of disease and disasters by an announced failure. To send out this Expedition, however, the noble lord was determined, because he considered that there was a fit disposable force in the country; a supposition taken up in direct opposition to the statement of the commander in chief. The noble lord was like the poor man in Horace, who could not be persuaded that all the wealth in the country did not belong to him. Nothing was sufficient to convince the noble lord, that he had not a disposable force.

The indifference of the noble lord to the sad consequences of his own folly and infatuation, was now detestable; the calamities which he entailed on the country were horrible, frightful beyond expression, and the levity with which he treated the subject in the present discussion, truly shocking. The noble lord had an idea, that because Antwerp was at the moment without troops, he might take it at once without difficulty. This was a most fallaciousidea. There Was, not, most probably, at this moment, a perfect garrison, either at Toulon or Brest; and yet what man in his senses could conceive the notion of taking either by a coup-de-main! If these things were to be persisted in—if the wealth, the strength, and the forces of the country were to be thus unnecessarily and unprofitably squandered, it was impossible not to foresee how it would end. The noble lord, had at length, however, thought proper to take some military opinions as to the possibility of taking Antwerp by a coup-de-main. He asked the opinion of the commander in chief—he knew nothing at all about the matter, but he referred to four general officers, and they, indeed, produced documents in reply, full of official form, full of affected science, assumed pomp, and perfect inanity. All of them said, if you do so and so, you may succeed; yet all agreed upon the idea of the coup-de-main upon Antwerp being absurd and impossible. General Brownrigg proposed two plans of campaign; but there were some slight objections to both; the one was impossible, and the other impracticable. The attempt by Ostend was out of the question; and the other plan, even putting the fever aside, very doubtful of success. However, between the commander in chief who knew nothing about the matter; the officers who knew nothing about the matter; and the minister who knew nothing about the matter, an armament was prepared out of the half recovered wreck of the army from Spain, and the volunteers from the militia.

In such a situation was the military part of the Expedition sent out; the same miserable deficiency in means, plan, and information, attended the navy; the noble lord at the head of the admiralty knew nothing at all—he was quite ignorant on every subject relative to the measure on which he should be informed; so was sir R. Strachan; he told lord Mulgrave so, But lord Mulgrave was not to be persuaded even by fact. "No," said he, you certainly do know nothing on the subject, but that is the reason I have great confidence in you —and you will do the business very well." Thus in this foolish; scandalous, and imbecile manner, went forth this disastrous Expedition, to diminish the honour of our army, and destroy the best, hopes of England. In fifteen days, it was calculated we might have reached Antwerp by Ostend; this was too dilatory for a coup-de-main, and was abandoned; the other plan of landing in Walcheren was adopted, and even before we got to Batz the fifteen days were exhausted. But still the ministers and the commanders were delighted—mutual compliments passed between them—it was in this respect the most good-natured expedition he ever heard of. The ministers praised Chatham; for his vigour, and he praised the ministers for their preparations; and so he went on gaining laurels and battles, carrying towns which were never heard of before, by a coup-de-main, and bearing down every thing before him, for the very best of reasons, because he was not opposed, until at last a wet ditch at Middleburg arrested his progress, and ended his achievements.

As to the navy, the occupation of Cad-sand had been stated as an indispensable preliminary, and there accordingly the marquis of Huntley proceeded; but when he arrived, the whole fleet of England could not furnish him with boats to land his soldiers, and so the indispensable object was relinquished. Some persons, it was true, had said, that this failure was not attributable to the want of boats. But the marquis of Huntley gave a different opinion, and that was all the answer which he would give to the objection. Two letters were written on the subject, one home from the admiral, and the other from captain Owen, to the admiral; the latter of those said, the weather was very fine, and the other said it was very bad; one said there was plenty of boats, and the other said there were none; and in this pleasing state of uncertainty, which he would not seek to obviate, rested the question.

At last, however, after many doubts, and failures, and disasters, the batteries were opened upon, Flushing, but at such, a distance that they could not even silence a little advanced battery before the town. The town nevertheless was taken, and the dreadful bombardment succeed. Thus it was with ruin in our acts, and hypocrisy in our promises, we attempted to conciliate the people whom we affected to compassionate under the iron despotism of Buonaparté We destroyed their habitations; we desolated their land, and we then told them we came for their preservation! Inhuman in our prosperity towards the natives, the ague attacked us, and then our minds changed; we became suddenly humane to all, except to our own poor soldiers, whom, lest we should offend the island, we left in their sickness to perish, without a dry spot whereon to lie, or a roof to protect them! This humanity was perfectly consistent with our preposterous management all through. For instance, sir Home Popham was the only person, except the pilot of the fleet, who was supposed to know any thing of the navigation of the Scheldt. To him was entrusted then the conduct of the fleet up to Batz. What did he do? Why, he attempted to go by the West Scheldt, until, by his failure, he found out that he ought to have tried the East Scheldt. Thus this best-informed man in the fleet took the course the most contrary to his interest and object. The gallant captain next went through the Veer Gat, and lord Chatham seemed to think, because this had been accomplished, that the enemy must be totally discomfited. All they had to depend on was the utter impossibility of this passage! Sir Home was next sent to ascertain the passage to South Beveland, and he proceeded to the North. He might just as well have set out from that House for Kensington over Westminster-bridge! (Hear, hear!)—On the 24th, at last, up they got to Batz, and then they came to a stop. Sir R. Strachan, taking advantage of the pause, ventured to hint that it would be convenient to know upon what place the conjoint expedition was to proceed. A council of war was called—they had now come to the grand point from which in future all their operations were to proceed. What did they do?—They set off home.

Thus ended an Expedition which was undertaken by ignorance, and executed by imbecility—an Expedition which wasted the treasure of the country, the lives of our troops, and the honour of our name—an Expedition planned by fatuity and impotence the most unparalleled. Was there then no punishment for those who had sent out this Expedition? Hardly anything could be stronger against them than the statements which they made in their own defence. Some might perhaps think that he spoke too warmly on this subject. He confessed he could not help feeling warmly for the unnecessary calamities which had been brought upon the country. He maintained that the ministers stood as criminals before the House, and that not only the ministers, but the general and admiral ought to be punished for having undertaken to conduct an expedition, in a state of complete ignorance as to the mode in which the duty could be performed. And nothing less than the impeachment of the one, and a court-martial on the others, could, or ought to satisfy the country. In all their proceedings there was a marked disregard for their country, and a cautious concern merely for their own interests. From beginning to the end they were all the same; all ignorant, presumptuous and imbecile. As to the commander in chief, he could not help saying, that the result of the inspection of the papers on the table was merely wonder how any man, with the feelings of a gentleman, could act as he did; how any man possessed of such conscious and convicted imbecility, could retain his situation. The noble lord was very anxious to separate the question of the medical board, from that of the merits of the Expedition. This he could not do: it excited in him the instant recollection of the brave men who fell victims to the disease. The noble lord betrayed, indeed, through all his speech a callous insensibility to the miseries he had caused, truly shocking; he sported with the death which he had occasioned, and even presumed to persuade the country that its calamities were honours! One would have thought that he who came down with the deaths of thousands on his head, would have expressed some sorrow for the bloody consequence of his own folly and incompeence. But no! the noble lord dared even to compare himself to Chatham, Nelson, St. Vincent, and those brave heroes who had directed our arms, under better and happier auspices, and to constant and imperishable glory. He was amazed how he dared to mention the names of those great men on such an occasion. (Hear! hear!) Why, this dreadful Expedition had cost the country, on a serious calculation from the returns on the table, which, however, were far below the mark, which he had made, three times as many lives as all the glorious naval victories which we had gained since the commencement of the war, including the glorious and decisive battle of Trafalgar!(Hear! Hear!) And yet of all this the noble lord spoke with a tranquillity, with respect to which he wanted language to express the feeling of his mind! When every indignant sentiment of patriotism was roused by the contemplation of these calamities, his lordship spoke of disease, death and destruction, as familiarly as girls of thirteen would talk of puppy dogs! The right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning) had rather deprecated the severity of the House on this point, and therefore be felt that there was at least more propriety in his language. But that right hon. gent. had made use of an argument respecting which he must say a word. The right hon. gent. accounted for the failure, not from the misconduct of ministers, but from the despotism of Buonaparté. This country, in that right hon. gentleman's opinion, came to the contest under great disadvantages, owing to the freedom of our constitution. He should have thought that the right hon. gent. so well read in the Greek and Roman historians, would have been among the last to have broached such an opinion. He (sir F.) had always understood that the energies of Greece and Rome were to be accounted for by the free nature of their institutions. So the most eminent of their historians accounted for them. These energies had been tried against despots; and if despotism had such peculiar advantages the results ought to have been very different. Machiavel, a finished politician, had declared that the greatness of the Roman people was founded on their freedom. They had indeed flourished, and they had so flourished by opposing despotism with the arms of liberty. So did Athens—her eloquence, and her free zeal, resisted numbers with success. The best and greatest of our own politicians accounted for the eminence in which England stood among European nations, beyond all proportion to her means, from the same cause—the freedom of her institutions. This doctrine of the right hon. gent. who had been lately high in office, and might perhaps soon return to office again, was to him new and mortifying. If these were the sentiments of our rulers this fact alone, in his opinion, was sufficient to account for our calamities.

He should now most heartily support the Resolutions proposed by the noble lord below (Porchester), though he though they should have gone farther. The ministers ought to be called to an account very different from a mere censure of that House, and the officers ought to be tried by Courts Martial. But the removal of the present ministers from office was not the only thing to be done for the salvation of the country. Without a change of system—without reverting to the principles of the constitution, with the decline of which the country had declined, no permanent good could be expected. That was his opinion, and he trusted it was the opinion of the country. If we wished to be rescued from our present perilous situation, we must have reform.—Reform which would revive and re-establish the ancient fundamental principles of our constitution. Unless this was obtained, neither himself nor the country would be satisfied. From the folly of not demanding this arose all our calamities. From it arose this Expedition—this child of corruption, expiring by its own inherent imbecility. All their calamities, all their disgraces, were derived from the want of a fair and equal representation. To that, and that alone, the people ought to look; it would be folly to expect relief from any other cause. If this was obtained, they would no longer see ministerial weakness working on abandoned prostitution. This was their only avenue of escape from ruin, imminent ruin. For himself, he cared not, if that ruin was to come, whether it came in the shape of a rotten borough, or an open iron despotism. Of the mismanagement of the medical department he had said little, because it was to come separately under consideration. The minister was mistaken, if he thought to escape by blaming the commanders, though for his own part, he admitted that all were guilty. In looking at this Expedition through all its parts, one could hardly speak of it with the necessary moderation. If in private life, if he saw the catastrophe of men so brave, so patient, so martyred, he could call it nothing else than cool, deliberate, atrocious murder. (Hear, hear, hear!) Though ministers within twelve hours' sail of Walcheren might have had every information, they would not deign to seek it, but sent their soldiers unheedingly to their grave. They now called for vengeance—the honour of the House was pledged to give it; and, for himself, he would say nothing but instant impeachment and court-martial should satisfy the nation for the cruel effusion of their army's blood.

, in allusion to what had fallen from the hon. baronet relative to the energies of the ancient commonwealths, begged to remind him that these energies were first impaired by the exertions of factious leaders of the populace, who hav- ing destroyed the aristocracy ultimately established a military despotism. There were many points introduced in the justification of the noble lord (Castlereagh) which he could by no means admit. He could not acquiesce in the argument, that because upon general views of policy our allies ought to be supported, and that there was at the moment large disposable force, therefore the country was to engage in Expeditions which put to hazard some of its most vital interests; much less could he admit the doctrine, that because there was ho immediate part upon the continent in which a British army could have come in contact with Austria, therefore we were bound to send an Expedition to another point, where the danger and the difficulties were such as to render the object either as a diversion for our allies, or for the accomplishment of a national benefit, almost wholly impracticable. He could not recognize any claims of policy or justice which made it imperative upon any country to engage in assistance to any ally where the prospect of success to the power to be supported was equivocal and precarious, but the injury to yourself certain and extensive. In appreciating the propriety of the principle by which they were called upon to make a diversion in favour of an ally, his Majesty's ministers were bound to consider, first, the extent of the assistance which the country was able to afford; and next the nature of the risks to which such an effort was exposed. Having said thus much upon the general principle by which the policy of that country ought to he actuated, he had now to apply himself to the particular merits of the Expedition to the Scheldt. In considering that transaction it was a matter of regret that it became the duty of that House to discuss operations with which, from the habits and pursuits of many of its members, they could not be supposed to be very conversant. But it being the province of ministers to advise and direct military expeditions, it of course became the duty of that House to watch over the manner in which their arrangements were carried into effect. That was a duty, however difficult in the practice, which the constitution demanded from that House. It was in his opinion no argument to say, that because upon a former occasion it was deemed expedient to effect the conquest of Flushing with a certain force, therefore the mere acquisition of that place by an armament, under different circumstances, and which had failed in the great object of its equipment, was a justification, of the policy which led to the Expedition. It was to be recollected that the proposition of lord Nelson did not embrace any thing beyond the capture of Flushing, which he considered might have been taken with 5,000 men, while the Expedition planned by his Majesty's ministers was one of a great and extensive nature, embracing many objects, to which the possession of Flushing was but auxiliary, but in all which objects this extensive enter prize failed. That Expedition was not only the greatest that ever left this country, but it had also this remarkable peculiarity, that there was not one naval or military officer who had given their sanction to the project. But then it was concluded by the noble lord, that the House of Commons had no right to discuss the plan or to decide against it, upon the ground that the ulterior object of the arrangement was not attempted to be put into execution. He had assumed to limit the whole combination of the arrangement within a certain point, and then contended that the only question for the House to consider, was the nature of the impediments which opposed and prevented its accomplishment. Surely such a course was not one calculated to bring the subject fully into view, in order to ascertain, first, whether the policy was right—next whether the arrangement was proper; and lastly, to discuss the obstructions which contravened the object. The honourable member then proceeded, from various parts of the evidence, to prove that no adequate provision was made to obtain possession of the banks of the Scheldt, so as to enable the fleet to proceed up towards Antwerp, a circumstance which rendered the enter prize abortive from its very commencement. With respect to the argument of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning,) relative to the dreadful sickness which affected our army, he (Mr. B.) could not admit its application to the present question. It was most true, that there were cases where the prevalence of contagion in a possession would never influence the government to think of abandoning such possession. It was so with our West India1 islands, and sometimes with Gibraltar. Still its application to this Expedition could not be admitted, because no analogy existed. There was a vast distinction between that policy which should induce a government to re- tain, even under all the disadvantages of great mortality, situations long in bur possession, with which many interests were connected, and the conquest of a new place equally contagious, but particularly if that conquest was made at the very period when such contagion became most malignant. The question then was, whether on the whole, the Expedition deserved not approbation, but justification or censure? And he should not be deterred, by the apprehension of the consequences which might follow from doing his duty. He agreed that his Majesty's ministers had not been actuated by an intention of sacrificing the army or the treasure of the country. Even the weakest men would at the head of the government be incapable of entertaining any such intention. This species of defence, however, excited his suspicion, because it shewed that the ministers had no ground to stand upon. The House was bound to exercise a controul over all administrations, and whatever might he the future consequences of his vote, however painful a duty he had to perform, he should still perform it. He had nothing to do with any ulterior measure, but he did think that the House would abdicate all its functions, if disregarding the general voice of the country, it could be warped by any consideration, from giving to that calamitous failure its appropriate character, and from pronouncing its censure upon the conduct of those who advised it.

observed, that it was his intention shortly to state the general grounds upon which he was induced to support the amendment of the hon. general (Craufurd) in preference to the rigorous Resolutions submitted by the noble lord (Porchester.) His first reason for that preference was, that he found it established by the evidence upon the table, that his Majesty's ministers had determined upon that armament with the fairest prospect of success. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Bathurst) had argued, that ministers were not justified to risque such dangers as that Expedition was exposed to, merely because the country, at that moment, had at its command a very large disposable force. That the safety of such a force should not be committed, but for objects likely to be effected, and with advantages commensurate to the hazard. He (Mr. Peel.) admitted the political axiom, but denied its application. These were objects, which to him, were of the most com- manding importance. Was it necessary for him to refer that House to the increased and increasing marine of France? Was it necessary for him to dilate in that assembly upon the facility which the ports and arsenals in the Scheldt afforded, for the consolidation of that naval power? But, though his Majesty's government could not suffer such a danger to the security of this country to escape their contemplation: was there not something in the period at which this Expedition was determined on, which must of itself convince them that the moment had then arrived for combining with our own security a most powerful effort for the general interests of Europe? What, he would ask, would have been the decision of the country, if it had seen its government sunk in a cold and torpid inactivity at that period when the storm was gathering in Germany; when Austria was determined to make one bold effort to resist the unprincipled exactions of the enemy of her independence? In such a state of things was Great Britain to continue regardless because she was not a sufferer—to be indifferent because she was safe? Having then decided to co-operate with Austria, where did true policy point at as the theatre for our exertions? France we knew wished to regenerate her naval greatness, and nature, combined, with art, had fitted out the Scheldt as the most formidable position for extending her maritime power. Whether they looked to security from invasion, or to the protection of our commerce, ministers must have felt the necessity of making an attempt upon those sources of our annoyance. Could they have shut their eyes to a danger that was so palpable? Could they say that the cause of our apprehension was remote, or that its extent was exaggerated? Suppose, that very danger realized; suppose this House now sitting in judgment upon the ministers who would have so sacrificed the interests of their country, and disregarded the duties they owed their sovereign? With what justice, with, what indignation, would the hon. gent. (Mr.Whitbread), who, with such zeal and talents, talents which he (Mr. P.) would not presume to depreciate by the humble tribute of his panegyric, concluded the debate of last night, call them to answer for such a manifest dereliction of their public trust? Would he be satisfied, with their defence or their extenuation, because they answered that Lillo and Liefkenshoeik were in a state of preparation and defence; or that the difficulties in the execution of the task had deterred them from the necessary experiment? If the House was prepared to give its sanction to such doctrine; if this tame and spiritless calculation of the risk became the criterion of national enterprise, then at once let it obliterate from the proud pages of its history, the memory and the mention of all its heroic deeds. Then, if in the beginning of the Austrian struggle, the right hon. gent. admitted this country should attend to the precepts of her ally, upon what principle was it that it should refuse to listen to her, at the moment of her depression, when, though her spirit was impaired, it still was not subdued? In her vacillation between peace and war, when it was in evidence that she desired the retention of Walcheren, could his Majesty's government be justified in removing the only fulcrum upon which she rested for support? Sensible of the calamities our array was suffering, and regretting it as sincerely as any man in the empire, yet could it be supposed, that any motive but that of the most commanding and positive importance would have induced his Majesty's government to defer the evacuation of Walcheren?

spoke at length in favour of the original Resolutions.

felt that, notwithstanding the exhausted state of the discussion, of the House, and of himself, he was bound to submit his opinion upon the subject. Although he could not hope to command attention upon a question so ably canvassed already, yet it was due to the question, to the House, and to himself, that he should not allow the debate to conclude without offering his sentiments. The House had heard much of the tragic consequences of the measure under consideration, and they had witnessed a conversion of the tragedy into comedy, by the manner in which some gentlemen on the other side bad observed upon it; but in point of argument, he never recollected an occasion in which less was called, into action. Of argument, indeed he felt that there never was a case in which opponents had presented less to answer, or friends left less to supply. Yet he did think it necessary to take some part in the debate, and he conceived it fortunate that it fell to his lot to follow a right hon. gent. of the late administration, (Mr. Windham), although it was by no weans his intention to follow him literally, in his course as, usual, of taking the farthest way about the nearest way home. But some remarks had fallen from that right hon. gent. which he, should take leave to answer. That right hon. gent. had said that the late Expedition was of such a character that even success could not justify it. Why, it was a little consolatory to think, that in such a sentiment the right hon. gent. enjoyed his characteristic singularity, and he was quite persuaded, that had the Expedition been successful, the right hon. gent. would have stood completely alone in any opposition which he might have thought proper to make to its policy. But as to the right hon. gent.'s idea that the object of the Expedition was to catch at any popularity by the acquisition of a few ships, he assured the right hon. gent. that he was quite mistaken. Those alone could attend to the idea, who were not aware of the important ends, with a view to which this Expedition had been undertaken, Unfortunately those ends were not obtained, and the Expedition had failed. But did it become the right hon. gent. to attach the character of incapacity to an administration, because its Expedition had failed? For surely if such a criterion were established, the right hon. gent. and his colleagues could not stand very high in public estimation, while the Expeditions to the Dardanelles and to Buenos Ayres, were at all in our recollection. [A cry of hear, hear, from the Opposition Benches.] The right hon. gent. submitted that it was fair in him to refer to those events, because gentlemen in a case of this nature were to consider comparative merits. [No, no, from the Opposition, Benches,] But he contended yes, yes! for comparison was the fair rule of judgment. If parties were to change sides, he would ask, what could be the pretensions to wisdom or common prudence on the part of those who undertook the Expedition to the Dardanelles, which could not be accounted for upon any consideration of policy, either national or general; or what right had such men to find fault with those who planned the Expedition to the Scheldt which had in view both a national and a general object?

But it had been contended that the objects of the Expedition to the Scheldt, were unattainable, nay, that it was chimerical to calculate upon their attainment. Before, however, the House concluded upon this, assertion, he hoped they would look to the authorities which spoke against it, They had the authorities of general Brownrigg, and of his highly respected friend near him also, (general Craufurd), that the object of the Expedition was attainable; and they had the authorities of lord Nelson, sir Home Popham, and commodore Owen, as to the value of that object. In fact, the occupation of Walcheren, and the destruction of the great naval arsenals of the enemy in the Scheldt, had been deemed of so much importance by various administrations, that that alone formed a sufficient justification for the expence and risk attendant upon the undertaking of the measure under discussion. It was not with a view merely to the destruction of the 10 or 11 sail of the line actually afloat in the Scheldt, that the Expedition was undertaken, but in order to destroy that arsenal which furnished facilities for the preparation of a formidable fleet, in a quarter most dangerous to the safety of this country. But independently of all solicitude for our own interests, the Scheldt was, he maintained, the best point that, under all the circumstances of the case, could be selected for the common purpose of promoting a British interest, and aiding the cause of our allies. It had been said that our army would have been better disposed of if sent to Spain. But he begged gentlemen to consider how unwise it would have turned out to send an additional force to lord Wellington, who found it so difficult to provide sufficient supplies for even the force which he had. In fact, any additional force, in his circumstances, instead of being serviceable, would have rather increased his embarrassments.

There was, however, another reason why an army could not have been sent to any of the points, which gentlemen on the other side recommended, and that was the inadequacy of our means, as appeared from the papers on the table, to defray the expences of any lengthened service. In fact, the country could not afford it, and no other choice remained, than to take the direction objected to, and in which, unfortunately, our efforts had been so unavailing. But, let it be considered, that, although we could achieve nothing in the way of a diversion, in favour of Autsria, which was one of the objects of the Expedition, yet that from the state of the war, a diversion was created in favour of the other object of that Expedition, our own national object being rendered more attainable by the occupation which Austria gave to the troops of the enemy. This he observed, merely to shew that existing circumstances were not so unfavourable to the Expedition, as the gentlemen so earnestly contended. That this latter object was practicable, was, he maintained, apparent, from the evidence, and that, the means were sufficient, could not, he thought, be questioned; government did not however undertake the expedition without a conception that it would be attended with risks and losses, but they never calculated upon it as a last stake. They were prepared for all the hazards of war, but they certainly did not expect the ravages of disease; and the former he had no doubt would have been completely overcome, if it were not for the progress of the latter. When gentlemen dwelt so much upon the great disasters of this Expedition, he would beg it to be recollected, that no military failure had occurred in the whole course of it; that in fact nothing had taken place which could be said to redound to the discredit of the country. But the tone in which all the gentlemen on the other side spoke of this event, betrayed the character of their opposition. A right hon. gent. had said, that wind and weather formed part of the plan; but he must be allowed to say, that wind and weather formed part of the failure, of which they were a great cause. He was aware that an hon. officer in his eye, (sir Home Popham), had communicated his opinion, that unless the Expedition sailed within a certain period, adverse winds must be expected—that it was to be remembered, that according to the evidence of admirals Strachan and Keates, the weather was unusually unfavourable, and to that state of the weather was attributable the whole difficulty of our debarkation. Why then, to this circumstance, which occasioned such derangement and delay in the conduct of the Expedition, ministers could not be pronounced any party. But it was said that ministers had no naval authority for the practicability of their project. That, however, could not be maintained by any of those who took the, trouble of looking at the minutes of the admiralty.

But the military opinions were urged against them. Let it however be observed, that the opinion of colonel Gordon, for instance, which had been so much dwelt upon, referred only to the danger to which our army might be exposed on its retreat. Now, it was calculated, that our army would reach Bathz on the 3d of August, and it appeared, that so late as the 11th, the enemy had but 26,000 altogether in Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Cadsand, and all the adjoining country. What then had our troops to apprehend in their retreat from Antwerp, had their object been accomplished within the time in the manner expected? As to the doubt expressed by his right hon. friend (Mr. Bathurst) respecting the plan intended to be pursued, he referred him to the evidence of sir Home Popham and lord Castlereagh, from which it appeared that the resolution was to go on to Bathz, as soon as a footing was secured in Walcheren. That the fleet had not at once gone up the Scheldt, was owing to the same cause which prevented the landing of our force at Cadsand on the 30th of July, namely, the state of the weather. If it were not for these impediments, for which it could not surely be meant to make ministers responsible, he maintained that our fleet and army would have reached Bathz, as soon as sir John Hope; namely, by the 3d of August, and, if so, they could have arrived before Antwerp by the 4th or 5th, when it was clear from the evidence there was no adequate force there for its defence. The failure then of this great object was ascribable to causes over which ministers had no control, which indeed they could not reasonably apprehend. Therefore, instead of the observation from the other side, that all circumstances were required to be favourable, in order to insure the arrival of our force in due time at Bathz, he would maintain that unfavourable circumstances alone prevented their arrival—any candid man who followed the evidence would, he was persuaded, admit, that, if our force had reached Antwerp by the 4th or 5th of August, no army could have been formed there to resist the national object of the Expedition. This, however, was an admission, which he did not expect from the gentlemen on the opposite side of the House. Those gentlemen were, on this occasion, seeking their own objects. No doubt they thought it for the benefit of the country to do so, and he would give them credit for the sincerity of that opinion as the ground of their efforts to get into the places occupied by himself and his colleagues. Now he begged to take credit for equal sincerity in thinking it for the benefit of the country to keep them out. (Hear, hear, hear, from the opposition benches) Was he to infer from that cheer that his sincerity was questioned? If so there was a want of reciprocity, and those gentlemen were not willing to allow to others that credit which they claimed for themselves. But what, he would beg the House to reflect, did those gentlemen look for by the Resolutions under discussion? They looked for the punishment of an administration, which had sought a practicable object by competent means, because that object failed through causes, against which it was impossible for any administration to provide. But he trusted that the House would by the adoption of the amendment of his hon. and gallant friend (general Craufurd) which contained a fair character of the whole proceeding, disconcert the means and frustrate the views of those hon. gentlemen.

The right hon. gent. here read the amendment, which had been proposed by general Craufurd, which, he contended, contained a fair description of the grounds of the Expedition. The right hon. gent. however, who preceded him, had referred to the Copenhagen Expedition, which he described as a lasting disgrace to this country; and at the same time stated, that one of the consequences of that Expedition would have been, that we should have had Danish sailors to contend against at Antwerp. With respect to that Expedition, he begged to say, that it was one which government had not engaged in from choice; it was imposed upon them by the imperious necessity of the case; and with respect to our having Danish sailors to contend against in the Scheldt, gentlemen, he was sure, would not deny, that, if that Expedition had not taken place, we should not only have Danish sailors but a Danish fleet to contend with.

He now came to a very important branch of this case, he meant the conduct of his Majesty's ministers in not abandoning Walcheren as soon as the ulterior objects of the Expedition were found to be unattainable. Upon this part of the case more feeling had very naturally been excited than upon any other. No man could speak of it, no man could think of the loss of valuable lives, without the deepest regret. He could not suppose, however, that those who declaimed loudest upon this melancholy subject, really felt more upon it than his Majesty's ministers. Party opposition could hardly be carried to such a length as to induce gentlemen to believe, that the feelings of regret on one side of the House were more acute than they were on the other. But it was one thing to regret the loss of lives, and another to maintain the accusation that that loss was owing to any misconduct of ministers. Gentlemen had contended that Flushing ought to have been given up, when it was found that Antwerp could not be taken. Now he begged to contend most confidently, that, so far from its being his duty to recommend the evacuation of Flushing when the ulterior object failed, that that very circumstance made it of infinitely greater importance to retain it. If we had taken Antwerp and the enemy's fleet, he should have thought our security had been effected; but having left such great naval means in the hands of the enemy, the possession of Walcheren became doubly valuable. He entreated the House to bear always in memory, that in undertaking this Expedition, government had two objects in view, viz. our own safety and the assistance of our ally; and that as long as the war continued, our possession of Walcheren would have been perfectly secure. The question he was now arguing was not whether it was wise to send an Expedition to the Scheldt, but whether Walcheren being in our possession, an island which had been the object of pursuit to so many governments, ministers would have been justified in giving it up without taking every means of ascertaining whether it was possible to retain it or not? Nothing, indeed, but an absolute conviction in his mind that it was impossible to keep Walcheren without a greater expence of men and money than seemed to be within the means of this country, would have induced him to give it up. Men were certainly always bad judges in their own cause, but he felt no difficulty in stating, that if ministers had, upon the first knowledge of the failure of the Expedition, given up Walcheren, they would have been the objects of accusation by the gentlemen opposite, for having adopted that very conduct which they were now blamed for not having pursued.

He entreated the House to consider what was the situation of ministers when they were in possession of a position of such immense importance to the enemy, both in a naval and commercial point of view. He knew there were gentlemen who affected to treat commercial objects with contempt, but his Majesty's ministers could not have been justified in acting upon such a feeling. They knew the commercial importance of Antwerp; they knew that in 1806 the customs of that city were one third more than these of all the other ports of France put together; they knew also, that by retaining Walcheren, the enemy would not only be deprived of that revenue, but of all trade from which it proceeded. It was therefore a question of importance, whether they should give up the key of that commercial town. This he admitted was a small object compared with Antwerp, as a naval station; but certainly it was one which ministers would not have been justified in leaving out if their consideration. It had been stated by his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning,) that the last advice of lord Grey, when he was going out of office to his successors, was, to attend to the growing strength of the enemy in that quarter. The same subject occupied Mr. Pitt's attention in his first and in his second administration, and also the attention of that of lord Sidmouth; and the plan was abandoned, not because the place was not healthy, but because a sufficient disposable force could not be spared for the purpose of attacking it. If the plan of attacking Walcheren had been given up by their different administrations, because theisl and was unhealthy, they would not have recurred, as they did from time to time, to the same project, because that objection would have always applied. His Majesty's ministers had therefore the authority of all these preceding governments in their favour, with regard to the importance of obtaining this object, and it certainly could not be supposed that Mr. Pitt, lord Sidmouth, or lord Grenville meant to have taken Walcheren and to have given it up immediately; they must have meant to retain it

In addition to these high and concurrent authorities, he might have quoted those of lord Nelson, lord St. Vincent, and indeed, of almost every naval officer. It would not be forgotten that the House had before them the letter of sir R. Strachan, pointing out the importance of Walchecheren, and pressing Ministers, in the strongest manner, not to give it up, until he had an opportunity of conversing with them upon the subject. In what a situation would ministers have stood, if, after this letter from sir R. Strachan, they had at once, without examination, without consultation, abandoned the island. If such had been their conduct, how loud would have been the accusations of the gentlemen opposite to him. He felt that against such a charge he should have been unable to make a defence. Let it be recollected that ministers had an opinion before them that Walcheren was tenable, and for that opinion he referred to the evidence of sir H. Popham. It was also to be considered that neither from the dispatches of lord Chatham, nor from any thing the noble lord stated on his return from the Expedition, could ministers collect any thing to weaken the opinion they were induced to adopt, as to the practicability of retaining this island The noble lord, no doubt, urged the propriety of furnishing an adequate garrison, but not a word about the indefensibility of the island. It would, no doubt, be asked, why abandon Walcheren under all these considerations He would answer, in consequence of the second report of sir R. Strachan, which was among the documents on the table—In the first letter, this gallant officer stated, that Walcheren was quite tenable; that a plan for its complete defence was drawing up, and that it ought not to be given up But in the latter report, the gallant officer communicated his opinion, that in consequence of the cessation of the war with Austria, the enemy would be enabled to bring such a force to act against Walcheren, as it would not be in the power of this country with any reasonable proportion of its means, to withstand, ministers therefore determined on the evacuation of the island.

If upon due consideration it had been found expedient to keep the island, means might and would have been taken to secure the health of the troops. Recourse would have been had to floating barracks, for it was to be observed that the sailors were not afflicted with the sickness. Indeed, with our naval means, a considerable part of the garrison of Flushing might have passed a part of the year on the coast of Kent, therefore there was no reason to apprehend that by the retention of that island, any troops Would have been destroyed. And here he would ask it of the candour of hon. gentlemen, if the evacuation of Walcheren was an operation, which could be carried into execution as soon as it had been resolved upon.—If it was or could be made the operation of a day? Supposing that evacuation to have been determined upon at a given time—that it had beet determined upon by his Majesty's minister, as a wise measure to evacuate that island—was there nothing worthy of consideration as to the propriety of the means by which that desirable object was to be carried into effect? The first object of their proceedings must be the removal of their sick. Would the precipitate abandonment of the island have been the best way to secure that object? Or in order to secure the safe and tranquil re-embarkation of the sick, was it not expedient that the healthy troops should be in undisputed possession of the island? Or would it have been a more summary way to have called off the healthy troops at once, and abandoned the sick to their fate? Well, then it is admitted that we should have first brought home our sick; and now let those gentlemen who have been so fine in their random flights at speculative censure, come down for a moment to the simple sobriety of fact. The navy could not bring home our sick—transports must of course have been employed in that melancholy service. After the transports had arrived they necessarily underwent the process of fumigation, and after that, returned to convey the remainder; for we could not command the means of tonnage to convey them all home at once; and then after the sick had been brought home, and not before, commences the evacuation by the healthy part of the troops; even this slight statement was, he believed; sufficient to shew that it was not possible to evacuate Walcheren at the time that it might have been thought expedient to evacuate it.

And this brought him to another question, involving still more conclusive reasons for the subsequent delay in the retentention, than those arising from mere practical difficulties. Would it have been right, under the existing circumstances, to have evacuated Walcheren so precipitately, independently of the physical impracticability of doing so? And now he would state to the House one fact—on the 10th of October the government had received intelligence to their minds satisfactory, that hostilities were on the eve of re-commencing between Austria and France—Now, suppose ministers, after having received that intelligence, had nevertheless determined upon the abandonment of Walcheren, and that hostilities upon the continent had actually recommenced, how easily was it to anticipate the torrent of invective that would have poured upon ministers from the hon. gentle- men opposite for abandoning at such period a conquest before so dearly bought, and then so critically important? Was it a rash supposition to imagine at that time the breaking out of hostilities between Austria and France? Was there nothing in the wavering and uneasy alternations that preceded the treaty of Vienna, to countenance the belief that the contending powers might again rush to arms, and another battle be fought for the political existence of the continent? And if there were grounds for an expectation so anxious, would Walcheren have been nothing in our hands against the common enemy? —Or would it not have been a most desirable, a most important means of annoyance? But there was yet another ground upon which, conjointly with the preceding, he thought the retention of that island defensible. On the 10th of October, for the reasons he had stated, it would have been wrong to have given it up, comparing fairly the good and evil arising out of the act of retention. The good effects he had observed upon—the bad was in one word, sickness—an evil lessening every day. Look to the report of doctor Blane—the distemper uniformly abates in October, and terminates in November. Here then the risks of the evil were momentarily decreasing, while the advantages reasonably to be calculated upon, rose with the crisis itself. At such a crisis, Walcheren ought to have been kept at any hazard, but at that very crisis the hazard proportionably decreased. And yet the gentlemen opposite would have it, that it ought to have been abandoned before the issue of that crisis which might have made it formidable was ascertained. As to the conquest itself, as he had already stated, he had not been without his apprehensions of its risks. But were was the military operation without its hazards? Gentlemen opposite would have an expedition subject to no chances, and secure of intermediate as well as ultimate success. Their theory, he must say, was more perfect than their practice. But still it was insisted upon that Walcheren was unhealthy during part of the year—why St. Lucia was unhealthy—St. Domingo was unhealthy. We retained them; and yet, though beyond comparison more unhealthy, they were beneath comparison with the acknowledged importance of Walcheren. He would detain the House no longer, wearied as was their attention, and exhausted as was the sub- ject. He had reluctantly endeavoured as it were, to drag them along with him through a length of detail that lent him no aid and to which his very humble efforts could impart no interest. He thanked the House for the candour of their attention, and he should sit down with simply stating, that it was his anxious and earnest wish as well as that of his colleagues to retain Walcheren, if that retention could have been practicable; and that their greatest regret was, that it was not possible to retain a conquest, which if retained would have proved invaluable.

The House now became exceedingly anxious for the question, when

rose, and after some time obtained a hearing. He assured the House, that at that late hour in the morning (four o'clock) he would not detain them long, but allusions of a personal nature having been made, he conceived it his duty to reply to them. His Majesty's ministers had been charged with intrigues and cabals, and with having sacrificed by them the lives of many brave men. The hon. gent. who had used that language would not be surprised if he (Mr. D.) should call for something more conclusive than his mere assertion for the truth of it. If my lords Grey and Grenville, and "all the talents" had been in power, the island of Walcheren would not have been evacuated one hour sooner than it was. With respect to the topics which had been urged by the hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett) respecting the answer of the King to the citizens of London, when they presented their address for an inquiry into the failure at Walcheren, his Majesty had stated that there was no necessity to institute any military inquiry. The noble lord (Porchester) had very candidly confessed that no blame was imputable to the military or naval commanders of the Expedition, yet his Resolutions included them in censure. He would ask the gentlemen opposite, whether, when the clamour had been raised against these commanders throughout the country, and when the noble lord did not in his speech attach blame to them, an apology from those gentlemen for having raised the clamour was not necessary, and whether an expression of retraction should not have been expressed in the Resolutions? Did the House think that the interests of the country would be benefited by ministers yielding to the factious clamours of any set of men merely for a momentary gra- tification, and bringing military men to trial, he would not say disgrace, because acquittal must necessarily have followed in that case? Would it be endured he would repeat, that two meritorious officers should be placed in jeopardy for the sake of satisfying the shabby, paltry, and contemptible feelings of any set of men? The right hon. gent. trusted it would operate as a warning to the country in future, and that they could not easily give in to such feelings. When military officers did their duty, as in the present instance, they were entitled to some better reward after being liable to the fortune of war, and it would not be an act of justice in any minister to abandon them.

spoke at considerable length in favour of lord Porchester's Resolutions.

The call for the question was again loudly repeated.

expressed his most perfect conviction, that when a subject, embracing the vital interests of the empire, one in which every man was anxious to ascertain the exercise of that duty which the House of Commons owed its constituents, was in discussion, he could not satisfy his feelings even by voting for the original Resolutions, if the matter was to rest there. He had a confidence that those who felt for the country's calamities, would first support the present Resolutions, and looking forward to the ulterior consideration, which could alone afford the country justice for the past, and guard against similar delinquencies in the future. Those who, on the other hand, could limit their sense of duty to the present Resolutions, would of course support them, inadequate as in his mind they were to any other purpose but the salvation of ministers.

wished to clear up two or three points. We endeavoured to catch the explanation, but the House was so clamorous we could not collect it correctly.

Strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and the House divided on the original Resolutions of lord Porchester.

A second division then took place on the first Resolution of general Craufurd, which was as an Amendment to the original Resolutions.

A third division took place on the omission of the word "nor," which was moved by Mr. Canning,

The fourth division was on the last Resolution of general Craufurd, declaratory of the approbation of the House in the retention of Walcheren, and consequently approving the conduct of Ministers in that respect:

Adjourned on Saturday morning at half past seven.

Mr. Baillie, of Inverness, was shut out in the first division, but voted with the minority in all the subsequent divisions.

Mr. Hobhouse was unable to attend; We are authorized to say, he would have voted in support of all lord Porchester's Resolutions.