stated, that he had in his hand a petition from certain inhabitants of Liverpool, in favour of parliamentary reform, &c. The mayor had refused to call a meeting but the petition was signed by 3,000 persons, many of them well known to him as of the most respectable description and of considerable property and influence.

The Petition was then delivered in at the table and read; setting forth, "That, in the year 1793, his Majesty, by the advice of his then ministers, engaged in a war against France, for the purpose of curbing the power of that country, and circumscribing its limits; and that in the prosecution of the said war, various military expeditions have been planned and conducted by successive administrations, which expeditions have almost uniformly failed in accomplishing the objects for which they were undertaken; and that, in proof of this assertion, the petitioners beg leave to call to the recollection of the House the expedition to Flanders in the year 1793, the descent upon Quiberon Bay in 1794, the invasion of Holland in 1799, the attack on Constantinople in 1807, the expeditions to Egypt and Buenos Ayres in the same year, the disgraceful convention of Cintra, the campaign of Sir John Moore in Spain, and the retreat of Sir Arthur Wellesley after the victory of Talavera, where he left his sick and wounded to the mercy of the enemy: and that the petitioners particularly beg leave to call to the recollection of the House, that his Majesty's present ministers did, in July last, fit out an armament of a magnitude unexampled in the annals of this country, for the purpose of taking the city of Antwerp, and destroying the ships and stores which might be found in that port; and that the said armament returned home without effecting the object of its equipment, and having its numbers miserably thinned by a disease, the certainty of the occurrence of which seems to have been known to every body, his Majesty's ministers alone excepted; and the petitioners further beg leave to represent to the House, that, in considering the foreign policy of the different administrations who have managed the war with France, they find, that, whereas on our entrance into the said war, all the great powers of Europe were in alliance with us, they are now arrayed on the side of the enemy; and that the general result of the present long protracted hostilities is, that, notwithstanding the most gallant exertions on the part of his Majesty's fleets and armies, the limits of France, instead of being contracted, are greatly extended, and that her power, instead of being checked, reigns paramount throughout almost the whole of Europe; and the petitioners, moreover, beg leave humbly to state, that their feelings on the above-mentioned subjects are greatly aggravated by the scandalous system of peculation which has of late years been disclosed, and by the profuse expenditure of public money, which has occasioned the grievous weight of taxation under which the nation now labours; and the petitioners do humbly conceive, that a long train of misfortunes such as they have enumerated, and the consequent diminution of the relative strength and political influence of the nation, must be imputed as matter of blame either to the commanders employed to execute the measures of government, or to ministers who by the unskilfulness of their plans have lost attainable objects, or by their folly and obstinacy have wasted the efforts of the nation on objects which are unattainable; and yet the petitioners are compelled to state, that, save in the case of the commander of the expedition to Buenos Ayres, no individual, either minister or general, has been brought to punishment as being accountable for the losses and misfortunes which have befallen the British arms; that, on the contrary, the plan and conduct of one disastrous expedition after another stands vindicated on the journals of the House; and that nothing appears there to deter his Majesty's ministers from again wasting the blood and treasure of the country, as they have lately done in the expedition to Walcheren; and the petitioners further beg leave to state, that they are humbly of opinion that this impunity of the planners and conductors of disastrous enterprizes, and the consequent repetition of such enterprizes, is no otherwise to be accounted for than by the mode in which many of the members of the House obtain seats therein, and especially by the introduction into the House of numerous placemen, pensioners, and dependents on the minister for the time being, whom the petitioners humbly conceive to have an obvious interest in forbearing to condemn, when condemnation would remove from office those to whom they look up for fortune and influence; and the petitioners further beg leave to state, that this their opinion has of late been strongly confirmed, by the open defence of the system of parliamentary corruption which, during the last session of parliament, was set up in the House, and which drew from the Speaker the memorable remark, that the practices so defended were practices at the mention of which our ancestors would have started with indignation and disgust; and that the petitioners have been still more strongly confirmed in the opinion above stated, by the fact that lord viscount Castlereagh, a member of the House, was in the said session convicted of the twofold offence of offering East India patronage in barter for a seat in the House, and that this offence, and the vindication of the system of corruption above alluded to, were passed over by the House without any vote of censure thereon; and that Sir Francis Burdett, bait, also a member of the House, having in a letter to his constituents on the committal of John Gale Jones, questioned the right of the House to commit any one not being a member of the same for an offence cognizable by the laws of the land, has, for the publishing of the above-mentioned letter, been himself committed a prisoner to the Tower; and the petitioners further beg leave to state, that, reflecting upon the long continued impunity of the authors of national disasters, and also upon the impunity of lord Castlereagh, and the vindicators of parliamentary corruption, as compared with the proceedings lately adopted against Sir F. Burdett, they are greatly apprehensive that an opinion may go abroad among the people at large, that a zealous maintenance of the liberty of the subject is a more flagrant offence in the eye of the House than the wanton destruction, by rashness and imbecility, of thousands of his Majesty's gallant soldiers and seamen, the profuse expenditure of the public resources, or the corruption of the representation of the people; and that the petitioners, abstaining from animadversions on matters which, will in all probability become the subject of legal investigation, humbly state to the House, that, considering the premises, and being anxiously desirous that the true dignity of the House should be maintained, they do strongly but respectfully press upon the consideration of the House the necessity of a reform in the Commons House of Parliament, which may ensure the purity and integrity of the House, and above all the responsibility of ministers; and they further beg leave to submit to the wisdom of the House the expediency of summoning Sir F. Burdett to assist in the deliberations which must necessarily take place on this momentous subject, and also of performing what the petitioners cannot but consider as an act of justice, the liberation of John Gale Jones from imprisonment."

stated that he concurred in that part of the Petition which related to reform, but could not give up the privileges of the House. He moved that it be laid on the table.

seconded the motion. He agreed in the respectability of many of those whose signatures appeared to the petition. But its sentiments were by no means that of the majority of the population of Liverpool, which contained 100,000 inhabitants. Not one-tenth of those he thought would sign that petition. His hon. colleague had himself not very long ago entertained a different opinion. In general the inhabitants of Liverpool were content with the blessings they enjoyed, without being disposed to cavil and exaggerate evils.

remarked that there appeared a disposition in some gentlemen to discredit petitions when they came to that House. This petition pretended to be nothing more than an expression of the sentiments of the 3,000 persons who had signed it. As to the allusion to a change of opinion, the hon. general would recollect that the member for Yorkshire had strenuously contended that the strongest proof of independence was to vote sometimes with one side and sometimes the other. There was one signature which added greatly to the weight of the petition—he meant that of Mr. Roscoe, a most enlightened patriot; and the hon. general would forgive him the wish, that Mr. Roscoe had presented the petition, and that the honourable general had signed it.

The Petition was then laid on the table.

presented a Petition from the Inhabitants of Worcester in favour of Parliamentary Reform.

seconded the motion for its being laid on the table, and expressed his determination to support such a Reform as might be consistent with the safety of the constitution.

The Petition was read, setting forth:

"That the Petitioners are of opinion it is indispensable for the preservation of our admirable and revered constitution, that the House should be so formed as to become in reality what it is in theory and in name (that is to say,) that it should actually consist of the representatives of such as pay taxes to the State; and that in various petitions which have been presented to the House, the defective state of the representation has been clearly pointed out; and particularly in a petition presented by Charles Grey, esq. (now earl Grey,) on the 6th day of May 1793, it was stated, and proof thereof was offered to be adduced, "That the House of Commons did not fully and fairly represent the people of England; that the elective franchise was partially and unequally distributed; and that the right of voting was regulated by no uniform or rational principle;" and "that Rutland and Yorkshire (the one the smallest and the other the largest County in England) returned an equal number of representatives;" and that in such petition are enumerated various other anomalies in the representation equally glaring, as will appear by a reference to the said petition, entered on the Journals of the House; and that in the opinion of the petitioners it is owing to these defects in the constitution of the House, that the nation is now groaning under a weight of taxes almost intolerable, occasioned by impolitic, ill conducted and disastrous wars; and also that to the same cause is to be ascribed the present temper and feeling of the people, who are unhappily led to regard the House as having ceased to be the efficient guardians of their rights, their liberties and their properties; and the petitioners having seen that the hon. Thomas Brand, one of the members of the House, has given notice of a motion on this subject, do therefore earnestly request that this House will give the same their most serious consideration, in order that means may be adopted, not only for shortening the duration of parliaments, but for carrying into speedy effect some measure of radical reform, calculated to remedy the grievances complained of, and to entitle the House to the affection and full confidence of the people."

presented a Petition from the freemen and inhabitants of Canterbury, setting forth, "That the petitioners, the freemen and inhabitants of the antient, and loyal city of Canterbury, assembled before the Guildhall of that city, on the 14th day of May 1810, humbly beg leave to lay before the House their heartfelt regrets at the late proceedings of the House, in which are involved the seizure and commitment of two of their fellow-subjects, on a charge of having offended the House by their writings, the breaking open of a dwelling house with an armed military force, under the alledged sanction of a warrant from the Speaker of the House, and the foul stain of murder fixed by two coroners juries on that body of troops to which the care of the royal person is more particularly confided; the petitioners neither wish nor mean to insult the feelings of the House by an open and explicit declaration of their sentiments on these subjects, and they humbly trust that the House will not be offended when they say, that they feel exactly as the House would feel, supposing, what cannot happen in this reign, that the King should by armed force break open the house of the Speaker, and convey him to the Tower, for having uttered an expression in a pamphlet, which however true in itself, might be offensive to some corrupt member of administration; and the petitioners do further beg leave to state to the House, that where the reign of unlimited privilege begins that of liberty ends; and that they, in common with the great mass of their countrymen, are thoroughly convinced, that if a body of men is allowed to be prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner in its own cause, there is not sufficient virtue in man to prevent that body from becoming arbitrary, oppressive, cruel, and tyrannical; the petitioners do therefore most humbly entreat the House, to revise their proceedings against Mr. John Gale Jones and Sir Francis Burdett, and to state in what their offence consists; for in the paper of the former the petitioners can see nothing to excite such indignation in the House: and the letter of sir F. Burdett to his constituents most ably, legally and constitutionally discusses the question of the confinement, and has never been refuted; and the petitioners are the more earnest that the House should revise their proceedings in these respects, since they are not able to account for the unexampled severity of the House towards Mr. John Gale Jones and sir F. Burdett, and the refusal of the House to enquire into the conduct of lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval, who at the time stood distinctly charged with the sale of a seat in the House, evidence of which was offered at the bar by a member of the House, and it was declared in the House, "that such practices were as notorious as the sun a noon day," practices at the bare mention of which the, Speaker of the House declared that our ancestors would have started with horror and indignation: now the petitioners humbly beg of the House to consider, which is of the greatest importance, the preservation of, to say the least, a doubtful privilege, or the preservation of the country from corrupt and dishonourable practices; and in what light it will be considered by posterity, that sir F. Burdett, a real representative of the people, should be confined in the Tower, and Mr. Perceval should be at large in the House, and should take so great a share in the rejection of Petitions coupling his name with a transaction of a most odious nature, from a charge of which he ought either to be relieved, or to receive the severest censure of the House: and that the evils of which the petitioners complain, and many more which they could enumerate, they attribute to the state of representation in the House, which, if suffered to continue, may place the country in such hands as will render the House totally ineffectual for the grand purposes for which it is designed, and make it, instead of the pride and honour of the kingdom, the contempt of our own country, and the laughing stock of foreign nations: the petitioners do humbly, therefore, intreat the House to adopt such reforms in the representation as shall prevent any individual from possessing in his own right the means of controuling the votes of members of parliament, and to restore immediately to his seat sir F. Burdett, that at this aweful crisis, and in this most important work of reform, the House may have the benefit of his advice and assistance; and the petitioners do deprecate the idea, that the House should ever stand in need of the military for its support, as their earnest wishes and prayers are, that the House may be entitled to the utmost respect and veneration of the whole kingdom."

The said Petitions were severally ordered to lie upon the table.

adverted to the impropriety of allowing the bill for dividing and inclosing Beer forest to pass unknown to him, when he had given notice of a motion on the subject. He strongly objected to the parcelling away of the royal forests in this manner among individuals, when the scarcity of timber was so severely felt, and the expence of ship-building had risen to double its amount some years ago. He moved that a committee be appointed to examine into the interest of the crown in Beer forest.

stated, that as to the allowing of the bill to pass, his lordship had had an opportunity of attending, as the bill had by no means been hurried through, the House. The interest of the crown had been carefully ascertained by the surveyor-general, and every attention paid to it. Only 8 or 900 acres of it belonged to the crown, which could not be inclosed till a division was made. By the division the crown had secured 1,500 acres, which might be inclosed, and the timber consequently preserved. This forest was not a royal one, the crown having only a small part of it. He saw no ground for the noble lord's motion.

stated that as the forest formerly stood, it was impossible to preserve the timber. The bill to which the noble lord objected was designed to accomplish the very object which he himself appeared to have in view.

The motion was negatived without a division.

then proposed a Resolution, That due notice should in future be given in the orders of the day respecting the proceedings upon bills granting away, diminishing, &c. the rights of the crown in the forests, &c.

stated that it was customary at present where the crown was interested, for the Speaker to ask whether the consent of the crown had been given. A plan, however was under consideration in a committee above stairs for having the several stages registered, so that any person might at once ascertain the stage of any such bill as this. The plan as to public bills was already known. Those that were both of a public and private nature were to be subjected to the double guard of a committee above stairs and a committee of the whole House.

expressed his surprise at the charge of precipitation in the proceeding on this bill, when it went on slower than bills of this nature usually did.

said, that a very effectual guard existed for the protection of the property of the crown. The surveyor-general examined, and reported to the treasury board, and they decided, whether the consent of the crown should be given. As to the bill in question, enough had been said to shew that the noble lord had been completely mistaken in his ideas respecting it.

agreed with the noble lord, that additional precautions were necessary with regard to these bills.

observed, that the practice with regard to the property of the crown, was exactly that with respect to the property of individuals. The crown and individuals stood on the same footing with respect to notices, and every thing was conducted in a way that precluded private interest and favour. An exact inquiry was made by the surveyor-general before the consent of the crown was given. He mentioned a forest in Lancashire of which the crown had only a small part, which was useless for the purposes of raising timber when undivided and uninclosed, but which, by being divided, as in the present instance, was in a fair way of being very valuable.

thought, that when individuals came asking favours, the House ought to stipulate with them in favour of the public.

The motion was negatived without a division.

rose to submit to the consideration of the House the motion respecting parliamentary reform, of which he had given notice previous to the recess. When he considered the vast importance of this great question—when he looked to the internal situation of the country at the present moment—when he perceived that much of its difficulty, and all of its danger, arose from withholding a moderate reform in parliament from the wishes of the nation; but above all, when he contemplated, the essential importance of this question to the liberties and rights of the empire, he felt the weight of the task he had undertaken—all the difficulties that belonged to it pressed upon his imagination; and he became more deeply sensible of his inability to do justice to the question. Before, however, he should enter upon the subject of his motion, he must beg leave to say a few words, which would relate personally to himself, in explanation of his motives in bringing it forward. At an early period of the session he had intended to have submitted to the House a motion similar to the present. On the morning (previous to the commitment of sir F. Burdett) of the decision of that House after the important discussion upon the Walcheren. expedition; a decision which had excited so strongly the feelings of the public, and attracted so much suspicion upon that House, and drawn down so much and such just censure upon his Majesty's ministers, he had determined to bring forward this motion. An hon. friend of his had, however, at that time dissuaded him from putting his intention into execution; and the arguments of his hon. friend on the occasion appeared to him so sound and cogent, that he was induced to defer for a short time the motion which he had determined to bring forward, though his purpose most certainly remained fixed and unshaken.

The reason, which influenced him to make this statement of his former determination, was that he might refute the calumnies which he had already heard, and which he had no doubt he should hereafter hear urged against him, as to the time and circumstances under which he had thought it right to bring this subject before the House. It had been insinuated against him as matter of charge, that he should have thought of making any motion respecting parliamentary reform in the absence of sir Francis Burdett, who was considered the principal supporter of such a measure. Bat the statement of his fixed determination upon the subject, previous to the events which led to the absence of that hon. baronet, was the best answer to such a charge. Besides, it was well known to most of the very respectable constituents whom he represented. What were his opinions as to the necessity and expediency of parliamentary reform—they expected from him that he should bring the subject into discussion—and in making his motion on this night, he should only be discharging a duty which was expected from him, and he was solemnly bound to perform.

The events which had already taken place, and the consequent agitation of the public mind on this particular subject, alike rendered this duty imperious. A moderate reform of parliament was absolutely essential to the welfare of the community. It was a measure, which the violent demanded, and the prudent deemed it wise to encourage. The critical situation of the country called for it as the best means to dissipate the alarm which was so general, and to allay the discontents of the nation. If they wished to recover or preserve the confidence of the public, they must take speedy measures to conciliate the people—they must identify more with the people. It was notorious that there were at that moment in the House about seventy members, who were sent there at the nomination of certain individuals, the proprietors of the boroughs which they represented. Surely it could not be said that such members were representatives of the people in that House. They in reality only represented places, which having been formerly rich, opulent, and populous, had obtained the privilege of sending members to that House: but that right was virtually extinguished in consequence of the decay, and impoverishment, and decrease of population, which had subsequently taken place. These were circumstances too generally known, and too universally admitted, to require any demonstration. Evidence had even been offered in proof of the fact at their bar, and, therefore, it was unnecessary for him to attempt to establish by argument what was so notoriously borne out by the fact. The evils resulting from such a state of the representation were two fold; first, many decayed, rotten, and uninhabited boroughs sent members to that House, which had the effect of disfranchising a large portion of the population of the country; and, secondly, many opulent and populous places sent no representatives whatever to parliament. There were various other evils attending the present system which he should hereafter allude to, but the two he had thus stated would be sufficient for him to notice at that time.

Before however he should proceed to the detailed consideration of the evils that existed, and the remedy to be applied, he begged to say a few words as to the mode which he proposed to pursue. The grievance, as he had stated, was universally admitted. Every man thought that a reform in Parliament was necessary, but most men were, alarmed at any idea of sudden or violent reform. He was ready to admit that be was one of those who felt this alarm; and, however partial he might be to his own plan, his intention was in the first instance, to move for a Committee, in which it might undergo a vigilant revision, and he would have the opportunity of adopting any amendments which might be recommended. His first step, therefore, would be to move, that a Committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the representation of the people in that House, and to suggest what remedies might be applied to any evils that existed. But previously to his making that motion, he felt it a duty he owed to the House, to state specifically the plan which he had it in contemplation to recommend, if it should be the pleasure of the House to accede to his motion and resolve into the Committee. (Hear! hear!) He Was not without hope, too, that his plan would meet the support of many of his hon. friends, as well those who wished well to reform generally, as those who were alarmed at the idea of any sudden or violent reform. Having stated thus much as to the manner in which he meant to proceed, he came now to the principal evils which he wished to have corrected, and to state the remedy he proposed to recommend.

The first, the most obvious, and the greatest evil that existed was, that so many members of that House were nominated by individuals, the proprietors of decayed boroughs. The remedy for this evil was to be found in the good old constitutional practice of the legislature. He was not disposed to look to any innovation—he should not consult any fanciful theory or speculative system—he would be guided by the sound practice of the British constitution, and in that he should find means enough to remedy the evil of which he complained. It was well known to have been the constitutional practice of old to relieve, on their application, particular boroughs from the onus of sending representatives to parliament. The same principle upon which this practice was founded, would authorise the disfranchisement at the present period, of such boroughs as no longer possessed property or population to entitle them to such a right. This principle had been uniformly acted upon, and he trusted that on the present occasion it would be applied by that House, in order constitutionally and effectually to correct the defects in the state of the representation. He trusted that the decayed boroughs, whose representatives were sent to Parliament at the nomination of individuals, would be disfranchised, and that the right of returning members to that House would be transferred to more opulent and populous places. There could be no question that it would be more desirable to have in that House, members uninfluenced by any external controul, than such whose opinions and votes must be controuled by the individuals who nominated them.

But, as he had before observed, the remedy was pointed out by the constitution; and the only difficulty that occurred to him in its application was, how they were to ascertain what boroughs were so decayed as to be proper objects for disfranchisement. There were, he had reason to know, above thirty boroughs which had not fifty voters each, and the representatives for which were consequently nominated by the proprietors of the boroughs. But it would be altogether for the Committee, if he should succeed, as he hoped he should, in his motion, to ascertain what boroughs were in that state, and to recommend to the House to disfranchise them—a recommendation which if made he trusted that House would not fail to act upon.

Now that he was adverting to that part of the question, he should beg to make one or two observations on the right of election. That right, he must contend, could not constitutionally exist in depopulated and uninhabited places. Property real and personal, and population, must and ought to be the basis of such a right. When a place became deficient in population, and no property existed in it but what was possessed by the individual claiming the power of nomination, then the place must cease to possess the right of returning representatives to Parliament: and no consequences could result from that right being suffered to remain with them, but such as were injurious and detrimental to the nation. That property and population formed the basis of representation, he clearly collected from the spirit of the constitution. It was a principle recognised and established by our ancestors, and he found it pervading every one of their measures respecting the constitution of Parliament.

The elective franchise for counties had very wisely been given to the freeholders of such counties. He should not think of altering that arrangement, but was of opinion that the copyholders should also be allowed to vote; as he could see no ground in reason or principle, why they should not, equally with the freeholders, be permitted to vote for county members. In this part of his plan, therefore, he should propose no innovation. He recognised in its full extent the principle of making property the basis of the elective franchise: for property would, inevitably, possess its influence, in spite of the theory of the philosopher, or the violence of the people. The counties, therefore, he should propose to leave as they are at the present, with the exception of adding the copyholders to the freeholders; and, after the destruction of the feudal system in this country, he could see no objection to a bill for enfranchising copyholders. This was in fact the only alteration he proposed to recommend in the regulation of the right of voting in counties, except in a few of the northern counties, and in Scotland, of which he should say something before he sat down.

In the metropolis, and in other populous places, he should propose that the right of voting should be given to all householders paying parochial and other taxes. This was a principle that had been recognised and acted upon by their ancestors; and in proposing to adopt and act upon it in the present instance, he thought that he removed the principal objection to reform. He was aware that this plan had not any of the ostentatious parade of theory, or the affectation of being rendered such as to be intelligible to even the meanest capacity; but it was all of pure English growth, and on that account, principally, he was inclined to prefer it. The representative system would be continued according to the sound old principles of the constitution; and no alteration would be made in any particular, but in extending the right of voting to copyholders in counties, and to all householders in populous towns and boroughs. In the northern counties of England, and in Scotland, he could not see any reason why the right of voting should not be assimilated to the practice in this country, and left in the counties to the resident freeholders and Copyholders; and in the boroughs, to householders, paying parochial and other taxes.

Having made these observations on the right of voting, he came, in the next place, to consider the question of disfranchising such boroughs as were in the nomination of individuals. To this part of his plan he could not conceive any constitutional objection. It was conformable strictly to what had been the constant and uniform practice of Parliament in former times. But there was one very material difficulty attending it, which could not so easily be got over, viz. how far it might be proper to give compensation to the proprietors of boroughs. In principle, or on the ground of strict right, they could not have any—such claim; because when the right became extinct in the boroughs, the people had the constitutional right to re-enter, and to claim the representation from such decayed boroughs. In feeling, however, and in equity, he thought that some compensation ought, perhaps, to be granted; at the same time that he should ever deny that the borough proprietors had any right to such compensation. Yet he would, with satisfaction, agree to grant some compensation; because, even though it should be prodigal, it would eventually be a saving to the country. He was sensible that this part of his proposition would not meet with the concurrence of those who were advocates for reform, but was, however, thoroughly persuaded, that, upon reflection, they would be of opinion, that, whatever taxes might be imposed in order to defray the amount of such compensation, this would be the cheapest payment ever made by the public.

He had thus briefly stated his plan, without anticipating any objections, or attempting to obviate them. What he had to say on this head he should reserve for a future opportunity, when he should hear what objections should be urged against his proposition. As the abolition of the rotten boroughs would necessarily reduce the number of members in that House, he had to come next to the consideration of that material part of the subject, the application of the members for the disfranchised boroughs, to places which have not hitherto been represented. Upon this head, not having the necessary evidence, it was impossible for him to be competent to point out the proper places to which to transfer the right of election. North of Oxford-street there was a population of above 400,000 inhabitants, who were at present not represented at all. In the west of England, on the contrary, many places returned members to Parliament without having any population deserving of notice. What claim, he would ask, could Gatton, Old Sarum, or the submarine inhabitants of St. Mawes, have to the right of sending representatives to Parliament? The right of election, in his opinion, should be transferred from these and such places to Sheffield, Manchester, Birmingham, and other populous towns, and the most populous counties. By applying such members as should be set loose by the disfranchisement of the boroughs in that way, the House would employ the sound constitutional remedy for the existing evil: they would restore the confidence of the country in its Parliament, and remove all those suspicions, which, in consequence of the late events, attached to that House, and that, too, without any innovation—without the adoption of any uncertain theory—and without any departure from the uniform practice of the constitution. There were repeated instances to be found in the annals of Parliament, of places having received the right of representation in the manner he now recommended. Whenever any town began to flourish, our ancestors took effectual care that it should not want a representative in that House to attend to its interests.

With respect to Scotland, he could not feel it so easy to point out a remedy, as he did with respect to his own country. He was not sufficiently informed upon the state of the representation in Scotland; but he should suppose, that there could be no objection to assimilate the election laws of that country to the laws of England. He was not aware that there was any thing in the contract for the Union of the two countries, that would or could operate to preclude such an arrangement. At least he considered it the duty of that House to inform itself upon that subject, and he could not bring himself to think that there would be any thing inconsistent with that contract, in the legislature endeavouring to ameliorate the laws of that country.

As to the state of the representation in Ireland, he was not disposed to propose any change. He should, however, bring that subject under the consideration of the Committee, if his motion should be agreed to. There were, he had no doubt, boroughs in that country, as well as in this, which were entirely in the nomination of some members of the aristocracy. But as the Union with that country was so recent, and the consequent abolition of boroughs there so extensive, he was not prepared to state how far that evil extended. The House, upon the whole, he was sure, would see and feel the necessity of adopting his proposition; because nothing could be so dangerous to the rights and liberties of a nation, as the forms of a free, and the spirit of an arbitrary government. (Hear! hear!)

He had thus given a general outline of his plan, which would go to obviate the two principal objections to the present state of the representation. Other gentlemen might consider other objections to the existing state of the representation of the people, of more importance; and particularly that respecting the duration of Parliaments. Upon this question he had bestowed much and earnest attention, and he found it one of enormous difficulty, but of extreme interest and equal importance. Septennial Parliaments had a tendency, from the length of their term, to weaken the relation between the elector and the representative, and to shake the dependence of the one upon the other. While annual Parliaments would be found not less exceptionable, from the shortness of the period, by leaving the representative too little accustomed to business to be competent to his duties in that House, and from the too frequent recurrence to the troubles and contests of Parliamentary elections. The one term was too long to please the people, and the other too short to satisfy the members. He, for his own part, would be inclined to take a middle course between the extremes of annual and septennial Parliaments, and to recommend triennial Parliaments; which, without the evils of either, would possess all the advantages of both.

But the difficulties in changing the duration of the parliament he must confess,, would be immense, unless a concurrent change were to be made in the mode of making the return. On this head much discussion had frequently taken place, and various opinions were entertained. Some thought that the returns should be made by districts, others, that the votes should be taken by districts. To making the return by districts he had strong objections; of voting by districts he approved. He did not, however, know whether gentlemen had attended particularly to this point, but he considered it of considerable importance. He begged to exemplify the opinion he had given by a reference to the county (Hertfordshire) he represented. If there were four members to be returned for that county, for instance, and they were to be returned by districts, that would throw the whole of the representation into the four principal towns of the county. The freeholders of the towns would uniformly prevail over the freeholders of the county, because they could almost always outnumber them at an election, and consequently some inhabitant of the town would be generally returned. This would be to commute the county for the borough election. But if the votes were to be taken by districts, it would save much expence, and enable those, who at present are deterred by a consideration of the expence attending an election from offering themselves, to become candidates. Nothing need prevent the sheriffs from taking the votes throughout the different districts without subjecting the candidate to the expence of bringing up the free- holders from the extremities of the county to the place of the election. The votes might also be collected in the same way, throughout the different parishes in populous towns. Unless some such arrangement should be made it would be impossible he was persuaded to establish triennial parliaments without producing mischiefs of the most dangerous tendency.

He had thus briefly gone through the statement of the plan he had to recommend; and in order to prevent all misapprehension or misconstruction of its nature, must beg to recapitulate its principal features. The subject had been repeatedly discussed, and a great variety of opinions was entertained upon it. No man could, therefore, enter into the question without feeling much difficulty, and some inconvenience. To guard against misconception, therefore, he would restate, that he did not mean to touch the right of voting for county members, except by letting in copyholders, and assimilating the mode of voting in Scotland to the practice in this country; that whilst he left the right of voting untouched, he should propose to disfranchise the boroughs in which the members were returned upon the nomination of individuals; and, as the numbers of the House would be diminished in that proportion, to transfer the right of returning such members to populous towns, and to apply any surplus to populous counties; that he would recommend the duration of parliament to be made triennial, together with a concurrent arrangement for collecting the votes by districts and parishes. This was what he had to propose; but there was one other point remaining, to which it was necessary to call the attention of the House, and which would require a remedy, viz. the number of persons holding places and seats in that House. Something was necessary to be done on that head, but he was ready to admit that he did not think that all persons holding offices should be excluded from that House. He was confident, however, that with a view to the independence of parliament persons holding offices without responsibility should not be suffered to have seats in that House. He hoped, therefore, that a bill would be brought in to exclude such persons from parliament. On these grounds he had felt it a duty he owed to his constituents and to his country to bring forward his motion, and he trusted the House would give it all the attention it deserved. Of one thing he was sure, that they must either have a temperate reform or a military government. In saying that, he was not actuated by any hostility towards the gentlemen opposite, or by any feeling of attachment to the gentlemen on the same side with himself. The people demanded a moderate reform as their right, and, if their demand were not complied with, would endeavour to assert that right. What the result of such a struggle might be, it was not for him to anticipate; but in his conscience he believed that the country must have a moderate reform, or it would be subjected to a military government. If that House were to reject the former; then would the sun of the nation's freedom and greatness be for ever set; but if, on the contrary, that House should adopt reform, then would the sun of Britain rise from its present dark horizon, and dispelling those clouds with which it was overcast, again shine forth in all the splendour of meridian lustre. He should not trespass longer upon the attention of the House, but concluded by moving;—"That a Committee be appointed to enquire into the state of the representation of the people in parliament, and of the most efficacious means of rendering it more complete, and to report the same with their observations thereupon to the House."

felt that the present was a question of great difficulty: but it was a question, which nevertheless he would acknowledge had engaged his most serious consideration. He felt, too, that it derived additional weight from the character and talents of the hon. gent. who brought it forward; and the plan submitted to the House was certainly the most moderate and reasonable of any of the plans of reform which he had lately heard. He thought, however, that all the reforms which he had heard proposed went on a wrong principle, because it was his opinion that the people were virtually represented in every branch of the legislature. He conceived that the King represented the people in his executive capacity, and that the House of Lords might be considered as hereditary representatives: for it could hardly be contended by any body that the nobles, or he should rather say the noblemen of this country, had any distinct interest from the rest of the people. It was not here, as in other countries, that they formed a distinct class; for the noblemen of this country saw their nearest relations, and their own children, mixed in the general mass of society. How then could they have interests different from those of the rest of the community? He conceived that the House of Commons were virtually the representatives of the people, although they were not absolutely their delegates. He did believe that, if the House of Commons were really a House of delegates, it would be impossible that the other branches of the legislature could exist in conjunction with it. Such, an assembly must be governed by every prejudice and biass of public opinion, and would gradually absorb the whole power of the state. Such a great share of public feeling and sympathy would always attach to a House of delegates, that the House of Lords could not weigh as a feather in the balance against them, and, indeed his firm persuasion was, that it would not be long suffered to exist as a branch of the legislature. This experiment had lately been tried in a neighbouring country (France); and the result of the experiment was in the knowledge of every person. The whole feeling of the country sympathized at first with the national assembly; and the king could no longer maintain the ground which the constitution of their own framing had assigned him. The history of our own country also furnished a remarkable instance how powerful a House of Commons was, around which the whole people rallied, and how soon that power was likely to be abused, and in its abuse to lead to the destruction of the liberties of the country. In our constitution, however there was something of the delegate system, intermixed with the representation; for there were particular members elected for large, populous, and commercial towns, who might be considered as delegates. Now it was a matter of opinion upon which men might well differ, whether there was not already enough of those delegates in the House of Commons under the present system? He would not say, that in his opinion, it would do any harm to disfranchise two or three rotten boroughs, and give representatives to two or three populous towns that did not return any. Others however, might think, that even now, there were too many members returned by popular election. This opinion did not seem altogether unreasonable, when it was considered how great a sympathy there was between the clamour of the mob and the opinions of some gentlemen in that House. He saw it laid down in all our constitutional books, that a representative elected for any county, city, or town, should immediately conceive himself to be the representative of the whole kingdom. How could this doctrine be reconciled with the delegate system? Nobody would venture to propose that the army and the navy should send their representatives to parliament, or that the inns of courts should return members. As the case however now stands, every person that is most distinguished in the military and naval service, in the profession of the law, and indeed in almost every trade or manufactory, found his way into that House, and communicated in the course of its deliberations, such information as could not otherwise be obtained. He certainly was acquainted with some of the boroughs in the South, one he would mention, Tavistock, and he did not think that Borough had been very unfortunate in its selection of representatives.

In talking of the best times of the Constitution, he thought that he should speak of modern times; for certainly the condition of the House of Commons was not much to be boasted of in those times, when they were only assembled to grant subsidies, and were not considered an efficient part of the legislature. Whatever defects there might be in the theory of its construction, yet the system went on well. It was easy to draw plans of constitutions; but when they were put into execution, many that were good in theory were found bad in practice, and soon led to what was the simplest of all constitutions, a military despotism. It would be absolutely impossible to apportion exactly the mode of election according to the bases of property and population. It would be hard to say how many men of a certain property should balance a greater number of inferior property. A charge had also been generally made, which he believed was considerably exaggerated. In all the petitions now presented for reform, the practice of buying and selling seats was alluded to, and he believed it was supposed to exist to a much greater degree than it actually did. He did not doubt but that perhaps 10 or 12 seats in that House might have been so obtained. (A general laugh.) If the election was for districts, in every district there would be rich demagogues, who would be sure to get themselves returned by their wealth and influence. Some few individuals it was true, might purchase in for the purpose of making money; but this was, indeed, a bad speculation. Among those who came into parliament from the influence of property, were many West India gentlemen. Now, when it was considered of what great importance the West Indies are to the empire, and the great revenues and commerce we derive from them, it was surely not unreasonable that some gentlemen connected with those interests should find their way into that House. He wished that those, who thought every thing bad in this country, would compare its situation with that of any other country in the world. All other nations had sunk in the struggle with France, but this country had stood its ground. And what had the people of this country to complain of? Nothing, but an accumulation of taxes, which a war of eighteen years rendered necessary. He felt the pressure of taxes as much as any one; but he knew that large armies and fleets were not to be kept without money. The country exhibited every mark of increasing prosperity. The canals, the docks, the public works and private speculations that were every day going forward, shewed the great and increasing wealth of the country. The climate even was improved, diseases were banished, human life was prolonged to a greater term, as was shewn by the bills of mortality, than ever it had reached before. The people were better fed, and that was a reason, why they should lire laager. In such a state of superior comfort, was there any body who would wish to throw all our national prosperity to hazard; merely because they thought that one individual (Gale Jones,) who had libelled the House, had been punished in rather too summary a mode, or that an hon. bart. had been sent to the Tower for a violation of the privileges of the House. He was ready to contend that our government, and every government except an absolute tyranny, must be considered representative. He then recapitulated the observations he had already made, and declared that he was afraid of the first step to reform, however innocent it might seem. About the duration of parliaments there would be also a great difference of opinion. One man would wish for a triennial parliament, another would be for annual parliaments, while a third, whose lunar periods recurred oftener, might wish them monthly. Even if the plan then under consideration should be adopted, some would complain that the freeholders and copyholders engrossed the elective franchise. He feared therefore greatly, that if any changes were made in our constitution, they would finally lead us through the tumultous storms of democracy and anarchy, into the gulph of despotism.

supported the motion. He by no means wished to change the constitution of the country, but merely to remedy these abuses which had been produced by time. When it was recollected that it had been offered to be proved at the bar of the House, that no less than 150 seats were disposed of by the nomination of a few individuals, he thought it was evident that some reform was necessary, and the reform proposed by his hon. friend appeared to him moderate and reasonable.

thought it impossible that any motion could come forward better recommended than this was. He hoped, however, that the House would not be induced to agree to the motion, merely from the high character, honour, and independence of his hon. friend who brought it forward with so much moderation and so much talent; and that they would not give less weight than it deserved to what had fallen from the hon. gent. who spoke last but one, merely from the part of the country he came from (Cornwall). The hon. gent, had said, that he only wished for the constitution, and to bring back the House of Commons to its constitutional purity, or rather to what he thought the House of Commons ought to be. Now with the information and historical research which his hon. friend had shewn, he would challenge him to point out the time, the year, when this happy æra was to be found, in which the House of Commons was in that state to which he would now wish to bring it. Would he go back to ancient times, and to the reigns of the Tudors, or would he wish to assimilate the House to what it even was in the time of the Stuarts, or more especially to that parliament in the reign of Charles 2, which was called par excellence, "the pensioned parliament?" His hon. friend would find, that in these very parliaments which passed the best laws, there were members sitting who represented such places as Gatton, Old Sarum, and Helstone, and all those boroughs which he wished to destroy with one dash of his pen. He was no particular friend to boroughs of this sort; but still he would say that they had introduced into the House, and to the service of the country, many men of the very first rate talents. The plan of his hon. friend was certainly fair to view, and specious. It Seemed to be well-proportioned, and adapted to its end; but he believed his hon. friend was much mistaken if he thought that he could by any such plan make a better constitution than the old constitution of this country. In America there was an example of a constitution newly formed, and supposed to be nearly perfect in its theory. What was it, however, in practice? Did his hon. friend really believe that the constitution of America was as well calculated for securing the happiness of the people of that country as the constitution of England was for securing the happiness of the people of this country? (Hear, hear! from the ministerial benches.) His hon. friend wished the House to grant him a committee in order to see what might then be done with his plan. But if the committee were granted, some member might propose other and more extravagant plans. He did not mean to say this plan was an extravagant one, for he did not think it so; but if there was a committee, every member of it might think himself competent to propose his own plan, He did not wish for his own part to go to sea to hunt for constitutions; he enjoyed the British constitution, and was perfectly content with it. He wished that those who spoke of merely bringing back the House of Commons to the state it formerly was in, would also tell to what times they looked for that state of the constitution of that House to which they wished to bring it back? This was a thing which he knew they could not do. As to shortening the duration of parliaments, that was a proposition which he had no objection to; but he conceived it more a matter of regulation than of reform. He thought his hon. friend could not want a committee for that purpose, but that he might have simply moved for leave to bring in a bill to shorten the duration of parliaments. He might have also at once moved for leave to bring in a bill to abolish burgage tenures, without asking for a committee, who would have not only to determine on his plan, but on every other plan which could be proposed. Did his hon. friend mean to contend, that the members of that House were bound in every instance to obey the instructions of their constituents? For his own part he had every respect for the opinion of the people, but his conduct as a member of parliament be must regulate by his con- science. When he spoke of the people, he by no means meant the mob. He knew that gentlemen out of doors could form as correct opinions as gentlemen in that House; and when he spoke of the people, he always meant those who were possessed of information. If the House of Commons were to consist merely of delegates from the people, what security were they to give the people that they would act in that capacity? Were they to be bound by indentures never to act otherwise than as they were instructed by their constituents? The House of Commons would then be converted into a congress of ambassadors. He was inclined to think that the people were nearly as well represented in the present state of that House, as it was possible. It had been laid down as the principle of representation, that Englishmen should not be bound to pay taxes, except by their own consent: But if this principle was to be carried to its full extent, it must lead to universal suffrage, which hardly any reformer had yet recommended. The plan of an hon. bart. (sir F. Burdett) detailed to the House last session was, that the right of voting should be confined to householders paying taxes. If it were the assessed taxes which were meant, this principle could not have been applied before the American war; for until that time, there were no assessed taxes. This was sufficient to shew, that it was a new principle lately introduced, and not an old principle of the constitution. If direct taxation was not the criterion, there was not a pauper who would not have a right to vote as paying taxes; for when every article of consumption was taxed, every person must pay taxes in some shape or other. If then they were to stop short of universal suffrage, they never could get at the real theory of the constitution. If universal suffrage were granted, how would it be possible to collect the votes of nine millions of people. It was even found that in Westminster the voters were so numerous that they could be hardly polled in 15 days, and was also notorious that every Westminster election was a scene of riot. If the parliament were to be so altered as was proposed by this plan, the members of that House, upon every great question, would be guided not by their own judgments, but by the popular opinion, which was often wrong. He objected most strongly to choosing a time of public ferment for convening parliament. When the pub- lic mind was in a state of madness, any one that would come forward to the people, and talk a great deal of nonsense, had a tolerable chance of being returned; and it was in this manner that the country had such a parliament as the present. He thought that the House should not be governed much, upon this question, by the idea of satisfying the people; for it was impossible that they could ever satisfy those who were determined to be dissatisfied. The present plan of reform was not so much a plan to reform the parliament, as to reform the constituent body. He thought that any alteration in the constitution would be full of danger, and he therefore felt himself bound to oppose the motion of his hon. friend.

deprecated innovations as much as any man. Gentlemen had no objection, however, to those innovations which had for their object to narrow the rights of the people. They had narrowed the right of voting in Ireland. They had taken away the elective franchise from the inhabitants of Shoreham, Cricklade, Aylesbury, &c. on the ground of their misusing the right; here they were only asked to do the same thing, on the ground that the right was, in the instances complained of, no longer applicable to the purpose intended. He had no manner of doubt but that parliament had strictly a right to do so in the case of any borough which, by misuse of its privileges, may have acted directly contrary to the objects on account of which the privilege was conferred. Those boroughs had the privilege to exercise for the good of the people; but instead of faithfully executing this trust, which the constitution and their charter imposed upon them, they made their election not for the people, but for the interest of the individual who had the nomination. His noble friend had cited, as an argument against reform, the example of the constitution of America. Now he must directly differ from his noble friend on the fact, and ask for what reason or upon what authority he had conceived that the American constitution was not as well framed for the happiness of that country, as the British constitution is for that of the people of this country? The people of America had been governed to their own satisfaction: their population, their commerce, their industry, and their wealth, had increased greatly under their present constitution: their "taxes were low, and their public debt was constantly diminishing. In what respect then had the constitution of America been found in practice to have failed? He did not wish to see the fabric of our constitution pulled down altogether, because it appeared to him only to want some timely and judicious repairs. He thought the constitution itself sufficiently pointed out the repairs that were necessary. Without perfectly agreeing in all the ideas of his hon. friend, he thought that he had stated a case sufficiently strong to call for a committee. Those gentlemen who had already spoken, seemed to agree that it might be an improvement to extend the right of voting to copyholders; but yet they were afraid even to adopt this measure, for fear it should lead to other consequences of the danger of which they seemed to be particularly apprehensive. They might, however, have recollected, that last year the House passed some resolutions favourable to reform; and that a bill brought in by an hon. friend of his (Mr. Curwen) had passed that House, although indeed it was previously mutilated and mangled in such a manner as to prevent any good resulting from it. He believed, that it would be a great advantage to obtain such a reform of that House as would be produced by the adoption of the plan of his hon. friend, even at the expence of giving compensation to the patrons of boroughs. He believed the only material advantage which Ireland derived by the Union, was getting rid of the rotten boroughs, even although the public paid for the purchase of them. He approved of most of the general ideas of his hon. friend, and thought that he had taken a right course in proposing a committee.

deprecated the wild notions which were so industriously diffused respecting the necessity and practicability of a radical reform in the representation of the people in parliament. The question, even if agreed to on the principles recommended by the hon. member, would only be productive of a little more or a little less alteration in the constitution of that House. When he found, that under this constitution as it now existed, a greater degree of security, a greater degree of civil liberty and a purer administration of justice prevailed than in any other part of the world, he could not bring himself to put these blessings to hazard by the inconsiderate adoption of wild and undigested schemes of reform. The hon. member adverted to the argument drawn from the failure of the Walcheren expedition in support of Parliamentary Reform, and asked whether if that measure were to take place, ministers would become better qualified to conduct expeditions, or whether it would have the effect of preventing wars.

contended that the decisions of that House were not to be ascribed to the preponderance of the representatives for rotten boroughs. If on the question respecting the Walcheren Expedition, the representatives of the cities and boroughs were put out of the account, it would be found that the number of county members who voted on each side were nearly equal. He thought the advantages derivable from a radical reform were much over-rated; nor could he think the plan of the hon. member would be productive of much benefit. There was a kind of Reform indeed that was very desirable; namely, that which should reduce the expences of elections. He was against the motion.

observed that it was very natural that any person or number of persons who were dissatisfied with the decision of a majority of that House, should persuade themselves that that majority not only thought differently from him or them, but from the majority of the nation also. So much had been lately heard of Magna Charta, that one might suppose that famous statute slept, until it was called into life and action by sir Francis Burdett. It was strange that that hon. baronet never should have mentioned the violation of Magna Charta when general Clavering and Mr. Sandon were sent to Newgate. And that he should have allowed the Speaker's warrant to be sent at midnight into the House of the latter, his drawers to be ransacked, and his papers brought away under the authority of that warrant. Where was the hon. baronet's exquisite sensibility for Magna Charta on that occasion? That hon. baronet had stated, that things had gone on well from William the conqueror to William the third, when the borough system began to prevail. Now, so far was he from agreeing in this opinion, that he would date the prosperity of the country, and the security and improvement of its constitution, precisely from that period. As to Magna Charta, nothing was more absurd than to take it as the standard by which we were exclusively to regulate ourselves. He suspected that persons talked of Magna Charta who had never read it. He did not wish to undervalue this grand Charter. But, as stated by a great authority, it was only intended to crop the luxuriance of the feudal system. Many of the provisions in that statute were wholly inapplicable to the present state of the country. Several of them related to ecclesiastical affairs; and the principle of every article that was good in it, was embodied, confirmed and enacted in the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights. There was no period of our history in which the constitution of parliament was more popular and pure than at present. If the population was diminished in certain places that sent representatives to parliament, the House should recollect how much the constituent body was increased throughout the kingdom. They would also recollect the distribution of property that had taken place since the reign of Henry the sixth; that the qualification for a vote for knight of the shire, which was then fixed at 40s. was equal to 61. in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and to 12l. in the reign of Queen Anne, and to 20l. forty years ago. The clamourers for Reform talked as if that House, when it taxed the people, did not tax themselves at the same time. It always was, as it should be the duty, and had been the practice, of the government when he was connected with it, so to combine taxation as that it should fall as lightly as possible on the lower classes of the community. Would the plan of Reform now proposed satisfy that class of persons whose petitions were on the table? He was persuaded it would not. They wanted sir F. Burdett's plan, the great principles of which were universal suffrage and frequent elections. That plan was opened to the House last session by the hon. baronet, and his adherents had been extremely active in the interval to rouse the counties and great towns to petition in support of it; and the result of their labours were the few petitions on the table. As to universal suffrage, it had been tried in two countries and completely failed in both. See the effect of it in France. See the effect of it in America. Of the latter country he knew nothing except from what he read, and from those who spoke of what they had been eye witnesses to. He read in one of these publications that in consequence of the system of election that prevailed in America, the popular branch of the legislature was so badly composed, that no honest tradesman would suffer one of its members to enter his shop.—He had also the authority of a noble lord (Selkirk) in another House, who had travelled much in that country, who visited it with strong prejudices in favour of its form of government, and who had studied its constitution in theory, and seen its operation in practice, that the scheme of representation by universal suffrage had completely failed. Whatever defects might exist in the representative system might be easily corrected, without having recourse to plans that, if pursued to the extreme that some hot spirits were disposed to push them, would at least endanger if not destroy the constitution.

observing, that an attack had been made on the plan proposed last session by his hon. friend (sir F. Burdett) and certainly not the less honoured from his being a prisoner in the Tower, and having a faithful recollection of the plan of his hon. and worthy friend, begged to call the attention of the House to its nature and features, from which they would see, that instead of there being any thing objectionable in it, it was highly the reverse. It went to two propositions, the duration of parliaments, and the description of persons who should have a right to vote. His hon. friend did not press any particular method of effecting these objects. He did indeed suggest, that freeholders, householders, and others, subject to direct taxations for church and state, should have a right to vote: and, as to the endurance of parliaments, that it should be brought back to the legal period. His hon. friend certainly did take property as the basis of political power. It was to property that they looked in the days of Henry 6, when the amount of income by which an independent freeholder was to be estimated, was fixed at 40s. If they were at this day to endeavour to ascertain the same thing, who, he would ask, were more likely to be independent than those who were able to pay the heavy burthens now imposed on the people of this country? He had no hesitation in declaring the feeling of his mind to be, that the right of election should be regulated by the property of the country, and should belong to those who contributed directly to the exigencies of the state. Who were they that now represented the freeholders of 40s. a year? They were comprised exactly in that class of men to whom he had alluded, namely, those who pay all the taxes of the state; and who by paying the whole taxes, are now the most independent body of men in the kingdom. The hon. gent. (Mr. S. Bourne) had said, that the constituent body had greatly increased. Why should it not do so, in proportion to the increase of property. It was a doctrine which he ever should maintain, that people could not be justly taxed unless they were represented. Henry 8, when he imposed taxes upon Wales, gave the people of that country representatives—thus laying down and marking this distinct line of right.

As to the duration of parliaments, the hon. mover preferred triennial. By an act of Edward 3, parliaments were ordered to be holden every year, and oftener if necessary. This rule was strictly observed from the 18th Richard 2nd, and was first infringed in the reign of Charles 1, when for 12 years together there was no parliament at all. After this time triennial parliaments were first introduced, and came, at the time of the revolution, to be considered as the law of the land, although, in the Bill of Rights, 'frequent parliaments' are the words made use of. The idea of triennial parliaments was a sentiment held sacred till the reign of George 1, in the year 1716, when instead of three years, parliament itself passed a law declaring that it should live for seven years. It might be argued that the supreme legislature cannot be bound. But if the representatives of the people took upon themselves to destroy the power of the people, he should venture to assert, that a more illegal act could not be committed; and that if ever high treason was committed against the state, it was in that very act. He begged leave to read to the House the sentiments of my lord Raymond on this occasion:—"The King, Lords, and Commons can no more prolong a parliament beyond its natural duration, than they can make a parliament."—Again, alluding to the despotic ministers of those days, the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer might judge how far the words were applicable to the present times. He said—"A standing army and a standing parliament are fit instruments to support each other." The right hon. gent. would know how far this applied to himself and to the present ministers. He asked, what had passed last session? Was it not then admitted that taxation and representation should go hand in hand? That was all he asked. The advantages to be derived from this rule, he could not pretend to cal- culate; but when he heard the hon. gent. (Mr. Bourne) contend that, when that House imposed taxes on the public, they also taxed themselves, he could not forbear from thinking that the sums distributed from the public revenue among the members of that House might account for some of the votes passed by them. If all the people who paid taxes were entitled to the right of voting he entertained no doubt that there would be an end to corruption, as it would be impossible that bribes could be given to so vast a number of electors. How, then, could a seat in that House be swapped for a writership? Such a thing would be impracticable—it would be impossible. (Cries of hear! hear! and question! question!) As gentlemen seemed to be in such a hurry for the question, he should not trespass much longer on their attention, though, to his mind, the subject was of far greater importance than by this impatience they seemed to suppose. There was another reason, why he was anxious to see a more extended exercise of the right of franchise. It would do away the number of controverted election petitions, with which so much time was occupied. Between the reigns of Henry 3d, and Edward 4th, being a space of 200 years, there were only three petitions of the kind presented to the House. The question being again called for, the hon. gent. declined proceeding and sat down.

rose to express his complete assent to the arguments and proposition advanced that night by his hon. friend (Mr. Brand). To the necessity of a reform in the representation he had been uniformly alive; and be had felt that necessity from long and mature research—from a reliance on the talents and integrity of those great authorities, which had for so many years pressed its adoption, as well as from the innate strength and irresistible conviction, which accompanied the very proposition itself. It had long and repeatedly engaged the attention of that House; by parliament its merits and demerits had been there before canvassed. It had to boast in its favour the coincident opinions of many great men, who, though, differing on other subjects, in the necessity of parliamentary reformation, all concurred. It had been considered by Mr. Pitt himself as a measure of the most vital importance; and by him, acting upon that feeling, submitted to the consideration of that House, though it was prevented from, being carried into effect only by a majority of 20 votes. To the introduction of such a measure no objection upon the ground of its being a rash and crude innovation, therefore could apply; and whatever difference of opinion may even now prevail, upon the propriety or expediency of bringing it forward; there seemed, however, to be a universal assent from all sides of the House, to the explicitness, the candour, and the moderation, with which his hon. friend had on that night introduced it. Notwithstanding the commendations pronounced by hon. members upon his hon. friend (Mr. Brand) for the display and illustration of all those qualities, it was impossible for him not to think, that from some of their insinuations his hon. friend had not been fairly dealt with. Motives were attributed to him for bringing forward the subject of that night, which no fair construction of his language or his conduct could warrant. It was charged against him that he was induced to press its consideration now, in consequence of the popular clamour, as it was styled, which prevailed out of doors,—that such a love of duty would not be felt or manifested by him if sir F. Burdett had hot been sent to the Tower, and Mr. Gale Jones committed to Newgate. On the part of his hon. friend, he protested against such a construction, and he could do so with the more propriety, inasmuch as he had the best reason to be convinced, that no such influence operated with him. So far back as the morning of the decision on the Walcheren question, the hon. mover had intimated to him his determination of making a motion upon the subject. For reasons unnecessary then to explain, he (Mr. W.) had recommended to him hot to press it immediately at that moment, not that he had ceased to entertain tire least doubt of the propriety of its adoption. Indeed, as he had before said, there could be no reason for a change of his opinion, agitated as that question, had been for almost half a century. In 1793 he voted for it; when brought forward in 1797 he took the same course; and so would he have voted in 1809, when it was introduced by sir F. Burdett, had he been in his place, from which he was alone presented by the utter impossibility from the short interval between the notice and the decision, of reaching town from the part of the country in which he then was.

The motion now proposed, as it appeared to him, wisely abstained from urging any distinct plan; it followed the precedents which were in existence; it was the course pursued by Mr. Pitt when he came forward the advocate of reform; it was that adopted by the Irish parliament, when that assembly was impressed with the necessity of correcting the prevailing abuses in its constitution. Such also was the course recommended when he had the first opportunity of expressing his opinion on the subject, at the period when it was introduced by his dear and noble relative (earl Grey.) True it was, that at that period, one of the great and strenuous supporters of parliamentary Reform had changed his opinion upon it. Mr. Pitt, the minister of that day, struck with the awful change that had taken place in the political situation of Europe, affected, as be said, by those changes combined with certain appearances in this country, then called upon his noble friend to retract the notice he had given of bringing forward that question. But whence sprung the objections of Mr. Pitt? Was it that he had altered his opinion upon the intrinsic merits of parliamentary reform? Was it that he felt the arguments for its adoption less cogent, or the effects likely to follow from its accomplishment less salutary? It was no such thing. He objected to it not upon any grounds attaching to, or deducible from, the measure itself, but growing out of causes altogether extraneous. His opposition to it cannot be considered as directed to the merit of the measure, but to the particularity of the season when it was introduced.

An hon. gent. (Mr. S. Bourne) had that night vauntingly asserted that the principle of reform by an extension of the right of suffrage had been tried in two different parts of the world, and that in both the experiment had failed. He (Mr. W.) begged leave positively to deny it. Reform had not failed, because reform never had a trial. In America, so triumphantly referred to by the right hon. gent., (and where he could find authority for the description he had given of the members of congress, he (Mr. W.) was wholly at a loss to ascertain;) the experiment had not been made. There it was creation, and not reform, that had taken place; and what an awful admonition to that House must arise from inquiring, what the causes were which forced upon America the necessity of that creation. All the evils which accompanied that unnatural contest—all the calamitous conse- quences which first tore America from England, and scattered the seeds of future desolation throughout the whole earth, might have been avoided, if the British House of Commons had been at that critical and awful period reformed. To the corrupt constitution of the parliament, said Mr. Pitt, was to be attributed the alienation of the colonies—the disgrace of the parent country and the dismemberment of the British dominions. It could not, therefore, be said, that reform had failed in America; but it was too manifest that the want of reform in England had forced America to the necessity of a political creation; which, so far from failing in its object, had far exceeded the extent of human hope—exceeded, inasmuch as it was the work of one of the greatest and the best of men—of that patriot (Washington,) who communicated to the government he had reared a certain portion of the purity of his own spotless mind and unsullied life: inasmuch as it had grown from the weakness of infancy to the strength of manhood, engaged in all the pursuits which lead to greatness and to power—capable of existing upon its own resources, and too likely to become your future rival. If such was the case as to America, how was the assertion of the right hon. gent. borne out by a reference to France? Could he affirm, that even there the experiment of reform was once tried? Unfortunately for France, for Europe, and humanity, reform was refused. To all applications for the redress of abuse, for to every proposed amelioration of the system of its government, the answer of those then in power in that country uniformly communicated denial—until those denials terminated in the overthrow of the French monarchy. Then followed the horrible catalogue of miseries which some few in that House had predicted, but which sp many of those who then would not believe, have now lived to see so lamentably realized.

When, then, such instances were plain to their understandings, was it not natural, that many persons in the country should now look to a reform in that House, impressed as they were with the opinion, that neither the American nor the French war, both events so replete with national calamities, would never have taken place if that House had been fairly constituted, and if it spoke the feelings and the wishes of the people? Was it not natural, when men contemplated the disastrous cam- paigns, the fruitless expeditions, the lavish expenditure of the nation's blood and of its means, which characterised so the political history of latter times, to attribute such effects to the want of that constitutional influence which the country should possess over the conduct of its public servants? When they see ministerial majorities ready to defend every rash project of war—to screen every delinquency—to protect every malversation, and to refuse every popular appeal for redress—could it be a matter of surprize to that House, to find the country anxious to correct that which they consider the source of all the national evils, namely, the imperfect representation of the people in the Commons House of Parliament? Then how was that remedy to be affected? It was to be effected, as his hon. friend said by looking into the principles of the constitution, and applying them to present circumstances. It was by giving to the people their due in returning men to that House who came there the representatives of the country, and not of their own money. But the hon. gent. opposite, has said that the peers constitute a virtual representation of the people. Did that hon. gent. (Mr. D. Giddy) forget the manner, in which such honours and dignities had been in modern times too frequently bestowed? Did he believe that the more the peerage was diluted by the prostitution of its distinctions, its honour was proportionably increased? Without any invidious application, he would suppose a case of a great independent commoner, from many causes possessed of considerable influence in that House and in the country: he would suppose top that to get the support of such a man must become a great object with the minister of the day. How could he more effectually proceed to accomplish his purpose than by holding out the honours of the peerage as the recompence for the desertion of the cause of the public?—Having thus excited no very commendable feeling of ambition, and with the facility of saying "much on both sides of a public question," which the member for Yorkshire (Mr. Wilberforce) had stated according to a great writer, to exist, was it not very probable to suppose that by such a pursuit the dignity of the peerage might be lavished in order to corrupt the members of the other branch of the legislature? Was there not some ground for believing that which had been often contended, namely, that such an instrument had the House of Lords been made as actually to suck at the best blood of the House of Commons? From the operation of such causes the House of Lords continued no longer what the constitution intended it, whilst the Commons stands in need of reformation.

In considering the mode of that reform that might be most eligible, it was impossible to overlook the consequences which followed from men finding their way into that House by the nomination of peers. Consider the relationship in which a person thus returned stands with a representative sent by a portion of the population of the country. The latter stands forward for the free choice of his constituents. He takes his place in this House unfettered. If circumstances should arise on which his constituents express their opinion, and request his support, what is his alternative? Should he even against his own judgment acquiesce with them or vacate his seat: (No! No! and some murmurs from the Ministerial benches.) If gentlemen would but wait with a little patience they soon should learn his opinion and that was, that the representative was not bound, whatever view he took of the question, to vacate his seat. But what was the case of a nominated member on a pinching question? Was he not bound either to vote for his patron or to vacate? The latter was the uniform practice when such circumstances arose: and it might be said in the one case, that the member refused to pay what some considered a legal debt, whilst there existed no objection to discharge the other, which might be termed a debt of honour. Such a man, the nominee for a borough, when he took his place in that House, came not as a representative of the people, but as the delegate of the nobleman. He was aware, however, that men of the first talents and strictest integrity were frequently in that way returned, and that in the present state of the representation, they could not from many causes obtain seats in any other manner. But the system of his hon. friend had the advantage of affording such men opportunities of being elected to serve in that house. And though it took away twenty nominators, it opened forty places where they could, from their talents and their character, establish claims to popular support.

But it was said by an hon. gent. (Mr. Giddy) that in that House there were many distinguished officers of the army and navy, and lawyers (of the latter a great superfluity,) who could not obtain seats unless by this mode of nomination. Did not the right hon. gent. know that some of the great cities and populous towns were in the habit of electing some of our naval heroes? Had he not an example before him. Let him look to the city of Westminster? Was it not at this moment represented by a noble lord (Cochrane) whose great and gallant services entitled and obtained for him the support and suffrages of his constituents? Had not lord Gardner, and before him lord Hood, been thus returned, standing forward as they did in the face of the people, and supported by that people in consequence of their professional services? So far as the assertion of the right hon. gent. applied to naval heroes, his statement completely fell to the ground.

There had fallen from his noble friend, (lord Milton) certain observations which he must confess he had heard with surprise. His noble friend had stated that at a popular election the man who could talk the greatest nonsense was sure to succeed. Now his noble friend had been engaged in a great popular contest, in which character was opposed to character, great natural interest to great natural interest, and money to money. The result had proved in favour of his noble friend, and without feeling inclined to make any invidious comparison, he would ask, what could have induced the people of Yorkshire to prefer his noble friend to his opponent; but that both he and his friends and adherents spoke better sense, and exhibited more constitutional principle? In this country the good sense of the candidate and the sound principles of the constitution would generally predominate at popular elections, he was convinced, unless some dangerous delusion in the shape of an hypocritical cant or a religious cry, was artfully raised to conceal some unconstitutional project.

It was now unfortunately but too manifest that in the public mind there prevailed a great and growing indisposition to that House.—(No, no, from many members) That such indisposition existed he was firmly persuaded, and he most apprehended that those who did not believe its existence, would not awaken from their delusion until it was too late. It had been generated by acts done in that House during the present and late sessions of Parliament. Many of its decisions had given great disgust to the great body of the people, in so much, that in their wrath against that House they would deprive it of those privileges which to a House of Commons duly constituted they would freely grant and cheerfully submit to. The opposers of reform, indeed, endeavoured to deny that it is the wish of the country, and they ground the assertion on this, that the people have not petitioned for it. But years ago the people had petitioned, and the reason they did not repeat their applications was, that they feel disappointed and disgusted with the apostacy of those who once were firm supporters of it. They have found ail their petitions for the redress of grievances disregarded; and in that very session they had seen the House of Commons frequently refuse to receive the prayers of the people. But it was most idle, most delusive and mischievous to believe, that they did not wish for reform in their hearts. Its necessity became every day more absolute. Wise councils might unquestionably do a great deal, for the country in its present situation, but for complete recovery, in his opinion, a reform in the construction of that House was essentially necessary. What, he would ask, had been the fate of other nations who neglected the means of national safety? Did Prussia reform?—Did Austria redress the people's grievances?—Why has Spain been the theatre of havoc and desolation?—Were their miseries to be traced to the experiment of reform? Or rather, was it not the effect of the resistance with which their respective governments treated every proposition of redress and amelioration?—Had Sicily reformed?—And what, notwithstanding the liberal assistance of Great Britain, will be its fate, unless that government shall be wise enough to accede to the reasonable wishes of the people? Subjugated Europe has fallen prostrate, not because she made rash experiments of reform on her systems of government, but by sanctifying every abuse, and pertinaciously refusing to accede to the just desires of the people; she destroyed the moral energies of her population, and though she placed arms in the hands of those, who ought to be her defenders, there remained nothing of influence over their hearts when brought in contact with the enemy.

What was the effect of the denial of reform in Ireland? It was this—that the corruptions of its Parliament became so glaring and so destructive, as to have rendered it necessary to merge it by an incorporating union in the legislature of Great Britain. Far better would it have been for the reciprocal happiness of both islands, that a course of a seasonable and salutary reform had been resorted to, and that the two independent Parliaments had been continued. When the hon. gent. (Mr. Bourne) talked of virtual representation and its beneficial effects, how was it that he did not speak one word of the representation of Scotland. Did it exist there? How was it that it escaped his observation? Was it that he knew nothing of its situation, of its crying grievances upon that subject; or that with the skilful adroitness of a dexterous pleader, he carefully abstained from touching upon that part of the subject in discussion: which must have exposed his fallacious sophistry. Compensation for boroughs had been alluded to by his hon. friend, but to arrangement for that object he was decidedly averse. There was not a feature of right connected with such a principle. The case here was different from that of Ireland, where compensations were made. There it was admitted by the right hon. gent. who now was at the head of its exchequer (Mr. Foster) that every thing connected with the union had been effected by means of money, and that every step of its progress had been procured by purchase for valuable consideration.

The hon. gent. then proceeded to comment upon the mischiefs which must follow from collusions between the patrons of boroughs, and the minister of the day, the one bartering his patronage either to gratify his ambition or his avarice; the other squandering the honours of the crown, or the money of the people, to acquire Parliamentary support. Suppose for instance, some great lord with his six, or seven nominees in that House, should, in the longing of his empty vanity grasp at those distinctions which were ordained to reward heroic achievements—that he should threaten the minister of the day with the defection of his nominees in that House, unless he obtained that ribband, which, though an ornament to merit, must when otherwise conferred, be considered a badge of disgrace to the wearer. Had such a case never happened, or was it it impossible that it should ever happen again? Had it never, occurred that menaces of a similar nature were addressed to a minister, unless his countenance were given to some proposed public work, in which was, however, blended some little of private interest, but for the accomplishment of which the public money was to be entirely applied?—If, then, such things had happened—if they can happen again—who was it, that could deny that the compliance of such minister constituted the most profligate exercise of those powers which were entrusted for far different purposes?

But between the contending opinions of his hon. friend and of the hon. gent. (Mr. Bourne) opposite, he (Mr. W.) was placed in a dreadful alternative. His hon. friend said, that unless reform took place, a military despotism would follow. The hon. gent. on the contrary was fully persuaded that, if reform was acceded to, this country, after being dragged through the vortex of democracy, would at length be subjected to a military government. It was not for him to say that either consequence would follow, bat in adjuring that House to acquiesce in the motion for going into a committee, he would appeal to the authorities of the dead to strengthen the admonitions of the living. I call upon you, said he, to bear in remembrance the mighty characters who have expressed their decided support to this question of reform. The horrors of that democracy which the denial to reform had accelerated in France, have subsided from their own exhaustion. England, though buffeted in the tempest, has escaped from the general wreck which has befallen so many other nations. Will she not profit even by their example? Will she, with their calamities and their fate, speaking to her with more than oracular force, refuse to redress her grievances, and, by such infatuation, hurry to the same destiny? Events have taken place within these walls which have sunk deep into the hearts of the people. It is true, that many of the gentlemen opposite think the impression done away, and that the popular reason is now righted. If the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the first minister of this country, thinks himself justified by the decisions of this House, he must allow me to tell him, that he grossly deceives himself. Let me assure him, that the votes of tins House, which were meant to justify his actions, have in no inconsiderable degree increased the advocates for parliamentary reform. Those fears, which springing from the changes of Europe in 1792, had so alarmed the mind against innovation, now cease to operate. All men see the absolute necessity of reforming—they see that danger pressing upon them which was so feared and so expected when our expenditure was ten millions—when afterwards twenty millions—How much more chilling the prospect when it has been increased to seventy millions? and when we contemplate the awful truth, that all human resources are finite? There was little to add to the reasoning already advanced at various periods upon the subject. But with respect to the sale of seats, he would contend that the man returned by his money could have little connection with the public feeling. With constituents he could never come in contact, perhaps never see them. He therefore had no bias to comply with their opinions. He felt and acted as the representative of his 5,000l. When versed in the system of ministerial management, he would not remain long backward in pursuing that course which he observed followed by so many to their own private advantage.—Mr. Whitbread next adverted to the Septennial Act, which, abstractedly considered, he thought most tyrannical, but which was in some degree justified by the motive which led to its adoption at the time, namely, the preservation and maintenance of the House of Brunswick on the throne of these realms. He would vote now for triennial parliaments, and for regulating the manner of taking votes, as recommended by his hon. friend. The latter would be a consequence of the first, and without it the other would be intolerable. Whether under a reform the members returned would be intrinsically better than those who now sat there, he would not say, but by coming in under so many popular checks, as much good would be produced as if they were intrinsically better. After expressing his wish to see, though not the efficient officers of the crown, yet their dependants removed from that House, he concluded with observing, that even though no other good was to follow but the satisfaction of the people, for that, the exertion, should be made, and from its accomplishment the most salutary benefits would follow.

conceived the question proposed by the motion to be plainly this, whether that House should declare itself inadequate to the performance of its functions—whether it should abdicate its authority? The House would, he hoped, pause before it decided in the affirmative upon such a serious subject. To what consequences such a decision must lead, 'through what variety of untried being,' it Was likely to take both the House and the country, he thought it unnecessary to describe. And for what purpose was such a dangerous experiment recommended—to conciliate truly not the sober reflecting part of the people, because he did not believe any thing of this nature was requisite to their satisfaction; no; but, a particular class, whose study it was to create agitation and make a noise about reform. For that class he could never hesitate to express his confirmed disdain. They were not deserving of any favour from that House, because for that House or the constitution they felt no solicitude. If such persons could attain their object, they would constitute such a system of popular delegation, as could not exist as a co-ordinate authority in the constitution of England. There could be no question that there existed such a party in the country, who pretended a zeal for reform but in reality sought anarchy, and, as the best mode of accomplishing their object, reviled and distrusted that House, the object of whose views was not its improvement, but its destruction: a vain, contemptible, degraded crew, who magnified themselves into the nation, and diminished the nation into a faction; who declared their own infallibility, and depreciated the judgment of all others; a body who were too weak to be respected—too despicable to be feared. But even this wretched body, though they demanded reform, declared that the reform proposed, would not prove sufficient. No, they would have the House of Commons omnipotent; they would have it every thing; all other establishments nothing; they would make it, like the rod of the prophet, swallow up all around it.

An hon. gentleman who had spoken early in the debate, (Mr. D. Giddy) had ably and satisfactorily shewn the incompatibility of any co-ordinate powers in the other branches of the legislature, with the existence of a House of Commons, such as the wildness of the democratic theory supposes—an assembly, which should be in itself the full, complete, immediate, and adequate representation and concentration of the will, the wishes and the interests of the whole nation. This is not the nature, it is not the just theory of a British House of Commons: nor is the argument of the hon. gent. (Mr. D. Giddy) that such a House of Commons, if it existed, would draw to itself all the power of the state, the exaggeration of an enemy of reform. Friends of reform in former instances have delivered the same opinion. And one of the ablest men that ever professed the creed of parliamentary reform—a man who professed it honestly and without participating in the views and principles of the reformers of the present day—a man too honest and too enlightened, not to have changed in some degree the opinions of his youth, after the experience of the last 15 years, (he meant sir James M'Intosh, of whom he spoke with the sincerest sentiments of esteem and friendship). Sir James M'Intosh, in his most eloquent publication in defence of the early parts of the French Revolution, in discussing the question of parliamentary reform, had stated distinctly his opinion, that such would be the power and preponderance of a reformed House of Commons, that the powers of the Lords and of the Crown would be but "as dust" in the balance against it." That sir J. M'Intosh now or ever seriously wished for such a reform, he (Mr. Canning) did not believe. In him this declamation was nothing else but the ebullition of a young and ardent mind, enamoured of the fair form of ideal liberty, and of the theories, the fallaciousness of which, and the danger of which he had not then had occasion to appreciate. But what be declaimed in the sport and exuberance of a classical imagination there are those, who would now reduce to sober and fatal practice; for he had no doubt that such was the general opinion and calculation of those who now so clamourously called for reform out of doors. Therefore he would resist them, because he saw no good that could result from conceding to them, while there was too much reason to apprehend great evil. To explain the grounds of that apprehension, to shew the effects of any attempt at the practical application of theoretic notions of democratic reform, he need only refer to the cases, already quoted in support of the other side of the argument, of America and France—to illustrate the circumstances of the former his hon. friend (Mr. S. Bourne) had already quoted the authority of a writer, who, on his arrival from that country about ten years ago, was industrious in proclaiming the baneful effects of a democracy, although of late years, still more industrious in supporting those who looked for what this writer called reform.

For his own part, he would freely own, that indulging, as he did, every desire for the dignity of that House, and cherishing every rational hope for the prosperity of the people, he could never consent so to raise them above their natural level as that every other constituted establishment of the state should be "but as dust in the "balance." No; he would never conciliate the reformers at such a price; and, at any expence short of that, he did not think they were to be conciliated.

The case of France, he would contend, afforded an equally strong ground of objection to the description of reform sought by designing persons out of doors, as that of America. For what, he would ask, had been the case actually in France? The reformed legislative assembly absolutely set out with the principles of revolution; but even if they had not done so; if their ideas had been purely patriotic, they were, in the wild frenzy of fantastic reformation, so strangely constituted, that it was impossible they could move in a natural orbit; it was impossible they should not run into an irregular and eccentric course, whirling every surrounding object into their dangerous deviation. Would the House follow that rash and awful example? Would they go wavering and perplexed to a Committee, without any adequate means to attain their object, or even without any adequate object to attain—without one fixed idea, except the wise notion that whatever is, is wrong, and the sober expectation that, by some lucky expedient, the right may be hit upon! There was, however, one principle to which those reformers pretended, and which of late, they appeared unusually eager to profess—a veneration for the throne itself, and an high respect for the individual by whom it was filled. But, unfortunately, that House well knew such language had not even the merit of originality. By such pretences it was, the unhappy Louis had been deceived. By such men it was he had been deluded into the notion that he had an interest separate from his people, and a place in the hearts of those who flattered that they might betray him. He hoped sincerely there was not a man in that House, who was not eager to ward off the melancholy omen. Why (said Mr. Canning) why should we embark upon this dangerous voyage? Why should we trust ourselves to this unknown ocean? We have heard that the ancient empires of the earth have been uprooted; that the most solid monarchies have been crushed; that oligarchies the best established have been destroyed, and that England alone stands erect among the ruins! And why have we so stood? because, say the reformers, we have been radically corrupt. Sir, I will not bow to the whimsical deduction; I will rather deduce from some wise distinction the source of our prosperity. Like the nations which have fallen, we have a monarchy. Like the nations which have fallen, we have an aristocracy; but unlike every one of those nations, we possess—an House of Commons! This is our proud distinction; this is the sole palladium of our salvation; and this we are now called upon to regenerate, by the mad cry of unmeaning reformation!

But, (say the discontented) the House of Commons, constituted as it now is, has hurried the nation into extravagant expenditure, and unnecessary wars. It is not the fact. There has not been a war during a century, which was not in its commencement strictly popular. The people it was who goaded the government and the House to hostility—the people it was who forced and goaded even the pacific sir Robert Walpole into the declaration of war. The people it was who at first urged the American war, and at last decried it when it became unfortunate; the people it was who encouraged the war with France, which saved this country from all the miseries entailed on that. What a pity then it was, that the House and the country at large did not become converts to the opinions of the hon. gent. and the few by whom he was supported in opposition to that war! What a pity they were not dipped in the well of his political sagacity, that they might meet, rebaptised, all the inevitable mischievous consequences which must have followed. After having thus gone through the history of ages, the friends of reform scrutinized the present times, and passed their unqualified censure on every vote of that House, and on every member with whom they were dissatisfied. All with whom they were not pleased, had, it seemed, some sinister motive. Now, even allowing this to be the case; even allowing that some extra considerations did enter into the minds of each unpopular representative, how would the reformers remedy it? Would they banish human nature from their reformed House of Commons? No, but they would banish the borough Now, if they would only take the trouble to examine borough members' votes, they would find that just as many voted on the popular as on the unpopular side of the question, so they would neither lose nor gain by their reform. They might in this way alternately subtract from each side, till they had eradicated all. Decimation would be mercy compared to this plan of reform; and, indeed, whether one considered its motive or its consequences, its justice would appear exactly to correspond with its policy.

The accusations of the reformers against that House were exactly those which could be made justly against themselves, for there never yet was a state democratic and powerful, which had not a tendency to war. The compliances which they sought from the House it was impossible they ever could obtain. The House of Commons owed to the people, a manly but not a servile obedience; they should be respectful, but not enslaved; they should not watch the eye, nor bend to the nod, nor crouch to the unspoken will of the multitude, but proceed in the plain path of undeviating independence; they should act to the people as representatives, just as they should act towards their Creator as men, virtuously but freely, founding their hopes of retribution on their consciousness of honesty. He was as ready as the hon. gent. to lament, that more liberal and solid provisions had not been made for securing the liberty of the subject, at the period of the restoration; but this made directly against the right hon. gent.'s own arguments, for Charles the second was restored chiefly by the spirit and strong impulse of the people. Let it be recollected too that it was the extent of the popular influence, which at the restoration prevented the arrangement of those provisions for the security of popular freedom, which an hon. gent., repeating an observation in the celebrated tract of his deceased friend (Mr. Fox,) had expressed his regret did not take place. A just sympathy with the people, and a reasonable attention to their desires, was no doubt, the duty and must ever be the inclination of that House. The people, unquestionably, could reason fairly when they had time; but as, notoriously, their first impulse was feeling, he did not think it would be politic, or for the interest of the country, to have that House quite subject to popular controul.

Every class of the people he must con- tend was fully represented in that House, and its general conduct since the revolution, excepting the septennial act of the whigs, tended to ameliorate the country. Therefore he saw no necessity for the proposed reform. As to the argument of that necessity which had been drawn from particular votes, he asked what assurance could be offered that similar votes would not take place even after the desired reform? He believed that, while human nature was unchanged, no change in the constitution of that House could guard against some improper decisions; and he could not discern, 'mid all the perils of surrounding nations, a nobler security to English independance than the established House of Commons. Should he then ungratefully now forget those benefits? Should he impoliticly fling aside all hope of future advantage, and trust to the conflicting wisdoms of a reforming committee to strike out some new and speculative system? He saw no necessity for the experiment; the House of Commons was all that the honestly patriotic could desire it. What question but here met a discussion? What grievance but here met its remedy? What man in the land so poor but here had his advocate? The experiment of reform had been tried in France and failed. They had it before their eyes. No honest visionary in this country should now be so blinded as to seek here, in the hope of benefit, what the corrupt men there sought to cover their ambition. If they did, some more cunning and ambitous visionary would take advantage of the tumult to place himself on the throne. They would soon see popular commotion end in military despotism, and find philosophical disquisitions superseded by practical oppression. "I cannot consent (said Mr. Canning) to hazard this. If I am obliged to choose between the capricious chances of an undefined committee and the ancient edifice which has so long upheld our rights, shielded our dignity, and secured our interests, I shall not hesitate—'Stet fortuna domus.'—Let the venerable frabric, which has sheltered us for so many ages, and stood unshaken through so many storms, still remain unimpaired and holy; sacred from the rash frenzy of that ignorant innovator who would tear it down, careless and incapable of any substitution."

, without any wish whatever to make the House and the law "as dust in the balance," was nevertheless a decided advocate for reform. Early in life, and now still later in life, he was of opinion that some change in the representation of the people in that House must take place. This he believed to be the opinion and the wish of all the thinking part of the community. He could assure the House, that he did not express this opinion from any look-out for popularity. No, popularity had of late fallen into such hands, that it was really no object of ambition to his mind. It would, indeed, be vain for those who thought with him to start for popularity, in competition with the persons he alluded to. For he was persuaded, that those persons would always be sure to run before them. He had, indeed, no doubt that it he and his friends were to decide that all householders ought to have the right of voting, the persons referred to would demand universal suffrage, and that if all men were permitted to vote, these persons would call for the admission of the women; nay, more, that if the women were admitted, they would insist upon the addition of the children [a laugh, and hear! hear!]. These persons therefore, he could not expect to satisfy, but it was his wish to give satisfaction to the sober thinking part of the public, whose praise, although not so noisy, he must be naturally ambitious to deserve. Among such people he found the call for reform universal. Indeed, it was impossible to mix in any society without hearing that call repeated—without hearing the evils arising out of the existing system of our representation dilated upon—without in fact hearing the House of Commons spoken of with marked contempt. [Some murmurs]. Gentlemen might murmur; but he stated his decided opinion of what he knew. He would, indeed, call upon any member of the House, whatever walk of society he entered, to state what he heard upon this subject. He did not say that that House deserved contempt, although many arguments might be drawn from its conduct particularly with regard to the Convention of Cintra and the Walcheren expedition, which appeared to account for the sentiment of the public. But the very circumstance of the right honourable gentleman opposite being the minister of the country, and supported by that House, was enough to deprive it of the public confidence. That support such a minister could not have if the House were properly constituted. In tact, if it were not for the Scotch members, who could not be called representatives of the people, the right hon. gent. must have fallen in consequence of the Walcheren expedition. But of that expedition the right hon. gent. would have heard more, notwithstanding his first victory, if it were not for the case of Sir F. Burdett, which occurred so opportunely for the right hon. gent. Yes, the right hon. gent. availed himself with promptitude and alacrity of that lucky event. Lucky it was to him indeed—for he firmly believed that the right hon. gent. owed the tenure of his situation to Sir Francis Burdett [hear! hear!] Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench might cheer; but he was convinced that according to their own feelings Sir Francis Burdett was their best benefactor.—In the plan proposed by his hon. friend, he maintained that there was nothing new—nothing which had not been recommended by many of the greatest men the history of this country could boast—among whom were the great Chatham and his illustrious son. His hon. friend proposed that system alone which accorded with the principle and practice of the constitution, and which had simply in view to render that House what it ought to be—a constitutional check upon the power of the crown, and a sparing dispenser of the money of the people. He would, therefore, support the motion; and he begged the House to consider the consequence of refusing even to enquire into the cause of all that evil which the people so loudly and so universally deprecated.

was surprized that there could be a doubt entertained of the undue influence in the House. It was proved that the peers had the power of returning seventy members, and yet the House would pretend to be indignant if a peer attempted to influence a vote of a member or a proceeding of the House. This was absurd and disgraceful. Why did they not at once expunge every resolution denying the right of the peers to interfere, and if they must be mean, let them beat least consistent? The quotation from Mr. Mackintosh, by a right hon. member, (Mr. Canning,) was completely misrepresented. That writer, in the passage alluded to, spoke of a tyrannical monarch and a slavish House of Peers, and concluded by saying, that a House of Commons justly chosen by the people, would easily master all tyranny in the people's cause.

declared his conviction that the abstaining of the House, during the last session, from punishing the undue influence exerted in elections by some of its members, was the stimulant that had so powerfully excited the popular discontent on the subject of representation. Adverting to the proposition of his honourable friend to strike off the burgage tenures, he observed, that he did not consider them so obnoxious as the small corporations, in which there existed more venality and less choice. Supposing, however, that they were equally bad, did it follow that the constitution would be subverted by their correction? These small corporations originated in the crown. The power of creating them had long lain dormant, but it might be re-exercised the next day. The crown could create, but it could not destroy. He did not see any thing in the proposition of his hon. friend which involved the fundamental principles of the constitution; there was nothing novel, nothing dangerous, nothing that could make the House of Commons so democratical as to overturn the other states. The only solid objection that he could imagine to his hon. friend's proposal was, that if the House once began to act in that way, it would be difficult to say where they would or should stop. He admitted that this was a consideration of great moment, and involving in it a danger from which this country had hitherto been exempt. Great Britain was the only free country in which the frame of the constitution had not been the object of political contest. In other free states these contests had been frequent. Hence in Rome the contest between the Plebeians, the Patricians, the Equestrian order, and the Tribunitiary power, by which at length the liberties of Rome were destroyed; the prevalence of the Tribunitiary power, and the letting in of the Albanian cities, making a way for the subsequent destruction of Roman freedom. But in this country there did not appear to him to be any such danger; for the crown had immense power, the House of Lords had great power, and therefore there was no apprehension that the democratic power, by a reform of the House of Commons, would become too preponderant. But, he would ask the House, did they run no risk by refusing all reform? What was the opinion of the sensible and reflecting part of the community on this subject? He had taken very great pains to ascertain it, and he was fully persuaded that they were far from being satisfied with the present state of the representation. Should the inquiry be entered into, and should it appear that the danger to be apprehended from any change was greater than the benefit to be expected, the people would be satisfied. For his part he could not see the danger. His hon. friend sought not to subvert, but to restore—not to improve by alteration, but to bring back the constitution of the House of Commons to its original principles. He was willing that the House on this momentous question, should act as a skilful navigator would act in an intricate navigation, who would not move without the lead and line in his hand. As to the details of any kind, he would not pledge himself to them; and for that very reason he would vote for the appointment of a committee. With the most perfect conviction on his mind that there never existed so good a constitution as the British, he was of course desirous to preserve all that was estimable, and to abolish only that which was confessedly bad; and above all he was anxious not to be supposed to countenance that which it was the fashion to call a radical reform.

opposed the motion, on the ground that a reference of the subject to a committee would unsettle the mind of every man in the country. When once the work of alteration was commenced, it would be impossible to say how far it might go. He could by no means accede to the appointment of such a committee, without pledging himself to some specific plan, and this he felt to be impossible.

said, that he had listened attentively to all the reasons that had been urged on both sides. In his opinion there was but one motive that should induce the House to accede to the motion; namely, the pursuasion that such was the stale of their organization that a repetition of the advantages which the country had heretofore derived from it could not be rationally expected. Now, although he admitted that there were many faults in the constitution of the House, he could by no means go to that length. Among ail, who had spoken during the debate there were not two who agreed in their ideas of reform. If the House went into the detail, they would soon find that they had not heard a tenth part of the varieties of opinion, which existed on the subject. Unless the House therefore wished to throw the country into confusion, they would not endanger that fabric which had been the pride and safeguard of the coun- try. On the whole, he should give his decided negative to the motion, convinced that such a vague proposition could not save but might ruin the country; at the same time he admitted, that it should be considered how that system of venality which at present existed could be best subdued.

in reply said, he had not heard any arguments to prove that the House was, as he had asserted it not to be, the true representatives of the people. They did not stand as every man ought to stand, an independent and free agent, answerable to none but his constituents. He condemned the nomination of members by peers as more dangerous than the taking of premiums for seats. Whatever the fate of his motion might be on this occasion, he would feel it his duty to bring the subject forward again and again. There were indeed certain parts of the plan he had detailed to the House, which he meant to propose in distinct bills, in the course of this sessions, if not too late—but if so, he pledged himself to submit these distinct propositions to the House early in the next sessions, and he had no doubt that their adoption would serve to raise that House in the estimation of the public. He had thought it incumbent on him to state what he thought would invigorate and revive the hopes of the people. An hon. gent. had called it an ill-contrived system, but he had never recommended any derogation from the established constitution. His object was to restore the ancient and constitutional rights of the people.—The House then divided:

For the motion, 115; Against it, 234; Majority, 119.