, pursuant to notice, moved, That a Committee be appointed to examine and state the Account of Parish Apprentices bound within the Bills of Mortality, and report the same to the House.

expressed his regret, that a Bill, on this subject had not been prepared at an earlier period of the session, and commented with much feeling on the deplorable state of many of those orphans, and the abuses, which prevailed from the maladministration of the existing laws. There was no subject which had a more powerful claim on the interference of the House, nor any in which that interference was likely to be productive of more good. There were several abuses which it was in his power to enumerate, but he should confine himself to a few of the most prominent ones. It was the practice of some of the parishes to bind a great number of apprentices at the distance of 2 or 300 miles from town, where they were deprived of all hope of ever seeing their parents again, or if "they attempted it, were in danger of being taken up as vagrants in some of the parishes through which they might travel. This was to be lamented, for every thing good in human character arose from the cultivation of that natural affection which subsisted between parents and children, and other amicable feelings of this kind. The consequences resulting from binding such a number of apprentices to one person, were very bad. He knew a recent instance of a man in Manchester, who had become a bankrupt, and no less than 200 parish apprentices bound to him, were, on his failure, marched oft" in a body to the workhouse. He was sorry to learn that there were so many objections urged against the Bill in contemplation, and he hoped the subject would be fully and maturely discussed. Among other evils attendant on the present disposal of parish apprentices, the crime of murder committed by the masters was not unfrequent, and he was in possession of some instances, which would fill the House with horror. In 1787, an unfortunate girl had been murdered by her master, by inclosing her in a heated oven: and several others, which he felt surprised had never produced the legislative interference of the House. Those poor children looked to the House for that protection which they could not meet elsewhere, and though it was too late in the present session for the Committee to effect any thing, he trusted the subject would be fully investigated.

heartily concurred with his hon. and learned friend, in the necessity which existed for the interference of the House, and knew of several instances similar to those which he mentioned.

said, that this subject had engaged much of his attention some years ago, and he had introduced some measures into the House relative to it. The abuses complained of were not confined to large establishments, as stated by the hon. and learned gentleman, where, on the contrary, it was the interest of the masters to derive benefit from the labour of the apprentices, rather than to destroy them, as they received them without a premium. Nor could he agree with him in what he slated about the evil of the apprentices being torn from their parents, for in fact, they had no parents who owned them, but they were thrown on the parish. If the number of apprentices in the large manufactories was limited, it would be productive of considerable injury to individuals, and the country at large.

stated, that if cotton manufacturers were prevented from taking a number of those apprentices, the price of labour would be raised, and great inconvenience experienced.

said, that he did not differ much in the main question from his hon. and learned friend, but thought, that a system of too minute legislation had gone abroad lately, and denied that a few instances summed up, and dwelt upon, were sufficient to prove that the abuses complained of were so great as represented; for his part, in his experience as a magistrate, he knew more instances of the bad conduct of apprentices than of masters, who were urged on by their profligate relatives, whom his hon. and learned friend wished they should see more frequently.

contended for the necessity of some regulation to ameliorate their condition. In his own experience, as a magistrate, he had known many instances of the inconveniences they suffered under the existing regulations.

said, that as he had been given to understand that extraordinary opposition would be given to the Bill he proposed to bring in, by the different Vestries, he had thought it better to move for a Committee, and deter the Bill till next session, instead of bringing it forward now, when it might be thrown out, and a second one would come with a bad grace after the rejection of the first.

observed, that, according to the course of proceeding adopted by the House in the present session, orders of the day were to have precedence of motions on his day; still however, be felt a conviction, that the motion which he had to make, a motion recognising the merits of the general, the officers and the gallant army engaged in the glorious battle of Albuera, would be allowed by the House to take precedence of any other business. (Hear, hear.) He colleted from this cheer an admission on the pan of the House, and should therefore proceed. Now again be felt himself placed in the situation, in which he had imposed upon on him the agreeable duty, which several times during the present session he had had to perform, of presenting to the consideration of the House the eminent services of the British and allied armies—services which had been so frequently crowned with the most signal and brilliant success He had again to bring under the notice, and recommend to the attention and approbation of that House, the meritorious conduct of the officers and men of that army, who had so nobly distinguished themselves in the glorious cause in which they were engaged—the defence of the oppressed people of the Peninsula against the most grinding system of tyranny and oppression to which any nation had ever been exposed. He had on this happy occasion to enrol upon the illustrious list of those heroes who had signalized their valour and skill in their country's service, the names of general Beresford, who so ably commanded the allied army at Albuera, and of the other officers, whose eminent merits contributed to the brilliant victory obtained in that part of the Peninsula. To himself it was grateful, as he was convinced it would be satisfactory to every gentleman who heard him, and to the country, that, although they might feel a pride in contemplating the accumulated glories and honours acquired by particular generals, yet the country could reflect with exultation that it was not to one or two generals they could look with confidence for signal talents and heroic achievements in the field, but that the country had numerous generals competent to meet any general of France, with an army nearly equal in numbers, not only with glory to themselves, but with defeat to their enemies. It was remarkable, that, in the short period of the present session, this was the third time it had become his duty to bring the eminent services of the army under the consideration of the House, as introductory of a vote of its thanks—the highest honour it could bestow. And here, he trusted, that the House would do his Majesty's ministers the justice to allow, that they had not studiously taken advantage of gallant exploits of equivocal character or inferior importance, to call upon the House for its thanks, for the purpose of obtaining an indirect attestation of their own merits and exertions in providing the means of accomplishing such successes. The House would, therefore, he was fully persuaded, give them credit for not having multiplied their applications to parliament for the high honour of their thanks to reward eminent military services, with any such paltry view. No, it was a duty imposed upon them by the blessing of Providence, which enabled his Majesty's forces to achieve in the short period which had elapsed of the present campaign, more signal and glorious successes than had been heretofore obtained in almost any space of a tedious and protracted war. Sure he was, that upon this point the House would be more disposed to censure the conduct of ministers for having been too sparing in their applications—for having withheld the thanks of that House from meritorious services—than to complain of their having multiplied the instances in which they called upon the House to record their high approbation of the gallantry and good conduct of their brave officers and troops. He need not here allude to the capture of the island of Banda in a most romantic and chivalrous stile by a small but heroic band—an enterprize entitled to rank for decision and intrepidity with any to be found in the annals of military achievements. Neither need he point out the masterly and gallant manner in which the conquest of the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius had been accomplished; an object of so much importance, not only from the annoyance which they enabled the enemy to give to British commerce, but from the anxiety which every minister of this counry had manifested to obtain possession of them. The House would acquit ministers of any anxiety to drag before their view services, however important, which might admit of doubt as to their claim to the thanks of Parliament. The occasions to which he had alluded particularly, as having submitted for the approbation of that House, were the gallant exploits performed in the peninsula; from the glorious victory of Busaco, obtained by lord Wellington in his retreat to his lines, to what surpassed all—the important victory at Almeida. Under all the circumstances of the case, it would be admitted that they had rather abstained from overloading the Journals with Votes of Thanks, than unnecessarily squandered that proud distinction; and if any gentleman were to criticise their conduct, his animadversion would be directed to their forbearance, at a period when scarce a day passed without an expectation of same victory; which expectation was uniformly realised by the ext accounts. In short, such a tide and flood of victory flowed in our favour, that of our army it might be said, as of an army of old, "Hostis nihil aliud est nisi perpetua gloriæ materia vestræ." The enemy, by the incessant victories gained over them, seemed to serve only as a fund to supply materials for the accumulating glories of the Bruish army. He had only to refer to the manner in which the former votes had been received, to shew that he had not been lavish in bringing these votes forward. Having stated thus much as to the circumstances in which he brought forward the motion of that night, he should proceed next to state the circumstances of the action to which his motion applied, It appeared by the dispatches, that general Beresford was engaged in the siege, when he received intelligence that marshal Soult, having collected from the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and from the interior of Spain, all the force which he could assemble, had broken up on the 10th of May from Seville, to march to the relief of Badajoz. Upon receipt of this intelligence, it appeared that be considered how he should meet the attack; whether he should raise the siege of Badajoz and await the attack of Soult, or provide for both objects. He determined to prepare for the attack, lest by endeavouring to attend also to the siege, he might risk the loss of both objects. He then took up a position on the river Albuera, where he was joined in the evening preceding the action by the allied force under generals Blake and Castanos, in pursuance of a previous arrangment with those officers; and it was not till the morning of the day on which the battle was fought, that he was joined by the corps under general Cole, which had been left to cover the conveyance of the heavy ordnance and stores from before Badajoz to Elvas.—The right hon. gent. then proceeded to detail from the official dispatches, the order of battle—the Spaniards on the hill on the right, general Stuart's division on the left of them, and general Hamilton's on the left of general Stuart's. The enemy made a demonstration on the left, and taking advantage of the weather", which masked his operations, directed the main body of his force and all his attention to an attack upon the position occupied by the Spaniards on the right. The Spanish troops resisted this concentrated attack with intrepidity and courage, but were at length obliged to give way to superior forces, and were driven from the hill. To the immortal honour, however, of these gallant troops, they rallied at the bottom of the hill, turned upon the enemy, and kept them in check by heir fire, till the brigade of lieut. col. Colbourne came to their support. The brigade of general Cole was stationed in the rear of the Spaniards. The brigade of colonel Colbourne, not being able to dislodge the enemy from their position by their fire, proceeded to charge them with the bayonet; and it was in this charge that that brigade, consisting of three regiments, suffered so severely from an unexpected charge by a division of Polish cavalry. A small regiment, the 31st, kept this cavalry in check, till the brigade of general Hoghton came up; when that brave and distinguished officer fell, cheering his men to the, charge.— Whilst stating this circumstance, he trusted the House would agree with him as to the propriety of marking their admiration of the glorious circumstances of his death, by erecting a monument to the hero at the public expence; at once a testimony to posterity of their gratitude and his glory. (Hear, hear!) In the course of this contest it would be observed that every man did his duty. But it was against the right that the principal efforts of the enemy were directed. In this point, the brigade of general Cole, and particularly the fusileers, took the French on their left flank, and making a combined charge with the other troops, drove them from the eminence which commanded the British line, and which was the great object of their efforts to acquire, and of their ambition to retain. It was upon being driven from this hill that the French were broken, and forced with great slaughter down the hill. Never had there fallen in so small a space so many victims to the fury of war as on the acclivity of this hill, after the enemy had been driven from the summit to the bottom. When he stated that the whole of the battle took place on the right, he did not mean to be understood that no efforts had been made in any other part of the line. The enemy had directed serious attacks in other quarters, and if no other action had been fought but what had taken place at the bridge of Albuera, that alone would be enough to immortalise the glory of that day. Such had been the circumstances of this glorious battle; the consequences of which were—the flight of the enemy from the scene of action—the abandonment of their wounded: and the situation of the miserable remnant of the French array might be estimated from the intercepted letter of general Gazan to Marshal Soult, which represented the force under him of wounded to amount to 4,000 men. But the usual consequences of this glorious victory would prove most highly beneficial to the cause in which we were engaged. When they considered the effect that must necessarily be produced by the signal disappointment of all the boasts of the enemy, by the frustrating of all their proud pretensions and anticipated triumphs, it was impossible to describe that effect in stronger terms than in the language of general Beresford, who alluded to the impression that would be made by the return of Marshal Soult, after all his boasts, to Seville with a broken army, and what was worse, a diminished reputation. But in the circumstances of this action there were some particulars which might afford the enemy a pretext to claim a victory. In the charge which the brigade of colonel Colbourne had sustained from the Polish cavalry, the three regiments of which it was composed undoubtedly lost their colours. The colours of one of them were afterwards recovered, one standard re-taken from the enemy, and the other preserved for his corps in an exemplary manner by the gallant officer who had the charge of it. The colours of the two other regiments undoubtedly were in the possession of the enemy, and would in all probability be made the ground of a claim of triumph. Whilst upon this topic, he trusted the House would excuse him for adverting to the very gallant and heroic conduct of the two officers who bore the colours of the Buffs, which had been preserved. One of them was surrounded by the enemy, and when asked to give up his colours, answered, "Not, but with my life!" and his life was the instant forfeit of his refusal, (a call of Name! name!) The name of this heroic individual was ensign Thomas. The standard thus taken was afterwards recovered from the enemy. The manner in which the other standard was preserved, was marked by circumstances equally meritorious and honourable to the individual who preserved it, and equally entitled to the applause and admiration of his country. Ensign Walsh was the officer he alluded to. This gallant individual, having the staff of the colours broken by a cannon bail, which also severely wounded himself, fell upon the field of battle, and more anxious about his precious charge than for himself, contrived to separate the flag from the remnant of the staff, and secured it in his bosom, from which he afterwards produced it when his wounds were dressed after the battle. (Hear! hear.) He was rejoiced to name these heroic individuals, and to give all the splendour to their reputation, which the mention of their deeds in that House was calculated to confer.—He knew not whether it might be permitted him here to mention also the case of General Beresford himself. After the charge of the Polish cavalry, which had proved so disastrous to the brigade of colonel Colbourne, one horseman, separated from his corps, and unsupported by any others, approached so near Marshal Beresford, either from the effects of intoxication or the phrenzy of military enthusiasm, as to aim a blow at his life. The general, anxious only to preserve the life of the man, evaded his blow by his dexterity, and, availing himself of his superior strength, pulled him to the ground; but no sooner was he perceived still meditating a blow at the general, than he was instantly dispatched by one of his orderlies. He mentioned this only to shew that this unforeseen accident might have deprived the country of the services of this gallant officer. He begged the House now to allow him to allude to the moral consequences which must result from this victory—such a victory occurring at such a time and under such circumstances. When they considered the attempt of Massena to relieve Almeida, and the almost contemporaneous effort of Soult to relieve Badajoz, they could not consider both in any other light than as a desperate attempt, undertaken in pursuance of orders from their govenment, to retrieve the character and the honour of the French arms in the Peninsula. He had also to acquaint the House, that it was now well ascertained, that Marshal Soult, on leaving Seville, in the confidence of anticipated victory, published one of those boasting proclamations for which the French generals were so remarkable; and that he had frequently on his march addressed his troops upon the certainty of their success. The utter disappointment of all these confident expectations of victory must raise the hopes and increase the confidence of the Allies, at the same time that it must lower the tone and the pretensions of the enemy. He could not but consider it as opening new and flattering prospects to us in the Peninsula.—He was aware that some gentlemen were of opinion, that there was no limit to the means of the French emperor, and that he could have no difficulty in sending three or four hundred thousand men into the Peninsula. For himself, he should say, that he did not think it so easy for him to send any large force thither; particularly when there was a prospect that he might have employment for so many of his forces elsewhere. But even if he should be able to place his force in the Peninsula on the same footing as before, he would find the allies better prepared to meet him: he would find from the glorious example set by the Spanish troops at Albuera, far different enemies to contend with. When he looked to the grevious disappointment of the hopes of the enemy, he could not think he entertained any exaggerated confidence in the operations of war: their issue was in other hands. Whether the pleasing hopes he entertained were well founded, under all the circumstances, he should leave to the public to decide; but whatever might be the foundation of his expectations, he prayed that God, in whose disposal the issue of all contests was placed, would grant that they should be realised. He would now conclude with moving, "That the Thanks of this House be given to lieutenant-general sir William Carr Beresford, knight of the most honour" able order of the Bath, for the distinguished ability displayed by him on the 16th of May last, in the glorious Battle at Albuera, which terminated in the signal defeat of the enemy's forces."

rose to second the motion. He expressed his conviction, that every man would rejoice, after the laborious efforts which general Beresford had bestowed on the creation and disciplining of the army, to find that he was rewarded by an opportunity of proving his valour in the field. With respect to the action itself, it was only necessary to follow the detail of the gallant officer, to admire it; but there was a difficult military question to be decided before the battle, for which he was entitled to the greatest merit. Lord Wellington was enabled to shew a force both at Badajoz and Almeida to the enemy, and it was for general Beresford to decide whether he would wait for the reinforcement which he knew to be coming, or act with promptitude upon the moment, trusting to his own measures. He took the manly and the judicious step. When they looked to the battle itself, they would perceive that the chief stress was on the right wing; and the House was aware in what a narrow space the conflict was decided—no less than 7,000 individuals lying upon the ground. The extent of that struggle might perhaps be measured by the numbers which were lost, numbers only equalled by those at the battle of Assay, considering those engaged. But if they wished to form an opinion upon proper grounds, let them look to the intercepted letter of the enemy; to the circumstances of the retreat, to the fact of the British army being in possession of the field, and general Beresford being enabled to advance a corps upon the retreating enemy. He complimented the ability by which the siege of Badajoz was raised, and though he could not avoid regretting, when he recollected that British soldiers bore the loss of such a number, still, if war must be carried on, sacrifices must be made, and losses expected; and it was consolatory to reflect, that never was a loss sustained under circumstances more honourable to the British character. The way to decide the advantage of this battle, was to weigh it together with the whole campaign, and he would say, that in no campaign was the sacrifice of human life so small, considering the effects produced by it. Lord Wellington had proved himself to be as sparing of the life of the soldier as he was careful of his health; and, checking his propensity to seek for glory, he economised the existence of those placed under his command. He knew, when he was in a situation to be better informed upon such subjects, that the proportion of the loss of the two armies bore no comparison. He was sure the House would feel that a great feature would be absent from the present contest, if, after the expulsion of the French from Portugal, a trial of strength had not been made upon both frontiers. He considered the two contests as trials of strength, undertaken by the enemy, in both of which he was unsuccessful.—In adverting to the co-operation of the Spaniards, he was happy to find that the testimony of the general represented them as having done heir duty in that day's battle, and he hoped the example would lead to happy results in the future. Up to the present moment, France had made but little impression upon Spain; for with all her efforts, she had never been able to send forth a single Spanish regiment to assist in the subjugation of the country. Whatever defects might exist in the military system, and that great defects did exist he was perfectly conscious, the House should recollect that Spain was not conquered, that she was not divided. As to those defects in the national character of Spain, which prevented her from availing herself of our more efficient assistance and co-operation, from putting herself in that condition which would enable her more effectually to resist oppression, it was but justice to observe, that the same untractable character that made her so unmanageable in the hands of her friends, made her more unmanageable in the hands of her enemies. No nation had ever proved more true to herself than Spain; but if she allowed her troops to be disciplined under British officers in the same manner as the troops of Portugal were disciplined already, her cause would be much advanced. At the same time it was to be remarked that she had not the same opportunity that was offered to Portugal. We had never said that we were ready to pay her troops, as well as to take them under our command; and he was confident it contributed greatly to the success of Portugal, that her soldiers were now, for the first time, paid weekly, and accounted with in as regular a manner as the British soldier. He was not sure, giving all the merit to Portugal she deserved, that the national character would have offered the same resistance to France as that of Spain had done. But he did not wish to draw any invidious comparisons—they were both fighting for their liberties—they had both displayed great energies, and he would only say, as had been already said, "that this great contest must be seen out, and that we must do our best in it." No one could pronounce upon the result, but they would have a better eye to posterity and the duty which they owed their constituents by doing all they could, and leaving the rest in the hands of Providence. He allowed that the war was a great burden, but he knew no man was prepared to say that he saw the moment when it ought to be abandoned. He was sure at this moment, that nothing remained for the country to do but to follow up the advantages it had so happily obtained.

thought that the conflict at Albuera had been one of the most severe and sanguinary during the war; and bore testimony, from private information he had received, to particular instances of gallantry and intrepidity that had been therein shown by our troops. He complimented the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the military precision with which be had stated the details of the battle. He knew no occasion on which the British troops had shewn greater instances of determined courage

could not hope to be able to add to the eloquent statement of the right hon. gent, and the noble lord, but still could not forego the satisfaction of offering his tribute of applause to the gallant general and the gallant army whose services was the subject now under consideration, nor could he contemplate without emotions of pride, that the gallant general, and also generals Cole and Hamilton, who bore so conspicuous a part in the glory of the day, were his countrymen. He hoped he should hear no more in this House that Ireland was a burden to this country. The right hon. gent. had on a former occasion, as well as the present, made honourable mention of glorious events in another quarter of the world, the capture of Amboyna, and Banda, and he was right, fur the picture of more gallant exploits was never submitted to this House, and he requested the House to recollect that these services were achieved in conjunction with the navy, by a part of that army which the tyranny and oppression of sir George Barlow had driven into a state of mutiny; and he was confident when that subject came before the House, this exploit, with a recollection of the long and zealous service of that army, would ensure to it the serious attention of parliament.

hoped that he should not be considered as digressing, if he stated shortly the services of the gallant general who was the object of the present motion. General Beresford had been thirty years in the service of his country. He commenced in America, was at Toulon, at Corsica, in India, at Madeira, in Portugal, and in Spain with sir John Moore. He had only to state to the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his consideration, that the gallant general had lost almost all he was worth in the world by the failure of his relative in Dublin. He stated this merely for his consideration, in the hope that some pecuniary reward would be added to his honours. The Resolution was then agreed to nem. con. As were also the following: "That the Thanks of this House be given to Major-Generals the honourable Galbraith Lowry Cole, the honourable William Stewart, John Hamilton, the honourable William Lumley, Charles Baron Alten, Brigadier-General Robert Ballard Long, and the sereral other officers, for their distinguished exertions on the 16th of May last, in the glorious battle at Albuera; and that lieutenant-general sir William Carr Beresford do signify the same to the honourable William Stewart, John Hamilton, the honourable William Lumley, Charles Baron Alten, Brigadier-General Ballard Long, and the several other officers. That this House both highly approve of and acknowledge the distinguished valour and discipline so conspicuously displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of his Majesty's forces, serving on the 16th of May last, under the immediate command of lieutenant general sir William Carr Beresford, in the signal defeat of the enemy at Albuera, and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary conduct." "That this House doth highly acknowledge the distinguished valour and discipline displayed by the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of that parl of the Portuguese army which served under the immediate command of lieutenant general sir William Carr Beresford, on the 16th of May last, in the glorious battle at Albuera."

said, that though he believed there was no instance in which that House expressed its thanks to the allies, unless when they acted under officers of our own, yet the nature of the present contest justified, he thought, a deviation from that rule: and, upon this ground he should move, "That this House doth highly acknowledge the distinguished valour and intrepidity displayed by the Spanish army under the command of his excellency general Blake, on the 16th of May last, in the glorious battle at Albuera."

next moved, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that a Monument be erected in the cathedral church of Saint Paul, London, to the memory of major-general Daniel Hoghton, who fell gloriously on the 16th of May last in the battle at Albuera, which terminated in the signal defeat of the enemy's forces; and to assure his royal highness, that this House will make good the expense attending the same."

begged leave to offer a few words with respect to the conduct of that gallant officer, who had acquitted himself worthily in all situations, both as a soldier and as an accomplished gentleman. He had devoted his life to the most active services, and visited every climate in the pursuit of that glory which his profession held up to his view. He had commanded a brigade at Martinique, and on his return from that country exerted himself to get employment under that illustrious general, his friend lord Wellington, whose greatness he had foreboded at an early period. In his last conversation with him, he had stated it as his distinct opinion, that on no account should England relinquish the scene of warfare upon which she was now acting with so much success. It was his fortune to head one of those bands of heroes, who restored the glory of the day at the battle of Albuera, and to perish in the act of encouraging his men. He trusted he should be forgiven for drawing the attention of the House to the merits of the distinguished general, whose memory they were now about to honour, and adding his testimony to that of the country at large, in favour of his virtues and abilities.

adverted to the memory of the lamented general Mackenzie. The circumstances of his death, in the battle of Talavera, were precisely similar to those attendant on the fall of general Hoghton. He thought therefore that as their rank was the same, and that their deaths had been alike glorious, their names should live in the equal testimonies of their country's gratitude.

admitted the full force of the observation just made; but there was a line of distinction which regulated the grant of honours, independent of the equal' claim upon the score of merit. What that was, as applicable to the present instance, he confessed himself then unable to state accurately. He should take care to make himself better acquainted with the distinction—and till he did, he should suggest to his right hon. friend the propriety of waving all further discussion on the claims of that much-to-be-lamented officer.

acquiesced in the propriety of this suggestion.

asked if it was not possible that there might be some expression of the feelings of the House upon the transcendant merits of the two young men who had behaved so heroically in the defence of their colours.

was glad the observation had been thrown out by his hon. friend. He had long thought that there would be great use in that House noticing and recording every splendid instance of individual valour, however low the rank of the person.

spoke to the same effect. At the same time that there must necessarily be some general limit which, whatever might be its latitude, might yet bear hard in its exclusive operation—there were instances however, that might well be admitted as exceptions; of which there surely could not be one more touching and more splendid, than that of the gallant youth who, as he fell, was only anxious to lay the colours of his country to a congenial heart that beat high for her praise" and whose last throb was for the glory of her arms.

in pursuance of his notice, rose, and addressed the House to the following effect:—Sir; the wish for a secure and honourable peace must be general; but no one, at this moment, believes in the possibility of its attainment; nay, all agree in the necessity of continuing the war. Those who, till lately, shared in the universal panic which the unrivalled success, for many years, of the French arms on the continent had produced, are; now considerably shaken in their first impressions, and inclined to hope where they had once despaired. Those who, with myself, never swerved from the opinion, that this nation possessed great military power, though they have lamented, and still continue to lament, the too frequent misapplication of that power, and the inadequacy of our exertions, cannot but most heartily rejoice in any event which demonstrates the gallantry and efficiency of our troops, however they may consider such events as indecisive of ultimate success, and only as positive proofs of the capability of the empire—proofs, however, not requisite to establish, though they afford a noble confirmation of our long-acknowledged character for national intrepidity. Yet, Sir, while ministers hold this language themselves, and cheer these sentiments in others, they declare that we are contending for our very existence as a state—that the great cause which we maintain in the Peninsula, is not so much that of the allies, as our own—that it is better to decide our fate there with the enemy, than to have to contend with him on these shores. We have been triumphantly congratulated on having escaped the fate of all the other powers of Europe, on our having arrested the progress of the enemy, by our glorious achievements in the Peninsula, where we are told, that we have directed the "impending thunderbolt" harmless to the earth. We have indeed gained that, which in war is inestimable—fame! We have obtained that, which is in itself a tower of strength—confidence!—While to the taunts of an enemy become insolent by success, we have replied by repeated victories. But Sir, as I was not one of those who mistook hopes for certainties, or construed the retreat of an enemy into the consummation of a campaign, I am not now surprised that a contest, which was considered as having finally terminated, should have but just commenced. I cannot forget that we are but now recovering, in consequence of the enemy's cession, that country, of which he had but recently dispossessed us. Assuredly we have cause to rejoice, and to be sincerely thankful—but while victory, that victory which is to decide between the two countries, is still doubtful, we should prepare more than ever for war—not hang up our arms, nor devote merely to eulogies and congratulations, those precious moments, which should be employed in exerting every nerve to afford lord Wellington, (who has spent his life in the "tented field," and who, repeatedly victorious, has never yet been defeated), a fair opportunity of measuring swords with the enemy, when, with increased force and confidence, he shall "rally for the fight." Sir; there is no man in this House, or in the country, less disposed to excite a spirit of interminable warfare than I am; but however most desirable a secure and honourable peace may be, as well for the interests of humanity, as to lighten the severe pressure on the public, I cannot discover in either government any pacific disposition; neither will, I fear, consent, without first obtaining an unfair advantage over the other. With the exception of the war in the Peninsula, Buonaparté's splendid and unequalled success has been the result of plans wisely conceived, and ably executed. His objects have been worthy a great conqueror. His exertions and means employed fully equal to the attainment. Look to him in 1799, when, for the first time, he was placed at the head of the government of France, collecting at Dijon an army of reserve (ridiculed, because its object was not understood), with which he secured his victory at Marengo in the following year (1800). See him at Boulogne with his army of England, equally ridiculed, preparing in 1803 for the defeat of Austria at Austerlitz in 1805. Behold him in his Confederation of the Rhine (early in 1806) anticipating by its agency the enthraldom of Germany, the subjugation of the Prussian monarchy, and the humbling of the great Autocrat of the north. View him on the Vistula in 1806–7, (while we were ridiculing his exertions" anticipating his destruction, and paralyzed into a state of culpable inactivity) collecting troops from Italy, and the most western extremities of France, Flanders, and Holland, by the aid of which, he afterwards fought and conquered on the memorable day of Friedland, decisive of so much!—Witness similar exertions after the battle of Asperne (1809) when at Wagram, he repaired the disasters of that day, and established his real supremacy in Europe, by a masterly and rapid junction of scattered and distant corps. See him at this moment in the north-west of Europe, under the pretext of merely excluding British commerce from the Continent (one of his objects doubtless—one too originally ridiculed as visionary; but which, however, unhappily for us, has been but too successful), organizing a force, by which he has already nominated to the throne of Sweden, and is now enabled to make any distribution he pleases of those of Denmark and Prussia. See him at Dantzic, Custrine, and Stettin—behold, on the north-east of Germany, his long-delayed, but sure-working plans as to the reintegration of Poland, whence, as from a citadel, he will be enabled to hold in subjection the whole European Continent. View him in his Illyrian empire, already directing his footsteps, resolved to plant his eagles on the Byzantine throne of the Cæsars. And, finally, behold him calling out the conscripts for 1811, for the purpose of securing, if not resisted by counter-exertions on our part, the conquest of Spain and Portugal, however hitherto deferred—and (not unlikely) for ulterior objects too, the mere mention of which might subject one perhaps to the scorn and derision of this House, and to the reprobation of an easily deceived public; who, feeble when they think themselves invincible, are frequently most confident when they have least reason for being so—and who, possessing great resources wherewith to become strong, are often ignorant how to call forth such power, and still more how to employ it when arrayed. From these examples, Sir, it is evident that Napoleon has left nothing to accident or chance, but than (with the exception already mentioned) he has invariably acted on plans suggested by the wisest policy, and carried into effect with the most consummate military talent, What have been during the same period, our continental exertions? In 1800, we appeared off Genoa with a small corps, not exceeding 4,000 men, a few days subsequent to the battle of Marengo. The junction of a considerable military force, such as might easily have been furnished by this country, would in all probability, a few days prior to our arrival, have secured the victory to the Austrians, and possibly have prevented the forming of those fetters, which have since enchained the powers of Europe. The attempt at least would have been worthy of this nation, and so great a cause. Subsequent to this, in the same year, we made two unsuccessful attempts against Ferrol and Cadiz. In 1801, with about 14,000 effective men, we undertook the expulsion of 26,000 of the chosen troops of Fiance from Egypt—a glorious expedition, and the only one successful during that whole war. In 1805, with 8,000 men, we formed a junction in Italy with the Neapolitan and Russian armies, but we speedily abandoned the country, and landed in the December of that year, with 25,000 men, in the North of Germany, where we took up a Position on the Weser, but not until the battle of Austerlitz had been lost, and an armistice signed preparatory to the peace of Presburgh. In 1806, with less than 5,000 men against a greatly superior force, we gained the battle of Maida, which, though highly glorious to the troops and to the general (sir John Stuart) as every thing connected with his mililary life has been, had no beneficial result. In the same year, we made several piratical descents at Buenos Ayres, where, after having increased our force to 10,000 men, we were ultimately foiled and disgraced. In 1807, with a small corps, we made an unnecessary, unjust, and inglorious descent on the "coast of Egypt, from whence, in a few months, we hastily retired. And in the same year, (after permitting a favourable opportunity to escape us, and suffering our allies, the Russians, to waste themselves in a most unequal contest, which they maintained with the utmost heroism) we appeared, at the very eve of the peace of Tilsit, with a small corps of 7,000 men at Stralsund, whence we speedily retired, without performing any thing; and with increased numbers, amounting to 25,000, we shortly after succeeded in the unhallowed capture of Copenhagen, In 1808, the gallant and ever-to-be-lamented sir John Moore, was dispatched (with what rational military object remains still to be explained) to Sweden, with a chosen corps of 10,000 men, which his good sense and firmness probably saved from destruction, and with which he shortly returned to the British coast, without having fired a shot. In the same year commenced our campaigns in Spain and Portugal, under the most propitious circumstances, the spirit of our people and that of the allies most enthusiastic—the slate of Europe favourable—the cause a great and just one! Yet sir John Moore, though at the head of a nominal corps of 40,000 men, was at no moment in a situation of offering battle to the enemy, with a force much exceeding 26,000 effective. I am aware that the Downing-street generals, assisted by their staff and official documents, proved to their own satisfaction at least, that he had 40,000; but sir John Moore, though in the field with them, never could discover more than 26,000; it is true, indeed, he had recourse but to the old exploded method of counting By the head. Yet in this same year it appears, that the whole French force collected behind the Ebro, did not exceed 45,000 men—and early in this year we might have had 70,000 in the peninsula. In 1809, after having received intelligence of the loss of the battle of Wagram, we committed an army of 40,000 men to the marshes of Walcheren. Our bravest sons, eager for the fight, there died the death of cowards and of common men! Sunk without wounds, and fell without renown! And this we did with such an admirable choice of time and place, that even had success ensued, we could not have struck an effectual blow against the power of Buonaparté.—Yet early in that year, by uniting only our Walcheren, Spanish, and Sicilian armies, we might have thrown on any part of the continent 93,000 men, a force greatly superior in number to that with which the archduke Charles joined the battle of Aspeme, and nearly equal to that with which the enemy obtained the decisive victory of Wagram. What, Sir, would Buonaparté have done with our means? How would he have availed himself of such opportunities? On several different occasions, the French armies were in Austria, at the most distant points of Prussia, nay at the eastern extremity of Poland. France, stripped of troops, exposed at all points, a population of eleven millions in the Peninsula, animated as one man against her, a hostile disposition towards her in various parts of the continent, these islands, peopled with a hardy gallant peasantry, trained in a great degree to arms, an embodied militia from 65 to 86,000 men, a regular army from 135 to 235,000, a local militia to any amount, the undisputed empire of the seas, tonnage equal to convoy any number of men, the enemy's shores within a few hours sail, all Europe open to us.—What, I ask, with these opportunities, and such means, would not Buonaparté have attempted? What would he not have effected? It has been said, that had we to select a spot in Europe, most favourable to ourselves, and most disadvantageous to the enemy, we should have chosen that on which we now act in the Peninsula. We have been reminded of the great and appalling difficulties under which the enemy has brought up his troops and supplies from the most distant points, and of the great comparative facility with which we have effected the same objects, in consequence of our maritime advantages and locality. How have we availed ourselves of these advantages of which ministers boast so much? The strength of lord Wellington's army, originally 25,000 men, has not in the course of two years been increased to more than 35,000 effective British; that strength now much diminished, in consequence of our severe recent losses. Yet we appear to be possessed of a force amounting to 235,000 men, from which, deducting the armies and garrisons of the Peninsula, Sicily, Gibraltar, America, the Cape, the two Indias, and Ireland, amounting to about 134,000, there remains a force unaccounted for (at least, not employed on actual service) of upwards of 100,000, allowing too in the above statement (of 135,000) 50,000 to be actually employed in the Peninsula, 20,000 for the East Indies, and as many for Ireland, both of which are greatly overstated at this amount. Do these 100,000 men really exist? If they do not, why is the country burdened with the enormous expense necessary for the support of such an establishment? If they are forth coming, why are they not, or a part of them, employed in the Peninsula? I shall not be told that it is necessary to: keep upon our own shores, a disposable force of 121,000 men, after what we have heard of the perfect internal security afforded by the Local Militia and other corps—this security should be something more than nominal, when it appears that the expence to the country of the embodied and Local Militia, and the Volunteer Corps, exceeds anually three millions sterling, while their vast numbers render any other species of troops altogether superfluous for home defence. Does lord Wellington not require reinforcements? Supposing the French armies now hovering on the frontiers of Portugal defeated—nay, according to the sanguine calculation of some gentlemen, destroyed—could this be effected without severe loss on our side?—Can we expect, when we consider the enemy we have to deal with, that lord Wellington with his present British force, aided but by the inexperienced, however patriotic and gallant levies of Portugal and Spain, can continue this contest with any prospect of ultimate success, so long as we only afford scanty and inadequate supplies. In the hour of our success, we calumniate the enemy. Are we ignorant how highly the officers who led the van of the British army applaud the skill and valour of Marshal Ney, and those troops who covered the retreat of Massena? Do we already forget our own severe losses on the Doas Casas, and that still more sanguinary, though glorious conflict of Albuera? In what state have the exertions of the enemy left our armies at this moment for active operations in the Peninsula? Would not a small reinforcement to him at this critical instant compel us hastily to retire to our lines? I deny, generally, the humble degraded state of the enemy and his loss of military fame, and I do so, not with a view of offending or irritating those who differ from me, but to remove an impression, which if suffered to remain, may be greatly injurious, at a moment when our exertions, instead of being relaxed, should be more vigorous than ever. Between October and the first week in March, lord Wellington did not receive more than 0,000 additional men, though it is evident he felt himself not sufficiently strong in his lines, for in October he recalled from Estremadura, marquis Romana and his corps, who at that moment threatened Seville, having recommenced offensive operations. The absence of this corps from this point enabled Soult and Mortier to combine their operations against Badajo, and may be fairly considered as having greatly accelerated the fall of that place. His lordship has proved to ministers the great value of a reinforcement, even of 5,000 men, for on the arrival of a force to that amount, in March last, he was enabled to undertake the double operations to the Agueda and the Guadiana: he has also avowed, that had he received these men earlier, he would have attempted the relief of Badajos. Ministers may now indeed chaunt the praises of lord Wellington, but it is evident they did not afford him effectual support, at a most important moment, and they may be accused of having even marred his plan. We are told, that we have secured for the allies an additional year. Let us not be too sure of this: but granting it, are we to rest satisfied? Is this the utmost of our expectations? An additional year! Is this the nature of the warfare which we wage r Is it for this additional year only, that, in all the "waste of blind extravagance," we are squandering our treasures, and shedding the best blood of the empire? It has been rumoured, that the Spanish Government at Cadiz does not enter cordially into lord Welington's views. I know not how true this may be; but of this I am confident, that, however the short-sighted politicians of Britain may consider a mere protracted contest beneficial to these islands, the Spaniards and Portuguese cannot but feel that war, with such an object, must end in their general desolation—and could it but reach them, that even the minister had, in argument, seemed to limit his views only to this—there is surely no inhabitant of the Peninsula who ought not, most anxiously, to desire the speedy removal of the British army. But the folly of limiting our exertions to mere self defence must be evident. Let us recollect that we are not now at war to restore or protect any particular dynasty—to dictate a constitution to another people—nor to prevent their procuring for themselves that liberty, and those privileges, which we never should have forgotten our ancestors obtained by the sword. Of this we might have been accused in 1793. We have since lived to see Europe in chains, and our own subjugation threatened. It is for this we arm! The moment is then one, not suited to dilatoriness or irresolution. We must have no half measures. Let us then not lose so great an opportunity—let us rally under the impression, so eloquently and forcibly expressed by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that "this enthraldom of Europe is not intended to last for ever—that possibly, in so just and great a cause, we may be pointed out, and intended by Providence, as the humble instruments of deliverance!" But to render, ourselves worthy of this high exaltation, we must not slumber on our posts! Why have all our victories hitherto been so unavailing? Because the nation has never put forth its strength. What was the result of the victories of Role and Vimiera? The Convention of Cintra. Why? The strength of the enemy. What of the victory of Corunna? Embarkation. What of the victory of Talavera? Retreat, and from apprehension as to the like, strength. What of Barrosa? Retreat, also! without accomplising the object of the expedition, the British not being it" sufficient force. And even now, when we think ourselves so successful, will lord Wellington suffer Massena to continue in Salamanca and Leon, or the other French armies in Andalusia? Supposing them to retire, and unite, has he strength prudently to venture into the heart of Spain, and to clear that country of an enemy, whom we scoff at, as discomfited and disgraced? Are all our rejoicings to end in this, that Massena having attempted that for which he appears not to have had sufficient force, has retired from a bad position in Portugal, to his resources in Spain, until it shall be his convenience, with increased numbers, and at a more favourable season, to return? Our past and present circumstances have been compared; that is, our situation now in the Peninsula, to what it was in 1808 Where are the Spanish armies of that year? Are they not defeated and dispersed? In whose hands are the fortresses then occupied by the Spaniards? Are they not principally in the hands of the enemy? We have reason now to exult, but at what? That the enemy has not hitherto succeeded in expelling us from Portugal! Our success "has this extent, no more!" But from our present rejoicings, one might be disposed to infer, that we bad expected annihilation. Why, in 1809, did Buonaparté withdraw himself and his guards from Spain? Was it not to defeat Austria? And did he not gloriously accomplish the object. Why has the war so long, lingered in the Peninsula.' Because he has had other views. Is he not now prepared to enter into another continental war, and in another quarter' of Europe, should circumstances render it necessary? I am sorry to perceive an anxiety in this country for such a war. We seem alike ignorant of the strength and situation of the enemy, and indifferent to the fate of other nations, eager for revenge we cry for blood, reckless of the consequences! It has often been our policy to excite the continent to war; and when the misfortunes of our allies, possibly our neglect, had separated us, we have immediately had recourse to an envenomed illiberal abuse,—proving ourselves no less powerful in enmity, than unserviceable in friendship. How cruelly have not the Russians been aspersed, against whom the pen even of the learned and the wise, has, with little justice and Jess charity, been directed; whose very virtues, with a shameless ingratitude, have been represented as vices? Having ourselves, in 1807, been mere spectators of the scene, we have since dared to question that merit, which even our common enemy has acknowledged; I say our common enemy, for France is still in heart the enemy of Russia, Should the emperor Alexander be so ill advised as to break with France at this moment, what are likely to be our occupations? If we do not materially change our system, we shall perhaps advance a little further into the Peninsula, still with an inadequate force. We shall subsidize Russia, if she will deign to accept; and provided no hitherto undiscovered rock, or petty island, attracts our notice, we may send to some point of the continent, far distant from the scene of action, and late in the war, a corps unequal to effectual impression, but just sufficient to encourage the deluded people, (naturally discontented with the tyranny under which they exist), to rise in arms; and, having elated them by our presence, abandon them to their fate, after having exhausted their country, and exposed them to the chastisement of an irritated master. How have you been hitherto waging war against Buonaparté? By exhausting your treasury and discouraging even your own people, by repeated continental failures, you flatter yourselves you are making a great exertion, because incurring an enormous debt, but while, doubtless, you are succeeding in this, do you thereby advance one inch toward limiting the power of France, which, if suffered to acquire strength in the rapid manner it has done, will shake your empire to its Very foundation? But you imagine that you are safe at home—Are you so? You have indeed challenged Buonaparté to your coasts, and with little justice and less modesty, have pronounced him afraid to meet you! You doubt his intentions to invade. Look to his levies of seamen, and his other naval preparations. Hear his threats—But you believe the thing to be impracticable Examine his means, and recollect your own history! Have you not heard from the first lord of the Admiralty, that the labours of the enemy to complete his navy are incessant, that he has nearly ready for sea sixty-four sail of the line—that commanding, all the naval resources and most of the ports of Europe, it would be "idle to question his capability of rendering himself formidable as a naval power." You have frequently experienced the gallantry of the seamen of Holland, France, and Spain, to whom those of Sweden and Denmark do not yield—those of Genoa and Venice have also had their day; why not again? Greece and her islands have hitherto furnished abundance of seamen to the fleets of Turkey and Russia. Ali, or the greater part of these countries, are under the absolute control of Buonaparté. We have been lately more successful than usual on the continent, because we have applied more of our physical strength. The enemy has been less so, from not having been able to direct all his energies to one point, as in his former wars. Our success, then, and the enemy's retreat, prove the truth of my position, which is, not that numbers will, and always have been victorious, but that without a certain strength it is impossible to succeed. Such troops as gained the battles of Talavera, Barrosa, and those of Portugal, can not be too confidently relied upon, but they should not be devoted in small numbers, where their heroism only can be proved. Buonaparté has hitherto waged successful wars against the corrupt and feeble governments of Europe, who mouldered at his very touch, but he never before was engaged in a contest with a whole people, who have no government to sell or betray them. One district may be held in subjection by the presence of an army, meanwhile the neighbouring pro vince rises. This species of warfare in other times would have exhausted any invading nation. Such a contest, well managed, may yet prove too mach even for Buonaparté. There never was a period in the history of this country when the union of political and military knowledge were so necessary, or might be so advantageously exerted in the councils of the nation, as at the present hour, "this important hour," perhaps "the very crisis of our fate." We have reason to feel somewhat of confidence, which we have not had for some time, not so much owing to what we have ourselves achieved, as inconsequence of the serious difficulties in which the enemy has involved himself, but we must not believe those who say he will abandon his views in Spain. Such, under his difficulties, might be the conduct of a Bourbon—a legitimate prince, who might, without risk, retire within his hereditary dominions; but he who has, by his sword, possessed himself of the Empire of the West, and is encircled by those he has despoiled, cannot venture to retrograde—he must prove himself invincible, or relinquish every thing. We are checked in all our sanguine expectations; by the apprehensions of the cautious, and the financial calculations of the economical, and every suggestion for opposing an effectual resistance to the power of France, is met by a reference to the already-protracted length, the frequent failures, and burthensome nature of the contest. I am aware of this; but I am convinced, that, however unwisely we have hitherto conducted the war, we possess the means to act otherwise—and if it be admitted that we cannot make peace with safety, the war should be carried on with energy, unless we would have the power of Britain crouch to that of France. It is, then, incumbent on us at length to put forth our strength—if we do not, then indeed will all our former exertions have been rendered wholly unprofitable. I admit our expenditure hitherto to have been immense—in many instances, profligate and useless! What sums have there not been expended since 1793, on coast and insular expeditions, and on some, most wild continental ones, many of which have not been enumerated! How many millions in subsidies, some of them most objectionable—in foreign levies—home fortifications, quite unnecessary—barracks, and other whims!—A small part of these sums would have enabled us to have acted as principals, most formidable, too, on the continent. We have been reminded of the war system of our ancestors—that we should adhere to that, and depend on our navy. It is idle to, look for precedents in times quite dissimilar to those in which we live. Our ancestors knew no such dangers as those to which we are exposed. I have lamented the division and misapplication of oar force, and have expressed a wish for concentrated, formidable attacks—for war with energy, not as we have waged it—war with no partial views, but comprehending the interests of the civilized world—war, as the soldiers of a great empire, not as the pirates of a petty state! It is evident from a retrospect of our proceedings, since the commencement of the war, that we have never been in sufficient force on the continent, and on reference to the Army Estimates of each year, it appears, that we have not employed in our continental expeditions, any thing like the quantum of force, which the military establishments of the country enabled us to employ—that we have never been at the moment, nor at any point, where supposing success to have attended our arms, we, or our allies, could have essentially benefited; that we have never anticipated, but have always awaited in stupid gaze the coming of events; that we have therefore never prepared before hand; that we have seldom had a fixed plan of our own, but have usually looked to the enemy for our motions; that of such plans as we had devised, and attempted the execution, most of them were conceived in utter ignorance; some accomplished, and others sought to be accomplished, in violation of solemn treaties, and the most sacred principles of the laws of nations! We have lost the finest opportunities! We have exhausted ourselves in a vast variety of insular, and some purely buccanneering expeditions, which have thrown a deceitful colouring of glory on our arms, and which appear to have enriched, while, in fact, they have impoverished the state, and deceived the people with, an appearance of security, strength, and prosperity, entirely fictitious. But this is not the moment for complaint, the past is irretrievable—the future is yet our own! I cannot conceal from the House my conviction, that this contest, sustained in the manner in which we are now carrying it on, cannot fail to terminate fatally. At this moment the efficient force under lord Wellington is over-rated at 25,000 men. It is also divided, and opposed by superior French armies—these armies, certain soon to obtain considerable reinforcements. What are our views? For the moment we are taking up strong positions on the frontiers, where, at immense loss, we have repulsed the enemy, but the intention, the avowed plan, is to fall back to our position, when the enemy shall have strength to advance in force, and to re-occupy our lines in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which require 70,000 men to defend. But should our losses continue in the proportion that they have been since the opening of this campaign, and our supplies be as slowly and sparingly furnished as they have been since the commencement of the peninsular war, the result cannot be problematical, but failure the most complete inevitable. One cannot hear with patience, after all our boasted facilities and maritime advantages, and the great difficulties under which the enemy carries on his operations in the peninsula, that at this moment, while we possess a numerous useless cavalry, at home, which we could (as it were in a moment) transport to the opposite shores, we are greatly out-numbered even in that arm. One cannot silently hear the merit of such an enemy decried, after his having overcome all these obstacles, and recently performed some of the most difficult and gallant military achievements, such as the retreat from Santarem, the evacuation of Almeida, with the destruction of that fortress and the preservation of its garrison: and the undaunted heroism displayed in the late sanguinary battle, where on the heights of Albuera, the troops of the two most warlike nations of the earth never more distinguished themselves, though victory declared in favour of Britain. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving the following Resolution: "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to assure his royal highness of the unfeigned attachment of this House to his person and government, and their undiminished confidence in his wisdom, vigour and perseverance; the display and exercise of which qualities in the administration of the affairs of this empire can alone, under the blessing of Providence, bring the arduous contest in which they are engaged, to an happy and glorious termination. "That, called upon as this House has been, to impose many and grievous burdens on a loyal, patient, and affectionate people, they should, nevertheless, fail in their duty towards themselves, his royal highness, and their country, if they did not declare their firm conviction, that it is by additional sacrifices alone, and superadded vigour, they can ever hope to bring this war to a safe and honourable conclusion, a war, unexampled in its extent and duration, in which they contend not for glory, empire, and dominion, but for existence. "If their efforts have been great, they must be still greater; if their sacrifices have been many, they must be still more numerous. They cannot but recoliect, that they arm for the independence of man against embattled Europe, awed by the assumed authority, and subdued by the power of one relentless mind, whose policy, whose? ambition, whose hope, is the destruction of this country, and all it" proud establishments. "That, anxious as they are to obtain a durable, a safe, and honourable peace, they can see no means of obtaining this inestimable good, but in the vigorous prosecution of the war, in a strict economy of all the remaining resources, in an indissoluble union, by one common interest, of every class of his Majesty's subjects, and in military efforts proportionate to the danger, and limited alone by the extent and powers of exertion, which are to be found in this empire. "That, in common with all his Majesty's faithful subjects, they have to lament former failures, and to rejoice at present successes. "That, in this protracted warfare, much has occurred to instruct ignorance, and chastise presumption, and a great deal to inspire hope, and future confidence. That if something has been done, much remains to be performed, which can never be accomplished without the most stedfast regard and attention to those fixed and immutable military principles, without which exertion must be useless, and courage itself unavailing."

said, it was not his intention to take up much of the time of the House. He assured the hon. gent. that in what he bad formerly stated respecting the views entertained by his Majesty's government, he had never designed to undervalue the force and the power of the enemy. It had never been in his contemplation to represent the French army as degraded, but upon comparing it in the state to which it was reduced by recent events, with that degree of estimation in which was before held by its successes, over the powers of Europe, be had meant to say, that its glory and its terrors were diminished. It was lowered in character from that unnatural height which it had previously attained, and was clearly proved to have no claim to the title of invincible. With respect to a system of protracted warfare, he certainly did consider that the maintainance of the contest on the Peninsula, even for another year, would afford a chance which it would be consonant to every sound view of practical policy to adopt. He had never, however, confined himself to the belief that another year was the necessary limit to our exertions in that quarter, and had never intended to urge more than that, if there was any where a peculiar opportunity, and a more favourable prospect than another of resisting the enemy, it was to be found in Spain and Portugal. It was there he conceived it to be the paramount interest of the country to maintain the straggle. With respect to what had been said of the want of feeling displayed by fermenting and keeping alive the war in the Peninsula, in his opinion, no calamity that might be inflicted on that part of the Continent by a protracted warfare, could be equal to the evil of French dominion. Thus much he deemed it necessary to say in explanation of his sentiments formerly expressed. In answer to that part of the hon. gentleman's speech in which he talked of lord Wellington's not having been sufficiently reinforced, and of his exertions having been starved, he had it in his power to say, that lord Wellington himself held no such opinion. He would, however, rather see this sentiment prevail in the public mind than the contrary one, that the blood and treasure of the country had been wantonly and extravagantly squandered. The reinforcements sent to lord Wellington arrived sufficiently early to enable him to prosecute all his designs. As to the general and speculative views taken by the hon. gent., it was easy in the closet to project schemes for the sending 50 or 100,000 men abroad, but the moving and the maintenance of such a body were difficulties not easy to be surmounted in practice; neither was the real military strength of a state to be fairly judged by its numerical amount. What had been already done by ministers was, an his judgment, enough to procure them credit for a disposition to make every practicable exertion consistent with the object of preventing the country from exhausting itself so as to leave it incapable of maintaining for any length of time the contest on which its best interests depended. However he might concur in the spirit with which the hon. gent. had regarded the general objects of our foreign policy, he did not think the House would be well advised if they were to adopt the Address of the hon. gent., or endeavour to stimulate government beyond that temperate and cautious, but firm and energetic system of exertion on which they had hitherto acted, for which reason he must oppose the motion.

in reply stated, that he did not propose this motion for the purpose of calling forth any explanation from ministers of their plan of proceeding, but merely to point out, that they were pursuing a plan in the Peninsula, that would tend to the ruin of this country. He felt it therefore his duty to protest against the manner they were carrying on that contest, without comparing the present ministers to former ministers, or giving any offence to the right hon. gent. and his colleagues. Ha was still convinced that our victories would lead to nothing, however much he united in sentiments that had been slated that night in favour of lord Wellington, who, whether he had been so successful or not, was fully entitled to the confidence of the country. If they suffered the French to collect a force, and not speedily meet them now, all the talent" of lord Wellington, and the bravery of British troops, might be in vain called forth to prevent us being driven out of the Peninsula.

on rising, declared, that if he thought there was any prospect of obtaining a fuller attendance at this period of the session, for the consideration of the motion of which had given notice, he would cheerfully consent to delay it. But when no such expectation was likely to be realized, it was not from any desire to interfere with the recent regulations of the House, that he must persevere in bringing the subject immediately under discussion. It would be recollected that he had enquired of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer early in the session whether it was his intention to introduce any clause into the Regency Bill for the purpose of making a provision in the eventual recurrence of his Majesty's disorder. On learning that he had no such intention he had then declared, that before the conclusion of the cession he would call the attention of the House to the state of the kingdom in reference to this subject. It was indeed a subject, in his estimation, of primary importance. After his Majesty's numerous and protracted indispositions; after instances of the royal illness having been concealed from the nation, and after looking back, at the same time, to those periods of our history, when the incapacity of the sovereign had led to intestine discord and commotions, he did think it was the duty of ministers to have proposed some measure which might guard our future history from the recurrence of similar disasters. He did think that it was their duty to have fixed a precedent, by referring to which that agitation of the public mind, and those feelings of party animosity which were always excited on these unfortunate occasions, might be in future avoided. In contemplating the situation of the country and reflecting on what that situation might be in a particular case, which although not probable, might still, in the course of human events, take place, he meant the death of the prince of Wales, the immediate heiress would be a minor, and the next heir, his royal highness the Commander in Chief, would be at the head of the army. (Hear!) He had no doubt whatever, and he was sure no person would suspect him of entertaining a doubt of the loyalty and allegiance of that illustrious person to those who were in precedence to himself in the order of succession to the throne. But he was persuaded, if similar circumstances had existed at any other period—if a female minor had succeeded to the crown, while the military power of the kingdom was under the controul of the presumptive heir—it would be incredible that parliament should be prorogued without adverting to such a situation of the kingdom, unless indeed the existence of a war of unexampled difficulty might create a belief that parliament had been so busily occupied as naturally to overlook this momentous consideration. In referring to those periods in which the sceptre of these kingdoms had been swayed by princesses, it was impossible not to augur well of what might hereafter happen; and in the contemplation of a female reign, pregnant as his mind was with grateful recollections of the past, and fond anticipations of the future, he could not but think that if he lived at a different time, we should find it difficult to believe that any ministers should be so negligent of their duty, so forgetful of the interests and tranquillity of the country, as to propose no legislative measure, to take no precautionary step in such a state of things, so fertile with danger and alarm. The right hon. gent. in answer to his question, had urged the difficulty of devising a remedy, and had stated that none had ever before been adopted. This, then, was his apology for the continuance of that evil—this his argument from past errors in justification of present negligence. Thus much for the general consideration; and he conceived that he had sketched a picture sufficiently interesting to induce the House to take it into attentive consideration. He would now beg leave to ask, what was the state of the country with respect to the King himself? At the opening of the session they were told that his Majesty's indisposition would not probably last a fortnight; another fortnight was then talked of; and then week after week elapsed, and still it was said that the Regency Bill would never pass into a law. The Bill, however, at length passed, and then the public anxiety was met by the bulletins of the physicians, so delusive and enigmatical, that, at last, folly itself could no longer place any confidence in them. Continually representing his Majesty to be advancing towards recovery, they still left him at a distance from the goal. What inference was it possible for the public to draw from these uncertain and contradictory declarations? Rumour, however, had lately mentioned differences, among the physicians, and not only, among the physicians, but among the Queen's council, some of the members of which it represented to have been of opinion that his Majesty was competent to the resumption of his authority. So much for rumour, which if not contradicted, he thought did furnish a sufficient ground to induce the House to take some step on this subject before the prorogation. The public was lately informed that his Majesty had had a fresh accession of his disorder, but that it was not on the increase. What did this mean? What could the, country understand from this declaration? Were they to believe that the disorder was less or more than on the 25th of October last? Supposing his Majesty to resume, and soon after to suffer a relapse, before the parliament should again assemble, the Regency Bill would be extinct, and every thing must be then repeated, and the old set of difficulties would again occur. Was this a state, he would ask, in which it was the duty of parliament to leave the country! So strongly had this consideration impressed itself on his mind, that he had determined to call the attention of the House to it, and would therefore move, That on Thursday next it should resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House, to consider the state of the Nation.

had no hesitation in saying, that if the honourable gentleman meant to propose permanent means for supplying any occasional incapacity in the executive in future, nothing was more inexpedient, nothing more improper. If any period was proper for this, it was not surely that in which the crown was incapacitated. He would, indeed, go farther, and say, that it was improper, prospectively, at any time to lay down rules for every future recurrence, and that it was better that parliament should leave the consideration of the question to the government, that it might establish a remedy itself. The farthest that he should be inclined to go, would be a provision for parliament to meet within a given time after the recurrence. This, in his opinion, was the utmost extent to which it was proper to go. But if it was thought that the provisions to be adopted, might vary infinitely according to the existing circumstances, it would be vain to think of anticipating all those circumstances so as prospectively to establish a government fitted to each particular case. He thought that the country bad had enough of experience already, and that whatever regulation future circumstances might make it necessary to adopt, might be effected with very slight variations from the plans already acted upon. All the details, however, could not be foreseen. With this view of the subject be should think that parliament could not entertain the present motion. If any such regulations as regarded the future, and intended to be permanent, were even to be made, surely it was not a time when the crown was incapacitated that they were to be made. It was necessary to have the superintendance of the crown to watch over its own interests.—The House Would expect that he should take some notice of the report mentioned by the hon. gent. relative to the division of opinions in her Majesty's council on the subject of his Majesty's recovery. He did not know that such divicions had never occurred. They might have happened. But he had never heard that any member of the council had ever thought his Majesty in a situation to resume the government. Upon that subject, however, he must say, that he had not the means of stating precisely the opinions of the members of the council on the subject, except in so far as they had been stated in conversation from time to time; but he could say he had never been able to learn from them that any diversity of opinion had ever prevailed on this subject. No doubt some of them might entertain more sanguine expectations than others of his Majesty's speedy recovery; but that any one held that that complete recovery had arrived, he had never yet heard.—But to return to the subject before them: if parliament was required to meet within a certain time after the recurrence, that provision was a sufficient security. The hon. gent. had said, that parliament possessed no security against their being prorogued. Undoubtedly they did not possess any. He thought it rather extravagant, however, to suppose that any one should presume to intercept the royal authority before the meeting of parliament. If parliament were to meet, then, no doubt, different opinions might be entertained as, to the length of its duration. He had been supposed a minister possessed of a degree of hardihood which no minister before him ever possessed: but this interception was supposing a degree of hardihood which no minister would presume to take upon him.—With respect to the supposed difficulties which would arise from the want of this permanent provision, as the former discussions had ripened into an act of parliament, there might be some difficulty as to the period when it might be necessary to act, whether it should be sooner or later; but he thought there could be little difference of opinion, in future, as to the manner of proceeding. He thought, therefore, that any further provision than that of securing the meeting of parliament within a given time after the recurrence, was superfluous and improper. With respect to the question respecting the possibility of the crown falling into the hands of an infant, if there was no person between that infant and the present sovereign, it would be wise to do what had been already done ill similar cases; but in former times the crown had itself superintended the making of such provisions. So long, therefore, as two lives were between that infant and the throne, he thought it would be improper to call for the consideration of this question.

observed, that the assembling of parliament, in the event of the recurrence of his Majesty's indisposition, was provided for by the existing act. On that ground, and on that ground alone, it appeared to him not necessary at the present moment to take any steps on the subject. At the same time he was of opinion, that on a future occasion means should be take to secure the assembling of parliament as soon as possible after such an event. It was quite impossible, however, that parliament should lay down before hand, all which it might be proper to do under every variety of circumstances.

did not conceive it possible that parliament should now enact, that parliament should not be at any time prorogued. This was one of the functions of ministers for which they were responsible, and for all abuses of this sort, ministers were particularly responsible. But to enact now that on any occasion, parliament should not be prorogued at the pleasure of the crown, was to change one of the fundamental principles of the constitution—it was enacting a principle which might be carried hereafter, as it had been formerly carried, to a most dangerous extent. When a case occurred, or on the case of recovery, parliament assembled, would provide for the recurrence. His right hon. friend had thought it enough to provide means at present for the reassembling of parliament; but he wished to add, that in his opinion, parliament ought to provide; what had hitherto been anomalous ought to be regular in future, and the settled course of the constitution. He thought, however, that the difference which existed as to the mode of supplying the difficiency of the executive power, should be submitted to them at a time when the executive government was in full force—when the consideration of the question could not involve the nation in anarchy or confusion—when it could be considered with perfect coolness, and not with the heat of party—and when it could be considered as an abstract question, compared with the principles of the constitution, and with the recent practice. They should then provide that parliament should meet within the shortest time after the recurrence, and should lose no time, as formerly. The mode was of little importance compared with the ascertaining of that mode. The discussion which took place about the time when parliament should meet, and the mode of proceeding, occupied the greatest part of the time of parliament formerly. If this was settled, all that would in future be necessary to do would be soon accomplished. He thought it was impossible to take a view beforehand of all possible cases. The hon. gentleman had put the case of a minor with the duke of York at the head of the army. It Would be quite madness in the House of Commons to say that in the case of a minor the duke of York should have no power in the regency. It was possible to discuss a case in which all hurry might be against you, and yet all prudence with you. This question not only involved all the principles of our government, but our temporary policy. Again, he was not prepared to say, that in case of the discussion anew of the question of regency on a relapse, that precisely the same restrictions should be enacted, and yet if the House were to go into a Committee that question could not be avoided, so that they would have to fight all the battles of this year over again, and to fight them over again hypothetically. They had already smarted under the late nights and long debates on this subject. In the legislature parliament could not regularly take cognizance of the feelings of the sovereign; the crown was supposed to be impassive and unfeeling; but in the present case, they had the recorded feelings of the Prince Regent on this subject; and the consequence of their present deliberations would be either unnecessarily to wound the feelings of his royal highness, or to come to a Resolution directly the contrary of what they had adopted in the very same session. The only case that could justify their interference in this respect, would be, that his Majesty might recover, and that, during that recovery, the duration would be so short as not to admit of reconsidering the question.

, in reply, thought the declaration of ministers the most miserable farce ever played off to the country, when not sanctioned by an act of parliament. He thought the right hon. gentleman perfectly capable of proroguing instantly, if he should think proper. It had been said that there would then exist justifiable grounds for arraigning his conduct, but he had always found, whatever justifiable grounds there might be for arraigning the conduct of ministers, these grounds never appeared to them justifiable. He had found them even voting on such arraigning of their conduct, in favour of themselves, and to hoist their own flags when conscious that if their own votes were withdrawn they would obtain a very small majority. A recent case had shewn him what a distinction men were apt to make between their own case and the case of others. A colonel of militia lately in tins House was in a minority of one, voting for an investigation into his own conduct, and this mode of proceeding was received with acclamation by those persons who had themselves behaved so very differently. What security had the country in the responsibility of ministers? They might be arraigned and arraigned, but they would always vote that there were no grounds for arraignment, and so put an end to the proceedings. With respect to the King's feelings, he could not conceive how a mind approaching to convalescence could, be affected with knowing that in case of any accident parliament should immediately meet. He thought the present time peculiarly favourable to the consideration of this subject, when men's minds were alive to it. With respect to the divisions in the council, he had certainly had no private confidential communication on the subject; but he had obtained the information in away that he could not disbelieve it, especially as he had heard the names and numbers of the division, and he must therefore believe it to be true. Although the right hon. gentleman was dumb as to the subject of his Majesty's health, and dumb as to the reports of the physicians—at least if he said any thing it escaped him—he did not mean to say that recovery was impossible. Undoubtedly little expectation of that recovery could now be entertained by any rational man who was not sanguine from interest. Supposing, however, his Majesty should recover on the 24th of July, and have a relapse on the 24th of August, there was no provision in the act of parliament relative to that recovery and relapse; and although in the hands of the present ministers there was no danger, in the hands of future ministers much mischief might happen. One of the objects to be inquired into in the Committee would be the grounds on which the physicians' opinions were founded; for the country was informed by the council, on the authority of the physicians, that his Majesty had made a material progress in his recovery; till at last, from progress to progress, he was at last cast a great way back. If they were not a nation of fools, tile physicians ought to be obliged to state the grounds for their opinion.

supported the motion.

rose to call the attention of the House to the. Petition of the Royal Canal Company in Ireland. [See p. 278.] He said he thought it necessary to make the House acquainted with their affairs, and accordingly entered into a history of their proceedings since its establishment in 1789. From the advantages likely to be derived from the plan, he had on a former application been in favour of assisting them in the prosecution of their design with a grant of 70,000l. This sum, however, was not advanced, in consequence of the representations made by the "Grand Canal Company." It was not till their last application that the Irish government had an opportunity of knowing the state of their affairs. On that occasion, the answer given by the lord lieutenant was, that no relief could be afforded, till the circumstances of the concern, from beginning to end, were laid before the Directors-general, that they might form an opinion on the subject. On this, the whole underwent an investigation by that Board, in consequence of which, the Petition came to the House, which he now wished to have referred to a Select Committee. It appeared that the Company had been allowed by their charter to create a stock, to the amount of 300,000l. to raise loans to the amount of what they expended of their capital, but not to raise by loan a sum exceeding such expenditure, and they were prohibited making a dividend but on their clear profits. The sum expended of their capital did not at most exceed 172,000l. but they had borrowed 842,000l. Their income was, 15,000l. annually, and their yearly expences were 11,000l. Thus it would be seen the annual surplus of their revenue was 4,000l. and as the interest of their debt made an annual charge of 49,000l. the returns of the undertaking were 45,000l. worse than nothing. The debentures, of the loan borrowed of the benchers, which were 100l. were now selling in the market at 92l. each, and if the undertaking were carried to the extent proposed, those most sanguine did not think that in Is years, and after expending 300,000l. the returns would exceed 30,000l. annually, in addition to the present revenue. His principal reason for wishing the subject referred to a Committee was, that the failure of the undertaking would greatly distress many of the share holders, who were for the greater part widows, or persons in low circumstances. He concluded by moving, "That the Petition of the Royal Canal Company of Ireland, together with the Report of the Director-general on the subject to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, be referred to the consideration of a Committee to be appointed to examine the same, and report their observations thereon to the House."