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Commons Chamber

Volume 18: debated on Friday 4 January 1811

House of Commons

Friday, January 4, 1811.

Issues of Public Money for the Service of the Army and Navy

On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the following Letter was presented to the House:

"Copy of a Letter from the Deputy Clerks of the Privy Seal, of the 4th January 1811; stating their Reasons why they could not prepare Letters to pass the Privy Seal, for the Issue of certain Sums of Money for the service of the Navy and Army.

Privy Seal Office, 4th Jan. 1811.

"Sir; In pursuance of your request, by command of the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, that we should state, in writing, the reason which induced us to acquaint the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that we could not execute the command to prepare Letters to pass the Privy Seal, for the issue of certain sums of money for the Navy and Army; we have no difficulty in complying with your request.

"The course of official routine, before we present the Letters of Privy Seal to the Lord Keeper, is as follows; A Warrant, signed by the King, and countersigned by three Lords of the Treasury, is directed to the Clerk of the Signet, ordering him to prepare a Bill for the Royal Signature, to cause Letters of Privy Seal to pass. The Clerk of the Signet then prepares a transcript of this bill, which being signed with his name, as examined, after having his Majesty's Signet affixed to it, is directed to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Upon receiving this, the Clerk of the Privy Seal has a transcript of it prepared; but previous to examining it, it is customary for him to send a Docquet, which in point of fact is a copy of the Docquet subjoined to the Bill, which is prepared by the Clerk of the Signet for the Royal Signature. This Docquet commences with the words following:

"'His Majesty's warrant for issuing, &c. &c.'"—and terminates, "Subscribed for Mr. —*, by Warrant under his Majesty's Royal Sign Manual;" countersigned by three Lords of the Treasury. This Docquet is compared with the Docquet to the King's Bill, afore-mentioned; and the Clerk of the Privy Seal in waiting, writes at the end of it "Examined;" signing his name. Upon this being returned signed by three Lords of the Treasury, the letters of Privy Seal are compared with the Signet Transcript, and being likewise signed by the said Clerk, are laid before the Lord Keeper, in order that the Privy Seal may be affixed thereto.

"Our objection to signing the Letters of Privy Seal, therefore, was, that we conceived it would be departing from the official line of our duty, and acting contrary to the express letter and spirit of our oath, if we signed these Letters of Privy Seal prior to the usual Docquet being returned to the office, countersigned by three Lords of the Treasury. We considered this of the greater importance, as we have always conceived the Docquet to be a certificate, under the hands of their lordships, that the Royal Signature had actually been affixed.

"Moreover, as the Lord Keeper always retains the Signet, and Docquet, as his vouchers for affixing the Seal; and the entry of the Docquet is the only record remaining in the office.

"The tenor of the oath is as follows:

"'You shall be true to our Sovereign Lord the King, his heirs and successors, Kings and Queens of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and them faithfully serve to the best of your power, as one of their Clerks in the office of Privy Seal; and during the time you shall continue in the same, you shall not prefer nor colourably present to the Keeper of the Privy Seal or Commissioners for the execution of the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal for the time being any manner of thing to pass the Seal, but such only as you shall have sufficient Warrant for, by writing or by mouth granted or given by the King's

* The Clerk of the Signet.

'Majesty, or some of his Highness's Council in the Court of Requests.—You shall not disclose any of his Majesty's causes to you commanded to be kept secret, until such time as publication be thereof made. And you shall not seek to break any order used for the attendance of the Clerks of the said office, or by colour thereof take any profits growing by the Seal of the said office, and thereby defraud them of the whole due or any parcel thereof.—So help you God, and by the holy Evangelists.'

"(Signed) By the Clerk."

"This day of in the year of the reign of king George, the said† hath taken the oath above expressed, and subscribed his name before me‡ Keeper of the Privy Seal; and hath also taken the oaths appointed by an Act of Parliament, intituled, "An Act for abrogating the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, and appointing other Oaths." (Signed)§

We have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

JOHN LARPENT.

JOHN JAS. LARPENT."

After the reading of the above Letter,

†Clerk's name.

‡Here insert the Lord Keeper's name.

§By the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

moved the order of the day for the House to resolve into a Committee of the whole House to take into consideration the Correspondence between the Lords of the Treasury and the Auditor of the Exchequer, (see p. 677). On the question being put,

assured the right hon. gentleman that he wished not to throw any difficulty in the way of his motion, or of the proposition to be considered under it; but he thought the House should be on their guard how, under the present circumstances, they gave into the practice of going into Committees on various subjects. They had, at the commencement of the business, determined to confine themselves to the single case of appointing a Regent, and had therefore formed themselves into a Committee on the State of the Nation, and he thought this business would be much better adapted to that than to a Committee of the whole House.

apprehended the circumstances before the House were sufficient to justify such a proceeding. If the right hon. gentleman would suggest any course more in conformity to the practice of the House, he should be ready to avail himself of such suggestion, if to act upon it should be equally practicable. The information before the House justified the course he proposed from necessity, as it was necessary that certain issues should be made which could not be made without the concurrence of Parliament. It was proposed to go into a Committee, that the circumstances of the case might be taken into consideration as a prima facie proceeding. It was his intention to move in that Committee that authority be given to make certain issues. It was always considered best to discuss such subjects in a Committee. He agreed with the right hon. gentleman, that the subject might be more properly taken into consideration in a Committee on the State of the nation, had not that Committee been adjourned to Tuesday. Under such circumstances, he conceived a Committee of the whole House fully competent to provide for such an emergency. That which the House could do in itself, he thought could quite as well be done through the intermediate discussion of a Committee. He was however perfectly ready to give his acquiescence to any better mode that might be proposed.

agreed with the right hon. gentleman, that nothing should be done which was not justified by the necessity of the case. If, however they went into a Committee of the whole House on that occasion, the right of doing so might be assumed hereafter in other instances. He could well comprehend the advantages of discussing such subjects in a Committee, but he objected to going into a Committee of the whole House on that which ought to be referred to the Committee on the State of the Nation. He thought there could be no harm in their then going into a Committee on the State of the Nation, and wished to know of the Speaker, if the order for Tuesday could be discharged?

apprehended that it was not the ordinary course of the House to discharge its orders for the purpose of accelerating the discussion of that which might come before it. The House was the best judge of its own proceedings. It was difficult to give an opinion on the present case as a matter, or on a ground, of precedent; the Convention Parliament, at the Revolution, had confined their proceedings to the single point of filling up the vacancy in the third estate; in the Restoration Par- liament they entered into the consideration of a great many money matters and other subjects. According to the present usage of the House, he thought they could not go into a Committee on the State of the Nation, that Committee having been adjourned to Tuesday, without departing from the customary practice of the House, but in all cases he conceived Parliament had ever proceeded according to its own views of the necessity of the case.

observed, that there was but a choice of difficulties. Notice having been clearly given, that the Committee on the State of the Nation would sit on Tuesday, if they decided upon going into the Committee on the State of the Nation, then it would virtually be but a Committee of the whole House. The little importance of the mode which they might prefer, was however such that he should really feel ashamed of standing up against any considerable number of gentlemen who might feel anxious to adopt a mode different to that which he had proposed.

was of opinion that there was a great deal more than form in this objection of his rt. hon. friend, and if there was reality in it, the House ought to consider it. He would therefore submit, that the House should resolve itself into a Committee on the State of the Nation, and thought the Adjournment to Tuesday, was no bar to such a proceeding. Great importance seemed to him to attach to the name of the Committee the House should now open. It had been agreed to go into the State of the Nation only, and if it was now agreed to open any other Committee, there was no knowing where they might end.

thought, that as the Committee on the State of the Nation was adjourned only for a particular purpose, there was no sound reason why the House might not resolve themselves into the same Committee for other purposes.

had no objection to the adoption of any mode most analogous to the practices of the House. He was content to go into a Committee on the State of the Nation, if that could be allowed by the forms of the House. It was very unimportant whether the Committee were called a Committee on the State of the Nation, or a Committee of the whole House, though had not the Committee on the State of the Nation been adjourned to Tuesday, he would have given that the preference. If they went into a Committee on the State of the Nation, the order must necessarily be discharged, and the subject taken up de novo. He should have thought from the statements that had been made, there could be no objection to a Committee of the whole House, if a special entry of the reasons they had for doing so had been made.

was not of opinion that the question was quite so immaterial as some members seemed to think. They had all seen in the late discussions how much weight precedent carried with it. Where a precedent could be adduced, numbers would be found ready to follow it right or wrong, because others had acted so before. If they went into a Committee of the whole House improperly in one instance, they might claim a right to do so in another. He approved of the idea thrown out by the last speaker, of making a special entry of the reasons which induced them to do as was proposed, if they went into a Committee of the whole House. That idea had with him great weight, as if they drew up a proper explanation of their conduct, and the reasons by which they were influenced, it would be as satisfactory to posterity as to themselves.

said, that a departure from their ordinary course of proceedings might be justified by the circumstances of the case. The House could, however, adopt a middle course, by going into a Committee of the whole House, and entering on their Journals, that this was done on account of the Committee on the State of the Nation having been adjourned to Tuesday.

, though no man could bow with more deference to the chair than he did, differed from the Speaker with respect to the circumstances in which they were placed. If they went into a Committee of the whole House, when they ought to go into a Committee on the State of the Nation, entering on their Journals that which it had been proposed to insert as a reason for their adopting that line of conduct, no one could tell how far the principle might hereafter be carried, and what might be the inconveniencies which thence might arise. In point of fact, he contended, that no adjournment of the Committee on the State of the Nation had taken place. It was true that they had reported progress, and expressed their intention of sitting again on Tuesday, by asking leave to sit again on that day; but still he maintained there was nothing to prevent their sitting before. If, for instance, the King had happily recovered while they were so situated, would any one tell him that they could not sit again till Tuesday. He did not see any impropriety in their resolving themselves into a Committee on the State of the Nation immediately, if in consequence of new matter arising such a course of proceeding should appear expedient.

The question was put that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House, and carried without opposition. The House then resolved itself into the said Committee. Upon which,

immediately rose for the purpose of submitting to the Committee the Resolution, of which he had given notice on this subject, and which the peculiar urgency of the case rendered indispensable. The discussions, which had already taken place, must have put those who heard him in possession of the grounds upon which he had formed an opinion, that it would have been extremely desirable, if possible, to avoid bringing this question under the consideration of the House. It must be obvious to the Committee, why he conceived it an infinitely better course for the responsible servants of the crown to take upon themselves the consequences of making certain issues for the public service, and to risk the censure or wait the indemnity of parliament, rather than to procrastinate public business by putting the House to the inconvenience of discussing such topics from time to time. This impression was particularly strong upon his mind, as it was absolutely impossible, that great and manifest public inconvenience must not result from the circumstance of more and more of the powers of the executive, successively devolving upon, and being exercised by the two Houses of Parliament. By the Papers which had been laid on the table, the Committee were in possession of the grounds upon which the application he was to make, rested; but as some hon. members might not have yet had an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the nature of the case, or with the peculiar circumstances which gave rise to the present demand, he thought it would not be amiss, nor unnecessarily occupy the time of the Committee, if he were to premise a few brief observations explanatory of the case, in order that every member of the Committee might be competent to decide upon it correctly.—It was hardly possible, he must observe, for any hon. gent. within the walls of that House to suppose that ministers could think themselves competent to raise one farthing of money from the public without the concurrence of parliament. Than such an idea nothing was more remote from their thoughts, and on this head he was confident no man who heard him could entertain a doubt. All that ministers had required was, that certain sums of money, which had already been granted for certain purposes by parliament, should be issued in order to be applied to those purposes for which they were granted. In making this requisition, there was a defect in point of form—that, however, which was wanting was merely an act of form, as the act relating to such issues had directed expressly that the necessary issues should be made by the Lords of the Treasury. He wished it to be distinctly understood, that it was only required that certain sums should be issued for certain services, for which they were intended,—that it had been the usage of the Exchequer to issue such sums upon such requisition—and that it could most undoubtedly be done by the authority of parliament, without its having been directed to be done by the King. It could be done by virtue of that authority which had been long acknowledged to belong to them, and not by any authority hereafter to be acquired. The signature of the King was therefore a mere matter of form, and of as little importance as it could possibly be in any one instance, if it was not of less than in any other. In the general view of what he conceived to be the direct course for ministers to pursue, the Order had been issued to the Exchequer from the Treasury. He had always thought that would be sufficient, and this he had intimated in a former debate. The manner in which that intimation had been received, seemed to imply a doubt as to whether that authority would be obeyed. In consequence of this, he had thought it his duty to ascertain the fact. Finding himself deceived in his expectation, he had then endeavoured to get the Privy Seal to the Warrant. The Keeper of the Privy Seal thought himself at liberty to apply it as appeared necessary, but the Clerks of the Privy Seal seemed to think themselves forbidden, by their oaths, to obey in this instance the instructions of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. This was an objection which could not easily have been removed. It remained then to be considered, whether there was any other course, by which the issue could be obtained for the public service, but unfortunately none could be discovered strictly speaking legal and valid. The opinions of his hon. and learned friends (the Attorney and Solicitor-General) upon a consideration of the acts, were clear as to that point. When he found, therefore, that he could not obtain the Privy Seal, and felt that it was essential for the public service that the thing should be done, he caused the two warrants to be issued from the Lords of the Treasury, requiring under the existing exigency, the issue of the sums respectively mentioned in the warrants. In reply to these warrants, a Letter was received by the Lords of the Treasury from the Auditor of the Exchequer, in which he expressed "That he had, up to that moment, been totally unapprised of any intention on the part of the Lords of the Treasury to transmit to him such warrants; but had every reason to believe that the officers of the Exchequer were to be called upon to act upon this occasion under the authority of his Majesty's privy seal, which, however irregularly it might have been obtained, would have been, in his judgment, imperative upon them. It therefore became necessary for him to consider the nature and extent of the duties which this new and unexpected course of proceedings imposed upon him, and therefore he requested to be informed within what time it would be necessary for avoiding inconveniences to the public service, that such orders should be drawn and transmitted to their lordships."—To this letter it was answered from the Treasury—"That according to the usual course of supplying the weekly issues, both to the army and navy, it would be necessary that sums should be issued beyond the amount of the existing credits, yet if orders could be so furnished, as to admit of actual issue by the following Monday, he apprehended no serious inconveniences could arise from so short a delay." To this followed a Note from the Auditor of the Exchequer, wishing for the Opinion of the law officers of the crown, and the Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General having been taken, in consequence of this request of the Auditor of the Exchequer, they were forwarded accordingly. The next Note in the correspondence was from the Auditor, who having perused the Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, and the whole of the documents communicated to him, gave it as his opinion, that the warrants of the Lords of the Treasury were not sufficient to authorise him to order the issue required. In a letter which accompanied the communication from the Lords of the Treasury, it had been stated, "That their lordships' sense of the mischief which would arise to the public service if any delay should take place in the issue of the money, required by the warrants, dated December 31, 1810, appeared to render it indispensably necessary that those warrants should be forthwith complied with, and that they were consequently ready to take upon themselves the responsibility of any act which might be necessary for that purpose." He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had certainly thought, till the receipt of the answer to that letter, that the noble Lord at the head of the Exchequer would have complied with that requisition. He had no intention of passing any censure on the conduct of that noble lord, after the Opinions given by the Attorney and Solicitor-General; yet when the Lords of the Treasury had offered to take upon themselves the whole responsibility of the act, he had hoped that the course, which that noble Lord would have taken would have been to comply with the requisition in consideration of the urgent necessity of the case, but at the same time to make a protest against the informality or illegality of the proceeding, in order distinctly to mark, that he was no party to the transaction, and to cast the responsibility altogether upon those, under whose authority he had been induced to act. That the Auditor of the Exchequer would even in such a case be in some degree responsible for acting he was not prepared to deny, but it must be obvious upon any fait view of all the circumstances, which he had detailed to the Committee, that the great weight of the responsibility would have rested, where it unquestionably ought to rest, with the Lords of the Treasury. The noble lord, however, felt differently, and feeling differently had thought proper to decline a compliance with the requisition. For his own part he would not presume to say that he might not have been wrong in the view which he had taken of this subject. Whatever may be the opinions of other gentlemen, the grounds upon which he had acted appeared perfectly satisfactory to his own mind. His conduct had been regulated throughout this business to the best of his judgment with a scrupulous regard to the principles of the constitution. If he had been capable of acting differently—if instead of acting as he had done, he had come originally to parliament, he should have expected that his conduct (in not relying on the acts of parliament which justified that conduct in his own Mind) would have been censured as one of the greatest acts of pusillanimity that ever disgraced a public officer, thus to fear applying the money voted by parliament for certain purposes to the services for which it had been granted. He would here read to the House two clauses from the Care and Appropriation Acts. The first was from cap. 45 of the act passed last session, for raising twelve millions (if he was not mistaken) by loan. [Here he proceeded to read the clause, which enacted that it should be lawful for any three or more of the Lords of the Treasury, or the High Treasurer of England, to issue certain sums of money for certain purposes.] He wished it to be observed, that it was there enacted, that it should be lawful for three or more Lords of the Treasury to order such issues. (He then proceeded to read the clause in the Appropriation Act, which set forth, that certain sums were to be applied to the purposes, for which they were voted, by the Lords of the Treasury.) From the evidence thus afforded, and from every thing else, he thought, that in point of strict law he should have laid himself more open to censure, if he had originally come to parliament for authority to perform an act of executive government, when he had the forms for the requisite issues thus pointed out to him by the acts he had cited. When, however, his learned friends (the Attorney and Solicitor Generals) had given him their opinions on the subject, and convinced him that warrants so issued were not valid, he had still felt that that was the line of conduct proper to be pursued, as it was the mode most analogous to that pursued in ordinary cases. Such were his ideas on the subject; and if, instead of acting conformably to those ideas, he had thrown unnecessarily more of the executive power into parliament, and tremblingly abstained from or- dering such issues as he felt the emergency of the case required, from a dread of their censure, that censure would have been richly deserved. With this feeling he had taken upon himself to issue the order he had given. That he might have done that which in the opinion of some was unconstitutional, unprincipled, and illegal, he was aware, but he trusted that his justification would be found in the necessity of the case.—The principles upon which he had acted were those, which appeared to him most consistent with his duty as a member of his Majesty's government, and best calculated to promote the public service; and, however, it may please gentlemen to assimilate or compare him to Reubell or any other member of the directory of Revolutionary France, he would assure those hon. gentlemen that he should not be deterred by any such imputations from pursuing what his conscience told him was the line of his duty. In the same spirit of fairness he and his colleagues had been called usurpers, who had taken the whole executive power into their own hands, but he trusted the House would not be greatly surprised at finding he was but little alarmed at such imputations. This was one of the usurpations of which he had been guilty—this was one of the stretches of power which might be laid to his charge. He knew of no public inconveniences that had arisen from their usurpations, as they had been called. He had never said that no inconveniences would arise from the indisposition of his Majesty, but he had said, that no sudden inconvenience was to be expected to arise within the period for which he on a former occasion proposed to adjourn, equal to that which might be expected to result from the adoption of any precipitate measures. He was certain gentlemen would not have any hesitation in coming to some resolution for allowing the requisite issues to be made. He was confident it would not be said, that no resolution of the nature of that which he intended to propose ought to be come to by the Committee. What public inconvenience was to be expected from it? He had been asked, why he had not brought the subject forward at an earlier period? He would readily answer that question. He had thought the mode of proceeding which he had recommended strictly legal till he was better informed by his learned friends. He had, therefore, in the first instance anticipated no difficulty. Afterwards when he found there was a difficulty, he had expected it would have been removed by means of the privy seal. Failing there again, he had caused the warrants to be issued on their own responsibility by the Lords of the Treasury. When he did this be was aware of the nature of the step he took, but it was one which he felt authorised by the necessity of the case at the period when it was taken.—Had he taken such a step a fortnight ago, there would not have been the same necessity, at that period, of calling upon the auditor, and consequently not the same justification of the act. Feeling, therefore, the full force of this consideration, he had thought it proper to make such an application at a period when he felt it was justified by necessity, while at the same time it afforded them an opportunity of discussing its expediency in Parliament. It had been said that those who professed the greatest veneration for the precedent of 1788, were acting in direct opposition to it in 1811.—That they were taking a course contrary to the one pursued at that period. He would be glad to know if there were any authority for that assertion.—Had those who made that assertion any means of proving that what was now proposed was the reverse of what would have been recommended by the administration of that day. If they had any such authority, let it be immediately produced. If no such step was taken at that period, it did not follow that the step now taken would not then have been adopted under similar circumstances. If no such measure had been recommended by the government or the parliament at that time, it might be that no such measure was called for by the circumstances of the times, and therefore that was not authorised then which was justified by necessity now. The change which had taken place in the situation of things, might easily account for this. At that period we were in a state of profound peace, at the present day the country was involved in war. Then no serious inconveniences could be apprehended from the delay of issues as in the present instance, and therefore there was nothing to justify the proceeding which was now found necessary for the public good. With respect to the administration of the domestic concerns of the country, it went on without the immediate interference of his Majesty. His patents given under the great seal, &c. &c. enabled all the departments of government to continue to exercise their authority thus legitimately gained. There were some instances in which the royal signature was of necessity required to enable the officers of the crown to go on with the public business. The judges, however, were not interrupted in the administration of justice; their commissions fully authorising them to continue the exercise of their judicial functions. In March 1789, previous to his Majesty's recovery, the judges went their circuits, as they usually do under the authority of the great seal, and he could not think the judges of England would have done this had it been illegal. There were also many serjeants and law officers, on those occasions, usually put into the commissions by the King's sign manual; these officers were at that period supplied, though they could not be put in the usual way, and this circumstance proved to demonstration that that great law authority of whom mention had in the course of these discussions been made so often, felt that necessity could authorise him to act as he did, and to do that which was not regular, and which, under other circumstances, might be censured as illegal. Actuated by a similar feeling, the then lord lieutenant of Ireland had given orders which he conceived to be essential to the public service, with respect to the troops to be sent to and received from America.

In the order which he had directed to be issued from the treasury to the exchequer, and in the letter which followed, he had given the officers of the exchequer authority to make the issues, for which, though undoubtedly they would in some degree be answerable, the lords of the treasury avowed their willingness to take the whole of the responsibility upon themselves. That he thought was the proper line of conduct for persons in office to pursue. A person situated as he was, ought, in his opinion to say, when he found it necessary to issue any order; so and so must be done, I cannot legally authorise the doing of it, but you know the circumstances of the case, and you must trust to a covering authority hereafter, and hold yourself justified by the necessity of the case.—This, however, was not to be done but in a case of necessity. He thought it important that they should concur, if he took a right view of the subject, in thinking that parliament ought not to be unnecessarily applied to for an exertion of the executive power. There were those who contended, that if the army in Portugal wanted support, reinforcements ought not to be sent, if the Houses were sitting, without an application to parliament. This went to say, that the sanction of parliament should be gained before any thing should be done at any time, by the King. If they could not send out troops at any time without the authority of the King, under any circumstances, as much embarrassment might possibly arise within the first fortnight that the parliament had adjourned, as within the six weeks of which so much had been said. Could it be said that ministers should come down and say to parliament, that reinforcements were necessary to be sent to Portugal, and move a resolution empowering them to send out troops, if it should appear expedient? Would it not be said that a minister who would thus seek to get an anticipatory vote, acted more improperly than he who said he was placed in an embarrassing situation, but having no present means of getting out of it, as he could not immediately resign, acted as circumstances seemed to require, and took the responsibility upon himself. He who would come down to gain first the sanction of Parliament to that which might become necessary, would lead them to vote in the dark, or he must lay before them the whole of the documents relating to the army, showing the situation in which they then were, the nature and extent of the requisitions made by its command, the plan on which it was proposed to act—whether an offensive or defensive system was to be adopted—in short every thing connected with the subject must be laid before them, that every point might be discussed, the effect of which would be to let the enemy know in a few hours what was intended to be done, or what were the formidable apprehensions entertained. He hoped it would appear obvious, that it was better that ministers should act on their own responsibility, than to have the affairs of the country carried on in such a manner. The case in which they stood at present was a case of actual necessity. The money required was essential to the public service, and could be obtained by no other means than those by which they endeavoured to gain it. He was persuaded that it must appear to the House highly inexpedient for ministers to be obliged to come every week or so to parliament on such an occasion. It was proper that the Lords of the Treasury should have the power of ordering issues, notwithstanding the forms of the exchequer, and it was better that that power should be at once given by one vote, than by repeated resolutions, in consequence of repeated applications to parliament. Feeling this, his resolution would begin by stating it to be necessary, under existing circumstances, that certain sums granted for certain specified services should be issued and applied to the services for which they had been granted; and that it was expedient the Lords of the Treasury should issue warrants, for such issues, which the officers of the exchequer should be bound to obey. He would now move his resolution, which was rather long, but which he trusted would meet with the approbation of the Committee.—The right hon. gent. then moved,—"That it is the opinion of this Commitee, that it is necessary, in the exigencies of the present conjuncture, that, until due provision shall be made for supplying the defect in the royal authority, such sums as have been appropriated for the services of the Navy and Army, by the act of last session of parliament, and other acts for enabling his Majesty to raise three millions, should be issued, in conformity with said acts accordingly; and that it is expedient that the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury should be required to issue their warrants to the Auditor of the Exchequer, for the payment of such sums as the exigency may render necessary; and that the said Auditor and Officers of the Exchequer are authorised and commanded to pay obedience to the warrant in this behalf, and to pay such sums as appear necessary, according to the warrants of any three or more of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, which they may issue from time to time."

On the question being put upon the Resolution,

said, he thought the course which the right hon. gent. had pursued was the best, the wisest, and the manliest that could be adopted under the circumstances: it met with his entire and most decided approbation. He wished that provision had been made to meet the exigency earlier, but as matters stood the right hon. gent. had done his best for the good of the country, he stood forward fairly, he did not shrink from responsibility, and was entitled to the applause of the country. Admiring, as he frequently had occasion to admire, the manly, fair, and candid manner in which that right hon. gent. had acted upon former occa- sions, he trusted that neither he nor the House would think it impertinent in him to have expressed his opinion upon the present.

said, that if the right hon. gent. felt himself in a distressing situation with respect to the issue of money necessary for the public service, it would be incumbent on the House to go a little back and consider what were the circumstances which led to this distressing situation. Parliament met on the 1st of November, the day to which they had been prorogued. Frequent adjournments had been proposed by that right hon. gent. and agreed to upon his distinct assertion, that no practical inconvenience would result from those adjournments. It now appeared under the right hon. gentleman's own hand, that an issue of public money must be made contrary to the practice of the Exchequer; that the usual forms in making such issues must be deviated from; or that a great public inconvenience would be suffered. The right hon. gentleman, indeed, had endeavoured to obtain the money without recurring to parliament; but in this attempt he had not succeeded. Notwithstanding the urgency of the occasion and the necessity of his being furnished with the means of meeting it, the right hon. gent. had gone on without apprising the House of the real state of the case, while he could command a guinea, and it was not till his money was exhausted, and he was no longer aware of any regular means of drawing more from the Exchequer, that he had thought proper to apply to parliament for authority to call upon the Exchequer for the issues indispensably necessary for the public service. The right hon. gent. however, had said, that as the sums of money had been appropriated by Act of Parliament for those services, he thought the warrants of the Lords of the Treasury were legal, until he was informed by the Attorney and Solicitor-General that they were not legal. He had also said, that it never entered his head that the Auditor of the Exchequer would refuse to issue the money on these warrants, and it was on that account that he did not state to the House an inconveence which he did not anticipate. If he felt so little doubt upon this point, why did not he think of the warrant in the first instance? How came it, on the contrary, that it was to the Privy Seal he looked in the first place; and that it was only when he could not obtain the Privy Seal, in con- sequence of the scruples of the clerk, and when he could not get the Great Seat either, then and not sooner, he should have thought of the warrant. It appeared evidently, then, that he must have known of the illegality of the treasury warrants, and ought therefore to have anticipated difficulties in obtaining issues of money by their means.—But it was asked, why should not the officers of the Exchequer subject themselves to the same responsibility which the Lords of the Treasury were ready to take! It was very easy to see the difference. The authors of the public exigency must of course be responsible for their measures. Why did they not sooner fill up the deficiency in the Royal Authority? If the Royal Authority had been supplied by the proper representative as soon as it ought to have been supplied, this difficulty would never have occurred; and it would be too much to expect that the Auditor of the Exchequer was to take upon himself any part of the responsibility which was occasioned solely by the delays of ministers. The right hon. gent. had said, that the difficulty did not occur in 1788; but then it must be remembered, that that was a period of profound peace, and consequently such issues were not wanting to pay the army and navy as were now wanting. The financial necessities of the country in 1811 were so very different from what they were in 1788, that in this point the precedent would not apply at all. It had been allowed by the right hon. gent. as an abstract proposition, that while Parliament was sitting it was the duty of ministers to apply to them in cases of difficulty; but the right hon. gent. had also put cases to shew, that the abstract principle would not apply to the present circumstances. He stated, that if reinforcements were to be sent to the Continent it would be injurious to the public service to have any disclosures made in Parliament. But here again the same question occurred, was it right to keep the regal authority so long unsupplied? If, while ministers were sending reinforcements to the Continent, they had proceeded pari passu in filling up the executive government, no one would have blamed them for what their duty as ministers required them to do in the interval. If however they chose rather to make a most unnecessary delay in supplying the royal power, they might certainly execute some of the functions of royalty on their own responsibility; but they were not to expect other persons to share with them in this responsibility.—The real question, which the committee was in that instance to consider, lay in a very narrow compass. Every loan bill and appropriation act stated, that the authority by which the money was to be issued should be under the signature of three Lords of the Treasury. Another act however stated, that money should only be issued under the Great Seal or the King's sign manual, or by the positive directions of an act of Parliament. The constitution and the law did therefore clearly mean to put some check upon the Lords of the Treasury. If it were not so, they would have the entire, revenue of the country completely in their own hands. It was now allowed by the right hon. gent. on the authority of the Attorney and Solicitor General, that the warrant was not legal. Now, what was it that he wanted the Auditor of the Exchequer to do? Why having himself brought the country into the exigency, he calls upon lord Grenville to help him for whatever time he chooses to retain the power in his own hands, by issuing money from the Exchequer in a manner contrary to law, and to the practice of the office. This was what he could hardly expect lord Grenville to do. The officers of the Exchequer would prefer being governed by the constitutional power of Parliament, rather than by the unconstitutional and assumed power of the right hon. gent. If there was not some check or limitation on the powers of the right hon. gent. he would have no occasion to fill up the deficiency in the royal authority at all. He might go on for weeks, for months, or years without a Regent, if he was enabled on his own warrant, or the warrant of three Lords of the Treasury, to draw the whole revenues of the nation out of the Exchequer, and apply them as he thought proper. He wished, however, that it should be recollected, that no public inconvenience had happened on this account, and that Parliament had now been sitting for a considerable time, and ministers had only themselves to blame for not stating this difficulty sooner.

said, that his right hon. friend had in the first instance tried to obtain the Privy Seal, after having failed in which he naturally had recourse to the Auditor of the Exchequer. The words of the acts which his right hon. friend had quoted, did authorise the Lords of the Treasury to issue money, but the noble lord contended that the words should not be so interpreted, and that the authority of the Privy Seal, or the Sign Manual, was essentially required. He (Mr. Rose) could hardly think, that words so plain, as those of the acts to which be alluded could have any other meaning than that ascribed to them by his right hon. friend. The act of William, it was true, directed that no money should issue from the Exchequer unless upon the authority of acts directing its application, but here were the particular acts which gave that authority. What said the words of the consolidation act? it said that the dividends should be issued by the Lords of the Treasury, and by no other. Did these words admit of no more than one interpretation. To the conduct of lord Grenville he did not attach the slightest blame; he had no doubt but that he was actuated by a wish to do his duty, but the words of the law were so positive that he was not surprised at the application made by his right hon. friend. What he rose principally to shew was, that the Lords of the Treasury were in the habit every half year, at the payment of the dividends, of acting against the principle to which they were now attempted to be restricted.

observed, that there were some parts of the speech of the right hon. gent. which he was compelled to notice. When he first read the Loan and the Appropriation Acts, he certainly was not clear but that the treasury might issue warrants for the disbursement of money from the Exchequer; and it was not until he heard the opinions and the very respectable law authority of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General to the contrary, as grounded on the invariable practice of the Exchequer, that his opinion to the contrary was decided. To their authority he bowed with great deference; but after all, that did not affect the merits of the question before them in the shape of a Resolution, as proposed by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That Resolution shewed more strongly than all the logic and all the eloquence of all the members of that House put together, the necessity that existed of supplying without delay the deficiency that existed in the executive government. Nothing could more forcibly demonstrate the imprudence of the course they had been persuaded by the hon. gentlemen opposite to take—to pass by the plain, simple, obvious, and constitutional mode of pro- ceeding, sanctioned by the precedent of one of the best parliaments that ever the country saw, for the purpose of preferring a mode founded on fiction, and inconsistent with the law, the constitution, and even with common sense or reason. Look at the Resolution—you thereby "require the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury to issue their warrants to the auditors of the receipt of the exchequer, for the payment of such sums as the exigency of the case may render necessary;" and go on to state that "the said auditor and officers of the Exchequer are hereby authorized and commanded to pay obedience to the warrants in this behalf."—Here, then, were the Houses of Parliament, in direct words, undertaking the executive authority, and commanding the officers of the Exchequer to issue monies. Were those of his side of this House during the late discussions wrong, when they said, that if the mode recommended by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer were followed, it would lead to the usurpation by parliament, of the power of the crown? He indeed, did not expect that the truth of their opinion would be so soon verified; that it would be so speedily proved, that if they took the step recommended to them, they would be compelled to follow it up by doing what was not warranted by the law or the constitution. When the right hon. gent. last night made his statement, he (Mr. Ponsonby) was struck with the exigency of the case; but he had no idea that the right hon. gent. would attempt to obviate the difficulty by such a measure as he had now proposed. He supposed he would rather have asked an opinion or declaration of the House, that when it met legally as a parliament it would do all in its power to indemnify those responsible for the act, which might be resorted to under the pressure of the necessity of the case. But it never occurred to him that a Resolution like this would be offered—a Resolution to assume the authority of the three estates, and of the crown acting in full concert with the legislative bodies. With such a Resolution he could never concur. Much had been said of the courage of ministers, in being willing to encounter all responsibility on this occasion. When responsibility was incurred for the purpose of serving the country, no man would applaud more than himself the minister who fearlessly incurred it for the public good. But he did not give such praise in the present instance, when the right hon. gent. had brought the difficulty upon himself and them, and it was only his own conduct which rendered responsibility at all necessary. The right hon. gent. had told them he was not answerable for the delays sanctioned by parliament. This was true: he was not responsible for what parliament had agreed to on his statement, he could only be responsible for giving false information to induce parliament to do what they would not otherwise have done.—But this was not the question now. They had to consider whether they would vote this Resolution or not. For himself, he felt an invincible objection to it, and he cared not whether they assumed the royal authority to command the officers of the Exchequer to act, or took the Great Seal into their hands—to both he had insuperable dislike. He would object alike to the one and the other; and for this reason—because they had an obvious mode of avoiding both, by promptly, safely, and immediately supplying the deficiency in the royal authority. In that case the three estates being full and complete, the constitutional orders necessary for the public service might have been legally given; but by the course now taken, they were involved in acts against the constitution, as well as against common sense and reason. The question had ben puzzled with legal definitions and arguments, but he was sure that no plain man, not perplexed with these subtleties, could hesitate for a moment between the two courses. The one presented a clear unembarrassed mode of surmounting their difficulties; the other was a phantom which would lead them to no good result. He objected to the Resolution as growing out of their original error—out of their original sin. It was impossible to sanction it; but, whether high or low—whoever it was in office who did any thing for the public service, he would at a future period go as far as any man to indemnify them for such acts.

said, that the objection of the right hon. gent. to the issuing a command by the House, must fall to the ground when they referred to the letter of lord Grenville. It was there asserted by the noble Lord, that "with them resided, under the present exigency, the power to command those official seals, the use of which would constitute an imperative and unquestionable authority to the officers of the exchequer." The House had no reason to think, that the bare declaration of an opinion as recommended by the right hon. gent. would ensure the obedience of the officers of the exchequer, on the contrary, there was every reason to conclude, from the Letter to which he alluded, that they would submit to a positive mandate alone. The privy seal was not, as the noble earl (Temple) had stated, the first expedient resorted to. One would suppose, by the defence into which that noble earl had entered of the conduct of his noble relation, that the conduct of that noble relation was attacked; but nothing could be more clear than the expressions of his right hon. friend upon that head, he having distinctly avowed that he attached no blame whatever to the auditor of the exchequer, but believed him to have done what he felt to be his duty. A resolution expressing merely the opinion of the House, besides being liable to the objections he had already stated, would have no tendency to remove the scruples of those officers who considered that their oaths stood in the way of their compliance with the warrants from the treasury. But it had been said, that the present transaction was a proof of the inexpediency of the proceeding they had already taken, and great complaints had been made against the delay of ministers. A right hon. gent. had taken a very proper distinction upon this head, when he said, that ministers were not responsible for the delay to which Parliament assented, unless they had made false statements for the purpose of procuring it. What his right hon. friend had said with respect to inconvenience, was not that none would occur, but that none would occur of sufficient magnitude to counter-balance the evil of precipitancy in resorting to a Regency on the moment. The noble Lord had said, there was no knowing where such a power as that proposed by the resolution, would stop, but there was evidently a limit beyond which it could not be pushed, for the resolution went only to money granted by Parliament, so that there was no danger of its going on from week to week or from month to month, when the extent of the power applied for was so clearly defined. The noble Lord was further desirous that Parliament should act themselves; but to him it appeared indisputable that it was the right and duty of the House to supply the defect in the executive, not to execute the duties of the executive in their own persons.

conceived that his right hon. friend was perfectly right not to attach any blame to the noble lord (Grenville) who had proved that he understood the law, and, as it now appeared, had acted with the sanction of the law officers of the crown. No money, he would contend, was ever issued from the Exchequer without the authority of the Great Seal, or the Privy Seal, by his Majesty's authority. The construction of the acts cited could not go to the exclusion of the royal authority, and no authority, such as was stated, was ever vested in three Commissioners of the Treasury; they had no more right to issue money without the authority of the King, than any other three persons. When his right hon. friend had said that no inconveniencies could result from delay, he no doubt was of opinion that money could have been so issued, and therefore he might have been sincere, but he was not accurate. The warrant was a measure, which if it was justified by necessity, was not sanctioned by law. The right hon. gentleman had said he would take the responsibility on himself, and this he thought might have satisfied the Auditor of the Exchequer. But what sort of responsibility was that of an officer, whose duty it was to take care that the money should issue legally, after conniving at its illegal issue, if he should plead that those very men on whose behalf he had permitted the illegal issue had taken the responsibility upon themselves, that not he, but they were answerable; would this be admitted to be a satisfactory defence? Was it not too ridiculous to be thought of? Would it not be said that he should answer for his own acts, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer could no more take this responsibility upon himself than any other individual. The money applied for would admit of no delay in the issue; but the manner in which they were called upon to grant it, was a practical proof of their former unconstitutional proceeding; it was an early and he hoped would prove a salutary warning. He dreaded the extent to which this power, if the principle were once admitted, might be carried; they might take upon themselves the whole executive government to make peace and war, to create Chancellors if necessary, in short to do what only one parliamentary assembly had ever done before them, the assembly of the Long Parliament.

said that he would not follow the hon. and learned gent. through all his arguments, a considerable part of which, however adapted to former or future questions, was not applicable to the present. In the latter part of his speech he had gone into a detail of the inconveniences arising to the public from the course already pursued, but whatever might be the opinion of that hon. and learned gent. upon this subject, he must contend that he had a right to justify that course upon the Resolutions already agreed to by the House. The second Resolution declared that it was the right and duty of the two Houses to provide for any deficiency in the royal authority in cases where absolute necessity occurred. It followed from this, that those who were in office should continue to act on their own responsibility, and the Houses should only be applied to in cases of necessity. A case of extreme necessity had now arisen, and this of course justified the application. The hon. and learned gent. who spoke last, had taken a great deal of pains to defend the character of lord Grenville; but the defence was quite needless, because no attack on it had been made. The noble lord was certainly the best judge of his own actions and the fittest person to decide whether he ought to take the responsibility on himself or not. At best, he could only have incurred a legal or formal responsibility; because the money which he was solicited to issue, had in the first instance been actually appropriated by parliament. But even should he issue the money under an order of the two Houses of Parliament, he was still responsible; because the legal issue required the authority of the Sign-Manual or the Privy Seal. The hon. and learned gent. had laid down a rule with respect to the issue of money, in which he was not correct. He had said that no money had ever been, or could be issued out of the Exchequer without the authority of the Privy Seal or the Sign Manual, but all the dividends to the creditors were issued without such authority; and, as his right hon. friend (Mr. Rose) had observed, every half year produced cases to which this rule did not apply. The continuance of the practice of affixing the authority of the King's Seal in other instances subsequent to the Appropriation Act, was perhaps to be accounted for from habit. It had been said that parliament should not command; he would confess it should not command nor interfere at all unless necessity required, but the chests would not be opened without the order, and the order should be made so strong and imperative as to leave no doubt of it being complied with. Besides, there were instances in which parliament had done the same thing before when the necessity existed. At the time of the restoration parliament gave the most decisive commands. The difference between the two cases was, that at that time there were no officers of the crown in existence, but now they were obliged to come to the House by the desire of the officers themselves.—He had now stated his cursory view of the subject, and in doing so he hoped he had not departed from that temper which he was happy to see had been so generally observed during the present debate. He augured, indeed, from their good temper, a most favourable omen. It was cheering to see that as their difficulties increased their patience and their mildness augmented. Some gentlemen opposite seemed to think that the present necessity had been originated by ministers, and the delays which their deceitful representations had occasioned. Every adjournment, however, had been agreed to by the House; and, most undoubtedly, the grounds of those adjournments had been stated by ministers on the most correct view which they could take of the subject. As to the present difficulty, it was impossible for them to have foreseen it. No minister could foresee that any man, with a reasonable mind, could have started the objection which lord Grenville did. In saying this he did not mean to attach the slightest blame to the noble lord: no doubt he acted on his own view of the case, and he was certainly the fittest person to judge as to what share of responsibility he would incur.

did not think the Committee exactly knew to what extent they were going to pledge themselves and the country: they thought, he apprehended, that they were only going to empower ministers to draw from the Exchequer sums of money which had already been appropriated by parliament. The power which they were authorizing was very different: it was no less than giving to the gentlemen opposite the entire disposal of the vote of credit, to the amount of three millions of money. This money had been voted for no one particular service; it was given in confidence to his Majesty. If the Committee had equal confidence in the right hon. gentlemen opposite; why, well and good: so be it. In the state in which the House now was, a necessity had indeed arisen—the die was cast, there was no alternative. Those three millions might now be whole, untouched, unapplied—or they might possibly be half-spent: they were voted for no specific service, and might be applied to any, at the will of his Majesty. There were other topics to which he might advert: he might advert, for instance, to the army extraordinaries; but it was not his intention to detain the House: he had merely risen to state that one fact; and to remind them of that which they might possibly overlook, namely, that they were giving to the ministers unlimited controul over three millions of money.

defended the part which had been taken by his noble relation lord Grenville, and maintained that the right hon. gent. should, when he asked for the adjournment, have stated to parliament the dilemma in which the government was placed. Had the right hon. gent. so done? On the contrary, he had declared that no inconvenience would arise; and what was the result? Why it was manifest that nothing but a choice of evils remained. Nothing should have induced the step which the right hon. gent. had taken, but the necessity being immediate and absolute. He felt a difficulty in putting into the hands of the Lords of the Treasury so absolute and uncontrouled a power as the Resolution would give, and should therefore, upon bringing up the Report, move an Amendment, to limit the issues to naval and military service.

, in explanation, contended, that the words of the Loan Act were fully sufficient to authorise and justify the drawing the money from the Exchequer by virtue of a Treasury warrant.

could not, consistently with his sense of duty, concur in the Resolution proposed by the right hon. gentleman. The words of the acts which had been so confidently quoted, he contended, did not warrant the construction which had been put upon them, still less the course which had been attempted to be pursued by ministers in order to obtain money from the Exchequer. If the Treasury Warrants were a sufficient authority, or if the right hon. gent. even thought so, why had he not in the first instance resorted to them? Why had he endeavoured to cast all the responsibility on the officers of the Exchequer? The right hon. gentleman had admitted, that at first it was in contem- plation to procure the authority of the Great Seal, but that the noble Keeper of it would not grant. The affixing it without the direct sanction of the crown, he knew was illegal, and he did not think proper therefore, to commit himself. The right hon. gent. disappointed in this quarter, turned himself to the Keeper of the Privy-Seal. The same reluctance, which prevented the Lord Chancellor from granting the Great Seal, was not felt by the Lord Privy Seal. That noble lord was ready to sanction the proceeding, but unfortunately for the right hon. gentleman's object, the sanction of the Lord Privy Seal alone was not sufficient to pass the Privy Seal. The Clerk of the Privy Seal executing the duties of his office under the obligation of an oath could not with a safe conscience pass the Seal. Mr. Larpent refused to sanction the proceeding with his signature, and here the right hon. gentleman came to a dead stop at once. Then it was, and not till then, that the right, hon. gentleman bethought him of the efficacy of the Treasury Warrants. There too he was disappointed in his hopes, as he was wrong in his law. The Auditor of the Exchequer would not obey those orders, and his refusal has since been justified by the authority of the law officers of the crown. He did not mean to impute the least blame to lord Grenville; but he must say, that his opinions in 1788, and which it seemed he still upheld, had led to this palpable, incurable, irremediable absurdity. His lordship would not issue the money on a Treasury warrant, but he would issue it on the order of the two Houses. Now he (Mr. Whitbread) denied that any such power existed in the two Houses. It was a case of conscience with him, and he would not give it up. Suppose lord Grenville, had said nothing about the two Houses: suppose he had said that he would issue for no other authority but the Sign Manual; how would the case have been? The responsibility of ministers was very different from that of lord Grenville. If lord Grenville had issued the money on an insufficient order he would have become a public defaulter to that amount, and his estates would have become liable. In consequence of his opinion of their authority, lord Grenville had thus sent the lords of the Treasury to the two Houses, for an order, acting under which, he imagined he became irresponsible. In this opinion he could not agree. Suppose the two Houses agreed in the resolution, and that some of the inferior offi- cers denied the right, and refused to obey it; how would the matter stand? The House could not turn them out; thus the whole of the emergencies of the nation must remain unsupplied. To such a state were they reduced by the course proposed by the right hon. gent. and his friends. How could he remedy it? Why, at once by adverting to the mode proposed, of addressing the Prince to assume the Regency, and thus with the utmost celerity supplying the executive. If this was not done, ministers, after declaring that during the exigency the two Houses must have royal power, might then prolong that exigency as long as they chose.

did not wish to say much at that late hour. It was his opinion, that whatever might be the circumstances that led to the present difficulty, it was necessary the money should be had, that the public service might sustain no injury, and the speediest way would certainly be the best. In order to satisfy the House, however, that this Resolution was expedient, the right hon. gentleman ought to have shewn the necessity of the case. If all the other executive officers had declined committing themselves on this subject, it was necessary for the public service that the House should interfere. He did not see however, why the great Executive Officers should not act in this case, as authorised by the act of king William; and much less did he see any reason why the Lord Chancellor should not have used the Great Seal on this occasion. Before the House, therefore, should take any step in this busines, it had a right to require why the Lord Chancellor had not acted upon his own responsibility. It was much more natural that the Lord Chancellor should take upon himself the responsibility than lord Grenville, who was in this case, properly speaking, merely an instrument. He wished also to have stated what objection the Privy Seal could have to the issuing of the order. He could see that Mr. Larpent was justified in his refusal to make out the order, but he did not see that the same reason should be urged by the Lord Privy Seal.

rose to reply to the questions which had been asked by the hon. and learned gent. respecting the Privy and Great Seals. As to the Great Seal, the right hon. gent. observed, that the Lord Chancellor did not refuse the Great Seal on account of any responsibility which might have attached to himself, but for this reason, that the application of the Great Seal was not legal for the purposes for which this money was to be applied, and the act of king William did not give authority for such application. On reading that act the Lord Chancellor wished to be informed what precedents were in existence with respect to the issuing of public monies under the Great Seal. If there were no precedents, then he was of opinion that a warrant issued under such circumstances would be an illegal order on the Exchequer. That opinion might or might not be erroneous, but it certainly was a sufficient reason for the non-interference of the Lord Chancellor. With respect to the Lord Privy Seal, the noble lord at the head of that department was ready to have issued a seal, but he saw no means of putting what was called "the Examinator" at the bottom of the instrument; and by the act of parliament the duty of the Clerk of the Privy Seal was that he must prepare the letters patent. The difficulty, therefore, was to provide that authority which should be received at the Exchequer as legal, and which the proper officer for issuing the monies dared not disobey. Neither of these would have commanded his obedience. The right hon. gent. trusted that the hon. and learned gent. who put the question would see that the proceeding rested on the fairest grounds, that the Resolution must necessarily pass, and, therefore, that he, for one, would not withhold his vote.—The hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Whitbread), indeed had raised another question; but the precise difficulty which suggested it would not, he trusted, arise in the breast of any officer. The difficulty was this, that the authority of a Resolution of this House even, might not be sufficient to command the obedience of the subordinate officers in the Exchequer. That such a practical difficulty should or could possibly arise, for his own part he could not conceive; because if such a thing could happen, the situation of the country would be most alarming and perilous. In case of such a refusal on the part of these officers to obey the Resolution of parliament, there would be no salvation for the country in the situation in which the government now stood, but on the principles contained in lord Grenville's letter, viz. that whatever is necessary must be done, and that necessity created the authority.—If gentlemen would but look at the absurdness of their objections, and of the means by which they would supply the exigency of the case, they would see they created difficulties, for they say, "All that you and the rest of his Majesty's ministers have to do, is to address the Prince of Wales, get a Regent, and then the impediment is removed." What a notion must the gentlemen have of the consciences of the Exchequer officers, to suppose that the Address would help them out of their dilemma. The Address would suit the purpose of the hon. gentlemen undoubtedly, but the necessity would be left just the same, and the House must be the only proper judges of what would best meet that necessity. There was no man, he was sure, would deny this proposition, that if the authority of the two Houses of Parliament was not sufficient to command obedience, then it was impossible to stir in the present difficulty—the wheels of government were in that case in a dead lock.—It was perfectly clear that there was no act done under an Address, which could, constitutionally speaking, be so binding on their officers as that directed by the two Houses. If it was to be admitted that the clerk of the pells, or any other inferior officer, should demur to the authority, see to what a dilemma the country would be reduced. No money could be got out of their hands. He did not suppose that it would be argued that the two Houses of Parliament had not the power of taking the seal out of the Chancellor's hands; how then could it be contended that the Regent alone might take it upon an Address. Why, the very admission that an Address gave him the authority, implied that the power lay in the parliament. Gentlemen might deny the proposition, but he defied them to prove the contrary.—The right hon. gent. then proceeded to animadvert upon the observations which had been made relative to the delays which had occurred in bringing forward the Resolutions on the subject of his Majesty's incapacity. These delays, however, he might fairly state to be the acts of that House, unless it was intended to be maintained or could be proved that he had falsely procured the first adjournment. If that could be established against him, he was ready to admit that he was criminally responsible, but with respect to the delay of the first fortnight, there could be no charge. As to the second delay, he should most distinctly say, that the statement which he had made to the House to procure that delay fell short of the authority which he had, and still has in possession from the physicians for it. He had stated much below, and not gone beyond the informations, which he received from them. As to the third Adjournment, an examination took place before the privy council, and it would not be said that any false information was derived from thence. But, then, gentlemen had made some observations upon what had fallen from him in respect to his statement, of no public inconvenience having arisen; and now say they, "You shew that it has arisen, by calling on parliament to provide for that inconvenience." Now (said the right hon. gent.) we have this monstrous, abominable, aggravated, and marked case before us—there it is in a most dreadful and hideous shape! What is it? If gentlemen would not give the King the chance of recovery, why then they were right to consider the delays as an inconvenience. But what was the great public inconvenience incurred by the delay? Why, this, that ministers had found it necessary to come to parliament for an authority for the issue of monies for services which they had directed should be done.

combated the argument that if the House had no power to assume the legislative, or regal prerogative, it had no power to selector nominate a magistrate. The two cases, however, in his opinion, were extremely different. Responsibility was the great object in the executive, and when the House selected a magistrate, this responsibility was preserved through the medium of his council, but if the House itself assumed the executive, there could be no responsibility, as no person could be responsible that acted under the authority of parliament.

in explanation stated, that he did not say there was no difference between their doing the acts of royalty themselves, and appointing a Regent in whom that power should reside, but that if they had not a right to do the one, in case of emergency, they would not have a right to do the other. The present application he had avoided till he found it absolutely necessary.

observed, that no advantage should be taken of the present difficulty against ministers, as their opponents had never stated that the mode of proceeding that had been adopted would expose the House to the necessity of interfering in acts belonging to the executive. The hon. member farther observed, that his right hon. friend had not wished to trouble the House, and was willing, had it been in his power, to transact the whole business on his responsibility. He had come to parliament, but not till he had found it necessary. The public service required their interference. He therefore saw no objection that could be made to the resolution, which should have his support accordingly.

approved of the conduct of lord Grenville, who had not only acted from his own judgment, but also upon the authority of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals. The responsibility was his own, and if he had acted wrong, he was liable to be called to account. He saw no right the Houses of Parliament had to interfere, as by doing so they would only be giving ministers a power to prolong the present blank in the executive.

The question being then called for, the resolution was again read, as well as several amendments proposed by Mr. Wynne. The first was, that the sum of three millions be omitted, and that there be inserted instead of it, 500,000l. for the army, and 500,000l. for the navy. The second was, that these words be omitted, "as the exigencies of the respective services may require." The whole of the Amendments went to limit the sums to be drawn by the Treasury, and to ensure their application. The Amendments having been negatived without a division, the question was then carried also without a division, and the Report was brought up and ordered to be communicated to the Lords.