reported from the Select Committee appointed to consider of the proceedings had and to be had with reference to the several papers signed "Francis Burdett," the contents of which related to his being apprehended and committed to the Tower of London, and which papers were communicated to the House by Mr. Speaker upon the 13th and 17th days of April last; and to report such facts as they may think necessary, together with their opinion thereupon, from time to time, to the House; and to whom the matters stated by the Serjeant at Arms attending the House, and the process served upon him in an action at law by sir F. Burdett; and also the summons served on Mr. Speaker and the notice of declaration delivered to the Serjeant at Arms at the suit of the said sir F. Burdett, were referred; That the Committee had considered the matters referred to them, and had directed him to report the same, as they appeared to them, to the House.

The Report [a copy of which will be found in the Appendix to Vol. 17, p. Ixxxi.] having been read,

said, that before he moved that this Report be laid upon the table, and also that it be printed, he thought it right to state his intention of Moving, for certain reasons, to have it taken into consideration instanter. There were, according to his judgment, three modes of proceeding in cases of this nature, from among which it would be for the House to select the one most congenial with its view of expediency. The first was, to issue some process which might serve as an inhibition to prevent the courts of law from proceeding at all in actions under consideration. But he did not understand that there was any precedent for such a course. As to the second mode, namely, that of committing all the persons concerned in bringing or promoting such actions, he conceived that there was a variety of precedents in support of the power of the House so to commit if it thought proper. The considerations of expediency, however, alluded to in the Report, and the attorney alone being at present engaged, were against the adoption of this mode. There was, then, only one mode remaining, and that was to plead to the actions, and let the parties sued shew to the court, that the acts complained of were done in consequence of the privileges of that House. If the House should think proper to allow the Speaker and Serjeant to plead, it would then have to consider what sort of plea should be put in; whether a plea in abatement, or a plea in bar. If the former, which would involve a denial of the jurisdiction of the court, that plea must be put in the next day, of course, no time was to be lost. It was necessary, indeed, that proper measures should be promptly taken, and this necessity called for the immediate consideration of the Report. The hon. gent. concluded with moving, That the report do lie on the table.

felt it impossible to sit silent after hearing the report which had been just read. What! that the Speaker should be advised to appear in a court of law to defend an act done as the organ of that House—of the representatives of the people of England! If this advice were acceded to, and that the court should go on, that it should enter into the action, in what a state would that House be placed? It would be defending itself in a court from which an appeal would lie to the House of Lords, and thus it might happen that the privileges of that House would be decided upon in the other House of Par- liament. He conjured the House to pause before it became liable to a consequence so much to be deprecated. Would the House be contented to place itself in such a situation? Would it be willing to go back a century in its consequence? Would it, after the decisive victory it had obtained in the Aylesbury case, consent to surrender its dignity and power by surrendering the means of their security, by committing their defence to a court of law? Was it to be endured, that the privileges of that House should be tried, perhaps overturned, by the decision of the court of King's bench? While he opposed such a proceeding, he protested against the other alternative, of committing the parties concerned in bringing the actions which gave rise to this discussion. Indeed, there was no other party to which such an order could apply, but the attorney. But it would be improper, in his judgment, to adopt either alternative. The House should not at all submit to have its privileges brought into discussion in an inferior court. If one privilege was to be so discussed, then another and another would be questioned, until all the power of the House would be put to hazard if not overturned. In fact, he did not see the necessity of taking any step whatever in this case. If it were said that by taking no step the parties sued would be left undefended, he would answer no. That House had always the power to defend its privileges, and its officers against any violation from any quarter whatever, and if it took no step whatever in this instance, it would be in no worse situation than it was at present. By these observations he wished to guard the House against the monstrous lengths to which it might be carried, if it submitted on this occasion to give up the privileges which could alone render them an efficient body. Here the noble lord took occasion to advert to the phrase of "illegal privileges," which he observed had been just repeated by his noble friend near him (lord Folkestone). Was not his noble friend aware, he would ask, that the law of parliament was a part of the law of the land; that it was as much a part of that law as any of the common law; aye, or of the statute law either; he felt most strongly that any abatement of the privileges of that House, which formed such a material part of the law of parliament, could not take place without a general deterioration of the constitution. The noble lord then exhorted the House to guard those privileges entire and unbroken which were so essential to the liberties of the people, and to the protection of the House itself against the prerogative of the crown. Let gentlemen consider that if the slightest invasion of the privileges were admitted there was no knowing where it would stop. The barriers once broken down, it was difficult to say, how far the invaders would proceed. But while he was thus tenacious of the privileges of the House, let it not be supposed, that he would be any advocate for their abuses in the opposition of individuals. He was not however prepared to say, that the charge of abuse or injustice applied to the case which gave rise to this discussion. The noble lord concluded with an appeal to the House not to endanger the best bulwark of the constitution and of liberty, by acceding to the recommendation of the honourable mover, by submitting the privileges of that House to be tried in an inferior court. He fervently prayed that providence might avert from the House the consequences of such a decision.

had not intended to trouble the House at this time, but from the allusion to an expression from him overheard by the noble lord who spoke last. He did contend that there might arise a state of things in which their privileges might be disputed in a court of justice. If they went the length to which the arguments used on this occasion seemed to go, and if they would justify every exercise of power for which they could find a precedent, then they might do whatever they pleased, and the person suffering under their act could have no remedy. To exemplify to what length this might be carried, he would suppose an extreme case, for it was by supposing extreme cases alone, that principles could be tried. Suppose, founding themselves on precedent, they should commit a person for a limited time, was it to be contended, that the subject could have no remedy against this arbitrary measure? Suppose they were to fine or to pillory a person, should the person aggrieved have no remedy? Suppose they had chosen to punish Mr. Gale Jones, as they had once punished a person, by putting him on horseback, with his face to the tail, thus conducting him to Charing-cross, and after having pot him in the pillory there, committed him to Newgate for life; could not that exercise of power be legally disputed? If they chose again to exercise this right; it was monstrous to contend that they could thus treat any man, without being amenable to a court of justice. And yet it would be the case, were they to plead against the jurisdiction of the courts in preference to putting in a plea in bar. With regard to the Report, he lamented that ever a Committee had been appointed to give their opinion on this subject. He wished it had been left to the course of law, without the interference of the House at all. He did not, however, quarrel with the Report; though it appeared to him to be deficient in that species of information which the House most required from the Committee. It produced a case in the 3rd year of Charles the 1st, which went directly against the opinion it recommended; for in this case the House had altered its course, owing to proceedings in a court of law. The bill of rights had been often referred to during these discussions, and particularly that passage which declared that the proceedings of parliament were not to be questioned out of parliament. But the case before them had nothing to do with what was done in, but what was done out of parliament. He maintained that it had not; for what had the breaking open of sir F. Burdett's doors to do with what was done in parliament? The Report, in stating the case of sir John Elliot, &c. had omitted a very material part of that case, namely, that the House of Commons, not content with their own declaration, and the declaration of the House of Lords, against the decision of the court of King's bench, had brought a writ of error into the House of Lords, to have the sentence pronounced, reversed. This proved that the House of Lords had been called on by the House of Commons itself, to decide on its privileges. The Report also stated the case of sir Frances Pemberton; and he was surprised that, after the consideration of that case, any man could wish the Speaker to plead against the jurisdiction of a court of law. It was held in that case that if the Speaker pleaded the court was to consider, not the privileges of the House of Commons, but, whether the person against whom the action was brought had acted according to these privileges? He held that the privileges of the House were known to lawyers; and though the opinion of lord Coke was often quoted, to shew that they were known to but few parliament men; yet lord Coke in an after-passage, explained the reason of this to be, that few persons would take the trouble to learn their nature and extent, but any one might do so who would take that trouble. He approved of the suggestion, that the Speaker should plead to the court in bar of the action now brought against him.

observed, that the plain question before them now was, whether the Report should lie upon the table? and he would have interrupted his noble friend, to remind him of this, but from a desire not to break in upon his speech. He was averse to this premature discussion, and thought the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and his friends, who had brought them into their difficulty, ought to state their opinions, and not now be allowed to gather from the feelings and borrow from the intellects on the other side, the mode in which they might procure a vote to bear them through. He wished to confine the present discussion to the point of order, and on the ulterior course of proceeding, before they gave their opinions on his side of the House, he thought it necessary that they should wait to hear what the chairman of the Committee had to propose.

agreed with the last Speaker, that a premature discussion of any of the points connected with this subject was to be deprecated, but it was impossible to sit still or suffer any other subject to intervene, after hearing the very extraordinary doctrines advanced by the noble lord behind him (lord Folkestone.) In opposition to that doctrine, he held, that all the privileges of the House must be discussed in the House, and no where else; and that when they first departed from that, their ruin began. The noble lord supposed extreme cases—but he saw nothing contrary to reason in the House having the power to fine now, as they had in the year 1669 fined White l,000l. The only thing to be considered was the time when it was proper to exercise these rights. He denied that the court of King's bench could interfere to remedy any abuses that might be committed by the House. It was the opinion of Mr. Fox, that it was the most absurd thing possible to argue from extreme cases, in discussions on a subject like the present, since, by the nicety with which the component parts of the constitution were balanced, and their action upon each other, all extreme cases were prevented. For instance, the King might order the first regiment of Guards to go into the House of Lords, and take their seats as peers; but the other branches of the constitution would soon remedy this extreme exercise of the power of the crown. He laid it down as a first principle, that the high court of parliament was the source of power. As all human institutions were liable to error, they might act wrong; but it did not, therefore, follow, that there could be an appeal to an inferior court. Do as they pleased, there must at last be a power in the state, against which there could be no appeal; and as well might the noble lord talk of referring to a quarter sessions to reverse the decisions of the court of King's bench, as of referring to the court of King's bench to reverse the decisions of the Commons' House of Parliament. Should any judge entertain an action against their privileges or proceedings, he was amenable to them, and liable to be punished on the bill of rights. The hon. gent. then alluded to the precedent established in the instance of his excellent ancestor, sir William Williams, against whom the court of King's bench gave judgment; but which judgment was immediately afterwards reversed by the House, and 8,000l. ordered to be repaid to sir William, out of the public money. In the first instance, however, the money was directed to be paid by the attorney general sir Robert Sawyer, who opposed this; and, through his interest, the bill was lost, after a second reading in the House of Lords. Another action was brought against sir William Williams, by lord Peter borough, for Scandalum Magnatum; but this was afterwards compromised. Would they, on these precedents, decide that that House should submit to be tried by an inferior court? Neither could they do so, on the precedent in the case of Topham, &c. in which parliament was prorogued, during the time the Serjeant-at-arms was in the country, executing his warrant. Verdon called witnesses to prove, that force was used every time he mounted his horse; and it was for the assaults committed by the Serjeant, after the power from which his warrant was derived had, ceased to exist, that the action against him was carried into court.

applauded the hon. gentleman who preceded him, for his manly answer to the arguments of the noble lord, and for his excellent and constitutional exposition of the privileges of parliament, with every word of which he perfectly agreed. The argument of the noble lord was founded on this, that there might be an abuse committed by the House of Commons, against which there was no remedy. While men were men, it was true, error could never be eradicated; but carry the noble lord's principle, on this subject, a little further than he had done, and see to what consequences it would lead. Suppose all the courts in the country should abuse the law.—Suppose the court of Common Pleas, from some secret corruption, should decide, contrary to law, to the oppression of an individual—he appealed to the court of King's bench, which (he hoped he should be pardoned for using such a supposition, even for sake of argument) partaking in the feelings of the other court, should come to a similar decision. From thence the wronged suitor carried his cause to the House of Lords, whose judgment was ultimate and decisive, and they, influenced by the general corruption, should confirm the iniquitous verdicts of the inferior courts. Supposing all this, he would ask, what remedy the suffering individual could have? He acknowledged that no court, that no country could exist where such profligacy prevailed; but because an extreme case of abuse of privileges might take place, could it thence be argued, that, therefore, such privileges ought not to exist at all? Could this argument be sustained, it would not only put an end to the privileges of the House of Commons, but to all powers of judicature, and the privileges of every other court. He again warmly commended the arguments of his hon. friend who had well contended, that as well might the quarter sessions be appealed to, to decide against the court of King's bench, as the court of King's bench to exceed its legal constitutional limits, and controul the House of Commons. The House was the sole and ultimate judge of its own privileges and of their extent. No court had any jurisdiction to decide on their existence or extent. They were to be judged by this House alone. No other body had the power to decide. Not but that their privileges might be incidentally brought before another court, which court, however, could not look to their privileges, but to their decisions upon them. It was by these that the court would be bound to decide.

conceived the question then before the House to be, whether the Report of the Select Committee should be laid upon the table. He wished that hon. members who had hitherto spoken upon it had considered that such was the question, and not strayed from it to speak upon that which was essentially distinct from it. He was against the appointment of the Committee, and thought that the laying that Report upon the table, would have as much effect upon the great question of their privileges, as if he threw his hat upon that table. He would vote that the Report should be received; and he hoped that when that motion should be carried, as he supposed it would, that the minister would muster up resolution enough to state to the House what would be the next course he intended to pursue.—The motion that the Report do lie on the table was then agreed to nem. con.

, in pursuance of the task imposed upon him, rose to propose another motion to the House. He had hoped, however much the gentlemen opposite had differed in opinion respecting the appointment of the Committee, yet that when it was appointed, by a great majority of the House, they would have contributed by their assistance and advice to direct the course which the public good rendered it most expedient to pursue. Disappointed in that hope, he still thought that when the Committee had made their Report, these gentlemen would not have looked on as indifferent spectators of the difficulties in which they considered the House to be involved, or have deprived the House of their assistance in this momentous question. The hon. gent. then repeated the statements he had made in his preceding speech, relative to the three modes in which the House might act, declaring, as before, that he should have preferred proceeding by inhibition. He noticed, in answer to a noble lord (Milton) that the consequence of not appearing to this action, which was brought against Mr. Abbot, as an individual, by name, and not in the character of Speaker of the House of Commons, would be, that the court, un-apprized of this circumstance, and of their privileges being involved, would permit the action to go on. Were the House to adopt the second course, and commit the solicitor, &c. others, if not the, persons committed, would go on with the action to an unlimited extent. There was then no other course but to go into the court, in a certain degree, in so far as to state, that the privileges of the House were concerned in the action. Under these considerations, and for the reasons he had already given, preferring the plea in bar, to the plea in abatement, he would conclude by moving, "That the Speaker and Serjeant be permitted to appear and plead to the said actions." The noble lord had recommended that they should take no steps at all; but if this advice was taken, the consequence would be, that the Court would proceed with the cause, and judgment to the full extent of the damages laid would go by default.—If the gentlemen opposite condemned the steps now recommended, they ought, as members of Parliament, not to wrap themselves up in silence, but, for the good of their country, state what course appeared in their judgments to be better. They might say the House was under difficulty, and he was free to confess they were; but it was a difficulty not arising out of the case itself, but out of the imperfection of the constitution, in not anticipating and providing against so extreme a case.—(Hear, hear, from the Opposition side.)—He repeated, that it was an imperfection, not to foresee and provide against the extreme case of an individual so daring as to resist the authority of the House of Commons. But it was not, as gentlemen who cheered him might contend, at all dependent upon this particular case. Last session these gentlemen were not sparing of commitments; and similar resistance and similar legal proceedings might have arisen out of these as out of this; the same difficulty would have ensued. Therefore, it did not depend on the committal of sir F. Burdett, but on the nature of the thing itself. He concluded by moving, "That it is the opinion of the House, that Mr. Speaker and the Serjeant be permitted to appear and plead to the said Actions."

A question being put from the Opposition side of the House, as to what was the subsequent proceeding he had to propose, Mr. Giddy stated, that, if his present motion was acceded to, he would then offer another, "That the Attorney-General be directed to defend Mr. Speaker and Serjeant against the said Actions."

understood these motions to be made in concurrence with his Majesty's ministers, and in conformity to the opinions they entertained on this subject. He wished to know if he was correct in this supposition, and that the course proposed was that which they would recommend to the House?

in reply said, he had no hesitation in answering this question with a decided yes; would the right hon. gent., had he put the question to him, have given a similar answer?

said, that he would be the last man to advise such a contest as that right hon. gent. had involved the House in; but being one engaged in it, he would be among the first to offer such advice as he thought to be expedient. It was for this reason he thought that the right hon. gent. ought not to shrink from the responsibility of giving his advice in a difficulty which he had not shrunk from the responsibility of creating. Upon a question which had so considerably engrossed and agitated the public mind, he knew not whether the opinions he was about to offer would be popular or unpopular—whether the magnitude and publicity of the subject would bring upon him a weight of odium or applause, altogether disproportioned to his humble and unobtrusive efforts to do his duty conscientiously; but this he knew, that this was a question of that unparalleled importance, that if it be decided in a certain way, the liberties of this country were at an end. He thought that House had the right of committing for a libel. This was his conscientious opinion—an opinion that might be unpopular, and which he should regret to find so; for, as a member of Parliament, he must ever respect the opinions of the people. Much however, as he esteemed the opinion of the people, he would treat them as he had treated the King when he was his servant. He would serve both, but flatter neither. In proceeding to state his opinion, he should ground what he had to offer upon two principles:—the first was, that each House of Parliament was, in its respective capacity, the sole judge of its own privileges—the sole judge of what those privileges are—the sole judge of the extent to which those privileges are to be carried—and the sole judge of the manner in which such privileges are to be exercised. It followed by consequence, that no other Court in this country had the right to interpose their opinion upon what was privilege of Parliament—the nature, the extent, or the exercise of it. The other proposition which he would lay down as a principle was, that whenever the Court of Parliament, no matter which House of Parliament, had declared a matter to be privilege, that all other courts throughout the country were bound to pay respect and implicit obedience to that declaration. To shew that he did not speak from him- self merely, that the opinions he had formed had the sanction of the wisest and the greatest authorities; he should, as he went along, refer to some books he had brought with him, and to prevent all mistakes; resulting from a lapse of memory, or inaccuracy of transcription—as also to evince that he made no purposely garbled extract that bore a different meaning from the whole of the context from which it was taken, he should read the passages from the book themselves: the first book to which be should refer, was, sir Matthew Hale's Treatise upon the Original Institution, Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament. Here the right hon. gent. referred to the book, and read from it a passage which was in substance as follows: "For as every Court of Justice hath laws and customs for its direction; some to the civil and canon, some the common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs, so the High Court of Parliament hath also its own peculiar law, called the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti, suis propriis regulis et consuetudinibus consistit sua lex, a law not to be judged of by other Courts, or questioned therein, and the same is law, because secundum legem et consuetudinem Parliamenti, and the rather for that every member of Parliament hath a judicial place, recognized by various judges." Here he need scarcely remind the House, that lord Hale took largely from sir Edward Coke, whose opinions upon this great question had been adopted implicitly by lord Hale; both these great authorities had affirmed the privilege of Parliament to be not merely lex Parliamenti, but lex terra, not the law of that House, but the law of the land. There was however, one objection to which he could not more opportunely advert to than now, it had been industriously given out that though these great lawyers were in the general sound legal authorities, that yet they had rather too much reverence for parliament—that they had too high a notion of the powers and authorities of parliament, and were, in fact, too much clouded by the abject prejudices of their days, to be relied upon implicitly in the present enlightened times. He would not here stop to combat prejudice by prejudice, or examine how far an objection so frivolous should be allowed to invalidate an authority so weighty; but he would take one of those whom he had understood to have been chiefly relied upon out of that House, as laying down opinions hostile to the extent and exercise of their privileges: he meant sir William Blackstone. This judge had been cited in a way so imperfectly as to the context, and so ignorantly as to the consequence, that he was considered by some of those who had suffered themselves to be so egregiously deceived, as laying down principles incompatible with what were called the privileges of parliament. Here the right hon. gent. referred to Blackstone's Commentaries, and read from it a passage to the following effect: "The maxims upon which they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in the breast of the parliament itself; and are not defined and ascertained by any particular stated laws.—The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite. And therefore when in 31 Hen. 6, the House of Lords propounded a question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, sir John Fortescue, in the name of his brethren, declared, 'that they ought not to make answer to that question; for it hath not been used aforetime that the justices should in any wise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament. For it is so high and mighty in its nature, that it may make law: and that which is law, it may make no law: and the determination and knowledge of that privilege belongs to the lords of parliament, and not to the justices.' Privilege of parliament was principally established in order to protect its members not only from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained, and no privilege to be allowed but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for the executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under pretence thereof to harrass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament. The dignity and independence of the two Houses are therefore in great measure preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. "Judge Blackstone further said, that no catalogue of their privileges should be stuck up for the information of all persons, as to define was to subvert the constitution of the House. After this, he hoped he would never again hear Blackstone quoted, as saying that the law of parliament was not the law of the land. He next referred to a treatise written on the power of parliament, by sir Robert Atkins, one of the judges of the court of Common Pleas—a man whom he described as a sound and constitutional lawyer. He read a passage from the 69th page of this treatise, which was in substance, that "Having made it appear that the power of the high court of parliament, though divided sometimes in the exercise, was the same in effect, however exercised, whether in its legislative capacity as a branch of the legislature, or in its judicial character as the Magna Curia, or in its capacity of a council, as the communia concilia regni." Though this doctrine was now thought not be maintainable in these enlightened times, yet this was no new discovery: the same objections were started a hundred years ago, but the objection was rested upon the abstract principle; independent of the constitution, and not upon any principle derivable from the constitution. The objection rested upon a principle that applied to all governments. None had, none ever could be constituted so perfect, as not to leave discretionary power somewhere. This was the principle of the objections of lord Holt, in that memorable case of the Queen against Petit in which he dissented from the eleven judges of that day. His argument was, that the House of Commons may declare any thing they please privilege. But this proved nothing more than that power might be abused.—Was it, therefore, not to exist at all? Yes, say the objections, but in a definite form. But the law of the land said otherwise—the moment privilege of parliament became definite it was subjugated. The law of the land was not to be overturned. If the law of parliament be supposed to be limited by a sound discretion, the judges are not to presume otherwise. The judges are in no case to presume that parliament has abused their privileges; their privileges exist in their own good pleasure; their own discretion is the essence of that privilege—if the one be removed the other is destroyed. Besides, lord Holt's objection went as much to human nature itself as to the privilege of parliament:—While men are men, some part of the most perfect sublunary government must be left in the discretion of their rulers. But lord Holt, in laying down his opinion upon a singular principle, stood alone in that opinion. Was it nothing that the remaining eleven judges of the land were of an opposite opinion? And here it was carefully to be remembered, that among them there were many as able, sound; constitutional lawyers as lord Holt himself. But it had been argued, that no unlimited undefined power ought to be known by the constitution. He did not argue thus for what ought to be, but what actually was. The constitution vested discretion, and there could be no constitution under heaven which must not vest discretion somewhere. If the King's-bench passes an erroneous judgment in law, there lay an appeal by writ of error to the House of Lords. Their lordships may confirm that wrong judgment instead of rescinding it. Here then was an injury without a remedy—but who would argue from thence against the wisdom of vesting such discretion in that House? If the judges of the King's bench were guilty of wilful corruption, the House of Commons would take cognizance of such alledged offence, and would proceed to prosecute such malversation to condign punishment. But who shall call the parliament to account? He might be answered, the people? But in what way were the people constitutionally to do this? When the members of that House went back to their constituents, then the people had the remedy in their own hands, and by re-electing or dismissing their representatives, might exercise all the controul the constitution of the country gave them. It was not the right remedy to take away the privileges of the popular branch of the legislature, because in some instance these privileges might be abused. The course would be, if parliament were distrusted, to address the King to dissolve them. If the House, from its construction, did not meet the public feeling, then redress was to be sought by all legal and constitutional means, to procure the necessary reform; but it was mischievous, as well as silly, to attempt the other course. But it was still contended that the House had no power to commit for libel. Where, he asked, were they to look for the privilege of parliament, if not in the customs and practices of parliament? If then he was right in that position, the application was not difficult; for from the earliest period that House had been in the habit of Committing for libel, and slanderous expressions. They would find an instance of it so far back as in the 59th page of the first volume of their Journals, followed by numerous others in the subsequent volumes. The law of parliament was on this head as clear as undisputed precedents could make it. That House could commit for libel nam ita lex scripta monet. There was no arguing against it; for it could not be rebutted by an evidence less than itself.—The usage of parliament was, as it were, a deed in evidence not to be defeated by moral testimony to the contrary. He could not say that the House had no such right, because their records said they had, so that he was (to make use of a law term) estopped from denying the factum, to which, as a member of that House, he was a party. But there had been a good deal of declamatory noise about the invasion of the liberty of the subject. There had lived before them men as much attached to the right of personal liberty as any the present times could boast. When the Habeas Corpus Act and the Bill of Rights were passed into laws, did the men whose public virtue consigned this invaluable legacy to Englishmen for ever—did they feel it necessary to come forward and claim of that House the redemption of the liberty of the subject from the teazing tyranny of their caprice? Did they express their apprehensions of very undue power assumed by the House of Commons? Did they feel any alarm at our privileges, or think those privileges incompatible with the liberties they were created to secure? He had already spoken to the right—to the necessity, of vesting a discretionary power somewhere in every government. The constitution vested that discretion in them; but it was objected—the constitution vested it no where else: and where, he would ask in such a government as this—where could that discretion be more properly vested than in the Commons, Representatives of a free people? Were the great men who worked out the salvation of our liberties, in the expulsion of the Stuarts from the throne, and in the establishment of the constitution—were they hostile, either in principle or education, to the personal liberty of the subject? Was the great lord Somers a friend to arbitrary power in any shape? Was the able sir John Maynard an enemy to the constitution? Was sir Joseph Jekyl a man indifferent to the rights and privileges of Englishmen? Did these men, upon the memorable question of the Kentish petition—did they for one moment entertain a doubt of the legal and constitutional right of that House to commit for libel? Did any one of them question the privileges of that House? Did they not rather give to them the weight of their united authorities? When I find, said Mr. Pon- sonby, the privileges of this House sanctioned by the ablest and most upright judges of the land—by the most profound and incorrupt statesmen—by the purest patriots—by the most constitutional and popular ministers—by men who did not talk about liberty, but hazarded their lives to secure it.—When I find the progress of time strengthening the work of their united virtue with the claims of antiquity—a work that it was not necessary for antiquity to make venerable—when I find all this, I own that were it possible for me to be so disposed, that my hand would tremble in the attempt to tear down that noble fabric their patriotism had reared, and their wisdom hadpronounced the fairest and the firmest in the world! With respect to the doctrine of contempts that had recently gone abroad, he must say that he did not concur in that doctrine. It was known that formerly the two Houses of Parliament sat under the same roof, and transacted business together. The time of their separation is not exactly known. The right of the two Houses, sitting thus in the high court of parliament, to commit for contempt, would not be disputed. Did then the separation which afterwards, for obvious reasons of mutual convenience, took place between the two Houses, as to the form of their silting together—did that separation divest them of their respective right to assert the authority of their court, and protect the proceedings therein from all obstruction, whether constructive or otherwise? He had no doubt that when they separated each retained the same power, and his opinion on this subject was fortified by the authority of Mr. Justice Atkins, which was express upon this point.

The right hon. gent. next proceeded to quote the authority of lord chief justice Wilmot, in support of the right of the House to commit generally. He stated that chief justice Wilmot, of the King's bench, was a man of admirable capacity, deep and extensive learning, and unimpeachable integrity. The passage to which he was about to refer was from a judgment prepared by chief justice Wilmot; but the case to which it related not having come on, the judgment itself had never been delivered. Here the right hon. gent. proceeded to read from a book which he held in his hand, observations to the following effect;—one was, "that in all courts whatever, in this country, the power of vindicating the rights, privi- leges, and authority of any court, was coeval with the existence of the court itself." Another stated, "that the power of commitment was a necessary incident to parliament, because it was incident to all courts of justice, whether of record or not;" and another passage laid it down, that privilege of parliament was as much lex terra and as much within the exception of Magna Charta as any one part of the known law of the land that did come within its exceptions.—As for Magna Charta, if they give it the general construction now attempted to be put upon it, no man who knew any thing either of the law or the constitution, could look around them, without seeing that it was in the same way universally violated; and that there were many other cases in which the subject was committed to prison without trial. They might as well say that the canon law, and the ecclesiastical law, were of no authority, as they were not contained in Magna Charta, and were totally distinct from it. They might as well contend that these laws overthrew all the rights and liberties of the people. Lord chief justice Wilmot stated, that he had inquired most minutely into the subject, to discover the origin of this law of parliament. From these inquiries he had found, that it was as ancient as the common law, with which it therefore acted conjunctly and in close alliance. It was the universal usage, from time immemorial, that judges in their several courts might attach for offences against their jurisdiction; and in the same manner, the House of Commons must have the acknowledged right to carry their privileges into execution, in the way they deemed most proper. The judges punished libels on themselves in the execution of their office, by attachment; though, in that case, the functions of judge, juror, and executioner, were united. Yet this was never objected to, or called in question, by parliament. It was said, that there was an absurdity in a man's combining, or in a body's combining in itself, the functions of judge, juror, and executioner of the law in its own case; but be the opinion of its absurdity what it might, the fact was, that such a combination did, exist in the judges, and he would contend in parliament also. He quoted, at much length, the authority of, lord chief justice Wilmot, in support of his opinion; according to whom, "it was part of the system of law in this country, that those who were guilty of contempt, &c. should be tried in a summary manner." They should take all the system together. Trial by jury was indisputably one part of it; but attachment was another; and they might depend upon it, that trial by jury would be buried in the same grave with the authority of the courts in which it was exercised.—In another place the same great authority asked how could the judges go on in the discharge of their functions if they were to be libelled as base, dishonourable, and unjust—should they stand at the door of a grand jury, in order to know whether their characters were to be vindicated or for the grand jury to determine whether their proceedings had or had not been obstructed? should they submit to the delay and formality of a verdict, subject to the influence of popular delusion, for the purpose of asserting their claim to the reputation which was undeservedly attacked? Having stated his opinion of the law of parliament thus far, and quoted such instances in support of that opinion, he thought it unnecessary to add any more upon that head, but the authority of judge Blackstone, who, though quoted in favour of the modern opinions upon this subject, had acted upon other principles in the case of Oliver. In thus communicating his sentiment upon the question before the House, he wished to be considered as not presuming to give any advice, as to the course which then ought to be pursued. In place of any attempt to direct the conduct of this House, he wished to be considered as delivering his own humble opinion in hit capacity of a member of parliament. And indeed from all that had already passed upon that subject, the right hon. gentlemen opposite possessed no right to call upon him for his views or his opinion. On previous occasions he stated both; but every thing he had said, every proposition he had offered, were by them disregarded. No one was more prompt than the right hon. gent. (Mr. Perceval) to oppose any propositions from him, and the House in its wisdom was pleased to over-rule them. Nevertheless he then felt it his duty to stand by the privileges of the Commons of England: and in the exercise of that duty, in adverting to the particular line of conduct which in his view should then be pursued, he begged to impress upon the House the paramount and absolute necessity of adhering in every step that it took, to the ancient rule of practice observed by their ancestors, in their contests for the preservation of their privileges. He was aware that in what he was about to recommend, he run the risque of exposing himself to a considerable degree of popular odium. But that man would ill deserve consideration, who, deterred by the apprehension of popular reproof, would in any great and pressing emergency, surrender to his fears the conviction of his judgment. (Hear, hear.) By such an impression he trusted never to be influenced to swerve from his public duty. Never, he trusted, when the events of that day became the subject of future recital and remark, should it be said of him, if so humble an individual had claim to observation, that he was a man, who in contradiction to his fullest conviction, but in compliance with popular delusion, surrendered the privileges of the Commons of England, and by such surrender, gave a fatal and irrecoverable blow to the liberties of England. (Hear, hear, hear!) Reverting then to the ancient rule of practice, it was invariably the custom of that House to commit any person who made himself the instrument of calling into question its privileges. Upon that rule of practice, he did feel it his duty, to state his opinion, that the solicitor who had caused the notice of action to be served upon, the Speaker should be committed. Such a course was not alone the practice of that House; it was acted upon in all courts invested with the power of commitment for a contempt of its jurisdiction. In the court of Chancery, for instance, where an injunction had been granted to stay proceedings in an action at law, the attorney who would after such injunction venture to proceed, would subject himself to an attachment, and be most certainly punished for a contempt of the jurisdiction of that court. Was not then the House of Commons fully empowered to take steps against a solicitor who had proceeded to call its Speaker to answer for conduct taken in obedience to its will, and which that House had adjudged to be necessary for the protection of its privileges? Most undoubtedly it was, and as in such a case the most correct line was to follow the conduct of their ancestors, the enforcement of such a right in the present instance was most advisable. The next question to be considered was the peculiar situation in which the Speaker of that House was at present placed. To many members it appeared a most monstrous novelty, that the Speaker of the House of Commons should be obliged to appear in one of the courts below for an act which he had done in pursuance of the orders of that House. A novel proceeding it certainly was, for which there was no precedent; as to an action brought against the Speaker, the instances were rare. Yet monstrous as it appeared to some, and novel as it roust seem to all, it was his firm persuasion that the Speaker ought to appear and put in his plea to the action. Such course was open to him without the slightest apprehension of his surrendering in the remotest degree the privileges of that House, and such course the House could adopt, although it had determined to commit the solicitor. As an illustration of that opinion, he would suppose the case of an individual committed by the court of chancery for contempt, whose solicitor had instituted an action in a court of law for false imprisonment against the chancellor. What were the steps which it must be presumed the lord chancellor would under such circumstances take? For himself he would say, that if such a proceeding had occurred when he had the honour of holding the great seal in Ireland, he would have certainly felt it his bounden duty, under the jurisdiction of his own court, to commit the solicitor, and to appear in the court of law to put in his plea. For unless such a course was adopted, how was it possible for the courts below to be apprised of the nature of the case?—how was it possible for them to inform themselves of those facts, without the knowledge of which they could not know whether the injury complained of was committed in a private or public capacity? With respect to that House, agreeing to resolutions in the shape of prohibitions to the courts of law not to entertain causes in which its privileges were involved, such a course was a complete novelty, on which he could not be expected decidedly to pronounce; inasmuch as in the whole course of reading and of practice, he had never met with such a precedent. It was necessary that the courts should be informed of the nature of the proceeding. The difficulty was as to the manner of making the communication. Should the Speaker write; If he did so, and were he (Mr. Ponsonby) a judge, presiding in the court where the process was instituted, without meaning any personal disrespect to the Speaker, he would most certainly take no notice of the letter, nor treat it in that court with the smallest respect. If, then, there was no proper mode of proceeding, either by prohibition from that House, or by notification from the Speaker, how else was the House to proceed for the information of the courts of law, except by authorising his appearance? For, surely, to leave the court of law in ignorance of the nature of the case, and afterwards to find fault and quarrel with proceedings which that court might allow, from the want of the information which the Speaker could give, would be an extreme exercise of the power of that House—a stretch of its privileges, which, with some justice, might subject them to the severest reprobation of the people. Upon every view of the case, it was his opinion that the Speaker should plead, and that the plea should state, that the act of which the plaintiff complained was done in obedience to the orders of the House of Commons and that there existed in no other court a power to relieve him. If after that appearance was made, and such information was communicated, a court of law should still think proper to proceed, by such act it would, to his view, most certainly exceed its jurisdiction—it would go far beyond the limits of its authority and power: but, indeed, he could not bring himself to conceive that any constitutional tribunal of the land, that any judge would venture—venture, he would not say, because he could not imagine that those placed in such wise and elevated situations could, under any circumstances, be guilty of that which would most certainly amount to a gross dereliction of their duty—a gross transgression of the law of the land. But such a consequence he could not anticipate, feeling the confidence he did in the learning, the wisdom; and the purity of the legal tribunals of the country. Nor would he restrict that confidence to the courts of law; but would extend it most anxiously to the good sense and observation of the country at large. Should events unfortunately prove that he had been mistaken in the dependence that he had placed upon the nation's sense—should it, or any considerable portion of it continue to be impressed with the fallacious thought that the possession of the privileges of the House of Commons were fatal to the liberties of the people—should it exert itself for the pernicious purpose of undermining those privileges, then most certainly the people of England would be greatly and fatally misled. It was not because the vote of that House, upon this or that public measure, was opposed to the wish and opinion of the people; it was not because their representatives had evinced a conduct which the constituent body at large disapproved; it was not because some of their decisions could not be defended, that the power of the Commons of England should be then curtailed. No; they were to be defended even under such circumstances, because a blow aimed at them, even in that House of Commons, would affect and overthrow its privileges, and with them the people's liberties through every succeeding parliament. But it might be contended that the possession and exercise of such privileges as that recently questioned was too great and too dangerous to be continued in any House of Commons. They were, however, borne in periods of our history in which the people of England were most high mettled, and jealous of the slightest invasion of their liberties. They were admitted in some of the best periods of our history, when many of our ablest predecessors were engaged in arduous contests for the rights of the people. It was sincerely to be hoped that the people would continue to respect them, inasmuch as they were the best barriers of protection to their own most valuable interests. For in that House ought the people to expect and to it they should look for security and protection. There was a new doctrine afloat, and a strange direction given to the popular hope. Whilst their feelings were estranged from the Commons, the people of England were directed to look to the crown for the guardianship of their rights. What! the crown protect the liberties of the English people? Attached as he was to a limited monarchy, he would contend, there never was, during the whole period of our history, a monarch, except the virtuous monarch, now upon the throne of these realms, who ever loved a House of Commons—there never was a king, with the same exception, who was not an enemy to public liberty. He founded this opinion upon no invidious comparisons of one reign with another. It was human nature; and there never yet lived the man who loved that power, which acted as a controul upon his wishes and his passions. That the family of Brunswick would long continue to support these principles, for the defence of which the people of this kingdom placed them on the throne, all were ready to believe. But who would take upon himself to say, that even in future successions of that family a prince might not appear jealous of the influence of the people, and anxious to destroy their weight in the constitutional balance. Under such a state of events, to whom could the people look for protection and support? What branch of the constitution could they depend upon for a successful resistance to the encroachment, that threatened their liberties with extinction? To the House of Commons in the full possession of those privileges, the efficacy of which the rash and the deluded would now wish to diminish? Was it not the House of Commons, supported by the voice of the nation, that resisted successfully the tyrannic encroachments of the Stuarts and ultimately dethroned that family, when it was found impossible to induce them to desist from their arbitrary proceedings? Never was there propagated doctrine more pernicious and delusive than that which went to alienate from that House the popular confidence, in order to give it to the crown. True it might be, that from acts of that House the confidence of the nation was shaken—true it might be, that it was considered rather the instrument of the minister than the organ of the public voice, (an opinion which he considered pressed too far in this country) yet even under all these admissions, it was not upon the crown that he could be induced to depend for the preservation of the people's rights. If the grievances of which the country complained were to be attributed to the construction of that House, let that construction be altered, if the nation wished and demanded it. But whilst it was necessary that a discretionary power should exist, where, he asked, could it be entrusted with more safety, than to the representatives of the people of England? But then it had been contended, that though there was no objection to concede a discretionary power to that House, yet its exercise should be limited. Was then the court of King's Bench, or was public opinion, to be the standard of regulating to what extent the power should be exercised? If the King's Bench was to possess the power of trying the legality of its privileges of commitments for libel, it would be invested with the power of being the judge of every privilege of that House. There could be no limitation. The very right of holding a plea in the case of libel would constitute the right of trying the extent of privilege in any other case. Suppose a person was committed for striking and violently assaulting the Serjeant at Arms, or any messenger of the House in the execution of their duty, and that for such breach of privilege it committed him. He brings his action in a court of law; nothing can prevent him, and the court must hold plea, upon the principle, that it had interfered before in the case of libel, and that it must now see whether the House of Commons had the power to do the act or not. In such case what became of the privileges of the Commons of England? Again—was public opinion to be the criterion for limiting their exercise. Set up such a standard, and fancy, if you can, the mischiefs which would most infallibly be the consequence. Then would you place the privileges of this House at the mercy of contending factions; both bidding against each other at this auction of popularity, until privilege and liberty fell a sacrifice to their selfish and unprincipled objects. One democracy of faction would be destroyed only to be succeeded by a worse; extinction of all order and all virtue would follow in their train, ultimately to secure the absolute rule of a single individual. Let the country remember the miseries under which, from such causes, it once suffered. Let it remember the recovery it has had: Let it remember that period of its history when, in the reign of the first Charles, that unhappy prince was reduced by the constitutional exertions of the House of Commons to desist, in a great degree, from his arbitrary acts of prerogative, and the salutary prospect presented itself of a free and legitimate government. From what causes was it that such exertions proved abortive? It was because a faction sprung up in that House and in this country, who arrogating to themselves all the patriotism and public spirit in the nation, misrepresented, defamed, and crushed the wise and honest men of all parties—a faction who possessed great talents but no virtues—with purity in their mouths, but profligacy in their hearts—who talked of liberty but meant despotism, who sought the Lord but found a crown. If England, with the example of all former ages before her, and particularly with the awful example of such a calamitous visitation, shall be so infatuated as to relapse into such dangerous and delusive errors, then I pronounce that she is doomed to suffer more grievous calamities than has ever yet befallen any nation upon the earth, and what is more galling and more aggravated, she is doomed so to suffer unpitied, unregretted and unrelieved.

expressed his intention not to trespass at any length upon the attention of the House, after the sound, constitutional, and eloquent speech which he had just heard from his right hon. friend? There was not, either in his principles, doctrines, or illustrations, a single point that did not come home to his mind, with feeling and conviction. Before the motion was put, he was anxious (although it might be impossible to prevent the proceeding in the present case) to impress upon the House the necessity of coming to a declaration, which would, in limine, give protection to the privileges of the House, which must otherwise according to the course now proposed, be deeply injured by not being asserted.—He felt that the House could only make use of such powers as it possessed, but those powers it was bound to use in the first instance, and try their efficacy. They had proved efficient hitherto, and surely we were not to conjecture without trial, that they would prove inefficient now. They had checked suitors in holding plea, where our privileges were concerned. The means which the House used had produced the same control on those who attempted to carry on proceedings in defiance of the privileges of the House, which courts of law produce to attain the enforcement of their judgments; and, on the same principle, a moral acquiescence from an apprehension of suffering under a physical force.—Mr. Adam said, that, undeterred by any unpopularity that might follow from it, he still felt it his duty to cling to the ancient practice of that House, and to avow that, in his opinion, it was incumbent on it to call the solicitor to the bar, and on finding that he was the indorser of the notice, to commit him: then to come to resolutions respecting our privileges, and make it apparent, that we continue to support and maintain them. Such a course might not, in that stage of the business, prevent the action going on; but it would secure the privileges of the House. Were that measure adopted, things would be as correct as possible up to the present period, and the proceeding be regular and orderly.—He therefore called on those who had taken the lead in this businesss on the Committee, on its chairman, and on the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer; to adopt this course, as that which had always been the practice; as most effectual to its ends; and at all events, a line of proceeding, which would show that the privileges of the House were asserted: whereas the mode pursued, of resolving in the first instance to plead to the action, was a virtual abandonment of them.

declared, that the general tenor of the eloquent speech of the right hon. gent. opposite was such that he should be sorry by recurring to any irritating subject, to interrupt the impression which that speech must necessarily have made on the House. He could not refrain from repeating his regret, that in a case in which the right hon. gent. himself conceived that the rights and privileges of the House were at stake, he abstained from lending his assistance to the Committee in order that they might arrive at a right conclusion. The right hon. gent. had talked of the unfortunate situation in which the House stood. What unfortunate situation? Only that situation to which it must be necessarily exposed on every exercise of its privileges, however moderate. The mere temporary imprisonment of a member, for the purpose of bringing him to the bar to receive a reprimand, would form as good a ground for an action as the rash step (as the right hon. gent. termed it) which he had advised the House to adopt with respect to sir F. Burdett. Besides, could any one who had observed the subsequent conduct of that hon. bart. doubt, that if he had been brought to the bar to be reprimanded, instead of having been sent to the Tower, he would have preferred an action against the Speaker for ordering him into custody, or that he would, when at the bar, have so insulted the dignity of the House, as to drive them to the adoption of the severer measure? With what justice, therefore, could it be said that the House had been brought into unheard of and unspeakable calamity and distress? If there were any imbecility in their privileges, he did not regret that that imbecility had been discovered at a time when they would have ample opportunity either to consider the mode of protecting the rights which they had, or the constitutional means of acquiring the power to protect them. He deprecated, therefore, such an emphasis on the difficulty of the situation in which the House was placed, confident that the House had not exercised a right which they did not possess—he was confident that they had not exceeded their privileges —he was confident that no authority, no judge in the land, when he learned that it was a question in which the privileges of the House of Commons were implicated, would determine upon it. He entertained no apprehension, therefore, that either the dignity or privilege of the House of Commons was endangered. The law prescribed the course which the House ought to pursue, and which they might therefore tread without danger. After alluding to the precedent of sir F. Pemberton and sir T. Jones, he adverted to the statement made by his hon. friend, namely, that a letter might be written by the Speaker to the Lord Chancellor, on which the Chancellor would necessarily issue a writ of supersedas. Although he could not admit that this alternative of his hon. friend was so absurd, as it was asserted to be, yet as such a measure would be effective only during the session, he must allow, that the proceeding would be of too limitted a nature for the House to adopt. He, and those who acted with him, had been thought deficient in their duty for not having recommended the commitment of the solicitor. For his part, he thought it wise in the House not to avail itself for that purpose of the unprecedented and unnecessary notice which had been sent to the Speaker. If the House had committed the solicitor by whom that notice was sent, which they had an unquestionable right to do, was it not probable that another solicitor would have been appointed, who would not have sent a notice, but would have brought an action? Would the House have committed him for that? How could they distinguish whether that action was preferred against the Speaker in his public or in his private capacity. If they had asked the solicitor, he would probably have answered that the interests of his client required secrecy. Would the House have committed him on that statement? If they had done so, he thought they would have acted rashly. It was in the anticipation therefore of all those difficulties, that the commitment of the solicitor had not been recommended. Those who had told him that he was wrong in advising the commitment of sir F. Burdett without foreseeing that he would resist the warrant, could surely not censure him for not having advised the commitment of the solicitor. Besides, in that case the House would have to commit the barrister. If one barrister was committed another might be found; for nothing need be done by the parties, but to wait till the end of the session, when they would be at liberty to proceed. By any such commitments therefore, the House would only have shewn their resentment without being able to vindicate their privileges. The openness with which he found it necessary to speak on these subjects, induced him once more to lament that the hon. gentlemen opposite felt such an alienation to an approach to their political adversaries, even on a subject of such general interest, that they would not join them in the committee in which it could be so much better discussed. With respect to the proposition recommended by his hon. friend who had immediately preceded him, he thought that the House would do well to adopt the motion before them in preference to it; and adverting to the assertion of the noble lord who had spoken early in the debate, that this course was novel in principle, he positively denied that assertion. That the House did not always feel themselves called upon to be vindicators of their own authority was established by numerous precedents. It was a matter entirely of discretion. When a Habeas Corpus was moved the persons were brought up under it, because until the return made to the writ, the judges could not ascertain the cause of commitment. Such persons were however invariably remanded. If the solicitor knew the cause of the commitment of his client, which he unquestionably must, he was subject to commitment himself for the proceeding. There was no instance, however, he believed, in which such a commitment had taken place, but there were many instances in which it had not taken place. He maintained that there was no more reason for committing the solicitor in the case under discussion, than there was for committing a solicitor who had sued out a writ of Habeas Corpus on an individual committed to his knowledge for a breach of the privileges of the House of Commons. In both cases the Houses might if they chose exercise the privilege of commitment, and in both cases it was perfectly in their discretion to abstain from it. He congratulated the House that on the present question there appeared very little likelihood of any difference of opinion. He rejoiced particularly that on the part of the subject upon which he had apprehended the greatest difference, there seemed a general concurrence of sentiments. He had feared that those who were impressed with the necessity of carrying the privileges of the House with a high hand, would have been inclined to proceed to extremities, which he was glad to find they did not propose.

explained. He should always think that the right hon. gent., by inducing the House to exercise their privilege of commitment in a case which did not call for it, had put the House in an unfortunate situation. He could never think any situation so unfortunate as when a considerable portion of the people disapproved of their proceedings.

agreed most fully in every thing that had fallen from his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby). He held it to be the duty of that House to follow up the steps which had been trodden by its predecessors. He should be for committing any solicitor, whom he could collect from circumstances to be apprised of his being engaged in bringing an action against the Speaker in violation of the privileges of that House. This was his opinion; and, however unpopular it might be, he should be ashamed if he could abandon his duty, or hesitate to declare it.

, after the part he had taken in the former discussions upon this subject, could not suffer the present question to go to a vote without saying a few words, to state shortly his opinion respecting certain doctrines which had been advanced in the course of that night's discussion. On the question he had no doubt whatever; as, in his opinion, the Speaker and Serjeant ought to appear to the actions brought against them. He was sensible that the question was of that kind which rendered unanimity in that House most desirable. But it was not the duty of any man, in order to obtain such unanimity, to sacrifice his opinions and his conscience. It was not his intention to go into the various topics which had been so ably touched upon by his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby) this night, and by his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Adam) in a former debate. Both differed from him in their opinions on this subject; and though he had considered himself called upon on a former night to state his sentiments more at large, in order to prevent that House from coming to what he looked upon as a wrong decision, he did not think it necessary on that occasion to plead the cause of parties litigating a question with that House. The present question was different; and if he was disposed not to go into it, he could truly affirm, that it was not in consequence of the doctrines he had heard advanced, but because the present state of the business did not call for it. He would confess, however, that he did not entertain the opinion that the privileges of that House ought not to be brought into discussion in the courts of law. He would readily admit that the privileges of parliament were a part of the law of the land, and had been as such recognised and acted upon in the courts of law. He would admit that that House had power to commit for a breach of its privileges, as he had before stated; but he entertained some doubts as to the existence of certain legal rights, which had been construed to flow from this right of commitment. As to the question before the House, there was in appearance a desire that something should be said as to the kind of plea which should be put in. But he could not collect what plea was intended to be set up, nor did he understand the House to have decided upon it. He conceived the objection generally meant to be made against proceeding with the action to be, that the Speaker and Serjeant, because they had severally acted as Speaker and officer of that House, in execution of its order, could not be sued in an action consistently with the privileges of that House. To him the possibility of such a plea was very clear. He could not easily see that the Speaker, acting implicitly in conformity to the order of that House, could very consistently make use of such a plea; but he could not equally satisfy himself that the Serjeant at Arms could avail himself of the same plea. As well as he could collect from such information as gentlemen generally had upon such subjects, the charge against the Serjeant was not that, as an officer of that House, he had acted by its authority, but that he had executed the warrant committed to him in an unwarrantable manner. Though the execution of the warrant simply might not be cognizable in a court of law, without a violation of privilege, yet the manner of executing that warrant might. The warrant might be legal, and yet the officer legally responsible for the mode of executing it; as there might be some doubts as to the legality of executing it in a particular mode. It did not appear to him how it could be put on the record that he bad acted as the officer of that House, in bar of an action for what be had done in executing its warrant. He felt all that had been urged in the doctrines advanced that day, that the privileges of that House could not be ques- tioned in the courts of law. But he would beg of gentlemen to remember what were the privileges of the other House of parliament; to bear in mind that they were contending then for the privileges of another branch of the legislature, which had no common feeling or common interest with the people, as much as for their own. It was an extremely dangerous doctrine to maintain that whatever was done against the privileges of either House of Parliament was to be arbitrarily punished without appeal or legal investigation, because the privileges of neither House were to be questioned in a court of law. He would repeat, that it was a most dangerous doctrine, and contrary to the principles of British law; and in proof of this, he would suppose an extreme case. He would suppose either House to pass a resolution restricting a man from the exercise of a legal right. If that individual were to be arbitrarily committed for acting upon a right sanctioned by law, would gentlemen think such an exercise of privilege was to be defended? Yet, improbable as this case was, it was a case that actually had happened, and at no very distant period, in the parliament of Ireland, now consolidated with the parliament of this country. That parliament voted any man who should demand or be concerned in prosecuting a suit for the recovery of tythes in agistment, an enemy to his country, Was such a resolution to be maintained as a privilege, when it went directly to deprive the subject of his legal rights and undoubted property? The case was an extreme one, and not likely to occur again; but it had occurred once, and might again in the variations of times and circumstances. If their privileges were not to be discussed in courts of justice, how did it happen that persons committed by the House were brought up on a writ of Habeas Corpus to the courts of law, where the judge ascertained the authority for commitment, before he remanded the party? What had been the opinion of lord Kenyon, a peer of the realm, when he made a long argument in his court on the subject? As to what had been said respecting the analogous practice of the courts of law in commitments for contempts, he could see nothing in that. When it was stated that a person imprisoned for a contempt could have no redress, he must say, that if such were the case, there would be an end of all jurisdiction. His right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), for whose opinion he had the highest respect, and whose honest, manly, and independent public conduct entitled him to the gratitude of his country, had stated what he would have done if a solicitor had brought an action against him for any judicial act, if he were chancellor. When he considered the situation which his right hon. friend had filled, he must be disposed to defer to his opinion; but they were all equalised in that House, and it was his duty to state his own opinion. He could state a number of cases where persons committed for contempt by one court had been brought up to another, who, upon consideration of their cases, had been liberated. He should more particularly allude to that case which contributed more than any other to the assertion and liberty of the subject in this country, he meant the case of Penn and Mead, two Quakers, who had been tried in the reign of Charles 2, for being present at an illegal assembly, and were acquitted by the jury against the direction of the judge, the well-known judge Jeffery^*. The whole of the jury were committed for a contempt, in having acquitted the prisoners contrary to the direction, and, as it was said, against the evidence. They were afterwards brought before Chief Justice Vaughan, who went into a long and laboured argument to shew that he had jurisdiction, and cited various cases in proof of it, particularly the case of a man committed by sir Nicholas Bacon for a contempt, who had been released by the King's Bench, because the commitment was for contempt generally, without specifying the particular contempt†. Therefore these analogies proved little for the argument in this case. But he was not desirous of saying much upon this occasion. Though he knew that any opinion of his was of little value to that House, his opinion was of much value to himself. He knew that the privileges of that House were given and maintained for the benefit of the people. Undoubtedly they were; but if the time should ever come when the people, instead of thinking that they were used for their protection, should believe they were exercised for their oppression, he must say, that he should consider that a most calamitous situation for the House to be placed in.

^* See Cobbett's State Trials, vol. 6, p. 951.

† Idib, vol. 6, p. 999.

understood his hon. and learned friend to say, that he wished to support the privileges of the House, yet his arguments were employed not to uphold those privileges, but to subvert them. The argument of his hon. and learned friend not only went this length, but it went to the subverting of all co-ordinate jurisdictions, and of all uncontrouled power. A respectable author (Dr. Paley) had laid it down, that there could not be a series of appeals. If there were, in the end, they must do harm to the government. If there was no court or other jurisdiction uncontrouled, there could be no human legislation. With certain limitations this was a power which must exist. He pressed on the House to be extremely guarded how it allowed any unusual intrusion on its privileges to be committed at such a moment. The only thing for them to do, was simply to let the judges of the courts know that this was not pleaded to because it was founded on a step proceeding from the House of Commons. He was originally averse to the mode of proceeding proposed, but the speech of his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), had reconciled him to it. He was now only anxious that the House should not be misunderstood; and that it should be manifest to the courts of law that this was a step taken by the House of Commons, and therefore that the judges should not interfere. He was satisfied the learned judges now presiding had too much knowledge of the law not to know that they could not interfere.

did not wish to detract any thing from the power and jurisdiction of the courts of law; but still when he considered the many cases in which the ablest judges of the courts of law allowed, that the privileges of parliament were above their jurisdiction, he could not believe that so many able and learned judges were all mistaken about their jurisdiction; and he therefore thought that the privileges of that House had been firmly recognized as the law of the land. As to the opinions which had been delivered by sir F. Pemberton and sir T. Jones, in the case which had been so often alluded to, he understood their opinions to be entirely as to the form of the plea. They did not deny that the matter of the plea would be a complete defence, but they conceived that the plea had not been put in as the form of the law required. He could not agree with his hon. and learned friend (sir S. Romilly) that the courts of law could ever take into their consideration and judgment the existence of the privileges claimed by the House. They were the only judges of their own privileges, and their decision upon them was binding in a court of law. In this manner the judges must have considered the law in many cases where writs of Habeas Corpus had been moved for the discharge of persons committed for violating the privileges of that House. In all those cases, when the cause of commitment was set forth, the prisoner was remanded. Lord chief justice De Grey gave his opinion most decidedly to that effect. If it were allowed that the House did possess the privileges which were called in question, it must also be allowed that they had the right of deciding on their privileges, and their decision must be final and conclusive. It had been thrown out in the course of this debate, that there was a considerable difference between the cases of the Speaker and of the Serjeant at Arms. As the defence was committed to his hands, it would perhaps be expected that he should say something on the subject. He felt not a doubt but that the judge on reading the Speaker's plea would refuse to listen to the action, but he could not feel the same assurance as to the plea of the Serjeant, because there might be a doubt whether he had or had not overstepped his lawful authority in the manner of executing the warrant.

entertained great doubts on what principle he could sanction the idea that there could be any power above the law. If gentlemen said that they were bound by the law, by an act of the three estates—to that he agreed. But if they contended that we were bound by any thing short of that, he must demur to the proposition. The change from triennial to septennial parliaments he conceived to be one of the greatest infringements on the liberty of the subject. If, therefore, that House had the power of protracting its own existence, and then of determining on its own privileges, the powers of parliament were more extensive than he had conceived them. Having said so much, he, however, agreed that it was fair that that House should enjoy the privileges they had had for ages past.

wished that the plea given in should be that which was calculated to hold the privileges of the House at the highest possible point, so as to make it obvious, that no question as to them could be entertained in a court of law. He was desirous instead of employing the attorney general that it should be left to the Speaker himself to put in the plea, without the intervention of any counsel.

The question, That the Speaker and Serjeant be allowed to appear and plead to the action was then put and carried.

said he had one other motion to make, to which he thought there could be no objection. Every gentleman must know how safe their privileges would remain in the hands of their Speaker, of whose zeal, experience, and ability, they had already had such convincing proof; but, at the same time, in such a case as the present, he presumed the motion he had now to make would not be objected to. He then moved, That the Attorney General be instructed to defend the Speaker and Serjeant against the said action.—Ordered.

asked, if it was to be held out by the House, that any person might commence such suits at law against the privileges of the Commons of Great Britain, without suffering any punishment for their temerity; and that the House was not now to act as it had done in all former instances. He alluded to a case in the only assembly which could bear any analogy to that House, the House of Peers, where no farther back than 28th November, 1768, in the case of Biggs against Hesse, an action was brought against a person acting by the authority of the House of Lords, and the House ordered the plaintiff and his solicitor to appear, and committed them to the custody of the usher of the black rod, till they executed a release of the action. This was a case not so strong as the present, and he wished to know if the practice was now to be discontinued?

was not prepared to give an opinion on a question of the kind, taking it as a general rule. The point would be open for the discretion of the House at any time when the case should again occur. As circumstances stood, such a step did not appear to him to be at present necessary.

thought it would be proper to call the solicitor in this case to the bar, lest, on any future occasion, if they acted up to the old practice, the person suing out the process might think he was treated with unbecoming harshness.

Here the matter dropt, there being no question before the House.

proposed a vote of 1,165,000l. 15s. 11d. for the ordinaries of the navy.

asked, whether the present number of seamen, amounting to 146,000 might not be reduced to 130,000? If such a reduction should be deemed eligible, he proposed that old seamen who had served from 18 to 20 years, should be discharged. He wished that these estimates had been referred to a select Committee, as had been done sometimes, in order to ascertain with more exactness what reductions might be made. He found they had considerably increased since last year upon the civil establishment of the navy. He contrasted the great advance which had taken place in the salaries of the civil department, with the slow progress, and in some respects diminution of the pay of the military department. As an instance, he mentioned the lieutenants of the 1st and 2d rates, whose pay was 6s. a day in 1694, and was still the same, subject to the deduction of the income tax. The increase altogether in the civil department appeared to be 500,000l. He thought the men engaged in harbour duty might be discharged. He also suggested that a saving might be made by reducing part of the press gangs.

was surprised that the hon. admiral should say, that there was an addition of 500,000l. on the civil department of the navy estimates above those of last year. On the contrary, the addition on the whole of the estimates did not amount to much more than half the sum. In a great many articles there was a considerable diminution, on account of so many ships of the line having been launched last year, which rendered it unnecessary to build many more this year; there was also a diminution in the expence of the sea fencibles, and in the article of transports. There was so much additional business in the civil service that the increase of salary was necessary, but the increase here was not above 20,000l. There was also some advance in the office of the admiralty records, which had been admirably regulated by the exertions of Mr. Pindus. There was an increase necessarily in the victualling department, owing to the excess in the army victualling. He contended against the policy of reducing the navy, which was at present in so much splendour, and which would, he hoped, always be the terror of our ene- mies. The fleets of Spain were in a dubious state, and the largest fleet might be raised at Antwerp—and this might be more dangerous than any other. There was an addition of enemies in the North, and it was necessary to have our fleets there to protect our trade. The fleet of Russia was increasing, and the fleet of Sweden might be turned against us, though there was no sentiment of hostility from that country at present. The Danish fleet was also to be considered. All these considerations shewed the necessity of keeping up the English fleet. We must be able to cope with the navies of the whole world. Besides those regularly employed, there ought to be a body of reserve; the advantages of which had been already felt, in the case of the Copenhagen expedition, in the facility with which ships had been sent to the Tagus, and in bringing off the army of sir J. Moore. The possibility of a rupture with America, was also to be considered, though he did not know that there were any symptoms of that at present. In every view it was proper to keep up the establishment.

was adverse to the reduction of the harbour duty men, and to the discharge of old seamen. It might be very injurious to the service. The impress was serviceable, not only in procuring men, but in preventing desertion.

rose and said: Sir; Indisposition has prevented me from submitting to the consideration of this House, those matters respecting which I had given notice, and the same cause has disabled me from paying that attention to the Navy Estimate, which I should have done, and which I might have done, had this estimate, completed in Feb. 7, been printed and delivered to us in proper time, instead of a few days ago, for which, however, I suppose, there was some weighty reason. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, enough will probably appear, to shew the nature of the thing, and first, as to the manifest injustice of the pension list.—An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410l. a year, a captain of the navy at 219l.; while the clerk of the ticket office retires on 700l.—The widow of admiral sir Andrew Mitchell has one third of the allowance to the widow of a commissioner of the navy.—Martha, widow of admiral Bourmaster, 75l.; Mary Hammond, a commissioner's widow, 300l. Elizabeth, widow of captain Blake, 60l.; Elizabeth, widow of commissioner Lane, 300l.—Four daughters of the gallant captain Courtenay, 12l. 10s. each; daughter of admiral sir Andrew Mitchell, 25l.; two daughters of admiral Epwort, 25l. each; daughter of admiral Keppel, 25l.; Elizabeth, daughter of captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25l.; four children of admiral Moriarty, 25l each.—Thus 13 daughters of admirals or captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of the country, receive from the gratitude of the nation a sum less than dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner.—This pension list is not formed on comparative rank or merit, length of services, or any rational principle, but appears to be dependant on parliamentary influence alone; for lieutenant Ellison, who lost his arm, is allowed 91l. 5s.; and captain Johnson, who lost his arm, has only 45l. 12s. 6d.—Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm, has 91l. 5s.; lieutenant Campbell, lost his leg, has 40l.; and poor lieut. Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80l. while sir A. S. Hammond retires on 1,500l. per ann.—The brave sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, 500l.; while the late secretary to the Admiralty retires, in full health, with a pension of 1,500l.—To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50 lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97 gunners, 202 carpenters, 41 cooks, cost the country, 4,028l. less than the net-proceeds of the sinecures of lord Arden, 20,358l.; Camden, 20,586l.; Buckingham, 20,693l.—All the superannuated admirals, captains and lieutenants, have but l,012l. more than earl Camden's sinecure.—All that is paid to all the wounded officers of the British navy and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, does not amount, by 214l., to as much as lord Arden's sinecure alone, 20,358l.—What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves, 11,408l. 16s. is but half as much.—Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the navy deserve at the hands of those who call themselves his Majesty's government? does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of the House; I cannot suppress my feelings. Should thirty one commissioners, commissioners wives, and clerks, have 3,899l. more among them, than all the wounded officers of the navy of England? I find, upon examination, that the Wellesleys receive from the public 34,129l., a sum equal to 426 pair of lieutenants' legs, calculated at the rate of allowance for lieutenant Chambers' leg.—Calculating by the pension for captain Johnson's arm, viz. 45l., lord Arden's sinecure is equal to the value, of 1022 captain's arms.—The marquis of Buckingham's sinecure alone, in the net, will maintain the whole ordinary establishment of the victualling departments at Chatham, Dover, Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean, Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5,466l. in the treasury.——Two of these comfortable sinecures, would virtual the officers and men serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain: viz. in 117 sail of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, 50 hulks.—Three of them would maintain the dock yard establishments at Portsmouth and Plymouth; and, by the addition of a few more, would amount to as much as the whole ordinary establishments of the royal dock yards at Chatham, Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; and the sinecures and offices executed wholly by deputy would more than maintain the ordinary establishment of all the royal dock yards in the kingdom. To return to this pension list: I observe that pensions given by the Whigs to commissioners, clerks, and others, whom they forced out to make room for their friends, amounted in 13 months, to about 1,508l. more than the present administration have, by this list, given away in nearly three years that have elapsed since—And the right honourable gentleman, (Mr. Ponsonby,) who, two nights ago made, so pathetic an appeal to the good sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to call designing men and demagogues, actually receives for having been 13 months in office, a sum equal to nine admirals, who have spent their lives in the service of their country; three times as much as all the pensions given to all the daughters and children of the admirals, captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent circumstances or been killed in the service! and as much as would pay the officers and men employed in the fifteen hulks of the line in ordinary.—From the minute expences noticed in this estimate, viz. for oiling clocks, killing rats, and keeping cats, I should have supposed that great care was taken to have it very cor- rect. It was, therefore, with much surprise; I found the name of my worthy and respected grandmother, the widow of the late captain Gilchrist of the navy, continued on the list, as receiving 100l. per annum, though she ceased to exist 8 years ago!—I shall dwell no longer on this subject than just to notice, that while all this profuse waste of the public money is going on, the builders in our naval yards, on whose ability and attention so much depends, have only 720l. per annum salary, that is only 20l. more than a retired clerk of the ticket office. The petty perquisite of a silver cup, given to them when they launched, and thereby added a ship to the British navy was taken from them as a saving to the nation, by the mischievous and contemptible admiralty of 1802. Such are the pretended savings, by which, when any are made, the country is duped.—Were there a prospect of success, I could point out to a committee of the House some savings worthy attention,—The canvas department (though by no means free) yet, least supported by political influence, is probably that in which the abuses might be most easily corrected. I will undertake to prove that, by adopting canvas of a better quality, a saving equal to one-fourth of the British navy may be made—a saving, equal to the additional income tax imposed by the Whigs. The remaining three-fourths of the ships will be more effectual than the whole, their velocity will be increased upwards of half a mile in seven miles; and thus every one will be enabled to capture those vessels Which at present escape from them all; as beside its bad quality, the enemy know our ships of war from foreign ships by the colour of the canvas, consequently run away the moment they perceive our black sails rising above the horizon; a circumstance, to which they generally owe their safety, even more than to its open texture. I have observed the meridian altitude of the sun through the fore topsail, and by bringing it to the horizon through the foresail, ascertained the latitude as correctly as otherwise I could have done. Any man who knows black from white can distinguish the difference, as you will perceive by the colour of the samples which I now shew you.——This (the white) is used by the Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Russian, Danish, American, in fact by all ships except ours. The difference of price has been stated as an ob- ject, (contemptible idea!) The paltry increase of cost will be more than compensated by the superior wear of the canvas, independent of its strength, on which, consequently, depends the safety of the ship, and the preservation of the lives of all on board. I shall, no doubt, hear it urged, that a remedy is about to be applied; and so it has been ever since I call remember: but remedies and redress at public boards are sought in vain; and so it is with respect to the hardships noticed by an honourable admiral, imposed on old and wounded sailors by the harbour duty; which is justly considered by them as oppressive in the highest degree, more grievous than all the other hardships to which they are subject.—Should the latter days of a life, spent in the service of the country, be those in which the severest duty is imposed, and that too, when wounds and infirmities have rendered men unequal to the task? One person who contends for its continuance says it is a laborious duty, and must be executed. This reason is conclusive, in my mind, why it should not be imposed on those, whose infirmities have rendered them unequal to the task. No good conduct, or character from his captain, can, under the present system, free an old seaman from this misery. I well remember the sad case of William Farley, an infirm petty officer; a man of respectable character, in my own ship, who, I think, had been in 13 general actions, and about 20 years in the service; he was sent to be invalided, that, by a change, his impaired health might be restored, and that he might pass his latter days in peace.—He was condemned to harbour duty, but obtained leave to return to his ship. After a time, being still unable to do the smallest duty in the ship, he was again surveyed: the same decision passed. Whether this happened a third time, I do not recollect; but of this I am certain, that he died on board off Brest. My gunner's mate (I think his name was Ford) was invalided too for this heart-breaking service, and such was his abhorrence of it, that, by permission of the lords of the Admiralty, he procured two substitutes, who cost him 90l. a sum equal to all that with the greatest œconomy he could save in ten years from, his pay. Is such a recompence for services? If meant as a benefit, as asserted by one officer, it should be optionable and not compulsive. If grievances exist, they should be examined into and redressed, that is the mode to prevent bad consequences or complaints. We have heard much about "deluding" the public; an unfounded statement can injure only the individual who makes it. These subjects are worthy of being examined by a Committee of the House, or a deputation; such as was ordered lately to Sombrero.—Although perhaps not immediately arising out of that part of the Naval Estimate, which is before us, I may be permitted to ask why are not the Ships abroad paid, as well as the Army? What inconvenience would result? We scruple not to export large sums for other purposes, less beneficial to the country than the exertions of our seamen, whose money is annually included in the Naval Estimate, although it is not paid to them.—The petty officers and seamen in the East and West Indies, Cape of Good Hope, Mediterranean, America, in fact, every where abroad, do not receive one shilling of pay until they are permitted to return to England, often after an absence of twelve or fifteen years!—The Boston's crew, who formed one half of my ship's company, joined the Pallas with nine years pay due, although the Boston had been all that time within about fourteen days sail of England! I should like to know where all this money is lodged?

said, that the noble lord who had just sat down, had made one of the most extraordinary speeches, that he believed had ever been delivered in that House, upon the question of the Navy Estimates. The noble lord had occupied the time of the Committee with discussing a variety of topics, which had no connection with the points then under consideration, but which it seemed of late to be thought necessary to bring before the public on all occasions, and which, indeed, had been so often obtruded upon the House, that they had become quite trite and hackneyed. He had represented ministers as totally regardless of economy, and as distributing public rewards, not for public service, but for the gratification of party feeling, and for the promotion of party purposes. He certainly should not follow the noble lord through all his deviations from the subject then under consideration, but he would, with the permission of the Committee, make some observations upon the very few remarks which had fallen from the noble lord upon the real question before the committee. The noble lord had discussed the navy pension list in a manner that did not appear to him to be very candid. The noble lord had stated different cases from he pension list, but he had omitted what in fairness he ought to have mentioned, viz. the dates of the cases which he had quoted, because, the Committee must be aware that a considerable variation had taken place in the value of money, and that what would have been a considerable provision thirty years ago, certainly was not so at present; but the noble lord had cited all the cases as if they were of recent date, and as if the present administration were answerable for them all. He would venture, however, to contend that no instance could be found in which the present board of Admiralty had not in granting rewards to officers for wounds which they had received in the service, or in providing for the families of deceased officers, gone as far as they were justified by precedent, and in many instances ho would take upon him to say, higher pensions had been lately given than had ever been known before. The Admiralty acted in all cases upon one regular uniform system; when an application was made, they ordered an investigation, and proceeded according to certain rules laid down apportioning the reward according to the rank and suffering of the person who claimed the reward, without regard to any other consideration. For the accuracy of his assertions upon this subject, he would appeal to any naval officer in the House, and he was sure that not one of them would assert that the present or any board of Admiralty, had ever suffered their decisions upon cases of this kind to be influenced by feelings of a political nature. If the Admiralty did in any case deviate from the strict letter of their duty, it proceeded from their anxiety to make as large an allowance, as the nature of the case would possibly admit. He would now, with the permission of the Committee, advert to some of the cases which had been mentioned by the noble lord. One of them was that of captain Dickson, whose pension had been represented as by no means adequate to the sufferings he had undergone. The facts of this case were simply these; Captain Dickson when a lieutenant, had distinguished himself by a very gallant exploit, in which he was severely wounded. The Admiralty, upon that occasion did every thing that was in their power to do; they immediately promoted him to the rank of commander, and they settled upon him his full pay as a lieutenant, and yet the noble lord had thought proper to select this case, as one affording ground of charge against the Admiralty. Another case mentioned by the noble lord, was that of admiral Moriarty's children, whose pensions he considered as insufficient; but when the Committee was informed of the real circumstances of this case, they would see that the noble lord had as little ground for censure, as he had in the former one. The noble lord knew that the widow or children of an admiral, were not entitled, strictly speaking, to any pension. It was found, however, upon admiral Moriarty's death, that his children had been left rather in distressed circumstances, and upon application a pension of 100l. per Annum was granted to them. Larger pensions had certainly been granted, but that was where the admiral had fallen in action when employed in active service, or had been particularly distinguished. Admiral Moriarty did not die, while on active service, nor had he ever been at sea, as an admiral. Another circumstance with which the noble lord had found fault, and upon which he had laid particular stress, was, that sir Andrew Hammond had been permitted to retire upon 1,500l. per year. Mr. Pole said, that it really was with the utmost astonishment that he heard the noble lord urge this as a ground of charge. Sir Andrew Hammond was a veteran of fifty years standing. During the former part of that period he had been employed in the most active service; he had distinguished himself upon many occasions, and had deservedly acquired a high reputation. During the latter part of his professional life his time had been devoted to the service of his country, in discharging the duties of the civil part of the naval department. The noble lord himself, a professional man, could net be ignorant of the eminent and important services of sir Andrew Hammond as Comptroller of the navy, and therefore he ought to have been one of the last men to censure government for permitting this distinguished officer to retire after 50 years active and meritorious service, with comfortable and honourable provision. The noble lord had also expressed great dissatisfaction at the amount of the pensions granted to the widows of the commissioners of the navy, which he considered as much too large. The Committee however would consider, that the commissioners of the navy were chosen from the captains of the navy, of long standing, for their knowledge of the civil part of that service, and that when they accepted the office of a commissioner, they gave up the emoluments and the honours of their profession, and he was very sure that unless the temptation of a pension of 300l. a year for their widows, was held out to them, very few, indeed, who were qualified for the office, would consent to accept it. This was the ground upon which these pensions were granted, and he was convinced that the Committee would be of opinion that the money was wisely and beneficially laid out for the public service. With regard to those pensions which the noble lord considered as being too small, he begged leave again to state, that the present board of Admiralty was, upon all occasions, anxious to go as far as they possibly could in bestowing rewards, and upon some occasions they had availed themselves of particular precedents to grant more than was strictly justified by general usage. In addition to the pension list, the board of Admiralty had last year brought forward an establishment of a compassionate list, similar to that which had been formed for the army, thereby evincing the anxiety they felt for the comfort of the families of the officers of the navy. Mr. Pole observed, that the noble lord had brought all his observations upon the Pension List to this result; that it was clear that the merits of officers were left wholly out of the question, and that nothing but parliamentary interest and influence could gain any like justice for any officer, however meritorious his services might be; that all rewards were apportioned according to interest, and that the services of the navy were wholly overlooked, unless they were put forward by the parliamentary friends of the minister. Now this assertion of the noble lord's was most extraordinary. That such an accusation should be brought forward by the noble lord, astonished him more than the game sentiment could have done, coming from any other quarter. That noble lord, who was, in his own person, the strongest example that could be produced of the injustice of the accusation he had brought against the government. For he would venture to assert, without tear of being contradicted, that there never was an instance of more ample justice being done to the merits of any officer, or of more signal and complete rewards being conferred for any services, than had been granted to the noble lord himself by the Admiralty, when lord Mulgrave presided there; and yet the noble lord was one of the most violent parliamentary opponents of that very Admiralty. Mr. Pole said he was one of those who set a high value upon the services of the noble lord. He had, at the time they were achieved, thought them most brilliant, and he thought, so still. But brilliant arid distinguished as they were, he would take upon him to say, that there was not a man in the House, in the navy, or out of doors, that did not think that the most ample and complete rewards had been conferred upon the noble lord for those services, and he believed if the navy had any colour of complaint against the Admiralty on that occasion, it was rather that they had done too much than too little. That the noble lord, therefore, should be the person to assert in this House, that no officer could have justice done him, or could hope for a fair reward for his services, excepting he was a parliamentary follower of ministers, was certainly most singular and incomprehensible. The noble lord in his observations upon sinecure pensions conferred upon public men or their families, for various services, had endeavoured to hold up the House to the public as a set of men actuated solely by views of private interest, and incapable of any sentiment of public virtue, applying his observations to both sides of the House, and his animadversions on the mode of rewarding the wants or alleviating the sufferings of the navy equally to all administrations.—The noble lord, after the very extraordinary comments which he had made upon the Pension List, had thought proper to make an attack upon the Wellesley family, of which he (Mr. Pole) was a member. And the noble lord had asserted that the Wellesleys received from the public no less than 34,000l. a year, in sinecure places, and had proceeded to make a most extraordinary calculation of the number of arms and legs which that sum would compensate for, according to the system of the Pension List. In answer to the noble lord's assertion, he begged to state to the Committee, that there was no member of the Wellesley family, except the noble lord at the head of it, who possessed any sinecure office. That noble lord certainly did, many years ago, receive the reversion of a sinecure office (which had since fallen in) when he was about to go to a distant part of the world, in a most arduous and important public situation. He was at that time in a delicate state of health, and had a large family. Whether that noble lord, in the distant service on which he then went, had discharged his duty with advantage to the state, he must leave to the decision of the House and of the country. Whether the other branches of the Wellesley family who were now employed in the public service, had discharged their duty with advantage to the country, it did not become him to decide, but he would willingly submit every part of their conduct to the judgment of the House and of the country. With respect to himself, he never had held, nor ever would hold a sinecure office, but he never would suffer any aspersion to be thrown from any quarter upon any of his family, without boldly and fairly meeting it. He despised pecuniary considerations as much as the noble lord or any of his connections, or any other person whatever. In the latter part of the noble lord's speech, he had made some observations upon subjects connected with the practical part of his profession, and had displayed that degree of information and ingenuity which every body allowed him to possess. During the period that he had the honour of holding a situation at the Admiralty, he had frequently the advantage of hearing the noble lord's sentiments upon practical professional points, and the noble lord, he trusted, would do the Admiralty and him the justice to admit, that his opinions had been listened to with that degree of attention and respect, to which, upon such subjects, they would be always entitled. He could not sit down without again expressing his regret that the noble lord did not consult his own natural good understanding instead of suffering himself to be guided by others, who were perpetually leading him astray. There was, to be sure, a considerable degree of eccentricity in the noble lord's manner, but at the same time he had so much good British stuff about him, and so much knowledge of his profession, that he would always be listened to with great respect; it was therefore the more to be lamented that he did not follow the dictates of his own good understanding, instead of being guided by the erroneous advice, or adopting the wild theories, of others. He advised the noble lord to give up such practices. He assured him, that he would find that an adherence to the pursuits of his profession, of which he was so great an ornament, would be more likely to tend to his own honour, and the advantage to his own honour, and the advantage of his country, than a perseverance in the conduct he had of late adopted, which was calculated to lead him into errors, and to make him the dupe of those, who would use the authority of his name to advance their own base and mischievous projects.

adverted to the proposed establishment of a naval arsenal at Northflett, which he strongly recommended as a matter now of imperious necessity, and regretted that sums were wasted in useless repairs of the old arsenals, and in other unprofitable objects, which might have gone a great way to effect this great object.

The Resolution was then agreed to, and the House resumed.