, conceiving the present the proper moment for expressing his dissent to some of the Resolutions conveyed in that Report, assured the House that it was his intention to avoid all repetition of the arguments heretofore introduced, and to confine himself to points either not adverted to at all, or but slightly introduced. After the various expositions of the precedents applicable to the question, which an honourable and learned friend of his (Mr. Leach) took on a former night, he would not be guilty of the unpardonable presumption of restating them. At the same time, he must insist, both from the practice and policy of our ancestors, that parliament, in supplying the deficiency of the royal authority, had uniformly proceeded without the imposition of restrictions. It had been stated by a noble lord, who argued in favour of restriction in the grant of peerages, that there was an instance to be found in the rolls of parliament, of a peer being created by the two Houses of Parliament, and therefore restriction on the Regent was presumed. He (Mr. M.) had directed his attention to that case, and the fact appeared to be, that though the creation took place in the presence of the three estates, the grant was conferred by the Regent, together with the Council of Regency. Indeed, it must be considered, that from the imperfect knowledge which the House had of the proceedings themselves, and from the tumultuary disposition of the leading characters, precedents from such remote periods could possess little influence in their application to the present times. There were, however, precedents in our history, of more modern existence, to which no such objections could apply, and with the principle and object of which the House had the fullest information. Such were the precedents founded on the Succession Act in the reign of Queen Anne, and in the Regency Act of George 2. The latter was particularly applicable to the present case, inasmuch as the interval during which the royal authority was to be supplied, might not have lasted even a single week. Yet in that act a power was given to the Regent to create peers. The same power was also given in the 5th of the present reign; and it was to be recollected that the precedents of those periods possessed this advantage over that of 1788, namely, that they were completed, and were the authentic acts of a full and concurrent legislature. A distinction might possibly be made on the ground that such powers were not given to the Regent but conjointly with a council. Such distinction did not apply to the case before them. All the House had to conclude was, that there was no limitation of the royal powers, whatever distinction might be made as to the mode in which they might be exercised. The distinction might be made an argument in favour of a council, but when it was on all sides agreed that his royal highness the Prince of Wales should be sole Regent, the precedents were wholly conclusive against the imposition of any restriction.—In reviewing the powers and prerogatives of the crown, he had ever considered them as so many links of one great chain, mutually and reciprocally supporting each other; not one link of which could be taken away, without risking the security of the remainder. With respect to the grant of peerages, he begged the House to consider for what purpose the constitution had entrusted the King with such part of the prerogative. And, in the first place, he would ask upon what ground it was the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, entrusted to the Regent the power of dissolving parliament? Was it not that he should have the means of appealing to the country at large, in case the measures of his administration were thwarted, and opposed by majorities of that House not speaking the public sentiment, but guided by their own factious objects? Assuredly it was. And was not the same principle applicable to the House of Lords? Had not the Regent a constitutional right to be invested with those powers with respect to it, by which he might be enabled to counteract any undue influence in that body to the system of his government? In the one case he had the power of dissolution, and upon a similar principle he ought to possess the capacity of creation to the peerage. He was ready to admit, that as the House of Lords was at present constituted, there was little ground for apprehension; but when he made that admission, he must deprecate personal character being allowed in any instance to afford him assurance upon questions of legislation. A jealousy of that branch was inherent in the constitution, and upon that principle it had provided in the prerogative of creating peers the salutary remedy. But then it was contended, that restriction was to be tolerated, because it was meant to be but temporary; that the interval of six weeks might restore the monarch to his full capacity. The events of these times proved unfortunately what awful consequences even the fraction of a year, as it had been styled, had brought about. In six weeks they had seen powerful monarchies subverted, and important revolutions carried into effect. Looking at the dial, six weeks, in point of time, was but short, but when he cast his eyes to the map of Europe, he could not arrive at any such conclusion. Of the restrictions, generally, he would say that enough was done for insult towards the royal personage, destined to be Regent, but little for security—enough was done to excite suspicion and provoke distrust, but nothing to secure that trust, and defend those interests which that suspicion would fain insinuate, were in danger. There was another point on which at present he would make but one observation; it was the appointment of a Council to the Queen. If it was meant to grant to this council a decision upon the state of his Majesty's health; and to take from Parliament the right of that examination, which was necessary before his Majesty's resumption of his authority—if this instrument of a council was to be made a part of the complex machinery as introduced in 1788, from him it should receive the most decided opposition, at the same time that he should endeavour to attain its apparent object, by less objectionable means.

said the Resolutions now offered to the House were the result of two days' very lively debates on the state of the nation in a Committee of the whole House, in which he had been an attentive listener, with an anxious desire to form such a satisfactory opinion as, in his own mind, should justify him in offering it to the House: and since then he had referred to such documents as the records of the House afforded, to strengthen it. The result was, that he now rose for the purpose of offering, in the name of his constituents of a very populous and important city, anxiously interested in the preservation of the constitution, a most solemn protest against the whole of the proceedings, as not warranted by any precedent of law or of parliament, and as a gross and dangerous violation of the constitution, for the reasons which he was prepared to manifest. He said, he had voted for the two adjournments proposed by the late ministers of the crown, feeling the time asked to be due to their responsibility, and to the shrine of humanity. He did this, too, differing from his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread) on the bench below him, whose acute discernment, accurate judgment, and unsullied integrity, both public and private, generally influenced his opinions. When, therefore, the Report of the Examination of the Physicians was made to the House, he impatiently examined it, for the purpose of ascertaining whether his hon. friend or himself was right. He found his hon. friend was not only right, in protesting against the adjournment, but, that having seen and more leisurely examined that evidence, he lamented to have what he felt it his bounden duty to state, that he thought the ministers of the day had imposed on the House, and that the Committee had not done their duty, in not extending the Examination, as the Report threw a strong suspicion on every act of Administration since the unhappy malady of his Majesty in 1788–9; and that in comparing dates and periods of other transactions, and applying them to facts on record within every man's reach, he had no hesitation in forming a decided opinion, that, availing themselves of his Majesty's infirmities, the various ministers and their dependents had grossly abused their trust, alike in the exercise of the prerogative, and the misapplication of the public finances, of which the table was filled with reports. He said, there were, in the limited report as it stood, two distinct periods to look at, viz. 1801 and 1804; and for facts he referred to the Pension Lists and other papers before the House, in one of which it would be seen, that at one of the periods stated, one of his Majesty's cabinet ministers had availed himself of obtaining the Sign Manual to warrants for money, no less than 1,418,000l. in terms so very gross and extraordinary, carrying with them the implied examination of various accounts and vouchers personally by his Majesty, and the acquittance of the party or his assigns, as would authorize him to declare they were purposely obtained to cover fraudulent conduct. He observed the House seemed astonished at the assertion. The documents were, nevertheless, before the House; and, if they wished it, he was ready to produce them, as he held them in his hands. Such, he said, was the complection of the advantages which appeared to have been taken of his Majesty's infirmities. Then as to the royal prerogative, said he, it had been exercised and pleaded by the basest miscreants as a cover for their abuses; it had been trampled under foot, and debased to that degrees that on a late examination, under a Parliamentary commission, into prison abuses in Ireland, when an unhappy, but truly loyal and valuable subject (who had been most grossly injured and oppressed, committed without any charge, or any evidence, or any crime or any information) stated to the court the infamous, cruel treatment he had received from a base jailor and wretched turnkey, he was stopt short in his evidence, and told by the judge in the court, "that he must not criminate any part of lord Hardwick's administration!" Such were the abuses which had been practised under the loose conduct of ministers, and so degraded was government for want of an active and competent controul over the advisers of the crown. He said, he was happy to see the Speaker in the chair, as, if he committed any error in what he said, he knew he would correct him; and if he was not corrected, he should proceed with confidence, in concluding that he was right—[The Speaker bowed to him]—Sir, said he, by the Report of the Evidence of the Physicians, in which all are agreed, we are told that his Majesty is unhappily incapacitated from attending his Parliament, and exercising the kingly office; so that of course, there is now a complete dissolution of all government, and the constitution is in danger of being lost, on account of the defect. In this situation, it is the duty of every man who loves the country, and values the constitution, to lose not a moment in supplying the defect by the most summary method possible; but I am sorry to perceive that the late ministers of the crown are nevertheless manifestly procrastinating by every plausible means to avoid the only measure which can restore the government, because that will be the hour of call upon them to defend their treasonable usurpation; but that, Sir, must be done, the constitution must be preserved, the throne must be secured, and the government restored, by those manifest means which the constitution and the Act of Settlement have pointed out.

Now, Sir, said he, let us advert first to the mode which these usurpers of the executive trust are pursuing: and, secondly, to the means by which they propose to supply the absence of the kingly office. They propose to proceed by legislative bill: but what bill can be had, in the entire absence of the third estate, and the impossibility of the King's assent? If this be done, any act, however flagitious, may be passed, and the Great Seal applied in justification of its illegality. If this be suffered, we violate the constitution, and return to the irregularities of ancient times, of making ordinances by extorted influence; and the application of the Great Seal alone may become superior to the legislative Act of the three estates. In former times, acts and ordinances proceeded from the King and Lords jointly: the Commons were only mentioned, even so late as through the whole reigns of Richard 2, and Richard 3, and a part of the reign of Henry 7, as petitioners or supplicants, and sometimes at the prayer of the Commons; in later times, the two Houses of Lords and Commons only legislated. Hence, after the restoration in deliberate and tranquil times, the Act of the 13th of Charles 2, now in force, that no two of the three estates can pass any act having the force and validity of law. Here, then, we have the constitutional rule and law of legislative process. Next, to secure all these canons of the constitution, passed the act of settlement, the 12th and 13th of William and Mary, fixing the hereditary succession, which and which alone should direct our course of proceeding at this time. Now, Sir, we have had various ancient precedents quoted with respect to the rule of legislating, in order to manifest that the King's assent has been indispensably necessary, and that no act passed without it can have the force and validity of law. But, Sir, there is a modern precedent, which, as it has not been adduced, I shall beg leave to state. It is a regular determination of the House of Lords in their judicial capacity, sitting on the trial of the earl of Macclesfield in the year 1725. This is a precedent which cannot be arraigned. It is a regular judicial decision, forming a legal and constitutional rule for all times to come. Lord Macclesfield, in his defence, took exception to various acts pleaded against him, as not having the King's assent, and therefore not having the force and validity of law; and especially the 11th of Henry the 4th, which was only on the parliament roll, and not having the King's assent was not entered on the statute roll. The Lords decided on the question, and issue was joined, whether the act excepted to had the royal assent. Mr. Holmes, the keeper of the Tower records, was sum- moned to bring the records into court, when it appeared the act had the royal assent; on which it was decided that the act, having the King's assent, had the full force of a law. Hence, it is manifest, that according to the act of 13 Charles 2d, which was never attempted to be infringed till the year 1788–9, no two of the three estates can legislate, and that no act can have the force and validity of law, which has not the King's assent. What then becomes of the ludicrous fiction about to be set up under the Great Seal? He here repeated his solemn protest against the unconstitutional proceeding, charging ministers with all the consequences so dangerous to the state, and so insulting to the nation, declaring as he felt, that the House having found the fact of the King's incapacity, which they had done in the first of their former Resolutions, it was their duty to have instantly proceeded under the Act of Settlement, establishing the hereditary succession, to address the heir apparent to assume and to exercise the duties of the Kingly office.

The hon. gentleman then proceeded to animadvert on the means by which the late ministers proposed to supply the absence of the Kingly office. This, he said, would be best understood by the question, under the present dissolution of all government, what is wanted? A vigorous executive authority.—Over whom, the people, forming the great physical power of the empire? No—The only necessary controul over the conduct of the people were the established laws of the country, to which they bowed obedience and submission, and which they respected and venerated for their own sakes as well as the good order of the state. He now entered into an high eulogium on the loyalty, attachment, and subordination of the people—he said, they had often been libelled and calumniated, to answer the base designs of ministers; pains had been taken to poison the royal mind of their venerated sovereign against them, and to make him believe they were disaffected to his government and were disposed to sedition and disturbance; hence the difficulty of presenting petitions to the throne—he himself had presented several which never got beyond the desk of the secretary of state. Let the House, said he, now they experience the pressure of it, reflect on the proclamation and speech of ministers to parliament in the autumn of the year 1792, falsifying the proud maxim of Mr. Burke, "that it was impossible to form a Bill of Indictment against an whole people,"—the foundation stone on which the country was perfidiously plunged into the present calamitous war—that war in which ministers started in alliance with all Europe—which having cost 1,200 millions of money and the blood of the people in proportion, now places us with all Europe against us—without a single alliance; for, said he, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily, so far from affording the reciprocity and mutualities peculiar to alliance, are a burthen to us, and must drop as became their rotten tenures, if we withdraw our military protection. This was the result of these calumnies against the people. What could better stamp the falshood of such insinuations, than the present condition of the country, when all government was dissolved by the absence of the Kingly office, and the people were all order, obedience, and submission? He said, he appealed to the right hon. and learned gent. opposite, the Attorney General, for the truth of this splendid proof of the loyalty and attachment of the people. The right hon. gent. was the best possible witness of it; for, with all his vigilance and watchfulness for the preservation of the laws, he knew he could not find a single instance of default on which to exercise the powers of his office by way of holding up an example.—The hon. gent. having begged pardon of the House for this natural involuntary digression, as a just tribute due to the exemplary good order of the people of the United Kingdom, in times of peril and difficulties like the present, said he would now return to his question of, under the present state of things, what was wanted—to restore the government?—An active masculine mind, with stores of wisdom and the knowledge of mankind, (which they all well knew where constitutionally to find) to organise, direct, and command the great machine of the state, and be a constitutional and strong controul over the conduct of the advisers of the crown, for want of which the empire was involved in all its difficulties, and threatened with ruin. But, said he, the late ministers dreaded such a controul; they wanted only a sign manual, which if they could have conjured up through the witch of Endor, as Saul conjured up the spirit, of Samuel, for an occasional purpose, the House and the public would never have heard of the present deplorable condition of the empire. He most sincerely la- mented his Majesty's affliction, as a subject, as a man, and as a Christian: but he most solemnly conjured the House not to lose sight of the constitution, the crown, and the government. Dissentions and distrust had heretofore been created in the royal family, as one insidious means by which ministers had been enabled to delude the country for the worst purposes;—the King had been deceived into a suspicion of the loyalty of his attached people: father had been set against son; and brother against brother; but, thank God, said Mr. Moore, he felt from a paper which he had lately seen, that even consolation had grown out of surrounding afflictions; and calamity, that common parent of reflection, had restored union, unassailable against all further intrigues, which had been happily detected, from whence he drew this most happy consolation, that in despite of all the mal-practices of ministers, the union would form such a pillar of strength as would preserve the throne, the constitution, and the empire, and restore that splendour to the monarchy from which it had been reduced by the criminal neglects and follies of interested ambitious ministers. He said he saw the ministerial papers abusing this happy and natural union of the royal family with a view to tear them asunder again, but he was confident they would fail in the wicked conspiracy. He concluded a long and animated speech, with protesting against all these restrictions, as unprecedented, unconstitutional, and dangerous, inasmuch as the country required a vigorous and powerful executive controul over the ministers of the crown; and those restrictions were attempted to be imposed, with design to establish a strong opposition and a weak government, offering an insult to the heir apparent of the throne, to whom the country looked for the preservation of the empire.

observed, that the Report had not been brought up; on which the question was put and agreed to, That it be read, which was done accordingly. On the question being put upon the first Resolution.

observed, that in discussing the outline of the proposed course, he should studiously keep clear of any reference to the particular mode by which it was intended to carry it into effect. Neither should he view the question biassed by any consideration of the characters of either of the three exalted personages, of whom there was but one opinion in that House and in the country. Were these considerations to influence the House, an answer to restriction at all would be found in the character of the Prince of Wales. But in his view, the objection was not that a Regent should be restricted, but that the restrictions which might be imposed upon any ordinary person invested with the Regency, were not compatible with an appointment to that situation of the heir apparent to the throne, arrived at full age. In all cases of Regency the great danger to be apprehended, and against which provision was to be made, was an alteration of the succession. That danger was not, however, to be feared in the present instance: and therefore could not be made the ground of any limitation. Where the Regency was delegated to other hands than the heir apparent, then indeed the doctrine of limitation would apply, because there were then fair grounds for a jealousy arising from the precariousness of the tenure, and the entire separation of the Regent with the succession to the throne. With respect to the grant of peerages, the general principle of the restriction was condemned by the exceptions. Why should that great stay and muniment of the monarchy, the House of Lords, be degraded by such an improper preference? The motive could only be ascribed to the wish of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to mitigate the rigour of his proposition, by taking advantage of the two great popular services of the state, the navy and army, and probably to procure a few additional votes for his measure.—The noble lord then proceeded to that part of the question respecting the propriety of restricting the Regent from granting sinecure offices. He put it seriously to the House if the leaving of this power unrestricted in the hands of the Regent could by any possibility endanger the resumption of the full powers of the executive by the King in the event of his recovery. Those offices must become vacant before they could well be disposed of; and then if, while the Prince was steering the vessel of the State, if in its course some little prize should fall in his way, one or two offices that might be called so many windfalls—why, this extraordinary exercise of power might prove fatal to the King's full restoration to all the functions of the throne! The absurdity was not more glaring in the way of putting this objection, than in the objection itself.

What! were they to be told that the Regent might, without any danger to the kingly power, remove from the administration of government those very men who had stood forth the King's friends, and the King's support—the props of Church and State. He meant the right hon. gent. opposite, and the rest of the right hon. mutes by whom he was then surrounded—were they to be told that this could be done without making any encroachment upon the certainty of the King's resumption, but that the grant of the place of Clerk of the Irons, or Surveyor of the Meltings, might be attended with consequences alarming, if not fatal to the security of that resumption. This was telling the Regent that he might strip the prerogative of all the substantial richness of its royal plumage, but that if here and there a gaudy feather casually dropped from its pinion, the attempt to replace it must be looked upon as an invasion of its honours and dangerous to its existence. But taking the proposition in an unqualified sense, he did not fear to put it to any hon. gent., and ask him to name those parts of the prerogative which could not be as safe in the hands of the heir apparent, being Regent, as in the hands of the King himself. With respect to the Household, he did not see the necessity of a distinct Household, of a double establishment, and where the people were hourly calling for retrenchment in the public expenditure, he thought that unless a strong necessity was made out, that House should be cautious how they added 15,000l. a year to the public burdens. But the only argument that could be admitted to have any weight in favour of the restrictions, was that which might be said to rest upon the supposition of a case morally impossible—that the Regent might be advised to throw obstructions in the way of the King's resumption of his office. But, he would ask, where in the blackest pages of history could be found an instance of a Regent being enabled successfully to impede the King's resumption of his power by such means as those which they were called upon to withhold from the Prince of Wales? There was one other consideration which he wished to press upon the attention of the House—if they were now to follow in the steps of the precedent of 1788, it would be impossible within the period of one month from that day to establish an executive government. Did the House keep in mind that by the ex- piration of that time must be determined the question of peace or war? On the 2d of February must be decided the question of peace or war with America; and at a period so critical and pressing was it expedient that the means of acting should be withheld from the Prince, by wasting the time in frivolous disputes and delays upon the propriety of granting every item of the power with which they were finally to entrust him?—Before he sat down, there was one other circumstance to which he should advert, and which involved in it an hypothesis, which though but an hypothesis, might be found not unworthy of serious consideration; there had been for some time back various rumours afloat: of those rumours he could not pledge himself for the truth: perhaps, though they had been so long abroad, and had appeared to acquire credit in proportion to the extent of their circulation, they might ultimately prove to have been altogether without foundation. But he should, however, submit au hypothesis to the right hon. gent.: suppose that, so long as a month ago the Directors of the Bank of England had given formal notice to the minister, that they had no means of supplying bullion to our army in Portugal for a longer period than three months, one of those months would have already passed, and what must have been the state of the country if the expiration of the remaining two should find this country still without an executive, or struggling under the weakness and indignity of a shackled one, or still in the hands of the right hon. gentleman opposite, who could not command the sincere confidence of one man in the country but themselves? He thought that they ought to feel something for the Regent, for the arduous and delicate charge they were about to impose on him, at such a difficult time, of which he must feel himself bound to give an account to his royal father. He should not longer trespass on the House, but conclude by moving the following Amendment upon the Resolution then before the House, "That the concluding words of the said Resolution, 'subject to such limitations and exceptions as shall hereafter be provided,' be left-out."

rose to second the Amendment. He disapproved of the system of restrictions—the name of Mr. Pitt had, he believed, given it a sanction, of which it was in every respect unworthy; but that was not the first instance of great authorities being made use of to give a sanction to absurdities. In his view of the proceedings of 1788 he thought that in consequence of an inadvertent assertion having fallen from an enlightened statesman of that day, which was tortured into a meaning not intended by him, and denied by his party, a pretence was created for carrying the opposite principle to an unjustifiable extent, and which, whatever was the motive, certainly had a tendency to insult the Prince. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer might smile, but he saw no good reason for restricting the powers of the Prince, but a suspicion that he would not use those powers wisely; and a presumption of this kind he thought unfair and insulting. The apprehensions of the King meeting with any obstructions in the resumption of his powers were scarcely deserving of serious refutation; could it be believed that the heir apparent would not be eager to catch the first faint dawnings of returning reason: He concurred in the truth of the fine illustration made use of by an hon. gent. that the King, like the sun, need only shew himself to be acknowledged—his recovery could not possibly be withheld a moment from his people—the precedent of the proceedings during the King's illness in 1788 had been attempted to be confirmed by the speech which the same ministers had put into the King's mouth, in approbation of their own conduct; but he did not understand how two bad precedents could make one good precedent. The precedents referred to in the case of the Regency during the reign of Charles the 6th of France, did not apply, as in that case the regent was not the next in succession. In imposing so arduous a duty on the Prince, he thought the House was bound not to deprive him of the means necessary to discharge that duty, however disposed the ministers, those modern Sangrados, might be to weaken and unfit him for the office. Much as they had heard of the precedent in 1788, it was not to be forgotten that the Bill for restricting the Regent did not pass till the 12th of Feb. and that at that late date the confident and sanguine expectation of his Majesty's speedy and complete recovery, he being then in a course of progressive amendment, must be supposed to have bad considerable influence upon those who voted for the restrictions. But the right hon. gentlemen still obstinately clung to their precedent. They threw it down before them as a sort of challenge of defiance to all opposition or objection, and this, too, on the mere strength of Mr. Pitt's name and authority. A certain puerile verse recited in some boy's game might, with a slight alteration, be applied to such reasoning—

"Here stands our Precedent. Who put it there?

"A better man than you, so touch it if you dare."

With respect to the nomination of a few lords of the bed-chamber, he could not think it of too serious a power to entrust with the Regent. The saving of the 15,000l. he confessed did not seem to him of much importance, because he thought that the great cause of public economy could only be advanced by great and well-judged reductions in the public expenditure—a moiety of the treasure wasted in the mad and disastrous expedition to Walcheren would weigh more in the scale of economical reform than many of such pitiable savings as were by some persons calculated upon. He concluded by seconding the Amendment.

expressed himself hostile to the Resolutions, as well as to the general mode of reasoning by which they had hitherto been attempted to be supported. If he understood them rightly, they appeared to him to be in direct defiance of the principles of the constitution. The second Resolution went to pledge that House to supply the deficiency in the executive, and they were at the same time called on to weaken and abridge those powers which were essentially necessary, complete, and unimpaired, to the supply of that deficiency. This was asking them to do two things which defeated each other; for he could not understand how the deficiency acknowledged to exist could be remedied by means not sufficiently ample to supply it. The duty of that House was simple and direct: it was to supply the deficiency existing in the executive, and fully to supply it. The partial or restricted supply of it was a sort of innovation which might at future period be converted into a precedent of a very different kind. If the House might now alter the mode of filling up the defect in the executive, by limiting the powers of a Regent, what was to proven a future House of Commons from proceeding upon an alteration of a different kind, and enlarging the powers of the Regent? Admitting the right of altering at all the mode of alteration followed irresistibly; and however various or opposite that mode at different periods, still the question of changing the executive, which ought to be unchangeable, must become a fair topic of justifiable discussion—such appeared to him to be the dangerous consequences likely to result from such a course of proceeding, because, if once they begun to alter at all, they could not put a stop to the mode of alteration. There was no part of the prerogative more important than the right of creating peers. He looked to the House of Peers as to a great and distinct branch of the legislature. The right of adding to the number of his hereditary counsellors was vested in the King, he believed, for the best and wisest of purposes. He could not consent to impose upon the Heir Apparent the weight of the royal functions deprived of all that could give him strength to wear and exercise them with dignity. The minister had affected to do much when he consented to leave to the Regent the right of making peace or war; but with respect to war, there was not in Europe a power left to declare war against us, they were at war with us already; and as to making peace, that House had frequently and decisively declared peace to be, for some time at least, impracticable.—The speech of his Majesty by commission on his recovery had been much relied on as a conclusive confirmation of the propriety of the proceedings in 1788. That speech was to be considered either as the speech of the King in his individual capacity—and to look at it in such a point of view would be, he conceived, a gross abuse of all parliamentary usage, and a violation of their duty to the public—or it was to be considered as all other King's speeches had been, as the mere speech of his ministers. In this just point of view they might come at its true character, and find in it, after all, nothing but a clumsy and fulsome attempt of the King's servants to pass a panegyric on themselves. With regard to the King, individually considered, he thought it the duty of that House to consult his private comfort and personal feelings, and to treat him with that duty, devotion, and respect which were even less due to his station than to his worth: that worth he admitted in its fullest extent—no man who knew what it was to be a father, no man who knew how to value the most tender and amiable relations of society, could possibly be insensible of that worth. Indeed, he had always thought that the private virtues and moderate conduct of his Majesty had been of more real service to the country than all the public measures of his reign. But while he stated this, he could not refrain from protesting against the use which had recently been made in that House of the general conviction of his Majesty's virtues, in order to influence the decision of a question, which ought to be determined without any reference of a personal nature.

congratulated the county of Cambridge on having a representative of so much ability as the noble lord who spoke last, for whom he had never ceased to have the highest respect and goodwill, even at the moment when they were more particularly opposed to each other; a representative descended of a family eminent both for its loyalty and private virtues. Though the subject now before them had been nearly exhausted, he thought there was still room for animadversion upon the speech, both of the noble lord opposite, and the hon. and learned gent. who had preceded him. For the purpose of making some observations on what they had said, he would take the liberty of stating his view of the question for their consideration. He did so, because the arguments which might be applicable to a different state of facts, might not be applicable to the present case; and though some of the Resolutions had not yet been brought up, it would, he apprehended, be more convenient now to consider them altogether.—The state of facts then was this; his Majesty had by the unanimous vote of both Houses been declared incapable of the personal exercise of the royal functions; but upon the same evidence on which this vote was founded, it appeared that the indispositions of his Majesty was not likely to last for any long period. Of the indisposition of this nature, by which his Majesty had been before afflicted, the first had lasted four months, and the others for a shorter period, and the physicians referred to this as a ground for their expectation that the present malady would be of no long duration. They were then called upon to supply the defect of the royal authority, but only for a very short period. How many arguments might be good when applied to a long incapacity, which were not applicable to the present state of facts. The two Houses of parliament had decided that it was their right and duty to supply the deficiency, and also to point out the mode in which it should be done; that it should be done not by Address, but by Bill, which was the constitutional form. The two Houses having decided that the proceeding should be by Bill, the conclusion was, that they did not think it right to take the whole power of the crown from the monarch, but that they should only take so much of it as would be necessary for a short period. The two Houses, by the same act, had also virtually decided that the ministers who had been in office before the incapacity took place, and who could not properly remove themselves, should continue to perform the duties of office till, by some measure or other, successors were appointed; they had virtually thus decided, he said, by not calling for the Great Seal and the other seals and symbols of office, for the purpose of taking the power and the duties into their own hands. This, too, had been a consequence flowing from the proceeding of 1788, under circumstances similar to the present. The two Houses having decided that the defect should be supplied in this manner, they resolved that the Prince of Wales should be Regent, with such powers as the two Houses thought proper to vest in him.—Proceeding to notice the arguments of those who had spoken on the other side, the right hon. gent. adverted to the objection in point of delay urged by the noble lord opposite (Porchester), with respect to our relations with foreign powers, and observed, that this might be a proper argument when urged in time, but that it now came too late; because he was authorized to say, that the two Houses had decided that the proceeding should be by Bill, and not by Address, and that the executive power should in the mean time remain in the hands of the present ministers, as the seals and the other symbols of office had not been sent for to be entrusted to committees of both Houses. He did not say that this should have been done, but only argued that as it had not been done, the ministers were forced to act on their responsibility. The ministers of queen Anne had in the same way taken upon themselves on their responsibility to act for the public till the arrival of George the 1st. In considering the general subject, he must observe, that the personal character of the Prince of Wales, or any one else, ought to be laid entirely out of view, because they were in all probability establishing a precedent for the conduct of future parliaments. The argument for personal confidence might be well found- ed in the present instance, and yet utterly inapplicable to a future case, and he would now give that sincere opinion to the House which he would have done to the Prince of Wales himself if called upon for his advice. Considering the question, then, as applying to the appointment of a Regent for a short period, he had no conception that the Regent ought to be invested with the full powers of the crown, notwithstanding the able argument of the honourable and learned gentleman opposite (Mr. Leach). Great stress had been laid upon the precedent of Philip and Mary, by which the King was invested with the full powers of the government during, the infancy of the heir to the crown which might be the issue of that marriage. But then it should be remembered, that Philip was actually King, as well as king William in the time of William and Mary: (hear! hear!) he maintained that there was little difference between the two instances, and the authority indeed was vested in queen Mary during her life (hear! hear!), but then her husband Philip had the title of King, and it was natural therefore that during the minority of the infant, he should act as King; and it appeared that by applying the whole law of treason to his person, the parliament had considered him as King. The government of Philip might, besides, have lasted for a very long time, and in such a case there might be many arguments to alter his opinion with regard to the degree of restriction, or possibly might occasion a doubt in his mind, whether there should be any restrictions at all. In the Council of Regency, in the time of queen Anne, there was a limitation as to the power of giving assent to certain specific acts, which was sufficient to show that some restrictions ought to be imposed. At the death of Anne, no peers had been made till the arrival of George the 1st, because it was thought that no power to create them had been given, and why should a temporary restriction in this respect be now objected to? He remembered what had passed in the discussion of 1788, having been in the House, though not regularly, and he defied any one to shew him an instance where some limitation had not been imposed on the Regent, either by the King or by Parliament. The noble lord opposite, had made a distinction between an heir apparent of full age and a presumptive heir, or an infant; and he (Mr. Yorke) allowed that there might be a difference of expediency as to the restrictions to be imposed, but there was no instance of a guardian to an heir apparent, down to the reign of George the 1st, without restrictions; and why should they now do more than the King himself, if he were to leave the kingdom for a short time, would chuse to do?—The power of the House, as had been justly observed, was limited by the necessity of the case, and they therefore had not the right to separate from the monarchy any more of the regal authority than was absolutely necessary to carry on the government for a short time. Was it then necessary within a short period of time to create peers? It had been said by the gentlemen on the other side, that whatever powers of the crown were not necessary to the conducting of the government, ought to be abolished. In that he did not agree; he considered the constitutional powers of the crown as a venerable gothic structure, and when he looked at its flowers and ornaments, the only question with him was, whether they were hurtful; but he did not think that the columns, the mouldings, and the ornaments ought to be taken away because every gazer below might not be aware of their utility. He, therefore, denied the principle, that it would be proper to deprive the crown of whatever powers were not absolutely necessary to the execution of the duties of the office. It was clearly not essential that the power of creating peers should be in continual exercise, and why therefore should it be given to the Regent? Why should the King be deprived of more authority than might be wanted to conduct the government during his temporary incapacity? for he had the evidence of the physicians to warrant him in affirming, that in all probability his indisposition would not be of long duration. As the Regency, then, could not be supposed to last long, and as no material injury would result from a short suspension of the power of creating peers, why should the Regent be entrusted with that power? He maintained, that on the constitutional principle as well as from other considerations, the restrictions were proper and necessary, and in conformity with the best view of all the precedents.—The right hon. gent. then came to the Resolution respecting the Household, upon which he wished to say a word or two before he sat down; and he contended that it was better, with regard to this point also to act upon the precedent of 1788. He still referred to the fact, that the King's indisposition would probably be of short continuance; and that a Regent would not be wanted for any long time. If it were to be of long duration, then perhaps he might be of opinion, that not only the power, but much of the splendour of royalty should be attached to the Regent, But why should the Prince Regent, holding the situation for a short time, have the household, any more than George 2, then Prince of Wales, administering the government for six months, in the absence of George 1, on the Continent? The difference between the two cases was, that in that instance there was a temporary personal absence, and here a temporary mental absence. Rather than separate the Household in the manner proposed, he declared he would prefer having no Resolution at all on the subject; because if there should be no Resolution, he could not conceive that the Regent, pro tempore, would think himself authorised to interfere with the King's Household. If the House should agree to this plan of separation, he was convinced they would find much more difficulty in the details than they were at all aware of. Though he was not much conversant with the Household, he knew sufficient to convince him, that they would have a most difficult task to perform; and that they would not be able to perform it at last. It was infinitely better, in his opinion, to leave the whole with the Queen for a short period. He did not see why the Regent should have more authority over the Household than George 2d had in the absence of George 1st, considering the short period that the Regency was likely to continue; and at a future period that power might be increased, if that should happen which he abhorred to think of. But he did not see why the attendance of the officers of the Household on the Regent should be necessary during the short period that he was to administer the government. He admitted there was weight in the arguments on the other side; but they could take no course that was attended with inconvenience—they had but a choice of difficulties, and the only question was, which course was the best. He was decidedly of opinion, that for the short period proposed, it would be in every point of view, more advantageous to confide the whole of the Household to the Queen, together with the custody of his Majesty's person.

was of opinion, that the feelings of the House; to which an appeal had been so frequently made on this occasion, were not to be taken into consideration on so important and constitutional a subject. It was the duty of members, whatever might be their feelings, to take care that affection should not subdue their judgment. It was their duty, as well as consistent with their feelings, to consult the interests and comfort of the monarch personally, but they were not to sacrifice to those feelings, however laudable in themselves, the interest and honour of the monarchy—a monarchy under which we had subsisted so many years with such glory and prosperity to the country. It had been argued, that we ought to consider what would be the sentiments and feelings of his Majesty on his recovery; but however much respect he was disposed to pay to those feelings and sentiments, he was called upon at present to exercise a still higher and more important duty—to consult the constitutional interests and dignity of the crown. The royal prerogative, to whatever hands committed, was not to be mutilated or impaired. It has been already in the course of these discussions satisfactorily proved, that at no former period the royal prerogatives had been impaired or restricted. They had existed, it was true, in more or less hands, according to the wisdom and provisions of parliament in cases of the Regency, but they were still left whole and entire. The Regent might have had a council to assist him, but to him, with his council, the whole powers of the crown were for the time delegated. A noble lord under the gallery had endeavoured to shew that all the functions of royalty had not been granted to the Regency in the minority of Henry 6, because sir John Cornwall had during that period been created a peer by the authority of parliament; but he would remind that noble lord, that in the 20th year of the same Henry 6, he was created earl of Milborne exactly in the same way as he had been made a peer in the 10th of the same reign. He asked also if the peerages of Hereford and Somerset had not been created under the minority of Henry 6, a proof that the power of creating peerages was not deemed inconsistent with the power and authority of the then Regency. With respect to the case of Philip and Mary, a right hon. gent. who spoke last had argued that Philip was invested with full and unrestricted powers, not as Regent, but as King.

This, however, he denied, and would ask that right hon. gent. if those powers invested in Philip were to be exercised till after the death of Mary. Till after her death they were certainly not to be exercised, and they must have been exercised by Philip, as Recent, and only till the heir apparent, or heir expected was capable of assuming the government. The Queen was then pregnant, and prayers were put up for her through the whole kingdom. The right hon. gent. had also argued, that this was a case where the exercise of those powers was likely to be continued for a long time; but this also he denied, as the Queen was not then more than forty, and in the ordinary course of things an interregnum could not have been expected to last long. The right hon. gent. had also alluded to the precedent in the reign of George 1, when George 2, was appointed Regent in his father's absence on the Continent. It was true that the powers of the Regent were at that time limited; but he was more properly appointed Guardian of the Realm than Regent, and as such, he admitted, was not invested with all powers. The two cases, he contended, were extremely different. The King was then in full possession of his faculties. It was not a case of inability but of temporary absence, and no more time was necessary to consult the sovereign himself, than just as much as might be necessary to send a courier from London to Hanover. This was a case by no means to be put in competition with the present. It might with equal propriety be contended, that the Prince of Wales should not be permitted to create any peerages, because the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was not invested with that authority. The Regent in the case of George 1, he regarded as nothing more than the Guardian of the Realm, or Lord Lieutenant of the kingdom, a case extremely different from the question now before them. In the case of a Lord Lieutenant the King might be consulted; in the case of George the 1st, the King might also have been consulted; but in the present circumstances there was no such alternative.—The same, he contended, would hold good with respect to the Household. The King was then in full possession of his faculties, and, with respect to the personal exercise of his prerogatives, was in full and perfect activity. He was ostensibly before parliament, in the eye of the public, and in the full ex- ercise of all his powers. There was, therefore, no reason for delegating his power to any temporary representative in his absence. The case was very different when all the royal functions were suspended, not only as they related to the exigencies of the state, but as they related to the direction and controul of the Household.—He adverted next to another argument of the right hon. gent., that this restriction, with respect to the creation of Peerages, was only for a short period, and that no injury to the executive, or to the public interest, could ensue from this Restriction, because, in the course of the four years of the present administration, no Peerages had been created, with the exception of military and naval officers. This argument he considered as extremely fallacious. With the same propriety it might be urged, that because the present administration had not, during these four years, made peace, the Regent therefore might be deprived of that necessary prerogative of royalty, without the public sustaining any injury. It was, however a mistaken idea that no peer had been created during these four years. Was not lord Manners made a peer, for the sake of becoming Lord Chancellor of Ireland? Might it not be also necessary to have a new Lord Chancellor during the Regency, and how aukward would it be for his lordship to sit in the House of Peers without having a voice. This was a very probable case, and bore directly against the argument he was combating. He denied that because a new peerage had not been found necessary during the last four years, it might not be necessary, therefore, during the next year. Was it certain, that they might see no inconveniency in continuing the present Lord Chancellor during next year, because they had seen no inconveniency in continuing him during the last four years? Would they, therefore, so tie down the Regent, that he should not have it in his power to make a new Lord Chancellor a peer of the realm? He contended that the exception of naval and military officers, was but a poor expedient to qualify this Restriction. In the reign of George 1, the House of Lords were pleased to request of that monarch to limit the number of Peers; that House,^* however, which had at all times stood forward in defence of the constitution, interposed and saved the other branch of the legislature from such an act of political suicide. It was impossible to say, if once tolerated, to what a dangerous extreme such a system might be carried. Till the present moment the executive had always been considered the judge on whom the grant of the peerage should be conferred, and to what extent that prerogative ought to be exercised. It had never once been thought that it ought to be confined to naval and military characters alone, nor had he been aware till now, that there had not existed men in the civil departments of the state who had as justly merited the honours of the peerage as any naval or military commander whatever. The services of lords Burleigh, Somers, or Clarendon, he had always understood, reflected as much honour on the present possessors of the honours of those noble families, as those even of the duke of Marlborough did on the representative of that great general. And, in more modern times, the honours conferred on lords Hardwicke, Chatham, and others were, to his mind, equally well merited as the honours conferred on any of our most celebrated officers, either in the army or the navy. Were we then now, for the first time, to be driven to make this invidious distinction? The next time gentlemen came to the House and called on them for limitations, they might go the length of asking, that the right of granting peerages should be conferred only on an Address from both Houses of Parliament, and from the Regent such a limitation might in time be extended to the King. It was a painful task to dwell on what were the hopes and fears as to his Majesty's recovery. But even if it could be calculated that his Majesty's indisposition might not exceed the term of six weeks, still he could not think it safe, that the royal prerogative should, to any extent, remain suspended for that period; or that the country should be accustomed to see it in any other than a full and entire state of activity. He could not conceive that it could be any thing else than gratifying to his Majesty, on his recovery, to see that his prerogative had been preserved entire, and had been exercised by the son in the name of the father. His Majesty, he had no doubt, would be satisfied that the House in delegating the trust to his son, had conscientiously discharged their duty. In delivering his opinion on this subject, it made no difference to his mind, whether the King on the throne, was Charles 2, or William 3,—whether he was a pattern of profligacy or of virtue. The prerogative was intended to be used for the public good, and to belong to those on whom the trust devolved. On these grounds he was of opinion, that the whole regal authority full and undivided must go to the Regent.

^* For the Debate in the House of Commons, on the Peerage Bill, Dec. 1, 1719, see 7 Cobbett's Parliamentary History, 609.

, however little he could expect that any thing he might say would have any weight with the House, certainly did expect that it would have some little effect with the hon. gent who spoke last, because the principles which he must now support, were the broad and constitutional principles of a noble relation of that hon. gent. (lord Grenville) and were drawn from a speech of that noble lord, made by him in that House in the year 1788, to the principles laid down in which speech that noble lord still adhered, after having had twenty two years to weigh and digest them. As to the speech of an hon. and learned friend of his (Mr. Leach) to which so many allusions had been made in the course of the debate, and which from the depth of research for which it was distinguished, and the great variety of precedents detailed in it, was entitled to the highest respect; giving to the speech of that hon. and learned gent. every degree of credit which was due to it, he could only say, if it had not received an answer from that side of the House, it was not because the speech of the hon. and learned gent. was, as it had been said, unanswerable, but because the principles laid down, and the arguments made use of in the speech of the noble lord (above alluded to,) had already answered them. The hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Leach) began by saying, that he defied any gentleman in that House to point out an instance where they had delegated the royal authority in any respect, and had imposed any limits on the exercise of it. But how did the hon. and learned gent. make out this proposition? by shewing, that when they delegated the royal authority to a Regent, they appointed also a council, to whom, jointly with the Regent, the unlimited exercise of the prerogative was committed; and from thence the hon. and learned gent. argued that the power of the crown had not been abridged. He would be glad, however, to know where was the difference between giving the whole power to a Regent, and to a council, without whose authority he could not use that power, and giving him only part of the power which he was at liberty to use at his own pleasure, subject to no controul whatever? Was that not equally a breach of the constitution, if it was unconstitutional to abridge the exercise of the royal prerogative? Could it be less a breach of the constitution, to bestow the whole royal prerogative with the reservation of a consent without which it could not be exercised in any respect whatever, than to limit the exercise of it only in part? Did not all the parliaments in all the instances referred to by the hon. and learned gent. in the appointment of Regents with Councils, without whose consent they could not act, maintain this, which was all that was now maintained by those who proposed the present limitations. Even in the best of times, when the Act of Succession was passed, the government was confided to a Regent and permanent Council, not only so, but there were even particular acts which both Regent and Council united could not do.—The right hon. Secretary proceeded to observe, that they were called on to beware of imposing any limitations upon the executive power, lest they should give a handle to the discontented to insinuate, that if they might be dispensed with now for a time, they might be dispensed with wholly and for ever. He was more afraid, however, if they should now depart from the line of proceeding adopted in the year 1788, that they might seem to abandon their duty to the best of Kings, and to be courting the rising sun. If they did so, how could they answer it to their constituents? They were now performing a duty which it was not calculated on, at the period of their being returned to parliament, they would have to discharge. The restrictions of 1788, though not carried into effect, were similar to those now proposed, and had obtained the sanction of both Houses, as well as the approbation afterwards of the crown. The object of that proceeding, and the circumstances, were precisely the same as now. It was then thought, that the necessary power would be better delegated to a single individual, than the whole power indefinitely entrusted to a Regent, with a controuling council, forming a sort of oligarchy less congenial to the spirit of the constitution. A noble lord who had spoken early in the debate (lord Porchester) had denied the right of the House to legislate, and had contended that the dangerous and critical circum- stances of the times required a vigour and independency in the Regency, inconsistent with any restrictions. He confessed he was not blind to those dangers, nor to the critical circumstances of the times, and was as solicitous as any man that every provision should be made for them, and that all necessary vigour should be placed in the hands of the executive; but he would, however, at the same time, ask, if one or all of those restrictions could possibly obstruct the exercise of that necessary vigour, especially as they were proposed only to continue for one year? The privilege of creating peers was not necessary, he contended, to a vigorous administration of public affairs, nor could the restriction of that right at all impede the vigour of government, or interfere in the conduct of the war in which they were engaged. This restriction was still more unobjectionable, if they considered that an exception was made in favour of naval and military officers. The propriety of this would be obvious when it was recollected that a naval or military commander might receive a mortal wound in the enterprise that entitled him to the honours of his sovereign, and the gratitude of his country. It was desirable, therefore, that those honours should not be delayed, and that there should be an existing power, capable of bestowing them upon merit. With this very proper exception, it was evident that the restriction, with respect to the creation of peerages, could be productive of no detriment to the public service; and it was equally evident that withholding the power of giving places for life, or the limitations with respect to the Household, could not in any degree injure the service or obstruct the vigour of government. It had been stated, that if the executive could be carried on with restrictions and limitations, the royal prerogatives so withheld might be abolished, as unnecessary to the purposes of government. This, however, he denied; and in support of his opinion again adverted to the speech of the noble lord to whom he had already alluded (lord Grenville). The prerogatives of the crown were established provisions for a long and continued government, and not granted by parliament in a case of emergency. If those prerogatives were bestowed by parliament, they would then be the prerogatives of parliament, and not those of the crown. Parliament had no right to vote away the whole of the prerogatives, but were called on to delegate as much of the royal functions as was necessary to supply the existing deficiency in the executive, and carry on the affairs of government. (Loud cries of hear! hear!) He was sure, however, that any mode of reasoning would have but little impression on the minds of the gentlemen opposite. Whatever line of conduct ministers had pursued, they should have equally incurred censure. The efforts of those gentlemen were not directed to correct their errors, if the ministers had been guilty of any, but to load them with abuse and invective. (Loud cries of Hear!) In adverting to another point, to which he directed the attention of the House, he contended, that they were not discharging a trust devolved upon them in the ordinary course of legislation, but were called on to discharge a duty as new as it was important, and in the discharge of which they were to look to the opinion of their constituents. The voice of the people had been already declared. He did not mean the transient and artificial voice, which was often opposite and contradictory,—he did not speak of the clamour of faction, and the noise of the mob, which often applauded the worst of measures, when misled by prejudice and ignorance, but the voice of the more sober and thinking part of the community. The Resolutions now were the same as in 1788, and though they were not then carried into effect, they had not only the sanction of the two Houses, but afterwards the approbation of the third estate, and of the country at large. The successful stand made by Mr. Pitt at that time, to secure the rights of the crown, and of the two Houses of Parliament, had gone farther to raise his name than, perhaps, any other transaction of his long administration. It was the anxious wish and earnest hope of the country at large, as well as of every man, he had not the smallest doubt, in that House, that his Majesty might in a short time be in a state to resume the exercise of his high and important functions, and it was their duty to take care that no obstacle should impede his return. If the country, then, was so tremblingly alive to those feelings, they were to consider how they should give an account to their constituents, when called on to answer for their conduct on this important occasion. He was willing to allow all possible delicacy towards the Prince personally, but that delicacy ought not to be carried so far as to destroy the freedom of parlia- ment. They were at liberty to feel the personal obligations they owed to the sovereign he also felt them, but, at the same time, he did not act from them, he acted from general principles and on public grounds. It was his wish to have a strong executive, but at the same time to secure the personal rights of the King, and facilitate his return to power.

rose and said:—Sir, from what I have heard in the course of this discussion it appears to me, that the question under consideration has not been fairly stated; that is, has not, in the manner in which it has been argued, been placed upon its real grounds. The question now before you is not what has usually been done in cases of Regency, but what ought to be done in the present emergency and under the existing circumstances of the times in which we live. The precedents bearing on the case of the appointment of a Regent, have been ably stated and commented upon by an hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Leach) in a former debate. The distinguished manner in which that hon. and learned gent. has argued that part of the question, leaves little to be added by those who may follow him in the same track. It is clear, then, from what has fallen from that hon. gent. that in every instance of a Regency, all the prerogatives of the crown have been given to the Regent; or if not given to the Regent that they were never suffered to continue in suspense; that if not active in the hands of the Regent they were still in subsistence for the benefit of the people. It is a very unsatisfactory answer to our argument, to say, that all the powers of the executive should not in this instance be given to the Regent, because in some cases certain powers were not given to a Regency. The nation has a right to call upon parliament to give the public the benefit of those prerogatives vested in the crown for their use, whether they are to be conferred on a sole Regent or a council of Regency. The public has an interest and a right in these prerogatives of the crown, and it is, therefore, incumbent upon those, who propose restrictions upon any of them, to shew, that they can be withheld with safety. The right hon. Secretary has indeed contended, that the prerogatives of the crown are not necessarily to be at all times in a state of activity. But does the right hon. gent. mean to say, that the essential and vital prerogatives of the crown are not necessary to be exercised, ata period when the coun- try is in such a state of difficulty and danger? But says the right hon. gent. the period of the restriction is to be short. How does he know that? The period proposed is one year. But will France wait for one year? Will America wait for one year? If you cannot postpone the activity of your enemy, you should not suspend the functions of your executive government. You cannot suspend the prerogatives of the crown without great danger to the constitution of your monarchy. The right hon. gentlemen opposite propose, that the Regent shall be invested with only a part of the prerogatives of the crown, and would have us believe, that the power of creating peers, of granting places or pensions permanently is not necessary in this period of war, at least for twelve months. If the right hon. gentlemen can shew that, they must do a great deal. It is an experiment highly exceptionable and imminently dangerous at any time to make it a matter of doubt, whether the vital prerogatives of the crown be necessary for well conducting the affairs of the nation. The executive magistrate, whether administering the government in his own name or in the name of his sovereign, ought to possess in their fullest extent all the prerogatives of the crown. Now, I beg leave to submit what I conceive to be the duty of this House on this occasion. Our great object is to supply the existing deficiency by putting into activity and action all the powers of the executive in the hands of the Regent. How far, then, is he to exercise the royal functions? By signing papers? No. How then? By exercising a competency of power to the exigency, and calling forth into action all the royal functions requisite for the salvation of the country. You must recollect, that this is a year of war. You must recollect, that this year, in which you are called on to deprive the Regent of some of the great prerogatives of the crown, is not merely a year of war, but a year, in which you may have to fight for England on British ground. The right hon. gent. has called upon us to prove, that the prerogatives proposed to be restricted are necessary to be given to the person who is to represent the sovereign in a period of war—of such a tremendous war. I say the right hon. gent. is not in-titled to make that call upon us. The prerogatives are allowed on all hands to be at all times necessary for the crown, and it is incumbent on him and those who think with him on the contrary, therefore, to shew that they are not necessary for the Regent, under the pressure of all the difficulties and dangers with which the country is beset. They are bound to shew that those powers, with which the ancient kings of England were invested, which the constitution recognises, and which are essentially necessary for the welfare of the realm, may be now safely suspended in this arduous and alarming crisis; that those prerogatives, which are of the essence of the monarchy are in the existing state of things superfluous and unnecessary.

But the right hon. gent., who has proposed these Resolutions, has himself given up his principle, when he excepts from his Restriction, persons performing great naval or military services. Having given up a portion of his Restrictions, he has nothing now to do but to give up the remainder. He has so far broken in upon his original proposition as to destroy the principle he professes to sustain, and whilst he wishes to establish his rule by the exceptions, he makes his exceptions the conditions of that rule. The right hon. gent. has undoubtedly admitted, that there might be much inconvenience in extending the Restrictions in a time of war to the case of distinguished naval and military officers. But why should not similar inconvenience be felt from including within its operation, the eminent services of meritorious civil officers? If the principle be right the exception is wrong, if on the contrary the exception be proper, the Restriction should be got rid of altogether. In fact the most irresistible argument against the Restriction, if it be wise or politic, is, that it is not carried far enough. Yet, let me ask, whether we should now set about making the experiment, how much of the royal power may with safety be suspended: how much of the royal prerogatives may be spared? the proposition of the right hon. gent. calls upon us to determine, not how much of the powers of the sovereign shall be given to the Regent, but with how little of these powers the Regent, in a period of unexampled difficulty and danger, may be able to do much for the salvation of the country. Will the House take upon itself under such circumstances the heavy responsibility of detaching from the executive magistrate so large a branch of the powers of the government? Will the right hon. gent. and those who think with him be responsible in their own persons for the consequences which may ensue? Let me add too, that it is not a fair way to state the question to say, that it is not necessary that this office or that pension should be granted or any particular peerage should be conferred. The real matter for consideration is whether the prerogative from which such favours flow is material to the Kingly office; and if it is, whether it be right that it shall be kept in suspense? If the Regent shall have no power of granting offices or pensions but during the Regency, or of creating peers except in specific cases, it must be obvious, that the ministers, who are the servants of the infirm King, will have a reversionary interest in such grants on the recovery of the King. If these ministers should not be the ministers of the Regent, this reversionary interest will be a means of strengthening them against his goverment and of weakening the powers of the executive at a time when all its vigour and energy are indispensably necessary. You will give to them, therefore, in prospect, what you take immediately from the Regent, and by stripping the person at the head of the government of the power of rewarding public services, throw into the hands of those ministers additional means of traversing the measures of his administration. Suppose, for instance, a person disappointed in his expectation of such a grant from the Regent, will he not naturally look to those, who may soon have that power, which the Regent is not to possess, and join them in an opposition to embarrass his government? The case is not unlikely to happen, and will you then by adopting these Restrictions establish a weak government and a strong opposition? Will you paralize the vigour of the executive by legislative provisions, and create a powerful opposition by act of parliament?

It is not enough to say, that the Restriction on this prerogative is necessary to facilitate the resumption of his power by the King on his recovery, or that it is not in contemplation to do any injury to the monarchy or to the constitution. If you confer only a part, and withhold the remainder of the prerogatives of the crown from the Regent, you will alter the whole face and complexion of the sovereign authority. The monarchical power will be no longer in the hands of the Regent, what the constitution directs it should be in the hands of the chief executive magistrate. This would be to alter the very frame of the government and the original principles of the constitution; to separate the authority to discharge the more arduous duties and functions of the government, the administration of foreign affairs, the decision of the relations of war and peace, and the distribution of justice and regulation of police at home, from those prerogatives, which add grace and lustre to the sovereign power, and by their amiability render the executive magistrate an object of affection no less than a source of terror, the fountain of bounty and favour as well as the executer of justice. It is not enough to make the Regent a penal magistrate, to arm him with all the coercive powers of government, to authorise him to in-force the revenue laws, to visit offences with punishment, and to exercise all that is harsh and odious in the duties of the chief magistracy; we must also give him those healing and remunerating prerogatives, which cast a veil over the severity of vindictive justice, and reconcile, by their salutary interposition, the sterner exercise of authority, whenever it may be necessary to put it into force for the welfare of the community.

But, Sir, let me ask, in the first place, whether it be necessary to suspend this prerogative under the present Circumstances; and, secondly, whether it will be safe to withhold any part of the powers of the crown from the Regent, at a time when not only the nation is at war, but also universally admitted to be in a state of imminent peril? Can it be necessary in order to facilitate the King's resumption of his power upon his recovery, which I sincerely hope may be speedy, that the Regent should be abridged of the power of creating peers for any given period? Can any man suppose, that the exercise of that power of making peers in any imaginable manner, during twelve months, could tend to obstruct the resumption of his royal functions by his Majesty? I concur most fully in the propriety of that provision, which gives to the Queen the custody of his Majesty's person during his melancholy illness. I am equally ready to admit that the first moment of his Majesty's restoration to perfect health should be the period of the full resumption of his authority. Every necessary precaution should be now provided to reinstate him in all the prerogatives and powers of the monarchy as soon as his Majesty's intellectual faculties shall resume their vigour. On the dawn of reason his Majesty should walk forth with all the ancient and undiminished privileges of the monarch. When gentlemen say, that the power of creating peers in the hands of the Regent would be productive of impediments to the return of the King to power, do they mean that a Regent would be so lost to the dignity and duties of his station, as to harbour such an idea? Do they think that, if he could find instruments for such a purpose, the Regent would be capable of entering into so foul a conspiracy against the rights of his sovereign and the interests of his country? The very Bill, which the right hon. gent. has himself brought, it negatives the base suspicion; for it declares, that the Prince of Wales shall be Regent, not in right of his birth, but on account of his fitness, Is it, then, consistent in Parliament to declare in the enacting clause his qualification, and in the restricting clause to deny it? The right hon. gent. has insinuated, that a number of peers had been created by the late administration. Granted. But has that obstructed the measures of the government? Has it impeded the administration of public affairs, or in any one instance embarrassed the functions of the executive? Yet, suppose this power of creating peers to be prejudicial; suppose that, by its exercise or its abuse, it might become injurious to the interests of the state, what is the remedy? To limit the power? Certainly not, but to withdraw it altogether, to secure the state from the danger, by taking away from the executive the power of abuse, to abolish the prerogative at once, and not to withhold it one year from the Regent, and then let it loose, use and abuse, next year to himself or his successors. The case of the creation of a number of peers atonce, in the reign of queen Anne, has also been adverted to, for the purpose of shewing that the abuse of this prerogative might be carried to an extent, that would amount to a controul upon the proceedings of the legislature. But, to give validity to the inference drawn from this case, it must be shewn, that the abuse of the power, in that instance, had either impeded or embarrassed the functions of the government. Certainly it cannot be denied, that the danger and mischief of such an abuse would be as great under a reigning sovereign as under a Regent, and though it is fair to argue from the abuse to the correction, it is as false in logic as it is unfair in argument to reason from the use to the abuse.

It is my opinion, Sir, that, generally speaking, the influence of the crown ought rather to be diminished than increased; but still I am an enemy to any curtailment of the just influence and necessary authority of the executive at this period. The proposition of the right hon. gent. respecting the disposal of the Household appears to me to be calculated to do this. If the Household be withheld from the Regent, he will not only be deprived of a certain proportion of influence constitutionally belonging to the executive exclusively, but that influence will be thrown into other hands. By acceding to this arrangement you will create a new political power, to keep up a continued rivalry and contest with the government of the Regent; you will in effect create two Regents; a Regent of administration and a Regent of opposition. (Hear! hear!) I beg pardon; I mean no improper or offensive insinuation; I feel all that respect and veneration for her Majesty which are so justly due to her exemplary character and conspicuous virtues; but I must strenuously protest against the enactment of a bad law, on the chance of its correction by a good queen. If the controul and patronage of the Household be intrusted to any other hands than the Regent's, it is not unfair to conclude that this influence will be exercised in opposition to his measures and government. Now if the council to be assigned to the Queen be not of the council of the Regent, it must be clear, that it will form a host independent of the Regent's government, ready to thwart all its measures, and adding to the strength of any opposition that may be formed against it. To the proposed plan, therefore, I most decidedly object for that; but no less so for this; that the complexion you will thus give to the character of the Regent, and the impression it must make upon the public mind, will have an injurious effect upon his future government, when by course of nature he will have to succeed his royal father upon the throne. If, by any parsimonious restriction of the royal prerogatives, you disable him from executing the duties of the executive with credit to himself or with benefit to the public, you will induce the people to suppose, that, as you suspect he would not be a good Regent, he must make a bad King. Is this then the treatment, which the Regent is intitled to expect at our hands? Does it become parliament to address the Regent in this language? "We give you the prerogative of making war or peace; we invest you with authority to dispense justice to the subjects of this realm; we intrust to you every power of the executive, which in its exercise can render your government unpopular or odious; but we do not think proper to invest you with any of the gracious and conciliatory prerogatives of the crown, and moreover set up a new political power in the state to thwart and oppose all your measures, and therefore we call upon you to take the administration of the government with such mutilated powers upon yourself, and to exert your best energies for the benefit and interests of the country." If parliament could act in this manner, it would reduce the country to the distressing and gloomy alternative of one king disabled by infirmity, or another king rendered odious by the effect of those restrictions.

For myself I feel no objection to the introduction of the King's name upon this; it is actually impossible to avoid it. We are called upon to supply a deficiency created by his infirmity, and cannot possibly discuss the means of doing that without referring to the cause. I am as well disposed as any hon. member to pay every deference to the feelings of his Majesty; but what are the feelings which the provisions of this Bill and the arguments of the right hon. gentlemen opposite ascribe to him? Are they not feelings derogatory from his known character, and disgraceful to one in his exalted station? Thus the sacred name of the King has been treated with disrespect and insult—by imputing to him anxieties not for the public welfare but for his individual gratification—by representing him as awaking from what has been called "the trance of reason," as inquisitive, not as to the situation of Europe but as to the state of his Household—not as to the fate of England but as to the condition of his establishment—alive rather to the nomination of his servants than to the calamities of his country—and demanding not an account of his ministers' measures but a list of his Household domestics. Thus, not content with calumniating the Sovereign's mind by supposing it filled with such unroyal notions, the right hon. gentlemen wish to make the very contemptible feelings they impute to his Majesty, the ground of our legislation. They first brand their King as unroyal, and then prove themselves unconstitutional. The best consolation of a sick King is the prosperity of his people. Parliament will abandon its duty, if it attends rather to the identity of they King's Household than to the competency of his government; and if such a mistaken view of what we owed to our Sovereign and our country shall influence the decision of this night, the Monarch will certainly on his recovery find himself surrounded by his old domestics, and possibly by the misfortunes of his country.

observed, that on a question of such complicated interest and great importance, as that of supplying a temporary defect in the functions of the executive, it was not only natural that they should not be all agreed, but impossible, that great diversity of opinion must not prevail. In order to meet the emergency, to which the country was now reduced, it was the duty of parliament in the first instance to inquire, whether they should look to the theory and principles of our government for the rule of their conduct, or direct their attention to those precedents, which the history of that government would furnish as analogous and applicable to such emergencies as the present. For his own part he was not disposed to value precedents upon any principle of proportion to their antiquity, or from any blind credulity in the superior wisdom of former ages. But when he found a precedent in existence, not only analogous in all its circumstances, but applicable in its general principle and character, he could not easily be brought to abandon the course it pointed out. A sort of light was derived from the experience and example of such a precedent on particular occasions of difficulty and embarrassment, which was calculated to remove in some measure that difficulty and obscurity, which always attend cases where men were left to the mere assistance of their own reason, and exposed to the influence of their passions. Principles when once established ought not to be hastily obliterated. Had ministers come down to the House with a proposition, formed without any reference to the course pursued in former emergencies of the same nature, it would have been incumbent on them not only to shew the propriety and expediency of their measure, but to shew also in what it differed from, and was superior to, such as had been adopted before. What a serious responsibility would they not then have incurred, Precedent ought then, in a general sense, to be the basis of any proposition that should have been submitted. The precedent of 1788, to which the present proceeding was particularly referred, had been fairly treated by only one right hon. gent. His right hon. friend, (Mr. Canning) who had displayed on this question all that ability, ingenuity, and eloquence, which so eminently distinguished him, had alone, of all those who opposed the proposition of his right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) taken a just view of the precedent upon which his right hon. friend had founded his proposition. His right hon. friend, wishing to get rid of the precedent of 1788, fairly stated his reasons, without attacking, as others had done, the principles and conduct of those, who had established it. This mode of discussing the question he conceived much preferable to that, which was founded on abuse of ministers, and ascribed to them improper motives. He certainly for one entertained a great veneration for the illustrious person who conducted the great measure of 1788, and could not believe that he deliberately would ever have proposed, that the House should do what was not perfectly consonant to the constitution. He regarded the precedent of that period as perfect and decisive, for although it had not passed through all the forms in the other House, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the only cause of that was his Majesty's recovery. Objections equally valid might be raised against other precedents to which constant and undoubted reference was regularly made. As far as he could be influenced by considerations of respect and attachment to the persons who framed the proceedings of 1788, he set a very high value on that precedent. He felt the highest admiration for the virtues and talents of those persons, though he must allow that neither they nor any created being could be superior to the lot of error. To assert the contrary would be to make them more than men; but he was confident, that, if they had fallen into error it must have been unintentionally. But whatever other error might be laid to the charge of the proposers of the proceedings in 1788, he did not think the crime of wishing to preserve their own influence and offices could be with any colour of justice charged upon them.

In examining the precedent of 1788, gentlemen must perceive that, though the transaction was literally unfinished, yet the bill had not undergone any material alterations in the House of Lords, to affect its principle. If the necessity, therefore, for the measure, had unfortunately continued, there was sufficient evidence to warrant a presumption, that in principle at least it would have been carried into effect, and with such a presumption in its support, the House was bound to consider the precedent as complete. In the case of the Revolution the intention and principles, upon which parliament acted, were fully and explicitly declared, so that if any similar emergency had arisen for supplying the vacancy of the throne, they should have been relieved from the necessity of answering the theoretical arguments used now, by the practical illustration which then would have been evident. However, as the present emergency was not similar, it was unnecessary to recur to the Revolution. They had, in the present case, only to provide for the temporary supply of the royal functions, and in the precedent of 1788 could find the only analogous case. By that precedent, therefore, he must contend, they ought to regulate their proceedings, and it was incumbent on those, who denied this position, to shew, either that the precedent itself was wrong, or that they were not now in a condition to follow it. For his own part he had conceived that this question had been completely exhausted in 1788, but a principle of a very novel nature had been lately introduced by an hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Leach) which gave a new aspect and turn to the subject. What would have been the expression of that eminent person, (Mr. Fox's) surprize, who contended for the right of the two Houses to adjudicate the claim of the Prince, had he heard what had been lately advanced. It was now made a question, not whether the House was competent to confer all the prerogatives, but whether it could withhold any branch of the prerogative under the present circumstances. It had likewise been contended that the Regent's authority must legally be co-equal to the King's—a position which he could not acknowledge as warranted by, or conformable to, any of the inferences that could be drawn from the practice of our ancestors. The rule hitherto observed, had been to suit the provision to the exigency, and it had never been before held, that any rights were unconstitutionally either assumed or abridged in so doing. The new doctrine, however, went farther than that in 1788, which had been generally considered to go far enough, and allowed to the two Houses nothing more than the power of designating the Regent, without any capacity of appointing or restraining him. It made it impossible to consider the question in the view of expediency. Yet expediency was a principle on which he conceived the decision of the House ought to be placed. He would grant no more than it should appear to him expedient to grant. The House were bound to act, in case of exigency, certainly according to the best of their discretion.—The question of competency and of incompetency, for the reasons he had stated, very naturally abridged the powers of the House on the question of right. What was the present proposition? It allowed that the person possessing the prerogatives was entitled to retain them; consequently the House had no right to deliberate upon it.

The cases of a King and of a Regent were intirely different. The law and the constitution pointed out what a King should be in respect to power, beyond that the House could not go. It did not belong to them to say what the Kingly functions are. So it was at the period of the Revolution, when parliament declared that the Prince and Princess of Orange should be King and Queen; the parliament then did not attempt to define what the rights of the monarch should be—the law had settled that point. Before gentlemen could contend that it was necessary to vest powers in the Regent, they should show that the office was ascertained, fixed or defined. Unless they could, there was an end of the argument. The office of Regent never originally had existence in this country; it was borrowed from France and from Scotland. In England the absence of the executive authority was supplied by Protectors. In the infancy of one of the monarchs (Richard II.) the Regency was composed of a council, the Protector being the head of that council. It must be clear, therefore, that the definition of the office of Protector was better ascertained than that of Regent. Indeed so little was the latter office known, that in the 6th of Henry the sixth, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, sent to the House to know what his functions were. The House of Lords in answer replied, that "they knew of none," and yet he was appointed by act of parliament. The precedents which had been adduced in support of the grant of full powers to the Regent were not founded on any rule of law, so that parliament could interfere.

They possessed merely a discretionary power, and nothing but the necessity of the case could authorise the use of that discretion. If his Majesty should recover in eight days, there could be no difficulty in dropping the proceedings which would be no longer necessary. The two Houses of Parliament had already concurred in two adjournments, while the royal functions were suspended, and even if any inconvenience had resulted to the public service, from these functions having been suffered to remain dormant so long, such inconvenience was not equivalent to that which might have resulted from the adoption of premature proceedings. Nothing but a sense of what they owed the country should make them act at all; and if it could be clearly shewn, that the public was not directly interested in the immediate exercise of any particular prerogative of the crown under the present circumstances, such prerogative might without detriment or danger be suffered to remain for a time dormant.

Having said thus much upon this point, he came next to consider the various precedents of a remote as well as of a later period, which had been referred to, and so mainly relied on by the hon. and learned gent. opposite (Mr. Leach) on a former night. The former, those of Philip and Mary, and of the act of succession in the reign of Queen Anne, could not be brought to bear on the question then under consideration. It would be needless for him therefore to take up the time of the House by commenting upon them. But the latter precedents, those of 1751 and 1765, in the reign of George the 2nd and of his present Majesty, negatived directly the argument founded upon them by his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Leach) because neither was a case of unrestricted Regency. Indeed the restrictions then imposed, were evidently calculated to enfeeble and cripple the government, and to such restrictions, he should not be disposed to agree. There was no comparison, therefore, between the cases; the Regent appointed under those acts had hardly any of the functions of royalty, while the royal person, the object of the present measure, had the whole but two.—The council of Regency, under those acts, bore no resemblance to the council of the 6th of Henry the sixth. The acts of 1751 and 1765 contained no such provisions as were brought forward in this measure; for it was provided that the Regent may act like a King, but with certain exceptions, limitations, and restrictions. These words however were quarrelled with, and it had been contended that this was a species of incongruity though copied from the former act of parliament. Our Regent has the power of appointing ministers, but in 1751 and 1765, the Regent had no such power, and by the act of George the second, seven out of ten of the Regent's officers of state were to be ministers of the King, and could only be dismissed by a majority of the council.—This was putting monarchy itself in abeyance. By the acts of 1751 and 1765, and also in that of Queen Anne, the Regent could not withhold his assent from acts of parliament. The prerogative when thus fettered must have been extremely weak, and wholly inefficient to the purposes of a vigorous government.—The quantum of power depended upon the degree of expediency, as to whether it should be given, or be withheld. It appeared to him that there was more objection to granting than to withholding the whole powers of the functions of the government. Shew there is a power necessary, and it ought to be given, point out the danger of its being abused, and it ought to be withheld. Prima facie it appeared that the powers of sovereignty are not more than are sufficient for the government of the country; and if that be admitted, it is incumbent on whose who maintain it to shew why certain functions are withheld. It was not his opinion that any should be withheld from an apprehension, that, if given, they might be used to prevent the King from resuming his authority; but that from the manner in which they might possibly be exercised, they should tend to embarrass his, government after his resumption. It was their duty to restrict the Regent, that the King may not be restricted. It would be idle to appoint a Regent, and not limit him. In the case of a King there was a security against the abuse of power, which cannot exist in the case of a Regent.—The government of a King is for life; nor can he be tempted to abuse his power, from any consideration of his interest being different at one time from another. The King can never wish to weaken his power, because he holds it for life; but a Regent may soon be reduced to the rank of a subject, and, therefore, may use the powers with which he may be invested, so as to strengthen his own means of opposing the government that would supersede him. The danger to be apprehended was in that respect. Why was it judged expedient to repose greater confidence in the Prince of Wales than in any other Regent? He did not mean to make this observation in an invidious way, for no man who knew his Royal Highhess would suspect that the confidence reposed would be abused. But it was a fair ground of objection for granting unlimited powers to a Regent, generally because it was impossible that the nation could have that security from a Regent as they would have from a King, the Regent being only a temporary possessor, and the monarch holding the office for life. A King never could designedly make any provision at the end of his government for enfeebling it. The contrary might be the case with a Regent; though he was perfectly ready to allow, that there was a most material distinction to be made between a Regent being the heir apparent to the crown, and a Regent who had no chance whatever of succeeding to the crown. In the former case the argument for limitations was greatly weakened; but in all discussions upon this subject, their views ought to be guided by general principles alone. The character or personal qualities of the individual to be appointed Regent should have no influence upon their deliberations. These arguments would apply generally, and not with reference to any Prince of Wales. It was an unfair suggestion to say, that those who supported and proposed the restriction, were disposed to study how to give insults to the Prince of Wales. Was he to be supposed less attached to that royal person, who, he was ready to admit; was eminently qualified for the Regency, because he stated his opinion that it would be inexpedient to vest in him for the present too much of the royal authority? So high was the opinion which he entertained of that royal person, that he was convinced his royal highness would not think the worse of any person for having delivered his sentiments upon the question freely and without reserve; and though his opinion might tend to provide for a diminution of his own personal powers, nothing personally offensive could be supposed to be intended.

He was aware that it might be asked how he could reconcile it to himself to consent to an unrestricted Regency at the end of a year, and contend for the limitations in the present instance? To this he should answer, that at the end of that period, there would be a combined reason for conferring upon the Regent all the powers of the government—from the danger of their abuse being diminished and from the inconvenience from their suspension being augmented. Supposing that the illness of his Majesty should continue, the restrictions should then be discontinued. It might so happen that the recovery, from the long duration of the malady, might be doubtful. Besides, it would be the interest of the Regent to act as if he were the sovereign—he would in fact have no interest distinct from that of the sovereign, and consequently no danger could be apprehended upon the whole. The right hon. and learned gent. contended, therefore, that he was justified in supporting the precedent of 1788 for the reasons stated, and should give his vote for the Resolutions as they now stood. [Loud cries of hear! hear!]

then rose and spoke to the following effect:—I entirely agree, Sir, with those members, who have by their cheers marked their approbation of the speech of the right hon. and learned gent., who has favoured us with the result of his profound learning and deep research in the elaborate argument we have just heard upon the law of the case under consideration; and should not have ventured to follow that right hon. and learned gent. in the debate, if technical subtleties and legal information were at all necessary for the discussion of the present question. It appears to me clear, that this is a question, which requires only a general knowledge of the principles and practice of the constitution, and some particular acquaintance, perhaps, with the circumstances, which took place during the period of 1788, in order to enable any hon. member to come to a sound and a just decision upon it. I trust, therefore, when I have declared this to be the conviction of my mind, that it will not be considered presumptuous in me to rise after the hon. and learned gent. and offer to the House my sentiments upon the question now before us. I most heartily concur with the right hon. and learned gent. in the opinion, that the Prince of Wales will not think the worse of any hon. member for delivering his real sentiments in this House upon the present question. I am sure that, when he attributes that feeling to his royal highness, he does him but justice.—I shall go farther, however, and say, that, if any man could take umbrage at what may be uttered by members of this House in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, that man would not be a fit person to be Regent. (Hear! hear!) But when the right hon. and learned gent. pays this just compliment to the Prince of Wales, I must beg leave to pay a similar compliment to the King. I say, then, that it is a gross abuse—a foul calumny in any person to suppose, that the King, on his recovery from his malady, will or can think of catechising the members of this or of the other House of Parliament for what they may, in the execution of their duty, think it right to say or to do on the present occasion. I am convinced that his Majesty, whenever it shall please Providence to restore him to health, will furnish fresh proofs of his paternal solicitude for the welfare and happiness of his people, and consider only the efficiency of the measures we shall adopt in the existing exigency, without any reference whatever to the freedom with which we feel it our duty to discuss them.

Having now heard the speech of the right hon. and learned gent., I think I may well suppose, that the House has heard all that in law or in argument can be possibly urged in support of the measure proposed for our adoption. When the learned gent. behind me (Mr. Leach) delivered on a former night the very able speech, which has been so justly said to be unanswered, and for this obvious reason, because it is unanswerable, no one of the learned gentlemen opposite dared to reply—they sat in a "deathlike silence and a "dread repose." Now, however, that the righthon. and learned gent. has at length after adecent pause come forward, I presume we may safely conclude that we have heard from the mouth of that organ all the arguments, that can be urged against that able, profound, and unanswerable speech.

We have heard a great deal, Sir, in the course of these discussions of the necessity, that we should, in the measures now to be adopted, follow implicitly the precedent of 1788. We have been told, too, in the language of praise and unqualified panegyric, of the great talents, the conspicuous virtues, and the eminent abilities of those, who had the merit of having proposed and prosecuted the measures adopted at that period. But, whilst the right hon. gentlemen opposite dwell with such emphasis upon this theme of their admiration, it is but fair for them to allow us, who differ from them upon these topics, to bestow with equal sincerity and no less zeal the tribute of our applause upon those, who opposed the measures of 1788; it is but justice in them to admit, that those who opposed, were actuated by as fair and honest and honourable motives as those, who either proposed or supported those measures. So far, therefore, as authority, derived from the personal character or constitutional knowledge of the individuals concerned in the parliamentary proceedings of that period, can be brought to bear upon the question now at issue, I must contend, that we stand on as high ground as the right hon. gentlemen opposite, and can appeal with no less confidence, I think with more advantage to the opinions and votes of those distinguished patriots and statesmen who ranged themselves against the precedent of that day. In their zeal, however, to exalt the precedent of 1788, the right hon. gentlemen would have us overlook altogether that great landmark of our rights and of the constitution, the Revolution of 1688. The circumstances under which the Revolution took place have, it is said, no resemblance, and consequently the precedent of that great and glorious event has no reference or application, to the situation and circumstances of the present period. The hon. gentlemen opposite argue that, at the Revolution, the country was without a monarch, and that the right and the duty to supply that deficiency had then constitutionally devolved upon the Convention. But say they, the case is now different; we have a living Monarch—there is no vacancy of the throne to be filled up—but as the King, unfortunately for the country, is for the present by his malady rendered incapable of personally exercising his royal functions, all that the two Houses are bound to do, is to make adequate provision for the performance of the regal functions, during the temporary incapacity of the Sovereign. In support of this reasoning gentlemen add, that at the Revolution the members of the Convention were at liberty to consider whether it might not be better to abolish the monarchy altogether, a privilege and a power which could not be assumed by parliament in this instance. I am very ready to admit that the Convention might have said that they had power to consider of the absolute abolition of monarchy, but they might also have thought it to be within their discretion whether they should do any thing at all. (Hear! hear!) But is it that you have been doing? What the Convention with the power of accomplishing never thought of, you without occasion or necessity are actually now doing. You are in truth, and have all along been doing nothing of what you ought to do, and on the contrary are doing every thing that you ought not to do. You are, in fact, doing every thing in your power completely to abolish the monarchy.

I applaud the motives by which the opposite profess to be actuated on this occasion. I respect the wishes, that we should most studiously avoid doing any acts which might have a tendency to obstruct or retard the happy event of the King's recovery. I do not, however, in doing justice to their feelings, believe that any measures, which this House in its wisdom may think it right to adopt in the present emergency, will have any such tendency. I must contend, that to express such an opinion in this House for the purpose of influencing its decision, is highly improper and unparliamentary. I may then well ask those hon. gentlemen who make use of such disorderly allusions, why will you force me to do that, which you have no right to compel or expect me to do, from ideal motives of delicacy to wards the Sovereign, and which, were we to suppose them well grounded, would amount to the most severe censure upon the head and heart of his Majesty.

But, Sir, we are told by the hon. and learned gent. opposite that the emergency of 1788 was exactly similar to that, in which we are now unfortunately situated. This I must beg leave to deny—the two cases are widely different—insomuch that, it is my firm conviction that if the great leader, who carried through the measures of 1788, were now alive, so far from proposing, he would actually vote against, the Restrictions, which in the former instance he thought it right to impose, (Hear! hear!) One of the learned gentlemen opposite, but I must beg pardon for employing this appellation, as they seem to disdain the title of learned, and are more anxious to be considered as ministers than as lawyers—one of these learned gentlemen, (Mr. Secretary Ryder) has thought proper to prop up his case, by quoting a book written by a noble friend of mine, now a member of the other House, though on the former occasion a member of this House. But I deny that the book of my noble friend has been fairly cited—I deny that he ever wrote such a book as that imputed to him, or containing arguments such as those quoted from it by the learned gentleman. Little did my noble friend (lord Grenville) think when writing his book in 1788, that it was to be quoted in such a manner and for such a purpose in 1811. In fact, the whole arguments of all the right hon. and learned gentlemen opposite, may be briefly summed up, the precedent of 1788—the whole precedent of 1788—and nothing but the precedent of 1788. The whole burden of the song amounts to that and no more. I do not mean to cast any reflection upon the conduct or memory of the great proposer of that precedent, for I will allow he was a great man; but without intending any disrespect towards him, I may venture to say, that if ever there was any precedent on your journals, which disgraced this House, it is that precedent, (hear! hear! hear!) This is not a time for empty compliment or cautious management of terms—the emergency is urgent, and it is our duty to speak out. I say then, Sir, that this precedent is a disgrace to our journals; it was established in a period of violent party feuds and political animosities, it was discussed in all its stages with an intemperance and heat which far exceeded the factious violence of former periods, nor were the heat and violence confined to either side of the House; they were equally manifested by both sides, so that the times, and the circumstances of these shameful proceedings are not fit to be now referred to or remembered. If I wished to illustrate the improper length to which the heat, and intemperate violence of that period were carried, I need only bring to the recollection of the House the language which was used by Mr. Burke in his place on that occasion—language, which must be fresh in the recollection of members, but what it is not now my intention to insult the House by repeating. Some opinion may be formed by those, who are not familiar with the proceedings of that day, of the excess to which intemperance and indecency of language was carried, when I state that a right hon. gent. a member of this House (Mr. Pitt) had the hardihood to get up in his place and assert "that the Prince of Wales had no more right to the Regency at that time than any other British subject." The bare statement of such a declaration is fully sufficient to demonstrate the factious spirit and party feelings of the times. If a bill had been then brought in true to the principle of that assertion, the preamble must necessarily have run thus, "Whereas every subject of this realm has as much right to be Regent as the Prince of Wales, be it therefore enacted, &c."

I need say nothing now of the gross abuse, which was in every way heaped upon the Prince of Wales throughout the whole of that disgraceful transaction, or of the indecent and undisguised provocations which he had uniformly received. The House must have in its recollection the manner in which that illustrious person had been offensively held up to the nation as a person not fit to be trusted. It was even, then, not insinuated but asserted, that he was at the head of a faction, and motives were most unblushingly ascribed to him of a base, illiberal, and ungenerous nature. From all these circumstances, and many more which could be mentioned, I am clearly of opinion that the precedent of 1788 in no degree applies to the present emergency. But laying aside every other consideration, there is in the bill itself fully enough to shew that no reliance ought to be placed upon it. The bill of that period is an insult upon the understanding of the House—there is not a word of truth in it from the beginning to the end—it is all an imposition—a fraud, a humbug. I had the honour, or rather the dishonour of being appointed a member of the committee to search for precedents on that occasion, of which the hon. representative of Yorkshire was also a member, and I believe, we are the only two now living, who served upon that Committee, at least the only members of it who attended the Committee recently appointed for the same purpose. The only cases we could find in print, were the precedents of the Restoration, and the Revolution. We entered on our duty on the 10th of December, and made, our report on the 12th, having terminated our labours in two days. We met, no doubt, many precedents on the journals, in bad Latin and bad French, but none similar or analogous, but the two great cases I have just mentioned, and having reported these precedents without lengthened detail to the House, as they were to be found at large on the Journals, we added that we discovered none others applicable to that emergency, so that if they wanted other precedents they must look for them themselves, (a laugh.)

But, Sir, the more I contemplate all the circumstances of the transaction in 1788, the more I feel inclined, I may add, bound to declare my utter disapprobation of the whole course and character of the proceedings then adapted. At that period we not only violated the constitution, but so far as depended upon us gave our sanction to a measure, which had a direct tendency to overthrow the monarchy; for we suffered a Bill to pass this House with this monstrous provision enacted in it, That the Regent should never create a peer during the whole period, however indefinite, of his Regency. By operation of such a bill, if it had not fortunately been arrested in its progress by the happy recovery of his Majesty, the whole power of the constitution would have been placed in the hands of the House of Lords; and, Mr. Pitt, who had himself made, I believe 100 of the peers of that day, would naturally receive support from them, in return, and consequently draw to himself all the unconstitutional power and preponderance, which he proposed by such a provision to give to the House of Lords. Is not this a notorious, a disgraceful instance of the party heat and factious intemperance, and gross lust of power, which disgraced the proceedings of that period? But that is not all; here is another instance equally unconstitutional and factious. The Queen was to have a council to consist of eight persons to assist in the care and custody of his Majesty's person, and the four persons named of this council in the bill were John, lord archbishop of Canterbury; Edward, lord Thurlow; William, lord archbishop of York, and Lloyd, lord Kenyon, to whom were to be added four officers of the Household. One would have thought, that if either of the four persons expressly named in the bill were to die, the person whom the Prince might think it right to appoint as his successor, should in virtue of his office become also one of the Queen's council. But no such thing. The Queen, and the Queen only, was to have the nomination, upon every such vacancy, of the members of her council. Why, Sir, it would be endless to go through all the gross and monstrous violations of the fundamental principles of the constitution which were embodied and enacted in this bill; it is difficult to decide, whether its infringements upon the constitution or the indecency of the insults it contained towards the illustrious person, who was to be Regent, were more reprehensible; the whole bill was made up of one uniform tissue of provisions designed by its framers to disgrace the Prince of Wales and to vilify and degrade him in the eyes of the nation (Hear! hear!) What, I ask, was the obvious import of the Restrictions, that persons appointed by the Regent to the official situations of the counsellors to the Queen designated by name in the bill, should not also succeed as counsellors to her Majesty? Does it not speak intelligibly its meaning? What does it say but, "We know that you will appoint, in case of vacancies, unfit and and improper persons to succeed to the offices of archbishops of York or Canterbury, of lord chancellor and lord chief justice of the King's Bench? We shall therefore provide, that, though you may by such appointment degrade these high offices, the council of the Queen shall not be composed of persons unfit to be placed in that important and delicate trust." The whole was the offspring of political intrigue and party feeling, and it is only necessary to read any one of the provisions of that famous bill to be convinced of the factious rancour and animosity which governed all parties during the proceeding of that period.

It is attempted, I perceive, to establish the authority of this precedent, or rather no precedent, of 1785, under the sanction of his Majesty's approbation subsequently expressed on his restoration to the full possession of his faculties and to his throne in the year 1789. Let us then examine the strength of this position. Let us just consider how far the expression of such approbation can have the effect by direct or retrospective operation, of giving to the proceedings the force and authority of a precedent. The speech conveying that approbation of his Majesty was either the speech of his ministers, or declared the individual and personal opinion of his Majesty. If it conveyed only the personal sentiments of his Majesty, it is, I must contend, most unconstitutional in any man to quote it in this House; and if on the other hand it is to be considered as the speech of the ministers, what construction or interpretation can it bear but that it was a declaration of their own approval of their own acts (Hear! hear!) I feel it more particularly necessary to advert to this point because I find it to be that upon which the right hon. gent. opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) has laid his main stress in his Answer to the Princes of the Blood; an Answer without any great characteristic; unless one were to notice the little spirit of peevishness in which it is dictated, combined with the indecent attempt to divide the royal family, at the same moment when he and his colleagues were meditating a division of the royal authority. But to recur to the proceedings of 1788–9: the hon. member for Yorkshire (Mr. Wilberforce) has thought proper to assert, that, however parties may have differed on that occasion as to the means of accomplishing their common object, it was his conviction, and he was sure the conviction of all those who supported the proceedings of that time, that their opponents were actuated by sincere motives of loyalty and duty, though in the unbiassed exercise of their own judgments they could not concur in their views or adopt their suggestions. Does that hon. member then not recollect the events, which succeeded the recovery of his Majesty at that period? Does he not recollect the dismissals, the exclusions, and removals, which with rancorous severity and unrelenting vengeance pursued the opposition of any individual in office who may have voted against the minister and according to his conscience on that great public question? If the ministers and their supporters were disposed to give credit for sincerity to those who opposed them, why visit with such rigour what they themselves allowed to be a conscientious discharge of duty? Do they mean, then, to attribute these instances of political persecution also to their Sovereign? Will they dare to say, that that mild and paternal Sovereign, whose character has ever been so eminently conspicuous for piety and benignity, was on his restoration by the will of Heaven to his reason and his throne, not employed in offering up to his God his most grateful acknowledgments for his divine favours, but eager and anxious to furnish these vindictive proofs of displeasure with which the happy event of his recovery was succeeded? Such an imputation, if any man durst venture to throw it out, would be as false, as brutal and disloyal, and yet I must admit that, false, brutal and disloyal as it would be, it would rest upon the same ground as the argument that makes his Majesty responsible for the speech of his ministers.

I do not, at present, feel it necessary to go more at large into the question under consideration, having thus disposed of the precedent of 1788—indeed little else re- mains to be answered; for all the arguments which we have hitherto heard from the gentlemen opposite, refer intirely and exclusively to the proceedings of 1788–9; they are in fact only a renewal of the phantoms of lord Thurlow, supported by the ghost of Mr. Pitt, (hear! hear!) When we come, however, to that stage of this proceeding, in which the authority of this House is, by a curious and unconstitutional fiction, to be further sanctioned by the application of the Great Seal, I shall then, I trust, be able to make one bold struggle on behalf of the constitution. I cannot omit noticing here, an observation, of rather an extraordinary nature, which fell from the noble lord under the gallery (lord Castlereagh) in explaining the view he entertained upon this subject. The noble lord has declared his readiness to entrust to the Regent the appointment to all the great offices of the household, and yet by a versatility not easy to be reconciled to any notions of consistency or principles the noble lord thinks it highly proper, that the Regent should be restricted in the power of creating peers. It is for the noble lord to explain this apparent contradiction; though it may reasonably be supposed that on this as on other occasions, the noble lord may wish to have two strings to his bow (hear! hear!) Were I, says the noble lord, appointed regent, (an event, by the by, not very probable, though the possibility of such an occurrence must no doubt have been first suggested by the remarkable declaration of Mr. Pitt in 1788, "that the Prince has no better right to be Regent than any other subject"—a declaration, which, however, has not yet produced another candidate.) Were I, says the noble lord, the regent, or the minister of the regent, I should feel highly delighted at being incapacitated by parliament for the performance of any executive function, the exercise of which might possibly be productive of much discord and ill will between me and the parliament. Now I will only ask in what political school that noble lord has been instructed? Does he then know the principle upon which this, his reasoning, is founded? Is he aware of the extent, the monstrous extent to which that principle and the argument derived from it may be pushed? Why, Sir, the principle goes directly, and inevitably, if carried as far as in fair reasoning it may be carried, to the utter extinction, in the hands of the Regent, of all and every of the functions of the kingly office. How can we be sure that the exercise of any other of the royal functions may not have the effect apprehended by the noble lord? And then upon the noble lord's principle, it would be an act of favour to the Regent, to take from him the trouble of attending to the interests of religion, by appointing bishops or archbishops—to the interests and security of the state, in the exercise of his judgment relative to the important questions of peace or war, or to the interests of the army and navy by a vigilant controul over the conduct of their respective commanders, and a liberal remuneration of great and splendid services; it would in fact be a most admirable contrivance of the noble lord to place his royal highness the Prince of Wales, during his regency, upon that noble lord's own peculiar bed of roses, (a loud laugh.)

An observation, Sir, not quite so curious, but fully as unconstitutional, has fallen from an hon. and learned gent. on the other side (Mr. Stephen) to which I beg to call the attention of the House in passing. That hon. and learned gent. has stated it to be his opinion, that the several successive contentions in which we have been in later times engaged, have so disgraced us in the estimation of the public, that if it were not for the personal virtues of the monarch upon the throne, the character of the nation must have irretrievably fallen together with every thing venerable and sacred in the state. I am, indeed, most ready to acknowledge, and to acknowledge too with pain, that public opinion is neither strongly inclined, nor partial to either side of this House, and I should consider this a most deplorable calamity, a crying grievance, if I could bring myself to look upon it as incapable of remedy. I should truly repine, and give up the situation of the country as desperate, if I did not feel, that the apathy and indifference of the public, at large, towards public men, is justly to be ascribed to a very natural but still not irremediable cause; to the nonperformance of the great pledges so often and so solemnly made to the people; to the temporary postponement of those plans of reform and improvement which those pledges had induced them to expect. The late administration acted perhaps too inconsiderately, upon the conviction, that the principles, which they constantly professed—which they uniformly and steadily maintained, and which they were still conscious that they not only che- rished, but that no change of circumstances could shake, fully entitled them to the confidence and support of the public. This was a conviction, which their own bosoms told them they had a right to entertain, though unfortunately the Circumstances which, while they were in power, interfered with the redemption of their pledges, and the accomplishment of those measures which the public expected at their hands, but too effectually weakened the bonds of attachment, which endeared them to the affections of the great majority of the nation (loud cries of hear! hear! hear! from the ministerial benches.) The right hon. gentlemen opposite may, if they see fit, indulge in all the exultation to be derived from their momentary security—from that miserable and degrading security, which with no title to support, a confidence springing from themselves, has hitherto continued them in place, only because from the lamentable diminution of public confidence in public men, there has not yet been an animated cry raised and re-echoed throughout the nation for the recal and re-establishment of their predecessors in the administration of public affairs. I repeat that the late administration acted upon the conviction of having deserved, and continued to enjoy the support of the country, and, if they did not at once proceed to the adoption of the great public measures which they had so uniformly and zealously represented as essential to the best interests of the state, that it was not because their opinion respecting those measures had undergone any change, but because their characters and their known principles were, they thought, sufficient fully to secure them from even a shadow of suspicion of apostacy, even during the temporary suspension of their patriotic efforts in the cause of amelioration and reform. The right hon. gentlemen on the contrary, whom I now see before me, are so conscious of the want of any such claim to public confidence and support, either from constitutional principles, or individual or collective talent, that I must do them the justice to admit, that they have had the modesty to abstain from the assumption or assertion of any such ground of preference in their favour.

However, Sir, to revert from this digression to the observation of the hon. and learned gent. opposite, (Mr. Stephen) I have no hesitation to pronounce it no less disorderly than unconstitutional. The private virtues of my sovereign I reverence and honour as highly and as sincerely as any man—his personal feelings and individual opinions, I value and respect—but for any hon. member to attempt to make them the great link and bond which connects and holds together the various branches of the legislature, is to libel both the sovereign and the constitution. When gentlemen indulge in such allusions, may I not as well be permitted to ask, has the Prince of Wales no virtues? Has he no feelings to be consulted, no opinions to be respected? Gentlemen answer, it is admitted he has—but we have no experience of him as a king—what then? why we mast impose restrictions upon him—that is to say, we must, in order to ascertain whether he will make a good king, abridge those powers and deprive him of those prerogatives and capacities, by the wise and constitutional exercise of which alone he could prove to us what we want to ascertain, and dispense effectually the benefits of the constitutional sovereignty to the nation at large. We have all heard of the absurd determination of the man, who was greatly alarmed at the danger of being drowned if he should go into water, and who consequently resolved never to venture into that element, in which alone he could learn to swim, till he should know how to swim. Yet how much more absurd is the course proposed for our adoption? That was the case of an individual in which he might safely err without injury to any other person—we are a deliberative body whose acts must affect the interests of the whole nation. The individual may never learn to swim, and yet not receive any injury—but by withholding those powers, the exercise and application of which can alone afford proofs of what we want so much to ascertain, we shall be making an experiment pregnant with danger to the state, and which may possibly sink the monarchy and the constitution together. But, says the hon. and learned gent., before we can place the same confidence in the Regent as in his royal father, he must have reigned 50 years. Yet surely that hon. gent. cannot possibly mean, that the energies of the monarch can be fully displayed until the powers of the man shall have actually ceased? He cannot possibly suppose that the competence of man to the performance of arduous and complicated duties, is at all ages equally perfect and unimpaired. And this he must maintain when he makes half a century the test of his confidence in the government of a Sovereign. In truth, the scope and tendency and end of all those arguments appear to me to be to prove of what little value or necessity the kingly office is. It is, however, said in defence of these Restrictions that they must expire within a year. Is that, I will ask, the intention of the right hon. gent.? Are all those means by which, according to his mode of reasoning, the state and happiness of the afflicted Monarch are to be preserved; are all provisions intended for that purpose to lapse and vanish within the short period of twelve months? Is the beloved Sovereign, if his lamentable indisposition should so long continue, (which God forbid) to be then given up to the care of that individual person, against whom the most unfounded and unjust suspicions are now, by the very Restrictions of this act, raised and sanctioned? The fact is not so; and the right hon. gent. must be fully conscious of that. The Restrictions are, he knows, to continue for a year, and till six weeks after the commencement of the next session of parliament, to be then again subjected to the consideration of parliament, whether it shall think proper to renew the lease. But when the question shall then be brought forward, if unfortunately the continuance of the King's illness should render that necessary, is there any reason to expect, that then, any more than at present, any officers of the Household could feel themselves at liberty, however conscientiously convinced of the propriety of such a course, to oppose any proposition on the part of the right hon. gent. for a still further continuance of the Restrictions. The dismissals which followed in 1789 are the strongest proof of the manner in which opposition, by any of those officers of the Household at any future time, would be treated. They must feel that for restriction they must vote or resign their offices. What is this but to degrade the monarchy?—To have the representative of royalty from year to year catechized by parliament; to place in his hands the sceptre 'quamdiu se bene gesserit?'—(Hear! hear!)—Much more willingly would I accede to have the period of limitation extended to three years, and then altogether to cease, than subject the executive magistracy to such degrading conditions. This is the marked distinc- tion between the plan now proposed and that of Mr. Pitt.—Even he would not have ventured to shackle the Regent with renewed considerations: and were it possible for that great man, (for great I will ever call him,) to revisit this life, what more degrading libel on his fame and character could he feel, than to see that what he, with his mighty talents and extensive influence, backed by the according sentiments of three-fourths of the people at that moment, would not have even ventured to propose, the pigmy gentlemen opposite have dared most pertinaciously to persevere in. (Hear! hear!)

I have a word or two, Sir, to address to the hon. member for Yorkshire, and in addressing myself to him I am ready to admit his own excuse for having been induced to rise upon the instantaneous feeling, with which he was animated by the allusion made to the character of his departed friend; (Mr. Pitt.) I can assure that hon. member, that I most sincerely applaud the zeal, and appreciate the warmth to which he was provoked, and though I at all times profess my disinclination to enter on any invidious comparison between the respective merits of those whose failings are consigned to the silence of the grave, I have however my claim to that species of panegyric which that hon. gent. has pronounced upon his departed friend. I may be allowed to do justice to the memory of him, whose amiability of mind both to attach friends and to appease enmities, was at all times admitted by that hon. gent. But I must own, that when he adverted to that great character, I could not expect from him such parsimony of praise; I did conclude that he who had, during his whole political life, made one measure (the Abolition of the Slave Trade) the very object of his soul, without which his conscience could never be at rest; on which he placed his happiness in this life, and rested his hopes of hereafter; I say, I did expect that he would have done at least justice to the memory of the statesman under whose auspices that great object was accomplished, and to the pure and disinterested consistency with which he uniformly advocated, and ultimately pressed and accomplished its adoption (Hear! hear!) No man, it was true, more eloquently arraigned the injustice of that disgraceful traffic, than that departed character, the theme of the hon. gent.'s (Mr. Wilberforce) full panegyric; but it was remarkable that on this point, he that could carry in this House every other thing, was sure to be defeated by the suggestions of Mr. Secretary Gradual (lord Melville.—Hear! hear!) But what my departed friend (Mr. Fox) professed out of place, in power he supported. He would admit no compromise, but hazarded the security of his government to evince his sincerity of principle. It was he who retrieved the nation from that turpitude and deadly sin, which the hon. gent. (Mr. Wilberforce) conscientiously believed to affect every individual of a nation which admitted such a traffic; that which he thought to be the salvation of the empire, my friend accomplished; and if ever there was that man, in whose heart the memory of another should have been canonized with superior attachment, I should have thought it was the memory of Mr. Fox in the heart of that hon. gent. (Cries of hear! hear!)

But, Sir, to return to the question before us, there are two points, which I feel it impossible to overlook—the situation in which we are placed and the condition of the government. As to ourselves, I contend that we are at this moment no House of Commons, and that the men who dare to execute the functions of the government are guilty of usurpation. The very avowal that it was open to them to exercise such functions, even though the assertion be not carried into effect, is treasonable. It is an act of high treason in the men who dare make the proposition, and misprision of treason in this House patiently to listen to such doctrine (hear! hear!) They are a new directory, self-elected and self-constituted, upheld by nothing but their own forcible seizure of the attributes and prerogatives of the crown. There is no other distinction between them and the executive directory of France in the year 1795, except that the latter owed their appointment to the appearance at least of popular choice. It would, indeed, in this era of military expeditions, be some consolation to think that our directory could boast such a skilful engineer and war minister as the French had in Carnot. There is, however, one similitude, that, at the head of the French directory, as well as now of our own, there was a lawyer, of the name of Reubel (a laugh). And I recal this to the attention of the gentlemen opposite, that, when the day of serious account shall come, as come it must, the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exche- quer, at a time when precedent passes for every thing, and common sense and the constitution for nothing, he might have the full advantage of the case and example of Reubel. (A laugh). As to our own condition, we seem to act under the impression that what the monarchy has lost has been divided amongst ourselves; whereas the royal power is so fundamentally interwoven with every other interest in the state, that by its even temporary interruption the life and power of parliament is paralyzed. We are now a sort of sheer hulk run adrift without either rudder, mast, or pilot. If this were your first session, what privileges could, in your present state, belong to you, demanded, as such privileges are in the first instance, from the crown? Have you committees of religion, justice, or privileges; measures which characterize your legislative existence? Do you print your votes? How, then can you assume the front and mien of a legislative body? The worthy baronet (sir F. Burdett) on a former occasion doubted your power to issue a writ for a vacant borough. In answer to his objection, it was stated that in the year 1789 writs after much deliberation were moved for and issued. But the fact was not so. A writ for Colchester was in the usual manner moved. The Speaker was the person who intimated the objection. The writ was granted; but what followed? The unsuccessful party presented a petition against the undue return. That petition you declared your inability to entertain. Where, then, I ask, is your power to issue such a writ, when you have not any competent authority to examine and decide whether the return to the writ be legal or not? In fact we are reduced to a most miserable and embarrassed situation, in which a regard for our own dignity, if no other consideration has power to influence us, ought to compel us not to lose an hour in taking the most prompt means to get rid of the difficulty.

But when we look to our foreign relations, can we see no difference in the prospect of the times at this moment, and when the miserable precedent of 1789 was introduced? What, I ask, is the object and argument and fixed determination of him who is now the Emperor of France, whose title it is folly to deny? What are the principles to which his policy gives utterance throughout the extensive range of his oppressive influence? That revolution which was to impart peace to cottages, and destruction to thrones, has ended in the establishment of more thrones, and the desolation of more cottages, than the afflicted world ever before witnessed (hear! hear!) Has he not declared the distant dynasties of Europe to be unsound and rotten, and professed his intention to accomplish their ultimate subversion? In spreading through the unhappy nations subjected to his will the horrors and hardships of his unfeeling despotism, of what powers of oppression does he avail himself? Are not his instruments kings, decked out in all the exterior trappings of royalty, but divested of all the means of grace, and benignity to win attachment, or to reconcile to privation? (Hear! hear! hear!) Warm as our sympathy must be, for the unhappy people subjected to his caprice, and sacrificed to the objects of his criminal ambition, it is impossible also not to feel for those unhappy persons who, temporarily raised to thrones and sceptres, have been disgraced and cashiered, for the abomination of exercising over their subjects, a more mitigated tyranny than his vile policy dictated. The executioners of his vengeance, he places them on a platform and calls that a throne. He puts a whip of scorpions in their hands, and calls that a sceptre. (Hear! hear!)" "See," said he to the ill-fated prince of Asturias, "the folly of being popular—behold the people of all nations panting for retribution—Kings they must and do hate." Shall I then by my vote this night, give currency to such doctrine? Shall this House furnish him with additional arguments in support of such principles, followed by an illustration of which he would not fail to take advantage? Will you allow to him the power of saying to the nations of the earth, "has not my opinion been well founded?—is it not human nature itself?" Can you doubt when you see Great Britain, notwithstanding its boasted excellence of constitution, greedily seize the first opportunity that has occurred, to curtail the legitimate powers of the sovereign, and in such an emergency to dismember almost the monarchy itself—(hear! hear!)? Shall I then, or will this House become the instrument of Napoleon, in furnishing him with illustration favourable to his detestable objects. It is a libel, false as hell, to describe such to be the feelings of the people of these realms, or to attribute to the Prince any qualities which, in the remotest degree, can war- rant suspicion (hear! hear!) Whatever are my hopes and views of reform, I say now, as I have ever said, that we are struggling to preserve a condition of society far above that to which the other civilized nations of the world have attained. Is then this the moment to fetter or restrict the constitutional powers of him whom the public voice has unanimously called to preside over our destiny, during the unhappy indisposition of his sovereign and father? Shall we send him forth with a broken shield and half a spear to that contest, on the issue of which depends not alone the safety of Great Britain, but the preservation of the rights and happiness of mankind?—(When Mr. Sheridan sat down, the cries of hear! hear! continued for some moments.)

succeeded Mr. Sheridan, and spoke in favour of the adoption of the report, but from the frequent cries of question, and the general expression of impatience, it was impossible to collect the grounds of his opinion.

rose, amidst loud calls for the question, and said:—Sir, I can assure the House, that after the indulgence which I have already received during the course of these discussions, it is not my intention to trespass at any length upon their attention on this night. I do not rise merely for the purpose of expressing again the sentiments, with which I have more than once had occasion to trouble them, or of declaring that I shall again vote in conformity with those sentiments. But I am anxious—I feel it due to myself—I deem it necessary for the explanation of my vote, and the justification of my conduct and motives, to protest against nine-tenths of the arguments, which have been urged on that side of the question which meets with my concurrence. My vote is governed by far other reasons than those which I have heard from the other side of the House.

If I am—as I decidedly am—of opinion, that it is not expedient to fetter the exercise of the royal prerogative in the hands, to which we are about to delegate the administration of it, by any of the restrictions which have been proposed to us, it is not because I disagree with my right hon. friends who have thought it their duty to prepare those restrictions, as to the undoubted right of this and the other House of Parliament to adopt that proposition, if it shall seem good and right to them so to do, and to couple the delega- tion, which it is their unquestionable province to make, with any conditions and limitations which they may think proper to annex to it. I agree on the contrary in by far the greater part of the able speech of my right hon. and learned friend, who sits beside me, (the Master of the Rolls)—in all that part of it, which went to establish the right of the two Houses to appoint a Regent, and to negative the existence of a right, or of any thing like a right in any person to claim that appointment at their hands—in all that went to prove the possession by the two Houses of a perfect and entire discretion to entrust, to the Regent of their own choice, such portion only of the executive power as they may think it necessary to entrust to him. But I differ from him wholly as to the practical application of these doctrines to the existing case;—as to the fit use to be made of our discretion upon the present exigency. I am for giving the executive power as free and unfettered as possible into the hands of the Regent, but not, because I think we have no right to withhold, not because I think he has any right to claim, the whole or any part of it, but simply because, in the full exercise of our right and our discretion, I think the exigency of the present times requires, that no material portion of the functions of executive government should be placed in a state of abeyance.

This is the practical question upon which the vote of this night is to decide. But surely to the decision of this question it was not necessary for those who agree in favour of the vote, in which I am also prepared to concur, for my right hon. friend for instance who spoke just now (Mr. Sheridan) to pursue the course of argument, which he has pursued through the greater part of his speech, and which every feeling of my heart as well as every principle of fair reasoning impels me to disclaim and disavow. Is my right hon. friend jealous of any concurrence of opinion upon the present occasion, except such as shall be founded on a participation in the dissentions and enmities of 20 years ago? Is it not enough for him to obtain our votes in his favour on the question of the present day? Does he consider them as not worth having unless we will also consent to go back with him to the transactions of 1789, and to enter into all the feelings and recollections of animosity connected in his mind with the discussions of that turbulent and agitated period?—unless we will join him in all that he alledges against his political antagonists of that day? Sir, I have heard these things from my right hon. friend (Mr. Sheridan) with peculiar pain: but he is not the first that has resorted to this singular species of reasoning.—What advantage any man, or any set of men, can propose to themselves from substituting for argument upon the question now actually under discussion, attacks upon the characters of persons now no more; and particularly (what from my right hon. friend I should have expected less than from any other) upon the memory of that great man, who bore a principal part in the proceedings of that period, I am utterly at a loss to imagine. Can it be necessary in our present difficult and distressing situation—a situation sufficiently full of divisions and distractions, to rake up the ashes of the dead for the purpose of kindling new flames amongst the living? For my own part I have the satisfaction to feel, that such is neither my opinion nor my practice. No man can accuse me of having ever gone out of my way, in any discussion in this House, to speak with disrespect of those, who differed from Mr. Pitt when living, and who are now gathered together with him in the peace and shelter of the grave. For myself, and I hope for all those who have imbibed their political sentiments from the same master, I can confidently say that we do not desire to erect an altar to the object of our veneration with materials picked from the sepulchral monuments of his rival. The character of him, whom we reverence and regret, we are satisfied may safely be suffered to rest upon its positive merits. It shines without contrast:—its lustre is all its own, and requires not the extinction of the reputations of others to make it blaze with a brighter flame.

I cannot—I own I cannot, conceive the feelings and policy of those, who pursue an opposite system. I cannot understand the wisdom of reviving at this moment those party heats and political and personal animosities, which the hand of death, one should have thought, might well be allowed to have closed: and which the progress of time might of itself be supposed to have obliterated. Is this the foretaste which the hon. and the right hon. gentlemen opposite think fit to give of the spirit in which their new government is to be conducted? Entering upon a new scene of things in which even if they could forget and cause to be forgotten every subsisting hostility, every partiality and prejudice, by which the political men now living are divided, they would still have difficulties enough to encounter. Do they think their administration requires any additional embarrassment? or do they think, that it will be a facility to it, that they should array against themselves the wishes and the feelings of every man in this House and in the country, who shares those sentiments, which it is my pride and satisfaction to cherish and to avow for my late illustrious and venerated friend? I doubt, Sir, if an undeserved attack upon that great man can add any thing to the strength of their future government; I am sure it adds nothing to the force of their arguments on the question now before us.

But my right hon. friend (Mr. Sheridan) was not the first to introduce this invidious topic into our present deliberations. He has but followed the example of an hon. and learned member, (sir Samuel Romilly) who had last night the merit, if merit it can be called, of relieving the dry discussion of the question now at issue by opening an attack, as unjust as uncalled for, and as singular as either, upon the memory of Mr. Pitt. Sir, I then repressed my feelings, strong as they were at the moment; and resolved to abstain from any animadversion upon the hon. and learned gent.'s proceeding. My hon. friend opposite to me (Mr. Wilberforce) had executed that duty in a way which left nothing to regret or to supply: and at the period of the debate, at which it was my fortune to rise, I was more anxious to bring back the attention of the House to the real subject of the debate, than to lead it back to a topic, which I hoped would not be reverted to again, and the introduction of which into these discussions, while I condemned it in others, I would not willingly countenance by my own example. But when I find that the hon. and learned gent.'s example is contagious—that even my right hon. friend (Mr. Sheridan) is infected by it—that it appears to be a measure of party to run down the fame of Mr. Pitt, I could not answer it to my conscience or to my feelings, if I had suffered repeated provocation to pass without notice. Mr. Pitt it seems was not a great man! (loud cries of hear, hear, hear!) Is it then that we live in such heroic times—that the present is a race of such gigantic talents and qualities as to render those of Mr. Pitt in the comparison ordinary and contemptible? Who, then is the man now living—is there any man now sitting in this House, who by taking the measure of his own mind or of that of any of his contemporaries can feel himself justified in pronouncing that Mr. Pitt was not a great man? I admire as much as any man the abilities and ingenuity of the hon. and learned gent. who promulgated this opinion. I do not deny to him many of the qualities which go to constitute the character which he has described. But I think I may defy all his ingenuity to frame any definition of that character, which shall not apply to Mr. Pitt—to trace any circle of greatness from which Mr. Pitt shall be excluded.

I have no manner of objection to see placed on the same pedestal with Mr. Pitt for the admiration of the present age and of posterity other distinguished men, and amongst them his great rival, whose memory is, I have no doubt, as dear to the hon. gentlemen opposite, as that of Mr. Pitt is to those, who loved him living, and who revere him dead. But why should the admiration of one be incompatible with justice to the other? Why cannot we cherish the remembrance of the respective objects of our veneration, leaving to each other a similar freedom? For my own part, I disclaim such a spirit of intolerance. Be it the boast and the characteristic of the school of Pitt, that, however provoked by illiberal and unjust attacks upon his memory whether in speeches in this House, or in calumnies out of it, they will never so far forget the respect due to him or to themselves as to be betrayed into reciprocal illiberality and injustice—that they disdain to retaliate upon the memory of Mr. Pitt's great rival.

From the hon. gentlemen opposite I see we are not to expect similar forbearance; they are not so tolerant. Their feelings appear to be something like those of a Catholic archbishop, of whom I have heard, in a foreign country, with which a treaty was not long ago negociating, in which treaty was inserted an article stipulating the toleration of the Protestant religion in that country. This stipulation was vehemently opposed by the archbishop; and when it was urged to his eminence that, as the Catholic religion was tolerated in England, the Protestant religion ought to be tolerated by the foreign prince, "The cases," he observed, "are widely different, the false religion is bound to tolerate the true, but it does not thence follow that the true religion ought to tolerate the false" (a laugh). It is on some such principle of reasoning, I suppose, that the gentlemen opposite considering their creed as the only true political faith, and us Pittites as heretics, think themselves at liberty to give full licence to their attacks on the memory of Mr. Pitt, though never provoked to it by any wanton or intemperate reflections upon the character of that statesman, who is the theme of their praise and the object of their worship.

It is to me matter of equal regret and surprise, that any set of men should conceive that by such means they can either raise themselves or strengthen their party. If persons of that description should become the advisers of the Regent; and if the system they mean to recommend is founded not on positive but on negative principles, not on a practical consideration of the true interests of the country, but on personal antipathies to those, who have heretofore conducted its affairs, on a proscription of Mr. Pitt's foreign and domestic policy; and on a constant determination to detract from the memory of that great man (for so I hope I may still call him) my first wish is undoubtedly that his royal highness may disdain to act upon such advice. But even could I be brought to apprehend, that his royal highness would adopt such a system, if recommended to him, and would act upon it, even that consideration would not alter my conduct to night upon the question immediately before us. My principles indeed would compel me to differ from such a system of government when carried into effect; and whilst even to such a government I trust I should not give a factious opposition, I should undoubtedly feel it to be a duty to watch its measures with jealousy and suspicion. But even in the contemplation of that possibility I would not now vote for disarming the government of the Regent of any of those powers, which are so necessary to its due efficiency, and which were originally given to the crown as a trust for the benefit of the people. If all that the hon. gentlemen have had in view is to lessen the satisfaction, with which a vote can be given in favour of their amendment by any man, who agrees with them not in party but in principle on this particular occasion, in that view they have succeeded. It is with reluctance, that I concur in a vote supported by such arguments as theirs. But as the vote is in my judgment right, I must conquer that reluctance. I think it my duty to lend my feeble aid to constitute an executive government as strong as the constitution allows and the times require: confiding in the virtues of the illustrious personage to whom the power is to be entrusted, that no ill use will be made of it whoever may be his advisers; but confident that, whoever may advise him or whatever their advice may be, the executive power cannot be so strong, but that parliament will have strength, if necessary, to check and to controul it.

said, that he did not rise to attempt an answer to that blaze of zeal which after the right hon. gentleman's silence of yesterday, and after 24 hours of calm consideration, had so unexpectedly burst forth, but merely to defend himself against that most unjust attack which the right hon. gent. had thought proper to make on him. The right hon. gent. notwithstanding what he had been pleased to say, perfectly well knew that he (sir S.) had not the merit, as he had been pleased ironically to term it, of introducing Mr. Pitt's name into these debates. The name of Mr. Pitt had been put forward by the gentlemen on the other side of the House, and had been relied on as giving weight and authority to the precedent of 1788. The right hon. gent. could not but know this, for he had so used the name of Mr. Pitt himself, and had in some degree apologized for departing in any respect from a precedent which was supported by so great an authority. He should have been very much ashamed if he really had diverted the attention of the House from the real question before it, for the purpose of throwing reflections on the memory of Mr. Pitt, or of any other individual, but the precedent of 1788 resting principally on the authority of Mr. Pitt, what he had said of him was in truth only an answer to an argument used on the other side, and he had no choice but to answer that argument, or by his silence and acquiescence to admit its validity. Even in courts of justice when precedents are cited, it is usual to discuss the characters and the merits of the judges, on whose authority they rest. Few men knew themselves, but he must be a very remarkable instance of self ignorance, if he really was a person who had a high opinion of himself, or who had the folly and presumption to think of measuring other mens' merits by the standard of himself. An hon. friend of his, one of the members for Yorkshire, who had, on the preceding night, without feeling the necessity of previous prepara- tion, in the simple language of the heart, defended his friend's memory, had advised him to add to his reading, that he might be the better able to estimate Mr. Pitt's character, but it could not be necessary for him to read, in order to learn the history of Mr. Pitt's administration; he had been himself a witness of it, he had been, he hoped, no inattentive observer of all the transactions of Mr. Pitt's public life. He spoke, therefore, of what he had himself seen, and knew, and though the opinion he had formed might be erroneous, he had stated on what it was founded. He had never disputed that Mr. Pitt possessed the most splendid talents, but he could not recollect how those talents had been employed, how the influence which he so long enjoyed had been exerted, and what opportunities of improving the condition of his fellow creatures he had lost, and join in that veneration which some men felt for his memory. If the right hon. gent. had in plain and simple language just pointed out the acts of Mr. Pitt's administration which he (sir S.) had overlooked, or if he had only told him, to what class of his Majesty's subjects he was to turn to discover increased happiness and comfort the effects of Mr. Pitt's talents, or to what part of the empire he might look to "read his history in a nation's eyes," he would have much better served the memory of his friend than by all this laboured accumulation of eloquence.

could not but think the zeal of the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Canning) intemperate and unbecoming, and he trusted that the manner in which it had been met by the hon. and learned gent. who had just sat down, would operate as a warning to that right hon. gent. not to suffer himself to be betrayed into such warmth of feeling and expression in future. With respect to Mr. Pitt, he felt no personal enmity against him. He had known him well by having been for sixteen years a close observer of his conduct and administration. But as to the eulogium of the right hon. gent., drawn forth as it had been by an allusion to Mr. Pitt's public conduct, he must say that it appeared to him not a panegyric upon the character of the man, but upon the system of government of which he was the head. He had no desire to add to the warmth which had been expressed on the subject, and it was his wish to reserve the observations he had to make on the memory of Mr. Pitt, until he had considered the question before the House.—The hon. baronet then took a view of the Resolutions, commenting on the restrictions which they contained, and shewing their trifling and vexatious nature in some instances, and their dangerous influence in others. Of the former kind he considered the restraint on the creation of peers, a restraint altogether nugatory and trifling, for the privilege, such as it was, in his opinion, should belong to the Regent. As to that Resolution by which such extraordinary power was to be conferred on the Queen, it was in itself so monstrous, that he could not imagine that it was possible the House could sanction it by their approbation. The comfort of his Majesty would, of course, be consulted, but all power and influence of the regal character should belong to the Regent. He professed his surprise at many doctrines which he had heard respecting the regal influence; when it was now said that the influence of the Prince's council was to be of an overwhelming nature, and to sweep before it all the barriers of the constitution. This language, and the doctrines which it contained were foreign from the idea he had formed of the constitution, and not to be found in those authorities to which he had been instructed to apply for constitutional information. From these authorities he had learned, that the happiness of the people under our form of government would be best promoted by a strong executive, and a House of Commons freely chosen, and subject to no undue or unconstitutional influence. By the measures now sought to be introduced, oligarchy, the worst of all possible forms of government, was, in fact, introduced. The hon. baronet again reverted to the administration of Mr. Pitt, asserting that its effects were as injurious to the independence of Europe as they were ruinous to his native country—an administration attended with continental desolation and domestic calamity — an administration, which had reduced the people of this country almost to the condition of the Romans under their worst emperors, when, as the historian expressed it, they were "odio et terrori servi"—an administration, which, by its persecution of the rights and liberties of the subject, had realised in this land of freedom a system of terror not to be exceeded by the atrocious crimes of Robespiere. He was now, however, inclined to look forward to better days. The times of delusion were rapidly passing away; and the people of this country, if restored to their rights, would be able to maintain them against any assailants.

rose to make an observation on what had fallen from gentlemen on both sides of the House, with respect to the memories of the great statesmen so frequently, and, in his mind, so unnecessarily, introduced. It would be wise to bury in eternal oblivion all animosities arising from the rivalship of the great men alluded to. The question of comparison had been unfortunately introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but, as that was foreign from the question before them, he would carefully avoid it. Their frailties should now rest in oblivion, their errors should not be mentioned. From this idea, he regretted extremely the language of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning), as well as that which it had called forth from his hon. and learned friend. But in defending the memory of his departed friend, the right hon. gent. had endeavoured to fasten an insinuation on the memory of his illustrious friend, which, from a thorough knowledge of the mind of Mr. Fox, he knew to be destitute of foundation. In a tone of triumph he had asked if this propensity to calumny was to be the mark of a Foxite; but from a long acquaintance with him he could say, that of all his virtues none was so conspicuous as his entire exemption from the low and grovelling passion of malignity. He hoped that the right hon. gent. would see the injustice of charging his side of the House with aspersions on the memory of his friend. It certainly was far from his intention to heap obloquy on his memory; he hoped, therefore, that the language of gentlemen on both sides would be free from any aspersions of this nature, and more temperate and more conciliating.

expressed his approbation of the conduct of the right hon. gent.; such an acknowledgment was all he desired.

, in reference to what had fallen from the right hon. gent. opposite, who seemed to consider himself as exclusively the friend of Mr. Pitt, rose to say, that (though he did not look upon himself as exclusively the friend of Mr. Fox), he did not wish himself to be regarded as included in the acknowledgment made by his right hon. friend.

The question being loudly called for strangers were ordered to withdraw. The Amendment made by lord Porchester was negatived without a division; so that the first, second, third, and fourth Resolutions passed, as originally proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Upon the fifth Resolution, which, had been amended, in the Committee by a majority of 13 (see p. 598), the Chancellor of the Exchequer divided the House, and his amendment, which went to restore it to its original state (see p. 550,) was negatived upon a division by a majority of three.