moved, that the chairman should report progress. He wished to give notice, that he would to-morrow move, that the Committee should sit on Saturday, and in the mean time he would propose to ask leave to sit again to-morrow, but with an understanding in consequence of what occurred on Tuesday, that the Committee should only be gone into pro forma.

stated it to be his intention to oppose the proposition of the hon. and learned gentleman for going into the Committee on Saturday. He thought it unreasonable to, suppose, that if the Committee were appointed to sit on Saturday, the attendance would be other than very thin, after the House had been occupied to so late an hour as that to which it might be expected the debate of Friday would be protracted.

had no wish to press it on the House or even on the right hon. gentleman. He did not wish the committee to sit late on Saturday, but he thought it might sit from three o'clock to five. If this were objected to, he would move, that the Committee should sit again on Monday, at the same time wishing to impress on the House the necessity of proceeding as fast as they possibly could with the enquiry.

The House resumed, the Chairman reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again on Monday.

objected to it on public grounds, as the report of lord Glenbervie, who was himself one of the principal subscribers to the canal, ought to have been long before on the table of the House, nor could they legally proceed on the Bill without it. The hon. gentleman had, like many other members, received a card from the noble lord on the subject of this Bill; he repeated his former arguments, as to the benefits lord Glenbervie was likely to receive from the undertaking, and concluded by moving, as an amendment, "That the Report be taken into further consideration that day fortnight."

saw no occasion for the proposed delay, as the Bill had already been four months under the consideration of the House, and he believed that no measure of a similar nature had ever obtained so much attention.

differed totally from the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, and was convinced, that whether, in the improvement of Mary-le-bone park, they were to be guided by pecuniary considerations, to make the utmost of it, or whether, according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's opinion, this was to be only a secondary consideration, still they wanted the report of the surveyor general, before they could proceed, and he would in consequence, vote for the amendment.

objected to that canvassing for jobs which was too prevalent on both sides of the House. He expatiated at length on the usefulness of Mary-le-bone park to the health of the inhabitants of this crowded metropolis. It was on that principle that the intended buildings in Hyde Park had been successfully resisted some years ago by a right hon. gentleman now no more (Mr. Windham) and by several of his noble and hon. friends. That principle was perfectly, and in every respect applicable to Mary-le-bone park, and although the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to have admitted this, yet the plan for the pretended improvements went directly against it. The projectors of the improvements intended to cut canals with their usual appendages of quays and warehouses, to erect barracks a mile in circumference, to build villas with delightful shrubberies, very pleasant, no doubt, to the owners; but all those fine things would leave to the people at large only one-tenth part of the ground on which they were wont to take their recreations. He thought that the best improvements that could be devised, would be to leave the park as nearly as possible in the same state in which it had been for such a length of time, and not to deprive the middling classes of the metropolis of their usual Sunday walks, for which they might look in vain every where else. In this point of view he considered the Bill, not as a private but as a public one; and he would oppose it as trenching on the comfort of the poor for the accommodation of the rich.

supported the Bill, as he did not think that canals and gravel-walks could possibly spoil any place of public recreation. He did not think, besides, that the present was the proper state to oppose the principle of the Bill.

The House then divided—

The Subscribers to the Canal did not vote on the question. The report was then brought up and agreed to, and the Bill was ordered to be engrossed.

rose, pursuant to a notice he had given, to call the attention of the House, to the two Tellerships of the Exchequer, held by the marquis of Buckingham and lord Camden. This subject had often been incidentally touched upon in that House, but it was his intention now to move specific Resolutions on the subject. He should wish to consider it as a mere question of private property between those individuals and the public, and to discuss it upon that ground. He thought that he could not be suspected of bringing the question forward on any party motives, when it was recollected that the two noblemen who held those great offices were of different parties. The place had been given to the marquis of Buckingham as a reward for the services of his father, George Grenville, who had been prime minister of the country. Lord Camden had received his place as the reward of the services of his father, who had been lord chancellor. He therefore did not mean to find any fault with the distribution of those offices, or to say that they were not given as a reward for those high services for which it had often been contended that such places ought to be given. What he found fault with was this, that the emoluments of those offices were indefinite in their amount, and in the proportion of the difficulties and distresses of the country. The fees were paid from the Exchequer, being in the nature of a poundage on the money issued. There was 7s. 6d. on every hundred pound issued for the ordinary service of the army, and 3s. 9d. for the extraordinary. Eight pence in the hundred for what was issued for the navy, and 12d. for the ordnance issues. But the largest fee was on pensions and annuities granted, which amounted to 2½ per cent. The effect of all those fees had been, that in the very same proportion that the distresses of the country were increasing, the profits of those Tellerships were rising. He then read a Report of the Commissioners of Public Accounts in the year 1782, by which it appeared that those places which in time of peace, and when they were granted, did not exceed 2,500l. per annum, had, in consequence of the expence during the American war, increased to 7,000l. a year. It appeared afterwards in the year 1808, by the Report of the Committee of Public Expenditure, that from the expenditure of public money, those two Tellerships at that time amounted to 23,000l. per annum each, and there could be no doubt but that from the additional expenditure since, the value of those offices was now much greater than it had been even at that time. It therefore could not be denied, that those two public officers, the marquis of Buckingham and earl Camden, received from the public exchequer more than the interest of one million sterling. If gentlemen would consider the manner in which other men who had rendered the highest services to the state were remunerated, they would perceive that what those two noblemen held as rewards for the services of their fathers, was infinitely beyond the proportion in which other men were rewarded. For lord Nelson's services, the reward granted was 7,000l. a year; for lord Wellington's, 4,000l.; and for the services of earl St. Vincent, lord Duncan of Camperdown, and lord Hutchinson, annuities of 2,000l. per annum. It therefore appeared, that the rewards of all the splendid military services which had been performed for the country, did not, united, amount to as much as either of those Tellers of the Exchequer received for the services of their respective fathers. Now he could not bring himself to acknowledge the right of either of those two noblemen to derive such enormous emoluments from the ruin of the country. If, therefore, they had the right to reduce those emoluments to that kind of standard, as to make those places in fact that kind of reward which was originally intended to be given, he thought that it would be a most desirable thing. He would deny the principle which he had so often heard contended for in that House, that a grant of an office by the crown was as sacred as any ancient grant of an estate, and could not be touched by parliament. When the crown, in former times, made grants of lands, or even grants out of the taxes, which were its hereditary revenue, it made grants out of its own property, which any private individual might do if he thought proper. But now that the whole expenditure of the public money was under the controul of parliament, he would deny that the crown could make any grant that was not subject to the controul of parliament. It was in the power of parliament, if it thought proper, to say, for instance, that the payments of the public money should be at the Bank, and not at the Exchequer; and if parliament should choose to say so, would it be in the power of the crown to say that it should be at the Exchequer, in order that those two noblemen should have their poundage? He would admit, that if in so altering the place any individuals suffered loss, they would have a right to come to parliament for remuneration; but then the remuneration should be measured by the justice of the case, and the peculiar circumstances of it; and parliament might perhaps think it not just that an allowance so far superior to what was originally intended to be given, should be continued.

The hon. gentleman then read the following extracts from the Report of the Commissioners of Public Accounts in the year 1782.

"The principle which gives existence to, and governs every public office, is the benefit of the state. Government requires that various branches of business should be transacted, and persons must be found to transact them. The acceptance of a public office implies an engagement to do the business, and a right to a compensation: the officer has powers delegated to him necessary for the execution; but he has no other right than to the reward of his labour: he has no right to any specific quantity of business; that quantity must fluctuate according to circumstances, or may be regulated by the convenience of the state: If the good of the community requires a diminution or annihilation of the business of his office, or the transferring it elsewhere, the officer cannot oppose to the regulation, the diminution or annihilation of his profits; because not the emolument of the officer, but the advantage of the public, was the object of the institution: to suppose in him a right to make such an objection, would be to suppose the office created for his benefit; that is, to suppose it to originate in a violation of public trust, an abuse of power, and an offence against the state. Where law or usages has annexed terms to the grant, which limit the right of the executive power to resume or take it away, the reason seems to be the expedience of leaving the officer in the exercise of the duties of his office, independent of the influence of that power, which might otherwise, at pleasure, remove him: but when it is no longer for public convenience that such duties should be exercised, or when the exercise of them becomes an unnecessary expence to the public, it would be an inversion of the principle that governs such establishments to suffer that private emolument, which was no motive for the institution, to prevent or retard the abolition of them. It matters not what the duration or condition of the interest may be, whether for life or years, during good behaviour or pleasure; all are equally subject to that governing principle for the sake of which it was created; the good of the public." Commons' Journals, Vol. 39, p. 779.

"The public cannot afford to maintain officers of any description at such an expence. This nation is in debt 230 millions. It raises every year to pay the interest and charges attending that debt, above 8,700,000l.; of which above 19,800l. the Bank fee alone, is to be paid every year to these officers, for business from whence the public derive no benefit; and should additions be made this year to the public debt, unless the legislature will interpose their authority, these fees of office will have their addition likewise. The profits of the Auditors of the Imprest rise in proportion to the increase of the public distress. Upon these reasons we ground our opinion, that the public good requires that all fees and gratuities in the office of the Auditors of the Impress should be forthwith abolished; that the profits of the auditors themselves should be reduced to a reasonable standard, and that every officer and clerk in the said office should be paid by the public, a certain fixed annual salary, in proportion to his rank and employment in lieu of all salaries, fees and gratuities whatsoever. And we continue to adhere to the opinion we have stated in our last Report, seeing no reason to depart from it, "That no right is vested in the auditor, either by the letters' patent by which he holds his office, or by usage, that can be opposed to this reduction and regulation." Commons' Journals, vol. 40, p. 123.

In the above opinions he perfectly coincided. Parliament did, in fact, interfere every day in the fees of those Tellers of the Exchequer. If there had not been a particular exception in the act which passed the other day for the Princesses' Annuity, two and an half per cent. must be paid out of that grant to the Tellers, which would be an addition of at least 200l. a year to the four tellers. In all the subsidies granted to foreign powers, there was also an exception that there should be no fees to them. They also claimed two per cent. on all money spent in secret services. They formerly claimed five per cent. on all sums issued for the extraordinary services of the army; and yet once upon the issue of 300,000l. for extraordinary services, it was thought right to reduce this fee to 3s. 9d. If parliament thought it reasonable formerly to make this reduction because 300,000l. were issued, what ought to be done now when seven millions are issued for extraordinaries? He was convinced that it was not only the right but the duty of parliament to interfere. In submitting to the consideration of the House the Resolutions which he held in his hand, his object was to comprise in them the history and origin of the office in question, the opinion of the commissioners of public accounts, and such incontrovertible facts with regard to the fees, as might lead the House to propose a reduction of them. He did not call upon the House, indeed, to state what would be their precise amount so reduced, but to make them more conformable to the emoluments of similar offices, and more suitable to the present condition of the country. The hon. member then read the following Resolutions.

1. "That it appears to this House that the two Tellerships of the Exchequer, now held by the marquis of Buckingham and earl Camden, are offices performed entirely by deputy, and that the same were given to the marquis of Buckingham and earl Camden on account merely of the profits of the same, and in remuneration of the public services of their respective fathers.

2. "That it appears to be an insurmountable objection to this instance of remuneration for public service being longer continued; that the profits of these tellerships are in their amount indefinite; and that they increase in direct proportion to the public expenditure, and consequently the distresses of the nation.

3. "That it appears that the fees of the Exchequer, which compose the profits of these tellerships, are a poundage according to certain rules, deducted from the monies paid out of the Exchequer to the ordinary service of the army, the army extraordinaries, the services of the navy and ordnance, secret service money, annuities, pensions, and other services.

4. "That it appears, by the 6th Report of the Commissioners for examining the Public Accounts, and which was laid before the House in 1782, that the profits of these Tellerships, then likewise held by the marquis of Buckingham and earl Camden, had amounted, at the close of the American war, to 7,000l. per annum each; and that, in a period of peace, they were about 2,500l. per annum each.

5. "That it appears, by a Report from a Select Committee of this House, made in the year 1808, that, from the enormous expenditure of the present war, the fees of the above two Tellerships of the Exchequer had amounted to the sum of 23,000l. and upwards to each teller; and, as the annual public expenditure has been increased by many millions of money since that period, so the fees and profits of the two tellers must have increased proportionably.

6. "That it appears to this House, that the amount of the fees or profits of these two Tellerships must at present be equal at the least to the interest of a million of money sterling.

7. "That it appears to this House, that parliament has at various times asserted and exercised a right of limitation and controul over the fees payable to the tellers, by excepting specific sums of money from the payment of all such fees; and that it is the duty of parliament, in the present unparalleled state of national expenditure and public calamity, to exercise its right still further over the fees now paid out of public money at the Exchequer, so as to confine the profits of the marquis of Buckingham and lord Camden to some fixed and settled sum of money, more conformable in amount to the usual grants of public money for public services, and more suited to the present means and resources of the nation."

On the first Resolution being put from the chair,

seconded it.

said, that although the first six Resolutions might be affirmed safely, yet as he could not assent to the practical effect which was intended to be derived from those resolutions, he could not see the necessity of agreeing to them. It was the ordinary practice of the House, when truths of this kind were proposed to them, to consider for what purpose they were called upon to vote them; and if they disagreed from the purpose of those who moved them, it was usual to wave the consideration of them. With this view, he should move the previous question upon the first six Resolutions, and give his decided negative to the last. The hon. gentleman said, that he wished this question to be discussed as a mere question of private property between man and man. This was a fair principle; but we should always recollect that one of the parties was the judge on this occasion, as parliament must represent the interests of the public. He believed, that it could not be denied that the Tellerships of the Exchequer in question were ancient offices, coeval indeed with the Exchequer itself, and legally within the gift of the crown. The right of those noblemen to those offices was a vested right which could not be touched; and it appeared to him that the emoluments of those offices, so legally granted, were also vested interests which must be protected. It must be recollected that most of the estates in the country had no better title than a legal grant on the part of the crown. In a case where parliament had formerly interfered with the office of Auditor of the Exchequer, and limited it, lord Sandys, the then auditor, had by some negligence in his office, put himself in such a situation that the Attorney General might have had the grant of his office repealed for his negligence. In such a case as that, it was the interest of the auditor to consent to allow the office to be reformed in the manner that government thought reasonable. The conduct of parliament in 1782, when they limited the emoluments of Tellers of the Exchequer appointed after that time, shewed most clearly that they did not conceive they had any right to interfere with the regular emoluments of those Tellers who had been legally appointed before that time. There would be much more danger and mischief from breaking down the barriers of private property in this instance, than in allowing those noblemen to receive the forty or fifty thousands a year, which were now the emoluments of those offices to which they had been legally appointed. The conduct of parliament in 1782, in not disturbing those vested interests, while they regulated the emoluments of Tellers of the Exchequer to be subsequently appointed, was a clear parliamentary recognition of those rights, and a parliamentary pledge that they should not be disturbed. The hon. gentleman (Mr. Bankers) who had lately brought in a Bill for the abolition of sinecure offices, uniformly recognised the principle of not disturbing the vested interests of those to whom they were now legally granted.

could not assent to the arguments of his hon. friend, nor to the authorities which he had quoted. He must contend, that by the law of England, no estate was better known, defined, or protected, than an estate in an office. It was as much private property as any other species of property could be. Those who doubted the position might refer to the first law authorities of the country, and from them get that information of which they seemed so ignorant. Although the power of parliament might take away the estate of any man, yet nothing could be more unjust or dangerous than to exert this power against private property. Those offices were ancient offices at common law, as old as the Exchequer, and he believed older than the Norman Conquest. He would not agree to the conclusions of the committee of 1782, "that the state, acting for the public good, might interfere with the emoluments of every office." The state had the power to do so, but the power was not the right; they had not the right to interfere in this manner with private property. There was no knowing where the reverse principle, if once admitted, might stop. What would be said, if, besides considering what should be taken from the emoluments of those offices to make them suitable rewards to those who held them, it should also be stated that parliament had a right to examine into the Church also, and consider what bishops had more than a suitable reward for their labours? If they were to go to tythes also (which were certainly panted originally for a different purpose), and take these away, not only from the clergy, but the lay-proprietors, it was evident that in this case there could be no consideration of what was just or reasonable compensation, but merely what was or what was not the legitimate private property of the person who held the bishopric or the tythes. It was just the same case in the present instance. They had no right to consider whether lords Buckingham and Camden had received too great rewards, but merely whether they were not entitled to the legal emoluments of offices which had been legally granted to them. He knew that those sentiments might be unpopular, but he would never, from any fear of unpopularity, shrink from a public avowal of those principles which might appear to him to be essential to the real interests of the country.

regretted to differ from his right hon. friend, of whose purity of motives both on this and on every other public question there could be but one opinion. He differed also from the other gentlemen who had already spoken, and therefore felt it necessary to explain to the House the points on which he differed. He admitted completely the legality of the grants, and that those who held those offices had vested interests in the legal emoluments of them. If, however, it should be found that parliament had been in the habit of limiting those fees from time to time, then it appeared to him evident that those who took those offices took them subject to the controlling power of parliament. He wished that on this part of his speech his hon. friend had been more explicit, as it was in this point that he felt that he wanted information. He had heard that in 1740, the House had directed a reduction of emoluments in certain offices; but whether that had been carried into effect, or what were the peculiar circumstances connected with this order, he was not informed of. He should, therefore, wish to vote in favour of the first six Resolutions of his hon. friend, the truth of which was not disputed. He should then wish that a committee were appointed to examine how far parliament had in former times interfered, in reducing the salaries of offices granted for life. He disclaimed, as well as his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby) acting upon popular clamour; but he thought that the great persons principally interested in this question, the character of the House, and the feelings of the public, did require that the historical fact should be ascertained, whether parliament had, at former times, interfered in reducing the emoluments of offices granted for life. If parliament had ever done so, he thought there was no time when such reduction was so imperiously called for as at the present time, when the distresses of the country were so great, and when the emoluments of those offices were allowed to be so greatly superior to any thing that was intended to be given at the time they were granted to the noblemen who now held them.

was far from disputing the principles laid down by the two right hon. gentlemen, as to the propriety of affording every sanction and support to private property. Even the doctrine laid down by his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), that offices were to be considered as in the nature of estates, he did not feel himself called on to dispute. That the offices in question, however, were to be put on a footing with the offices in the Church, he was not so thoroughly convinced. In the Church there were great and important duties to perform. The Church had grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength; whereas the offices in question had only grown and increased with the burdens and distresses of the country, by which they were fed and nourished, and through which alone they now produced such enormous emoluments, as to have suggested to his hon. friend the propriety of the present motion. According to the doctrine laid down by his right hon. friend, whatever might at any time be the amount of the emoluments of these offices, the House could not interfere to regulate or restrain them. If by the lapse of time, supposing lord Camden to live 30 or 40 years longer, and supposing the amount of the offices to increase in the same proportion as they had hitherto done, still it would be equally incompetent for the House to interfere then as now. If the House could not now interfere, the amount to which the fees of office might increase, however exorbitant, could make no difference. If, instead of 30,000l. a year, which these Tellerships now produced, they should mount up to 130,000l. still, on the principles on which his right hon. friend argued the question, the House had no right to interfere! This was a doctrine, to which, as a guardian of the public purse, he could not suffer himself to agree. When the two noble lords alluded to were appointed to those offices, they yielded about 7,000l. a year each, and now they produced, to each of the noble lords, about 30,000l. a year. [No, no, only about 23,000l. or 25,000l. from the ministerial bench.] The noble lord rejoiced to hear the right hon. gentlemen opposite object to this, because, if they admitted that the amount had any thing to do with the question, then they admitted the force of his argument, and conceded that if the emolument did exceed what was reasonable; if, for instance, they should amount to 60,000l. a year, then it would be fit for the House to interfere. For his own part, he would never consent to give his vote that the House could not interfere to the effect of regulating the amount of the emoluments arising to any public officer. The only question, he conceived, was, whether the House could or could not interfere, and if called to give his vote on this subject, he must give it in behalf of the public.

stated, that if the early Resolutions should pass, he should then vote for the Amendment proposed by his hon. friend.

Mr. H. Thornton and Mr. Vansittart each said a few words on the liability of the sums laid out in the reduction of the National Debt to the fees in question.

observed, that as he had the misfortune to differ from his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Ponsonby), not on the principles laid down by his right hon. friend, but on the application of them, he was anxious to state the grounds of his opinion as shortly as possible. He admitted with him, that the tellers had legal and vested rights in the fees of their office; but he would still contend, that parliament was entitled to regulate and confine those emoluments, when they became exorbitant and utterly beyond any thing that could be prospectively contemplated when the offices were first created, or when the present possessors obtained their grants. There was the strongest presumption in favour of this doctrine, because in various instances which occurred in the course of every session, parliament was in the habit of curtailing the emoluments of the tellers, by voting sums either in the shape of charity or remuneration, which were exempted from the payment of fees. The crown might have the power of creating the office, and appointing the fees, but to the people and their representatives belonged the power of raising the money on which the fees were to operate; and could the crown say to the House of Commons, "you must raise in every instance a sum of money additional to the estimate, for the purpose of remunerating the officers I have formed?" Certainly not. The Commons were entitled to use their own discretion on that point. Besides, his hon. friend behind him had stated a case in 1740, where the fees of these tellers were regulated and reduced. It was not shewn to be done with their consent and if done without their consent, it would prove that parliament had a right to confine the pro- fits of these offices. Besides, the expenditure of the country now comprised many items, which could not be in the contemplation of our ancestors when these tellerships were created. The sums, for instance, appropriated to the extinction of the national debt, could not have been contemplated when national debt was unknown; and was it not monstrous that the tellers should receive fees on their issue from the Treasury? Neither was such a tax as the income tax known to our ancestors, or at all in their contemplation. When that source of revenue was first proposed, he had little doubt that had it been submitted to parliament to exempt its enormous produce from the payment of fees, the proposition would have been agreed to. And if the principle could be interfered with at all, it could be interfered with to a much greater extent. On these grounds he was prepared to vote for the Resolutions; nevertheless, if the Amendment of his hon. friend seemed more likely to obtain the concurrence of the House, he was prepared to adopt it for the present. He did not vote for the mere purpose of obtaining popularity. He trusted that he stood far above any imputation of speaking or acting for the purpose of courting popular applause; but he thought that every man in the country must lament if these offices should be found to be above all controul. Surely, however great were the services of the late earl Camden or of Mr. George Grenville, he could not help being persuaded that they would be, amply rewarded even by the amount of emolument drawn by the late first lord of the Admiralty as teller of Exchequer. There did not remain an atom of doubt in his mind, that when the House voted additional supplies, they had the power to exempt them from the operation of these fees. There could not be a doubt when the Chancellor of the Exchequer came forward to propose additional taxes for the year, and it would be a most serious question, whether the people were able to bear them, it could not be doubted, that the House were entitled to enact that their produce should pass through the Exchequer, exempted from the payment of fees.

was desirous of stating his reasons for the opinion he entertained on this subject. No committee was necessary to prove what was an undoubted right. Had he entertained any hesitation on the subject, the speech of his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), would have con- vinced him of this. Nothing, he conceived, could be so clear as that in all regulations for economical purposes, vested rights must be sacredly protected. If there was even a solitary precedent, as had been alleged, in the year 1740, in which a contrary line of proceeding had prevailed, still he should hold that to be a bad precedent, and one which ought not to be followed. No man could deny the right of the House to regulate, reform, and even abolish offices; but still that must be done subject to regulations. He was prepared to go as far in regulations which had economy for their object as any man, but in doing so, the rights of those having vested interests in such offices must be kept sacred. The property of the state was not to be protected at the expence of private property. All property was the creature of the law, and equally depended on it for protection. If this principle were once broken through by the House, temptation would grow upon them, and there would be no end to it. He reminded the House that such an interference had been one of the steps taken by those frenzied politicians in a neighbouring country to whom it was to be attributed, that that country had so long been the prey to anarchy, and every other description of horrors.

, after referring to the 38th volume of the Journals, expressed his opinion, founded on some Resolutions which he had found there on the subject of money vested in the Bank, that the money is used for the redemption of the national debt was not liable to the payment of fees. With regard to the question before the House, however strongly he might be impressed with the importance of retrenchment, yet he felt that if due attention were not paid to the vested rights of individuals, the benefits of retrenchment might be more than counterbalanced by the evils of mischievous example. But it could not be denied, that the fees now taken by these individuals infinitely exceeded all anticipation, and all just measure of remuneration for services; and the public also had their rights and interests, which it was the duty of the legislature to attend to. There had already been an example in 1740, of the curtailment of these fees, and parliament was in the frequent habit of exempting grants from that burthen. In such cases it would not be denied that the money was equally secure in its passage through the exchequer, though it paid no dues. Parliament, therefore, had the remedy in its own hands, and no individual had a right to complain, if it more frequently exercised this power of exemption. He thought also it would be well for the executive government, acting on the part of the public, and on the precedent of 1740, to come to some agreement with the tellers for the curtailment of fees which became enormous in their produce when extended to the whole immense expenditure of the country.

admitted that the fees received by the tellers of the exchequer were now much larger than at the time of the creation of the offices, but this could not be urged as any sufficient reason for invading private property. As well might it be said that the Chancellor should be deprived of the large emoluments arising from bankruptcies, because in modern times they had been so greatly augmented. If the attempt were to frighten the noble lords into a secession, some ground at least ought to be stated on which the threat was to be founded; above all, he censured any attack by a side wind.

wished before the House came to any decision, that all the facts connected with the two tellerships of the exchequer should be brought before it. He was desirous of knowing whether these offices were in reality to be deemed private property, or whether they were held under any qualification or condition? Nothing could be a greater violation of law and equity than to abolish such a right, without making a previous and full enquiry into its foundation.

said, that after the able manner in which the subject had been already discussed, he could not expect to influence the House more than it was at present influenced. But feeling a cordial participation in the sentiments expressed by his right hon. friend, (Mr. Ponsonby) he was bound to take his share with him in the unpopularity which might attach to the avowal of his opinions. He lamented the circumstances under which the question came before them, on account of those who, like himself, were favourable to the Bill of an hon. gentleman (Mr. Bankes). He could not conceive any thing more likely than the present motion to defeat the object of that Bill in another place. There, it might be said, "See what the Commons are doing. They send up a Bill, professing to respect vested interests, and wishing to abolish sinecures while they regard recognized rights: but, look at their votes, and you will see that they are going on to the demolition of vested right!" Such arguments would be powerful against agreeing to a good Bill. The law would recognize these vested rights as much as any other species of right. All claims were valid, as they were sanctioned by law; and those places were held by the legal grants of the crown. Could there be a stronger argument on the subject, than that of the duke of Richmond's rights respecting coals? They were called on to vote on grounds of necessity, to which he could see no limit. He spoke not of these grants with partiality, and he knew what was the public, view and feeling respecting them: but he must still respect the source from whence they sprang; and nothing that he had heard could induce him to agree to the motion on the mere view of saving the money. How much farther might the principle be extended? These two offices were the subject of the motion, and were liable to observations on account of their enormous profits: but, though vested interests, they could not continue very long: one of the holders was above 60 years of age, and the other not very far from it: certainly more than 50. (Some expressions of dissent.) "I am," said Mr. Tierney, "more than 50; and I know that my lord Camden is my senior." As to their present receipts running on for 20 years, he did not think, on the present scale of expenditure, that it was possible for the war to continue 20 years, and peace would materially diminish their emoluments. He did not know the fact that the fees had ever been diminished by parliamentary controul: the poundage was on the issue, and not on the grant. As to any arrangement, he apprehended, that if the teller did not agree to a reduction, he would have his remedy in a court of law. Was that House to interfere in such a matter? It seemed a monstrous proposition. Let the question be put into a fair train of adjudication, and the right would be soon determined. He thought that the sale of a life interest in such cases would be acknowledged by the courts, the patent would be produced, and the manner in which parliament had looked at the question stated. If parliament changed its opinion, what might become of the unwary purchaser? The practice of parliament had hitherto been in favour of all vested interests. Viewing the subject as he did, he was willing to take his full share of the unpopularity that might follow, from voting in favour of the previous question.

declared his intention of not dividing the House on his original Resolutions, but on the Amendment of his hon. friend.

The six first Resolutions were then severally put and met by the previous question, moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was carried against all of them.

moved his amendment to the 7th Resolution, which was, "That a Committee be appointed to enquire into the precedents which exist as to the deduction from, or suppression of, any fees payable to the tellers of the Exchequer for monies issued out of the same."

observed, that of course he could not agree to this amendment.

The House then divided—

The original Resolution of Mr. Creevey was afterwards negatived without a division.

, in pursuance of notice, rose to move for leave to bring in a Bill which would have the effect of amending the state of the representation of the people in parliament.—By means of the augmented influence of the crown, the sovereign was enabled to retain in his service ministers whose conduct received his ap- probation, though their measures were universally condemned by the people, who loudly called for their exclusion from power. It would not be denied, he apprehended, that the votes of parliament were sometimes in direct opposition to the sentiments of the nation at large; and he believed that it would be equally readily admitted that some reform was necessary. He did not mean to say that it would be proper, in the first instance, to adopt one general or violent measure to attempt an immediate reform: on the contrary, he thought the only wise and prudent mode would be to proceed, step by step, until at length the object so much desired was attained, a full, fair, and adequate representation of the people in parliament. The accomplishment of the design would be much more probable, if the House advanced with caution, than if it at once resolved to overthrow existing and long established rights. The purpose he had in view by the Bill he should afterwards submit to the House, was to limit to a certain extent the expences of county elections. In the first place he should endeavour to prevent the great inconvenience to which freeholders were subject in travelling to the town where the election was to take place, and in the next place to put an end to the corrupt practice of giving money to voters under the pretence of defraying the charges they had incurred in coming to poll; he should suggest that the electors should be allowed to give in their votes in the hundred in which they resided, and that one day be appointed for renewing suffrages in each hundred. He should add to this the establishment of a special county court for the nomination of candidates. His lordship then moved for leave to bring in a Bill "for regulating the election of knights of the shire to serve in parliament."

said, that he did not rise to oppose in its first stage a measure which had in view so desirable an object as the limitation of the expences of county elections. He wished it, however, to be distinctly understood, that he was giving no pledge of approbation to any of the provisions the noble lord might deem it expedient to introduce. He begged also explicitly to declare, that in not opposing the introduction of this Bill, he was not admitting that either that or any other measure was necessary to diminish what was termed the overgrown influence of the crown, by means of which the noble lord had asserted, that the sovereign had it in his power to continue any administration, however impotent or obnoxious to the country. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was convinced that the assertion was not well founded. In the present state of the constitution it was not in the power of the crown to retain in its service any administration that, in the judgment of the people, was unworthy of or inadequate to the situations they occupied. The sovereign, however, had authority sufficient to continue his confidence to those individuals, who anxious for the well being of the empire, had conducted its affairs with as able a judgment, and as firm a hand, as any of their rivals. If the noble lord, or any other member, thought it prudent to throw out any challenge upon this ground, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) should be always ready to meet and to answer it, for he conceived the remark to have been made by the noble mover with reference to the present administration. If the contrast were pressed upon him, he would venture to assert that the other side of the House could not adduce a single instance from the transactions of the last administration, which, either in point of vigour, of wisdom, or of success, could for a moment be put in comparison with the exertions and achievements of the present.

enquired whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer would allow that the Bill should be printed and circulated before he gave his decided opposition to it, in case he should feel it right to resist it at all?

replied in the affirmative. He meant to have expressed his willingness to do this in the remarks he had made.

pointed out the propriety of ascertaining the profits and emoluments of the situation of Usher of the Black Rod, and expressed his wish that it should be placed precisely on the footing of a similar situation connected with that House. He thought the officers of the House of Lords ought to be regulated as well as those of the Commons. The emoluments of the Usher in one year, ending in 1812, amounted to 3,562l. 18s. 3d.; and he also learned that he gained considerably by the sale of inferior places, which, as well as the tax which his office imposed on the members of the upper House, was a species of profit of a disgusting description. In order to afford the House regular information on the subject, he moved—"That there be laid before the House a copy of the appointment of the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod; together with an account of the fees, profits, and emoluments of the office for the last ten years."

did not deny the right of the House to call for the information demanded. But he would put it to hon. gentlemen to consider how far it would be proper for them to enquire into the emoluments of an office attached to the other House of Parliament. When the hon. gentleman spoke on the subject yesterday, he related a circumstance of which he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer,) as well as others, was of course ignorant. The hon. gentleman referred to the death of an individual (sir Francis Molineux,) who, it appeared, was still in existence, and suggested, that the situation should not be filled till a complete investigation had taken place. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had declined giving any answer; and he now wished to point out the inconvenience which would arise from an interference with an officer of the House of Lords, supported by fees collected at their doors, and recognized by usage. Whatever information the House wanted on the subject, could be procured in a more respectful way than by acceding to the motion. There was then a committee sitting with respect to the fees and emoluments of certain offices, and the House might, by message, place before that committee those who could give full information on the subject. But, if the course proposed were followed, it was most likely that it would occasion a disagreeable feeling in another place. If there were any other mode by which the inconvenience could be avoided he would be extremely willing to accede to it.

said, he agreed that nothing could be more injurious or improper than to do any thing which might create a feeling of jealousy elsewhere; but he had yet to learn that the Gentleman Usher was an officer appointed by the House of Lords.—The individual was placed in that situation either by the Lord Chamberlain or by the crown; and, consequently, he could see no reason for not enquiring what the profits of the office were. The right hon. gentleman had allowed, that they were authorised to demand a copy of the appointment to the office; why, then, should they be denied an account of the emoluments? The great point connected with the business was, to introduce all such savings amongst the offices connected with the other House, as were intended to be introduced here, on the decease of the present occupants.

contended, that the privileges of the other House were not infringed by the examination of officers belonging to them by the House of Commons; and, with reference to what had fallen from a right hon. gentleman, he could not conceive how the House could give to a committed a power, which the right hon. gentleman did not seem to think the House itself possessed.

shortly stated his reasons for preferring the proceeding by committee. If the person cited by them refused to attend, the dernier resort would be to the whole House; so that in the end, the business, if the first application were unsuccessful, must be decided by them.

dwelt on the feeling which would be excited in the House of Commons, if the Lords sought to enquire into and regulate the emoluments of their officers.

confined his motion merely to "a copy of the appointment of the Usher of the Black Rod;" which was agreed to.