in rising to submit to the House a motion on the subject, did not feel that it would be necessary for him to trespass on their patience at any considerable length; or to adduce many arguments to shew the expediency of affording that assistance to Portugal at the present moment, which had been sanctioned by the approbation of parliament, at former periods, when the advantages attendant upon it were by no means equally evident. Indeed the question appeared to him to be drawn into such a narrow compass, that it was scarcely possible for any one to doubt the principle of expediency on which the proposed grant rested, unless one of the following propositions was affirmed, viz. that it was so fundamentally wrong to subsidize any foreign power, that no application of that nature ought to be made to parliament; or that the state of the war in the peninsula was such, that, notwithstanding the treaties by which the two countries were so closely united, notwithstanding the glorious successes of our arms, and notwithstanding the solemn faith which parliament had so repeatedly pledged on the subject, no further exertion I should be made by Great Britain, but that Spain and Portugal should be left to the dreadful fate which awaited them. Unless one of these two grounds was taken, he confessed himself wholly at a loss to conceive how the present proposition could be opposed. It was far from his wish to re-agitate those topics which at former periods had given rise to such controversy. It was unnecessary to recur to those topics, in order to sustain the motion with which he should conclude. Nor would it be politic to recur to them; for he was persuaded, that if the committee should agree with him in thinking that the same pecuniary support ought to be extended to Portugal as was given in the last session, they would also agree with him in thinking that it ought to be done with as much unanimity as possible; for whatever differences of opinion might have existed in parliament at a time when the experiment of assisting Portugal had not been tried, now that it had been tried and proved successful, he trusted that a general disposition would ultimately be manifested to mark by an unanimous vote, the approbation with which the British parliament regarded the exertions of the Portuguese in the common cause, and the fidelity which they had manifested under those numerous circumstances of extreme peril and difficulty, to which the various fortunes of the war had necessarily exposed them. Without, therefore, dwelling at any length on the topics to which he had alluded, he would just call to the recollection of the committee, that when the principle of the present proposition was broached two years ago, a great disposition existed in parliament to doubt whether any military exertions which it might lend occasionally to Portugal, could be ultimately successful. Many gentlemen of high military character seemed inclined to believe that the Portuguese army, which it was the object of that proposition to raise and subsidise, could never be brought into such a state of discipline, as to render it efficiently serviceable. The division on that occasion exhibited a strong feeling in the minds of a great number of hon. gentlemen, that the encouragement in a military point of view held out by the proposition, was by no means adequate to the expence of it Those, however, who enjoyed more intimate means of judging of the probable result, pressed the vote upon the House; it was passed; and in the course of the year the efforts made in Portugal in consequence were such, that in the next session of parliament, even those who had opposed the proposition in the first instance, candidly allowed, that it had been productive of the most advantageous results. Accordingly when the proposition was again brought forward, those who had voted against it in the first instance, abstained from a repetition of that vote; representing, however, at the same time, that although they admitted that the measure had produced great advantage; yet that after all, the efforts of the combined British and Portuguese armies had ended only in shutting them up in the lines of Cintra, and leaving the enemy in possession of the remainder of Portugal. At least the committee would feel that this obstacle to an unanimous expression of sentiment was removed; for the vote of the last session had enabled lord Welling on to drive the enemy over the frontier, and expel them wholly from Portugal. Parliament therefore was now called upon to contemplate a system, not which might lead, but which actually had led to the most brilliant success. The committee, in coming to the consideration of the present Resolution, would be divested of all those difficulties which had heretofore existed on the subject. He would, however, make a few observations on the principle upon which the present proposition rested. If ever there was a question of subsidy which could be maintained on sound, legitimate, and justifiable grounds, it was this. In the first place, it was subsidising a power with which we were connected by a kind of natural feeling. Indeed, it could hardly be considered in the light of a subsidy; for the measure afforded such effectual aid to the British army, charged as that army was with important operations, comprehending our own essential interests, that the money might with propriety be voted on that view of the subject alone, and without any particular reference to Portugal, for it was impossible not to admit, that all those splendid exertions of lord Wellington would have fallen very short of their existing extent, had that noble lord been deprived of the support of that part of the army which had arisen out of the liberal policy on which the present proposition was founded. That such was the true character of the Portuguese army was felt by the enemy at Busaco, who considered it as British, and attributed it to lord Wellington as a stratagem of war, that for the purpose of alluring an attack, he had clothed the British soldiers in the Portuguese uniform. Another ground for granting this sum was, that it would be applied and administered under the inspection of British officers. Never had any subsidy been afforded, for the faithful application of which such complete security existed as this to the government of Portugal. There was another view to be taken of the subject. This was not money granted to Portugal in exoneration of any charges which she might fairly be expected to bear herself. The government of Great Britain had frequently on former occasions been accused of thus unnecessarily subsidising foreign powers. But this remark was not applicable to Portugal. It was a satisfactory and interesting fact, and one which he was sure the committee would learn with pleasure, that such had been the financial exertions of Portugal, that at the present moment, after all the efforts of the war, after the country-had been in the temporary possession of the enemy, and had been drained even by that temporary possession, the revenue of Portugal, applicable to the prosecution of the war, was at a higher point than before the commencement of the contest. The Portuguese government was in the actual collection of a greater revenue, and cherished hopes that by measures now in progress, that revenue would be considerably increased. They came to the British parliament only to assist them in making those exertions adequate to the great cause in which the two countries were so deeply interested. On the whole, therefore, he trusted that although there might be ground for doubting the expediency of such a proposition as the present, when originally made, yet as the experience of the two last years had completely disproved the soundness of those apprehensions, the committee would, by an unanimous decision, mark the feeling of respect which they entertained for the exertions, and for the fidelity of Portugal; for it was a proud circumstance for that country, that when it was overrun for a time by the enemy—when the British army, actuated by motives of profound military policy, retired to Torres Vedras that they might again advance with greater effect—the faith of the Portuguese remained inviolate; there was not the most momentary adherence on their part to the enemy; they submitted to all the military inflictions which their firmness occasioned; they bore the devastation of their country without repining; and in no single instance were they false to the common interest. The noble lord concluded by moving the following Resolution: "That it is the opinion of this committee, that a sum not exceeding two millions, be granted to his Majesty, to enable him to continue to maintain in his pay a body of Portuguese Troops, and to give such further aid and assistance to the government of Portugal as the nature of the contest in which his Majesty is engaged, may appear to him to require."

denied that the noble lord had satisfied his mind with respect to the propriety of the proposed grant. The noble lord had adverted not to the general state of the war, but to the particular state of Portugal. To all that the noble lord had said in praise of the exertions of Portugal, he heartily subscribed. But he could not allow an additional burden of two millions to be imposed upon the country, without bringing back to the recollection of the committee the original object, for the attainment of which this grant was in the first instance voted. That object had failed, and therefore to continue such grants, was merely to persevere in a system of lavish expenditure, from which no satisfactory result could be expected. When the first grant of this nature was proposed, it was to afford British aid towards rescuing Spain from the gripe of France. At that time he concurred most cordially with the whole country in the effort. But four years have elapsed, and not an inch of ground having been gained, he had a right to alter his opinion on the subject. So far were we from having emancipated Spain, that we had not a single man there, nor could we entertain a rational prospect of making any impression on the enemy in that quarter. He put it to the committee, whether if four years ago the merely remaining in Portugal had been described as the ultimate object of our efforts, the proposition to make those efforts would have been received with that acclamation and support which actually accompanied it? In objecting to the present motion, he felt that he trod on ground not most popular just then, of course he should have to contend with the gentlemen opposite; he should also have to contend with many with whom he was in the general habit of political accordance. But so strong was his conviction on the subject, that he felt it imperative upon him to express his opinion. He had patiently listened to every argument and opinion connected with it, both in parliament, and in private society, but hitherto no one had been able to persuade him that, under the present circumstances, Great Britain ought to persevere in a system so lavish, that it must eventually lead to her utter destruction. It was on the ground of expence, that he argued against the motion. We had failed in every effort which we had made to drive the enemy from Spain. We had failed, not from any want of courage in our troops, not from any want of skill in our officers, but from a want of co-operation on the part of the Spaniards, from a want of that assistance which we expected from them, and which we had a right to expect. In the present state of the committee he would not enter into any details of the war in the peninsula: but he would implore them to pause before they fruitlessly expended two millions of the public money. Let them consider, that two millions was near one-sixth of the produce of the Income Tax. Let them look at the enormous expenditure of the country, and endeavour to devise the means of diminishing, rather than of augmenting it The present annual expenditure of Great Britain amounted to nearly 100 millions! He would defy any minister to maintain the present expenditure of the country, with resources so diminished, and the trade and commerce similarly circumstanced. He need only refer the right hon. gentleman to what he had stated last year, when proposing a subsidy for Portugal—when at the same time there was a petition from the manufacturers, complaining of the decay of trade, and praying some relief. On that occasion, the right hon. gentleman had said, that it was impossible to afford the relief prayed for, until Buonaparté had altered his prohibitory decrees. Since then the ruler of France had encreased them, and therefore the situation of the country in that respect was worse. Under these circumstances he should most earnestly recommend to the House to adopt economy—to diminish the expenditure, and make it more commensurate with the means of the country. The noble lord had stated that the revenue of Portugal was materially improved since the former subsidy was voted by parliament. If so, she had no right whatever to call upon Great Britain for further aid; the increase of the revenue of Portugal ought to be applied to the maintenance of her army, especially as our revenue was on the decline. If England was menaced with a foreign invasion, would Englishmen, he would ask, condescend to receive pay for carrying muskets in defence of their liberties and of their country? The fact was so with the Portuguese, for the subsidy was granted for the express purpose of assisting them in defence of their own country (Hear, hear!) Gentlemen might exclaim, but he wished they could contradict him. He would state a few facts in detail of the expences of our army in that quarter. At this moment, it must be admitted, on all hands, that the extent of it was not under 50,000 men at least available for service—the expence of the establishment of mules employed in carrying stores, &c. was not less than 4,000l. per diem, and this he could prove, if necessary. Each horse cost this country 5s; per day, besides the provision for the cavalry, which was imported from America into Lisbon, and thence transported to the army, and their horses were expected to be furnished from this country. The ex-pence of transporting the heavy ordnance from Oporto to Ciudad Rodrigo cost this country 20,000l. With respect to keeping up the force we had in the peninsula, our means were not adequate to the effort, for the militia regiments were called on to supply their quotas for the line, and many of the, militia regiments were not complete, for some of the counties could not afford a ballot. There was no chance therefore of deriving assistance again from that, source. It was impracticable to keep up the cavalry regiments; he could affirm, that one regiment, which at the end of the year 1808 was complete, consisting of eight troops, containing 640 men and horses, landed in Portugal, was now reduced, though it had been recruited five times since that time, to 480 men, and when in the field could not muster more than 400 men. Indeed he might say of all, 'Exeuntdisce omnes!' In recommending economy, he did not mean that our armies should be withdrawn, or that at the first charge the country should surrender at discretion. His only object was to induce the House to look at the situation of this country, and by its conduct prevent the furtherance of what he must deem a ruinous system, carried on in a country where so fair a prospect was not now presented as at the commencement of the contest. (Hear, hear!) The right hon. gentleman might exclaim again, but that was his opinion; and therefore he could not avoid recommending the adoption of measures more conducive to the security of the empire, and upon a scale more consistent with its resources.

said, that he was one of those who originally thought that we should not have entered as principals into the war in the peninsula; he still thought so, but he conceived that there was a great difference between such an opinion and that which he might entertain after that war had been so commenced, and continued for years. Whether they should have entered into it on the scale they had done, and whether they should now abandon it, were quite different questions; for the policy of abandoning it might be a great deal worse than the policy which induced us to commence it. He could not agree with his hon. friend who spoke last; for in the system which he recommended, though he said he would not abandon the war, yet his opinions would lead him to starve it. That would, indeed, be carrying on the war so as to be burdensome, while at the same time it afforded no probability of succeeding in any one object of it. Though he still thought it would have been wiser to have acted differently, yet it should be recollected, that there was nothing so disgraceful to the character of a great nation as a changeable vacillating policy. It often happened in the concerns of nations, that it was better to pursue a course which was not in the first instance rightly, selected, than to give it up altogether, after following it for a considerable time. If we now abandoned it, or did what was almost the same thing, starved it, and if we thus suffered the French to gain nearly all their objects, what would any statesman say—what would all Europe say to our conduct? They might say that when we were unsuccessful,—when we were defeated in our objects,—when oar gallant general was slain, then we were disposed to continue the war; but that now, when we had obtained brilliant successes,—when we had secured our position in the peninsula,—when our armies were commanded by one of the greatest generals of modern times; now, a new light had broken in upon us; now, we found that we could not afford to continue the means of farther success; now, we felt ourselves indisposed to grant the necessary succours to our allies! His hon. friend thought it discreditable to the Portuguese character to be paid by England. But what was the fact? The Portuguese had first done all that was in their power, and then they received our assistance to make still greater efforts. His hon. friend said, that we, in England, would not think of being paid by another nation for defending ourselves. God forbid that such an event should ever happen as to drive us to a question of such a nature! Should the necessity of defending ourselves in our own land occur, we should, doubtless, perform all that lay within the compass of our own ability; and he trusted that we should feel no necessity to resort to the supplies of other governments. But really he could discern nothing disgraceful in the conduct of the Portuguese, who, without the financial means of exerting all their powers, and calling forth all their own resources, received the pecuniary assistance of their allies in a common cause. What they had done, had been the practice of some of the greatest states in Europe: several instances of which, he imagined, his hon. friend approved of. What had been the case respecting our allies during the whole of the war for near twenty years? Was it ever said, that the emperor of Germany was a disgraced person because he accepted pecuniary loans and subsidies from this country, to enable him to send his armies into the field? But if affording pecuniary aid to Portugal were expedient, and justifiable on the score of policy, it was yet much more so at present, on the ground of honour. In fact, we were pledged as strongly as we could be to assist Portugal; and she had done nothing lately to forfeit the fulfilment of our promises of support; he meant not that hollow, niggardly, illusive support that some recommended; but a real, efficient, and vigorous assistance. With regard to Spain, he thought that if she had ever deserved our aid, she deserved it peculiarly at the present time; for she had lately endeavoured to increase her own means of resistance, especially in her abolition of a weak and execrable government. He was not however disposed to deny that the time might come, when this question would appear under a very different aspect,—when we might find ourselves pressed by domestic difficulties, which would render it advisable to husband our resources with the utmost economy; and he would fairly own, that he was not altogether free from apprehensions on that subject. The time might possibly arrive sooner than most persons expected. Yet he must maintain upon every consideration, whether of national policy, or of public honour, that if we should deem it proper to abandon the vigorous prosecution of the war in the peninsula, we ought to do so slowly and reluctantly. Such a measure ought, in his mind, to be the result only of well weighing, and duly estimating whether we were really unable to persevere in that war. We ought to look around us carefully, and examine what other branch of expenditure we could retrench or give up, rather than for the sake of the cost to abandon the defence of our allies. Thus much he felt himself bound to say, because he certainly thought, and had before said, that in the commencement, it would have been better policy for us not to commit ourselves so far, as principals in the war. But when he heard gentlemen argue in favour of stopping the career in which we had been engaged for several years, and to which we were now so strongly pledged, he must declare, that he could not hear such sentiments without stating, as he had done, his opinion on the present state of the policy and honour of this country.

entertained similar sentiments with his hon. friend who had just spoken, and was disposed to give credit to ministers, and to the noble earl at the head of the army in the peninsula, for the conduct of the war. He was, however, sorry to be obliged to withhold his praise from the course originally pursued by government in respect to the affairs of Spain. If proper exertions had been made at the commencement of the contest, different results would have ensued. They ought to have insisted on the adoption of those measures since pursued by the present government in Spain; such as calling together the Cortes, and using other means of strengthening themselves against the enemy. He trusted that greater cordiality would subsist than with the Central Junta, and in that event he hoped that before long the most favourable results would occur.

observed, that if the principle were to be admitted that they were not to consider the existing state of their own finances, it might be fairly enough said, that they ought not to consider the amount of the proposed vote. As he viewed the matter, however, he thought they ought to take into consideration the means which this country possessed, and the object to which it was proposed that those means should be directed. He fancied, when he heard the noble lord speak of the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo, that he was riding the horse of the war minister, and had forgotten that he held now another office. With all his Quixotic notions, the noble lord surely could not mean to say, that there was any great success to be anticipated by taking that fortress,—that could not be his serious meaning. It was one of our worst symptoms, that the tone of the country and of that House was so changed. This he attributed to the vast increase of our military establishments; but that consideration should not deter him, any more than it ought any other member, from discharging his duty. He was surprised to hear it said that economizing was starving our operations. Was there no difference between hesitating at a vote of two millions and abandoning the war? Was there no middle way of proceeding? For his own part, he protested against its abandonment; but an hon. gentleman who spoke with much ability the other night (Mr. Robinson), as well as others, were obliged to maintain their arguments always by the presumption, that those who objected to expenditure were advocates for total abandonment. The vote was asked for the peculiar defence of Portugal. If the Portuguese really could not pay their own men, but yet would do all they could to raise them, he did not say that we should deny them any assistance; but it was the object of his motion lately, to acquire a knowledge of the facts. This became more necessary when a sum of two millions was in question. There seemed to be an apprehension of unpopularity in speaking of economy in the conduct of the war, but no man should be deterred by that consideration. He had often perhaps been very unpopular in his opinions, but that should not prevent him from maintaining them.

considered Portugal to be defensible against the French arms chiefly at the lines of Torres Vedras, which were so strong as not to require so great an army as we had there, and which gave us a free communication with the sea, whereas our operations were conducted on a much more extensive scale between Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, places which, if we got possession of them both, were not tenable, unless we had a military force perfectly capable of coping with the French forces in the open field. Both these places stood on plains: and the French, it should be recollected, were much superior to us in the number of their cavalry, and often had brought a much larger general force into the field. The war would be much less expensive, were the lines of Torres Vedras considered as the true defence of Portugal; by which means, instead of our keeping 60 or 70,000 men in Portugal, comparatively idle, or at least not in a state of military activity, we might detach just now, as we might have done before, a portion of our army to Cadiz, and raise the blockade of that city. A small portion of our army might also be sent to Catalonia, where they might reverse all the successes of the enemy: and we might act all along the margin of the Mediterranean with the best, effect. There were numerous small forts on the coast which we might get possession of, and thereby command all the neighbouring country. We might have done much oh the whole eastern side of Spain, at Valencia particularly, and might probably retake Barcelona. All this was not only useful but practicable at a much smaller expence than our present system. Thus we might have constantly checked and counteracted the objects of the French. This suggestion he did not make as his own. It had been the recommendation of others, as well as his, and seemed to be obvious to any body. For the principles on which it was founded, he had the advantage of great authority, which, he quoted. He declared that he saw nothing in the war to occasion our despair, if we conducted it on principles by which we might be enabled entirely to clear the sea coast, and have, at the same time, a large proportion of our army now in Portugal, disposable at home or elsewhere, for such objects as we desired to obtain. The vote for the two millions might, if applicable to these views, prove very beneficial: for no service could be more important than to sweep the French, as we might do, with one effort, from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and clear the whole Mediterranean coast from their intrusion.

rose to propose a resolution for granting the sum of 80,000l. on account of the intended Breakwater in Plymouth Sound. The right hon. gentleman observed, that he should propose to vole the sum in the first instance for the better protection of his Majesty's ships in harbour, trusting that as the papers on the subject had been long on the table, they were fully known to gentlemen. The two principal points upon which he claimed attention were, in the first place, to ascertain whether it was expedient and necessary to do any thing in Plymouth Sound; and secondly, whether the plan on the table was the most beneficial. As to the first point, every gentleman who had turned his mind to, or was acquainted with the naval service, must conclude that the western ports and roadsteads were highly deserving of consideration. No doubt the naval service was the most popular, and that House naturally looked to it with a sort of affectionate regard, which the nature of the service generally assured, though he was one of those who was not disposed to think that service the only one to which the country was indebted for its protection, yet it was the most material part of its defence. The greater part of the world placed dependence on the British flag for protection; a flag which had carried the glory of their country to its highest pitch. The House, however, would not be justified in entering blindly into a proposition of the nature he was about to bring forward, without due consideration of its principles. The ports and arsenals of the navy were capable of great improvement, and when it was considered that the skill and courage of the navy were carried to the pitch of greatness he had just stated, it might be desirable, as affecting the safety of that navy, that the civil improvements should be attended to, and it might be worthy of consideration to inquire into the state of all the ports. He would, however, confine himself more particularly to the Western ports. For many years past, Plymouth Sound had been found to be the most magnificent arsenal for the rendezvous of ships of the line, but the Hamoaze for the last 20 years had not been judged so safe for ships of the line to anchor in. During the summer months there was some little security, but not for large fleets at any season. At the breaking out of the American war, in 1778, the fleet under admiral Keppel anchored here so late as the middle of October. Sub-sequent to 1790, not a ship of the line had been enabled to anchor there; they were obliged to go into Cawsand Bay, that part of the roadstead being a better shelter from the winds. It was, notwithstanding, a more confined anchorage, and open to tempestuous seas; the consequence was, that our fleets were compelled to use Torbay and Falmouth. If an adequate protection could be, given to Plymouth Sound, he should be justified by every naval man present in saying, that it would be preferable to either Torbay or Falmouth. Though Toxbay was a noble anchorage, yet in 1795, when lord Howe's fleet anchored there, they were caught by an easterly wind, which did some damage, and the greater part were in considerable danger. If gentlemen would look at the chart, supposing proper shelter was afforded in. Plymouth. Sound, they would perceive that the facilities in sailing from it with an easterly wind would be greater than from any of the western ports. Another advantage would be the opportunity of being prepared for the enemy's fleet. It was true, that at present the enemy had no fleet at Brest, but the House would not therefore suppose that at some future time that most important port of France might not have to boast of a fleet. At present there was but one solitary ship of the line in the harbour; there might be at some future time 25 or 30 ships, as formerly. If it would be proper to make Plymouth Sound a safe harbour, why not do it now, in order to. be prepared in the event of the enemy having a fleet at Brest? Another great object was, to save as much as possible, the wear and tear of the ships. With these, views it would be desirable to make it a place of safety for the western fleet. The question was now, whether the mode suggested for improving the harbour was the best? The committee would be aware that the idea was not modern. A variety of plans had been suggested. In 1806, lord Howick had directed the plan of Mr. Rennie to be taken into consideration, and persons were appointed to survey the Sound, and report upon the practicability of carrying the plan into execution. The result of the investigation was, the proposal of a Breakwater, leaving open a passage to the East and West, to cover not more than three nautical miles; the extent of the Breakwater to be something more than one mile; the depth of the water would not be great, not more than between 28 and 30 feet, sufficient however for receiving, any ship of the line. The opinion of Mr. Jackson, the present Master Attendant of Plymouth Yard, was, that the water would be of depth sufficient for thirty-six ships of the line; but supposing that not more than fifteen or twenty were safe moored under this proposed shelter, it would be a great gain to the country. The estimated expence of the whole of the works would be about 1,500,000l. That sum would be soon repaid in the saving which would arise in the fitting out of ships; With respect to the plan, it was proposed to form the Breakwater upon shoals now very dangerous, as the Shovel and Carlos Rocks, which do harm to the Sound. In proceeding on the works there would be no speculation, for it was well known what had been done at Cherbourg, similar, in many respects, to the present plan. It was first proposed by M. Vauban after the battle of La Hogue, but was not carried into effect till the year 1785. The situation of Cherbourg was different from Plymouth Sound, for it was exposed to the most tempestuous weather, with great rapidity of tides. It was proposed to sink a few cones, but that not succeeding, they had recourse to stones, and the works were completed in that manner. It was carried in extent two miles and three quarters in between nine and ten fathoms water, and now afforded complete shelter for the enemy's ships of the line, in all weathers. If, therefore, the works were completed at Cherbourg, why might they not be completed at Plymouth Sound, where the facilities were greater, the proposed road not being more than one mile, whereas the French road was two miles and three quarters; the shoals at Plymouth not being more than from 14 to 15 feet, and between 5 and 6 fathoms water. The probability of the success of the undertaking being so great, and the advantages likely to result so beneficial to the country, he frosted there could be no objection to the proposition. The right hon. gentleman then moved, "That a sum not exceeding 80,000l. be granted for the purchase of quarries, and to carry en the works in Plymouth Sound, in order to form a Breakwater."

wished to propose a clause to prevent the infliction of the punishment of flogging in the Local Militia.

apprehended it was too late to introduce a clause, but the hon. baronet could move an amendment to any clause he might object to, and doing so, he would have an opportunity of making any remarks he might win to offer.

in consequence of this suggestion, arose to offer an amendment. He prefaced his motion with a few remarks on the impropriety of resorting to the punishment of flogging. Adverting to the case of Mr. Taylor, to which he had alluded last year, he maintained that what he then stated was correct, and that subsequent information had satisfied him that Mr. Taylor was a man of excellent character, of good education, and considerable talents. Education had been recently spoken of as likely to tend to the abolishing of flogging, but here was an instance from which a different inference might be drawn, as Mr. Taylor's education had led him to write that song for which he was punished. He then noticed what had taken place at the isle of Ely, where, on account of a squabble between the officers and men about the marching guinea, to which the latter thought they were entitled, their conduct had been said to be mutinous, and a number of these young men who had but just put off their smock frocks, had been sentenced to receive 500 lashes. He would ask, if such punishment was not out of all character? and since there were persons who seemed to resort to it with such alacrity, it seemed to him highly expedient to prevent its being inflicted. This was the more necessary as the country were likely to be called out; and it was too much that the punishment of flogging should be inflicted on our entire population. He concluded by moving, that to that part of the act extending in case of invasion, the provisions of the Articles of War to the Local Militia, the following words be added "Except so far as shall extend to inflicting the punishment of flogging, which shall in no case be inflicted on any officer, private, or drummer, serving in the Local Militia."

opposed the motion. The hon. baronet, by the amendment he had moved, would exempt the Local Militia from the regular discipline of the army, at a time when they were called upon to act as a regular army, while he left them exposed to the punishment of flogging, during their being raised and trained. The cases to which he had adverted, of Mr. Taylor and the men at the isle of Ely, were cases in which punishment was imperiously called for, and in which it had been inflicted with justice and moderation, as he believed would be admitted by the parties themselves; an acknowledgment of the justice of his sentence could be produced in the hand-writing of Mr. Taylor.

said it was believed in this country that corporal punishment was not inflicted in the French service. He, however, had to state, that one of their books had fallen into the hands of a division of our army, at the battle of Fuentes d'Honore, which contained the proceedings of their court martials, from which it appeared, that within a very short time, 320 men, chiefly deserters, had been sentenced to death. Not only in such cases was the offender put to death, but his parents might be imprisoned for six months, and those who had harboured him were fined 1,500 francs. The book was afterwards lost; but he was authorised by an officer to state what he had advanced, and if it were necessary, he was at liberty to mention the name of his author; and at the same time to say that if another book of that description fell into our hands, care would be taken of it, that gentlemen might see it and make their own comments.

was of opinion that the argument to be deduced from the circumstance last mentioned cut quite the other way, as it shewed that even a capital punishment was more tolerable to the French army, than that of flogging.

objected to a relaxation of discipline, though he thought severity of punishment in the Local Militia would be best avoided.

supported the amendment, and contended that the abolition of flogging would tend not to relax, but to improve the discipline of the army. As to the book which they had been told was found, and afterwards lost, and which was to be taken such care of if found again, and for which he supposed the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer would advertise, offering large sums for its production, as he had done for another celebrated book (the Delicate Investigation) on a former occasion, it seemed after all to make against his argument, as it turned out that there was no proof of corporal punishment being inflicted in the French service, to prove which it was brought forward.

said a few words in support of the original clause.

was of opinion, that if corporal punishment was considered necessary in any part of the army, it was equally so in the Local Militia.

said, that to his knowledge, the French prisoners at Gibraltar had borrowed our cats to flog their own people.

professed himself to be adverse to the infliction of corporal punishment in the Local Militia.

wished that some clause had been introduced which would direct a reference to the Secretary of State, previous to the infliction of corporal punishment. He did not know, at the same time, how to vote with the hon. baronet, as he conceived a case might arise to make corporal punishment necessary.

moved for leave to bring in a Bill for declaring the seats of members, who should become bankrupt, vacant after a limited time. He did not think it necessary to preface his motion with any long speech. It was quite right, he thought, that a beggar should not be a member of that House. Its dignity and independence required that some measure of the nature of the present motion should be adopted. His Bill only went to assimilate the law of England to that now existing in Ireland. If an Irish member became bankrupt, his seat became vacant in six months after his bankruptcy, unless he produced a certificate from the commissioners. He did not know why English members should have privileges to which the Irish were not entitled.

was of opinion that the preferable mode of proceeding would be for the House, in the first instance, to go into a committee to enquire into the privileges of members. He thought that adopting this measure at once would be to pass, in the public opinion, a great stigma on bankrupts, which, in the present state of the country, he could not think was altogether proper.

approved of the proposed measure, though the period of six months might not be sufficient in many cases to enable a correct idea to be formed as to the state of the bankrupt's affairs. He was, however, a friend to the measure, and thought that the publicity attendant on bankruptcy was one strong reason for the House adopting it.

also approved of the measure.