moved, "That the order of the day, for resuming the adjourned debate on the motion made upon the 27th day of March last, That a Letter, signed 'Francis Burdett,' and a further part of a paper, intituled, 'Argument,' in Cobbett's Weekly Register of March 24, 1810, is a libellous and scandalous paper, reflecting on the just rights and privileges of this House, be now read:" And the same being read,

rose, and in a low tone of voice proceeded to vindicate the doctrine laid down by the hon. baronet respecting the right of commitment, as claimed and exercised by the House. It was not his intention to discuss the first part of the publication of the hon. baronet, as that on which the greatest stress was laid was entitled the Argument. He was of opinion, notwithstanding all that had been contended to the contrary, that the publication did not come under the cognizance of the House. He cited the authority of chief justice Holt, that neither House of parliament could infringe upon the liberty of the subject. He further quoted from the same authority, that the privileges of parliament were founded upon the laws of the land, and could not be in contradiction to those laws. He stated also, that, in the argument laid down by chief justice De Grey, it was laid down that, as the law of parliament was only known to parliament-men, the public could not be justly answerable for any breach of it. The noble lord then adverted to those personal considerations that must shew that sir Francis Burdett could not have been influenced by any anti-constitutional motives in his public conduct. He derived those well-grounded presumptions from the hon. baronet's amiable private character, his great stake in the country, and his ancient family.

differed most materially from the noble lord who had just sat down, in many points, but in none more than as to his sense of the importance of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wean the feelings of the people of England from the support of that House. The House stood in that peculiar situation, that it behoved it to guard itself equally from the invasions of the influence of the crown on the one side, and the advancement of popular encroachments upon the other; and the best way to do that effectually was uniformly to support its own rights and privileges. These privileges had never been exercised but for the good of the country at large, and it could not be for the benefit of that country to shrink from the discussion, and the support of them. The question now before the House was extremely clear, whether there had been a libellous publication. against the rights and privileges of that House, or not; whether the rights and privileges, so long exercised by that House belonged to it, or not; and if they did, whether the House had or had not, the right of enforcing them. And here he would ask, if it was necessary for the House at that time of day seriously to inquire, whether it had the privileges said to be infringed upon by that publication? The first thing that presented itself in the shape, of even a plausible objection to the existence of the privilege in question was, that this was a libel, and therefore did not come under the head of a contempt of court. Admitting it, however, to be a libel, how did it follow that it was not a breach of privilege? Was it no breach of privilege here, because it was an offence of another kind elsewhere? Or, was it to be said, that because the offence had such extent as to be punishable elsewhere, it was therefore not punishable here, a position which could not be maintained unless the latitude of the crime was to be made a ground of comparative impunity? The offence was indictable in one of the courts of law. What then? Because it was so, were they to pass it over without notice; that was, in other words, were they to be told, that because it was a libel, it could not be a breach of privilege? But it had been argued, that a libel, though a breach of privilege, ought not to be punished as such, but generally as a breach of the peace. Here they had a libel admitted to be a breach of privilege, and that admission ended the argument so far; for if they had privileges they must have the power of supporting them. He, however, denied altogether that an offence amounting to a breach of privilege was removed out of the jurisdiction of that House, because that breach of privilege was also a libel.

The hon. baronet began his Letter with stating, that "the House of Commons having passed a Vote, which amounts to a declaration, that an order of theirs is to be of more weight than Magna Charta and the Laws of the Land." This was an insidious and false way of stating a groundless proposition—a groundless calumny. What was the question? Did the House really act in violation of Magna Charta and the law of the land? What was the law of the land? Where was it to be found? Where were they to look for it? He knew of no place to look for it but in the practice of that House and the other established courts of jurisprudence. What, then, was the privilege claimed by that House?—that that House being a third branch of the legislature, should have the power of preventing or removing all obstructions thrown in the way of the free exercise of its judgment—all contempts must be allowed to be classed under the head of such obstructions—all calumnies circulated against the free exercise of their right of judgment would be admitted at once to be breaches of privilege; and, if such calumnies, instead of evaporating in words, should be elaborately embodied in a printed paper, was the breach of privilege the less, or did it, on that account, cease to be a breach of privilege? Should the House of Commons suffer itself to be run down in such a manner? Was there a common club of the meanest description that had not in itself a power of protecting itself against such calumnies from its own members? Obstructions, it could not be denied by any man, the House had a right to remove; and, not merely personal obstructions, for there were obstructions, which, though not operating by actual personal force, had yet the same effect in ultimately influencing the decisions of that House, Whatever went to prevent the free exercise of the judgment of that House was a virtual obstruction, and as such ought to be removed. Were such obstructions altogether unprecedented? Had they been in other times unusual? How had the vote been carried against lord Stratford? Had the exercise of the judgment of the House been free and uncontrouled in that instance? When the walls were placarded with menaces, and members hooted and halloo'd by the mob as Straffordians, as they passed to and from the House:^* And why might they not do the same to-morrow? Aye, but then it might be said that hooting was more like a personal obstruction than placarding and posting upon the walls. But was nothing to be construed as an obstruction but what was personally so? Were there no such things as constructive obstructions? Impediments which were not actually personal, but which had virtually the same effect. Libels came exactly up to the case of constructive obstructions. The privileges of that House were essentially necessary to its existence, and as calumny was the most dangerous assailant their privileges could have, was it to be supposed that the putting that calumny in writing took from the House the right of protecting itself against its influence by the punishment of the author? Or was the House compelled, in such a case, to wait the slow progress of an indictment? a remedy, that after all would not apply to the offence, as an offence against the privileges of that House. The courts below to which they would in that case apply, would not look upon the offence as a breach of privilege, they would not take cognizance of it in that view: they would try it as a breach of the peace, and not as a breach of their privileges.

The next question was, if they had those privileges, had they the power of judging of offences against their own privileges? And here perhaps, he ought to apologize to the Chair for merely asking that question; for if the House of Commons was not judge of its own privileges, and the only judge of those privileges, he for his part did not know how the House of Commons could be said to exist at all. In his judgment their independence was totally gone when any other power than themselves was allowed to be judge of their privileges; and in saying this, was he claiming more for the House of Commons than belonged to the lowest court? The lowest court could punish for contempt, and, what was more, no court would interfere in commitments for contempt by any other. So that the House by inforcing this privilege asked for nothing more than what belonged to every other court. That House had therefore the power of judging of its own privileges, and of protecting those privileges. That power, however, like every other power, admitted of abuse: but the abuse of a thing was no argument against its existence. As to the charge of abuse of its power, the House of Commons might with confidence appeal to the past. It would be found that, for the List three hundred years, in the same proportion as their authority had become more solid and extended, had their exercise of that power been calm, moderate, and prudent.

^* See 2 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. 753.

But it had been said that a breach of privilege was no contempt. This objection he did not answer, only because he did not understand it. If a breach of their privileges was not a contempt of their authority, he did not know what contempt was. Again, it was objected, that if they were the judges of their own privileges, they might make what privileges they pleased. But had they done so? Let them look back, and they would see, that that House had never been fond of creating new privileges, they had privilege enough to uphold their own independence, and vindicate their constitutional authority, and one, and perhaps the most important of those privileges, was to prevent their deliberations from being impeded by the attacks of calumny. The calumny, in the present instance, came from one, who had set himself high on the side of the people. He would put the case, that that the same attempts to run down the character and authority of that House had been made by the crown, or he should rather say the servants of the crown, and he would ask, in that case, what would have been the language of the gentlemen who were now so moderate and so full of doubts upon the present question? Would those gentlemen have been quite so calm and considerate as they now appeared to be? or would not the House have heard from them different language and in a much higher tone? But whatever their language might be, he would take the same part in either case, and impartially defend the privileges and authority of that House against both. Committal for contempt was, however, not much disputed, as being that which the House had done at all times.

It had been said, that the right of committing for libel could not be traced. He admitted that it could not. They could not trace the fact, from the very simple reason, that libels must have been subsequent to the invention of the art of printing—printing must have been common before a case of libel could have occurred. But if they could not trace the fact, they could easily trace the principle. That did not depend upon the fact of printing. Courts had uniformly punished calumnious expressions. That House had been in possession of the right of doing so from its earliest stage; and the principle upon which it exercised that right was not altered by the calumny appearing in a printed form. He was very far indeed from being disposed to panegyrize the wisdom or prudence of the hen. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge), in forcing the attention of the House to the libel now before them. But, now that it was before them, and that they were called upon either to stand by, or to renounce their privileges, he admitted that there was no receding from the broad question. It was a remark that would be found to hold without one exception, that whether the government was in the hands of the whigs or the tories, this power of committal had been always exercised by that House, and in every instance of that exercise having been questioned by an appeal to the courts of law, the right was uniformly confirmed by their decision; the courts of law having uniformly justified that power upon the same grounds upon which they professed to hold their own.

He was surprised at the noble lord's citing a publication of the House of Lords respecting their own privileges, as an authority to weigh with that House in determining upon their's. He would refer that noble lord to the answer given to that publication for the vindication of the privileges of that House. In all times the House punished for libel as an attack upon their privileges. The case of the King versus Flower was a proof of this. He did not want to borrow support from the other House, but he had no objection to their aid where their cases properly applied. Crosby, the Lord Mayor of London, was sent to the Tower. He applied to the Common Pleas for his Habeas Corpus; the other person taken up with him, and committed by virtue of the same warrant, applied to the King's Bench for his Habeas also? The Habeas was refused in both instances. Lord De Grey, a great constitutional lawyer, an upright judge, and an honest man, remanded the Lord Mayor, and why? because the reason assigned for commitment was deemed sufficient contempt on the face of the warrant. That great lawyer pronounced the House of Commons to be the judges of its own privileges. The law of their privileges was to be found in their own adjudications of those privileges and their mode of punishment was that of commitment. But what were the words of Lord De Grey, in speaking of this right of commitment on the part of the House—"They have a right to commit, because it is necessary they should." This was the reason assigned by lord De Grey, and the moment they parted with the right of judging their own privileges, that moment they ceased to be independent.

The case of Alexander Murray was another in which the right of the House to commit had been tried by an application for an Habeas Corpus, and confirmed. Murray was remanded. The case of the Kentish petition was also in point. At that time the parliament was a Tory one; the ministers, Tory; the six persons who presented the petition were committed—in the course of that year there was a change of Ministers; and the next year there was a Whig ministry, and a Whig parliament. What did they? They not only followed up the proceedings of their predecessors, but embodied them into Resolutions; so that here was a case, where in the heat of party contest, men differing upon every other subject, agreed upon this point of privilege; this was in 1701. The case of Chief Justice Holt was greatly relied upon; but let gentlemen remember, that if Lord Chief Justice Holt was of one opinion, the other eleven Judges were of an opposite opinion. Besides, were they to be told, that the authority of other great lawyers went for nothing? The hon. baronet had made light of the names of De Grey, Mansfield, and Kenyon; those sages of modern times; but it did not follow, that the House would think as lightly of them as the hon. baronet. Besides, lord Holt never denied the right of the House to commit for contempt. Lord Holt merely questioned the limits, whereas the hon. baronet denied the existence of the power; and he candidly cited the authority of lord Holt in aid of his own opinion, as if the authority that objected to the excess of the power, was fairly to be brought forward as an evidence, that the power did not exist at all! He mentioned this, therefore, merely to guard the House against confounding the opinions of the hon. baronet with the judgments of lord Holt. He therefore was warranted in repeating, that the House of Commons in their assertion of this right, was claiming nothing more than what of right belonged to the lowest and most confined jurisdiction. Of all their privileges, none was more important to them than that of preserving their authority from those contumelious and licentious calumnies which had a tendency to shake their dignity by lowering their character in public estimation. Attacks of this description, no matter how embodied, or from what quarter directed, whether from a mob out of doors, or one of their own members from within, the privileges of that House were equally competent to resist and punish whatever form they assumed, whether they appeared in the shape of a libel or of a personal breach of the peace; they would in either case be no less breaches of privilege, and as such, subject to the undisputed cognizance of that House.

With respect, then, to the hon. baronet, he would say, that as to the course he had taken up, it appeared to him to be an hopeless one; at least, he might be allowed to say, that the reasoning, upon which his doctrines had been founded, did not appear to him calculated to impress conviction upon those who read it; the arrangement was bad, and the management of the argument was worse. The question, in fact, had been often agitated; it had been the subject of many pamphlets in the time of Wilkes. The proceedings in the year 1701, and on the question involving the legal jurisdiction of the House of Lords in the case of Ashby and White, all these sources furnished ample matter to the hon. baronet, but he might have borrowed with more selection than he had done. Indeed, the pamphlet of the hon. baronet teemed with evidence of dull, clumsy, ill-digested plagiarism, old and exploded doctrines revived without even their original strength, and put so badly, as if they were either wholly misunderstood, or stupidly misapplied; and this naturally brought him to the consideration of the importance of the pamphlet in question. He could not help think- ing it (whatever it was meant to be) a very harmless production, and he could lave wished that the zeal of the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge) had been better tempered. If the notice of that House had not been forced to that pamphlet, it would have died the natural death of the nonsense that had gone before it. While, however, he acknowledged the pamphlet to be any thing but mischievous, he could not help observing upon the gross want of candour that distinguished most of its quotations and mis-statements. In the motto, the opinion of Judge Blackstone was given at large upon the right of personal liberty, from the third book of his Commentaries. Now, it was unfortunate for the hon. baronet's quotation, that Blackstone was himself one of the Judges who remanded the Lord Mayor of London, Crosby; and as to the candour, the hon. baronet could not have been ignorant, that, in the same work, the King's Bench is stated to have the power of bailing all persons committed on charge of certain offences, save those committed by either House of Parliament. Another instance of the candour of the hon. baronet was, his putting into what he called his Argument so many things that had not been uttered by him in that House; thereby wishing to make the House an instrument of its own disgrace, in tacitly succumbing to the avowal of such doctrines. Again, he lays it down in another part of this pamphlet, with equal candour,—"We may reasonably conclude, that all the privileges the House of Commons then thought itself intitled to, were enumerated in the order of the 1st of June, 1621, as sir Edward Coke, so well acquainted with, and then contending for them against the undue prerogative of the crown, claimed no more."

But the fact was, that the House then, as in all other cases, was employed in vindicating not the whole detail of their privileges, but the individual right and privilege in question. The pamphlet was, he repeated, deserving only of contempt, and he-had therefore not the slightest apprehension as to any effect it could have upon the sound good sense of the people of England; at the same time, the privileges of that House could never suffer from discussion—the more they were discussed, the firmer they would stand. What the House meant to do, he was at a loss to know. The pamphlet appeared to him to be an aukward compilation of very bad arguments in very bad language; and he must again repeat his wish that such a work had been left to its own fate. He (could not extol the wisdom or the prudence of the hon. gent. (Mr. Lethbridge), in visiting it with a character of importance so foreign to its own merits. He would advise that hon. gent. the next time he felt his zeal prompting him so hastily, to pause a little to consider the ulterior consequences a first step in such matters might lead to. He would advise that hon. gent. before he took a similar proceeding in future, to consult with others whose experience might be found to equal his own, and whose counsel might prove no unworthy or unnecessary accession to the native resources of his own practical wisdom.

expressed himself to be the more desirous to follow the learned gentleman, because, though a gentleman of so grave authority, he found himself compelled to say, that he differed from him widely, on almost every point to which he had alluded. The hon. gent. who brought forward the motion, had abstained from stating what were his views of the subject, and this he had a right to complain of on the part of the House. In this respect the hon. gent. had left the question entirely open to conjecture of every kind. He had not failed, however, to inform the House, how much he had been alarmed by the speech of the hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett), and how anxious he felt to see a check given to the practices in which that hon. baronet had been in the habit of indulging. Such an effect, indeed, had the speech of his hon. friend, the worthy baronet, had on the hon. mover, that, as he himself expressed it, "his hair stood on end." This conduct of the hon. mover had been attended with disagreeable effects; for, from this circumstance of their being in utter ignorance of the ideas of the hon. mover, every gentleman had taken an opposite view of the matter. Some complained of one expression, others of another. The hon. and learned gent. who had just sat down, accused his hon. friend of inaccuracy, but principally of bad taste. The motion of the hon. mover went to this, That the publication of the worthy baronet was a scandalous and libellous paper. The learned gent. who had just sat down, however, had taken no steps to prove that the publication was scandalous or libellous; he only attempted to shew, that it exhibited proofs of bad taste, but, in his conclusion admitted, that it could do no harm. The learned and hon. gent. Also accused his hon. friend of want of candour, and for proof of it, referred to the quotation on the title page. This might have proceeded from inadvertence to accidental inaccuracy; but, supposing that not to have been the case, want of candour could be no ground for complaining to that House. The right hon. and learned baronet, however, before he accused his hon. friend of want of candour, should be certain that he had acted with complete candour himself. He had referred to the Resolution of the House in the year 1621, in which the privileges of the House were enumerated, and in the giving of which he accused his hon. friend of having made an omission, whereas in fact, the Resolutions referred to by the right hon. and learned gent. were those of December,1621 and his hon. friend referred to those of June, 1621, drawn up, as was supposed, by lord Coke.

Another hon. and learned gent. the other day, had complained of the publication in question, in as far as it presumed to doubt of the legality of the Speaker's warrant. The jet of his hon. friend's argument, however, was fair on this point; and if he Could question the validity of such a warrant at all, was exactly such as he must be supposed to have used. Before gentlemen pronounced the worthy baronet guilty of so serious an offence as that which the motion inferred, on a ground such as this, they were bound to look to the opinions of authors of reputation and weight, on the subject of warrants, and to their description of those which bore the marks of being legal or illegal. Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, talking of legal warrants, laid it down that four things were necessary in them; as, the hand and seal of the person by whom the warrant was granted; lawful authority on the part of the person granting the warrant; lawful cause for granting it; and, a lawful conclusion. In all of these respects, so far, at least, as they could be seen on the face of the warrant itself, the paper authorising the commitment of Gale Jones was deficient; Was it not, therefore, too much to lay it down, that for a person unlearned in the law to hold, agreeably to the opinion of writers on that subject, that such a warrant was illegal, was a gross and scandalous libel? Another right hon. and learned gent. had laid great stress on the word "resist," as if it was an expression of a most indefensible nature. If gentlemen took the whole of the paper together, they would, however, find the word "resist" uniformly coupled with some words, importing that nothing but a legal resistance was contemplated. They would see, "to resist" the doctrine," "to resist with their "voice," &c. It was impossible, he contended, without giving to the words a forced construction, that any thing improper could be inferred from them. If the House was in any doubt on this subject, he held in his hand certain declarations of the great lord Chatham, which must at once convince them how dangerous and unconstitutional it would be to give such a construction to a term so innocent in itself. In these declarations the noble lord expressed a hope, that old as he was, he might see this House, of which he was then a member, and the country in general, once more united to oppose a despotic minister; he hoped to see measures fairly disputed; if not, might discord prevail for ever. It was of no consequence, the noble lord contended, whether the question was stated as applying to a despotic minister, or to the House of Commons. When they saw an authority such as this, he presumed the House would be slow, on a word of so slight a meaning, of passing so severe a judgment.

There was another offence also imputed to his hon. friend with equal injustice, as if he wished to represent the Bill of Rights as having been converted into a Bill of Wrongs. This was by no means the fact. The reverse indeed, was the case, as any gentleman might see who chose to read the passage throughout.—Here the noble lord quoted the whole passage as it stands in sir F. Burdett's Letter, which runs thus:—

"But in order that nothing may be wanting to render truly ludicrous every part of this proceeding, which, inverting the laws of the drama, as well as all other laws, begins with a farce, and ends with a tragedy; the House of Commons imprison Mr. Jones—under the sanction of what law, think ye? The Bill of Rights. Well might Paine call it the Bill of Wrongs, if it could be thus converted into an instrument to oppress and destroy the liberties of the people; those, liberties for which it was expressly framed, claimed, demanded, and insisted upon to protect. Mr. Yorke has discovered a new meaning in the Bill of Rights; and, because the Bill of Rights declares that a member of parliament cannot be questioned any where out of parliament for words spoken therein, he has sapiently concluded, that the people are prohibited from exercising their understanding, for the purpose of discussing or censuring the conduct of the gentlemen who sit in that House," &c. On reading this passage gentlemen would be convinced, that though Mr. Yorke might be entitled to find fault with it, the House had no right to complain, still less any constitutional power to punish for it. The hon. baronet, so far from reflecting on the House, had gone out of his way to liberate them from any charge on this head. Another passage had been alluded to as the ground of serious charge against his hon. friend. The passage was that, where (speaking of the House of Commons), the hon. bart. stated that they, "inflated with their high blown fanciful ideas of majesty, and tricked out in the trappings of royalty, think privilege and protection beneath their dignity, assume the sword of prerogative, and lord it equally over the king and the people." Now, he must say, whatever might be attempted in the way of ridicule, that he agreed with an hon. and learned gent. below him (sir S. Romilly), that he did not clearly understand this passage. Yet, whatever these words were, every one of them, he believed, had been before used by the hon. bart. in his place in that House, when he moved for the liberation of Gale Jones. He was sure they had been used by him on other occasions. He did not state that as a justification, but only as to the fact of their not being unprecedented. As far as he could make out their meaning by the context, he presumed that by "assuming the sword of prerogative, and lording it equally over the king and people," was meant the power assumed by the House of Commons, of punishing where the law did not order it, and of doing acts beyond what the king or the other branch of the legislature had the power to do. That was the best interpretation that he could put upon it. The passage might perhaps be offensive; and they were told, that it was the more injurious as it was unintelligible. There might really be some ingenuity in this reasoning; but he could not perceive why the House should be the more inclined to punish, when sitting in judgment on a passage they did not clearly understand, It was called scandalous and libellous. He spoke in the hearing of learned persons when he said, he believed, that to be scandalous, it must be false, and to be libellous, a bad intention must be shewn; which he had not yet heard urged. He could see no right to infer any bad motive from this publication, unless it were from the word "Resist;" for which, he declared, he could find no ground.

The right hon. and learned gent. however, had said, that the paper in question reflected on the just rights and privileges of the House. The House, therefore, was called on to determine not only on the scandalous and libellous nature of the publication in question, but also on the justice of its own rights and privileges. The paper in question, it was to be observed, was one in which the worthy baronet proposed to explain to his constituents, more fully than in the usual method, his sentiments on a particular question. The noble lord did not pretend to know how far that was right. He was aware that it was considered as a violation of their rules, that any account of their proceedings should be made public; but of this he was also certain, that for many years the violation of this rule had been systematically connived at, till the infringement of the order had become more a matter of right than the observance of it. It was well known however, that even while the right of keeping their proceedings secret from the public was rigidly acted up to, it was the constant and uniform practice of members to send to their constituents, daily, weekly and monthly accounts of their proceedings, particularly so far as the individual member was himself concerned. Gentlemen were, therefore, to determine, if this was an allowable practice in members of that House, whether in a case of this kind, they were entitled to proceed entirely from recollection, particularly when so many, members were present now, who had not been present when the speech of the worthy bart., so communicated by him to his constituents, was made? In considering this question, too, the House must take into view that they were called on to pronounce this a libel in the particular circumstances he had mentioned. No person, the noble lord presumed, would venture to assert, if one were satisfied that the right did not exist, that he was not entitled to say so. In the first place, therefore, the question to be considered was, what was a privilege? The definition of the term seemed to imply, that it was an exemption from the law as applied to others. This clearly implied that such privilege must be distinctly defined. The ancient privileges of the House were, freedom of speech; and freedom from arrest for themselves, and even for their servants, except in cases of treason, felony or breach of the peace. The noble lord believed, the reason of these privileges was to prevent the members from being impeded in giving their personal attendance in parliament; what was complained of in the present case, however, did not come under any of them. The right hon. and learned baronet said, that freedom from libel was necessary for the members of the House to enable them to give their minds to the consideration of the subject, which might chance to be before them. It would be giving a wide interpretation indeed, to the privileges of the House, to maintain that they were to be extended to the length now contended for. As to hissing or hooting the members in coming, to or returning from the House, that was very different from the present case. He was far from objecting to the right of the House, to remove obstructions to its proceedings, but the present was not a case of that kind. The right hon. and learned Master of the Rolls had stated, that it was necessary the House should have the power of commitment. He did not state, however, that it was necessary they should have this power as a privilege. Chief justice De Grey, too, had said, that it was necessary the House should have this power. What was this but saying, that it was necessary the House should have the power of removing all obstructions to their proceedings, a power which nobody thought of denying? Here, however, there was nothing of that kind. In the offence committed by Jones there was nothing that could have obstructed the proceedings of that House, had no question been raised on the subject. In former cases they had gone on equally well without any committal. They had done so in the cases of Stockdale and of Reeves.

It had been said by the right hon. and learned baronet, that all courts had a power to punish for contempt against themselves. Then, he submitted, it was necessary to shew what contempt was. It must, he was satisfied, be something calculated to obstruct the proceedings of the court, or to load it with contumely. Lord Kenyon had laid it down that contempt might be committed out of court; but he had only adduced one instance to this effect, which was the case of an Under-Sheriff, who had neglected his duty in putting in force the process of the court. In the Court of King's bench, Mr. Bingley, a bookseller, had been brought before lord Mansfield, charged with publishing libels against the court, and on his refusal to answer, insisting that he had a right to be tried by his peers, was committed to prison, where he was detained for two years, still refusing, during the whole of the time, to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. Finally, he was discharged on the motion of the Attorney General, on the ground that his imprisonment had been of longer duration, probably, than he might have suffered had he received judgment for the offence. This, however, instead of being an argument for, was an aggravation of the offence originally committed, and which had been weekly and daily repeated by Mr. Bingley during the whole of that period. If a contempt, therefore, had in that case been committed in the first instance, it had been aggravated, and the court had been foiled in the attempt to punish it. In the recent case of Hart and White, printer and proprietor of a newspaper called the Independent Whig, for a libel against the court of King's bench, that court had not proceeded against them as for contempt, but they had been tried, and were convicted by their peers. In the same way on former occasions, that House had not committed Stockdale and Reeves for contempt, but had ordered prosecutions against them.

An hon. gent. had asked, if the worthy baronet denied the right of that House to commit any person not a member of the House, why did he not object to the committal, during the last session, of Huxley Sandon? That case, however, had no relation to the present case; there then was an obstruction of the proceedings of the House. It was essential that the House should have it in their power to take every step to enforce the exercise of their own privileges as a court of inquiry. If, there-fore, they had a power to examine witnesses at the bar, it was essential to the due exercise of this right that they should be entitled to inforce compliance with it. He contended, however, that the House was entitled to exercise this power only in the removing of obstructions to their own proceedings.—At one time it had been assumed as the privilege of that House to imprison a man for a week, a month, a year, or any other indefinite period. Now, however, it was admitted, that no such power existed. It was obvious, therefore, that this could not be meant for punishment. The House could only commit during its own sitting, thereby clearly shewing that the power was conferred solely to prevent the obstruction of their own proceedings. If otherwise, and the power were given them for the sake of punishment, what would be the inference? that for a petty breach of privilege one man who was guilty of it on the first day of the meeting of parliament might be at their mercy possibly for seven years, while another person who had committed a grievous offence on the last day of their sitting must be liberated, on the very same day?, If the power, therefore, was meant to be conferred for the sake of punishing offenders, he submitted that this uncertainty could not have been tolerated. The privileges of that House were to be regulated by Magna Charta and the law of the land; and Magna Charta itself declared that the subjects of this country were to be imprisoned only 'per judicium parium, vel legem terræ.' Even in the reign of Charles the 1st, there was a direct acknowledgment to this effect, by the three branches of the legislature, where it is declared that no freeman can be confined or detained in prison:—That a writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be denied to any man:—And that, if any one should be committed without just cause, he ought to be delivered up or bailed. This was at a time when the House was assuming to itself great powers, and when it was contending with the crown as to the power of commitment. The House of Lords, too, had declared this right on the part of the Commons, to be an assumption of power against law. And in the case of Asby and White, it had been resolved, that neither House had any such power, so far as it was not warranted by act of parliament. These Resolutions passed during periods of heat and contention, and when the House had assumed powers which nobody would venture to deny were illegally assumed. Undoubtedly, the House would not go to the Journals of the House of Lords learn what their privileges were; but when they were called on to make a moderate use of their privileges, they could hardly act amiss in seeing what were the opinions of others on the subject of these privileges. Each of the three branches were at all times anxious enough to deny such a privilege to each other; but they were all, in their turns, alike eager to assert it to themselves.

There was another circumstance, too, which might be worthy of consideration. "On what ground did either House claim this privilege?" The House of Lords might assert it in their legal capacity; but that House could lay claim to it only as a branch of the legislature. The right hon. and learned gentleman who spoke last, had said it was necessary that no slur should be cast on that House. Were they, however, to be in this respect more protected than the crown? The crown could do no more than order a prosecution in case of a libel against its authority: so could that House without resorting to the present extraordinary privilege, without which they would be equally protected with the crown.—The right hon. and learned gentleman, however, went on to say, that this privilege was agreeable to law, and that there were instances of complaints of the kind from the earliest period, when there was any necessity for making them. This he denied: as the first instance of such a complaint was in the case of Hall, in the reign of queen Elizabeth. The right hon. and learned gentleman had also said, that there had been a regular and undisputed custom of committing on such charges. This he must also deny. In the case of Crosby and Oliver, the House had undoubtedly proceeded to commitment, and the judge had refused them the benefit of the Habeas Corpus, although it was declared to be the right of every man, but this they had done on the ground, that these two persons had been committed for an infringement of the law of parliament, which was unknown. This, he presumed to think was a dangerous doctrine, but he left it to abler hands to discuss it. In the case of Mr. Wilkes, however, the House had not ventured to commit, for he had resisted their authority. There were only two cases of the kind in which resistance had been made, and in both of these the commitment had been prevented. In the year 1680, Mr. Stowell was ordered to be committed, but he resisted the order, and the House finding itself in a dilemma, voted that he was sick, and could not be brought up till a distant day. The other case was that of Mr. Wilkes, who having refused to attend in consequence of the order of the House, the House again fixed the Friday for his attendance and to avoid meeting the question, adjourned on the Thursday.

The noble lord then proceeded to notice the case of the Kentish petitioners. One of these, a Mr. Culpepper, afterwards petitioned against a return of one of the members, alleging that he had the greatest number of legal votes, and a Committee of that House reported on his petition, that he being one of the petitioners in the scandalous Kentish petition, was not duly elected. Could there, he asked, be a stronger specimen of the feelings of such a parliament, and of the danger of such an arbitrary right as this? He begged the House to recollect that the two cases decided by chief justice De Grey were determined on this ground, that the law of parliament was unknown. Lord Shaftesbury too, was refused to be released on similar grounds, but from this additional reason also, that he had been guilty of a breach of privilege in facie curiœ, so that his conduct might have amounted to an obstruction. Were the subjects of this country to be tried by a law which was not known? Were they even to become amenable to a secret tribunal? If the House had a right to call before them persons not members of the House, to answer for their conduct, would not such persons in reality become subject to a secret tribunal? Would they not be deprived of their fair trial by their peers? become subject to a tribunal not bound down by the solemnity of an oath; and where the privilege of counsel would not be allowed them?

He had felt it his duty to say thus much as to what he conceived to be the law on this subject. He had done so to shew what would be the grievous oppression to which the public must be exposed, if persons, not members of that House, were liable to be so called on and so treated. He hoped the House would recollect that they were called on to determine a question of the most grave consideration, and which was so doubtful in the opinion of a great majority of that House, that they adjourned the consideration of it for a week. The worthy baronet had not had the opportunity of hearing the observations against him, or of making any reply to them; he hoped, therefore, the House would come to the consideration of the question not with the feelings of advocates but of judges. The hon. gent. who had brought forward the motion stated it to be his object to give a check to such observations as he had been accustomed to hear from the worthy bart. The hon. gent. who seconded the motion stated it to be his object to repress jacobinism; and a third gent., on a former night had said, that no person could doubt as to the opinions and views of sir Francis Burdett. He trusted the House was not prepared to come to a decision on so important a question with such feelings as these; but that they were prepared dispassionately to say, whether the publication in question was or was not a scandalous libel, reflecting on the just privileges of that House. For his own part, he thought it was not. He felt, however, that the House was in a dilemma on the subject, and therefore should move that the other orders of the day be now read.

said he did not think it possible to overstate the importance of the paper then under the consideration of the House, because it attacked, in the most gross and violent manner, the just privileges of that House, without a due respect for which they must soon sink into insignificance—because the present were not ordinary times, nor was the hon. baronet, who was the author of it, an ordinary man. The hon. baronet had, for a length of time, in furtherance and support of his favourite child—a reform in the representation of the House of Commons—taken every opportunity to blacken the character of the House. From time to time, the House had heard that they had not a leg to stand on; and in the course of the last session the hon. bart. had even said, that the only place in which the people of England were treated with contempt was in the House of Commons. Some gentlemen had, in extenuation of many passages in this paper, said, that they were nonsense; he had no inclination or intention to deny the truth of the observation; but that, in his mind, made very little difference. Certain facts, stated in a certain way, might be equally mischievous m their tendency and effect, whether done nonsensically or with ability; and, if the House wished their privileges should not be trampled under foot, it was high time to assert them. The noble lord had said a great deal on the word resist—but all he had said amounted only to this, that it meant humble petitions. He was, however, of dif- ferent opinion; for when this word came to be coupled with and applied to particular passages of the hon. baronet's Letter to his Constituents, it would appear to mean a resistance much more forcible and energetic, and what was meant to lead to very different results than those of humble petitions. The hon. bart. had said, the decision of the House of Commons was greater than the law of the land. He had also said:

"It is therefore now time to resist the doctrine upon which Mr. Jones has been sent to Newgate; or it is high time to cease all pretensions to those liberties which were acquired by our fore-fathers, after so many struggles and so many sacrifices."

"Either the House of Commons is authorized to dispense with the laws of the land, or it is not. If the constitution be of so delicate a texture, so weak a frame, so fragile a substance, that is to be only spoken of in terms of admiration, and to be viewed merely as a piece of curious but unprofitable workmanship; if Magna Charta, and all the wholesome laws of England be a dead letter; in that case, the affirmative of the proposition may be admitted; but if the constitution lives, and is applicable to its ends; namely, the happiness of the community, the perfect security of the life, liberty, and property of each member, and of all the members of society, then the affirmative of the proposition can never be admitted; then must we be freemen, for we need no better security, no more powerful protection for our rights and liberties, than the laws and constitution."

"To these laws we have a right to look with confidence for security; to these laws the individual now imprisoned has through me applied for redress in vain. Those who have imprisoned him have refused to listen to my voice, weakly expressing the strong principles of the law, the undeniable claims of this Englishman's birthright. Your voice may come with more force, may Command greater respect, and, I am not without hope, that it may prove irresistible, if it proclaim to this House of Commons, as the tongues of our ancestors proclaimed to the kings of old, Nolumus leges Angliœ mature, or in more clear and not less forcible language, The laws of England shall not be changed."

These passages, he must contend, meant a resistance far beyond the noble lord's explanation of humble petitions. The hon. baronet had set out with saying the House had no power to commit; there was he said, no period in the history of the country in which the House had not enjoyed and exercised that right, though he confessed it had always been exercised with the greatest leniency. The noble lord then adverted to the committal of the messenger of the House by the lord mayor in 1771. In that case the House ordered Wilkes to attend, but he refused to do so, unless they sent for him as member for Middlesex. He was ordered to attend on the 8th, and they afterwards adjourned to the 9th, because, for reasons best known to themselves, they did not then chuse to enter into a controversy with him.—In the case of Woodfall, who had published a libel against the Speaker, Woodfall was sent for, and gave up the author, John Horne. Horne was then sent for, but having more wit about him than many other men, he desired to be informed whether he was sent for as a witness, or on a charge. He was told there was a charge against him, and he appeared. He escaped, however, any further notice, because no charge could be made out against him. The noble lord said, it would be an abuse of the time of the House to waste more of it, by endeavouring to shew that this paper was a gross and scandalous libel on its character, and a breach of its privileges; the manner in which the hon. baronet had mentioned the Speaker's Warrant would be conclusive on the subject. "Let this instrument, this thing sui generis, be contrasted with the description above given, of the properties of a lawful warrant. Does it not evidently appear that this piece of unsealed paper, signed by the Speaker, by which an untried subject has been outlawed, bears no feature of legality? And that from the commencement of this proceeding, in its progress, and to its conclusion, there is not one single step that has not been marked with disrespect for the laws—a disrespect in which all the parts have been wonderfully consistent throughout, in constituting the most unlawful act the mind of man can possibly conceive."

It would be endless to point out all the passages, that contained injurious and insulting reflections upon the character and conduct of that House, he should therefore content himself with calling the attention to one or two other paragraphs which struck him as peculiarly calumnious. One was that where in the hon. baronet charges the House with the assumption of the power to inflict arbitrary and unlimited punishments.

"Then, again, as to the kind of punishment, if they have the absolute power of imprisoning and releasing, why may they not send their prisoners to York gaol as to one in London? Why not confine men in solitary cells, or load them with chains and bolts? They have not gone these lengths yet; but what is there to restrain them, if they are to be the sole judges of the extent of their powers; and if they are to exercise those powers without any controul, and without leaving the parties whom they choose to punish any mode of appeal, any means of redress?"

There was also a passage in which the hon. baronet spoke of that House as being the lower or inferior branch of the legislature: "They (the House) have become the proprietors, by burgage tenure, of the whole representation; and in that capacity, inflated with their high blown, fanciful ideas of majesty, and tricked out in the trappings of royalty, think privilege and protection beneath their dignity, assume the sword of prerogative, and lord it equally over the King and the people." His lordship said, he did not know the meaning of it; but it was certainly a very great abuse of the House of Commons. The hon. baronet had been pleased to refer to the Roman Satirist, who, when lashing the vices of a corrupt country, particularly upbraids the absence of feeling generally exhibited for the sufferings of small men in humble stations. The poor man may lose his goods and all his effects. Should his house be burned to the ground, no one troubles himself about it; but if misfortune touches the great, then all partake of the general sorrow.

"Magna Arturii cecidit domus, &c.

"Tunc gemimus casus urbis; tunc odimus ignem."

"Poor Codrus excites no sympathy," &c.

This was an insinuation the House has never deserved. He had not heard, nor could conceive, that the House ever oppressed a poor man. He could conceive a poor man committing a gross and scandalous libel on the House, and also a powerful man who could write a still more scandalous libel in defence of him; and as the hon. baronet had in the House admitted that libel to be his, he thought it high time for the House to assert its privileges, and he should therefore vote for the Resolutions.

observed, that when this question was before under consideration, he felt it to be his duty to impress upon the House, the necessity of allowing time for the, fullest deliberation of so important a subject. Since, that period he had given it all the attention in his power: yet after all the consideration that he had bestowed on it, he must say, that if it was true, as had been stated by gentlemen opposite, that he was the only person who entertained doubts; of those doubts he was not ashamed. He had now to congratulate the House upon the disposition that was manifested to meet the discussion with that degree of temper and deliberation which was suited to its importance. He congratulated it upon the change which had taken place in its tone and feelings upon this question. They had not that night heard of carrying it with acclamation. There was happily a cessation of those warm, indignant, and intemperate emotions, under the influence of which many were disposed on the former occasion to precipitate the decision. The result of such a satisfactory change must be, that though the decision to which the House would now come, should be the same decision as it would have pronounced upon the former night, still it was impossible, but that the House must declare its determination, in a manner much more creditable to itself, as well as more calculated to acquire that respect from the people, which, upon every principle, was always to be desired. In taking into its consideration the nature of the publication complained of, the House had two questions to discuss: First, whether it was a libel at all, and, next, whether it was expedient to acquiesce in the Resolutions proposed. For his own part, he was free to admit, that he still entertained doubts; first, whether this publication was a libel; and next, whether it intrenched upon the privileges of that House. In order fairly to consider the full bearing of the question, it was absolutely necessary to review it, from the very circumstance in which it originated, to the motions now proposed. Such a course was absolutely necessary before they could justly pronounce against the present publication. The hon. baronet who was the author of it had complained of a proceeding of that House against a subject of these realms as, in his opinion, highly illegal. Another hon. member of the House, indignant at such complaint, had submitted certain resolutions, declaring the conduct of the hon. baronet a gross, and scandalous offence. The House, therefore, before it could pronounce upon the present paper, must he aware that it could not, without a strange departure from justice, do so, without considering the nature of the other, case, namely, its right to commit Mr. Jones, Whatever impression, therefore, some expressions in the publication of the hon. baronet might probably make, if in the main view of the original question, that was, the imprisonment of Mr. Jones, he (sir Francis) should turn out to be right, surely such a conclusion must have the effect of mitigating the impropriety of any strong or offensive observations into which in arguing such a serious subject the hon. baronet might have been led.—Upon that original question, namely, the right of this House to commit for libels, reflecting upon its proceedings, he (sir Samuel) would proceed with great candour to state the doubts he entertained of the legality of its exercise. Perhaps it would be a more appropriate expression to say, that he doubted its justifiableness, the term illegal not being properly applicable to a body which was not under the controul of any superior jurisdiction.—Whatever, therefore, were its acts, in whatever view it interpreted its privileges, he was convinced that if even it proceeded in error, that error could alone be remedied in that House. The very extent of such a power should, of itself, recommend the most scrupulous forbearance in carrying into practice privileges dependent upon very dubious grounds for support.

With respect to the right of committing for a libel, therefore, it would ill become him, knowing that the House so lately decided differently, to give his opinion without some diffidence. Had not that case been so prominently before him, he would not limit his expression to the term doubt, but would at once say, that he thought the commitment for a libel reflecting upon the past proceedings of that House, was unjustifiable. When, therefore, such an opinion was entertained by any part of that House or of the country, it was to be recollected that there was at present a person suffering under the exercise of the disputed right, and therefore it became a duty particularly and deliberately to review the merits of that individual's case. Taking for granted, (indeed it had not been denied) that the warrant under which Mr. Jones was committed, was strictly copied in the publication of the hon. baronet, that warrant set forth two offences: first a scandalous and libellous attack upon the conduct and character of that House; and, secondly, a similar offence against the character and conduct of some particular members. With respect to the first head of offence, although he had looked with the most inquisitive attention to the publication for which Mr. Jones was committed, he must contend, that in such paper there was not a single expression reflecting upon the conduct and character of that House. It most certainly complained of the conduct of two members of that House, and in making them the subject of a discussion in a debating society, putting them on their trial before persons who had paid their shilling for admission, and subjecting them to be arraigned by those who gratuitously displayed their eloquence in the accusation of such characters, was very reprehensible; but, still, it could not be construed into a libel against the character of that House. For what were the words of Mr. Jones's publication?—

"Windham and Yorke.—British Forum, 33, Bedford-Street, Covent-Garden—Monday, Feb. 19, 1810.—Question:—Which was a greater outrage upon the public feeling, Mr. Yorke's enforcement of the Standing Order to exclude Strangers from the House of Commons, or Mr. Windham's recent attack upon the Liberty of the Press?"

The gravamen of the complaint was for enforcing the Standing Order for exclusion. Such enforcement was the act of the individual and not of the House (murmurs from the ministerial benches.) From the manner of the gentlemen opposite, he perceived, that they did not concur in his inference. He, however, felt convinced that his observation was justified by the understood practice of that House. He was fortified in that opinion by the authority of the Chair, when on a recent occasion (the discussion of the bye-law of Lincoln's-Inn,) it was communicated to a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Windham,) that the propriety of enforcing it could not become a question of debate. The only point, in which the House gave its concurrence or was at all consulted was upon the first day of the Sessions, when it agreed to the Standing Order. But the succeeding paragraph of the paper fully proved, that in the contemplation of the author, the censure expressed did by no means apply to the House but to the individual member. That paragraph was as follows:—

"Last Monday, after an interesting discussion, it was unanimously decided, that the enforcement of the Standing Orders by shutting out Strangers from the gallery of the House of Commons, ought to be censured as an insidious and ill-timed attack upon the liberty of the press, as tending to aggravate the discontents of the people, and to render their representatives objects of jealous suspicion."

Observe, then, how carefully, and in what a jealous manner the opinion which the sentence went to convey, was expressed. Why was it so guarded? only to prove that its censure went to affect the individual members, and was not at all intended to apply to the character or conduct of that House. Moreover, it was evident, that the censure was not levelled at the Order of that House. No such intention could be supposed. The attack was made upon its enforcement at that most particular moment, when the public mind was vigilantly directed to the proceedings of Parliament; and as that enforcement could only be the act of an individual, it was impossible to say that in the publication there was a single syllable affecting or reflecting upon the character of the House, unless it was attempted to be held that its character was committed with the conduct and character of every individual member. Though such was his sincere conviction upon that part of the case, he trusted that no person would consider him as in any degree justifying the nature of this attack upon these two hon. members (Messrs. Yorke and Windham). He would go further, and state his opinion, that such a publication amounted to a libel against the individuals mentioned, inasmuch as it imputed by inuendo, very improper motives to their conduct.

But then, in reverting to the warrant under which Mr. Jones was confined, it would be found, that though one branch of his offence was stated to consist in libelling the conduct and character of particular members, still it was not specified that it was for conduct pursued by them within that House. Next, with respect to the remedy which a person so committed possessed. Although it was true, as in the case of Alderman Crosby, that the courts below would not interfere, upon the ground that they knew nothing about the privileges of Parliament; yet, if it were specified in the warrant of commitment, what those privileges were, and in what their alledged violation consisted, was it not reasonable to presume that the individual might be relieved by Habeas Corpus? Suppose, for instance, that a man was committed by the House for saying, that Bank notes had depreciated in value, and that they had chosen to declare it a breach of privilege. Would it be maintained that such a person would not be relieved by Habeas Corpus. Indeed, from every view which he was able to take of the question, he could not restrict himself to say, that he merely doubled, but must avow that he entertained very strong doubts of the power of that House, to commit for libels affecting its past proceedings. He, at the same time, fully admittted that such a right was possessed by them, in order to punish all breaches of privilege which went to obstruct the performance of their many sacred and important duties. Such obstructions, how ever, must not operate in indirect way, they must at once tend to produce that with which they were charged as intended to produce. There were numerous cases where the authority of the House would be debarred unless it had the power to prevent these direct impediments to the exercise of its duties. Such were the refusal of witnesses to attend, or answer interrogatories put to them. Such were all attempts to intimidate members in the votes they should give. Unless the House had in such cases the power of proceeding by the summary way of commitment for contempt, there could be no unbiassed decision.

The power of commitment for censuring past proceedings, was far different in its nature and consequences. It was in contradiction to the most sacred and important principles of positive law. It confounded in the same tribunal the discordant characters of party, accuser and judge. It deprived the accused of that which every legal jurisdiction secured to him, the power of being heard in his own defence. It went to decide upon the conduct of the accused without suffering him to state his own construction, and in his absence, the judges who were to decide, were each engaged in putting an aggravated interpretation upon his meaning. He who must best know what he himself meant, was refused to be heard, and the construction of those who were ignorant of his motives and meaning, was to be substituted. Was there he would ask one judge in the courts below, who would deny to an individual thus situated the right of being heard in his own defence, or in the denial of such a right would venture to adopt his own construction of the conduct of the accused? Let the House pause, then, and reflect upon the course it was now adopting! Let it recollect that it was proceeding against the hon. baronet, without having examined a single witness, without the power of examining upon oath, as judges of the law and of the fact, and without that power of appeal being allowed, which the accused in all the ordinary courts of justice possess.

But even allowing that in very extraordinary cases this power should be vested in the House of Commons, still he would contend that where the necessity ceased, there the privilege ceased also. In the case of Mr. alderman Crosby, what was the language of chief justice De Grey? He argued that such a power was legal because it was necessary. Was it not then strictly justifiable in him to assume the converse of that proposition; namely, that when it is not necessary according to the interpretation of that judge it was not legal? Where, then, was the necessity for putting into practice a disputed privilege for an alledged offence, cognizable by the courts of law? A right hon. gent. on the former night of this discussion, had stated that the powers of that House were not to be circumscribed by the exact and artificial rule of evidence observed m courts of subordinate jurisdiction. The rules upon which he (Sir Samuel) conceived that House were bound to regulate their decisions, were comprehended within no such, definition. They were rules above them and all courts whatsoever, by which from the fallibility of human nature all its tribunals should be governed. The being that had the powers to dispense with them was far above us, uninfluenced by the prejudices of human passions, or the wanderings of human reason.

It was often repeated by the gentlemen, opposite, that for the exercise of this privilege the precedents upon our Journals were innumerable. He should be glad to know where they were to be found, in order to ascertain the analogy. The first case in which this privilege of committing for libels upon past proceedings, and which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had cited as a precedent during the former debate took place in the year 1580, against Arthur Hall. It was, indeed, rather extraordinary to refer to such a period for precedents, and not less to fix upon that particular case. One would have thought, that the reigns of the Tudors were not the times best calculated to illustrate the sacred security in which our ancestors had held the privileges of parliament, and the liberties of the people. One would have supposed at least, that those, now so tenacious of the privileges of that House, would be slow in referring to the reign of a monarch who told the House of Commons not to trouble itself with matters of State, and who upon another occasion dispatched a messenger to that House, commanding it not to proceed further in a public transaction, in which it was engaged.

But reverting to the case of Hall—He was not alone sentenced to an imprisonment for six months, but fined 600 marks, and was to undergo a further undefined imprisonment unless he should make such a retractation as suited the taste of his Majesty's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Comptroller of the House-hold, and the two Secretaries of State. If, then, such a proceeding was the precedent for that House to adopt and act upon in the present case, were the hon. gentlemen opposite prepared to act upon the whole case; because, most certainly, if from such authority they drew the right to commit; why not to inflict fines, and demand retractations suited to the taste of his Majesty's ministers, under p in of continued and unlimited imprisonment? If the existence of precedents was all that was wanted, he could refer them to many—to cases where the House of Commons had adjudged persons for a breach of its privileges, to hard labour in jails, to imprisonment for life, and to the case of two men, who were placed upon the same horse, with their faces towards the tail, thus exhibited to the derision and contempt of the populace. Still there was no analogy in the breaches of privilege thus punished and in the case of libel. Indeed, there was the authority of Mr. Hatsell, that from the period of Hall until the time of the Long Parliament, an interval of sixty years, this privilege against libel was not called into practice. And it was most mistaken language to call these cases precedents, in the legal signification in which that term was understood. They were not such—they were the mere exercises of authority, and not the solemn decisions of a judicial tribunal, upon a case fully and temperately argued and decided upon. He knew very well that in the year 1659 in the struggles between that House and the House of Lords, Resolutions of a strong nature were adopted by the former. It was then "Resolved, That to print or publish any books or libels reflecting upon the proceedings of the House of Commons, or of any member thereof, for or relating to his service therein, is a high violation of the rights and privileges of the House of Commons." But surely it was not upon a Resolution of that House they would proceed to invade the liberty of the subject.

The learned gentleman next proceeded to review the modern cases of Crosby and Flower, and contended, that they were no authorities for the present case. In the former there was no publication, and that of course decided nothing. Neither did the refusal of the judges prove any thing in support of such privileges. They refused to interfere because they were ignorant of them. They considered them as described by sir Edward Coke, as those privileges looked after by so many, but which no man could find; and that no judge could discharge an individual charged in execution by another court, and that it was impossible to relieve those who sought their remedy by another law than that by which they were committed. With respect to the case of Flower, the Editor of the Cambridge newspaper, he was committed by the House of Lords, for a libel on an individual of that body (the bishop of Landaff,) and ordered to pay a fine. Was the House in the present case prepared to say, that was an analogous precedent? Would they say that they possessed the right to fine as well as to confine? But the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had adverted to the opinion of lord Kenyon, when an application was made to the Court of King's Bench, in behalf of Flower, for a Habeas Corpus. That noble lord did then think proper to introduce into the preliminary observations to his decision, that if ever the time should come that any malignant, any factious, any bad man, should wish to overturn the constitution of the country, the first step he would take, he dared to say, would be by attacking the courts of justice, and the privileges of the Houses of Parliament (Loud cries of hear, hear, from the Ministerial benches.)

Would the hon. gentlemen continue their cheering when they learnt that the noble judge thought proper to introduce this observation upon the case of a man committed, not for an attack upon the privileges of any court of justice, or of either House of Parliament, but for a libel upon an individual. Indeed, whoever reviewed those observations of that noble lord, in which he stated his refusal to the application for a Habeas Corpus, could not consider it as the calm, deliberate, sober determination of a learned judge, sitting in judgment upon the personal liberty of a subject. When the following observation, with which he concluded, was fully considered, it was impossible to allow such a precedent to have weight with any unprejudiced tribunal. "Having heard it argued, I am of opinion that the party must be remanded—beyond all doubt, unless we wish to overset all the law of parliament;—unless we chuse to lend our hand to do that most sacrilegious act, to endeavour to overthrow the constitution of the country, this person must be remanded." That could only be considered the language and decision of one member of that body, whose commitment was complained of, and of one judge, for it did so happen, that when the case was argued Mr. justice Lawrence was absent from indisposition, and Mr. justice Le Blanc sat at Nisi Prius, in Guildhall. It was upon these grounds that he (sir S.) entertained such strong doubts of the justifiableness of that privilege, which went to declare as libels all censures upon the past proceedings of that House, There was no man who would deny that that House ought to be under the controul of public opinion. When, therefore, the expression of a popular and constitutional jealousy chanced to wander into libel, the trial of the offence ought to be submitted to those tribunals, where those who were to pronounce the verdict were neither parties nor accusers. So impressed was he with the purity of such doctrine, that he should feel it to be his duty, at no remote day, to move for the liberation of Mr. Jones, without expecting him to present that kind of petition which had been considered usual on such occasions.

It could not, he observed, reasonably be considered as necessary that a person committed should consent to a formal abjuration of the opinion which had given offence, before he was discharged. This was not thought necessary in any civil court, though abjuration might be required in the spiritual courts. Could it reasonably be required that a man should consent to his own humiliation, so far as to acknowledge, for instance, that he had prevaricated? And here he alluded to a case that occurred last session, that of general Clavering, where the person committed had refused to make any such declaration, and that refusal at least, in his opinion, did him honour. Such men might very possibly believe themselves innocent; and whatever the House might induce them to declare, they could not make them alter the opinion. But this was not directly to the present question. Thinking the author of the paper complained of, right in the main proposition, though he confessed that the language appeared to be in some parts intemperate, he could not agree that it deserved any censure at all. Some of the passages he did not well understand, but he could not therefore join in the opinion of the noble lord (Binning) who owned that he did not known their meaning, but still thought they must mean some abuse of the House. If the hon. baronet really thought that as injustice had been committed in imprisoning a British subject, it could not have been expected that he should speak of this with perfect calmness, and there some allowance ought certainly to be made. There was a case, which if it had been that of an individual, he would have cited in the way of an argumentum ad hominem. The House of Commons in the case of the Aylesbury election, in a paper of Reasons drawn up by that Committee, agreed to by the House, and sent up to the Lords, had used language much more violent to the House of Lords than any that had been used respecting themselves in the publication now complained of. He read an extract from the paper, which was in substance—"That the House of Commons did not wonder that their lordships, after the encroachments which they had made upon the constitution, now wished to overturn the whole frame of it; that the House found that under the specious pretext of a regard to public freedom, their lordships endeavoured to draw the determination of liberty and property into the bottomless and insatiable gulph of their own privileges, which tended to swallow up the rights of both crown and people." He asked whether there was any thing in the publication now complained of equal to the violence of this language? If a private person had made use of the language he had just quoted, it might have been justly said, that it was not for him to be rash in complaining of intemperate expressions.

He next adverted to the invidious reference which had been made to the past conduct of sir F. Burdett, he not being present to defend himself. Such an irregular proceeding would of itself, in a court of law, be considered, if persevered in, as a contempt. The hon. baronet was to him a total stranger, except in as far as he had observed his public conduct; and therefore it could not be supposed that he was influenced by any other consideration than a regard to duty in the course which he felt himself bound to pursue. It had been remarked by a right hon. and learned gent. (the Master of the Rolls), that the question had been forced on the House, and the House was bound to decide upon it. This would have been correct if it had been asserted of any of the courts below. They must decide if their opinion was called for. Their rule was fiat justitia—they must pronounce whatever might be their opinion of consequences. That House, however, was under no such obligation. It was not bound to decide because an individual reading a publication in the morning, which appeared to him very offensive, had brought it in the evening before the House—and he thought this a case on which it would be better not to adopt any proceeding, even if, by a severe construction, it could be contended that privilege had been violated. In matters of authority, as well as in religion, severity against heresy only served to increase the number of its disciples. After the late decision of the House, this was no time to provoke discussions respecting its authority. He did not mean to say that gentlemen had not voted conscientiously on the subject of the Expedition to the Scheldt; but unfortunately in that instance its decision was contrary to the opinion of the nation in general. He asked whether gentlemen themselves were not satisfied that this was the case? The hon. and learned gent. concluded by observing that he would vote for the order of the day.

, when he heard the able and eloquent speech of his hon. and learned friend, to which he had listened with admiration, if not with conviction, felt that the account he gave of what he stated on a former night was correct, viz. that he doubted whether this was or was not a libel. He gave no decided opinion on that occasion, and there was hardly any thing in what he had just said inconsistent with his manly character. If any thing could have added to the respect he felt for him, it would be the contemplation of the generosity with which he supported the cause of one whom he conceived to be an injured individual, in opposition to what he understood to be the general opinion of the House. But the last topic which his hon. and learned friend had introduced, had better have been omitted, as it tended to provoke disunion, and to prevent the influence of his own argument. Even though it were admitted (which he did not admit) that the decision of the House on the late Inquiry, was contrary to that of the nation in general, it did not therefore follow that the House should abstain from supporting its own privileges. If it were true that the House had fallen into discredit, it was not likely to be raised again, by the admission that a British subject had been unjustly committed with the assent of both sides of the House. His hon. and learned friend was not present at that time; but then he was too well convinced of his love of justice to doubt, that if he had thought the act wrong, he would have taken the earliest opportunity to move that the prisoner should be discharged.

He had listened with the most peculiar attention to the speech of his hon. and learned friend, because he expected to have found in it something precise upon a point which the noble lord near him (lord Ossulston) had left in a very vague state, namely, as to the bounds between what was, and was not a libel. He had endeavoured, but in vain, to ascertain whether his hon. and learned friend did, or did not, think this publication libellous. If he did not consider it a libel, then the greater part of what he had said was relevant; if he did consider it in that light, then the greater portion of his elaborate argument did not apply. His hon. and learned friend meant to say that this was no libel; what he must defend was the assertion, not that the House had no power to commit for censure on their past proceedings, but that it had no power to imprison in any case. The argument was that the House had no right to commit in any case without a trial. The assertion was, not that the House had erred in the exercise of a just right, but it was argued syllogistically, that the House had on right to fine or imprison in any case. His hon. and learned friend, however, admitted, that, in certain cases, the House had the right of committing to prison. His hon. and learned friend had said, that he would move, that Mr. Jones should be discharged. If he could bring the House to agree with him in discharging the prisoner, upon the ground that the House had no right to commit him, then he (Mr. S.) thought that he ought not to stop there, but that he ought to move for an address to the crown, to make some compensation to Mr. Jones for the time he had been imprisoned. He did not however think the House would agree to discharge him on any such ground; but if it should, then he himself should think it his duty to move for an address of this kind.

His hon. and learned friend had next discussed the question. Whether Mr. Jones had been properly committed? Those who argued that his committal was unjustifiable, appeared to him to deny the principle on which the argument in his opinion, must rest. He did not know how to defend the justice of the act, except upon authority, and the custom of parliament. This, however, in his opinion, was the obvious and proper ground; and being borne out by the best authorities and the custom of parliament, he had no hesitation in saying, that the proceeding was completely within the jurisdiction of the House. His hon. and learned friend, however, had rejected authority. He had arraigned lord Kenyon of precipitation in the case of the king and Flower, and had laboured to overturn the authority, upon a ground which had been generally considered as adding strength to an authority, namely, that the Judge had immediately declared the matter to be so clear that it was not necessary to hear it argued at length. He had not been able to find in the pamphlet itself the reasons for setting aside these authorities; but now precipitation in a judge, deciding upon a great constitutional question, in which the liberty of the subject was so materially concerned, was specifically alledged.

Supposing, however, that this objection could have availed, how could his hon. and learned friend get rid of the decision of the Court of Common Pleas? That court had decided in the same way in the case of Crosby, and had expressed its opinion in the strongest and most distinct language.—The Judges stated that they could not take cognizance of the case, as it depended not on the common law, but on the consuetudo parliamenti—the custom and law of parliament, of which the Houses of parliament themselves were the sole judges. This case of Crosby, therefore, he contended, was a clear and distinct authority for the steps that had been taken in the cases of Flower and Jones.

The modern authorities appeared to him to have been denied, for no other reason that he saw, except that they were modern. But even the ancient authorities had not been fairly stated. The hon. baronet had in his pamphlet reasoned syllogistically on the remarks of lord Coke, that no court, not of record, had the power of fine and imprisonment. Now lord Coke applied this only to the ordinary courts, as evidently appeared from his Fourth Institute, wherein he stated, that the judges were not to take cognizance of the decisions of parliament, which were governed not by the common law but by the custom of parliament. And in another part of the same Institute he said, that the House of Commons had the power of Judicature, and he cited cases from the time of Elizabeth, to prove this.

But then his hon. and learned friend had maintained, that little weight could be allowed to authorities taken from times when the House was treated with no great respect by the sovereign. The argument would have been good for something, if this question had related to the prerogative of the crown. But it was nothing with reference to the subject now under consideration—the power of parliament in defending its own privileges. The inference, therefore, was rather in favour of his view of the subject. The power was so clearly understood, too, that the House had exercised it, even at a time when it was so narrowly watched by the crown. His hon. and learned friend had still relied on the case of Mr. Hall, cited by lord Coke; and contended that the additions there to the punishment of imprisonment rendered it of no avail as a precedent. But it did not follow, because there were other circumstances connected with the exercise of the authority of the House in that case, that the House had no power to commit at all. Mr. Stephen then mentioned another of the cases, where a man was committed for assaulting a member of the House. All these were cited by lord Coke, to shew that the House had the power which the hon. baronet had denied.

As to the inference deduced from this not being a court of record, Mr. Stephen expressed his surprise that of all men lord Coke should have been cited in support of that argument—when it might have been found by an examination of Hatsell's Precedents, that lord Coke had wished that the tongue might cleave to the roof of his mouth who said that this House was not a court of record, or that it had not the power of judicature. It unquestionably had that power, according to the authority of lord Coke, in certain cases. Now, it was not fair, to publish partial citations so as to make the public imagine that so great an authority as lord Coke was in favour of those who argued that the House had no power to imprison. The modern decisions, he believed were admitted to be on his side. He understood his learned friend to have said, that the courts below did not commit for libels as contempt. To disprove this, Mr. Stephen cited Blackstone, who stated that the courts had the power of summary committal generally for any attack on the past conduct of the judges in the discharge of their duties. This would have been a strong authority in his favour as far as analogy went, even if no precedents had existed.

Mr. Stephen expressed his astonishment that those, who were peculiarly attached to the democratical part of our constitution, should be willing to allow this House to be trampled upon, or to go begging for protection to the courts of law, connected as its privileges were with the support of that constitution. He had not heard this question met at all upon its real principles and true merits. If the House must go to the courts of law for the protection of its privileges, then the judges appointed by the crown would be the arbiters of these privileges; for, though not now removable at the pleasure of the crown, the judges were still appointed by it. They, however, would no doubt act with impartiality; but then an appeal would lie to the House of Lords, and then the privileges of that House would depend upon the other House of parliament. With respect to the decision on the Inquiry into the policy and conduct of the Expediton, he did not think the public in general differed from the House. The public had discovered by the Inquiry, that their previous opinions with respect to the commander, had been founded in delusion and calumny. They had perceived that their first impressions were erroneous, when they found the commander completely excul- pated by one of the Resolutions proposed by the gentlemen on the other side. Nor would the public how think that they were wrong in supporting those principles which had been sanctioned in the best of times, and which had been found necessary in order to enable the House to protect the liberties of the subject. If the millers of Isleworth were to send representatives to that House, who would agree to give up the power of imprisonment, the House would have no authority to compel the attendance of witnesses, or to force them to give evidence;—Sandon and Clavering would have escaped, and the most important functions of the House would be at a stand. He called therefore, upon even those who might think that the House laboured at present under public disapprobation, to support its privileges in the hope of better times in future. His hon. and learned friend had said, that he knew nothing of the hon. baronet, except in his public capacity and by his public conduct. He (Mr. Stephen) was also subject to that disadvantage. But could any member have in this case any other feeling, than that of a regard to duty? If they had any particular sympathy, it must be with the party accused. He was a member of the House, and it might be his own fate to incur its displeasure. As to the argument, that the members were judges in their own cause, he would ask his hon. and learned friend, whether he was not in the habit of applying to the court of chancery for committal for contempt, in cases where the contempt was so very oblique as that of marrying a ward of chancery? In cases of commitment by one court, no other would interfere; and though he was hardly called upon to meet an extreme case, he would say, that even supposing the House did commit for alledging that bank-notes were depreciated, no other court would interfere, if it was stated in the warrant that the commitment was for a contempt, as this would be taking upon itself to decide upon the privileges of one of the Houses of parliament.

Mr. Stephen then proceeded to observe, upon the unfair treatment which he thought the hon. gentleman who brought forward this business had met with from the gentlemen opposite. It had first been laid to his charge, that he had been guilty of the offence of consulting with the minister. When the hon. gentleman denied this, then the charge was turned upon the seconder; and when he, too, denied it, then the hon. gent. was arraigned for not having consulted persons of experience before he brought a matter of such importance to the notice of the House. The affair, however, was now before them, and they must proceed upon it, however inconvenient that might be. They could not pass it over without exposing themselves to be trampled upon and despised altogether in future. He recollected a story which he had heard abroad applicable to their present situation. A person of the name of Murphy, who, to distinguish him from another of the same name, was called Irish Murphy, had suffered himself to be most unmercifully beaten by one of inferior strength without resistance. A man met him the next day with his arm in a sling; his eyes black and blue; his teeth knocked out of their places, &c.&c.; and said (though, by the bye, there was some doubt, whether he was an Irishman), "Why, you are a disgrace to your country. You are the first coward that ever came from Ireland." The bruised man replied, "My dear creature, I wish to take the world aisy." Now, this was a wrong application of a correct principle, for the man was much more severely beaten than he would have been if he had defended himself to the utmost of his power. The House, by passing this breach of its privileges over, would be in a worse situation than it could be reduced to by taking steps for its own defence.—Mr. Stephen then denied that Magna Charta was disregarded by those who contended for this power in the House, because it did not apply to cases of contempt. The House, he asserted, was acting with lenity, because the publication had found its way into various newspapers, and was industriously circulated. Several further complaints might therefore have been made on the same ground as the present. This view of the matter, then, was, that this was an unfortunate occurrence, but one upon which they could not help coming to a vote. What proved the necessity of this, if other proofs had been wanting, was the fact, that it had been argued that very night—that the House had not the power, because it had not exercised it in its full extent, in the case of Wilkes. If then the House should consent to pass over this affair to-night, they might justly be considered as having renounced the whole power of commitment in future.

rose and spoke as follows:

Mr. Speaker; it was my anxious wish, that full time should be given for the consideration of this most important question, and I strenuously supported the adjournment which has taken place in order that our minds might come to this discussion with the most perfect coolness, and after full deliberation I have devoted myself during the interval, to the investigation of the subject, with all the attention I am capable of bestowing, both as to the general question of privilege, and as to the particular case before us; and with every sentiment of respect for the talents and knowledge of my learned friend (Sir Samuel Romilly,) who spoke last but one, I am compelled to say, that if the doctrines which he has promulgated, are to prevail, there is, in my opinion, at once an end of the privileges of this House, an end of its authority, and, with that, an end of the free constitution of this country, which has been obtained and preserved by the exertion of those privileges. My learned friend has referred to the course of proceeding respecting privilege, during the reigns of the house of Tudor; and has justly reprobated that period as one of constitutional authority. But, sir, the very contemplation of that period sets the character and privileges of this House in the most conspicuous light. After an era of prolonged and despotic usurpation under the Tudor race, when the princes of the House of Stewart, when James 1. and Charles 1. attempted to continue the tyranny which had characterized the preceding reigns, the efforts of the House of Commons (the champions of the liberties of the people,) armed with nothing but its privileges, their sole but sure means for protecting the constitution; wielding them by the advice of the great and enlightened patriots of that period, beat down the tyranny of the Stewarts, and, in defiance of the crown, established the liberty of England. Then it was that sir Edward Coke, Mr. Pym, Mr. St. John, Mr. Selden, and the other great men of that period, skilled equally in the law of parliament, and in the common law of the country, but never confounding them, directed this House to those great ends. In that period, the House of Commons fought its way through every difficulty, and forced the monarch to yield to the inalienable rights of the people. Those efforts, it is true, were followed by the effusion of much human blood, and the establishment of the most cruel despotism—events deplored, even in contemplation, by all good men; but it never occurred till how (when it is introduced, to start doubts, as to the use and existence of those important privileges, which before the usurpation of Cromwell had accomplished objects of such magnitude,) that those grievous calamities formed an argument against the constitutional privileges of this House. Afterwards, when the restoration took place, without a single stipulation being made with the sovereign in favour of the subject, at "thatæra of good laws and bad government,"^*when the usurpation and tyranny of Charles 2. and James 2. were to be encountered, the House of Commons again, without any additional weapons, with no means but its privileges to counteract the despotic character of the Monarchs, the corruption of ministers, and the venality of judges, vindicated the liberties of the people, and compelled James 2. to abdicate his throne. And these privileges, these grand and efficacious safeguards of freedom, which have accomplished such ends, are what we are now called upon to give up as tyrannical and usurped, and as inconsistent with the liberty of the people—those privileges which we hold, and have always held, not for ourselves, but for the benefit of those we represent.

Surely, sir, when these things are brought back to the memory of the House and the public, it never can be maintained with any colour of reason, that, because in a recent and solitary instance,^* the power has been exercised without discretion, it is to be denied or abrogated. The House of Commons is a supreme power, and it is a necessary ingredient in the constitution of every supreme power—it is essential to every supreme court of justice, to maintain its independence, protect its character, and secure efficacy to its acts and authority, that it should have the innate power of punishing contemptsby commitment. It arises from the necessity of the case, and it is so imperative in its nature, that even those who argue against the power in case of libel, are forced to admit it in cases of obstruction.

My learned friend (sir S. Romilly,) indeed does not find it possible to limit contempts (after the manner of the modern assailers of our privileges) to mere obstruction; he therefore takes another view of the subject, quite distinct from that which forms the basis of the argument of Sir Francis Burdett. But I confess, I am as little satisfied with the principle which my learned friend espouses, as I am with the doctrine of obstruction; and as my learned friend, in maintaining his principle, has found it necessary to attack the resolutions of the House of Commons, and has denied their authority, I am compelled to consider his argument as utterly destructive of the best rights and privileges of this House—rights and privileges, which have been asserted by its acts, and which stand recorded in its resolutions; to deny which, is to deny the very existence of our most important powers, and to annihilate our independence as a separate and supreme branch of the legislature. This most alarming doctrine, I trust, in the course of what I have to offer to the House, I shall be able to refute.

^*Mr. Fox's History, page 20.

†The commitment of Gale Jones.

My learned friend argues, that the case in question is no violation of the privilege of this House, by showing that the case of Gale Jones was not a breach of our privileges; and to establish that, I understand him to take this distinction, that it related to matter that was past, and not to matter depending; contending that a libel upon that which is past and over, is not cognizable as a contempt; but admitting that a libel on existing proceedings is a contempt, and may in any court be punished by attachment and imprisonment. Sir, I must positively and distinctly deny the soundness of this doctrine; I deny it as applicable to courts of justice, I deny it, if possible, still more distinctly and emphatically, as applicable to the privileges of the High Court of Parliament, as applicable to the privileges of this House, a branch or member of that High Court of Parliament, an independent branch of the legislature, a supreme authority in the state and constitution.

Shall it be recognised as a principle, that you can only treat as a breach of privilege, an attack upon a matter under deliberation, but that reviling the House for matter that is past, degrading its authority by abuse and defamation, as to the acts that are gone by, and thus bringing it into contempt and hatred, shall not be considered as a breach of privilege examinable and punishable by the House: but that such an offence must go to another tribunal, and, assuming the distinct character of misdemeanour, as distinguished from contempt, be triable at law only? I contend, Sir, on the contrary, to use a common and perhaps vulgar expression, that this destruction of the character of the House by wholesale;—that those attacks upon the House, or upon its members, in the discharge of their parliamentary functions, tending to degrade them in the eyes of the people, and to frighten them from the discharge of their duty by calumnies upon their past conduct; is a breach of privilege punishable as such by the House, and that the House is not driven to bring the matter before the common tribunals of the country, unless it prefers that course of proceeding; an option, which I shall shew hereafter, in general to be most unfit and injurious to the privileges of this House, and of course to the interests of the people.

Sir, among other doubts expressed as to the existence of the privileges of this House, a doubt is started, founded on the mode in which the House formerly acted in respect to the punishments which it inflicted for breach of privilege; but surely the nature of the punishment can never be used as an argument against the existence of the right to punish. Time, circumstances, and a course of proceeding in one way, will be justly held to circumscribe and regulate the punishment: but the existence of the punishment in any shape, establishes the existence of the privilege. As to the origin of the privilege, on which likewise doubts are started with a view to prove, it an innovation; it stands upon the same foundation with all our general rights, civil and political: on that principle, which is held to be the clear unerring foundation of our law, namely, that we find it in full observance for ages, and that we do not find the period when it commenced. The doctrine, however, which is chiefly relied on, not by my learned friend, but by those who deny that libel on the House of Commons, or its members, is a breach of privilege, and restrict all contempts to the mere right and privilege to remove an obstruction; those who maintain this argument say, that the authority of this House, like that of the constable of the night, rests upon the right which must exist in every case in which a legal act is to be done; namely, that it is legal to remove any obstruction which may be placed in the way of those who are to do the act; that this House, if impeded in its deliberations by obstruction; that its members, if stopped in their approach to the House, or in the exercise of their function, have a right to punish such obstruction as a contempt. Thus, Sir, the privileges of this House, of this supreme branch of the legislature, of this grand inquest of the nation; the effect of whose acts, the validity and character of whose functions, are to be salutary and useful, according as they are respected or disgraced, are to be put on the footing of the obstruction given to the constable of the night, who in the performance of his watch sends any drunken person to the watch-house, who may impede him in his rounds.

Is it possible, that any thing but the most determined resolution to degrade and vilify the House of Commons, to destroy the privileges which it enjoys for the protection of the people, and which in their exercise have achieved objects of such magnitude and importance, should be compared to the constable of the night? Would a right and authority thus restricted and debased, serve the purpose of maintaining the dignity and efficacy of any Court? And can it be borne for one moment, to have it said, that the High Court of Parliament, that this branch of it, the representatives of the people, the popular part of the constitution, which is now falsely held up as inferior to the other branches of the legislature, can only defend itself against an inroad of physical force; but that it has not the means, by its own intrinsic authority, by its original and inherent constitution, to punish those who shall set up a moral obstruction to its authority, and shall destroy the efficacy of all its functions, by libellous attack and defamation?

My learned friend says, that this is not a time for agitating questions of this nature, when the nation has been told by the House of Commons, that the Expedition to Walcheren had been wisely planned, and ably executed.—Sir, no Member of this House regrets more than I regret, the decision which the House came to on that subject. I can never sufficiently deplore the effect of that vote. No man who hears me is more conscientiously convinced than I am, that the conduct of ministers on that occasion has been most ruinous and culpable; and that their continuing to discharge the duties of government, is utter destruction to the country.—But, when the privileges of the House of Commons are questioned, when there is an attempt made to beat them down, and destroy them, I must forget the conduct of the House on the particular occa- sion; I must even pass by the imprudence which has brought the question into discussion, in the particular instance, and I must maintain the constitution of parliament, in the anxious hope, that, if its rights are asserted, it will act hereafter with more wisdom; and to this determination I am led by the absolute certainty, that, if the House is deprived of its privileges, if its means of defence and attack upon those who are enemies to its dignity and existence, are taken away, it can never again act with effect.

Surely, Sir, it is a most unwarrantable conclusion to deny its privileges at large, because you disapprove of its conduct in particular instances.

I proceed now, Sir, to state to the House what I consider to be the question Immediately under consideration. It is most material that it should be understood with precision, because much of the argument against it is founded on misrepresenting it. What I contend for is, that a libel upon the House of Commons collectively, or against any of its members, discharging their duty in Parliament, is a breach of the privileges of this House; and that the House has the power to punish such breach of privilege by such imprisonment as it is the usage of the House to inflict; namely, by imprisonment during its pleasure, whilst the session lasts; but not for a time certain. I maintain, that such is the privilege and power of this House, and that the argument of sir F. Burdett on the subject, is, from beginning to end, erroneous.

The next consideration before us, is, whether his address and argument be not libellous as well as erroneous. And lastly, we must decide in what manner he ought to be proceeded against, if it is libellous.

Before I enter upon the argument, which rests on the deep and solid foundation of reason, authority, and precedent, I wish the House and the public thoroughly to understand, not only what I contend for, as I have just stated; but what I do not contend for; because much of the art of those who are enemies to our privileges, consists in misrepresenting and in misstating the question. First, I do not contend for the privilege of punishing, as a contempt, libel generally against the state, or government of the country. This I think it necessary to remark distinctly, because by the cases to which we are referred, in the argument of sir F. Burdett, it will be found, when examined, that they are not cases of libel against the House, or its members: but cases of general libel against the government. Secondly, I do not contend for the privilege of imprisoning for a time certain; but only for the power of commitment for the period of the session, or during the pleasure of the House, short of the session. Thirdly, I do not contend for the right of imposing a fine. Such is the moderate nature of the privilege asserted: and yet by the most unaccountable perverseness, the very moderation of the usage is brought as an argument against the power.^*

Sir, I beg to have it distinctly understood, that I do not dispute the propriety of free discussion by the people, of the proceedings of parliament; and that I am farther clearly of opinion, that the privileges of the House may be discussed with freedom, if they are discussed with decency; but that it cannot be permitted to discuss either so as to degrade and vilify the House of Commons; but that a discussion in that temper is a libel on the House of Commons, destroying its functions, disabling it from the exercise of its privileges, powers, and authority, in support of the liberties of the people; and that whoever discusses it in that spirit, is guilty of a breach of privilege, and liable to be proceeded against for such libel by the House, punishing such person according to the custom of this House, which is part of the law of the land.

The learned gent. who spoke last, (Mr. Stephen) has cited many of the authorities; particularly some of those from parts of lord Coke's Fourth Institute, written professedly on this subject of parliament, to which I should have called the attention of the House in detail. I shall now, as they have been so recently read to you, chiefly allude to them, requesting that you will always bear in mind, that lord Coke was the highest authority on this subject that can be referred to; having united to the most profound knowledge of the common law of the country, the most profound knowledge of the law and custom of parliament, and having shewn himself a most authoritative and most active member of this House, at a time when the privileges of this House were, as I have already said, the means of curbing the attempts of the Prince against the liberties of the people.

Lord Coke, in his Fourth Institute, page 15, says, "every court of Justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some by the common law, some by the civil law and canon law, some by particular laws and customs; so the high court of parliament suis propriis legibus et consuetudinibus subsistit.

^* See sir F. Burdett's Argument, at p. 438.

"It is lex et consuetudo parliamenti, that all weighty matters in parliament moved concerning the Peers of the realm or commons in parliament assembled, ought to be determined, adjudged, and discussed, by the course of the parliament, and not by the civil law, nor yet by the common laws of this realm, used in more inferior courts; which was so declared to be, secundum legem et consuetudinem parliamenti, concerning the Peers of the realm, by the King and all the lords, spiritual and temporal; and the like, pari ratione, is for the Commons, for any thing moved or done in the House of Commons; and the rather, for that, by another law and custom of parliament, the King cannot take notice of any thing said or done in the House of Commons, but by the report of the House of Commons. And every member of the parliament hath a judicial place, and can be no witness. And this is the reason that Judges ought not to give any opinion of a matter of parliament; because it is not to be decided by the common laws—but secundum legem et consuetudinem parliamenti; and so the judges in divers parliaments have confessed. And some hold, that every offence committed in any court, punishable by that court, must be punished (proceeding criminally) in the same court, or in some higher, and not in any inferior court, and the court of parliament hath no higher."

The doctrine thus taught by lord Coke, rests upon this incontrovertible maxim;;— that every supreme body in a state must, from necessity, have such a power, that it may be able to perform its functions, not actually only, but with effect. It follows, therefore, that it must have the power of punishing libels upon its character and conduct generally, by its own innate vigour and authority, without being compelled to have recourse to another tribunal to judge and determine on such matter: that such a privilege is essential to a supreme power in a state; that it can alone judge with accuracy of the contempt: that other tribunals being ignorant of the facts, and unacquainted with the effect which it produces, are unable duly to apportion the punishment: that such authority is not only inherent in the Houses of parliament, but belongs to every supreme court of justice: punishment of contempt by the court, by attachment, being as much a part of the law of the land, as the trial by jury.

God forbid, Sir, that any thing should interfere with or infringe that sacred right, the trial by jury; but if courts could not protect themselves from contempt by attachment, this other grand protection for the civil liberty and lives of the people would be but of short duration. And if this power has been for ages acted upon, as essential to the supreme courts of judicature, surely the same principle will equally extend it to this House, a supreme branch of the legislature—the grand inquisitor of the nation, which has to defend itself against the encroachments of the crown on the one hand, and the injudicious or ill-intentioned attacks of individuals among the people, on the other. I assert, therefore, that nothing can defeat such a privilege, but clear manifest proof of its abandonment or abrogation; shewing, that instead of extending to the cases in question, it has been limited and reduced to the miserable and inefficacious power of punishing acts of mere obstruction, which do no injury to our proceedings by affecting our character; but only stop for a time, the progress of our measures, or for a time prevent individuals from taking a share in them.

Sir, the doctrine contended for by those who would narrow our privileges is not only directly adverse to the principle which have been referred to, in lord Coke; but is overset, by the equally sound doctrine of more modern times, upon the subject of contempt and attachment, as it prevails in the courts of law.

My learned friend (Mr. Stephen) has referred to a passage in Blackstone's commentaries, to which I beg to call your attention again, and more at large. It is of the highest importance in the consideration, of this question, and it is expressed with all the perspicuity and eloquence which distinguish the author of that great work.

The whole passage is well Worth studying, but it is unnecessary to trouble the House with more than what I am about to state.—Volume 4th, p. 280, Blackstone says, "To this head of summary proceedings may also be referred the method immemorially used by the superior courts of justice, of punishing contempts by attachment. The contempts that are thus punished, are either direct, which openly in sult the court, or the persons of the judges who preside there, or consequential, which (without such gross insolence, or direct opposition) tend to create an universal disregard of their authority." He then states different heads of contempt; and in p. 282, he proceeds thus: "By speaking or writing contemptuousIy of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; printing false accounts (or even true ones, without proper permission) of causes then depending in judgment; and any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect, which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the people."

The process of attachment for these and the like contempts, must necessarily be as ancient as the laws themselves: for laws, without competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempt, would be vain and nugatory.:—A power, therefore, in the supreme courts of justice to suppress such contempts, by an immediate attachment of the offender, results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and must be an inseparable attendance upon every superior tribunal. Accordingly, we find it actually exercised as early as the annals of our law extend."

Mutato nomine, every word is applicable to the House of Common. Nor is this doctrine so truly stated and so well euforced, as necessary to the existence and efficacy of the judicial establishments, restricted to that which is actually proceeding; but necessarily includes what is past. Nor does it place the privileges of a supreme body upon the degrading footing of the power necessary for the constable of the night, or of an individual removing a nuisance^*.

After duly considering this deliberate authority applied to courts of law—surely it cannot with truth be said, that the most atrocious, libel on the character and proceedings of this House—disabling the representatives of the country to resist the crown, or benefit the people, is to be sent for trial to another tribunal, and cannot be dealt with by the House, which it vilifies? Such doctrine is equally degrading, injurious, and erroneous.

Sir, if authorities are attended to, if the case is considered in all its aspects, with care and gravity, it will be found, that all the sources from which the principles which must govern in questions of this sort, are to be collected, unite in establishing to the most perfect and unanswerable satisfaction that the privilege exists in the manner in which I contend for it.

^* See sir F. Burdett's Argument, at p. 438.

This privilege, such as I have defined, it, rests upon the reason of the thing, on which I have already so much enlarged, and which I have maintained and illustrated from the authority of lord Coke and sir W. Blackstone, and is farther enforced and proved; first, from the clear and uniform usage of Parliament; secondly, from the decisions of courts of justice, upon the very question of our privileges, when incidentally forced upon them; and lastly, from what are, and may be deemed, text authorities on the subject. I shall take these in their order.

But, Sir, before I enter upon the proof of this privilege, from the practice and resolutions of the House of Commons, I cannot help again calling the attention of the House to the serious, and (I hope he will pardon me for adding) the dangerous tendency of the doctrine of my learned friend (sir S. Romilly) who has contended, that we are not to look to our Resolutions as constituting the law of parliament. Sir, if this be the case, I ask, on what do our best and most important rights and interests, and, in our persons, the rights and interests of the people (it is for their sake that these rights are vested in us), depend? How have we attained, but by our resolutions, and by acting upon them with the approbation and acquiescence of the public, the privileges on which our very existence as an independent body rests? Is it forgotten that there was a time when our right to try the elections of members returned to this House, was contended by the crown, and ministers of the crown, to reside in the King's courts, and that the keeper of the great seal (that officer of the King, whose existence in his situation depends upon the pleasure of the King) asserted the right of his own authority to issue the writs to fill vacancies! We all know, that, in the reign of James the first, those rights were insisted on; and how were they resisted, but by the Resolutions of this House? Again, in the reign of Charles the 2nd, when the lord chancellor Shaftesbury, to aid the despotic views of that prince, attempted to draw to himself the filling vacancies, and trying rights to seats in the House of Commons, what checked the attempt, but the resolutions of this House? What has placed upon a rock the exclusive right to try the elections of members returned to the House of Commons, and to issue writs to fill vacancies, but the resolutions of this House, enforced by the practice of this House? And I ask, if this privilege had not been successfully enforced, where would have been the independence of this House? How could it have achieved the great measures for the liberty of the people, which it has so often successfully accomplished, if the right to sit here had been judged by another tribunal, and placed under the cognizance of judges who held their situations at the will of the King; and who, by the influence of the crown, declared, in defiance of the law and constitution, that the King might imprison members of this House, for speeches spoken, and acts done, in asserting its privileges^*? And shall it be said, that if this great and vital privilege, this barrier to royal encroachment on our right of election, and on our vacant seats, has been attained by the resolutions of the House, that they do not make the law of the House and of the kingdom? and shall not such acts, thus constituting the law and the rule of parliament, binding other authorities, and uniting other powers, controlling the writs of the crown itself, with all the solemnities and authority belonging to it, be sufficient to give effect to such privileges as are now under consideration?

Upon the privilege now under discussion, it so happens, that the course of our proceeding has been uniform and invariable in favour of the privilege, as I contend for it; and that it is not only sustained by resolutions, but by regular undisputed acts, immediately succeeding the revolution; at a time when the great and able men, who accomplished that great work, were living and acting as members of parliament. The very question now before us, namely, whether a libel on the conduct of this House be a breach of its privileges, came before them. It arose from the Kentish petition, which was presented to the House in 1701 †. The authors of that petition were first committed to Newgate, and their commitment afterwards changed from Newgate, to the custody of the Sergeant at Arms, to render their confinement more close and exclusive. Upon that occasion, it is necessary to remark (because a noble lord who sits behind me, has represented this case, as if it were one which was connected with, and polluted by a question of election), that Mr. Colpepper, one of the persons concerned in the Kentish petition, had a question before the House, respecting his election for the borough of Maidstone. Now, sir, it appears by the proceedings of this House, that the consideration of the matter of privilege was adjourned until the matter of election should be decided^*. And after several adjournments and much deliberation, after a motion by lord Hartington, on which a resolution was founded to consider at the same time, the rights and privileges of the people, the Chairman of the Committee reported, on February 26, 1701, "That they had come to several resolutions, which they had directed him to report, when the House should please to receive the same." A question then arose, whether the report should be postponed till the Saturday following, or received immediately: upon that, it is material to observe, that a division took place, and that it was carried, to report immediately: that sir Robert Walpole, then Mr. Walpole, was a teller for the majority, and in favour of an immediate report, which marks, that those who sustained the principles of the Revolution, were clearly and decidedly in favour of the resolutions, and that they considered them to be declaratory to the law and the privilege on this subject; and thus the only impediment, namely, the decision on the Maidstone election, being removed, the resolutions were reported and agreed to by the House. It was accordingly resolved,

^* The case of Coke, Pym, Philips, Selden, and Malory.

† See 5 Cobb. Parl. Hist. 1250.

First, "That it is the opinion of this Committee, that to assert that the House of Commons is not the only representative of the Commons of England, tends to the subversion of the rights and privileges of the House of Commons, and the fundamental constitution of the government of this kingdom."—This refers, to the libel.

Secondly, "That it is the opinion of this Committee, that to assert that the House of Commons have no power of commitment, but of their own members, tends to the subversion of the constitution of the House of Commons."

Thirdly, "That it is the opinion of this Committee, that to print or publish any books or libels, reflecting on the proceedings of the House of Commons, or any member thereof, for or relating to his service therein, is a violation of the rights and privileges of the House of Commons."

^* See Journals, Feb, 7, 1701.

Then follow Resolutions respecting the people's right of petitioning, &c. with which it is not necessary on this question to trouble the House.

Will any one doubt, after reading these Resolutions, passed when the principles of the Revolution were best understood, when the circumstance of sir Robert Walpole being teller in the division for an immediate report, proves that the supporters of the Revolution were the foremost to promote a vote, which considered a libel on the House to be a breach of its privileges; and that to say you had no power to commit the libeller, was a subversion of the constitution; that such is the law of parliament? Can the case stand on more correct or more constitutional ground? This, Sir, is the privilege for which I contend; this is the privilege which I assert was declared by those resolutions, to be clear and undoubted, resting on those high authorities. An attempt indeed is made in the Argument of sir Francis Burdett, to ascribe a contrary opinion to sir Robert Walpole at a subsequent period; but it will be seen when I come to that part of the question, that the statement there made of the opinion of sir Robert Walpole is either founded in the most complete mis-apprehension, or is a wilful misrepresentation.

I have now, Sir, laid before the House the law of privilege, as declared in the Resolutions of the House, which, I must again assert, constitutes the law of the land on this subject. Sir, it will next be seen, that this law has been acted upon uniformly and invaribly; and is confirmed by constant, repeated, and uncontradicted usage.

To establish this positron, I wish to call the attention of the House to a comparatively recent period, to a most important precedent; one which made a deep impression on my mind from various causes, and particularly from having occurred a very few months before I had the honour of a seat in this House; a period when, though very young, my attention had been much directed to subjects of this description. All the circumstances of this case, both as they appear in the Journals, and are connected with the history of the times, are most material.

Sir Fletcher Norton, your predecessor, Sir, was libelled in the session of 1774, in a letter, printed in the Public Advertiser, for the conduct which he was said to have held in respect to a private bill. Observe, Sir, it was an act past and over. The matter was stated by sir Fletcher Norton to the House, and he called on those concerned, both in supporting and opposing the bill, to speak to his conduct regarding the bill. Several Members, among them Mr. Alderman Sawbridge, stated his conduct to have been correct, and that it was grossly misrepresented in the letter which had been inserted in the newspaper.

The printer of the newspaper, Mr. Woodfall, was then ordered to attend, and a question arose, whether he should be committed to the Sergeant at Arms; to the Gatehouse; or to Newgate.

Lord North contended for the first; Mr. Fox for the last. In the course of this proceeding, Mr. Woodfall, the printer, informed the House, that he had inserted the letter without knowing its tendency; and that it was brought to him for insertion by the Rev. Mr. John Horne.

It was then proposed that the matter should be adjourned, and Mr. Horne ordered to the bar. During these proceedings, no person suggested an idea of the illegality of the measure. It was neither intimated that a libel on the speaker in the discharge of his duty was not a breach of privilege, nor that imprisonment was an illegal punishment for it.

Some delay took place in the further proceeding, owing to Mr. Horne evading the warrant for attendance, by saying to the messenger who served it, that he could not be the person meant; but he was afterwards brought to the bar.

He was told by the speaker, that Mr. Woodfall had given him up as the author of the letter, and asked whether he was so. He asked, whether what Mr. Woodfall had stated was to be considered as matter of evidence, or matter of charge. He was told, matter of charge. On receiving that information, he said, "Then Sir, I plead that I am not guilty." On his putting in this plea, he was ordered to withdraw. Sir, I am particularly anxious that this should be attended to, as most material, not only in this, but in a subsequent and most important part of this case. The solicitor general, Mr. Wedderburn^*, stated that he knew too well the principles of the law of England, to insist for a moment that Mr. Horne should be found guilty on the evidence of Mr. Woodfall, who, by throwing it on Mr. Horne, acquitted himself; it was therefore proposed to adjourn the consideration of the question, in order to the evidence of some of Mr. Woodfall's servants being laid before the House, who were stated to be able to prove the fact against Mr. Horne.

^* Afterwards lord Loughbourough and earl of Rosslyn.

Upon this, a most acrimonious debate took place, in which the ministers were charged with an intention to procure evidence for the purpose. But, what is most remarkable and most important; during this acriminious discussion, in which Mr. Dodswell, Mr. Burke, Alderman Townshend, Mr. Barré, and others spoke, not one word was uttered, denying or questioning that such a libel was a breach of privilege, or that imprisonment was an illegal punishment; and Mr. Horne Tooke, whose interest it was to have denied the jurisdiction—to have disputed the power to punish by imprisonment (whatever he may have whispered or inculcated now), raised no such question then, though it would have been decisive to his acquittal. On the contrary, he put in the plea of not guilty, which, if the fact had been proved against him, must have been followed by imprisonment.

Now, Sir, I ask, whether this transaction does not shew most incontestably, that that law, which was resolved in 1701, was acted upon as undisputed in 1774; that the House in this latter period, filled with men of the highest authority on all questions of Parliamentary law, many of them having a direct interest (if party were to bias opinion on such questions) to dispute the privilege if it had been disputable, never questioned the privilege or the punishment. At that time, sir George Saville, Mr. Burke, Mr. Dunning, lord George Cavendish, Mr. Frederick Montague, lord North, Mr. Fox, Mr. Thurlow, Mr. Wedderburn, Mr. Welbore Ellis, and I think Mr. Dyson (a great authority, and who had not then retired from parliament,) were all members of this House. From none of them did a whisper against the privilege arise. At that time, Mr. Hatsell, whose principles on constitutional questions are well known, and a gentleman (Mr. Ley) whom I now see, and whose knowledge and judgment I highly value, were here to be consulted; and allow me to say, that from that quarter of the House, not the least important in ques- tions of this sort, no doubt seems to have arisen. Shall it be said then, that when, in a House of Commons so rich in parliamentary learning, no doubt was raised, one shall prevail now, flowing, I will venture to say, from no such sources? No, Sir; it was reserved for the present times, thus contumaciously and libellously to dispute these privileges and powers.

The interval between the year 1701 and 1774 might be easily filled up with instances, proving the rule to be as I have stated it, acted upon by the House, submitted to by the offending party, and sanctioned by an approving and acquiescing public. But, Sir, considering the time I have consumed, and the great attention with which I have been honoured, I should deem it a most unwarrantable trespass, if I was now to go through a bead-roll of precedents, to shew the uniformity of that practice. No, Sir, I place the case here; I say, there is the law announced at the beginning of the century in 1701. Here it is acted upon near the close of it, in 1774; and I defy any person to shew me an exception during the interval, or a successful attempt to question it, until the daring and calumnious effort now under consideration.

Sir, it is further worthy of observation, that uniform as the practice has been, clear as the right is, unquestionable as the character of a supreme tribunal is by any regular human authority; this power has seldom, if ever, been the instrument of unnecessary severity. It has been generally exercised with becoming discretion; and its having deviated in the instance which has given rise to this discussion at to the commitment of Mr. Gale Jones, can be no ground for doubt as to its existence; the difference being very wide between the denial of the right, and questioning the prudence of its exercise in the particular instance.

Sir, the authority of parliamentary precedents is confirmed by the uniform course of the courts of law, when these questions have been incidentally before them. And I think, in considering this part of the case, I shall be able to shew, that even lord Holt's conduct and doctrine in the case of Ashby and White, does not form an exception to the general rule. It would be a very tedious, and not a very useful effort, to go through the detail of that great case. It is well known, that the question arose from the House of Commons having considered the proceeding of the court of King's-bench, in trying an action brought by a voter of Aylesbury, against the returning officer of that place, for refusing to admit his vote at an election. Lord Holt, the chief justice of the court, contended, that the court must entertain the action, and that the House of Commons had no privilege to stop it; the House, on the contrary, considering the trying that question as, in a manner, inferring the right to try the election of its members; and therefore a violation of the privileges of the House. The matter was carried by Writ of Error to the House of Lords. The utmost heat prevailed upon the subject between the two Houses; the details are unnecessary. It was tending to the extremity, to which all disputes between supreme powers must lead, if they entertain different and opposite views of the discretion which they have to exercise; when it was stopped by a dissolution of the parliament. But during the contest, the persons who brought the actions were committed by the House of Commons for breach of privilege. The persons committed, applied to the court of Kings-bench, to be released on Habeas Corpus. The three puisne judges, who had differed from lord Holt throughout, were of opinion, that they could not discharge the parties, considering, that to interfere with a commitment by the House of Commons, was to interfere with the privileges of the House. Lord Holt differed, not because he thought the House of Commons could not commit for breach of privilege; on the contrary, he delivered a clear opinion, that the court could not release the prisoners on Habeas Corpus, where the commitment was for a breach of the privileges of the House. But what he contended was this, that where there was a right of action at law, the House could not stay that action by considering it as a breach of privilege; that the bringing the action, therefore, was no breach of privilege; and consequently, that as the bringing the action appeared to be the cause of the commitment, which he considered as no breach of privilege, he thought the parties must be liberated. This special ground, therefore, may be said not to affect the general case. But with all respect to lord Holt, with the highest opinion of his learning, integrity, and his firmness, he is the only one of all the judges in Westminster-hall, who has ever gone to that extent. It has been the uniform course on all other oc- casions, for the judges, when the matter has been brought before them on Habeas Corpus, to give the most implicit effect to the privileges of this House. It is unnecessary to go through all the cases; the whole is collected and stated in a most powerful and enlightened judgment, delivered by lord chief justice de Grey, in the case of lord mayor Crosby; from which, and from the opinions of the other judges of that court, the opinions of the courts of law on this subject may be distinctly collected.

In the year 1771^* this House took notice of the printing its debates, and determined to bring the printers before them, for that breach of privilege. The lord mayor Crosby, Mr. alderman Oliver, and others, committed the messenger who went to seize the printers; and these magistrates were, for that offence, committed to the Tower by this House. They sued out writs of Habeas Corpus, one in the Common Pleas, another in the Exchequer; by both courts the prisoners were remanded, and upon the same ground, namely, that the House of Commons was the judge of its own privileges, and that the courts could not decide upon them. The case, as it passed in the Common Pleas, is to be found in Wilson's Reports, and likewise most fully reported in the State Trials. The judgment of lord chief justice De Grey is a most highly finished and well-considered performance. He is supported by Mr. justice Gould, who certainly was a judge of as great integrity, as much attached to the authority of the common law, and as sincere a lover of the liberty of the subject and of the trial by jury, as any who ever sat in Westminster hall; by sir William Blackstone, whose eminence in questions of this sort I have already shewn you, and whose integrity in the administration of the law is universally admitted—a person, who added to the careful and anxious discharge of his judicial duties, the most enlightened views of all abstract and legal questions. Mr. justice Gould says—"This court cannot know the nature and power of the proceedings of the House of Commons; it is founded on a different law."—"The cases produced respecting the high commission court, &c. are not to the present purpose, because those courts had not a legal authority. The resolution of the House of Commons is an adjudication, and every court must judge of its own contempts." Sir William Blackstone says—"I concur in opinion, that we cannot discharge the lord mayor. The present case is of great importance, because the liberty of the subject is materially concerned. The House of Commons is a supreme court, and they are judges of their own privileges and contempts; more especially with respect to their own members."

^*This was a commitment arising out of a question, which had no relation to that now under consideration. On that occasion, the original breach of privilege, which gave rise to the commitment of the city magistrates, was one, which must be universally admitted to be a breach of privilege, viz. the publishing the debates of the House—the magistrates were committed for an undoubted breach of privilege, viz. committing the serjeants and messengers of the House, charged with a warrant to take the printers. But the case which happened three years after, viz. that of Mr. Horne, in 1774, was expressly for libel as here defined; and on that occasion it never was disputed that libel, as here defined, is a breach of privilege.

My Lord Chief Justice De Grey, after much detail of argument and authority, says, "In order to see whether the House of Commons has authority to commit, see Coke's fourth Institute, 23. Such an assembly must certainly have such authority; and it is legal, because necessary. Lord Coke says, they have a judicial power, each member has a judicial seat in the House: he speaks of matters of judicature of the House of Commons, fourth institute, 23. The House of Commons, without doubt, have power to commit persons examined at their bar, touching elections, when they prevaricate, or speak falsely; so they have for breaches of privilege; so they have in many other cases."—"In the case of the Aylesbury men, the Council admitted, Lord Chief Justice Holt owned, and the House of Lords acknowledged, that the House of Commons had power to commit for contempt and breach of privilege."—"Perhaps a contempt in the House of Commons, in the Chancery, in this Court, and in the Court of Durham, may be very different; therefore, we cannot judge of it, but every Court must be sole judge of its own contempts." And then, in the conclusion of his judgment, he says, in the most eloquent and emphatical language, referring to the case of Mr. Murray in 1754: Courts of Justice have no cognizance of the acts of the Houses of Parliament, because they belong ad aliud examen. I have the most perfect satisfaction in my own mind, in determination. Sir Martin Wright, who felt a generous and distinguished warmth for the liberty of the subject; Mr. Justice Denison, who was so free from connexions and ambitions of every kind; and Mr. Justice Foster, who may be truly called the Magna Charta of liberty of persons, as well as of the lives and fortunes of men; all these revered Judges concurred in this point. I am, therefore, clearly, and with full satisfaction, of opinion, that the Lord Mayor must be remanded."

The opinion of lord Mansfield is well known; that of lord Kenyon has been already quoted by others in this debate. The Court of Exchequer, in 1771, gave an unanimous decision the same, way, in the case of Oliver. Thus, both at the conclusion of the century, and at the commencement of it, all the Judges in Westminster Hall gave the same judgment, with the single exception of Lord Holt, and even Lord Holt, as I have stated, went on the exception, but admitted the general rule to be, that the Houses of Parliament were judges of their own privileges, and in that view of lord Holt's opinion, Lord Chief Justice De Grey agrees; so that we have it confirmed from the highest authority that privilege of parliament is to be judged of only in parliament.

It appears, that these solemn adjudications are confirmed by what are denominated text authorities. As to lord Coke's doctrines, I have already referred to the various extracts read by my learned friend; and I have read some of them myself, and these are all recognised by sir William Blackstone, whose text work I have already cited. In addition to this, I have the authority of lord Hale, whose deep research into every question, of which he has treated; whose learning, whose love of liberty, and whose integrity, can never be too much extolled. Mr. Hargrave, whom my learned friend (sir S. Romilly), so justly praised for those high qualities of learning, integrity, and industry (in which I must cordially join) has given to the public much valuable learning of lord Hale's; and with a liberality which always accompanies true genius, is ready to communicate whatever he possesses of book or manuscript. I found, that Mr. Hargrave, in his opinion, in the case of Mr. Butler, alluded to lord Hale's opinion in an unprinted manuscript; that I might be sure of the quotation, I obtained from him the passage of the manuscript*. It is entitled, "A discourse, or history concerning the Power of Judicature in the King's Council in Parliament." In the eleventh chapter of that work, lord Hale says, "But surely the right of criminal punishment of breaches of privilege of the members of the House of Commons, by long and unquestionable usage, belongs to the House of Commons; but not to give damages." Thus putting the power of criminal punishment by the House for breach of privilege, upon long and unquestionable usage; and by excluding fine or pecuniary damages, making it clear that the punishment must be imprisonment to be regulated by the nature of the usage, as it is now well understood, not for a time certain, but only at pleasure, during the session, to end with prorogation. With the authority of lord Hale, a person, whose extreme accuracy and habit of the most scrupulous inquiry would never permit him to state any right, as founded on long and unquestionable usage, which he had not discovered to be so, I might safely close this part of the argument, and call upon the House to conclude, from their own resolutions and their practice, from the authority of Courts of Law, from the writings of lawyers, that the power of commitment for breach of privilege, was clear and unquestionable. But I cannot avoid bringing under the consideration of the House, an opinion which may be justly placed in this part of the discussion, and which at once establishes that commitment is the punishment for breach of privilege; that libel on the House or its members is breach of privilege, and that the House is sole judge of the offence. The opinion to which I refer, alas! is canonized by the death of him who gave it; one whose loss still creates almost an incapacity to discuss what fell from him: the greatest of all parliamentary lawyers, I mean Mr. Fox, distinguished for his love of justice and his love of liberty; who (as I have often heard him say of himself) was, as it were, brought up and educated in this House, gave an opinion on this subject, in 1798. I have been for some time possessed of that opinion; but it is now given to the public in the Morning Chroncle of this day, by the person at whose request it was obtained. The case on which Mr. Fox's opinion was asked, went directly to the question here at issue; namely, whether libel on the high Court of Parliament or its members, for their conduct in parliament, is a breach of privilege, punishable by imprisonment. It is given upon a case respecting the privileges of the House of Lords, but the reasoning turns entirely upon the privilege, as maintained and exercised in the House of Commons. The strain of the opinion throughout establishes distinctly, that he thought that the House of Commons had the power to punish libel on the House or its members, in the exercise of their duty, as a breach, of privilege or contempt, by such imprisonment as the House is in the practice of inflicting. It is further material to observe, that Mr. Fox, whose attachment to the trial by Jury was most rivetted, maintained this opinion during the whole of his life, and delivered it as his opinion in this House, the last time it was discussed, stating, that the House could not part with it, or with safety give it up to the other tribunals.

^* Hargrave's Judicial Arguments, vol. ii. p. 7.

Mr. Perry submitted his queries to Mr. Fox, in regular order, and Mr. Fox regularly answered them. The first query is, "Though the House of Lords as well as every court of justice, have the power of protecting their proceedings from unlawful obstruction, can this right extend to the commitment for the misdemeanor of libel?

In answer to this question, Mr. Fox says, "There can be no right of committing but for contempt; but an act which comes properly under the description of a contempt, is not the less a contempt for being also a misdemeanor. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a contempt which would not be a misdemeanor."

Here is no limitation of contempt to the narrow, degrading ground of mere obstruction; but both from the terms of the answer, and the subject matter of the inquiry, it is quite clear that the contempt which was in his view, was the misdemeanor of libel upon the House or its members, in the exercise of their functions in parliament.

The second query is likewise important. It implies, that the right is in the House of Commons, and puts the doubt as to the House entirely on the excess of punishment inflicted by that House.

Second query: "Has the House of Lords, either in its legislative or judicial capacity, any power of commitment beyond that of the House of Commons? the latter never committing for a time certain, nor imposing a fine."

Answer: "I do not think the House of Lords, in any capacity, has powers of commitment beyond the House of Commons; but, I believe such powers of commitment have been exercised by it; and I fear, without the reproof which such exercise ought to have drawn from the House of Commons."

Mr. Fox's answer to this query, distinctly recognizes the power of the House of Commons, to the extent to which I have here argued it. And as the whole question turned upon a libel on the conduct of the House of Lords being a contempt, or breach of privilege, it is clear that his opinion was, that libel, as I have defined it, is a breach of privilege; and that such commitment as the House of Commons practices, is a legal punishment for such an offence.

Besides, Mr. Fox explains himself in his answer to the first query, by saying, that a contempt is not less so for being a misdemeanor. He accompanies these answers with a letter to Mr. Perry: and what he states in his letter, makes his opinion on the queries still more distinct and clear. He says, referring to the commitment of Mr. Perry by the Lords; "The conduct of the House of Lords seems to have been very harsh. But harsh as it is, I do not know that it is contrary to precedent, or otherwise illegal, than with respect to the term and the fine; and I do not know that my opinion upon these heads is that of any other person, much less the general one." In the latter clause of this sentence, Mr. Fox clearly refers to the difference which the term and the fine, as exercised by the House of Lords, made, and not to the general question of considering libel as contempt, and punishable legally as the House of Commons punishes it. And in the first branch of this sentence, he delivers a clear opinion in favour of the doctrine for which I contend.

He afterwards observes on Mr. Erskine's letter, respecting the case of contempt in Ireland; and says, "The whole letter seems to relate more to ordinary courts of justice, than to the Houses of Parliament; but even in the case of such courts, if a man were to write contumaciously, of the manner in which a Judge gave judgment, I suspect he would certainly be attached for a contempt; though this case is not mentioned by Mr. Erskine, nor does it come perhaps strictly within the line of his argument." So that Mr. Fox entertains not the least doubt of the power of Courts to punish for contempt; and clearly considers that a contumacious attack upon a judgment pronounced, past and over, is a contempt which a Court might punish by its own authority, and without the intervention of a jury. I confess, sir, the perusal of this opinion, the knowledge that Mr. Fox retained these doctrines, as the sound doctrines of the Constitution, to the last, give me much consolation, and inspire me with great confidence in the opinion which I have endeavoured to maintain.

After such a train of precedent, regularly resolved, and uniformly acted upon by the House, and acquiesced in by the public; after the opinions of Courts of Justice in public, of lawyers and statesmen in their closets, can a doubt remain as to the nature of the privilege, or the extent of the power to punish a breach of it? And is it fit that we should be told at this time of day, that we can only check libel upon the House or its members, by the interposition of the Courts of Law, and by a prosecution in Westminster Hall? Consider for a moment, Sir, how ill adapted this House is for proceeding by that course. We have not means for it, adequate even to those of a parish vestry; we have no law officer of our own; but we have to borrow the law officers of the Crown; and by their efforts, if we are reduced to proceed against libel in a court of law, we must have our cause conducted. Is it possible, under such circumstances, that those who wish well to the station and authority which this House has held, in the constitution of the country—should desire to have our redress for such offences, remediable only by a Court of Law? Do they recollect the effect of that proceeding in the two last instances in which it was adopted by the House, I mean the case of Stockdale, and the case of Reeves? The first a most libellous attack upon certain members of this House, in the great and arduous duty of prosecuting by impeachment, attacking the very essence, as it were, of our power, as the great inquisitor of the nation; the other, a direct attempt to annihilate the independence of the House of Commons, and assert the omnipotence of the Crown in the Constitution of the country. Those gross outrages against the privileges of the House; the one destructive of our inquisitorial character, the other denying our functions, and asserting that all was vested in, and flowed from, the crown as matter of indulgence, went acquitted and unpunished. Are these the means by which the people's rights are to be vindicated and maintained, or the privileges of the Commons of England to be upheld? Sir, if a contrary doctrine is not enforced and maintained, now that its privileges are so daringly attacked, there is an end of that great security of the people's freedom, so often asserted and sustained by the just, temperate, and firm exercise of the privileges of this House.

Sir, I come now more particularly to the consideration of the Argument of sir Francis Burdett—Whether that Argument is a libel or not, has been called in question even by the authority of my learned friend (sir S. Romilly.) This, in my mind, is a most extraordinary and unaccountable doubt. Sir, it is impossible to look at the very introductory sentence of the Address, without seeing that it is at once meant to libel and misrepresent. Sir Francis Burdett's Letter begins on the page after the signature of Mr. Cobbett's name. I therefore presume, that the words which follow, "Sir Francis Burdett to his Constituents," are his words, and not those of Mr. Cobbett. The passage runs thus: "An Address by Sir Francis Burdett to his Constituents, denying the power of the House of Commons to imprison the People of England."

I ask, Sir, if these words can be considered as other than the most libellous? and whether, in their natural acceptation, they give a true representation of the question at issue—I ask, if it is true that the House of Commons has asserted a power to imprison the people of England; I ask, if it is not slanderous so to insinuate; and whether this does not, in the outset, stamp the character of the production to be libellous? Is it true, that the assertion of a privilege to commit for libel on this House and on its members, acting in discharge of their duty here, is an assertion of a power generally to imprison "the people of England;" and yet that is what is meant to be conveyed, to delude and deceive the public. But, Sir, on examining the body of the Argument, my mind is left without a doubt upon the sub- ject of its being libellous. It is a rule in every case of libel, that the whole context is to be taken into consideration, by the tribunal which is to judge of it; not only with a view to discover whether the words charged be innocent, but whether they be libellous: in short, to decide upon the guilt or innocence of the paper. Before I proceed to the examination of certain passages of the paper, bearing the rule which I have just stated, constantly in view, I wish to have it understood, that in construing a paper of this sort, I do not consider the passages which are most abusive in expression, as the most libellous upon the House of Commons. On the contrary, I think a contumelious and contumacious denial of the privileges and authority of this House—a representation of its modes of acting, which degrades it, and brings it into contempt; a false representation of the manner in which it exercises its power—so as to bring it into hatred with the people—are libels of a more atrocious nature than that gross verbal abuse which has been so often referred to in this debate, and which my learned friend has protected from being libel by calling it nonsense. Look to the whole work; consider quo animo it is dictated, and whether the general tendency of it is not (under the pretence of representing his conduct to his constituents) to vilify and degrade the, character of this House. Look to particular passages, and say whether they are not a direct libellous attack upon the constitution of the House, and the manner in which the constitutional rights have been exercised; not questioning their existence or their fitness in powerful and respectful argument, a right which nobody denies, but in terms which clearly mark the disposition of mind to be libellous and slanderous. In page 35 he says, "Yet limited and circumscribed as the House of Commons is, having no means of trial, no rules of judicial proceeding, being no Court of Record, not presuming to fine, not competent to administer an oath; nevertheless, it takes upon itself, first, to determine the crime ex post facto: secondly, it calls upon the accused to criminate himself, contrary to every principle of English law; and in this extrajudicial manner, upon a man criminating himself (so far as avowing himself the author of what has not been proved to be a crime, can be called criminating himself), the House proceeds to judgment, and investing itself with all the powers of Grand Jury, Petty Jury, Accuser, Judge, and Executioner, without evidence, without trial, it pronounces a sentence of indefinite imprisonment; and this in its own cause, where, least of all, it should take upon itself to decide."—Now, Sir, I deny that this representation of the course of our proceeding in such case is true; and I assert, that such misrepresentation, thus conveyed, is a libel, and breach of privilege. First of all, it is impossible not to observe, that he sets out with denying the qualifications of the House of Commons, according to its ancient constitution, which have been sufficient for all its functions in all times, by the means of which it has made those wonderful exertions in support of the people's rights; in successful resistance to the Sovereign's usurpations; in regulating the system of this free and limited monarchy, on which I have observed in the outset. We are here represented as unfit for our duty, because we cannot administer an oath; yet in all times we have discharged our great functions, legislative, judicial, and inquisitorial, in the maintenance of freedom and order, without such a power; and it is not immaterial that these objections to the immemorial constitution of this House were not observed and noticed, when witnesses of the most dubious character were under examination in the last session. When the private repositories of one of those witnesses were ordered to be broken open, under the authority of this House, under your unsealed warrant, no objection was raised to the defect of our constitution, or the injustice of our act. Yet we are now accused, "first, of determining the crime ex post facto."—" Secondly, of calling upon the accused to criminate himself." Now, Sir, this is the first time I ever heard that a crime could be determined otherwise than ex post facto; and on this passage I must have recourse to the notable vindication, that it is not intelligible. But sir Francis Burdett, in the passage under consideration, says, secondly, "We call upon the accused to criminate himself, contrary to every principle of English law." Now, Sir, this is directly contrary to the fact, for we proceed according to the strictest rules of justice. We ask the party, if he is guilty or not guilty. If he admits the guilt, we proceed; if he denies it, how do we proceed? I desire that sir Francis Burdett may be referred to the case of Mr. Horne in 1774; to which surely he might have had access from the most authentic source. I have already stated that case fully, as it applies to this question in another point of view, I mean as a precedent establishing the privilege. I now beg the House to apply it to the matter under consideration; and I ask, whether it does not afford the most convincing proof that there is not the least foundation for the libellous misrepresentation that this House, in its judicial character, in its proceedings, and privileges, "calls upon the accused to criminate himself." Did it do so in the case of Mr. Horne Tooke, in 1774? That gentleman was not called on to say a word, but, on the contrary, was admitted to plead, and he pleaded Not Guilty. So accurate was the House in its proceedings—so little inclined to act contrary to the principles of English law, by forcing the accused to criminate himself, that the evidence of the printer was not permitted to be read against Mr. Tooke as evidence, because it was given to exculpate himself—that other witnesses were called—that those witnesses did not prove the fact—and that though Mr. Woodfall had stated that Mr. Horne was the author of the letter to sir Fletcher Norton—and though every body was morally certain of the truth of that fact, yet Mr. Horne was acquitted, because it was not legally proved, that he was the author. Can there be a more demonstrative proof, that this assertion respecting the proceedings of the House of Commons is without foundation; and if so, that it is a libel on the House, and a wilful attempt, with better knowledge at command, to mislead the people? The House is accused, by sir Francis Burdett, of being "Grand Jury, Petty Jury, Judge, and Executioner, without evidence, and without trial." With respect to the last branch of the accusation, the case which I have just referred to, proves it to be unfounded—with regard to the other part of it, it is a false colouring, calculated to mislead and irritate.

The constitution of the House of Commons is, in that respect, like every other tribunal proceeding for a contempt; and it is a little curious, that those very persons who admit the necessity of committing for obstruction, seem never to have considered, that, in the case of contempt which they admit, this general charge is equally an objection. Sir, it is an objection, arising from the very nature of this necessary power vested in a supreme tribunal. But grave, and serious, and uni- form as this part of the libel appears, it falls far short of that which I am about to observe.

In page 43 he says, "First, The proceedings are upon bare suggestion, contrary to Magna Charta."—"Secondly, Mr. Jones is called upon to criminate himself, contrary to common sense, and every principle of the law."—"Thirdly, The House of Commons ascertain the fact without evidence, being incapable of administering an oath."—"Fourthly, They previously determine the guilt, without appealing to any law."—Fifthly, They pronounce judgment without trial."—"Sixthly, They pass sentence of indefinite imprisonment, contrary to law."—"Seventhly, The Speaker issues a warrant of commitment, illegal in the gross, and in all its ingredients—no lawful authority—no lawful cause—no lawful conclusion—and wanting that essential stamp of law, a seal of office. That the public may exercise its own judgment, however, the warrant is here set forth.

'Mercurii, 21° Die Februarii, 1810.

Whereas the House of Commons hath this day adjudged, that John Gale Jones, having written and caused to be printed a certain paper, containing libellous reflections on the character and conduct of the said House and of some of the members thereof, is thereby guilty of a high breach of the privileges of the said House: and whereas the said House hath thereupon ordered, that the said John Gale Jones be for his said offence committed to his Majesty's gaol of Newgate: these are therefore to require you, the Keeper of his Majesty's gaol of Newgate, to receive into your custody the body of the said John Gale Jones, and him safely to keep in your custody during the pleasure of the said House, for which this shall be your sufficient warrant. Given under my hand this 21st day of February 1810.

CHARLES ABBOT, Speaker.

To the Keeper of His Majesty's

'Gaol of Newgate.'

"Let this instrument, THIS THING sui generis, be contrasted with the description above given of the properties of a lawful Warrant. Does it not evidently appear, that this piece of unsealed paper, signed by the Speaker, by which an untried subject has been outlawed, bears no feature of legality? and that, from the commencement of this proceeding, in its progress, and to its conclusion, there is not one step that has not been marked in a peculiar manner with disrespect for the laws; a disrespect, in which all the parts have been wonderfully consistent throughout, in constituting the most unlawful act the mind of man can possibly conceive?"

How groundless and calumnious all this enumeration is, and is proved to be, by what I have just stated! But that which I consider to be the most libellous and offensive, is what is said, Sir, upon your warrant. It is done, too, in some respects, with considerable address, so as to have a case for observation, which shall avoid the contumely. He says, p. 44: "Let this instrument, THIS THING"—Then come the two Latin words, "sui generis"—unintelligible to the multitude; and, therefore, conveying to those whom it is meant to poison, the unqualified and contemptuous epithet of "this thing;" but saving the general sense of the passage from that meaning, by the insertion of the words "sui generis," which may be said to qualify the contemptuous epithet. But, Sir, I do not put the injurious and most defamatory character of this part of the paper, upon any nice distinction like this; I put it, Sir, upon the gross, the unjustifiable, and degrading manner in which he attacks the warrant issued under your hand, by the authority of this House. And because it has not a seal to it; because the ancient and undoubted authority by which the House have always spoken according to the ancient law and usage of Parliament, has not this appendage of a common law writ, it is scoffed at, and represented as bearing no feature of legality, not only that the unlettered multitude, but that men of education, may be deceived.

Good God! Sir, what is this country arrived at! What is the ignorance of the writer, or his persuasion of the ignorance of the people, when he states such an objection in language and in substance, so grossly libellous and offensive, as that this warrant, this instrument by which the House acts in all its functions, judicial, legislative, and inquisitorial, is "illegal in the gross and in all the ingredients!" Sir, it was by this warrant, however described, and whatever its form—this warrant without a seal, this warrant, signed by the Speaker of the Commons House of parliament, that our ancestors made the great seal of England in the hands of the Keeper of the King's conscience in the custody of the Chancellor of England, bend to its will—It was this abused, de- graded, and vilified instrument, which made the Earl of Shaftesbury, in 1670 (when he lent himself to accomplish the tyrannical designs of Charles the Second, by attempting once more to attach to the crown the sole power of filling the vacancies of this House, and trying the returns of its members), give way to its authority. It is this warrant, this unsealed paper, which now daily commands the clerk of the crown to append the great seal of England to the writ for electing a member to this House—an effort so supreme and powerful, that it seems to me most extraordinary, that its efficacy should now be questioned; and questioned in such terms as have been applied to it, in the argument of sir Francis Burdett. That this warrant, which has endured for ages, which has, "without a seal," been in constant use to attain all the ends of this House, in its inquisitorial, as well as in its judicial character; which has been uniformly obeyed with as much regularity as the writs of other Courts, in opening the repositories, and compelling the appearance of parties, should be characterized as bearing no feature of legality; that a use of the warrant, which has been uniform and invariable for ages, should now be stigmatized "as constituting the most unlawful act that the mind of man can conceive"—can only be accounted for, by considering it as resulting from a mind determined to libel the long established process of this branch of the high court of parliament; the forms of which are as much recognized as a part of the law of England, as the writs of those tribunals to which it is compared.

Is it possible, that any person, reading this passage, can attach to it any other character, than that of a libel, founded in doctrine which, if it prevails, annihilates at once all the means by which this House has uniformly proceeded—by which, in all its ordinary acts, it has at all times obtained persons, papers, and records—without which, it could not bring a person, by the sergeant, to the bar of this House, to answer any question on a breach of its privileges (for that act is an imprisonment, and that act is done by this warrant; founded on uniform custom and immemorial usage), necessary to preserve its station in the constitution by duly supporting its just and necessary privileges.—That the language and strain of argument in this production, therefore, are libellous, I have not a doubt. And if I were trying the question, I must pronounce a verdict of guilty.

But the legal reasoning and authorities on which it is founded, are as fallacious as the production itself is libellous.

The whole proceeds upon a supposition, that the law of parliament is not part of the law of the land—Refute that position, and the whole fabric is overset.

That the law of parliament is a branch of the law of England, and has always been so, it is unnecessary to prove: it is text law, to be found in the earliest and the latest works of all who have written on the subject of our laws and constitution; so much so, that I feel a degradation in being called on to make the assertion. Where then is the argument founded on Magna Charta which is worded in the alternative? which says, no man shall be imprisoned but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; clearly declaring that there are other modes than judgment of his peers, by which a subject of England may be imprisoned.

In the Argument, there is a great display of legal authorities—lord Coke is repeatedly quoted, and his doctrine relied on. Without dragging the House (after the kind attention I have received) through all these quotations, and shewing that the doctrine relied upon by sir Francis Burdett, is doctrine referring to the common law, and not to the law of parliament; I do beg the House to attend to this one observation in the Address and Argument of sir Francis Burdett—lord Coke is quoted, I believe, thirteen or fourteen times. Lord Coke wrote four great general works, by the name of Institutes: the first, his commentary upon Littleton, professedly on the law of tenures, branching into topics of municipal law, and rarely into the constitution of parliament: the second Institute, readings on certain statutes: the third Institute, a dissertation on the criminal law. The fourth Institute is upon the great courts of the kingdom; the first chapter upon the High Court of Parliament; so that this last-mentioned work is the only one of those four Institutes, containing doctrine professedly on this very subject, and distinguishing throughout the common law from the law of parliament. This fourth Institute, accordingly, forms the great repository of the parliament, to which we all have recourse, when any question of the nature now under our discussion arises.

Now, Sir, it will surprise the House, when I tell them, that the numerous quotations which sir Francis Burdett hag made from lord Coke, are all confined to the three first Institutes; and that he has not one quotation or reference to the fourth Institute, the only work which lord Coke has written professedly on the constitution of parliament. No, Sir, this grand repertory of the law of parliament; in which are to be found all those doctrines respecting our privileges, to which I have already referred in what I have stated to the House in the outset, is entirely passed by, and the existence of such a work is never once pointed out or acknowledged. What shall we say of the candour of a disquisition which is thus conducted? But, Sir, this is not the only observation which this course calls forth. By treating this subject, with reference to the doctrine of the common law, which is only one branch of the law of England, the mind is entirely misled, and doctrines referred to, which the law of Parliament not only does not acknowledge, but denies.

Sir, there is another course of argument equally fallacious and unjust in the Address of sir Francis Burdett, when the assertion of the privileges of the House of Commons is referred to, as made in the reigns of James the first, and Charles the first, under the sanction of lord Coke, and the other great men of that day.—It is represented that the privileges here contended for, are not enumerated among those there asserted; and it is concluded, therefore, that as this privilege was not then asserted, it did not exist:—yet it is well known to all who have any information of the history of those times, that no privilege was asserted, but those which had been disputed; and it would be easy to enumerate many of the best ascertained privileges of the House of Commons, which were not asserted at that period. But does it follow from thence that they did not exist? The best and most convincing proof of the weakness of this mode of treating the subject, is to be derived from the admission of privileges made by those who deny the privilege in question: namely, the doctrine of contempt by obstruction. Those who argue most strenuously against libel on the House or its members being a breach of privilege, still admit that the obstructions of our proceedings are breaches of privilege; yet that privilege is no more to be discovered in the enumeration of those which were asserted in 1621, than the more extended privilege for which I have been contending. It would be endless to go through the other objections in detail, which this work affords, all of them shewing equally its fallacy in argument and authority, and its libellous character in intention and in language: I shall, therefore, proceed now Sir, to the third and last branch of this most important question— the punishment.

Mr. Speaker, I announce my views of this part of the subject with the more satisfaction, because nothing has yet been stated, or is yet known, as to the punishment intended to be proposed by those who have brought this matter forward, so that it is impossible to impute the proposition of any individual, to the influence of fear or apprehension. Upon the most attentive consideration which I have been able to give this matter, I am satisfied, that in this case, and as applied to this person, the most advisable punishment is a reprimand from the chair; and when the proper time comes, I shall think it my duty to move that sir Francis Burdett do attend in his place, and receive such reprimand. In proposing this, I propose a punishment most perfectly appropriate to the offence, perfectly consistent with the dignity of this House and the maintenance of its privileges. Upon the subject of libel upon the House or its members, the power to inflict a discretionary punishment implies the necessity of weighing it with the greatest deliberation; and considering the situation, the character, the rank, the education of the person who is the odject of it—nothing is so ready to mislead in a question of this sort, as to inflict a certain punishment on one person, because that punishment has been adjudged on another for a similar offence. First, the discretion may have been injudiciously exercised in the first instance. Secondly, the impression to be made on the person who is the object of punishment, must be different according to the mind of the offending person, being more or less educated, and his station more or less elevated in society. Sir, the object in point of public example and public information, will be more effectually attained by a reprimand, than by any other course. It is of infinite consequence, that the doctrine respecting the privileges of this House, should be often inculcated and pressed upon the public mind, that the antidote to the false doctrines which have been forced upon the people, may be replied to in the most effectual manner, and may come from the highest authority. We all know, Sir, with what effect this would be executed by you; with what sincerity, zeal, and perspicuity the privilege would be asserted; with what just severity, and in what forcible language, the reprimand would be pronounced. Such a punishment to an educated man, is more severe and efficacious than any other, and, in all its aspects, is peculiarly calculated to do service throughout the kingdom. Besides, Sir, the most recent case upon this subject of a member libelling the House, shews, that the punishment which I propose, is not at all inconsistent with the offence, as expressed in the resolution under consideration. It is proposed by the motion in your hand, that the Address and Argument of sir Francis Burdett should be voted to be "a libellous and scandalous paper, reflecting on the rights and privileges of this House." To this proposition I most cordially agree. But as to the punishment, I refer to that of major Scott, who in 1790 published a libel affecting the privileges of this House, in one of the most important functions which belong to it. He attacked its privileges by libelling its members in the discharge of the great duty of prosecuting by impeachment; embarrassing the cause of justice in the proceeding before the Lords, against Mr. Hastings, for high crimes and misdemeanors. The vote which was passed against major Scott was, "that he had published a letter, which the House declared to be a scandalous and libellous paper, reflecting on the honour and justice of the House, and the conduct of the managers," in terms almost the same with what is now proposed respecting sir Francis Burdett. When the amount of the punishment was discussed, Mr. Pitt, with infinite good sense, and most laudable moderation, in my opinion, pressed for the punishment of reprimand, and that course was adopted without a division—while the power to imprison was fully recognized by the whole House, as a legitimate course; and the libel being a breach of privilege, was never even called in question. I cannot use words so likely to prevail on the House to follow that precedent, as those which are attributed to Mr. Pitt on that occasion. He said, "He would recommend it to the House to take the matter up with temper and moderation, rather with a view to mark their disapprobation of such publications, and to hold out a lesson to persons to avoid incurring their displeasure in future, than, by any unnecessary harsh proceeding, to give the world reason to suppose that the motive was founded in personal resentment, or any thing that could be construed into a vindictive feeling; neither of which, he was persuaded, had the smallest influence on the minds of any one gentleman of that House, on the present occasion." This sound and moderate doctrine, falling from such high authority, I do trust, will have its influence with the House on this occasion. And they will see that it is perfectly consistent to vote a paper to be libellous, scandalous, and a breach of privilege; and to follow up that vote with the punishment of reprimand.

Sir, I have now closed all that I have to offer on this most important question, with one small exception.

I omitted to state in its proper place, the observations at which I hinted at an early period of this speech, respecting some of the precedents and authorities, on which sir Francis Burdett relies. I mean that respecting Holt and Bridgeman, and that relating to the proceedings against sir Richard Steele. In the first of those, the proceeding was before the House of Lords, and may relate therefore to privileges very different from ours; and consequently not applicable to this subject—that House having the character of a court of error and of appeal in causes. The case of Holt and Bridgeman was a proceeding of that sort. The office of clerk of the crown was granted by Charles the second, as a sinecure office, to the duke of Grafton. To defeat that sinecure grant, lord Holt granted the office to his brother Mr. Holt. An action was brought in the court of King's Bench, to try the right to the office; and a bill of exceptions was tendered to the direction of the court, which the judges refused to seal. A special verdict was found, and on that special verdict the court gave judgment for Holt. Bridgeman brought a writ of error in parliament on the special verdict; but as the judges had refused to seal the bill of exceptions, it could not make part of the record. Bridgeman wishing to have it before the court of error, petitioned the Lords to make the judges seal the bill of exceptions; and the Lords ordered the judges to answer. They, as it were, pleaded to the jurisdiction, and assigned their reasons—representing strongly and firmly against the proceedings of the Lords—who in the end gave way, and did not insist upon the compulsion which they at first threatened— which was in fact requesting the judges to do that for which the statute law of the land had provided a remedy. The whole matter proceeded upon the petition of the party in a cause, which the Lords, neither in their legislative nor judicial character, had a right to propose or enforce; and the proceeding having dropt in the manner stated, it may serve to show the firmness of the Judges in a contest with the House of Lords; but it never can illustrate the question of privilege.

In the case of sir Richard Steele (which I likewise omitted to state), it is contended by sir Francis Burdett, in a note, that sir Robert Walpole declared, that the publication of a libel was no breach of the privileges of the House of Commons; and that it was against law for the House to treat it as such. I must beg the House to attend to the fallacy and want of candour of this statement. It is most important to detect it.

I have formerly observed, that sir Robert Walpole, in the year 1701, took a very decided part in the resolutions of the House respecting its privileges; declaring, that to publish libels respecting the proceedings of the House, or the members for their services therein, is a violation of its rights and privileges. It is important therefore, to show, that what he did in 1713, was perfectly consistent with his opinion in 1701, and was most just and correct in every point of view; and that the representation given of this transaction by sir Francis Burdett, is completely erroneous. The only question now under consideration, is whether a libel on the House, or its members for their services therein, is a breach of privilege. It never was contended or dreamt of by me, or any who have ever supported this doctrine, that a libel on the state or government generally, was a breach of privilege. Observe then, that sir Richard Steele was not accused of a libel against the House of Commons, or against any of the members of the House, in discharge of their duty there—the charge against him, which was made 13th March 1713, is this—"Complaint being made in the House of Commons, of a paper called the Englishman, and a pamphlet entitled the Crisis; and Mr. Steele acknowledging himself the author of these pieces, they are voted scandalous and seditious libels; highly reflecting on her Majesty, the, nobility, gentry, clergy, and universities; maliciously insinuating that the protestant success- sion in the House of Hanover was in danger under her Majesty's administration, &c. and that Richard Steele, Esq. the author, be expelled the House." Not one word of the House of Commons, from beginning to end; so that this, instead of being a libel on the House or its members, is a general attack upon the general government of the country, for which the House of Commons took upon themselves to proceed against their member—and which proceeding, promoted by a Tory administration, sir Robert Walpole, as a Revolution Whig, opposed; but in doing so, he made no sacrifice of the privileges of the House of Commons; nor did he in the least deviate from the principle, of which I have shewn him distinctly to be a supporter in 1701.

Thus, Sir, it appears, that when precedents and authorities are sifted and examined, they are not applicable to the case in question; and it is by those misrepresentations and generalities, that privilege is rendered doubtful, and the people misled.

There is, Sir, at present, a prevailing plan and system to degrade the House of Commons, and to represent this branch of the legislature (which is connected with, and flows from the people—which has privileges and rights exclusively belonging to it, of the highest nature; armed with which, it has repeatedly fought and conquered in the cause of the people), as inferior to the other branches of the legislature. For this purpose, the miserable shift has been resorted to, of alluding to the appellation of the lower House, as confirming this doctrine, and implying, that its rights and powers are inferior in their nature. They understand but little of the constitution of England, who rest upon such observations, and rely on such doctrine. Sir, the powers of this House vary from the other branches of the legislature, and its functions are different. But its rank is co-equal; and many of its powers exclusively its own: while its efforts have been peculiarly those, by which the constitution has been vindicated and asserted. Those who represent the House of Commons as inferior, and exalt the other powers of the state to its prejudice, are the worst enemies to the liberty of the country. This House has, and I trust will, by a due attention to its dignity, its privileges, and its independence, in defiance of despotic attacks of the crown on the one hand to enslave it, or wicked or misguided efforts of some men on the other hand to degrade it, always succeed in maintaining its proper rank and importance in the constitution; and as a sincere lover of my country, and therefore a strenuous advocate for the just, the necessary, the ancient privileges of this House, I conclude, esto perpetua.

, in explanation, stated, that he had never said or maintained that the doctrines asserted in the paper under discussion were not a breach of the privileges of that House. Any thing that obstructed their proceedings must come under that description, but the only doubt he had was as to the libel.

then rose and said, that he hoped for the attention of the House whilst he made a few observations, and was happy in doing so to take that opportunity of bearing his testimony to the legal and constitutional sentiments delivered by his hon. and learned friend who had just sat down. But great as was his respect for that hon. and learned gent. and unlimited as his reverence and love were for the authority (Mr. Fox) which he had quoted, he must still be allowed to say, that he was not convinced by the arguments of his hon. and learned friend. Had it ever been contended that the House was to abandon its privileges? No. Whatever might be the wish of any member as to the revision and reform of these privileges, no man deemed them of more value than himself; no man thought more highly of them. He considered any breach of the just and legitimate privileges of that House, as a direct assault upon the liberties of the country; and, consequently, he was not to be told, that in order to support the privileges of that House, they were called upon to condemn the letter of sir Francis Burdett. The privileges possessed by the House had been given for the benefit of the public. Without such a power, how could the ordinary business of the House be conducted? How could the chairman of its different committees proceed? He had himself, as chairman of a committee, exercised the authority given by the House in sending for papers, persons, and records. The orders of the House were, in such cases, uniformly obeyed, as they must be obeyed, or there would be an end of the most important of their functions and of the liberty of the country. His hon. and learned friend had expressed some doubts as to the propriety of the commitment of Mr. Gale Jones, and thought that case ought to have been considered with some latitude. Whatever might be the weight attributed to Mr. Justice Blackstone's authority, no man could have higher claims to attention for constitutional doctrine than Mr. Hargrave.

His hon. and learned friend had also adverted to a private and unpublished letter of the late Mr. Fox, as an authority for his argument. From that letter he should beg likewise to state, as the opinion of that great man, of whom no man thought more highly than himself, "that the House of Lords, no more than the House of Commons, had a right to commit persons, and that it was matter of regret that the Lords had been suffered to exercise that right by the House of Commons without reproof." Upon this authority, then, it appeared, that so far from claiming the privilege itself, the House of Commons was considered as deficient in duty for not having expressed any reproof of the Lords for having exercised the power. But the hon. and learned gent. opposite (Mr. Stephen) had asked, whether it was their wish to go back to the times of queen Elizabeth. He felt no disposition of that description, but if they were to refer to the practices of such times, he was much afraid that principles of tyranny were contagious, and that no benefit could possibly result from the retrospect. He must again repeat, that their privileges had been given with a view to the benefit of the people, and should never be exercised but for the purpose of promoting that end. And here he felt bound to state the difficulty arising out of the case of Mr. Gale Jones. They might have proceeded against him in a far different way, though they had thought proper to commit him. The libel of Mr. Reeves, which had been alluded to by an hon. friend of his, had been voted by that House most libellous and slanderous, and though one gentleman proposed he should be taken into custody, and another that his libel should be burnt by the common hangman; yet whilst two of the ablest men that ever existed were present, the case was referred to the Attorney General to prosecute, and the consequence was, that the individual was acquitted.

His hon. and learned friend had, he thought, not treated the hon. baronet fairly, when he referred to Mr. Horne, and charged the hon. baronet with disseminating that gent.'s opinions. That might be a good argument as against an individual, if just, but would not go for any thing upon the general principle.—But to return to the authority of Mr. Fox; it was the opinion of that great man, that every court, which appeared to claim a power beyond what was necessary for its proceeding, usurped that power. Was there any case in which the House had gone farther than in the case of Gale Jones? It was the opinion of Mr. Fox, that the House of Lords could not exercise that power, because there was no appeal but to the legislature, of which that House was a part. But was not the House of Commons equally a part of the same legislature? Nothing could induce him therefore to vote that the paper under consideration was a libel. But upon this subject he was bound to admit, that he did not think that the hon. gent., who had brought forward the question, had lent himself as a tool to any administration in the proceedings which had taken place. He begged of the House however, to consider the steps by which the business had hitherto proceeded. It had been said, that he had not on a former occasion declared by his vote that Gale Jones was not guilty of a breach of privilege, and he took shame to himself that he had not asserted on that occasion what he now felt to be right. In the paper under discussion, sir Francis Burdett only exercised a right which belonged to him and others, to state his opinion upon a public subject. That he might have done so in intemperate language, he was not prepared to deny; but he must insist, that, Mr. Gale Jones had conducted himself at their bar respectfully and with decorum. The hon. baronet (sir J. Anstruther) had then an opportunity of stating his sentiments upon the subject; he had another opportunity when the motion of his hon. friend was brought forward for the discharge of Mr. Jones.

As to the argument of the noble lord opposite, founded upon the appeal made in the paper to the voice of the people, he was of opinion that it did not rest upon any firm foundation. On the contrary, he was persuaded that the language of the hon. baronet in that particular was perfectly justifiable. But though he idolized, at least respected in a degree little short of idolatry, the memory of the late Mr. Fox, still there were some things which he should not be disposed to admit, even upon such high authority. He could not as- sent, however, to the justice of the observation of the hon. gent. who alluded to the circumstance of that distinguished Statesman having, whilst a very young man, sat upon the Treasury Bench, and voted in a particular way on a motion of Mr. serjeant Glyn. If he knew any thing of Mr. Fox—if he was alive to his principles—if he had imbibed any of his spirit or feelings, he was convinced that Mr. Fox, upon consideration, would have admitted that his conduct in such cases had been erroneous.

But in order to shew that the language of sir Francis Burdett's paper was not libellous, he must again refer to a pamphlet published by Mr. Burke, in the time of Wilkes, called "Thoughts on the Public Discontents." In that work it was broadly asserted, that the people should exercise a vigilant superintendence over the administration of public affairs; and that, in certain cases, there was no remedy for grievances to be expected but from the interference of the great body of the people. Had any thing so strong as that been stated by the hon. baronet? No: he only called upon the people to express by their voices what they felt upon the present situation of affairs. Was there any thing in the production of the hon. baronet to be compared with what had been published by that great man Mr. Burke? If they were but to look at both, they would be sensible how feeble that language which had been brought under the consideration of the House was, compared with that which had never been questioned any where. And here he must be allowed to observe, that he held in contempt all fears that would prevent him from doing his duty, and voting conscientiously. His only apprehension was, the degradation that might be brought upon the House of Commons. The paper, he was of opinion, ought not to have been noticed at all, and though noticed was not such as to call for reprehension. He agreed with the Master of the Rolls, that it was a question of magnitude, but did not think that any harsh or hasty proceeding was to be taken upon it.

But neither the hon. baronet who had spoken early in the debate, nor his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Adam) had convinced him by their arguments that any serious or severe notice ought to be taken of this case. He would not deny, however, that in certain cases, it would be proper for the House of Commons to pos- sess the power of commitment, though that should always be regulated by the necessity. But it was not expedient that it should always exercise that right, in case of libel, as was evident from the manner in which the prosecution against Mr. Reeves had been managed. His learned friend (sir S. Romilly) had never asserted that that House had not the power of removing nuisances; but that such power should never be used but upon a necessity. It would certainly be a most strange mode of arguing, to contend that the placards displayed in the streets by Mr. Jones could have the effect of interrupting the proceedings of that House. But it might be said, that as they had committed Mr. Jones to custody, they ought also to commit sir F. Burdett. This he denied. It was his opinion, that unless they should agree to the proposition of his noble friend, they ought to vote the adjournment of the discussion for some months, so as to get rid of it altogether. For his own part, upon the best consideration he could give the subject, he did not perceive the smallest matter that was libellous in the publication. As to the allusion to the means by which that House was assembled, he could see literally nothing improper in that: sure he was, that it would puzzle the hon. baronet to point out how the member for Tralee (Mr. Canning) came to have a seat in that House. The true course for that House to pursue, he must contend, was not to arrogate more privileges than it was entitled to, or by constant usage enjoyed.

With regard to the real character of the paper under discussion, he declared, that he saw no libel whatever in the first letter of the hon. baronet. In the report of his speech there were some points pushed to an extreme. But a disposition to exaggerate was the constant error of the hon. baronet. He was too much in the habit of dealing in the superlative degree. This however, was generally the error of sanguine men, and certainly no man could be more sanguine than the worthy baronet in the pursuit of his object, which was, no doubt, that of true constitutional liberty, for he saw no reason to impute to him any Other motive. There were some passages in this paper which, he confessed, he could not understand, and of course he could not set them down as libels. Indeed, these passages reminded him in some degree of the placard of Q. U. O. Z. which was some years ago posted about London. Every body asked, what it meant; and at length the waggish writer confessed, that he had it distributed in order to shew how he could puzzle the people by publishing four nonsensical letters. As to the hon. baronet's allusion to the possibility of the Bill of Rights becoming a Bill of Wrongs; that allusion, he thought, warranted by the manner in which that bill had been abused upon the motion for the committal of Jones. But there were many statutes made for the benefit of the subject, which were afterwards perverted to a different purpose, For instances, the Place Bill was, he understood, made use of in Ireland, to get rid of members adverse to the Union, to procure substitutes by whom that measure was carried. This, then, furnished an illustration of the doctrine of sir Francis Burdett. The scriptural language applied to that House, by the hon. baronet, could not be found very inapplicable, after the conduct of the noble lord (Castlereagh), and the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had been palliated and passed over after their violation of the most essential privileges of the House had been overlooked. Upon such a proceeding, any terms of animadversion could hardly be too strong. He would offer some scriptural language also to the consideration of the House—"The beginning of strife was as the letting in of water;" and he cautioned the House to consider well the course it was pursuing. He strongly recommended it to get out of this business. His proposition was, that the motion then under consideration should be postponed till such a time beyond the expected sitting of the House, that there would be no chance of any farther discussion of it—that Jones should be liberated—and then let a question be raised upon this subject in such a shape that it might be discussed without any mixture of heat or prejudice—without any proceeding calculated unduly to influence their own minds or to inflame the minds of others. This course be earnestly pressed upon the consideration of the House, but above all he exhorted it to attend to the moderate and judicious advice of the learned gent. on the lower bench (the Master of the Rolls) and not punishing where there was reason to doubt, by not pushing matters to extremity.

said, he could assure the hon. member who spoke last, that if ever he came to the consideration of a question without the least feeling of political animosity, it was to the discussion of the question now before the House. For himself, he could say, that he met it with a mind as unprejudiced as could be expected from the inevitable infirmity of human nature. He had not sought the question; he could not decline it when it pressed upon him. In the state in which the question was presented to the House, it was not possible to avoid coming to a decision upon it. If the House were inclined to adopt the course recommended by the hon. gent., they should endeavour to make their conduct consistent. If they arrogated privileges that did not belong to them (an opinion in which he was by no means disposed to coincide), the most manly course would be to confess their injustice, and to repair any wrong they might have committed by inforcing them. Upon this principle, the hon. gent. would himself come in for his share of whatever blame might be attached to the late proceedings of the House. He could not learn that the hon. gent. had ever even entered his protest against the commitment of Mr. Gale Jones; and he therefore contended, that the hon. member was consequently himself a party to the injustice of that act, if unjust it were. But after what he had heard that night he would not allow that the House on that occasion had overstrained any privilege claimed by it. He would confess that he came to the consideration of the question with considerable doubts on his mind, as to the power of the House to commit generally—doubts that were greatly increased and almost confirmed by the ingenious speech of the hon. and learned gent, (sir Samuel Romilly) on the other side;—but the arguments of the learned gent. on the bench below him (Mr. Adam) completely removed them.

With respect to the case of Reeves, which had been so much insisted on, he begged leave to observe, that the resolution ultimately adopted by the House was not that first proposed by a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Sheridan), whom he did not now see in his place. The resolution first proposed was for an address to his majesty to deprive Mr. Reeves of any office he might have filled, and to render him incapable of holding, for the future any place of trust or emolument under the crown. It had been said, in the course of this discussion, that the defence of the hon. baronet consisted merely in having employed a flower of speech, and it was asked, what! would you come upon the hon. baronet for a metaphor? But what was the offence of Mr. Reeves, for which he was ordered to be prosecuted? Was it not also a metaphor? His right hon. friend, in the richness of his exuberant imagination, could discover a libel in this metaphor, in this child of fancy; but the less imaginative minds of an English jury could not recognize any feature of this repulsive description. It was impossible, in his judgment, to separate the cases of Mr. Jones and sir Francis Burdett. If the House should admit by the vote of that night, that sir F. Burdett was entirely guiltless, it followed that their whole proceeding against Mr. Jones was founded in flagrant injustice. For his own part, he must express his sincere regret, that the House was called to decide upon a question of this nature. With the hon. baronet, whose conduct was the subject of consideration, he had not the honour of the slightest acquaintance. He had however opportunities of judging of his abilities and of his motives, as far as one man could judge of the intentions of another, from his conduct. Of the hon. baronet he would say, that he considered him as a man gifted with extraordinary talents; of powers of the very first grasp, which, if directed in a proper channel, might produce incalculable advantages to his country. He never knew the hon. baronet to rise in that House, that he did not acquit himself as a person of first-rate ability; always entering with uncommon zeal into the consideration of any subject he undertook, and conducting it throughout with equal ability. Of the talents, and he would fain hope the sincerity and purity of the hon. baronet's motives, there could hardly be a difference of opinion. But the question was not respecting the views or parliamentary talents of the hon. baronet. The offence charged upon him, and the necessity of vindicating that offence, was the question on which they were to decide. The question was, whether they would or would not uphold the privileges of parliament. These privileges were not to be sought for as laid down in books and charts, amidst the violence of conflicting parties; but they were to be discovered or deduced in or from the invariable practice of parliament. When he considered the purposes for which these privileges were claimed, that they were claimed to uphold and protect that House against other powers, he felt it to be his imperious duty to maintain them with firmness and jealousy. Though it was far from his wish to be called upon to decide on a question essentially connected with the independence and the existence of the House, he did not look to the decision with the apprehension that other gentlemen did He came with his mind reluctantly, but perfectly, made up on the question. In deciding on it, therefore, he would take care, as far as it depended on him, not to compromise the privileges of the House, and, above all, to distribute justice with an even and impartial hand.

disclaimed being a party to the commitment of Mr. Jones. In presenting himself to the House after the right hon. gent., it might be supposed that he rose to impugn the principles laid down by him and an hon. and learned friend (Mr. Adam) on the same bench with himself, respecting the privileges of that House. No such thing. That House possessed the privilege and power of committing for contempt, or for libel. Nothing was clearer to his conception than this; it was confirmed by the practice of two centuries, and in repeated instances. In discussing, however, any doubts that might be now entertained respecting the existence of such a power, it would be desirable to keep an eye on the position laid down by sir F. Burdett.—That hon. baronet stated, that the House had no power of commitment except of its own members; and in support of this assertion, he quoted the passage from Magna Charta, that no person was to be confined except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. Why, according to this doctrine, there was not a member of that House who would not be excluded from the benefits of this clause of the Great Charter. He never heard a more fallacious opinion, and he was happy to find there was not one man in the House who concurred in it.—As to what had fallen from his hon. and learned friend (sir S. Romilly), he heard it with deep regret, entertaining, as he did, the highest opinion of his talents and his virtues. His hon. and learned friend seemed not to be aware of the consequences of the principles he had laid down. According to his argument, the jurisdiction of no court could extend beyond the actual commission of the offence that called for reprehension. It would be incompetent to punish on Tuesday that which was done on Monday. But his hon. and learned friend surely could not have forgotten that courts of justice were in the practice of attaching for such contempts, and that it was, a fortiori, a privilege that could not be refused to parliament. In insisting, however, upon the necessity and legality of this privilege, he must admit that discretionary power was, in its nature, dangerous, and that it was adviseable it should be as much circumscribed as it could be consistently with its main end and design. After the experience of centuries, however, he did not expect to have heard it doubted at this day, that the law of parment was part of the law of the land. From Fortescue down to Blackstone, with hardly a single exception, this principle had been uniformly recognized.—It was asserted in the resolutions of the House, and by the conduct of the Commons at different times; and he knew not where to look for the privileges of parliament, but in the law and practice of parliament.—The right of the Commons to commit having been already disposed of, there remained another question for the consideration of the House. That question was, whether the conduct of sir Francis Burdett was a breach of privilege, and whether the House was called upon to mark it as such? Upon these points there had been various revolutions in his mind. At one time he was disposed to think the paper on the table libellous, at another time not. Would it be said, that it was not competent to any one to discuss the decisions of that House outside its walls? At this day, he could not suppose such doctrine would be maintained. On, the contrary, there was no constitutional subject that might not be freely discussed; and in these discussions it was not always possible for men so to measure their words as to be entirely free from offence. He believed it would be allowed, then, that the constitution of that House might fairly become the subject of discussion; and that the question of parliamentary reform, so vitally connected with it, was also a fair object of consideration.

If some subjects were to be admitted and others rejected, in consequence of the exercise of this privilege, he would be glad to know where the House was to place the limit. This, he believed, was the first time that the House was called upon to agree to a set of resolutions without being apprized of the ulterior resolution with which it was intended to follow them up. Had he been in his place when the case of Jones was under consideration, he would have opposed the commitment of that person, and he would now equally oppose the commitment of sir F. Burdett, Such practice would close all discussion, and put an end to the liberty of the press. He admitted that there were very intemperate expressions in the letter, perhaps libellous, but they were not of so marked a nature, he must contend, as would justify the House in resorting to so strong a measure as this. He would most readily agree that the House possessed the privilege, in the fullest sense of the word, of committing, and might exercise it when it thought fit; but this was a case, in which he must maintain it ought not to be exercised. Instead of making sir F. Burdett less powerful, it would make him more so, and render the question for parliamentary reform more popular than it had ever been.

a speech of some length spoke in favour of the former resolutions.

justified the course adopted by his hon. friend, the member for Somersetshire. His hon. friend had proposed his resolutions on the offensive paper, leaving it to the discretion of the House to say what punishment should follow. He could scarcely have expected that any man would be found in that House to maintain that the paper was not a libel, seeing the extravagancies and violence of the expressions, and when it was apparent, that it was published with no other view than to bring the House into disesteem and disgrace. He trusted that the result of the vote that night would be to shew, that they were not prepared to give up the privileges of that House, or to surrender them to be trampled upon by any individual.

lamented that this subject had ever been brought before parliament. It was a contest in which victory would be without glory, and in which defeat must be followed by disgrace. When the House went to hunt in holes and corners for questions of privilege, they diminished their own dignity. They might depend upon it, that the result of this contest would not tend to their satisfaction. Had they forgot Wilkes's case? Did they not know that it ended in his being elected for Middlesex, and nominated Chamberlain of the city of London, and that parliament was at length obliged to shrink from the contest? In this battle between the giant and the dwarf, the giant diminished in size, and the dwarf magnified. The peo- ple of England, with their characteristic generosity, would range themselves on the weaker side, and oppose the shield of their compassion against the arm of power.

called upon the House to support, its privileges.

could not agree to proceed to the other orders of the day. He thought the House was bound to assert its privileges.

complained that the hon. mover of the resolutions did not know what he was doing. The hon. member had spoken of his hair standing on end, but he had not spoken in any way to afford information to the House. He was convinced that the House had no right to commit the hon. baronet. On many occasions the worthy baronet had been branded by gentlemen on the other side of the House, with the terms of jacobin, democrat and demagogue; but the country knew sir Francis Burdett, and knew how to appreciate his virtues and his talents. If ministers sent him to the Tower, it would be against the good wishes of every friend to his country.

thought it was impossible for the House to pass over the paper. The question was of that nature that it could not be blinked. If the House adopted the resolutions, they must of necessity proceed farther; but it was advisable that the punishment that was to follow should be as lenient as possible. He would vote against the amendment.

would not undertake to justify every thing that was said in the paper on the table. He professed his intention in case the motion of his noble friend was negatived, to move an amendment to the resolutions, recognizing the right of members of that House to publish their opinions on constitutional points, to communicate with their Constituents, and that such parts in the Letter and Argument of sir F. Burdett, as did not contain inferences derogatory to the Constitution, were not a breach of privilege.

contended that the paper was a gross breach of the privileges of that House, and charged the hon. baronet with having altered and misquoted precedents in the Argument to serve his own purpose. From 1547, when the Journals of Parliament first commenced, all the precedents were in favour of the privilege of commitment, by the House. Instead of any harsher proceeding, he would recom- mend that the Speaker should reprimand sir F. Burdett in his place.

was for postponing the further consideration of the subject to a distant day.

was convinced by the arguments of the hon. and learned gent, (sir S. Romilly) that the House did not possess the power of committing persons who were not members. At the same time he felt himself bound to say, that there were many passages in the paper highly offensive.

thought that before the House proceeded to a vote, they should hear the hon. baronet in his defence.

entered into a very able justification of sir F. Burdett's conduct.

said, he trusted the House would give him credit for not being a person likely to trespass on their patience at that late hour. He was not a person disposed to betray the privileges of that House, which, no matter whether they were usurped or conferred, were necessary to their existence, and which if they did not possess, they would not be then sitting there as a branch of the legislature. But they should recollect that their privileges were derived from the people, and were held for the advantage of the people. If the House were brought into an unpleasant predicament, woe be to the late member for Cambridgeshire. That gentleman was answerable for its embarrassment and whatever consequences might follow. It was he who excited these doubts concerning the privileges of the House, by converting a personal attack on himself into a violation of the Bill of Rights. This sent people to enquire into the nature and extent of privilege of Parliament. He wished to know from the gentlemen who supported the Resolutions, what conclusion they intended to draw from their adoption. Did the hon. mover mean to move that sir F. Burdett should be sent to the Tower. If that was his intention, for himself he would say, that he would not be made a stepping stone to assist him in his progress. He would not consent to hurt a hair of sir F. Burdett's head. What did the hon gent. or his friends mean to move? He called upon him for an answer; he was entitled to it.

would state what his course had been, and what were his intentions. He was not to be forced beyond the line of conduct he prescribed to him- self. He would lay the Resolutions before the House, leaving it to them to dispose of them as they might please. If they were adopted, it would be competent for any hon. member to follow them by any Resolution he might think proper. When such should be proposed, he would give his vote conscientiously on the question.

said, that if the Resolutions were agreed to, he would feel it his duty to propose that sir Francis Burdett be committed to the Tower.

said, that no man felt a stronger inclination to uphold the privileges of that House, but he could not vote for the Resolutions, because he was convinced they proceeded from vindictive feelings.

said, he had been surprised by the expression 'vindictive,' uttered by the noble lord. He trusted the House would give him credit for impartiality. A more gross, foul, and scandalous libel, had never, in his opinion, occupied the attention of Parliament, and if it was decided to be a libel by the sense of the House, he thought it their duty to commit the author to the Tower. He thought many of the members who had not spoken with freedom during the debate, were intimidated by what had passed out of doors. [Here Mr. Tierney spoke to order, and complained that the observation was unparliamentary; it was, however, decided by the Speaker, that the right hon. member was not out of order.] He then continued, and stated, that he had been induced to allude to the transactions without doors, by what had happened to himself on his way to the House. Passing through the Hall, he had been surrounded by a mob, many of whom exclaimed "Burdett for ever!" and other words.

contended, that Parliament had no right to give up the privileges of the people of England, of which this right claimed by the House was undoubtedly one. The power of commitment was sanctioned by precedent, and essential to the independence of that House. He thought the wisest course they could adopt would be to come to a vote on the Resolutions at present, and to defer the consideration of the measure of punishment to a cooler moment. He considered the argument of the last speaker, as rather unfair. It seemed as if it were intended to induce them to adopt the motion for commitment, by making them ashamed of appearing to be intimidated. He thought the House was in duty bound to mark their sense of the paper on the table.

was convinced the House would render a more grateful service to their constituents by rescinding the vote in favour of the Walcheren Expedition, than by provoking a contest respecting the existence of a privilege that was not attacked.

Sir J. Newport and Mr. W. Smith announced their intention Of opposing the Resolutions, since it was proposed to follow them up by a punishment not warranted by the offensive matter contained in the paper on the table.

A division then took place, Ayes, 80; Noes, 271; Majority against reading the other orders of the day, 191.

Strangers were not again admitted; but the Resolutions proposed by Mr. Lethbridge, were agreed to without a division.

A motion for the Commitment of sir F. Burdett to the Tower was then made by sir Robert Salusbury, upon which a discussion of some length took place. An amendment was proposed, that sir F. Burdett be reprimanded in his place, upon which the House divided,

List of the Minority who voted against Sir Francis Burdett being committed to the Tower.