addressed the chairman in substance as follows:—Mr. Lushington, the Resolutions agreed to on a former occasion by this Committee having now received the concurrence of the House of Lords—I mean the three Resolutions, the first stating the present in-capacity of his Majesty to execute the functions of the executive government, the second declaring that it is the right and duty of both Houses of Parliament to take measures to supply the existing deficiency, and the third prescribing the mode, viz. by way of Bill, that should be adopted for this purpose—I say, Sir, these Resolutions having been agreed to by both Houses, it only remains for this Committee to take into further consideration the particular measures which it may be expedient for them to adopt. On a former occasion. Sir, I explained the view which I entertained on this part of the subject. I stated that in my apprehension the Committee and the House would do well to conform, as nearly as circumstances might render it reasonable to conform, to the course of proceeding which it was intended to carry into effect in the year 1788. I also stated that with that view of the subject it was my purpose to submit to the Committee Resolutions, by which his royal highness the Prince of Wales should be desired to take on himself the exercise of the royal functions, by which certain exceptions should be specified with regard to that exercise; but by which it should be provided, that those exceptions should be adopted only for a time to be limited. I stated that those exceptions would be the power of creating peers, and of granting places and pensions for life, except such offices as are by law required to be granted for life, or during good behaviour, and I likewise stated that I should propose making a provision for the care and custody of his Majesty's person during his indisposition, which provision would lead to vest that care and custody in her Majesty, with the assistance of a Council to be formed according to the provisions of the Bill, which it is my intention to move for leave to bring in. The first consideration to which the attention of the Committee must be directed, is the Resolution respecting the authority to be given to his royal highness the Prince of Wales. That Resolution I will now read.

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that for the purpose of providing for the exercise of the royal authority during the continuance of his Majesty's illness, in such manner, and to such extent, as the present circumstances, and the urgent concerns of the nation appear to require, it is expedient that his royal highness the Prince of Wales, being resident within the realm, shall be empowered to exercise and administer the royal authority, according to the laws and constitution of Great Britain, in the name, and on the behalf of his Majesty, and under the style and title of Regent of the Kingdom; and to use, execute, and perform, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, all authorities, prerogatives, acts of government, and administration of the same, that belong to the King of this realm to use, execute, and perform, according to the law thereof, subject to such limitations and exceptions as shall be provided."

In laying before the Committee, this or any other Resolution, it is material that I should endeavour to separate the points which are likely to create a difference of opinion, from those in which it is probable that we may be unanimous. In this view of the subject, from what I have myself heard, and from what I have collected from others, I think I may assume that there exists no difference of opinion, on the propriety of requesting his royal highness the Prince of Wales to become the Regent. I think, Sir, from what I have observed, that I may assume, that it does not occur to any of the gentlemen opposite, to advise that his royal highness should have any Council associated with him in the Regency. The difference of opinion which may be expected to take place will probably arise from those points in the proposition which I am about to submit to you, that lead to the restriction of the royal authority in the hands of the Regent; and to those points, therefore, I shall particularly direct the attention of the Committee. The questions which we have to consider and to determine are these:—Whether or not it is right to admit of any Restrictions on the royal authority, when placed in the hands of the Regent? If it be determined that any Restrictions are proper, whether the Restrictions which I propose, or some other Restrictions, be preferable? Lastly, if the Restrictions which I propose, or any other Restrictions, be adopted, whether those Restrictions should have any period, and if so, what period of limitation? On these three questions, Sir, I apprehend that the discussion of this evening will hinge. With respect to the first question, whether or not it is right to admit of any Restrictions on the royal authority when placed in the hands of the Regent? I trust that the Committee will, as well as on every other occasion in the course of this important business, constantly keep in mind the nature of the duty which we have to perform. We are called upon, Sir, to provide, not for a vacant throne, but for a temporary suspension of the exercise of the royal authority—a suspension which we have reason to flatter ourselves may not be long protracted, and which there can be little doubt will be ultimately put an end to by the restoration of his Majesty's health. From this view of the subject naturally arises the consideration what ought to be the power entrusted to the Regent under such circumstances, and during a period of the suspension of the royal authority, which we are justified in being sanguine enough to believe will not be of extended duration. There are two important objects to which our attention must be drawn. The first to provide for the security of the kingdom, by establishing an effective administration of public affairs, and giving to the exercise of the royal functions in the hands of the Regent an energy and extent sufficient to guard the interests of the country entrusted to him. The second object, of an importance nearly equal to the other—to provide for the removal of every possible obstacle to the restoration of his Majesty to kingly power; and not only to secure the certainty of his Majesty's resumption of that power, but to provide, as far as human foresight can provide, for his resuming it without any embarrassments which might be created in the interval of suspension. As far as we can, Sir, we must reconcile these two objects. Where the one appears incompatible with the other, we must wave the expectation of uniting them, and in those cases it will become our duty to give the preference where it is due. In the discussions which have already taken place on this subject the jet of the objections which I have heard against the proposed restrictions of the royal authority in the hands of the Regent, appears to be the danger which the executive power will incur by the diminution of its energies, and of its means of acting for the public benefit. I apprehend, however, that a due consideration of the arguments thus adduced will tend to enforce my second proposition, namely, the necessity of securing to his Majesty a return to power, and a return unobstructed and unembarrassed. We are imposing the Restrictions on the Regent for a very limited period;—for a twelvemonth and a fraction, to provide that the limitations shall not expire until parliament shall have been six weeks sitting. But, Sir, with respect to his Majesty, I trust we may happily contemplate that Providence has in store for him many years of happy reign. In providing therefore, that the kingly power shall not be affected during its suspension, we probably secure the efficiency of the executive authority for a much longer period than that to which the Restrictions on the Regent will apply. The Restrictions on the Regent will extend to little more than a twelvemonth, but if the return of his Majesty to power be embarrassed, the inconvenience may be of much longer duration; and that weakness in the executive authority will be produced which the gentlemen opposite so loudly and properly deprecate. We must feel, Sir, that the duty which has devolved upon us, arises simply and exclusively out of the necessity of the case. What is necessary we are authorised to do. What is not necessary we are not authorised to do. As has been ably said, "the power which necessity gives, necessity limits." We must look at the nature of the necessity, and we shall find that it is not more our duty than interest not to go beyond the neces- sity of the case. I apprehend also, Sir, that acting with these views we must act on a general consideration of the subject. We must not regard individual character. We must not think of the Prince, but we must only consider that we are called on to provide a Regency in the person of a Prince. We must not be drawn aside by any high and just estimation of the character of his Royal Highness. We should act most unwisely and most weakly, if in the performance of a great act of legislation, we were to found our proceedings on particular circumstances, and not on general principles. To general principles parliament has ever thought it its duty to refer on occasions like the present. Whether a Regency has been appointed during the illness, or during the infancy, of the Monarch, or any other occasion, it has almost always been accompanied with a qualification of power. There is scarcely a case in our history in which the royal authority has been conferred on a Regent without some restraint or limitation. I certainly do not mean Restrictions precisely similar to those now proposed. They have been of a different description, but in most cases infinitely more inexpedient, when considered with reference to the present necessity. I refer to them merely to establish my position, that the general usage of parliament has not been to consider the limitation of the powers of the Regent as insulting to the Regent, degrading to the monarchy, or dangerous to the constitution. That usage and that principle being established, it follows for the Committee to consider what particular Restriction it is which ought to be provided. The general proposition that has been advanced by the gentlemen opposite is, that we endanger the royal authority and constitution, by cramping the power of the Regent. This proposition extends to Restrictions of any kind and of any duration. Let us see, therefore, Sir, whether cases may not be stated in which to give a Regent the full and complete exercise of the royal authority, would be to do a very precipitate and a very mad thing. Suppose, for instance, we were now to provide for a Regency during the infancy of a monarch; in infancy which might expire in a month or six weeks. Urgent public affairs might require that the Regal Functions should be discharged during that period by a Regent. Would it enter into any man's mind that for such a limited period as that which I have mentioned, the whole au- thority of the crown should devolve on the Regent; including in it the power of creating peers, of granting places and pensions for life, or of doing any other act not immediately necessary? Would any man propose such an absurdity? Certainly we are not in a situation to contemplate any thing like a satisfactory certainty, that six weeks after the Bill which I mean to propose shall be passed, the necessity for it may expire; but, at the same time, there is no ground absolutely to conclude that the necessity will continue longer. Taking into our consideration the time which must elapse in the progress of the Bill, before it can pass into a law, I contend that no man is entitled to lay such gloomy colours on the picture, as to pronounce the event impossible. It follows, therefore, that that which would be unreasonable in the case which I have imagined, would be unreasonable in the present case, as the periods of the termination of the necessity, in both instances might probably be the same, All that I have hitherto urged, Sir, applies to the expediency of some limitation or other. I am not now arguing the particular restriction. It will be for the House, in a future stage of the business, to consider the precise nature and extent of the restrictions. It may appear to some—I own I have no immediate view of the kind—that the restrictions on one part of the Regent's power should continue for one time, and the restriction on another part of his power for another time; because to those persons it may not appear necessary that the restrictions should be equally extended in duration. I apprehend, Sir, that it is not necessary for me at present to enter much into detail as to the nature of the restrictions which I propose to recommend, nor does it appear to me to be necessary to say much on my abstaining from proposing a council to aid the Regent, or any other such limitations of his authority. However proper such restraints might be at other times; I apprehend that in a time of war especially, it is infinitely preferable to impose a restriction on the power in the hands of the Regent in particular instances only, rather than by the appointment of a council to restrict that power generally. In the years 1788 and 1789, a period, Sir, to which I have so often referred, and to the proceedings in which, in my individual judgment, I bow as to great authority, it was intended to restrain the exercise of those very prerogatives on which it is my intention at present to propose restrictions. But there is a material difference in the two propositions, the cause of which I am anxious to explain. I repeat, Sir, that I look to the authority of the period to which I have alluded with the greatest reverence. I recollect whose judgment, whose abilities, and whose character presided over the transactions of those days; and although I do not expect the unanimous concurrence of those who hear me, in the opinion, I am nevertheless persuaded that from the circumstance of the plan being proposed after great deliberation, by the illustrious individual by whom it was proposed, the general presumption of the country is so much in favour of the following such a high authority in the present instance, that it is much more necessary for me to say why I depart from the plan of 1788 in any one instance, than why I adopt it in general. I shall therefore state the grounds which induce me to depart from the plan of 1788; I mean that part which relates to the limitations of the restrictions. In 1788, the Bill originally contained no limitation of the restrictions. Before it passed, however, a limitation was introduced, to the extent of three years, in the restriction on granting peerages. If I were asked why no limitation on the restrictions existed in the Bill of 1788 except to that which I have mentioned, I would reply, that I apprehend it was because at that time there prevailed such a complete ignorance as to the nature of his Majesty's disorder, and as to the probability of its duration, that those who imagined that his Majesty would recover at all, were considered as sanguine in the extreme. Although Dr. Willis and other medical men expressed their expectation that that recovery might take place at no very distant period, yet I am confident that those who recollect with me that period, will remember that the general impression on the public mind was, that his Majesty's case, if not wholly hopeless, was nearly so. So indefinite was the expectation of recovery, that the period at which the restrictions on the Regent were to terminate, was left entirely undefined; and it was understood, that during the course of the Regency, it might become a subject of parliamentary consideration, whether the restrictions on the power of the Regent should be taken off or continued. The Committee will, however, feel the great distinction between the power of parliament to review this subject at the period when the restrictions expire, and at a period when they still continue. In the latter case, the three branches of the legislature must concur in putting an end to the restrictions; in the former they must concur in restoring them. It is probable that the limitation on the granting of peerages in the year 1788, arose from the apprehensions that the jealousy of the Lords might otherwise secure the continuance of the restrictions during the whole period of the Regency; but if we limit the restrictions to twelve months, when these twelve months have elapsed, that restriction, and all other restrictions, will expire, unless every branch of the legislature concurs in providing for their continuance. This, Sir, is a material distinction between the present plan and that of 1788. I have been led to think that the duration of the restrictions which I recommend is not unreasonable. It appears, by a reference to the testimony of all the physicians, that in their opinion, the best criterion of the probable continuance of his Majesty's disorder is a consideration of what took place on former unhappy occasions of a similar nature. On that view of the subject, coupled with the alteration that, in the opinion of the physicians, the increased age of the royal patient may occasion in the period of his recovery, I ground my proposition. It appears to me, that if the House should agree to limit the restrictions to twelve months, they will afford his Majesty a much longer period than that occupied by his recovery in any former case; they will give him whatever may be advantageous in the change of seasons, they will allow a latitude sufficient, but not too extensive. I am very ready to admit that on this subject there may be a difference of opinion. Some gentlemen may think that the period of limitation ought to be longer, others that it ought to be much shorter. This, however, seems to be established, that for a certain period, we should ingraft into the Bill a limitation of the restrictions. There may be some, who, agreeing in the value of restrictions at a former period, may conceive, that what in 1788 was advisable, is, from the change of circumstances, not wise, expedient or even admissible at the present moment. Nothing, however, of change of circumstances occurs to me, Sir, except what may arise from the maturer age of his royal highness the Prince of Wales; from the present being a time of war instead of being a time of peace, and from any sup- posed alteration in the temper of the people, which may render it necessary to guard the royal authority with peculiar vigilance at a time when attempts may be anticipated to diminish its extent. Let us consider these circumstances.—And first, with regard to the maturer age of his royal highness, it surely cannot be maintained that in 1788, when the Prince was 26 or 27 years of age, there could be any doubt of the propriety of intrusting his royal highness with the royal authority on the score of his youth, when it is considered, that had there been a demise of the crown his royal highness would have been fully entitled to that authority. Nor does in my mind the difference between peace and war, make any difference in the question before us. I allow that there are prerogatives which may be restrained in peace with less inconvenience than in war, but those prerogatives are not of the number which I propose to restrain. Is there any reason because we happened to be at war, that the Regent should for the next twelve months be enabled to make as many peers, and to grant as many places and pensions for life as he pleases? Is there any thing in the nature of war, which demands that the Regent should exercise this power? That the Regent should possess complete controul over the army; that he should possess complete controul (as far as the royal authority extends) over the public purse; that he should possess generally all the great prerogatives of the crown; that he should be enabled to dissolve parliament, if the dissolution of parliament would impart greater efficiency to his government, all these are positions which I admit, and for which indeed I am ready to contend; but with the power of making peers, the war has nothing to do beyond that for which I have already stated I shall propose to provide. In war, cases certainly may occur in which the House and the public might lament that an instant opportunity was not afforded of conferring a mark of distinguished honour on the hero of an achievement, who might, perhaps, not live to enjoy it if it were postponed for a twelvemonth. Amidst the brilliant and important efforts of our navy and army, some action may occur in which it may be most desirable immediately to reward the gallant commander under whom it may be performed, who may perhaps be wounded on the ocean or in the field, and who, if the honour be withheld for a twelvemonth, may expire ere he receive it as the solace of his departing life. With respect to the remaining considerations, Sir, namely, the danger arising to the executive government from those who may be presumed more or less disposed to attempt the diminution of the royal authority, I confess that I have not the least apprehension on that ground. I contend, that if any thing could render it impossible that this or the other House of Parliament should receive with countenance or favour any attempt to abridge the royal power, it would be more especially the restrictions of that power which it is proposed for a time to impose. I think it would be the unanimous sentiment that at such a period any proposition of that nature ought to be postponed. I am persuaded that no one would wish to attack the royal authority, at a time when the crown did not possess all the energies necessary to its maintenance and defence. I trust therefore, Sir, I have proved, that the assertion of a change in circumstances since the year 1788 justifies a change in our proceedings is unfounded, and that there is not any thing in our domestic or foreign relations which renders necessary any deviation from the established precedent. I maintain that there are no particular objections to the plan at present proposed, but that the objections to the plan at present proposed were equally cogent when advanced against the plan of 1788. I come now, Sir, to consider the objections made to every diminution of the royal prerogative in the hands of the Regent. The argument is, that we are not to presume the existence of any prerogative which is not necessary for the benefit of the people, and, that if necessary for that purpose, it ought not to be limited or restrained.—But can any thing be so extravagant as to contend that because a prerogative is eventually necessary for the benefit of the people, that it cannot be limited for the period I have mentioned without injury? Can any thing be so extravagant as to contend that because the crown ought not to be stripped of its power of making peers, that power may not be limited for a short period, when the royal authority is in the hands of a Regent? Let us argue the case retrospectively. During the last four years, that is during the period that the present administration had been in office, with the exception of peers created for naval and military services, only two new peers had been made! What just reason, therefore, can there be for supposing that the constitution and the country will be endangered, if no peers were allowed to be created for the next twelve months? Again, during the administration which preceded us, and which remained in office a year, eleven or twelve peers were made. I do not allege this as an impropriety; I never heard it alledged as an impropriety; but I mention it to show the probability, that in the event of another change of administration (if another change should take place) a large creation of peers might be recommended. Is this desirable? It has been insinuated, Sir, by gentlemen on the other side of the House, that it was by no means clear that myself and my colleagues had any merit in this abstinence from the creation of peers, but that it was probable that his Majesty, observing how the power had been exercised, had determined for the future to take it into his own keeping, and not to allow such a number of peers to be made. Those who assumed this ground, had no right to assume it. But it makes good for my argument; for if his Majesty thought proper to take this power into his own keeping, and to resist the further creation of peers, where will be the expediency of omitting to provide, in the proposed bill, against the abuse of an authority which his Majesty is so desirous should not be abused? I deny, however, the assumption. The opinion of his Majesty concurring with that of his advisers, has led to the abstinent use which has been made of this part of the royal prerogative. There is surely good ground to provide that this precaution, which has existed for four years, and it may be easily supposed not without substantial reasons, shall not be destroyed in four months. The honourable gentlemen opposite have said, that the plan which I propose is degrading to the monarchy and disrespectful to the illustrious personages who are immediately concerned. How? Can it be said that any restrictions of the description which I propose, introduced for the purpose of preserving to the monarch his rights on his restoration to health, is degrading to his Majesty? Is the anxiety of parliament that nothing should be done to interfere with his Majesty's power on his recovery disrespectful, or does it evince any thing but the lively interest which parliament takes in the monarch as well as in the monarchy? Still more strongly do I deny the imputation of intended disrespect towards his royal highness the Prince of Wales. By whom, Sir, is this imputed? Is it by those who are so fond of talking of the love of liberty, and of the danger of trusting uncontrolled power in the hands of any individual? Is it to be endured, that we are now to be told by these men, that when power is placed in the hands of an officer, it is an insult to the officer to provide that the power shall not be abused? What is the nature of the trust? Doubtless the prerogatives of the Crown are placed in the hands of the crown as a trust for the people. They will be placed in the hands of the Regent as a trust for the people too; but they will also be placed in his hands as a trust for his Majesty. We are called upon to make provision that both trusts shall be duly executed. We are called upon to restrain the mal-exercise of both. Sir, I am ready to push this argument to any extent. If a reference be made to the principle that the King can do no wrong, if that principle be extended to the declaration that the Prince of Wales can do no wrong, I will ask in reply, if they may not both be ill advised. Give me leave to say, Sir, that when we are told, as we have lately been, that in consequence of the age of his Majesty, the state of his sight, and other circumstances rendering it desirable for him to live in a more retired manner than that by which he formerly used to gratify his affectionate subjects, the people may not be perfectly satisfied of the actual recovery of his Majesty whenever that recovery may happily take place—give me leave to say, Sir, that when we are told this, it is proper we should reflect very seriously on the steps which we ought to pursue. Every man will take care how he acts on such a consideration of the subject. But it is possible that such an opinion as that to which I have alluded may enter the minds of those whose province it may be to advise the Regent, and it is possible that the Regent may be induced by such opinions not to give credit to the recovery of his Majesty. I state this, Sir, only as a possible case, which if Parliament did not contemplate they would not do their duty.—We are called upon to provide such regulations as may make the resumption of power by the King easy, and the exercise of that power, when resumed, unembarrassed.—(A cry of hear, hear! from the Opposition benches.)—No clamour, Sir, shall ever induce me to retract this opinion; no clamour shall induce me to abstain from proclaiming it as a consideration of the highest importance, to which our attention should be peculiarly directed, and from which we should not be deterred by any apprehension that our motives may be misinterpreted. With this view of the subject, it seems to me to be incumbent, that while we give the power, we should give it in such a manner as to show to the Officer to whom it is given that it is not his own authority, but that he is a trustee for another, In every case of regency, but more particularly where the Regent is the next successor to the crown, it is the indispensible duty of Parliament to mark that the power is not the Regent's but the King's. It is therefore, Sir, that I think that while the Regent should be armed with all these prerogatives beneficial to the subject—that while he should be strong in those respects, he should be weak for any thing which, by misadvice, might thwart the restoration of his Majesty to power, or might thwart the exercise of that power when resumed. I shall propose, therefore, Sir, the following Resolutions:—

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, that, for a time to be limited, the power so to be given to his royal highness the Prince of Wales shall not extend to the granting of any Rank or Dignity of the Peerage of the realm to any person whatever, except such person or persons as may perform some singular naval or military achievement.

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, that, for a time to be limited, the said power shall not extend to the granting of any Office whatever in Reversion, or to the granting of any office, salary, or premium, for any other term than during his Majesty's pleasure, except such offices as are by law required to be granted for life or during good behaviour."

I apprehend, Sir, that as the same general reasoning applies to the last Resolution as to that which respects the Peerage, I need not trouble the House by urging any thing further on the subject. There has been an alteration in the law since the year 1788, with respect to his Majesty's personal and private property, which renders it necessary to change the nature of the Resolution on that subject. Instead, therefore, of the Resolution agreed to in 1788, I propose the following:—

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, that such parts of his Majesty's private Property as are not vested in trustees shall be vested in trustees for the benefit of his Majesty."

The particular provisions for carrying this resolution into effect, will be detailed in the Bill which it is my intention to submit to the House. They will of course be affected by the Act of 1796, to which I have already alluded.—I have now, Sir, said all that it seems to me to be necessary to say with respect to the four first Resolutions. If I thought it probable that we should go into the consideration of the fifth Resolution this evening, I would state my sentiments upon it. However, it does not seem to me likely that we shall do so, and I think it would be better to abstain at present from any such statement, (Go On! Go on! from the Opposition Benches.) As a wish has been expressed by the gentlemen on the other side that I would proceed, I will state my views generally—not particularly, because I repeat that I do not think it probable we shall enter into a discussion on this part of the subject to night. The Resolution relates to the royal household; it will be as follows:—

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the care of his Majesty's royal person, during the continuance of his Majesty's illness, shall be committed to the care of the Queen's most excellent Majesty; and that, for a time to be limited, her Majesty shall have the power to remove from, and to nominate and appoint such persons as she shall think proper, to the several offices in his Majesty's household; and to dispose, order, and manage all other matters and things relating to the care of his Majesty's royal person, during the time aforesaid; and that, for the better enabling her Majesty to discharge this important task, it is also expedient that a Council shall be appointed to advise and assist her Majesty in the several matters aforesaid; and with power, from time to time, as they may see cause, to examine, upon oath, the physicians and others attending his Majesty's person touching the state of his Majesty's health, and all matters relative thereto"

The Committee will see, Sir, from this Resolution, that the care of his Majesty's person is to be committed, as of course every one will conceive it ought to be committed, to her Majesty the Queen during the continuance of the Regency; but that her Majesty's power over the household is to be limited, with a view to the same considerations as those which induced the proposed limitations in the other resolutions. Some variation may, pro- bably, with advantage, take place in the appointment of the Council to advise and assist her Majesty. In the former Bill, four persons were appointed for that purpose; some of whom were specified by name, and others by the offices which they held in the household; the consequence of which was, that those of the latter description, being removeable at pleasure, the council was rendered not permanent. It appears to me expedient to correct this evil, although it is not necessary to introduce in the Resolution the names of the individuals, whom I shall propose in the Bill. If the provision by which her Majesty is to have the controul of the household were to be a permanent arrangement, it might possibly be open to some objection; but when it is considered that twelve months will be the utmost extent of its continuance, and that we may fairly indulge a hope of its speedier termination—when we also consider the nature of the household, and a variety of peculiar circumstances connected with it—I am sure the Committee will revolt at the idea of adopting any measure by which, if his Majesty should recover in six weeks after the passing of the Bill, he will find that the controul of the household has been removed. With respect therefore to the controul of the household, whatever may be the future arrangements of parliament, all that the Committee are now called upon to agree to is, that for a limited time that controul shall be in her Majesty's hands. With respect to that part of the fifth Resolution, which relates to the care of his Majesty's person, there can be no doubt that during the continuance of the Regency that trust will be allowed to remain with the royal personage in whom, by the resolution, it will be vested. At the expiration therefore of the period of limitation parliament will doubtless take some steps on the subject. For although it may not be advisable that after the expiration of that limitation her Majesty should retain the controul over the whole of the household, yet some arrangement will be necessary with respect to the immediate establishment of their Majesties. This, however, is a subject, the detail of which may be more advantageously entered upon at a future period than at the present moment. At the present moment, we have only to decide, whether or not her Majesty shall, for a time to be limited, have the controul of the royal household. If, according to the opinion of the gentle- men opposite, no power whatever over the household should be vested in her Majesty, the consequence would be, that if his Majesty were to recover a fortnight after the passing of the Bill, he would find his household deranged, and his whole domestic establishment subverted. I am persuaded, therefore, that parliament will be of opinion that the royal power over the household should be continued for a given period. I confess, Sir, that if there is any part of the provisions of the plan of 1788, which I am more particularly anxious to carry into effect than another, it is that part of them which respects the domestic arrangements of his Majesty's houshold. It would be most ungracious when, after experiencing the blessings of his Majesty's reign for 28 years, Parliament in 1788 adopted a provision on this subject similar to that which I propose, but without limit, a provision to which they were prompted by respect for his Majesty's character, and tenderness for his Majesty's feelings. I say, Sir, it would be most ungenerous, were his Majesty to recover at a short period from the present, and on a comparison of what it was intended to do in 1788 with what had been done in 1811, to be led to conclude that the last 22 years of his life had diminished rather than increased the attachment of his subjects. I freely admit that this consideration ought not to have any weight if opposed by any great constitutional objection to the measure; but if no constitutional objection existed in 1788, no constitutional objection can exist at present; and surely, Sir, we cannot be less anxious at the present than at the former period, to act on principles of the most delicate attention to the feelings of our beloved monarch, and to spare him the mortification of finding that it had not been thought proper to treat him with all the consideration to which he had formerly been considered entitled.

The first Resolution was then read by the Chairman; upon which,

in rising expressed his inability to follow the right hon. gent. through the more minute parts of his able speech, but felt it to be his duty to submit some observations upon the general principles involved in this great question to the consideration of the House. The right hon. gent. had now opened the plan, under which he proposed to commit, during the incapacity of his Majesty, to his royal highness the Prince of Wales the government of these realms; and it was for Parliament to decide how far that plan was expedient, or whether it was such as could with propriety be adopted. With respect to those functions derived under the King, but in the exercise of which he had no immediate concern, such as the administration of justice in the courts of law, it was evident that the royal authority had suffered no diminution, and that the powers of the executive were in their full force and vigour; but where the mind of Majesty was to be applied, where the personal judgment of the Sovereign was to be called into action, there the executive was incomplete, and those powers were dead and gone, and dormant to as great an extent as would result even from the demise of the King. The question now, therefore, before the Committee was, whether they would supply those powers in a complete and efficient manner, or in the mode proposed by the right hon. gent. With respect to the precedent of 1788, upon which so much had been said, and to which so much authority had been ascribed, he must say, that having never been carried into effect, it wanted the great sanction of all authority, it wanted the sanction which every precedent should have, that of experience. It was in reality no precedent, and he was convinced that had it been carried into effect at that period, the consequences would have been found to be most injurious to the country. But should any gentleman from deference to the characters of the eminent men of that day, and more particularly to that of the distinguished individual with whom it originated, be inclined to look to it with more respect, they would do well to consider the times that had passed over in the interval, and the different circumstances in which the country stood, and stands respectively at the two different periods. It was not enough in describing that difference, to say with the right hon. gent., that we were then in a state of peace, and now in a state of war, (and here he must beg to remark that there was a reprehensible levity in the right hon. gent.'s manner upon this part of the subject, which he thought but ill accorded with its nature and importance) the country was then not only in a state of peace, but of internal tranquillity and safety; now it was engaged in foreign war, oppressed with internal dissatisfaction, surrounded with peril and with danger. Such was the situation in which they were called upon to constitute a limited Regency; but let gentlemen put it to their own minds, then, whether, under such circumstances, a proposition of that kind could with propriety be acceded to; and with respect to the precedent of 1788, so much but so undeservedly relied on, let them reflect, whether, if the limited government then projected had been carried into effect, and his Majesty had not happily recovered, that government would have had force or energy enough to weather the storm of the French Revolution. It was not necessary for him to speak here of the measures adopted at that period, or the alarm which was spread in consequence of that great event, men's minds were sufficiently made up on these points. There might have been, and he had no doubt that there were, many persons in that and in this country, who believed that the alarms which prevailed in this country, during the French Revolution, had no solid foundation, and were excited without any justifiable cause; but there were also gentlemen who believed that there were real grounds for those alarms; and he would therefore put it to those gentlemen to say, if they believed that during the period of those alarms we should have been able to weather the storm with the arm of the royal prerogative so palsied and weakened? With respect to external danger at the present moment, he had not words to express his sense of it, and as to domestic danger, though he had not much fear in general of opinions that could be met with other opinions, he was not without his apprehension. What were called jacobinical principles in the former instance—the refinements of philosophy, and the speculations of theorists which characterised that day, carried a sort of corrective in their own wildness and extravagance; but the doctrines which were now afloat were much more dangerous, because more specious and more seemingly constitutional. But after all, why should Parliament entertain such suspicions of his Royal Highness as were evidently to be inferred from imposing such limitations? He did not mean to offer any personal eulogium upon that illustrious Personage, agreeing, as he did, with the right hon. gent. in the impropriety and irrelevancy of it upon the present occasion; but still he could not avoid saying, that he considered such suspicions wholly unfounded and unnecessary. Why was that illustrious person to be deprived of the necessary power, for effectually exercising the royal prerogative? The right hon. gent. told them that he would vest him with all the powers of that prerogative, necessary to carry on external war, because the interests of the country demand that he should have the most ample powers in that respect; but that it was otherwise in the internal management of the nation. Why did the right hon. gent. make this distinction? Was not this a most dangerous doctrine? Are we not taught to consider the power of his Majesty and that of the country as one and the same, and that the one assists and supports the other? Are not the powers of his Majesty in external war materially influenced by the internal management of the country? With respect to the power of creating peers he differed very much from the right hon. gent. The right hon. gent. had been careful to state the few creations which had taken place during his administration; and he had been no less studious to point out a period wherein he conceived the power of creating peers to have been abused. But he would contend that the instance brought forward was by no means an abuse of the royal prerogative; and that these creations were highly necessary and expedient. They were necessary to give to the House of Peers an accession of property and influence corresponding to the growing prosperity of the nation. As to the danger of bad advice being given to the Regent, he could see no reason for assuming that a Regent would be influenced by bad advisers any more than a King; and to his mind it appeared most clear, that any arguments, which applied in support of the restrictions in the one case, would equally apply in the other.

As to the household establishment, which the right hon. gent. was at first unwilling to enter upon this evening, he would say, that the officers of the household are officers appointed for the purpose of supporting the splendour and magnificence of the crown. The House would do well to consider, that in all the plans of reform which had yet been submitted to them, no reformer had ever attempted to encroach on the magnificence of the throne. This had always been considered as essential to the executive; and surely they could not think it proper, in the present case, to attempt to disjoin that splendour from the executive. To his Majesty that splendour was now useless; it could minister to him no enjoyment, it could afford him no gratification. Why therefore should there be two households? Surely in the present state of the nation, when economy was so necessary, and considering how little prospect there was of his Majesty's recovery, it was every thing but wise, to saddle the nation with two establishments, one for his Majesty and the other for the Regent. What however was the object of the proposed limitation of the Regent's controul over the royal household? The whole object was professed to be delicacy to his Majesty, that his Majesty may find on his recovery the same persons around him whom he saw previous to his calamity. If this was the object, he must say, that the method proposed afforded no such security; according to this resolution the Queen might remove them if she pleased, and he did not know that in this respect a tribute of delicacy was more likely to be paid by her Majesty than by his royal highness. But the body to which he alluded, the lords of the bed-chamber, &c. was also a political body, and the question now was, not whether the influence of such a political body should remain, but whether it should be put into other hands than those of the Regent? (Hear, hear!)—Many books had been lately written on the subject of the influence of the crown, and some by honourable and right honourable members of that House. In some of these, it was contended, and with great show of reason, that the influence of the crown has not been lately increased, and was barely sufficient for the due carrying on of the business of the nation. He would put it to those gentlemen who entertained these sentiments, how they could conscientiously vote on the present occasion, that the powers of the executive ought to be limited. He would put it to those gentlemen who had the most recent experience of the difficulties thrown in the way of government by the different parties in that House, and in the country, to say, if they found the management of the public affairs with the unimpaired vigour of the crown, so very easy a matter. But, if the influence of parties prevailed at present, what would they be during a Regency? A Regency, as was well known, was the period when factions of all kinds were sure to prevail the most. Was it the duty of the Committee then to weaken the arm of the executive at a period when it ought to be the strongest? He would, therefore, put it to the Committee, if it was not their duty so to legislate on the present occasion, as to prevent the danger to be apprehended from the collision of these factions and parties, and so as to prevent the undue diminution of the influence of the crown. He therefore moved, as an Amendment, That the last words of the Resolution, "subject to such Restrictions and limitations as should be provided," be omitted; but in moving this Amendment, he abstained from any reference to the limitations which were connected with the custody of his Majesty's person, and the arrangement of his household, as those were to become the object of future discussion.

rose and spoke as follows:—Sir, having upon a former occasion taken the liberty of intimating to the Committee the opinion, that I had formed respecting the restrictions, which my right hon. friend then declared his intention to propose, and which, in a most perspicuous and able speech, he has now proposed to us, I was anxious to follow my right hon. friend, and to explain as early as possible the grounds upon which I differ this night from him in opinion. I was anxious to do this, before the debate could possibly have grown into asperity or contention,—asperity in which I utterly disclaim any participation—contention in which, I trust, I need not assure my right hon. friend I should be most unwilling to engage in any difference with him. I nevertheless most readily gave way to the hon. gent. (Mr. Lamb) who has just sat down, whom from our concurrence in sentiment on this occasion I believe I may call in a parliamentary, as I am happy to call him in a private sense my hon. friend;—and whom I can with sincerity assure, that no one has listened to him with more pleasure, than I have done; more particularly from his having discussed the subject in debate with that moderation, with which such a discussion ought to be commenced, and with which I hope it is to continue to be conducted.

Sir, after the various and ample discussion which the great question, upon which we are engaged, has undergone, we are now arrived at that point in our proceedings, at which the opinions of those who have hitherto generally agreed, may naturally be expected to separate and diverge; at which many of those who have hitherto felt themselves bound to go along with my right hon. friend in pursuance of the precedent, which he most properly has proposed as the general rule of his conduct, may apprehend, and, in my judgment correctly, that the precedent which has kept us together thus far, ceases to apply. In short, Sir, we are arrived at that point, where authority fails us, and where discretion must begin. Justly as the precedent of 1788, has been represented as affording a rule for the conduct of parliament in all cases of similar visitation—as the sure basis of all future legislation upon emergencies like that to which it applied; it seems obvious, that it is only so far as the circumstances of the emergency are alike, and only so far as the precedent itself was completed, that there is any just ground for reasoning conclusively from its authority. To the discussion of points not decided in 1788, and of circumstances essentially different from those of that time, we come as to so many new questions; unbiassed by the authority of a precedent not strictly applicable, and unfettered in our judgments, so long as we keep the range of our respective opinions within the sphere of the constitution.

The authority attributed, and justly attributed to the precedent of 1788 is twofold—that which belongs to it as a proceeding of parliament; and that which it derives from the sanction of the great names of those, who devised and conducted the parliamentary proceedings of that day. The first branch of this division—its authority as a proceeding of parliament, is again distinguishable into two parts; that which actually received the final sanction of the two Houses of Parliament, and that which was left inchoate but imperfect. The former may be justly described in strict parliamentary language as a parliamentary precedent. The latter, whatever opinion we may entertain of what might possibly or even probably have been the ultimate decision of the two Houses respecting measures in progress, but not completed, cannot be considered in the light of authoritative precedent.

It has been argued by my right hon. friend, and well and rightly argued, that the authority of what was done at that period by the two Houses of Parliament had been greatly augmented by the subsequent approbation of his Majesty after his recovery; that the royal authority having, when revived, sanctioned retrospectively the proceedings adopted during its suspension, told back upon all the antecedent stages of their progress, and gave an effect to what had been done equivalent to the royal assent to any act of parliament. But though such may have been the effect of his Majesty's subsequent approbation upon such part of those proceedings, as had received the final sanction of the two Houses of Parliament, it cannot be contended, that such approbation told equally in confirmation of those other parts of the precedent, which neither had been previously, nor were subsequently, carried into effect; which were merely the acts of the House of Commons, and had never received the sanction of the other House. On the contrary, if that, which had been agreed to by both Houses, is admitted to have received confirmation by being subsequently approved of by his Majesty, I am intitled to insist by a parity of reasoning, that, whatever parts are so defective as not to have received the sanction even of both Houses of Parliament, cannot possibly be considered as of authority equally binding. If such proceedings being found imperfect and incomplete at the time of the King's recovery, because not having then received the concurrence of one of the branches of the legislature; if the Regency Bill then in the House of Lords had carried forward to their completion, and passed with a prospective view, undoubtedly the provisions of that Bill would have been binding as the act of the whole of the legislature; and this would surely have been the course pursued had it been the purpose of the parliament or of the government of that day to make the Regency Bill of 1789 a precedent for all future occasions. But if, so far from having been approved of, adopted, and enacted into law, the Regency Bill was immediately upon the King's recovery rejected by the Lords, is the mere circumstance of its having been proposed and discussed, and formally decided upon in one House of Parliament, to be considered as placing it on the same footing with proceedings clothed with full parliamentary authority, and having received their confirmation from the crown? Upon the very grounds upon which my right hon. friend contends, and I agree with him in contending, for the authority of the former part of the proceedings of 1788, which we have hitherto faithfully copied; I must deny the same validity to the remainder; unless we are prepared to exalt conjecture into precedent; to give the face of legislation to the projects of former times; and to equalise solemn and recorded acts of parliament with the traced intentions of individuals, or at most of one branch of the legislature.

There is, however, another species of authority, not binding indeed as that of the legislature, but one nevertheless of no small obligation, derived from the character of those engaged in any great political transaction. Of him who carried through this House those proceedings, which furnish the precedent for the measures now under discussion, it cannot be necessary for me to say, that I cherish his memory with as much affection and veneration as any man, who is the most forward to quote or to imitate his conduct. Yet ardent as is my attachment to the character, and deep and unfeigned as is my respect for the opinions of Mr. Pitt, I still cannot think myself warranted to claim, nor can I expect that others—that the House—would allow the authority of those opinions, great as it may be, an equal weight with the positive enactments of the legislature. This I could not do, nor expect others to concur in doing, even if in looking back to the history and progress of the proceedings in 1788, I were to find, that the course then pursued, in framing the provisions for the establishment of the Regency, had been marked from the beginning by some principle as clearly defined—as that which formed the foundation of the prior part of those proceedings: namely, of the averment of the right and duty of the two Houses to provide for the exercise of the regal power. But nothing can be more distinguishable than the two different stages of the proceeding upon that emergency: that in which parliament affirmed and established the right of the two Houses to provide, and that in which it proceeded to frame the provision: distinguishable not more in the degrees of their intrinsic importance, than in those of the authority which they respectively derive from parliamentary or individual sanction.

The right of the two Houses was proclaimed and maintained by Mr. Pitt: that is the point on which his authority is truly valuable; on that point it was confirmed by the adoption of both Houses of Parliament: it was acted upon by them to the fullest extent; and that proceeding of the two Houses it was, which received the subsequent sanction of the crown. The principles, upon which this right was affirmed and exercised, if true at all, are true universally, for all times and on all occasions. If they were the principles of the constitution in 1788, they are equally so in 1811. The lapse of twenty two years has not impaired—the lapse of centuries cannot impair them. But the mode in which the right so asserted should be exercised, the precise provisions to be framed for the temporary substitution of the executive power,—these were necessarily then, as they must be now, matters not of eternal and invariable principle, but of prudence and expediency. In regard to these, therefore, the authority of the opinions of any individual, however great and wise and venerable, can be taken only with reference to the circumstances of the time in which he had to act, and are not to be applied without change or modification to other times and circumstances. We have Mr. Pitt's authority against such an application of them, for if he had thought the Regency Bill ought to have passed as a model for future times, why was it dropped? why was it not completed and recorded together with the foregoing part of the proceedings of that day? Nor is the final fate of the Regency Bill the only argument against the conclusive authority of its provisions. In the very progress of it through this House, any man, who has read or can remember the history of that period, must know, that opinions were greatly divided with respect to many parts of that Bill, even among those who were generally favourable to its object, and to Mr. Pitt's administration; and that, in the very last stage of its progress, when the Bill was in the hands of the Speaker, and ready to take its flight to the Lords, Mr. Pitt consented to two most material alterations with respect to some of the restrictions, which we have this night proposed for our adoption: the first limiting the restriction of the prerogative of creating peers to three years, recommended, I believe, by the late Sir Wm. then Mr. Pulteney, the other reserving to parliament the power of reconsidering that clause which restricted the grant of offices for life, in the case of any person, whom the Regent might appoint to the office of Lord Chancellor. I am, therefore surely borne out in my argument, that the proceedings upon the Bill are not fairly to be assimilated in authority to those previous procedings of both Houses, which were founded on constitutional principles applicable to all times and all circumstances; but that the provisions of the Bill were shaped and fashioned to the particular circumstances and exigency of the occasion. It follows that they are liable to be so shaped and fashioned now, without any derogation from the authority, or any deriliction of the principles of the legislature of that day; or of that great man, by whom the deliberations of this branch of the legislature were particularly guided.

Having thus cleared away from the discussion all that undue influence, which has been attempted to be raised on presumed authority, and which if admitted would be a bar to any discussion at all, I come now, Sir, to an impartial consideration of the nature and principles of the question immediately before us. Omitting for the present any reference to the former period, of which so much has been said, I shall take the liberty to consider the measure now proposed to us upon its own grounds, and with reference to the time and to the circumstances in which it is proposed. What then is the nature of the duty imposed upon us by the emergency in which we stand? What steps have been already taken by us in discharge of that duty? What is the precise object of this night's deliberation?

We have already solemnly determined that it is the right as well as the duty of the two Houses of Parliament to provide for the due discharge of the royal functions during the lamented incapacity of the sovereign. In effecting this purpose we are all agreed, that, while we provide for the temporary exercise of the regal power, every necessary provision should be made to secure to his Majesty the effectual resumption of his functions in the happy event of his recovery. We are all agreed that the most advisable and expedient mode of carrying on the executive government during this interval will be by a sole Regent; and that the Regent so to be appointed should be no other than the illustrious individual by birth and situation nearest to the throne. The question of to-night is, what portion of the regal powers and prerogatives should be given to the Regent for the execution of the arduous trust confided to him; or what portion withholden from him, for the purpose (as I understand) of marking that it is a trust confided, and not a right adjudged to him?

Apprehensions have been shadowed out rather than expressed by my right hon. friend, that, if the whole prerogatives were made over to the illustrious person in question, he, but not he more than any other individual placed similar circumstances, might be led to regard himself in another light than that of a trustee:—that, in the full and unrestricted exercise of the powers of the sovereign, he might forget that they were exercised by him only in the name and on the behalf of their rightful possessor; that he might consider them as an inheritance, rather than as a deposit, to be restored entire and unimpaired, whenever it may be the will of Providence to re-establish the health of his Majesty. I confess I do not share in these apprehensions. The case itself—the discussions in this and in the other House of Parliament—the sentiments expressed so distinctly and unequivocally in every part of our recorded proceedings—the common sense and feeling of the whole country—all must concur to shew to the Regent the real nature of his trust and office: even if, in the absence of any or all of these indications, it were possible that he could have conceived any powers to be vested in him, which would not be to be resumed by his Majesty at the moment of his recovery.

The quantum of power, to be confided to the Regent, must then be decided by other considerations than that of the danger, to be apprehended from a mistake so monstrous on the part of the Regent himself, an apprehension in my judgment altogether visionary. We must consider what is the task which the Regent will have to perform, and what are the powers requisite for its due performance. Having found and recorded the actual incapacity of the sovereign: having assumed and asserted the right and the duty of the two Houses of Parliament to supply that incapacity, let us now consider, what is the nature of the business, which through incapacity stands still, and which we are to find the means of carrying on. It is the business of a mighty monarchy. It consists in the exercise of functions as large as the mind of man can conceive:—in the regulation and direction of the affairs of a great, a free, and a powerful people;—in the care of their internal security and external interests;—in the conduct of foreign negociations;—in the decision of the vital questions of peace and war;—and in the administration of the government throughout all the parts, provinces, and dependencies of an empire, extending itself into every quarter of the globe.

This is the awful office of a King; the temporary execution of which we are now about to devolve upon the Regent. What is it—considering the irresponsibility of the sovereign as an essential part of the constitution,—what is it that affords a security to the people for the faithful exercise of all these important functions? The responsibility of ministers. What are the means by which these functions operate? They are those which, according to the inherent imperfection of human nature, have at all times been the only motives to human actions, the only controul upon them of certain and permanent operation, the punishment of evil and the reward of merit. Such then being the functions of monarchical government, and such being the means of rendering them efficient to the purposes of good government, are we to be told that, in providing for its delegation, while it is not possible to curtail those powers, which are in their nature harsh and unpopular, it is necessary to abridge these milder, more amiable and endearing prerogatives, which bear an aspect of grace and favour towards the subject? or are we to be told that in depriving the Regent of the means of grace to sweeten the exercise of power, while we impose upon him all the invidious functions of government, we are not making a most serious change in that branch of the constitution, which we profess our desire to uphold in all its powers and prerogatives?

My right hon. friend says, that our duty and indeed our right to act is limited by the necessity which creates it. We should not be justified, he contends, in doing any thing, but what the pressure of this necessity actually requires to be done. I adopt my right hon. friend's principle: but I apply it differently. What is necessary is, to provide for carrying on the functions of the disabled sovereign: What is not necessary is, to change their nature. What is necessary is, that the government should go on: What is not necessary is, that part of it should be arrested. We are compelled by necessity to delegate the exercise of the executive authority to a Regent: but there is no necessity for making that exercise more difficult in his hands than in those of the rightful possessor; for imposing new difficulties upon this arduous office—diminishing the means of its efficiency—and adding to the irksomeness of its burthen. It is neither necessary nor politic, in my opinion, to mark distrust and jealousy, when, by the free tender of a magnanimous confidence, we might alleviate at least the heavy responsibility which we impose, and furnish incitements to the faithful discharge of it, such as jealousy and distrust are little calculated to inspire.

But perhaps the prerogatives of the crown are more than adequate to the discharge of its important duties, more than sufficient to maintain the dignity and lustre of that throne, which he, to whom we are now entrusting the support of its rights and powers, will in due time himself be called to fill? Perhaps this temporary delegation affords an opportunity for trying an experiment, which in the person of the rightful occupant could not be tried without danger.

Sir, I confess I dread the example of this experiment, not for any use which I believe to be intended to be made of it by my right hon. friend, most assuredly not, but from the manner in which it is likely to be welcomed, felt, and treasured up for future use by others, who may be disposed to employ it for purposes very foreign to his views. I am not one of those, Sir, who think the crown already too powerful. That, I am convinced, is not the sentiment of my right hon. friend any more than it is mine. And being of opinion that the executive power in this country does not possess too much influence, or too extensive means of rewarding public services, I must in consistency with that opinion, contend that, whatever portion of the powers of the crown shall be withheld from the Regent, will be so much taken away from what is necessary for the due discharge of the indispensible functions of the monarchy.

This, Sir, is my general view, with regard to the proposed restrictions, or rather, of the principle of restriction itself as applied to the munificent prerogatives of the crown in the hands of the Regent. Thus I think of it, as compared generally with the general principles of the constitution. But is there any peculiar consideration arising out of the times in which we live, arising out of the present circumstances of the country, which lessens the force of the objections, which I have taken the liberty to urge, and renders that course safe and profitable now, which, I think, I have shewn to be generally inexpedient? The answer to this question is, the precedent of 1788. Sir, I will not say that in 1788 restrictions might not have been expedient. I will not go into the circumstances, because I will not revive the animosities, of that period. But if not absolutely necessary then, at least they might have been harmless. I perfectly concur in the observation of my hon. friend opposite (Mr. Lamb) as to the difference between the circumstances of the country in the year 1788 and at the present moment. I agree with him, that my right hon. friend, in stating that difference to consist merely in the simple opposition of a state of war to a state of peace, has treated this argument with somewhat of levity, and greatly under-rated its force. My right hon. friend seems to think, that the only effect of such a difference in the situation of the country, is to render such of the royal functions as are particularly and directly applicable to a state of war, more necessary to be preserved in full efficiency on this occasion than in the year 1788. Surely this is a very narrow and imperfect view of the question. When I admit, that, in time of profound peace, some of the functions of the executive government might have remained in repose with little disadvantage, as compared with that which would result from suspending their activity in a time of war; do I, therefore, mean that the difference between a state of war and a state of peace, as bearing upon the question, consists exclusively in military operations? Do I mean that the powers of the executive government which enable the Sovereign to meet the exigencies of war, are those only, which are exercised in the management of fleets and armies? Do I mean that there are peace prerogatives and war prerogatives, perfectly distinct in their nature, one half of which may occasionally be suspended, so that the other half be continued in activity? No, Sir, a state of war is not merely a state implying military enterprizes and military dangers, and requiring military means and exertions. It is a state of civil, as well as military hazard and difficulty. Failures as extensive as unexpected, and as unmerited as either, must at least be contemplated as possible in the course of a war—even of one generally fortunate, and well conducted—the pressure of pecuniary burdens upon all classes of the community, is necessarily aggravated; trade suffers; danger is apprehended; and does my right hon. friend conceive, then, that a state of war involving the possibility of so many perils—of so much public embarrassment and national disappointment, must not materially augment the difficulties in every part of the home administration of the government? Does my right hon. friend state the question fairly, when he supposes it to bear only on the conduct of the war itself; and on the powers directly and specifically applicable to military operations? Does it not affect the whole of the powers of the government? And can it be expedient, is it even consistent with a just regard to the security of the nation, that the general powers of the kingly office, necessary, even in time of peace, for conducting the administration of the country, should be restricted at a time, when the person in whose hands they are placed is called to the task of carrying on an arduous war, encompassed with all the various and accumulated difficulties, foreign and domestic, which are inevitably inseparable from such a state of things?

Do not let it be imagined, Sir, that, in stating these difficulties, it is my wish to magnify them beyond their just size. I am desirous of being distinctly understood not to entertain the slightest apprehension, but that the country possesses in ample store, both the spirit and the means to meet and successfully to overcome them, (hear! hear! hear!) All that I mean to infer from this statement, is, that difficulties of such an extensive and complicated nature, afford strong grounds of objection against imposing any unnecessary restrictions upon any of the functions of the executive government—that it is not a fair view of the nature of these functions, to suppose them capable of being separated and parcelled out—one for this purpose, one for that—one for time of peace, another for time of war—but, that the body of the prerogatives must be considered as a whole, constituting by the assemblage and union the aggregate power of the kingly office, not as I think greater than is necessary for the carrying on the government well, and more indispensably necessary than ever in times of national difficulty and national exertion.

My right hon. friend, therefore, does not appear to me to have done any thing towards extenuating the obvious distinction between a season of peace such as that of 1788, and one of war, such as the present, or towards reconciling the precedent of 1788 in its provisions and details to the exigency of the present occasion, by merely keeping alive, what he is pleased to consider the warlike part of the prerogative, of making peers, for instance, while he throws that prerogative and others generally into abeyance. In at- tempting this he has indeed done quite enough to shew, that he himself distrusts and cannot follow out the precedent of 1788, to shew, that it is not applicable to these times; that he cannot adopt the Restrictions and Limitations of 1788, without restricting those Restrictions and limiting those Limitations; and after a forcible and elaborate panegyric upon the Regency Bill of 1788—after holding it up, and strongly recommending it to the Committee as the rule of their conduct—after intimating no small surprise, that any admirer of Mr. Pitt should presume to question any part of it as applicable to the present state of things, he concludes by presenting it in a changed and mutilated state, and, I will venture to say, in scarce one material clause precisely the same as it passed this House in 1789. This is surely a singular way of proving the veneration which he feels for this precedent himself, or of inculcating it in others.

Now, Sir, I have ventured to give it as my opinion, that the Restrictions and Limitations of 1789 are not applicable to the present time. My right hon. friend may, therefore, have flattered himself, that I am one of those, who are to be gratified by his Restrictions and Limitations upon them. I do not know whether he is prepared to hear from me that I disapprove his Restrictions and Limitations, upon the Restrictions and Limitations even more than the original ones; that thinking the plan altogether objectionable, I think this, which he intends as a mitigation and improvement, the most objectionable part of it. Extraordinary as my right hon. friend may think this declaration at first sight, I flatter myself I shall be able to make it intelligible to him, if not to induce him to concur in it.

My sentiments are too well known within these walls, not to secure me from any imputation of wishing to shut the ranks of the peerage against those, whose distinguished merit, in their country's service by sea or land, shall hereafter in-title them to such exalted honours. The achievements of military heroism are by the common consent of mankind fit objects of the highest reward. Would I consent to check so legitimate and beneficial an ambition?—to damp an ardour as splendid in its character as pure in its motives?—to withdraw from valour and prowess the just incitement which arises from an enthusiastic hope of identifying their personal fame with the greatness and the glory of their country? What! if lord Wellington, who has displayed so eminently during the late campaign, those distinguished qualities of a general, which he was supposed, but falsely supposed, not to possess—should, before the conclusion of the present year, exhibit to his admiring and grateful countrymen another specimen of those more shining qualities, for which he has been uniformly acknowledged to be conspicuous, and should terminate a campaign, signalized by such consummate prudence and skill, by an achievement more congenial perhaps to his nature and habits—a brilliant victory—would I be the man to deny to him the well merited reward of more exalted rank in the peerage? or, if a gallant admiral with the characteristic enterprise of his profession, should rush into battle with that animating exclamation, with which Nelson led on the battle of the Nile, "A Peerage or Westminster Abbey," would I be the man to contend for closing against his hopes one part of that glorious alternative? for leaving him, indeed, the monument to cover his remains if he should fall; but for shutting the ranks of the peerage against his living glory?

I hope, and trust, Sir, that no hon. gent. will suppose such to be my feeling. I hope I shall not be so answered, when I declare, that I must give my opposition to the exception, in favour of naval and military peerages, now proposed by my right hon. friend. Far, indeed, am I from wishing to exclude meritorious individuals of these descriptions from the well-earned honours of the peerage. Long may such honours be so bestowed! many be the victories in which they shall be won and worn! But the manner, in which I wish such rewards and distinctions to be conferred, is in the ordinary course of the constitution;—in the spontaneous and unfettered exercise of the royal prerogative;—such as it has been for ages—such as it is now—such as the very exception, proposed by my right hon. friend, proves that it ought to continue—but such, as that exception does not leave or make it. I would accomplish this salutary and necessary object by the very simple process of leaving things as they are, not by first lopping off from the royal prerogative the power of granting peerages generally; and then turning round again for the purpose of piecing it again, and restoring its former state in part, with a view to meet the circumstances of a particular case. It is not—it cannot, be a sound or a just principle of legislation, first to undo, and in the same breath partially to re-establish what we have undone. This in itself is irrational: but this is not all. There are other objections much more conclusive against this exception, than even against the general limitation, as it stood before the change. The necessary effect of this exception would be, not to relieve the prerogative from restraint, but to change its very nature; to strip that part of it, which would be so withdrawn from the limitation, of one half of its value. For in what does the value of this prerogative consist?—Not surely in any duty and positive obligation imposed upon the possessor of it to give or assign a certain stipulated reward for a certain definite service. He is not to adjudicate the specified and rightful earnings of valour or merit. There is a grace and favour in the reward of eminent public service; there is a discretion in selecting them for that reward, which can only be found in the free choice of the sovereign, and in the spontaneous exertion of the royal prerogative. It is in this view that the grant of honours and distinctions is "twice blessed," that,

"It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes."

that it endears the bestower and receiver to each other; that the stream of nobility springs, as it were, warm from the heart of the sovereign, ere it descends upon the favoured head of a meritorious subject. Strip the prerogative of this grace, this discretionary power, and you do not only restrict its operation, but you destroy its essence. If the law were to direct such honours to be conferred, where would be the grace? Where would the gratitude be due? Where the obligation conferred? Deprived of all appearance of spontaneous bounty, the honour would be claimed as a right, not acknowledged as a favour, and the Regent would be placed in the situation of a bare trustee indeed, but of a trustee without confidence, authorised only to perform in previously specified cases a prescribed and indispensable duty.

Nor is this the only objection. To change discretion into necessity, and grace into obligation would be bad enough. But how full is the prescribed task itself of difficulties in the execution? By the terms of the Resolution it would in effect, be obligatory on the Regent to confer the honours of the peerage upon any person, who may "achieve any signal naval or military services." Such words allow great latitude of construction; and may be productive, under the various interpretations that may be put upon them, of much and serious embarrassment to the government of the Regent. If a signal and decisive victory—such as should decide the fate of a campaign or lead to the conclusion of a peace—such as the victories of Marlborough or prince Eugene, should be gained,—there would unquestionably be no difficulty,—every body would be agreed upon the merits of such a service, and would admit the indubitable claim, arising from it, to the rewards of the peerage. But such decisive actions and such unquestionable results are not to be looked for in the ordinary course of war. On the other hand a signally disastrous defeat might possibly befal a country without any blame being imputable to to the commander—nay even after he might have performed every duty that could be required of him in a most exemplary manner. Still, however, in such a case (I trust a most improbable one) there might be no great embarrassment to the Regent. No one would blame him for not marking even consummate ability, shining through unmerited misfortune with splendid reward. But between these two extremes may probably be found most of those military services, the merits of which would become the subject of discussion, if they chanced to be performed during the interval while the honours of the peerage are exclusively appropriated, and consecrated by act of parliament, to military merit. Numberless cases may exist between the distant limits which I have described,—and who but must foresee in the practice of this exception an endless source of embarrassing discussions, of jealousies and invidious comparisons, no less injurious to the public service, than perplexing and inconvenient to the Regent? Am I putting an imaginary case? The course of the last twelve months has furnished precisely such an instance, as I have ventured to anticipate for the present year. It must be in the recollection of every gentleman present, that the glorious victory (so I must call it) of Talavera did not meet with the unanimous suffrage of this House. If that had been an "achievement" under the Regent's cognizance, to be dealt with according to the provisions of this bill, he would have been accused by the hon. gentlemen opposite of having abused the discretion confided to him, and squandered the honours of the peerage. For I will not put the other supposition, that he could have withholden the peerage from lord Wellington on that occasion.—And who is sanguine enough to hope, that all the "achievements" of the year to come will be of a character more unequivocal, of less disputable glory than the battle of Talavera?

So far, therefore, from correcting the limitation as it originally stood, I contend, that the exception makes it infinitely worse. Whether the Regent should grant or should withhold the honours of which he is made the steward, his conduct would be equally liable to question; nor would it be any trifling practical inconvenience, that the early part of the next session of parliament should be occupied, as it possibly might be, in inquiries how far that officer of parliament may have made a proper use of the portion of the prerogative committed, not to his discretion, but to his responsible charge. Much better would it be to suspend the prerogative altogether, than to vest it in so mutilated a state, and on such perplexing conditions, in the hands of the Regent. Better would it be, that for one year military merit should go without its reward, or that we should at once resolve, as it were, that this year shall be barren of glory, than that the royal prerogative should be exhibited in a state so shackled and degraded—in a state so inadequate to its purposes and so foreign to its nature.

So much, Sir, for the limitation of the limitation proposed by my right hon. friend. But now as to the limitation itself. Is it exclusively in cases of military or naval merit, that it is essential to the best interests of the state, that the person exercising the royal authority should have the unrestricted prerogative of creating peers? Are there not other instances in which the exercise of such a prerogative, unfettered by limitations, is equally necessary to enable a Regent well and beneficially to administer the affairs of the nation? I will suppose, for instance, that the eminent person now holding the Great Seal, might be desirous of retiring from office; and that the Regent might in consequence select for his successor, some one of the ornaments of the bar. Now, under the restriction, which I am now considering, the Regent could not elevate the object of his choice to the peerage. A Lord Keeper might indeed be appointed, and I am aware, that in the eye of the law, the Lord Keeper and the Lord Chancellor are the same: whether Lord Keeper or lord Chancellor he is by virtue of his office prolocutor of the House of Lords. But if he cannot be raised to the peerage, must not great inconvenience at least, perhaps more than inconvenience, be felt in the progress of public business, when he, who presides over the proceedings of the peers, not being a peer himself, can take no share in their debates, but must remain as mute as the mace upon their table?

Other cases may easily be imagined, wherein the operation of this limitation would interfere with the completion of arrangements, either for forming an administration, or for the conduct of affairs in parliament. But I think I have stated enough to justify the opinion, that the prerogative ought to remain unfettered; and that, at all events, it would be more becoming to withhold it altogether, than to grant it under restrictions never before devised or imagined; restrictions by which we should, in effect, reserve to ourselves the power of controuling the exercise of that part of the prerogative, which we confer, and should tell the Prince Regent, that, while we allowed him to administer the functions of royalty in the name and on the behalf of the sovereign, we were determined to constitute ourselves "Viceroys" over him.

As to any argument to be deduced from a supposed abuse of this prerogative, or from the too lavish use of it, either in recent or former times, the fault of that argument is, that it would lead not to a temporary, but to perpetual restriction of it. It would lead to abridging the prerogative in the possession of the crown, not to a mere partial suspension of it in the hands of the Regent. But I agree with my right hon. friend, and with my hon. friend on the other side of the House, (Mr. Lambe) that the imputation of an extravagant use of this prerogative, is at least excessively exaggerated. In very late times, and by the present administration, either whilst I was connected with it or since, certainly there has been a most, sparing use of the power of creating peers. But, looking back to former administrations, to which this abuse is imputed, I must say, I very much doubt, whether the House of Lords, numerous as it now is, has been so augmented as to bear a greater proportion than heretofore, to the weight and influence of the Commons, and generally to the increased diffusion of wealth throughout all classes of the community. It is true, that there is recorded in our history one instance, and one only, of a flagrant abuse of this power for political purposes; that in the reign of queen Anne; when the Tory administration, by pouring twelve newly created peers in one day into the House of Lords, established a majority in their own favour. But even this abuse, if it were likely to be imitated, could not now be imitated successfully. It must be admitted, that the addition of twelve peers, when the whole number consisted but of 200, must have borne a considerable proportion to the whole. But now when the House of Lords consists of 360 peers, what would be the addition of twelve, even if in the present times such a stroke were likely to be ventured; and how much greater must the addition be to make such a stroke permanently decisive! And here again the argument goes too far for the object to which it is applied. If there be this danger in the unlimited power of creating peers, the limitation, to be effectual, must be made permanent. But to all such stretches of prerogative the House well knows, that there is a limitation more operative than the provisions of a bill; more efficacious than any system of checks and balances, the controul of public opinion.

The same objections, which I have stated to the general suspension of the prerogative of making peers, apply according to their kind and degree to the next restriction—that upon the grant of patent offices or pensions for life. Much has been said of late years, of the great extent of this patronage and of the expediency of reducing it. I have never, any more than my right hon. friend, allowed the truth of these statements. Investigation has shewn them to be exaggerated: and even if it were possible for me to consent to any change in the system, it certainly should not be to one, that should materially diminish its amount, though it might alter the mode of administering it. But that there must, and ought to exist, in the hands and at the discretion of the crown, means, and ample means too, for the remuneration of public service in the civil and political departments of the state, I am, and have always been, decidedly of opinion. The legitimate use of such means appears to be in the facility which they afford for winning men of ability, who may have no very ample property, into the public service. On this ground I have hitherto supported, and on this ground, I shall continue to support them. On the bench, from which my right hon. friend has spoken, may be found sufficient proof of the utility of such means of remuneration. My right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, is a proof of their advantageous application to the public service, brought as he was, at the formation of the government in 1807, from an honourable profession, of which, if he had continued a member, he must unquestionably have risen to the head, to take a share in the administration of the government. The sacrifice of these prospects his Majesty had most graciously intended to compensate by the grant for life of a sinecure office, had not this House interfered by an Address to his Majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to grant it only during pleasure. This vote, if the question shall ever again be brought before parliament, I shall most heartily concur in rescinding, and so giving full effect to the principle, for the justice of which I am contending. Another instance of the proper application of such offices is to be found on the same bench, in the grant of one of the Tellerships of the Exchequer, in the last session, to another right hon. friend of mine (Mr. Yorke.) When I see before me two such instances of the beneficial use of this power of calling great abilities into the public service, I cannot consent that this power should be suspended. Perhaps there are few public men less interested than I am, in any probable arrangement of a new administration. I speak, therefore, with the more freedom upon these subjects. And as to any misuse, which may be apprehended from favour and partiality in the distribution of such offices as may fall vacant, during the continuance of the Regency, I will fairly own, that, if his royal highness should have the power of rewarding the long and disinterested attachment, the steady and tried fidelity, and the great public talents of any individual, who even might not have strictly earned such reward by actual labour in office, I should not grudge such an exercise of the power of the Regent; nor think it more than a reasonable compensation to his royal highness for the cares, the anxieties, and the embarrassments of the situation the duties of which he is called upon to discharge.

One argument for these restrictions, is, that the powers and prerogatives they withhold, might, if confided to the Regent, constitute a bar to the resumption of the royal functions by his Majesty on his happy restoration to health. The supposition, that such an effect could be produced by such a cause, appears to me in the highest degree extravagant and ridiculous. Can any man seriously believe, that all the possible chance of the falling in of offices for life, all the various casualties, which within a year, could occur to create vacancies, (for it must be recollected that they must fall vacant before they can be given away)—or that even all the abuse which could take place in the distribution of peerages during the Regency, could so fortify the government of the Regent, within that period, as to enable him, (if so inclined) to prevent his Majesty's ready resumption of his power in case of his recovery? What tendency even have such causes to produce such an effect? Where is the man who, though neither formidable, nor mischievous, would yet, if elevated to the peerage and made formidable by a pension or a sinecure, be enabled to stand in the breach and to obstruct the King's reoccupation of his throne?

The argument, if argument it may be called, and the apprehension, in which it pretends to be founded, appear to me perfectly senseless. There is moreover a strange inconsistency in the different arguments respecting these powers and prerogatives. When it is proposed to us to withhold them from the Regent; they are represented as wholly unnecessary for the well carrying on of the government. But they are at the same time, it seems, as strong to do mischief as they are weak to do good. They are strong enough to endanger the whole of the executive government, if abused; and by a strange perverseness inefficacious to their legitimate purpose. They are nothing in positive activity, but every thing in prospective prevention—they would not, if properly used, tend to secure a majority in parliament, but, with a little stretch, they might effect a revolution. By what process all that which is so powerless in esse can be so formidable in posse, is what I am at a loss to conceive.

But here again the zeal of controversy appears to outrun discretion. For if, in fact, the powers to be withholden from the Regent, can by their abuse be productive of such great inconvenience, and yet by their proper exercise be productive of so little good, that the executive govern- ment can go on very well without them, this surely would be an argument for abolishing such prerogatives altogether. A power capable of doing much mischief, and but little good, ought not to be preserved.

Fortunately, however, the argument is good for nothing either way. The apprehension of any opposition being made to the return of his Majesty to the exercise of his authority, must be felt, even by those who use it, to be in the highest degree extravagant. If I could believe that there existed a man, so lost to what is due to himself, to his sovereign and to society, as to harbour such an idea, I would not only not consent to give him power without restrictions, but I would not confide to him any power at all. I would not arm with "a pigmy's straw" that man, into whose mind so monstrous a design could even for a single moment find admittance. God forbid that any power should be granted, or any provision made, which could, either by perversion or by accident, obstruct his Majesty's resumption of his functions. I would have nothing to impede, nothing to retard, that resumption beyond the moment, at which it should please a gracious Providence to restore him to the wishes of his people. No effort, no exertion should be necessary on his part. Like the sun, by the mere act of his appearance he should dissolve and dissipate all the clouds and vapours by which his lustre is obscured.

But in exact proportion, as we make anxious provision for the secure resumption of his power by the King, I think we should abstain from unnecessarily restricting the powers of the Regent. These, Sir, are not times in which any man can think it desirable to cripple the energies of the executive government, in whatever hands it may be. But we must recollect, that in the very circumstances of the King's situation—of his desired, and, (thank God!) probable recovery, there is a certain source of weakness to the ephemeral and evanescent government of the Regent, which going to repose in the possession of power, can never be certain that it may not awake and find itself dissolved in the morning.

There are some species of difficulties, Sir, which, when a man has to encounter, he feels his courage rise in proportion to the task, and is animated by the obstacles which oppose him. This is the case where he is backed by all, that should be his natural support: where he brings the full use of all his means and resources to bear upon the contest in which he is engaged. But not so, if he goes into the field with his best faculties shackled, with jealousy instead of encouragement, at his side. The difficulties which we are about to impose by the restrictions are of this latter description; and tend to dishearten and unnerve the executive power at a moment, when surely all its energies are necessary to be employed.

And after all, the only reasons for proposing these restrictions appear to resolve themselves into this, that they were already proposed in 1788. To this I have answered that there are two kinds of imitation; one, that which catches the spirit and the principle, and applies them to similar circumstances; the other, that which takes the dry and dead letter and attempts to adapt it to circumstances wholly dissimilar. My right hon. friend, indeed, has found that the precedent of 1788 did not suit his case, and therefore, has been reduced to the necessity of endeavouring by clipping here and stretching there to make it fit. For myself I have truly said, and am anxious again to repeat, that I can be surpassed by no man in respect and veneration for the great man, who guided the proceedings of 1788. But I am convinced, that I do that precedent more honour, in considering and approving of it, with reference to the circumstances of the period in which it was proposed, than those do, who contend, that the great and fertile and profound mind, that framed it, could, if he had happily survived to the present times, have devised nothing more applicable to the emergency, for which we have to provide.

Sir, as my right hon. friend has expressed a wish that no discussion should take place this night upon the last resolution, it is not my intention to go much at length into the matter, which is the subject of it. The custody of his Majesty's person, I take it to be perfectly clear from every analogy of private life, and from all the feelings of nature, should be given to the Queen. With respect to the household, I must confess, I do not approve of my right hon. friend's proposed arrangement. I should much rather attach a large portion of that establishment permanently to the service of his Majesty, than have the whole of it attached to him for a limited period as proposed in the resolution; then to be revised and retrenched. I say this with as much frankness, as if advising with my right hon. friend, as a member of the government previous to the bringing in of his measure. I should have recommended an attempt now to preserve a proper splendour to surround his Majesty's person during the whole term of his natural life, should his illness unfortunately be commensurate with his life, rather than leave the matter in prospective dependance upon the decision of some future and perhaps less favourable disposed period. I may be wrong or fanciful in point of feeling, but I will own, I am not satisfied with a provision, which has the appearance of fixing a time after which, there is to be no hope entertained of his Majesty's recovery. I do not wish that there should be added to the preamble of the Bill a clause stating, that a period will come and that parliament will have to declare that period, whether it be six or twelve months, when the recovery of his Majesty will be hopeless. Notwithstanding the comments which have been made upon my former statement of my readiness to have concurred in further adjournments, if proposed, I now repeat, that I should be much better satisfied, that the functions of the crown should remain in suspence to the longest period of which the exigencies of the public service could possibly admit, than be thus reduced to the necessity of defining a period at which all hope is to be abandoned. And this appears to me to be the effect of providing a larger scale of household for a limited time, with a recorded admission that it must then be altered;—of accumulating comfort and splendour upon the period of hope with an avowed view of reducing them to a more contracted scale at the æra of despair.

Sir, I would do what is right at once, and once for all: I should not think any thing right but what was ample both for comfort and for splendour; and I would settle the establishment permanently, in order that the portion of patronage, which may be withheld from the Regent, may not be given to any body else. For upon this point I perfectly concur with my hon. friend on the other side (Mr. Lambe,) that it would be highly improper to set up a new political power growing out of that influence, which belongs to the appointment of the household, and which has always hitherto been joined to the executive government. Why should that influence subsist at all during the Regency? The Regent certainly must not have it, and why should her Majesty be burthened with it? Why should not the lords of the bed-chamber and such other attendants, as ought to be attached to his Majesty's person, enjoy their places during life, that is, during the continuance of the King's illness, whatever that may be, independent alike, of the Regent, or of any other political influence whatever? Something of this sort it appears to me might be done, and might spare all the jealousies and heart-burnings, to which disputed patronage and renewed discussions may give rise;—while, more than any other practicable arrangement, it would secure to his Majesty the most faithful and acceptable attendance. This is not the time, however, for going into any detail upon this subject. Generally I will only say, that no views of niggardly economy ought to be permitted to mix themselves with the consideration of how we may best provide for the safe, the tender, and the respectful care of the King. We must not think of saving by his sickness. We must not forget that he is still our King.

We must not consider him as a remnant to be thrown aside: but as a relic to be treasured with pious devotion, to be consecrated with the prayers and the vows of all good men; to be not immured, but enshrined amidst the gratitude and veneration of his subjects.

Sir, I will trouble the Committee no further. The vote, to which we are about to come to-night, is upon the Restrictions to be imposed upon the Regent. I have stated my reasons for thinking these Restrictions inexpedient.—I have stated why I think the limitations introduced to qualify them more exceptionable even than the Restrictions themselves. With these opinions I cannot do otherwise than vote for the Amendment, by which both the one and the other are to be altogether done away.

rose to say a few words in support of the Resolutions proposed by his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In his opinion, the arguments of the right hon. gent. who spoke last, applied equally well to the propositions of his lamented friend, (Mr. Pitt,) submitted to the two Houses of Parliament in the year 1788; and yet he had always understood that the right hon. gent. had warmly approved of those propositions. The object of Mr. Pitt was to facilitate the resumption of the exercise of the royal functions by his Majesty when he should recover; and if Mr. Pitt for that purpose in 1788 proposed Restrictions upon the Regent, for a longer period of time, why should they now refuse to agree to similar Restrictions for a shorter period? The whole of the speech of the right hon. gent., and that of the hon. gent. on the other side (Mr. Lambe), to whose ability he paid a sincere tribute of applause, went upon the ground, that these Restrictions were to be imposed on the real possessor of the crown, and not upon a trustee. But his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had proceeded upon the authority of the great man, who in 1788 took care that the legitimate possessor of the crown should, upon his recovery, be enabled, without difficulty, to resume the royal functions, unincumbered by any thing that could subject him to disadvantage in the exercise of them in future. This he thought the proper course, but he disclaimed all invidious allusion to the person of his royal highness the Prince of Wales, The hon. gent. opposite had animadverted upon the assertion of his right hon. friend, that the throne was full, and had observed, that the royal authority could only be said to be in activity at present to an extent, which he illustrated by a reference to the functions performed by the body in sleep, but that it was extinct as to all the other powers. But he would again ask, whether this argument did not go to consider the Regent, not as a trustee, but as a King? It was necessary to preserve the powers of the King in such a condition, that he might when the sun arose—a figure by which his recovery had been beautifully illustrated—resume their exercise without embarrassment. Many other arguments might be urged in favour of the mode of proceeding adopted by his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but he would leave it to the House in its wisdom, to give them their due weight, without trespassing any longer upon their patience.

stated, that the duty of forming a deliberate opinion on a subject of such importance, as that now under consideration, was one from which no member of parliament could stand excused; and having formed that opinion it became a duty not less imperative, explicitly to submit it, with his reasons to the Committee. In the particular case Parliament was now called on to provide for, he considered that his Majesty's ministers had exercised a sound discretion in founding their measure upon the precedent of 1788. The principle of Restrictions, as applied to the power of a Regent, acting during a temporary incapacity, of the monarch, was consistent with the uniform practice of the constitution; it was founded on the most weighty constitutional reasons, and a departure from that principle, in the present instance, would establish a precedent, which might be productive hereafter of great embarrassment and public danger. The noble lord said, that his reasons for this opinion would best be stated under the two leading heads of objection on which the Restrictions had been opposed; 1st. That they tended to dismember and cripple the regal power at a moment when a strong executive authority was requisite; and 2dly, That they indicated ungracious distrust of the illustrious personage to whom it was proposed to tender the Regency.

With respect to distrust in the Prince of Wales, the noble lord said, he could with perfect truth declare, that such a feeling did not exist in his mind; on the contrary, his conviction was, that were the full regal authority entrusted to his Royal Highness, it would be exercised with the utmost forbearance and moderation on his part. Were he providing, Lord C. said, for an interest of his own, he would not hesitate a moment in acting upon that conviction, but as a representative of the people, he did not feel himself at liberty to act upon principles of personal confidence. He had a public duty to perform, which required him to provide for a constitutional exigency, upon constitutional grounds. Under these impressions he was of opinion, that the security which he was bound to look to was the security of legal enactment, and that in the discharge of a public trust it was impossible for him to recognize any other as adequate.

The noble lord disclaimed any inference being drawn from his vote, that he imputed more dangerous views to the possible advisers of the Prince, he did not believe at the present moment, that any set of men whom his Royal Highness might think fit to honour with his confidence, would, during the short period the limitations were proposed to last, advise an abusive exercise of the prerogatives of the crown. It was not enough, that such should be his feeling with respect to the present moment, unless he could persuade himself that on no future occasion (whatever might be the character of the parties, and the temptation to abuse), Restrictions could be requisite; even in the most transitory case of the interruption of the personal exercise of the royal authority, he could not think it safe to decide this case upon personal grounds; and thereby to establish a precedent which must render every future Regency arrangement, not a question, what powers were necessary to be invested in the Regent, during temporary incapacity of the monarch, but whether there were motives arising out of the character of the individual, who was to be placed at the head of the government, for not confiding to him the entire powers of the King.

The noble lord pressed the extreme danger of throwing upon future ministers and future parliaments a task so alarmingly invidious, as that of being influenced in their decision on such a question by the personal character of the Regent; if such a principle was admitted, under no possible circumstances, could parliament limit a Regent's powers, without a recorded stigma upon his fame and character: how fatal must be such a principle in a free government, more especially when it is considered, that the next heir to the crown is the natural object to be looked to, for the exercise of such a trust. He said, he could well imagine the generous satisfaction the Prince of Wales might feel in being wholly unrestricted, that he might thereby have the grace in the eyes of the nation and of his royal father, when restored to health, of having been the unfettered and faithful guardian of his throne and power. Such feelings were highly laudable, and every man must wish, they could be indulged without hazard, but considering as he did, that the case now to be provided for was precisely that, which of all others upon general principles called for and justified Restrictions, he could not consent to sacrifice the rule to the particular case.

In this part of his argument, the noble lord distinguished between the case of a Regency being created to administer the government through a minority of several years, and during such an indisposition as the King now laboured under, which, if it should follow the course of his three former illnesses, was likely to endure only for a short time, or if it unfortunately assumed a more continued character, must at the end of a limited time be considered as justifying so little hope of recovery, as to constitute at once a state of things, in which all men would agree that limitations should entirely cease to exist.

He next proceeded to argue the objections to the Resolutions, arising from the doctrine, that it was unconstitutional to dismember or cripple by restrictions the regal power, more especially when the third estate was not in a capacity to act; the latter part of the objection was answered by the decision already come to by the House, that it was not only the right, but the duty of the two Houses to provide for the deficiency in the third Estate, in which right must be included, the discretion to do so, in the manner, and according to the circumstances, which the particular exigency shall require.

So far as the principle of Restrictions is to be tried by the conduct of our ancestors, it would be found, that under no circumstances, whether the delegation of authority proceeded from the monarch, as in the case of custodes regni; from the legislature, the three branches being entire, as in the minority acts since the Revolution; or from the Lords and Commons alone, when the third Estate, as at present, has been defective, as in the cases of Richard the 2nd and Henry the 6th, have full regal powers ever been granted to a sole Regent. The nature of the Restrictions has been varied at different times and under different circumstances, but always so as to operate some controul; in the minority of Richard the 2nd, the government was in a council of nine appointed by parliament, in which, however, none of the royal family were included, nor was there then any Regent created. In this council resided the ordinary functions of government, but many of the higher powers of state were still retained and exercised by the Lords spiritual and temporal, sometimes upon Petitions, as was usual in those days, from the Commons, but more generally of their own exclusive authority.

In the reign of Henry the 6th, both during the infancy and incapacity of that monarch, the regal power was exercised by a council, not by a Regent, with a council. Neither the duke of Gloucester during the minority of the King, nor the duke of York during his incapacity, were authorised to assume any higher title than that of Protector, and the former was expressly told by the parliament, that that title was assigned him to mark, that he had no other power than as first in council; neither were the whole functions and prerogatives of the monarch invariably exercised by that body; many executive acts, and especially that of creating Peers, were done in parliament in the King's name, and as it is expressed, on the rolls of parliament, by the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal in that parliament assembled: such was the case in sir John Cornwall's Peerage, and others in that reign.

In more modern times, viz. in the act of queen Anne, the 24th of George 2, and the act of the 5th of his present Majesty, precedents entitled to the more weight as they carry with them the authority of laws passed by the legislature when entire, the most deliberate pains seem to have been taken, that the kingly authority shall not be exercised by an individual without check or controul. In the first case a council was to govern, during the King's absence, without a Regent. In the two latter, during the eventual minority of the infant King, the Regent was to exercise the regal powers, but as expressed on the face of those acts, under the Restrictions and Limitations therein prescribed; which, so far from leaving him the authority of a King, deprived him of the power, even of choosing his own ministers, without the consent of a certain proportion of the council: a council not of his own choosing, but named partly in the Act, and partly to be constituted by the wills of the then reigning sovereigns. It may certainly be shewn, that during the usurpation of Richard the 3rd before he assumed the crown, and also during the usurpation of the powers of government by the duke of Somerset in the minority of Edward the 6th, they both exercised full regal powers, uncontrouled by either parliament or council, but such illegal assumptions of powers can weigh but little, where the unvarying course of more constitutional proceedings has established the practice of not at once raising the authority of a Regent to the standard of the monarch in whose name he governs.

Many objections of great weight may be made to governments so constituted, as those referred to The importance of having a more energetic and active executive has united all opinions both in 1788 as well as on the present occasion in favour of a sole Regent, if not endowed with all the powers of royalty, at least exercising those entrusted to him, in a manner as entire and unfettered as if he was King. The only prerogatives which it has been attempted to limit, on either of those occasions, and that only for a short space of time, have been the power of creating Peers, and of granting away the patronage of the crown. Where the Regency is to last, as may happen in a case of minority, for many years, or where the recovery of the monarch becomes improbable, the argument against Restriction's acquires great force: indeed in the latter case, as applied to a Prince of Wales, it almost ceases to exist, but surely the case is widely different, where either the minority must be of short duration, or the interruption to the personal exercise of the royal authority, from indisposition, is likely to be of no long continuance. In such a case the inconvenience of such powers being withheld, is to be balanced against the possible evils of their abusive exercise, by which the whole frame of one branch of the legislature, as well as the general patronage of the crown, might be so disturbed and wasted, as to render it difficult if not impossible for the King, when he came to assume his government, to carry it on without, at least, such an increase to the peerage, as it is of the utmost importance to avoid.

The noble lord then argued that where the Restrictions were intended to continue only for a year, the suspension of these powers was not likely materially to weaken the Regent's government; the interval was not such as to deprive him of the benefit resulting from favors and expectation; and sure he was, that his government would be stronger under a temporary restriction imposed by law, than, if having the power, the Regent was to attempt, from a principle of forbearance, to abstain from the exercise of it, a forbearance which might create jealousy and dissatisfaction on the part both of his ministers, and of his supporters.

Upon these grounds he considered himself intitled to contend, that full regal powers should not at once be conferred on the Regent, that the proposed mode of limiting a sole Regent was preferable to the course formerly adopted of parceling out the regal powers amongst many Counsellors, and that the principle of restriction was justified so far as it was confined to the protection of the reversionary interest of the King, in his government, preserving at the same time to the Regent the most enlarged exercise of the powers of the crown, which was consistent with this consideration.

Lord Castlereagh then proceeded to observe upon the 5th Resolution relative to the Household, to which, as copied from the precedent of 1789, he felt strong objections; the separation of the King's Household from the executive government (he meant that part of it, which was alone used by the monarch in public, for purposes of splendour and state) and the transfer of it to the Queen, did not appear to him to fall within the conservative principle he had before contended for, or to rest upon any adequate principle of expediency: he considered the dignity of the monarch best upheld, during his personal incapacity to govern, by the regal authority being administered not only in his name, but in his state also; he thought there was the strongest objection to the Regent having a distinct Household, he deprecated a contest between the splendour of the crown and of the Regent; he wished the Regent to shew himself to the people as deriving every thing from the monarch, to whom all was to revert, the moment his Majesty was restored to health; he objected to the appearance of the Regent being any thing per se, it ought to be marked that he was only an individual authorised to represent the King still on the throne. It was open to Parliament to limit the powers, or to withhold from him, if they thought fit, any portion of the King's state, but whatever it was fit the Regent should assume, he thought it ought to be the King's and not his own.

Having pressed this view of the question, he adverted to the plan of a distinct Household for the Regent as objectionable, both on grounds of economy and influence. If the measure was wise and necessary, the expence would form but a subordinate objection; he considered, however, the transfer of such a branch of the influence of the crown to the Queen as highly objectionable in itself, as mixing her Majesty unnecessarily in politics, and as carrying upon the face of it the appearance of a double influence, which, if exercised adversely to the Regent's government, might seriously weaken it, whilst, if thrown in aid of a separate Household of his own, it might prove a most dangerous and unconstitutional increase of the influence of the crown.

When this measure was discussed in the year 1789, it was then contended, (he thought not convincingly) that the great Officers of State could not be separated from those branches of the Household which must necessarily be administered by the Queen, as charged with the care of the royal person; but this difficulty was given up by his right hon. friend, whose Resolution proposed that the intire of the Household should be under her Majesty's controul, only for the year, for which the limitations were to endure; at the end of that period, if his Majesty's indisposition unfortunately should continue, his right hon. friend was prepared to make the separation. What he then desired was, that the separation should be made now: he thought it extremely objectionable to hang up any part of so delicate an arrangement, to embarrass Parliament in a future session; the government of the Regent should be settled before he entered upon his functions, and he ought not to be exposed to the aukwardness, when administering the government, of having measures of a nature so personal to himself; besides it was highly desirable, as a precedent hereafter, that the present Regency Bill should be rendered as perfect as possible, he was therefore anxious that the Bill of 1789 should be altered in this point, as it appeared to him unconstitutionally to assign to her Majesty, powers and duties not necessarily appertaining to the important trust, with which her Majesty was to be charged; but which, in their nature, were calculated to augment her Majesty's anxieties, and to add to her embarrassments. Could he suppose the arrangement, as proposed, would conduce either to the comfort, restoration or true dignity of his Sovereign; no one would more eagerly support it. He had stated his reasons for holding the contrary opinion, and he therefore hoped his right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would be prepared now to come forward with that arrangement which he agreed, was, after a certain period, inevitable; he was persuaded he would see the importance of doing so, when he adverted to the aukwardness of either leaving the Regent for a year without an adequate Household, or compelling him to form a Household to the exclusion of all his Majesty's present servants, which must be the result, unless the still more inconvenient plan of creating a distinct family of his own, to be disbanded at the end of the year, was adopted.

Without detaining the Committee longer, the noble lord said, he hoped he had sufficiently explained his reasons for supporting the principle of limitations, not as a precaution which he deemed applicable to the present occasion, but as a precedent important to futurity. In preserving the principle, his object was to strengthen as much as possible the government of the Regent, and to relieve it from every counteracting influence, and he felt persuaded, that, during the short interval for which they were intended to attach, the efficacy of the Regent's government was not likely to be impaired by the nature of the restrictions to be imposed on his authority.

said, that on constitutional grounds, he must support the Amendment of the hon. gentleman; thinking as he did, that the proposition of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the most monstrous that had ever been submitted to a British House of Commons. In one of the Resolutions lately passed by the House, they had declared it to be their bounden duty to maintain the constitutional authority of the King entire. Yet, what did the proposition now submitted by the right hon. gentleman amount to, but to dismember it, and parcel it out? The constitution gave to the King certain prerogatives to support the authority of the crown. The House of Peers had also certain rights and privileges; and to this House there were also committed certain privileges—all of these however, being to be used for the benefit of the people. He now, therefore, put it to the House, whether it was becoming, that at a period when the King had been attacked by one of the greatest calamities which could possibly assail a human being, they should avail themselves of such a moment, to attack the crown? He confessed, he should least have expected such an attempt from the right hon. gentleman opposite. It was dangerous to change the King, but in his opinion, it was infinitely more dangerous to attack the kingly office. The hon. gent. who spoke last but one, had said, that the House were not to provide for any long suspension of the kingly power. In his opinion, however, there was nothing in the Examination of the Physicians to warrant such an assertion; not one of them having named a period at which the recovery of his Majesty might reasonably be calculated upon. But, even if these physicians had specified some period for the recurrence of this event, he could not have placed much reliance upon it; medical predictions being at the best extremely fallacious, and more especially in such a malady as that with which his Majesty was at present unfortunately afflicted. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had admitted, that if a speedy recovery did not take place, it would be improper that the restrictions should be continued. Now, in his opinion, they were proper at no time. The noble lord who spoke last had argued on precedents. He, on the contrary, contended that at no time had the kingly office been curtailed. Regents had been appointed with councils, but no limitations had ever been imposed on what pertained to the exercise of the kingly office. He also contended, that there could no instance be shewn where any person but the heir apparent had been appointed Regent, where such heir apparent was of age; and if so, and if there was no instance of a precedent for curtailing the exercise of the kingly office, he asked, why should such a proceeding be adopted here? Was it because his Royal Highness's conduct both towards his father and towards the country had been such as to procure him not only the love and affection of all the people of these kingdoms, but also the admiration of all Europe? Was it because we were now reduced to a state the most distressing and untoward in which the country had ever been placed? With regard to the proceeding in the year 1788, he had always considered it the greatest political error into which Mr. Pitt, whom he considered a great man, had ever fallen; and he earnestly wished, that the whole of the proceedings of these times on this subject were obliterated from the Journals of the House. Gentlemen opposite had argued, as if the Prince of Wales might violate the trust reposed in him—as if he might impair and pollute the Peerage. It must be on that idea alone, that they could now think of depriving his Royal Highness of one of the most important powers of the government. He trusted, however, the vote of this night would prove that the House entertained no such suspicion. They were about to devolve on his Royal Highness an important office in a difficult and dangerous period; and he trusted they would give him the trust together with the means of executing it in the most effectual manner for the public good. He hoped that when the King should return to the discharge of his royal functions, he would see, not that the House had refused to trust his son, but that they had placed in him the exercise for his father of the full powers of the kingly office. It must afford to his Majesty, in the event of his recovery, the highest satisfaction to see that the two Houses of Parliament had not thought soun-worthily of his heir apparent as to deprive him of the exercise, in the name of his fa- ther, of those powers which he must one day have in his own right.

rose and spoke as follows: The Amendment moved by my hon. friend suggests for discussion two important questions: the right of the two Houses of Parliament to subject the royal authority in the hands of the Regent to limitation and exception; the expediency of doing it if they have the right.

My right hon. friend, who moved the Resolution, pressed upon the Committee the precedent of 1788. The noble lord who spoke last but one (lord Castlereagh,) has told us, that to depart from this precedent would be to embarrass the public interest, and to occasion serious future mischief. It becomes us then to consider what is the authority of precedent. A succession of precedents beginning in remote times form the common law of the land, and the common law of parliament. They prove the law, not simply by the exercise of it, but by the acknowledgment of it, by the submission to it, which is implied in the continued exercise of it. A single precedent, and that in modern times, not having the authority derived from this acknowledgment and submission, is nothing more than the particular opinion of the actors upon a particular occasion.

In courts of justice, where those who declare the law cannot be supposed to have, nor have in truth any other motive than a sense of public duty, a single precedent is entitled to, and receives great respect. It is the honest judgment of one or more eminent and learned persons upon the point declared. It is prima facie an authority, but it is not conclusive. It may be questioned and examined: those who question it must shew error in it; must expose some misapprehension of principle, or some mistake in the conclusion; and if error be once shewn, the authority is gone.

A parliamentary precedent cannot stand upon higher grounds. Let us act upon the precedent of 1788, if error be not shewn; if there be no misapprehension of principle, no mistake in the conclusion.

If the two Houses of Parliament, in supplying the defect of the personal exercise of the royal authority, have the right to subject that authority in the hands of the Regent to limitation and exception, the right must be founded either in the statute law of the land, or in the common law of parliament, or in constitutional principles applicable to the special case.

It is admitted that no statute gives the right. The common law of parliament, as I have before observed, is to be found in parliamentary precedents. It may be collected also from ancient text writers, whose works are entitled to authority, as containing not only principles and doctrines derived from parliamentary proceedings of which records exist, but as being a sort of tradition of the effect of former parliamentary proceedings of which there are existing records.

It is admitted that the right now claimed to limit the royal authority is not to be met with in any text writer. There is indeed no text writer who treats of this question. But it is insisted that there is in ancient parliamentary precedents much authority for this right. My right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the noble lord to whom I have before alluded (lord Castlereagh) assert that in no instance where the two Houses of Parliament have supplied this defect in the personal exercise of the royal authority, whether arising from infancy or infirmity, have they ever conferred upon the Regent the entire power and prerogatives of the crown. Now with respect to this question, of right in the two Houses to limit the royal authority, there can be no distinction in principle, whether they exercise that right and duty to supply the present defect, which our resolution of a former night has declared, by naming one person or more than one person to fill the office of Regent, whether they name a sole Regent or a council of Regency, or a Regent controlled by a council. I agree that in no instance have the two Houses supplied the defect by giving to a sole Regent the whole royal authority, for in no such instance have they named a sole Regent; in no such instance has there been at the time an heir apparent of full age. But upon the best examination which I have been able to give to all the precedents in our history, I cannot find that in any case in which the two Houses of Parliament have supplied the defect of the personal exercise of the royal authority, whether arising from infancy or infirmity, have they ever proceeded to limit and abridge that authority itself wherever placed.

I believe that the first precedent upon this point is the case of Edward 3. The Committee know that the unfortunate monarch Edward 2, while confined in Kenilworth castle, was compelled by the queen, his wife, and her favourite Mortimer, to summon a parliament. In this parliament he was compelled by the same influence to resign his throne, and his son Edward 3, then 14 years of age, was declared king. Mr. Hume, the historian, tells us that a council of regency was appointed by parliament, consisting of twelve persons, whom he names. He does not tell us from whence he derives his knowledge of this fact. From the rolls of parliament it sufficiently appears that a council was appointed, but I can find no trace of the actual appointment there or elsewhere. I think it reasonably to be inferred, that this council possessed the whole regal power without limitation, because deriving their authority in effect from the queen and Mortimer, whose instruments they were, a limitation of the power of the agents would have been a limitation of the power of the principals; and because the historian mentions no such limitation, and because in the succeeding precedent of the next reign there was no such limitation.

Edward the 3d died on the 1st of June 1377, leaving his grandson and successor Richard 2, eleven years of age. He was crowned at Westminster on the 15th of July in that year, and on the succeeding day an ordinance was made by the House or Council of Peers, as it is there termed, there being no existing parliament, and the minor king being present in person, the effect of which, was that the King and the Peers should chuse twelve persons to form a council of Regency with the Chancellor and Treasurer, in other words, that the Peers should name the council. The letters patent appointing this council are to be found in the seventh volume of Rymer's Fœdera. They are in general, words applying without limitation to the whole regal authority.

A parliament was called in the month of October following, and it appears by the Rolls of Parliament that upon the petion of the Commons, according to the then form of proceeding, the number of the council was changed by the House of Peers; and it was provided that they should be annually elected, but no limitation appears to have been imposed upon their authority.

The next precedents are to be found in the reign of Henry 6. At the death of Henry 5, his father, this prince was only nine months old. His elder uncle, the duke of Bedford, was then in France. His next uncle, the duke of Gloucester, caused the Great Seal of the late king to be put into the hands of the infant monarch, and from thence delivered over and put to a commission authorising the duke of Gloucester to hold a parliament. By this parliament the duke of Bedford, when he should return to England, and the duke of Gloucester in his absence was appointed protector and defender of the realm. The patronage of certain offices civil and ecclesiastical was given to the protector personally. All other patronage was declared to remain in the disposition of the king by the advice of the protector and council assisting in the government, and certain persons were appointed to be the counsellors assisting in the government. The authority of the protector and council in matter of government thus to be exercised in the name of the king was given in these general words, and necessarily extended to the whole regal power.

In the 32d year of the reign of this monarch the nation was in his person visited with the same calamity as now afflicts this country, in the person of our beloved sovereign.

The parliament stood adjourned till the 14th of February, and by the influence of Richard duke of York, and by the advice of the privy council, as it is alledged in the public instruments, the great seal was put to a commission, authorising the duke of York to meet and hold the parliament on the day to which it had been adjourned.

By this parliament, Edward, prince of Wales, then an infant in the cradle, when he should come to years of discretion, and the duke of York in the mean time was named protector and defender of the realm, with a council assisting in the government, according to the precise form of the prior precedent in this reign.

In a few months the king resumed his power, and the duke of Somerset, the avowed enemy of the duke of York, being placed at the head of the administration, the duke of York took to arms, and the first battle of St. Alban's was fought, in which Somerset was slain, and the king made prisoner; and then in the 34th year of the reign the parliament renewed the appointment of the duke of York to be protector and defender of the realm, with a council according to the former precedents, his authority being limited to determine when Edward, prince of Wales, should come to years of discretion.

The only remaining case is that of Edward the 6th. This prince, at the death of his father, Henry the 8th, was 9 years old, and the will of his father had appointed sixteen executors, whom he desired to have entrusted with the whole regal authority until his son should attain the age of eighteen. Parliament sanctioned this will, and the administration proceeded accordingly. Somerset being elected by the council to be chief counsellor under the title of protector, and this is therefore to be considered as another parliamentary precedent of a Regency without limitation, inasmuch as the authority could only be legally derived from the sanction of parliament.

The noble lord has referred to the cases of Custodes Regni, lieutenants of the king, or lords justices appointed to administer the government during the temporary absence of the monarch from the kingdom, and tells us, that in all such instances limited authorities alone are granted. The noble lord must permit me to state that the cases have no application. These are not appointments to supply the defect of the moral capacity of the king, they are not appointments made by the two Houses of Parliament; but they are appointments made by the sovereign of his own authority to provide against inconvenience in the administration of the government, during his temporary absence. The extent of their power depends altogether upon the pleasure of the sovereign, and has been very different at different times, as the nature of the absence and the difficulty or facility of communication with the sovereign made more or less power expedient.

Upon the best consideration, therefore, of the precedents which I have stated, and which I believe to be all in our history, in which the two Houses of Parliament, without an efficient third estate, have supplied the defect of the personal exercise of the regal authority, I presume to say that this right is not found in the common law of parliament, is supported by no authority, and is repelled by all such authority as there is upon the subject; and whatever objection may be made to the times and circumstances, in which particular precedents occurred, yet the general conclusion is, that in no times, nor under any circumstances have the two Houses of Parliament ever assumed the right now claimed.

Let us, however, for the sake of the argument, proceed to consider this question of right as if authority were equally absent on both sides, as if the case of supplying the defect of the personal exercise of the regal authority were wholly new, a case not provided for. I entirely agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that, in the consideration of right individual character is wholly out of the question. I admit, that the question of right must be the same as if the illustrious and excellent person proposed to be Regent, in the place of all those high qualities which entitle him to, and command the admiration and affection of the country, were a person of the very lowest rate of character and talent, to whom it could be supposed that the two Houses, by reason of the pretensions of birth, would be induced to commit the high office of Regent.

I agree that the individual character of the Prince must go for nothing upon the question of right, though it would be far otherwise upon the question of expediency if the right were supposed.

But if the individual character of the proposed Regent is of no weight upon the question of right, of what weight can be the individual character of the sovereign, the defect of whose authority is to be supplied? Can the right of the two Houses to supply this defect depend upon the fact, whether the sovereign is deservedly the most popular or the most unpopular prince that ever filled the throne? Let not our affections and feelings in this respect misguide our better judgments. Not only can the individual character of the sovereign be of no weight upon the question of right, but it could, as I think, be of no weight upon the question of expediency, if the right were admitted. The expediency is to the public interests. Is it expedient for the public interests that the whole regal authority should be placed in the hands of the Regent? Is it essential to good government, to the maintenance of the constitution? Of what importance to these questions can it be, whether the indisposed sovereign is more or less entitled to the love and reverence of his people? If it be asked whether in such afflicting circumstances you would deal in the same manner with a monarch who deserved all the blessings, and with a monarch who called forth all the execrations of his people: Certainly not. Affection and gratitude give grace and honour to national character, as they give estimation and value to individuals. The affection and gratitude of the people, should follow the person of a beloved monarch into the shades of his retirement, should surround his repose with all the dignity that can influence respect. But most unfortunate would be the direction of such feelings if they led us to forget what was due to the power and splendour of the throne itself; and most unnecessarily and unwisely to select such particular form of paying our just tribute to the virtues of our afflicted sovereign, as should endanger the substantial interests of his people.

To return to the consideration of the question of right, as if the case of supplying the defect of the personal authority were new. The King, by reason of infirmity, is incapable of those acts of royal authority which require his personal interference. The constitution has provided no remedy, necessity demands that this defect should be supplied. By whom to be supplied, but by the remaining estates of the kingdom. Of necessity it is the right and duty of the two Houses to supply this defect. What is the particular defect? The political capacity of the King is entire. Personal infirmity cannot touch it. It must at all times pervade in equal force the general administration of government. The natural capacity of the King is entire; there is no demise of the crown; the throne is full. The defect is in the moral capacity of the King; the will to do acts, requiring personal interference. This will is then to be supplied, some representative of the royal will is to be appointed to act for the King, and in his name, in matters requiring his personal interference. This is the extent of the necessity, and that royal will supplied in the person of the Prince as Regent, the defect is cured, and the monarchy entire. The right created only by necessity is limited by necessity, and here ends the right and duty of the two Houses.

But is that all which this Resolution calls upon us to do? No. It requires us to subject this royal will to be represented by the Regent to some limitations and exceptions. He is to act for the King, not in all matters requiring his personal interference, but in some such matters only; and as to these excepted matters there is to be no representation of the royal will; the functions of royalty to that extent are to be suspended: the constitutional monarchy therefore is not to be reanimated, but a mutilated monarchy is to be created, a new monarchy, for the difference makes it new. In considering this question we are not to look at the particular limitations and ex- ceptions: for if there be the right to limit, it can have no bounds but the pleasure of the two Houses. How is this right of innovation, of change, to be brought within the necessity which creates it? It is said that if the exercise of the right be limited by the mere necessity, and is to end with supplying in the Regent the defect of the royal will, much inconvenience may ensue, and therefore the two Houses, upon the principle of public expediency, must have a right to go beyond the necessity in order to avoid the inconvenience.

To what end are dignities and prerogatives given to the crown? As the means of efficient government, as the means of maintaining the constitution, the balance of the three estates. As an abstract question, then, it must be admitted to be most inexpedient and dangerous, to leave it to the two Houses to determine in any case what portion of restraint and controul upon themselves the crown shall possess. But it may be said, we have but a choice of evils, and the least evil is, that the two Houses should possess this power of limitation, though the danger cannot be denied. What is the evil on the other side? It is said if the Regent be intrusted with certain prerogatives of the crown, he may, during this temporary exercise of the royal authority, so abuse his power as to create obstruction to the due exercise of the future government of the King when he resumes the throne. An instance has been put, that he may, during the Regency, create so many peers, that when the King returns to power, he cannot, upon principles of public policy, for some time add to the number, and thus the King's government will be enfeebled by the want of this power of making peers.

The supposed evil therefore is, that when his Majesty is happily restored to the throne, the public interests may suffer by the want of his entire constitutional prerogatives. Now this evil is at least uncertain, for although we all look with sanguine hopes to the recovery of his Majesty, yet it is not morally certain. It is fair in argument to assume the possibility of the abuse of power by the Regent, however little to be apprehended in fact; but it cannot even in argument be assumed that it is certain the Regent will abuse his power.

Now to avoid this uncertain evil, what are we called upon to do? To incur certainty, an evil precisely of the same nature. The evil which the public interests may suffer by the want of the entire constitutional prerogatives of the crown in the hands of the Regent; and we are desired to consider this certain evil as so much preferable to the same evil in uncertainty, that we are to purchase this preference at the price of assuming in the two Houses a power over the regal authority, which in its principle cannot be denied to be of most dangerous and unconstitutional tendency.

In this way of viewing this part of the case, I have given a weight to the argument of the possibility of the abuse of power by the Regent; to which I think it in no degree entitled upon general principles. A Regent may abuse the royal power, a monarch may abuse his power; but has not the constitution given to the two Houses of Parliament, such means of restraint and controul upon the royal authority, as both in theory and practice effectually to guard against such abuse, and is it to be apprehended that these means, which have been found efficient in the case of monarchs, will be too feeble to resist a Regent? That a Regency, a temporary government, will prove more powerful than a monarchy, a permanent government?

Another mode of arguing this question is, that the two Houses having a right to supply the whole royal will, have therefore a right to supply any part of the royal will, for the greater right includes the less. In matter of property a right to dispose of the whole necessarily includes a right to dispose of a part. If the whole is mine, every part is mine; who has a right to say that I shall not give what is mine wholly or in part? But does the defect of the royal will make the royal authority the property of the two Houses? Make the royal prerogatives their property, to be disposed of wholly or in part at their pleasure? What is one main object of these prerogatives? To enable the crown to maintain its independence of the two Houses. Can it then be contended, with any colour of principle, that the right to restore the royal authority includes in it, as in the relation of part to whole, a right to limit the royal authority, a right so to limit it, if the two Houses please, as to make it dependent upon the two Houses, a right so to limit it as to destroy it?

Again, it may be said that if the right of the two Houses is to be so limited by the necessity, that it is to end by supplying in the Regent the defect of the royal will, the two Houses cannot even have the power to provide for the security of the King's person, or for the facility of his return to power. It appears to me that such consequence does not necessarily follow. The objection is to the right of the two Houses to impose limitations upon the royal authority: but provisions which secure the King's person and his return to power, are not necessarily limitations upon the constitutional authority of the crown, but matters merely collateral. I admit that the particular provisions about to be proposed for those objects, are in their nature limitations of the royal authority; and to guard, therefore, against an undue assumption of power, by the two Houses, under colour of such provisions, I am disposed to think, that it might be more sound in principle to say, that even to this extent the two Houses could not of their own authority interfere, nor until they had supplied the third estate. The only argument against it is, that by possibility the Regent may not concur in proper provisions, that the first act of power by the Regent may be a gross violation of his public duty. I confess that the constitutional powers of the two Houses, considering the question generally, and not the particular case, are sufficient to relieve me from this apprehension, but I think this point not very important.

For these several reasons, assuming, for the sake of the argument, but not admitting that this claim of right in the two Houses to inforce limitations upon the Regent is to be considered as if authority were equally absent on both sides, that it is a new case, and a case not provided for, my conclusion is, that the right is as unfounded in principle as it is in precedent. And here I should be warranted in terminating the argument; for if it be clear, as I think it is, that there is no right, then the question of expediency in the particular case cannot arise.

I am willing, however, to consider the question of expediency, not the supposed public expediency, which is used in argument to support the right, and to which I have already attended, but the expediency of using the right in the particular case, if the right existed.

A right to be used as it may be expedient, as times and circumstances may require, stands separated by clear distinction from a positive rule of conduct which is applicable to all times and circumstances. Before the right is used the expediency must be proved.

Is it as a general proposition expedient that wherever the personal exercise of the royal authority is for a time to be placed in other hands, some of its functions and prerogatives should be suspended; that in the hands of a Regent the public should lose the benefit of some means of good government, which in the hands of a King must be intended to be necessary for the public service? In forming our judgment upon this question we may have the benefit of the wisdom of those who have gone before us; of former legislatures, who having had occasion to provide for the temporary exercise of the regal authority, were called upon to consider, whether it was or was not expedient to the public interests to suspend in such case, any of the functions or prerogatives of royalty, upon the ground of possible abuse by the temporary possessor or possessors. These acts of parliament having passed when the third estate was efficient, form no precedent as to the right of the two Houses of Parliament to limit the royal authority, when there is no efficient third estate, and have therefore not been noticed by me in the consideration of the right.

By the statute of the first and second of Philip and Mary, chapter 10, it is provided in case of the death of the queen leaving issue to succeed her, if male, under the age of 18 years, or if female, under the age of 15 years, that Philip should have the education and government of such issue and of the realm, until the issue attained the ages stated.

It could not have escaped this legislature, that by possibility the regency of Philip, by reason of the uncertainty of the age of the issue at the death of the queen, might have been of the shortest duration, but the whole royal authority is conferred without limitation.

By the 6th of Anne, chapter the 7th, commonly called the Succession Act, after reciting that it might happen at the death of the queen, that the next protestant successor might be out of the realm, provides, that in such case the archbishop of Canterbury, and six great officers of state, who are named, together with seven other persons appointed by the successor during the life of the queen, if he should think fit to appoint such, should, until the arrival of the successor, or until he should otherwise determine their authority, execute all powers, authorities, matters, and acts of government, and administration of go- vernment, in as full and ample a manner as the successor himself could do if present within the realm; with these exceptions only, that they should not have power to dissolve parliament without the consent of the successor, nor to give the royal assent to any bill for altering or repealing the statute of Charles 2, for securing the established church of England, commonly called the act of uniformity nor the act made in Scotland in the last session of its last parliament, for securing the Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government in Scotland.

These particular exceptions have no application to the matter of the present limitation; they grew out of the particular circumstances of the times. The proposed regency was of a most temporary nature; it could not endure many months. And yet it was not thought expedient to make a precedent for suspending any general function or prerogative of royalty.

By the 24th George 2, chap. 24, it is provided that if the crown should descend to any of the children of the then late Prince of Wales under the age of eighteen, the princess dowager of Wales should be guardian of the successor, and regent of the kingdom with a council of regency. Certain powers are given to her personally; but with respect to the granting of peerages, pardons for high treason, grants of great offices, treaties for peace and war, and some other important matters, she was to act only by the consent of a certain number of the council. But the whole royal authority is by this act conferred upon the regent and council together, except the power of altering the succession to the crown, and altering or repealing the two acts for securing the established religion of England and Scotland.

By the 5th of the present King, precisely the same provisions are made, and the same powers given to a regent and council, in case of the death of the King during the minority of his successor.

The particular exceptions in these two acts, like those in the succession act, have no application to the matter of the present limitations. The regencies established might have been of the shortest duration, and the acts may not unfairly be considered as declarations of the legislature against the expediency of suspending any general function or prerogative of royalty during a temporary government.

If it be said, that these statutes, except that of Philip and Mary, divide the powers of royalty amongst many, and that a security was thereby provided against the abuse of power, which might make it expedient to give the whole regal authority in such cases, although it may not be expedient with respect to a single person.

I answer that in case of power in the hands of an individual, the public derive protection against its abuse from his honour and character, and responsibility to public opinion; and that all history and experience prove that authority derived from the law, is never so liable to abuse as when by its distribution amongst numbers the force of responsibility is divided. I must consider that these legislatures resorted only to the expedient of numbers, because from the circumstances of these cases there could be no heir apparent competent to the government, no person who being one day to fill the throne, in his own right, might consistently be placed in the temporary possession of it.

My general conclusion upon the head of expediency is, that in no case in the English history, except the precedent of 1788, the error of which I have endeavoured to expose, has it ever been thought expedient to suspend during the temporary possession of power any function or prerogative of royalty. And gentlemen have to ask themselves, whether, having regard to all the circumstances which belong to the times, the Sovereign, and the Regent, it can be expedient for the public interests to make upon this occasion the first precedent of a royalty mutilated and defective in its powers.

The considerations which I have submitted to the Committee have been the result of much labour and some reflection. They may form materials upon which gentlemen may exercise their better judgments. Speaking for myself and from my own conviction, I am bound to say, that it does appear to me that if any function or prerogative of the crown be now suspended, that it will be for the first time in the annals of the country;—that the right of the two Houses of Parliament to make such suspension in the absence of an efficient third estate is supported by no authority, and is repelled by all such authority as the case affords,—that it is wholly inconsistent with the principle of necessity, which is the basis of our proceeding—and that it is attempted to be supported by assumptions false in reasoning and dangerous and unconstitutional in their tendency;—and that the argument of expediency is as unfounded as the claim of right. I feel, therefore, but I desire to express it with all due respect for the opinions of other gentlemen, that if the committee be brought to reject the Amendment proposed, they will act under an awful responsibility to that people, whose interests they will not, I think, protect; and to that constitution the integrity of which they will not, I think, maintain.

expressed his disinclination to trespass on the attention of the House after the able manner in which the question had been already discussed; but there were one or two points upon which he was anxious to explain himself. Much stress had been placed by several honourable members on the precedent of 1788; at this he was not a little surprised, seeing that the altered situation of affairs had rendered the present so dissimilar to that time. And here he thought it his duty to take that opportunity of retracting the opinions he held at that period, and the assistance he had then given to the carrying of measures which his better judgment had since led him to condemn. That precedent, it was well known, was laid on a struggle for power, into which it was not unlikely an inexperienced member might readily be led. In his opinion on the present question, the House ought certainly to provide for the quiet resumption of power by the King, whenever his Majesty was restored to health. But this was not their primary duty. Their primary duty was to take care that the regal authority should be properly administered for the public good, and if this were the case, which he could not suppose would be denied, then it followed, that the regal authority in the hands of the Regent ought not to be diminished. With regard then to the limitation of the grant of pensions for one year; certainly he could have no objection to this generally, but it was his opinion that the Restriction might as well be applied to a King as to a Regent.

contended, that the assumption of power by the House rested on necessity alone, and therefore as it did not rest on any case analogous in the history or constitution of the country, he did not think it necessary to examine or give attention to the precedents adduced by the hon. and learned gent. near him (Mr. Leach), precedents which were drawn from times entirely different from the present, when the country was in every respect in a state utterly dissimilar. No course was pointed out to them by the constitution, and the case under their consideration neither rested on the common law, or the statute law. Their functions were very different from those exercised by parliament in those times; for now they had not a vacant throne to fill, but were called on to assume the power of supplying a deficiency in the throne. They ought not, therefore, to be asked to shew a right, as the hon. and learned gent. had argued, to give the regal powers with some restriction; but on that side it ought to be shewn, why they were to delegate more than was necessary to supply this deficiency. If parliament had a right to appoint a Regent, it followed of course that they had a right to determine what degree of power they would delegate to him; and still further, they had no right to give more than the necessity of the case required. The precedent of 1788, he contended, was excellent, in so far as it went, and deserved, from its exact similarity to existing circumstances, the greatest consideration from the House. But the hon. and learned gent., by the same process of argument he had used in overturning this precedent, might be equally successful in overturning the precedent of the Revolution. As for the argument, that it was never carried into effect, it did not apply to the Resolution before them; for they were now on the very Resolution, viz. the appointment of a Regent wish Restrictions, which, in 1788, had been approved of by both Houses of Parliament. In that part of the case, therefore, the precedent was complete, whatever a right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) might argue it was in other points. It was not the times, or the difference between 1788 and 1810, it was the principle on which that precedent was founded, that he was of opinion they ought to follow—that principle was, that they thought it to be their duty to the crown not to have it perpetually interrupted by any act in the temporary appointment of a Regent. They were bound to take care that no impediment was left in the power of any one to prevent the return of the King to his regal functions, or to place obstacles in the way of its full exercise after such restoration. This was not a question of personal confidence, but of general principles, and therefore he need not say that they put all consideration of the character of the Prince of Wales entirely out of his view. By making him the Regent, they were placing him in a situation of greater constitutional jealousy, and his advisers were to be considered as answerable for any act done. As for the argument of a right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning), that there could be no danger from an abuse of the power of creating peers, since the number had risen from 200 to 350; he thought that the right hon. gent. had shewn the fallacy of it himself, when he stated an instance in which the decision of the former number was turned by the creation of 12 new peerages. Balanced as they might be now, the same thing might again happen, and have the same effect: and what was worse, it would be beyond the reach of parliamentary remedy. Upon the whole, it should be recollected, that these restrictions would not be encroaching on the prerogative; on the contrary, they would go to secure it entire on its return, and only for that purpose limited the temporary exercise of it. He concluded with a few observations, in which he insisted that the Restrictions would not be invidiously taking away all that was precious from the exercise of regal powers, but that great services would be rewarded by thanks from parliament, and public opinion, though from the circumstances of the times honours might for the moment be withheld. As for the household, he thought the splendour ought to accompany the exercise of the power, and that the expences of two great establishments ought to be avoided.

, in explanation, said, that the first part of the precedent of 1788, for which he contended, had been acted on to the full by both Houses; and they had asserted their right to appoint a Regent; but the mode of applying that measure had not been sanctioned by either; and, he had argued, was not therefore entitled to similar respect. The former was a measure applicable to all times, the latter only in the particular time for which it was framed. Before he sat down he could not help noticing, that every hon. gent. who had spoken on the other side, from his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the last right hon. gent. who had just sat down, had begun their speeches with expressing the highest veneration for the principles of the precedent of 1788, and had concluded with recommending some deviation from it.

explained, and denied that he had recommended any deviation from the principle.

said, the right hon. gent. had defended himself on a point on which he had not been attacked.

The House then divided upon Mr. Lambe's Amendment, when the numbers were,

On a division upon the Second Resolution for restricting the Prerogative as to the granting of Peerages, the numbers were,

On a division upon the Third Resolulution respecting the Grant of Pensions, &c. The numbers were:

The Fourth Resolution, relative to the disposition of the King's private property, was agreed to without a division; and the discussion upon the Fifth Resolution respecting the Household Establishment was postponed till to-morrow.

Adjourned at half past twelve o'clock.