said, he rose for the purpose of moving that the different Petitions, which had been presented to the House relative to the affairs of the Royal Canal Company, should be referred to a select committee, in order that the situation of that Company might be fully investigated, and that it might be ascertained whether, in the present embarrassed state of their affairs, it would be practicable to secure to the public the benefit of that great national, work, and to grant any relief to the unfortunate creditors, who, under false pretences, he might say, had been led to their ruin. It would be necessary for him shortly to recal to the recollection of the House what passed upon this subject last session. A Petition was presented from the proprietors of the Royal Canal Company, praying for relief. Their Petition was referred to the consideration of a select committee, and that committee, after a full examination of the subject, reported that, under all the circumstances of the case, it was their opinion that it would not be proper to grant them any aid. He mentioned this fact to shew the House the reason why he had not recommended, on the part of the crown, the Petition which had just been offered. The government of Ireland felt that, after such a report, it could not give its sanction to such a Petition. But if the House should agree to his motion for appointing a select committee to examine the various Petitions that had been presented respecting this Company, the petitioners might, he apprehended, lay their case before that committee, with such documents as they thought proper. His object in proposing the committee, was to ascertain the actual state of the Company, and whether it would be possible to secure to the public the benefit of that great national work, and also to enquire whether any relief could be granted to their creditors, who had advanced no less a sum than 840,000l. for which they were not now receiving one farthing of interest. The select committee which he should propose would consist of the same members that formed the select committee last year, with the exception of two names. One was a noble lord, who from his official situation, could not now attend the committee; and the other was sir E. Nepean, who was abroad. He should propose in their room sir G. Hill and colonel Barry. He concluded with moving for a Select Committee, which was accordingly appointed.

then rose pursuant to the notice which he had given, to move that the House should on Monday resolve itself into a committee to consider of a Resolution which he should propose for raising the Salaries of the Commissioners of Appeal in Ireland. These gentlemen had very important and laborious duties to perform; they heard all the appeals from the country, as well as those arising in Dublin. The business of the revenue was so much increased, that their time was now wholly occupied, and he had the satisfaction to add, that it was impossible for any gentlemen to perform their duties in a more exemplary manner, or more to the satisfaction of the public. These commissioners were of very old standing, having been established in the reign of Charles 2, and they were most inadequately paid; their salary was at first 300l. a year, which was paid out of the civil list. In 1802 or 3, upon a representation of their case, 200l. a year was added to their salaries; so that at present these distinguished persons, who were necessarily eminent lawyers, and who acted as judges in cases of property to a vast amount, only received 500l. a year each. This subject had been for some time under the consideration of the Irish government; the case had been referred to the high law authorities in Ireland, who were clearly of opinion that their salaries were inadequate to their labours. Under these circumstances, he should propose in the committee, that their salaries should be raised to 800l. a year; that they should hold their offices like the judges, during good behaviour, and that they should be entitled to a retirement of 500l. a year after fifteen years service. The pension allowed to the judges was two-thirds of their salary: in the present instance, the sum to be allowed as a retirement was not quite two-thirds. This subject was very well understood in Ireland, and he did not think that he should meet with any opposition in the motion from any gentleman from that country. He had mentioned his intention of making this proposition to a right hon. gentleman, who held formerly a high legal situation in Ireland, whom he did not then see in the House, and that gentleman had expressed his approbation both of the increase of the salary, and of the tenure by which it was proposed that these gentlemen should hold their offices. He had only further to add, that he should propose that these salaries should in future be paid out of the consolidated fund. There was now a deficiency of seven or eight thousand a year in the civil list in consequence of the increase which had been made to the salary of the lord lieutenant, and by transferring these salaries to the consolidated fund, the civil list would be relieved of 1,500l. a year.—If the committee should agree with him in thinking that these salaries should be raised, there could not, he was persuaded, be any objection to the increase taking place from the commencement of the year.

The motion was agreed to.

rose to make a motion relative to the Petitions presented from the Frame-work Knitters of the town of Nottingham. He was not himself prepared with any specific remedy for their distresses, but wished to refer them to a Select Committee above stairs. He then stated, that there were two sorts of lace-manufacture, one by double, and the other by single press; and some measure should be adopted to prevent the selling of single press-work for double.

seconded the motion. He said, it was lamentable that the number of frames in four years was reduced from 700 to 150. This arose partly from diminution of trade, and from war, but chiefly from the manufacture of a coarse and base fabric, which had been introduced to the destruction of the reputation of the lace-manufacture.

The Petitions were then ordered to be referred to a Select Committee, who were to examine the matters thereof, and report the same to the House, together with their observations thereupon.

rose, pursuant to his notice, to submit to the House a motion upon the present defective State of the Representation of the country. He could not, however, but express his extreme regret at beholding the thinness of the House, when a measure so important was to be discussed. He would not suppose that it had arisen from any indifference to a subject which animated all persons to whom the best interests of the country were dear, and he could therefore only conclude, that it was to be attributed to the weakness and inability of the humble person who then had the honour of addressing them. When he looked around him, however, he saw some whose presence would amply console him for the absence of others, and thus supported he should proceed in the task he had enjoined himself. The measure he intended to propose, was one, he trusted, which would not be resisted in limine, from any apprehensions as to its effects upon the constitution. The day of alarm had gone by, and the question might now be dispassionately discussed, without the fears of parliament being excited by representations that it involved the safety of the constitution, or that it was imitative of that never-failing watchword of terror, the French Revolution. For himself, he wished to declare, that it was not as the friend of innovation or of speculative improvement that he offered himself then to the attention of the House, but as the zealous and strenuous assertor of the rights and privileges of his countrymen, and therefore he relied confidently on their support. All questions that pointed at Reform were, he knew, viewed by many with a certain degree of apprehension; and when such questions were agitated, the people were commonly alarmed, by being told to look at the countries on the continent, now prostrate at the feet of a military despot. But in his opinion, we might profit by the example of other nations, in the same manner as we profited by their sufferings. Perhaps he should be asked, why press a measure like that upon the House, when it was notorious, that the people at large were indifferent about it? He denied, however, this frequent and confident objection; he denied that the people were indifferent. Were there not Petitions upon their table from the city of London, from the city of Westminster, from the counties of Middlesex and Essex, and from other places, praying for a Reform in the representation of the country? The necessity of some reformation had been also, in various ways, uniformly and strongly pressed upon their attention. But if such were not the case; if there existed no such expressions of public opinion upon the subject, yet certain statements had been made to that House, which loudly called upon it to enter upon the discussion; which, in his opinion, should make the desire of that Reform, a natural impulse of patriotism in the bosom of every member; and which rendered it a duty imperative upon the present House of Commons, beyond what it had been in any former period. He alluded to what had been stated by a member of that House in his place, that ministers openly and avowedly adopted the most corrupt practices, in order to obtain seats in parliament, for those who would vote in support of their measures. A motion founded on this charge had been rejected, because it was thought indelicate and unfair to proceed against persons for conduct so notoriously common. At that time statements were made, so disgraceful, that their Speaker himself, with all his great constitutional knowledge, pronounced them to be such, that "our ancestors would have startled with indignation" at them. And yet, notwithstanding these statements, parliament had gone on, without effecting any salutary regulation, and leaving the people to form the dangerous opinion, that their representatives were attentive to their own interests, but utterly disregardful of the rights of their constituents. Admitting, as he was disposed to do, the universality of the practice alluded to, that, in his opinion, was only an additional ground why the question should be entered into by parliament; instead of which it seemed to be, unfortunately for the country, neglected with a sort of sullen indifference, or left to the zeal and industry of individuals to propose remedies, when they ought rather to originate in the combined wisdom of the legislature. Notwithstanding, however, such seemed to be the negligence of parliament in that great question, he should venture again succintly to recommend the consideration of it; he said succinctly, because he had, two years ago, stated a general outline of what he conceived to be the remedy, corresponding with the ancient practice of the constitution.

On that occasion he had maintained, and he still maintained, that the great danger which threatened the constitution, arose from the number of members returned by places which were now uninhabited and desolated, or which possessed so few inhabitants, that it was mockery to continue to them the elective franchise. He had, as a matter of curiosity, made an extract, which he believed to be correct, of the present state of the representation; but if any gentleman doubted its correctness, let him move for committees, and he would prove at their bar, that what he was now going to mention, was the actual state of the representation of the people, or rather their absence of representation. On this subject, however, he wished to observe, that he never had contended against the fair right of property in influencing the representation of the country, and what he should first state, therefore, was more a matter of curiosity than any thing else. It appeared, according to the facts which he had collected, that 182 individuals re- turned, by nomination and otherwise, 326 members to that House. In specifying that number, he was to be understood as speaking of the united empire of Great Britain. There were also above seventy place-men in the House of Commons, and above forty persons who were returned on either side, by that which was denominated a compromise. Having stated those facts, he owned he was at a loss how to express himself upon them, in what might be deemed becoming language; he knew not where to find expressions which would adequately convey the feelings he had upon this occasion, for it was to be remembered, that notwithstanding such was the present representation of the country, the House of Commons had, by their decision in a case to which he had already alluded, voted themselves a full, fair and free representation! But, how could it be held a full, fair and free representation, when, upon the most moderate computation (and he wished to avoid all extreme calculalations,) there were 292 persons among them so brought in, that they could not exercise a full and fair discretion upon any subject brought under their consideration? Would any person pretend to call such a representation a proper one? And yet, a House of Commons so composed was returned for seven years. With regard, indeed, to Septennial parliaments, much as he objected to them in principle, he should not wish the Act which authorised them repealed, unless some mode of limiting and decreasing the expence of elections was previously adopted. Fortunately, however, such a mode was now in contemplation. A noble lord whose name was enrolled in the annals of his country, as a name dear to the cause of freedom, had moved for leave to bring in a Bill, the specific object of which was to contract the enormous expences which now attended an election to serve in parliament. That measure, if carried, would ultimately lead, he hoped, to a plan which would prevent the too long suspension of communication between the constituents and their representatives. The Septennial Act, indeed, had always appeared to him a manifest violation of the principles of the constitution; for if the parliament had the power to vote itself a duration of seven years, he saw no reason why they might not have equally voted themselves for 20 years, or even for life. Such a proceeding, therefore, he could not but consider as unconstitutional, and indeed, he knew but two points of the constitution which had been untouched by that House, namely, the Acts of Union—If however, the House of Commons possessed in 1734, the power of voting itself septennial, why had not they an equal power now to vote themselves perennial, if they were so disposed? He was at a loss to imagine what plea could be urged in defence of such a step, except that perhaps of expediency; but he thought it most inexpedient that there should be such a suspension of intercourse between the representative and the electors. It removed that wholesome check upon the proceedings of a member which a quick return to his constituents would create; and it tended to excite in him a consideration merely of his own individuality, so to speak of his own personal advantage. If any proof were needed of this, it would not be difficult to produce it; and he would refer, as one sort of proof, that the expectation of soon meeting their constituents was a necessary check upon members; to the lists of names to be found on some recent occasions, and among which were certainly some which would not have appeared had this been the first year of their return to parliament. Having now stated the evil, he came to the remedy. Here it was natural to expect that there must be doubt, and difficulty; however, he had only to state what, in his humble judgment, appeared to be the measures best calculated to remedy the mischiefs of which he had been complaining. He would say, that generally the leading steps to such measures would be—first, granting to copyholders a right to vote; and secondly, abolishing the right of nomination so as to generalize the right of voting, and thereby more fairly to proportionate the number of representatives to the extent of the population of each place represented. He need not remind the House of the preposterous disproportion which at present existed, where many depopulated, desolate boroughs returned as many members to that House as the whole county of York, while Manchester, Birmingham, and other opulent towns returned not one member to parliament. Great as was his sense of the evils resulting from the present inadequate system of representation, he should yet rather submit to their continuance than propose for them a remedy not to be found in the ancient constitution of this country. The remedy he had suggested was, he contended, to be found in that constitu- tion, and would be rather a restoration than a change. It was idle to say that the extension of the right of suffrage would weaken the influence of property, whether that right was or was not spread out upon the surface of the population, still property would, and must have its natural influence. But he objected that 182 persons should regulate and command votes in the House of Commons; it was revolting to his mind, that seats should be bought and sold in open market for immense sums, when it was clear, that the only profit to be derived from them was the assumption of the rights of others; above all, his mind was filled with disgust, when he contemplated that persons who came home loaded with the wealth of either Indies,—persons used only to the treatment of slaves, should have the power of nominating members to the House of Commons.—He would propose then to get rid of nomination, and to throw the representation of the close boroughs into a more enlarged representation of the more populous counties—these boroughs, which Mr. Pitt, (whom he confessed he was not much inclined to admire except for his extraordinary talents) in the early and purer part of his political life, made such efforts to abolish, were said to amount at that time to thirty-six in number. These, it was well known, were made mere articles of commerce, common conveyances for the transfer of the rights of Englishmen from one borough-monger to another. It had been suggested, in conformity with the ancient practice of the constitution (which he would always keep in view) that these boroughs might be thrown into the hundreds; and as to the objection that the poor voter would be more accessible to corruption than the rich borough-holder, he would wish to know the difference between the poor man taking a bribe of five guineas for his single vote, and the rich man accepting as many thousands for nominating to a seat in that House, unless it was, that in the former case the corruption went no farther than the abuse of a single vote, and that in the latter the nominator had for his money a power to dictate to the crown, to the minister, and to the people. One part, therefore, of the plan he had in view was, to bring in a Bill for the abolition of those boroughs, which were now known to be as common articles of trade as the woollen of which the coats they wore were made; from the abolition of these boroughs, and the consequent appropriation of a more extensive suffrage to the more populous counties, would arise an equalization of members to the different parts of the empire. As to the other part of his proposed remedy, that of admitting copyholders to the elective franchise, this question had been much agitated in the middle of the last century, being started in the county of Oxford. It was in the course of this controversy that sir William Blackstone wrote his able treatise on copyhold tenures, and that eminent authority was clear as to the constitutional right of copyholders to vote. He (Mr. B.) therefore, in proposing that they should be admitted to the elective franchise, was proposing nothing foreign to the ancient constitution. He had omitted many topics which he had on a former occasion introduced, especially the subject of Scotch representations, in which, more than in any other, the feudal rights were abused. This question was in the hands of one (Mr. Brougham) who, by his learning and powerful influence in that House, would be able to do it ampler justice; his own immediate object, was to repress the system of nomination; to prevent the disgraceful mischief that a House of Commons should be constituted and influenced by an oligarchy, and bow in obedience to the directions of a portion of the monied interest. He did not wish to speak outrageously, but there was now scarcely any person who contended, that the representation of the people was either preventive of corruption, or efficacious against the inroads of the crown. Parliament was just in such a state, that it could be said, that public abuses were not condemned, but exposed; and they were exposed, because they were intended to be sheltered. It was always in the power of the minister to cover over every enormity by his majority. He did not mean the present ministry; he spoke historically, or, perhaps, by anticipation; and it was possible that a ministry might exist who would not think proper to govern by majorities. However, it was scarcely necessary for him to add, that on the Walcheren enquiry the country did not sympathise with the House. (Hear!) Gentlemen might cheer as they pleased, but his argument went against no administration. His argument was intended against the House of Commons as it was at present constituted, and in favour of that feeling of the people which tended energetically to produce a purity which would be above all temptation. He was ashamed thus to delay the House before empty benches; but he confessed, that on such a subject, he expected a more full attendance of those members who usually voted on the same principles with himself. It was possible, that if the question was one of party against party, he might command a more respectful attention to his motion; but the fact was, that it was a question between a disgusted aristocracy and a borough faction; and the latter being the richer, would, he was afraid, be predominant. Give him seven or eight borough proprietors, and he had not the least doubt but that at all times he would be able to command a majority of the House. His object was not to put down any minister, but to destroy a dangerous and prevalent oligarchy. His object was not to innovate, but merely to restore the constitution to its former state; it was not to break down, but to build up those fences which the great innovator, time, had rendered necessary to its protection.—The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal the Act 31 Geo. 2, c. 14, 'for further explaining the laws touching the Electors of knights of the Shire to serve in Parliament for that part of Great Britain called England,' and to entitle copyholders to vote for knights of the shire."

, in seconding the motion, alluded to the manner in which the observations that had fallen from him last night, had been met by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That right hon. gentleman seemed to consider what he then heard as personally directed against himself, when it was merely intended to apply to the influence of administrations in general over the deliberations and decisions of that House. It was well known that persons, when opposing the measures of government in that House, had been threatened by members of that government with an appeal to the people—a threat that could not but imply a consciousness on the part of government of their own influence in getting members returned to that House more tractable to their wishes than those they had so unconstitutionally menaced. As to the appearance of the House, he was extremely sorry that it was so thin; but this very fact of a thin House on such a subject was with him a great argument for a better representation of the people. It was at least an argument, that the House of Commons would never reform itself. The error did not lie in this or that administration—the root of the evil was to be found in the defective and corrupt system of representation in that House. If the present motion should be agreed to, and that the House should be disposed to suffer the Bill, for the introduction of which leave had last night been given, to pass, it was in that case his intention to follow it up with another Bill for the repeal of the Septennial Act; this subsequent measure, however, must depend upon the fate of the other, for he agreed with his hon. friend, that if the expences of the present mode of carrying on elections could not be done away, triennial parliaments would only encrease the evil they were designed to remedy, and by giving the victory to the longest purse, alarmingly extend the influence of the crown. He at once admitted and regretted the division of opinion that prevailed amongst even the best friends of Reform, as to the precise mode in which Reform could best be carried into effect. He thought, however, that the differences were such as might admit of complete accommodation, and he believed, that if the real friends of Reform could meet, and frankly consult together, that their dissensions would be soon reduced to points that would be found to be any thing but important. Some persons would be content with nothing less than what they called radical Reform; others thought moderate Reform would be the less hazardous proceeding; it appeared to him that both these parties might be easily reconciled by a Reform radical, as far as it went, to the root of all corrupt influence, and moderate as far as it restrained itself within the limits of practical good sense, and kept clear of all the wild theories of visionary speculators. He trusted that in their attempts to prosecute this desirable object, they should not again be met with such an objection as had once been thrown out in that House, that a certain portion of corruption was necessary to the carrying on of the government. Such sentiments could not be too strongly censured, for the toleration of corrupt maxims in theory, must soon lead to the justification of corrupt principles in practice. He concluded by calling upon the House ever to keep in their recollection the memorable saying of Montesquieu, that when the legislature should become more corrupt than the executive, the liberties of England were no more.

warmly opposed the motion. It appeared to him to be nothing less, than staking, on a precarious and desperate chance, the experienced and acknowledged benefits of a constitution, which had hitherto been the admiration of the world. There was no form of constitution which had been attended with more beneficial effects than that of Great Britain, a fact which was sufficiently demonstrable from the contrast between the state of the continent and of England at the present moment. The former, exhibiting all the distresses incident to the successful career of a despot; the latter enjoying perfect tranquillity and uninterrupted prosperity.—When he looked at the present state of the country, unshaken amidst the convulsions that had so long surrounded it, he could not readily consent to the impeachment of that constitution, which had kept them safe from the general ruin. The principle of Reform was to give the people a greater share and influence in that House than they at that time had—to prevail on him to accede to such a principle, it must be first made out, that—the people had not then all the influence in that House which they ought to have. He thought they had. Those who were advocates for a reformation in parliament, were bound to shew, first, that the happiness and prosperity of the people were diminished; and secondly, that that diminution resulted from the defects in the representation. The existing commercial distresses were out of the question, they were of a temporary nature, and originated in different circumstances, although he was by no means disposed to conceal their magnitude; convinced as he was, that to be fully sensible of our dangers, was the surest mode of bringing to a successful issue the dreadful contest in which we were engaged. It might be said, that those distresses arose from the war. The making of war was the prerogative of the crown. But that in supporting the present and every war since the Revolution, parliament only expressed the sense of the people; however mistaken that sense might be, a reference to history would indubitably establish. Into the war of 1739 the government of that period were urged by the people. The American war, so adverse to equity and sound policy, and the ill effects of which were felt by Great Britain to this day, was a war in which the people concurred. Only one Petition from the people had been pre- sented against it. It was the virtue of parliament and not the virtue of the people that put an end to that war. The economical reform that followed was owing to the virtue of that House; and when it was remembered how the people afterwards treated that parliament, there could not be much said either for their patriotism or for their constancy: and it was remarkable, that were it not for that very part of the representation which it was now proposed to do away, that House might never have been adorned with the great characters that then did so much for their country, and who must so long live in its annals. So with the present war, the people were so completely with Mr. Pitt in the support of it, that the enemies of the war in parliament retired from their seats for a time, in utter despair of making any impression on the minds of the people, favourable to what they conceived to be the true view of things. The inference was, that the present war was not attributable to any defect in the representation, since the people maaintained as strongly as their representatives the principle on which it proceeded, and yet to the war the existing distresses of the country were attributable. In general the House spoke the sense of the people; and as to any particular decision either upon the expedition to Walcheren, or on any other topic, there could be no argument from particular decisions against the general practice of the constitution. No plan could remove the imperfection of human nature—no plan could produce an uninterrupted course of wisdom, or secure complete unanimity. There would still be majorities and minorities, and the latter would still complain of the corruption of the former. The theory of the British constitution was incapable of being defined; it could be deduced only from practice; it consisted of mutual checks and controuls among its component parts, the mode of operation of which it was not very easy to ascertain; it stood on prescription; it grew out of the feelings and habits and necessities of the people. The actual state of things therefore was the only criterion by which to judge of our institutions. Let that rule be applied to representation.—It was true that Birmingham was not represented—that Leeds was not represented—that Sheffield was not represented. But were these places less flourishing than York, which was represented—than Hull, which was represented—than Bristol, which was represented? Were the interests of any particular place neglected in the House? The fact was, that the House represented the whole country. But the reformation proposed would at one blow exclude from parliament, many of those who were best calculated to do the country service. No one wished more than he that there should be an identity of interest between parliament and the people; but he confessed that he did not wish to see parliament whirled about by every gust of popular opinion.—There was no part of the proposition for Reform, to which he so strongly objected, as to the restoration of triennial parliaments. It was said that they would be more pure. On what was this assertion founded? If experience were consulted, it would be found that triennial parliaments had been more personally corrupt than septennial. Their only effect on the people was to corrupt their morals, by taking them more frequently from their occupations, and by originating endless animosity and contest. An analogy in favour of Reform had been attempted to be shewn, from the reduction of the representatives of Ireland. That reduction was necessary; the proposed Reform was unnecessary; and therefore he would not hazard it. So with respect to the proposed Reform in the representation of Scotland, his argument was, that Scotland was the least adequately represented of any part of his Majesty's dominions; that that state of the representation of that country had existed for above a century, and yet that no part of his Majesty's dominions enjoyed greater prosperity. Why risk all this good? When his hon. friend proposed leading the House into these unexplored regions of ideal purity in parliamentary representation, it would be well that he had explained how far he wished to carry them. How vague, how undefined, how opposite, were the opinions of those who professed themselves to be the friends of Reform! They scarcely got together at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, or at the Freemasons' Tavern, before they began to dispute upon their respective plans. How would his honourable friend propose to reconcile these discordant opinions? How could he conciliate those who in 1793 presented a Petition founded on the abstract rights of man? How could he conciliate that great patriarch, as be was called, of Reform, major Cartwright? How would he conciliate those who maintained the opinions of Mr. Flood? A Society had lately been established under the name of "the Hampden Club." One of the resolutions advertised as proceeding from this club was,—"That according to the principles of the great Camden, taxation and representation were inseparable." Now if this meant (and from its having the name and sanction of the honourable member for Westminster, he supposed it did so mean) that every man who paid a tax was entitled to a suffrage, how would his hon. friend conciliate these Hampdenians? Whose minds did his hon. friend think he would settle? He (Mr. E.) could tell him what minds he would unsettle. He would unsettle the minds of a large portion of the population of the empire. He would unsettle the minds of many of those who were attached to the constitution as it stood. He would tear up that stable anchor of the state—a prejudice for antiquity, a reverence for ancient usage and acknowledged benefits; and he would turn the country adrift upon the rocks of vain speculation and fantastic imaginary improvement. Never was there a period when any measure of Reform in the representation in parliament was less called for. Never were there fewer Petitions on that subject. He confessed that he entertained some doubt with respect to the validity even of the few Petitions for a Reform in parliament, which had been laid on the table of that House. The advocates of Reform knew very well how to mimic the public voice. He did not, however, believe, that there was any thing like a general feeling on their side. In this opinion he was confirmed by their own complaints of the languishing state of the public mind on the subject, and of the necessity of stirring it up to exertion. Their efforts, however, had evidently failed. To commence a Parliamentary Reform at the present moment—(even were it necessary, or advisable at any period) would, in the words of an estimable friend of his, be to begin the repair of a house in the hurricane season. At such a critical period, was it prudent to call on the people to search the very foundations of the commonwealth? Such an attempt would be only to make a breach in the walls, and to let in all the fury of the elements upon that venerable edifice, which had hitherto stood so many storms and assaults. On these grounds he should give his decided vote against the motion; and he earnestly hoped and prayed, that it would receive the negative of a large majority of the House.

, admiring as he did, the singular eloquence and statesman-like speech of his hon. friend who had just sat down, and coinciding with him also in many of his premises, felt himself obliged to dissent from his conclusion. He agreed with his hon. friend, that the constitution of England was built not on theory, but on prescription and practice. He agreed with his hon. friend in his objection to many of the doctrines of the reformers, and particularly to those of the hon. member for Westminster. To say that to return to the state in which the representation was 500 years ago was no innovation, was to deceive ourselves. The different situation of society rendered the recurrence to such ancient principles impracticable. But he differed from his hon. friend, in thinking that no Reform whatever was necessary. Making every allowance for the probability of his being biassed by party feeling, he still was persuaded that the House of Commons had sunk in public opinion. When he thought on this subject, he did not feel it difficult to point out instances in support of such an opinion. One case was of a peculiarly striking nature—one of great parliamentary corruption—well calculated to create indignation in the House—a sort of high treason, if he might use the expression, against the House—but of which, notwithstanding it was clearly proved, the right hon. gentleman opposite, and the noble lord near him, were acquitted. The Walcheren expedition too, was another question on which the House had lost ground in the public opinion. If these were instances, as he conceived they were, of undoubted corruption, and if the votes then come to by the House were to be attributed to the influence of the crown; then, he contended the influence of the crown ought to be abated in that House. Every man who contemplated the composition of parliament, would agree that there was in the House as much talent, as much knowledge and capacity for business, as much character, and as much property, as it was reasonable to expect could be obtained by any change which might take place. It was to an abatement of the influence of the crown, therefore, that the House must chiefly look. The corruption was to be traced to the excessive number of placemen and pensioners. That members of that House should hold those places, at least to the extent they did, was a blemish in the eye of the public. It was in the power of a minister (he spoke not of the present House of Commons) to attach young members to him, by holding out to them the expectation of places, and thereby to procure votes which he would not otherwise have had. There were in the House of Commons, too, another set of men, who, if the crown did not act upon them, still had no tribunal to answer to. There ought, he contended, to be in every instance a public tribunal;—he did not talk of the rabble, but of the people of this country, to whom every member should be responsible for his conduct. So long as that House continued as it was he could not hope for any great change, but the patronage of the crown would still continue to have a similar operation on the House. He hoped to see the time when the apathy with which gentlemen seemed to regard this state of things would cease—when they would assume a spirit which should lead them to keep a watchful eye on the motions of the minister of the crown, and on the exercise of the royal influence in that House.

rose and said:

I am perfectly sensible, Sir, that there is no occasion on which it does not become me to apologize to the House, when I presume to trouble them with my opinion; I am also sensible that a more than ordinary apology is required for addressing them upon a subject which has already on former occasions undergone repeated discussion by some of the greatest men this country ever produced, and which we have again, this night, heard treated in so able, eloquent, and, to my mind at least, satisfactory manner, by my right hon. friend who spoke second in the debate. And indeed, Sir, it is not with any expectation of being able to add any thing to the arguments that have been already used, still less with that of shaking the conviction of any man's mind, that I now offer myself to your attention. But, Sir, entertaining upon this question a deep rooted opinion, and feeling upon it a most anxious wish, I am desirous, as it were, once for all, to place my sentiments upon record, and, at the same time, which is also necessary, to clear up that misunderstanding and free myself from that misrepresentation, to which those who think as I do are exposed, and particularly in these times.

And if this were not a question upon which I take a more than ordinary interest, if it were not one upon which I think the public has a right to a free and open profession of faith from every person that even takes any share, however inconsiderable, in the debates of this House; if I felt myself at liberty to decline contributing in however small a degree to stem that tide of mischief which I tremble to see flowing in upon us every moment with increasing rapidity and power, I should not rise to oppose a motion for a Reform in Parliament. Sir, I well know that if I undertake to argue against this favourite measure, I must do so in the face of great authority living as well as dead; I must do so in opposition to the recorded opinion of a great majority of those with whom I usually act, I must do so at the risk of incurring some odium and at the certain loss of that share of the public favour which an opposite line of conduct, even when pursued by the humblest abilities, is now almost certain to obtain. For, Sir, it unfortunately happens, and it is by no means the least of those disadvantages with which we have to contend, that though, as in my conscience I believe, truth and sound reason are with us, all those specious arguments, and all those splendid topics of declamation that address themselves with most force and effect to the popular mind, are ranged on the side of our adversaries. It required no great skill in the reformers to enlist in their favour some of our soundest principles and some of our strongest feelings. The great mass of society, who love liberty and who hate corruption, are naturally inclined towards a project which they are continually told, and with very little contradiction, is to extinguish corruption, and bring the principles of freedom into more decided and more extensive operation. All hasty views, all first impressions are in favour of Reform, and we must discuss this question under the disadvantage of having to oppose reason to passion, and of endeavouring to divert men's minds from vague hopes and delusive promises to the cold dry maxims of prudence and experience.

And, Sir, if the reformers had been contented to avail themselves of those advantages which fairly belong to the cause they have espoused, however much I might have regretted that such advantages should exist I should not have thought myself entitled to object to the use of them. But, I think I have a right to com- plain of the manner in which this question has been treated, not indeed within the walls of this House, but in almost every other place in which it has been discussed. Sir, if there ever was a weighty and delicate problem in politics, if there ever was one which might fairly divide the opinions of wise and good men, if there ever was a question that ought to be treated calmly, dispassionately, and without reference to mere personal or temporary motives, it is this. And yet, Sir, how have the reformers proceeded in all their numerous speeches and writings? Why, no pains have been spared, no arts have been left unpractised in order to fix upon the enemies to the measure the most odious and the most despicable motives. We have been represented in almost every sentence as the patrons of corruption, the enemies of freedom, the shameless interested advocates of a system alike repugnant to common honesty and to common sense. Sir, I had rather discuss this question without reference to the motives that may be supposed to actuate either party, but if I were compelled to enter into that consideration, I should do so with reluctance indeed, but without apprehension, nor should I be afraid to challenge for the enemies of the measure as strict an investigation into character and motives as may be thought expedient for themselves by the most strenuous advocates of reform. Perhaps indeed the charge of sinister intentions may not only be repelled, but retorted, and we may venture safely to ask whether the history of all mankind, whether our own history in particular, but more especially, whether the history of the times in which we have ourselves lived, does not shew that if the friends to the ancient order of things are liable to the imputation of corruption and profligacy, and hostility to the principles of freedom, those that aim at great changes and adopt high popular courses, may not with as much reason be suspected of a mean desire to catch the applauses of the mob, of endeavouring to obtain by their violence that share of reputation which they never could have acquired by worthier means, of mounting to power on the shoulders of those whom they mean afterwards to betray, of a low vanity, and of a cruel, desperate, and unprincipled ambition. "Ut imperium evertant, libertatem præferunt, postquam evertere, ipsam aggrediuntur."

But Sir, without entering further into this most unpleasant part of the subject, on which I only touch defensively, and for fear I should be supposed to acquiesce in the justice of those imputations which I had passed over in silence, I shall proceed shortly to state the grounds upon which I shall oppose this motion.

Every person that has attended at all to the history and progress of this question, must have remarked that there are two separate grounds upon which the plan has been rested, that of right, and that of expediency. Since the failure of that great Reform called the French Revolution, which proceeded almost entirely upon speculative principles, the doctrine of abstract right has been in a great measure abandoned. The tremendous example which that event exhibited to the world, has indisposed the minds of men towards a doctrine so fruitful in calamities, and in crimes, nor, so far as I know, has it ever been directly and avowedly made the foundation of any argument in this House. The Petitioners indeed proceed upon both grounds, but first and principally upon that of theory. They state some practical grievances, but by far the greater part of their objection to the present constitution of parliament, is of a purely speculative kind. For when they have once shewn, in the sense, and generally in the very words of that celebrated Petition which was prepared by my right hon. friend near me in the year 1793, and which has served as a text book to all subsequent lecturers upon the same subject, when they have once shewn what nobody denies, that a very large majority of the House is returned by a very small minority of the people, and that the crown and the nobility exercise a very considerable influence in it, they think they have made out an unanswerable case, and that they have nothing more to do than to exercise their talent for invective, against the House itself, and all its defenders. Sir, I shall not take up your time by going into the merits of this argument, because I am persuaded that there are but few indeed among those whom I have the honour to address with whom it will have much weight. To them it is unnecessary to prove that the House of Commons neither is, nor ever has been, nor ever ought to be, framed upon a purely democratical model, and that a certain influence both of the crown, and of the nobility, in an assembly which has in a manner absorbed the whole power of the state, is absolutely necessary, in order to save both from utter destruction, and that consequently the only question is, as to the degree of influence that ought to exist. All I wish is, that gentlemen should keep the nature, extent, and unavoidable operation of this principle, if it is once admitted, clearly before their eyes, and particularly to point it out to the attention of those who are inclined to adopt what is called a moderate reform, and who believe that the bulk of the reformers would, be satisfied with any thing short of an utter subversion of the whole system.

In the few words therefore with which I shall trouble the House, I shall consider this question in that point of view in which it has been considered by the hon. mover of this question, and by all its most temperate and most judicious advocates, and by those who from their character and talents are most likely to influence public opinion, that is, as a purely practical question; and I shall direct my attention to the arguments not of those who think that men have an abstract right to this or that particular mode of government, but of those that without reference to any such doctrine, imagine that the condition of the country would be ameliorated by a change in the representation. The course of reasoning which they have adopted is completely different, much less alarming in appearance, much less revolting to the friends of our constitution, but quite as fallacious in its principles, and quite as mischievous in its tendency. They begin by grossly exaggerating the evils that exist under the present system, they ascribe them all to that system, and they conclude by recommending Parliamentary Reform as the safe, certain, easy remedy for them all.

Now, Sir, in the first place I must beg leave to remark, that the way in which the reformers have overstated the public grievances affords no very favourable specimen either of the goodness of their cause, or of the temper in which they are disposed to discuss it. Indeed some of the doctrines that one has heard upon this subject exhibit the most remarkable instance with which I am acquainted of the power of a heated imagination in blinding men to facts which every moment experience seems in a manner to force upon their attention. The more violent part of the reformers have treated the constitution and government of this country, as if they were speaking of Spain, or Turkey, of the Divan, or the Cortes; of a system so incurably vicious that every thing was to be gained, and nothing to be lost by a change. How the present order of things may appear when tried by any new test, or measured by any new standard of ideal excellence, I know not; but sure I am that if it is compared with any thing that is, or with any thing that has been, it can only gain by the comparison. I know no better test of the excellence of a constitution, than the happiness of the people that live under it. In estimating that happiness in any country, one is naturally led to compare it with other countries, and with itself at other periods, and if upon examination we find that for the last century it has gone on increasing in prosperity, if the last twenty years, notwithstanding the pressure of continual war, have been years of the most rapid, visible, and essential improvement; if turning ourselves towards other countries during the same period, we find them torn by anarchy, crushed by despotism, or desolated by foreign conquest, we shall not, I think, be inclined to come to any very hasty conclusion against that order of things under which we have exclusively enjoyed so many blessings; we shall perhaps be still less inclined to do so, when we call to mind that some of those nations, the internal condition of which we now regard, and justly regard, with wonder and compassion, have been made the subject of some political experiments conducted by as able hands as any that are likely to be employed in the business of reform here, and from which as much good was as confidently predicted, as any man can now venture to anticipate from a change in the constitution of England. Sir, I do not mean to insult the good taste, and waste the time of the House, by declamations upon the excellence of our constitution, or the happiness of the people; I merely wish them to keep in mind, that the object of reform is not, because it cannot be, to restore us to any state of happiness from which we have fallen, nor to place us upon a level with wiser and happier nations, but that what these gentlemen pretend to accomplish, and that for which they wish us to place every thing upon the cast of a single die, is to elevate us to a state of political purity and excellence, of which we at least know thus much, that it never existed nor does exist, in this or in any other nation upon earth. At the same time I am not disposed to carry the argument that arises out of this circumstance further than it will fairly go. I am perfectly aware that it is bad reasoning to say, that because we have a good constitution now, because the people are tolerably happy, and because on the whole we are better off than our neighbours, therefore no attempt ought to be made to improve the constitution, or to render the people still happier. The history of our own country would be a sufficient refutation of such a doctrine. There was a time, for instance, before the constitution of England had attained to that pitch of excellence to which it was afterwards carried, when with the royal power still undefined, with the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission still existing; in spite of all these blemishes, our constitution was better than that of any other country in Europe. Yet that neither did prevent, nor ought it to have prevented all those glorious efforts for its amelioration which have rendered it superior to any form of government that ever existed in the world. Nor do I even contend that excellent as it now is, it has attained to the utmost possible pitch of perfection, or in other words, that we enjoy all the happiness that positive institutions can confer. But as often as we hear those exaggerated and mischievous statements of the public grievances, which by appealing to the prejudices and passions of the multitude, tend to disgust them with the whole existing order of things, so often must we be permitted to remind them of their real condition. Whether or not the constitution of this country has defects which it is possible to remedy, is another consideration, but this much is certain, that we enjoy a measure of tranquillity and happiness unknown to any other country in this stormy and disastrous age, that we have hardly tasted that cup of bitterness which has been drank to the very dregs by the rest of the civilized world; in short, that we are in a state in which much can be taken away from the stock of public happiness, and in which little can be added to it; a state therefore in which we may well pause before we adopt any great, radical, and uncertain change.

I say we ought to pause only, because all that I contend is, that the actual excellence of our constitution, and the happiness of the people that live under it, affords a prima facie case in favour of things as they are, against things as they may be. And I am the more anxious to be clearly understood, and as it were, in limine upon this point, because it is one upon which the argument against reform has been most frequently and most successfully misrepresented. It has been a very common accusation against us to say that we are actuated almost entirely by one great leading principle, the dread of innovation, a principle, in the extent in which it has been stated, most absurd, and which the friends to the measure have accordingly been at great pains to ridicule and to refute. Now, Sir, though I by no means deny that there are persons who do entertain this general dislike to every species of change, and who must of course concur with us in opposing so great a change as Parliamentary Reform, and though I am no more disposed to reject their aid than the moderate reformers appear disposed to reject the aid of those that carry their views upon this subject to the most alarming extent; yet I must beg leave to insist that this is no doctrine of mine, nor one of which we stand at all in need as the foundation of our argument. In almost all those principles that have been so frequently and so triumphantly stated in defence of innovation I completely concur. I am perfectly aware that whatever is institution now, was innovation once, and therefore that to object generally to innovation is to object to art, to science, to law, to every thing that has dignified, and to every thing that has adorned mankind, and not least of all to that very constitution which I am most anxious to uphold. All I would ask is, not that innovation should be considered as an evil in itself, but merely that it should not be considered as a good in itself; that before we adopt any change we should reflect calmly and dispassionately what is the real amount of the evil which it is designed to remove, and in the next place how far it is calculated to remove it without substituting some greater evil in its stead. So far I trust I shall carry along with me the opinion of all sound judging men, and that without being considered as an alarmist or a bigoted and indiscriminate enemy to every species of change, I may be allowed to consider the actual prosperity of the country, (so far as it goes) not indeed as a conclusive argument against reform, but as a circumstance which, so far as it goes, renders the necessity of that measure less urgent, and the advantages of it more questionable.

Before, however, I quit the subject of innovation, I must beg gentlemen to bear in mind, and it is a consideration most material in forming a correct opinion upon this great question of reform, that whatever may be the result of the experiment we are called upon to make, be it good or be it bad, it is in its nature final. If when this fundamental change in the government of the country has been adopted, instead of its being attended by those beneficial and splendid consequences which the promoters of it now so confidently anticipate, we should discover upon actual trial, that the share, both of freedom and happiness, which we had enjoyed under the old, rotten, corrupt constitution of England, was greater than any that we had been able to realize under the newer and purer system, still, however much we might wish it, and however bitterly we might repent of our folly and precipitation, still we should seek in vain to reestablish the ancient order of things, and we might wait through whole ages of turbulence and calamity till a combination of circumstances, too fortunate perhaps to occur twice in the history of any nation, should have restored us to those speculative defects, which afford matter for the invectives of mistaken, factious, and visionary men, and to those practical advantages which diffuse happiness over millions. They call upon us, Sir, to put off from shore in search of what they tell us is a more genial climate and a more fertile soil, but if we do so, let us at least not forget, that it is under this inexorable condition, that we shall never return, even if upon our arrival we find that this promised land of theirs is cursed with irremediable barrenness, and perpetual storms. Therefore, if there is any person, I will not say, who thinks that this experiment will fail, but who doubts of its success, and who, doubting of its success, is not of opinion that any failure is preferable to a longer endurance of the present evils, upon him I think I may fairly call to give his most strenuous opposition to these projects.

But, Sir, fortunate as our situation undoubtedly is in itself, and still more fortunate when compared with that of other countries, still it must be confessed, nor do I at all disguise from myself in the consideration of this question, that there are circumstances in that situation which are calculated to excite anxiety and alarm. Persons may differ in their estimate of grievances and dangers, but that grievances and danger do exist, it is imposible to deny, and it is therefore for us to consider, how far that change in the government of the country which is now proposed, is calculated to afford to us ease and security.

Sir, the great evil, as I apprehend, and that which is the root of all the present discontents, is excessive taxation, which taxation has arisen from the war. Now, Sir, I happen to be one of those who think that the war was undertaken originally upon insufficient grounds, and that many opportunities have been lost at which it might have been terminated without danger or disgrace; and I have always regarded the continuance of it (up to a very late period) as the capital mistake of every cabinet by which this country has been governed for the last eighteen or nineteen years. But, Sir, I am utterly at a loss to understand, how the war could have been prevented by a change in the constitution of parliament. That, indeed, might have been said with truth, if it had been begun and continued by the executive government, in conjunction with this House, and against the will of the nation. But, Sir, be it right, or be it wrong, a question which this is not the proper occasion to discuss, this war always has been, and still is, the war of the people. For the truth of this assertion, I need only appeal to my hon. friend near me, (Mr. Whitbread) who has long, consistently, and, as I think, wisely, but always most unsuccessfully, opposed it. And when I say that he has been unsuccessful, I do not merely mean that he has failed to convince a majority of this House, but that he has failed equally to convince a majority of the people. From them he has received neither gratitude, nor support; and sure I am, that whatever popularity a long, able, and upright parliamentary career may have acquired to my hon. friend on other accounts, no part of it is due to his efforts to put an end to a contest, which, in spite of all the disasters it has brought upon as, has always found advocates in the pride and prejudices of this wealthy, ambitious, and warlike nation.

But then, Sir, it has been said, that though national ambition would still occasion wars, those wars might be managed with greater regard to economy, and that infinite waste and profusion which now prevail in every department, might be pre- vented by the vigilance of representatives whose interests were more closely united with those of the people. And this, Sir, is the opinion which most deserves consideration, since it is undoubtedly to it, right or wrong, that the cause of Parliamentary Reform now owes the greater number of its proselytes. For some years past, the subject of pecuniary abuses has become so popular, that it has almost entirely overwhelmed every other consideration. The great question of peace and war; those questions that arise out of the management of the war, those that relate to the character and conduct of ministers, all these things have in a manner lost their interest, whilst the public mind has been absorbed in economical details. When more millions were wasted in one year upon the most absurd and most disastrous enterprizes, than all the plans of economy that human ingenuity can devise, or human integrity can execute, could save in ten, the people of England comforted themselves in the hope of reducing the petty perquisites of a few miserable offices; and they looked with cold-blooded indifference upon the loss of whole armies sacrificed to the incapacity of their government, a few months after they had been employed in canonizing the authors of discoveries about female influence in the disposal of a commission.

It is evident that the utterly disproportionate share of attention which the objects have occupied, that this low and inadequate state of the public mind is owing to the grossest and most malignant misrepresentation, both as to the amount of abuses and as to their cause. Persons have not been wanting ill-informed enough or ill-intentioned enough to tell the people that a great part of the burthens under which they labour are the result of peculation; and yet when the authors of all these clamours have been put to the proof, all they have been able to produce has been vague declamation, unwarranted suspicion, and the repeated enumeration of the few instances which the most vigilant attention has been able to detect. That abuses do exist I am far from meaning to deny, indeed it would be absurd to suppose that a revenue so vast as ours, raised by such complicated means, and expended upon such complicated objects, is not liable to fraud both in its collection and in its disbursement, or that the public income can be managed through all its branches better than any individual can manage a large private fortune, though stimulated by motives of personal interest, and enjoying over his property and his agents that permanent controul which is so material in forming and in perfecting economical arrangements, but which, for reasons better than any that can arise out of mere economy, the ministers of a free country neither can nor ought to possess-How far peculation may extend, I do not pretend to be accurately informed, but I am yet to learn the reason for supposing that it has reached to such a height as to call for a change in the government of the country; or even for thinking that parliament as it is now constituted is not fully capable, I will not say of extinguishing it utterly, but of reducing it to its minimum.

But, Sir, this subject of abuses adapts itself so admirably to the understandings and feelings of those to whom it is addressed, and to the particular circumstances of the times, that it is impossible to flatter oneself that it would not produce a considerable effect. On the one hand, people labouring under great and increasing burthens, are very apt to give credit to any body that promises them speedy and certain relief; on the other, it was quite natural that the reformers should be desirous to see some share of the popularity belonging to this question reflected upon their own favourite topic, and to connect together, in the estimation of the public, the subject of economical reform, with that totally different species of reform which consists in a fundamental change in the constitution of this country; for if they could once persuade the people, in the first place, that they are suffering neither from the consequences of their own pride and folly, nor from the pressure of external causes obviously out of the controul of any change in the external administration and government of the country, but from the corrupt management of the revenue; and if, having persuaded them of this, they could in the next place convince them, that the corruption itself was owing to the defects in the representation, their cause was evidently gained. But I apprehend that they have not only very much exaggerated the evil, but that they have totally mistaken the remedy. For Sir, I would fain ask in what way is parliamentary reform likely to occasion any improvement in the financial administrations of the country? Would it ensure greater integrity in the immediate and confiden- tial servants of the crown? No person, I am sure, that is at all acquainted with the subject will maintain that it would, or even that it could, produce any such effect. For I will venture to say that there never was any age or country in which the higher class of public men was more completely pure from the stain of corruption than in this. And this is no trifling advantage which we enjoy under the present system, bad as it may be, that though the government of the country may fall, and, as I think, has often fallen into the hands of persons on other accounts utterly unfit for so great a task, yet through every change of party, and under every combination of circumstances, it has always remained inaccessible, except to spotless and unsuspected integrity.

But then, Sir, might not the House itself be more vigilant, and do more to guard the public against the depredations of persons in subordinate stations? I know very well, that for some years past, it has been very much the fashion among a certain description of politicians, to represent parliament either as conniving at abuses, or at least as taking no effectual steps in order to remove them. Now, Sir, I apprehend the fact to be, that parliament has completely gone along with the improvement that has taken place in the public feeling upon this subject. It requires very little knowledge of our history in order to be convinced that there never was a period during which parliament has laboured more diligently or more successfully in order to extinguish, not only abuses, but every species of unnecessary expence, as during the last thirty years. I need not mention Mr. Burke's Bill, the many reforms introduced during the administration of Mr. Pitt, the labours of the committee in which you, Sir, took so distinguished a share, the various parliamentary commissions, and more lately the committee of finance. And then, Sir, let us compare these with what have been sometimes called good days—With the time of king William and queen Anne, and we shall see such a scene of profligacy in the members of this House, and of corruption in those that had the management of the public money, as will make all the most notorious delinquencies that have been detected of late years, appear only in the light of venial transgressions. Now it is worthy of remark, in the first place, that all these things happened in the time of triennial parliaments, a very favourite nostrum with some of those who call themselves moderate reformers; and in the next place, that all this corruption and venality never appears to have suggested the idea of parliamentary reform to any of the great men of that age—and no age ever produced greater men, or warmer and more enlightened friends to liberty—all this infamy, I say, transacted before their eyes, never seems to have suggested to them the idea of having recourse to such a remedy as a change in the very frame and constitution of parliament itself. And it must be confessed that the lot of parliament would be very singular, not to say a little hard, if after having passed unhurt through times of comparative profligacy and corruption, it should be destroyed at the end of a period through which it has gone in a continually accelerating pace towards the extinction of abuses, if it should at last be overwhelmed by the public indignation, and declared to have filled up the measure of its iniquity; at a moment when it is undoubtedly far purer in itself, and a far more faithful guardian of the public purse, than it was in those days when it was not only unassailed by any domestic enemy, but regarded with envy and admiration by all Europe, as the most splendid model of a popular assembly the world had ever seen.

Is it ability? is it disposition? is it the means of enquiry that are wanting in the present House of Commons? None of these, as I apprehend. The House contains a large proportion of acute and vigilant persons, whose eyes are constantly directed towards this object; no minister dares refuse, even if he is disposed to do so, of which I am very far from suspecting the right hon. gentleman opposite me, no minister dares refuse information in those instances where his consent is necessary in order to obtain it; and any discovery, or feasible plan of retrenchment, is sure to be immediately attended by such a share of importance and popularity to the discoverer, as ensures a proper degree of attention to an object which so well rewards the promoters of it. In one very material point, I will venture to say, that this House is very superior to any reformed House—that is, in ability to carry plans of retrenchment into effect. Whatever merits any schemes for Parliamentary Reform that I have seen may have in other respects, and however much they may differ from each other, they all agree in this; that they have a tendency to diminish the number of men of business in the House; of men, who, from their education and habits, are likely to bring to the investigation of financial questions, that skill and attention which, more perhaps than almost any other subject, they require.

On the whole, there cannot be a more absurd, or a more pernicious opinion, or one which it is more the duty of every real friend to his country to combat, than that it is possible, so long as the present war lasts, to make any perceptible reduction in our expences, or to relieve the people from any part of their burthens. Reformed, or unreformed, we must continue to make enormous sacrifices in order to maintain that awful struggle in which we are engaged; fortunate, indeed, if we do not increase to an intolerable degree those evils which the present course of external events seems to be preparing for us, by our own internal dissentions, and by tampering with that order of things, under which, in the undisturbed enjoyment of domestic tranquillity and happiness, we have been enabled to make efforts unequalled even by the convulsive energy of revolutionary warfare, and to bear up against difficulties, untried, nay, unthought of by our forefathers.

Sir, the next great evil under which, as I conceive, we labour; an evil connected with, and arising out of the other, is the enormous influence of the crown. And undoubtedly, those persons who, agreeing with the right hon. gentleman opposite me (Mr. Rose), think that this influence, far from having exceeded its proper bounds, is only just sufficient to carry on the government, argue the question of Reform to much greater advantage than those who, still unconvinced by his pamphlet, think that it has reached to a height which may give reasonable ground of jealousy even to the firmest friend to the monarchical part of our constitution. To that class I must fairly own that I belong, and, putting all other considerations out of the question, I think I may safely appeal to the very existence of the present administration. Good luck might sustain a weak government, or a combination of great and splendid abilities might atone in the eyes of the public for the want of success; but a ministry at once feeble and unfortunate could only be sustained by such an exertion of power in the crown as would have been utterly impossible at any former period since the Revolution. This is the great grievance of which we have to complain, though at the same time, it must be remarked, that it is the grievance under which the more violent reformers acquiesce the most patiently. The reason is obvious; The formation of a vigorous and reputable government would be the most fatal blow that could be struck against their designs. These gentlemen well know that the weakness of government is not felt merely in the miserable mismanagement of our affairs, foreign and domestic; in the expedition against Walcheren; and in the expedition against the hon. baronet; but that its consequences extend much further. They are well aware that it destroys the respect that is due to high station, weakens that part of authority, (and no inconsiderable part it is in a well-regulated state) which resides in opinion, and lowers all government whatever in the eyes of the people. But, Sir, though I perceive the full extent of this evil, though I acknowledge that this influence exists, and though our attention to its existence has been most powerfully drawn of late years by the manner in which it has been abused, yet I see nothing in all this that should incline me to Parliamentary Reform.

If, indeed, the influence of the crown consisted entirely in the disposal of certain offices held by members of this House and their connections, a Reform in Parliament (or even a Place Bill) would prove a very effectual check to the evil, as the House would then have more to fear from the resentment of the people than it would have to hope from the favour of the crown. But unfortunately this influence is so extensive that it reaches not only to the House but to the people itself, and acts quite as powerfully upon the constituent as upon the representative body. Our establishments are so enormous, and such a vast proportion of the whole population of the country eat the King's bread, that there is hardly any educated person that may not hope either directly, or through his connections, to become an object of royal favour. It is quite natural that people in this situation should be desirous that some share of the political power which the constitution enables them to delegate, should be exercised to their own advantage; I do not mean to their own advantage on any liberal extended scale of public utility, but to their own private benefit, emolument, and promotion. The real wish of their hearts is, not for an able independent representative, but for an active useful agent, some person that may represent them not merely within the walls of this House, but at the door of the Treasury; a channel through which some rivulet from the great stream of patronage may be drawn to fertilize their own native spot. The only bad votes, in their view of the case, are those that disqualify the voter from becoming a successful suitor to those in power when any revenue officers are created, when an incumbent drops off, or when a son is to be provided for in the civil or military service of the honourable Company. They care mighty little for the distant result of wise measures and free government, when set in opposition to immediate tangible benefit to themselves and to those in whom they take an interest. Patriotism, they think, is no bad thing, and they have heard something about the necessity of watching and even opposing the ministers of the crown. But these advantages, like all others, may be paid for too dear, and cannot be much regarded by those who look to the favour of the government to assist in providing for their families. They have no natural preference to a weak administration or a bad measure, but they had ten times rather the administration should be supported, and the measure justified by a majority of this House, than that the course of jobbing should be interrupted for a single day. An elector looks much less to the vote of his representative, than to the good things he has obtained, or is likely to obtain for himself or his neighbours, and for the purposes of a sure re-election, a morning well employed in Downing-street, is worth many an evening spent in this House.

To hear the language of many persons upon this subject, one would really imagine that in all those instances in which the decision of this House had appeared most questionable, the majority had consisted entirely of the nominees of peers, and members for rotten boroughs overpowering by a dead weight of profligate votes a virtuous minority of county members and representatives of large towns. Now, Sir, every body must know that this neither is the fact, nor any thing approaching to the fact. If for instance I might without irregularity arraign any vote of this House, it would undoubtedly be that which was given in vindication of the expedition to Walcheren. And yet even from the result of that memorable division no inference whatever can be drawn as to the question of Reform. Quite as many of the real representatives of the people voted for the minister as against him, nor do I see any reason to suppose that if parliament had been dissolved the next day, any gentleman would have found reason to repent of the support which he had given to those persons, who in spite of all the disgrace and all the calamities they had brought upon the country, still enjoyed the favour, and still dispensed the patronage of the crown.

And so long as that patronage remains undiminished, so long this evil will remain without a remedy. Indeed I cannot help thinking, though I am well aware how uncertain all predictions must necessarily be as to great political changes—I cannot help thinking, that, as things now are, a Reform in Parliament would be more likely to increase than to diminish the influence of the crown. By stripping the aristocracy of their boroughs, it would very much diminish their weight in the scale—It would diminish a power which has hitherto been, and which still is, the great, steady, effectual counterpoise to the influence of the crown—a power which, according to the vulgar theory of the constitution, they ought to exercise only within their own walls, but which, according to a practice coeval probably with the very existence of parliament, and which may be most clearly traced through the happiest and most brilliant periods of our history, they have, with the most salutary effects, exercised by what are invidiously called their nominees in this. Indeed I do not see how any person can consider the present state of the country and call to mind from what quarter it is, that all substantial opposition to the will of the crown has for many years past proceeded, without being persuaded that the best chance we have of resisting its encroachments, is afforded to us by the preservation of a large share of political power in the hands of those persons, who from their wealth, their dignity, and a certain hereditary attachment to the principles of free government, are less liable to those daily increasing temptations, which have already proved too strong for the great mass of less considerable individuals.

Parliamentary Reform, then, would not relieve the country from either of the great evils under which it labours. And here perhaps the argument might fairly rest, since no man is so zealous an innovator as to think, that we ought to have recourse to any great change without a prospect of effecting some essential good. But then I maintain that when we have stated this, we have stated only the least considerable part of our case, and that there is the strongest reason for believing not merely that Reform is incapable of producing any good, but that it would give birth to great and irremediable evils.

Among the greatest evils arising from Parliamentary Reform, I do not hesitate to class the immediate effect it would give to the will of the people upon the votes of this House, and consequently upon the decisions of the legislature, and upon the measures of the government. For the reasons I have already stated, I am inclined to think that the crown, in the present state of patronage, would find as little difficulty in managing a reformed as an unreformed parliament—that is, in the ordinary course of measures which would be much less accurately discussed, and much less vigorously opposed than they are now. But then it must be recollected that occasions now and then occur, on which the people are very violent; and when they are very violent they are in general very wrong—occasions on which all other considerations give way to a momentary passion, and the great mass of society assume the character and feelings of a ferocious ignorant mob. They clamour for peace when peace would be disgraceful—they ask for war when war would be impolitic or unjust—or they desire to persecute some religious sect, the followers of which are filling the ranks of their army and navy. It is on occasions like these that we feel the advantage of having a House of Commons which speaks the sense of the people, not from day to day, but from period to period, which accommodates itself (as has been well said) to the average, and not to the fluctuations of public opinion, which is the faithful portrait of the national character in its ordinary attitude of dignity, sedateness, and repose, not the mirror in which those transitory but disgusting forms are reflected, which it assumes when under the dominion of ignorance, prejudice, and passion. But it may be said, and, I believe, with truth, that these delusions never last long, and that however wrong it may be for a time, the public is sure to recover its senses at last. But in the mean time the evil may be done, and done irretrievably. We may have plunged into a disastrous contest, we may have made peace upon ignominious terms under the pressure of temporary difficulties, or we may have inconsiderately swept away some of our most valuable institutions. That the public opinion and wish ought ultimately to prevail I most readily admit—it is a doctrine that lies at the very foundation of all free government. But what I maintain is, that the House of Commons, as it is now constituted, expresses that opinion in a more eligible and a more authentic manner than it could be expressed by a reformed House. Indeed I would almost be content to give up the whole cause at once, if a single instance could be produced in which this assembly, corrupt as it may be, has ever acted for long together in contradiction to the will of the people of England. What the present composition of parliament enables us to do, is not to act in opposition to that wish, but to wait till it is clearly, strongly and finally expressed, to separate the real permanent sense of the people, from their hasty passing impressions, and to keep up that right of appeal from present passion to future judgment, which is necessary in order to preserve us from all the horrors and absurdities of democratical government.

In the next place, the project of Reform, if carried to any considerable extent, would completely put an end to that regular, systematic discussion of the measures of government, which, if all the notions we have entertained on the subject for the last hundred years and more, are not completely wrong, is essential to the well-being of the country, and forms an indispensable ingredient in our free constitution. This discussion is conducted, as we see, under great parliamentary leaders, that is, by persons who bestow all their time and the very best abilities on this object, and who, under the present system, are nearly certain of always obtaining a seat in this House. That certainty is in a manner essential to the formation of such characters; for what person—at least, what person of that description, would throw away his time and his talents in qualifying himself for a situation from which mere accident might exclude him through all the best part of his life. And yet one of the objects of any such Reform as would satisfy the petitioners, is to put an end to every thing like permanence and stability in the situation of a member of this House. As it is, no great party is ever so completely crushed by another as not to retain all its principal organs and spokesmen in this branch of the legislature, and not to remain as a watch and a check upon its opponents. If every election depended upon popular feeling, any party that was once fortunate enough to raise a successful cry against its opponents, might drive from within these walls every individual that was at once able and willing to discuss its measures, and reign undisturbed till a new election gave a new turn to affairs. At the time for instance, when the present ministry came into power, such, it must be confessed, was the effect of the right hon. gentleman's "No Popery" cry, that it would have been very difficult by method of popular election to secure the return of lord Howick. Still, was it just, nay, except in a moment of phrenzy and intoxication, was it the wish of the country, that at the end of a brilliant career of near twenty years, that distinguished statesman should be deprived of every opportunity of contributing to the deliberations of this assembly that wisdom and eloquence, which no man will deny him to possess. Mr. Windham too would probably have shared the same fate, and yet I would have ventured to ask his most determined political enemy, even before his death had mitigated all feelings of animosity in every liberal mind—whether it would have been creditable to the House, or useful to the country, that popular violence should exclude from these walls, the most accomplished gentleman of whom England could boast? It is one of the most important duties of a public man to oppose vulgar prejudices, and to stem the tide of popular opinion when flowing in a direction contrary to reason and justice—a duty which is already rendered sufficiently painful by the unavoidable discouragements of odium, calumny and misrepresentation that attend it. But if, in addition to all these, it is to be visited by a total exclusion from public life, small, I am afraid, indeed, will be the number of those endowed with the heroic courage and self devotion which the performance of it will then require. Human virtue is too feeble for such a task.

And this, Sir, leads me to mention the change in the description of persons composing this House—a change which, in my judgment, we ought rather to deprecate as an evil than to wish for as a blessing. If the Reform was carried to any great extent—which if it is once suffered to begin, it will undoubtedly be—the House would consist, almost exclusively, of men of great landed estate and their connections, who would sit for the coun- ties; and of persons that had acquired influence in large towns by their wealth or their political activity—that is, of great proprietors, great merchants, and demagogues. No man could hope for a seat unless he was possessed of a large property of a particular kind, or unless he had been fortunate enough to ingratiate himself with some large body of people. So that a perpetual bounty would be held out to every species of turbulence and intrigue. Every candidate, except the few whose wealth ensured them influence independently of exertion, must go through a species of political probation. Where the court party was strongest, he must shew himself capable of becoming an useful agent in procuring ministerial favours—where the democratically influence prevailed, he must give proofs of civism. So that the whole country would exhibit a perpetual struggle who should go furthest in subserviency to the court, or in democratical violence: not that I am by any means an enemy to popular elections. I am perfectly aware that they are indispensably necessary in order to keep alive a spirit of discussion and of independence, and to preserve the public mind from languor and stagnation. But then it appears to me that we have them quite in sufficient numbers to answer all these purposes most completely. And I must confess that there is no evil that I should more dread than that state of morbid agitation which would be produced in the political body by bringing all the active enterprizing talents of the country into constant and immediate contact with the most powerful, turbulent, and self-willed part of the population—by teaching every man that the first, and the last, and in fact the only material step towards political reputation and power, was popularity, and, consequently, by raising the art of flattering and bribing the people, above all other arts. Sir, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that I do not see why the practice of this art ought to be made a necessary step in the education of every English statesman. No theory that I can form would lead me to such a conclusion; all experience, I am sure, is against it. If I look round this much reviled assembly, which in spite of all its defects, appears to me not inadequately to represent the wisdom and the property of the country, I see many persons, and those among its most conspicuous ornaments, who after an early life spent in liberal studies, in learned professions, in the acquisition of all those branches of knowledge which most calculate a man for business and the conduct of great affairs, have, at last, acquired their seats in this House by those very means, hitherto so familiar to the practice of our constitution, but which we are now told it is our duty to prevent. I must own that I am at a loss to understand how this description of persons could have found admittance into a reformed House of Commons, still less can I persuade myself that they would have been more enlightened, more independent, or better fitted to guide the councils of their country wisely and magnanimously, if their youth had been spent in the labours of a canvass, in the study of a poll-book, or in the care of cherishing some local interest, or in devising mountebank tricks and mischievous projects, like the orators of old in the petty republics of Greece, to delude and to ruin the people. From those gentlemen, Sir, whom I mention with all that respect which is due to great talents usefully and honourably employed, we may, I think, fairly expect some aid in defending that constitution to which they are indebted for the opportunity of displaying their talent upon that great theatre on which they must naturally be most anxious to display them, and on which for the sake of the country it is most desirable that they should be displayed—talents which might otherwise have been buried in obscurity, or debased and perverted by those habits to which, under another form of government, it would be necessary to have recourse, in order to obtain a seat in the free, uninfluenced, democratical House of Commons. Sir, when I call to mind the names of all our most distinguished statesmen, when I place before my eyes the long and venerable order of those to whom England is most deeply indebted for her liberty and her fame, those whom we most reverence, those whom we most regret, and those whose like we most wish to see again, I cannot at the same time forget that they almost all owed the first opportunity of appearing in that assembly in which they were destined to rule by the force of their genius, to those very places, and to those very means to which it seems no person in future is ever to owe a similar advantage, and that they made their first spring towards glory from that contaminated ground which we are to cut from under the feet of all succeeding generations.

But then, Sir, comes the selling of seats, which is always stated as the unanswerable part of the case; that grievance for which a remedy must be provided, that scandal for which no apology can be found. This is a subject upon which a great deal might be said; but having already troubled the House at such length upon other points, I shall content myself with a very few words upon this. In the first place, if as I have endeavoured to shew, the existence of what are called close boroughs is almost essential to the very existence of our constitution, it is no argument against the whole system to say that it is liable to abuse, and that some evil is interwoven with the good. In the next place, there is no manner of reason to suppose, that the evil has extended very far; on the contrary, it is perfectly well known that the bought seats bear a very inconsiderable proportion, indeed, to the whole number; in the next, unless some actual evil can be shewn to have arisen from the practice, it is no more wrong that a certain number of seats should be sold than that commissions in the army, or situations in the old magistracy of France, should be disposed of in the same way; and, lastly, granting that the sale of a seat in parliament is a thing in its own nature utterly infamous and inconsistent with all the principles of free government, it remains to prove how you can prevent it, or at least, how you can prevent something to the full as bad. You may, indeed, by disfranchising the small boroughs, prevent any person, or small number of persons, from acquiring a certain fixed interest which they may dispose of for money to any body they please, but still I insist that it is utterly out of your power to prevent practices quite as objectionable in point of principle, and far more extensively mischievous. The plain truth is, that nothing is more corrupt than popular election. It has any merit you please besides purity. One well fought county gives occasion to more bribery than half the boroughs in Cornwall put together. So that if purity is the object more is lost than gained, since, for one act of corruption you substitute many, and extend the mischief further by involving more persons in the guilt. For in what, I beg to ask, does bribery consist? Does it consist merely in giving a man money, or in what is called treating him in order to obtain his vote? No, it consists in a thousand things which cannot be prevented, nor so much as defined by law. It is impossible to draw an accurate line between friendship, benevolence, and good neighbourhood on the one hand, and corruption on the other. It is not bribery, for instance, to let a great estate in a county you wish to influence, very much below its value; it is not bribery to procure some mark of honour from the crown for some neighbouring gentleman who can command a good many votes; it is not bribery to obtain from the Treasury all the patronage, as it is termed, of any particular place, that is, to distribute among your own supporters all the offices in the revenue and other departments that may happen to become vacant there. This is not bribery in the technical sense of the word, but do not these things exist? And is not their motive just as unquestionable as their existence? Does any man think that in point of morality there is any difference between them and the passing of money from hand to hand. The distinction between them is altogether of a special kind—it might get off a culprit at the Old Bailey, but in the discussion of a political question it is utterly inadmissible. There is no doubt that a certain number of persons do owe their seats to the disinterested attachment, or the political enthusiasm of their constituents, but I am afraid that in matters of this sort, affection and enthusiasm are far less powerful principles than self interest, and that so long as a seat in parliament continues to be a desirable object, the disposal of it, let it be vested in what hands it may, will be influenced by motives that are neither pure nor legal—unless, indeed, gentlemen think that they can eradicate men's feelings by act of parliament, and alter human nature itself by method of bill.

But, Sir, it may be said, that the objections I have urged apply to a more extensive change than that which has been proposed by my hon. Friend; and that he speaks of moderate, and I of radical, reform. Sir; of all the visionary expectations to which this project has given birth the most visionary is to suppose that reform is a thing of such a manageable nature, that it will stop at the precise boundary to which its authors may wish to confine it, that the waters will cease to flow at the bidding of those that have torn down the dykes. My hon. friend's plan indeed, to do him justice, is sufficiently moderate, and if it is not calculated to do much good, I must confess that, per se, it is not calculated to do much harm. In my view of the subject the main argument against this and all similar plans, is, that by adopting them we should admit the principle of altering what has been found practically good, upon mere theoretical grounds, which, whenever we do, a breach will be made in our constitution through which all that banditti will instantly rush, which we are now, though with difficulty, able to repel. We are told, indeed, that it is necessary, not only on its own account, and for the sake of the benefits that are to flow from it, but in order to satisfy the people. This, however, is not so much a matter of argument, as a question of fact, and every person will be a good deal guided by the result of his own observation. As far, however, as my own knowledge and experience have gone, I am inclined to think, that, with a view to this subject, the people of England may be divided into two classes; those that are; content with the existing order of things, and those that are desirous of a far greater change than any that my hon. friend is prepared to call for. I know it has been supposed that a large class of persons exists, desirous of what is termed "moderate reform" persons in the main well affected to our constitution, and when it depends on ourselves, either wholly to conciliate and make our own, by yielding to their just and temperate demands, or to drive into an unnatural but formidable alliance with the Jacobins, by clinging blindly and pertinaciously to the most objectionable parts of our old system. Now, Sir, I must own that of this moderate party so limited in their wishes, and consequently so easily to be contented, I am not able to see any very evident traces. That it exists I do not deny, but that it exists in any considerable number I utterly disbelieve. On the contrary, in all the most numerous meetings that have been held for the purpose of agitating this question, in all the speeches and publications that may be supposed in the most authentic manner to promulgate the will and pleasure of the reforming body, the idea of moderate reform has either not been mentioned at all, or mentioned only to be reprobated and disclaimed. Their complaints and their demands are alike incompatible with any thing like what my hon. friend would call moderation. The grievances they state are such as never in the days of our forefathers were held to be grievances at all, and the remedies they propose are alto- gether subversive of the constitution as it existed in what are universally confessed to have been the best of times. The substance of their objection (as I have already had occasion to remark) consists in this, that what are called the representatives of the people are in fact returned by a very small minority of the people. Now, Sir, I should beg to ask how this defect can be cured by any thing in the shape of moderate reform. To meet the wishes of these persons we must at once sweep away all our boroughs, we must burn all our charters, we must abolish all our franchises; and in place of this antiquated rubbish we must adopt a page or two of the American constitution. Short of this we shall do nothing to content them, the representation will still remain unadapted to the population, and their ground of complaint Just as strong as ever. Such a reform as that proposed by my hon. friend will be received not only with dissatisfaction, but with scorn, and I, or any other person who is resolved to concede nothing, but to oppose every plan for a change in the representation, will stand better with the real reformers than the authors of what they will consider as a contemptible and illusory project. What then are we to do by acceding to this motion, and whom are we to oblige? We are to change the constitution of the country, under which it has enjoyed the greatest share of prosperity and glory ever enjoyed by men, in hopes of conciliating a class of persons who are either too feeble to make their voices heard amidst the more powerful cry for a radical reform, too little united among themselves to agree upon any common plan, or too lukewarm about their object to take the trouble of stating it in a separate form.

There cannot, I am persuaded, be a more fatal error than to concede points of this sort in the hope of pleasing the multitude. The discontented, though numerous, and powerful, more than in proportion to their numbers, from their zeal, their activity, and that proselytizing spirit which adds daily to their force, are still a minority of the people of this country. But nothing is so likely to convert that minority into a majority, as feeble, graceless concessions on our part, concessions by which we shall forsake the vantage ground on which we stand, by which we shall surrender our best weapons of defence, by which we shall increase the strength of our enemies, without at all abating their rancour. Sir, in every age, and in every country, those who have been entrusted with the power of the state, have had to contend with something which for the moment has been the favourite project of vain, ambitious, or mistaken men. In our days they have thought fit to aim at a vital part, and the constitution of parliament is what we have to defend, and what it will require our utmost efforts to secure. Indeed, the very nature and condition of man almost forbid one to expect, that blessings so great as those we enjoy under the existing order of things, should, for long together, be held without interruption, and without struggle. For that struggle, I trust, we are prepared; since, if I am not much deceived, it will be long, perilous, and doubtful. But, at least, let us have no paltry ineffectual compromise. Let us make our stand upon our immemorial usages, upon the wisdom of our ancestors, and far more, for there are persons to whom these things seem light, upon the practical benefits we have derived from the present system in times of singular difficulty and danger. This is our only chance either for dignity or safety; but if we come at last with our miserable canting confession, implied or expressed, that we, heretofore falsely and fraudulently denominating ourselves the Commons of England, are not the Commons of England, and that we are too weak and too corrupt to manage the affairs that have been entrusted to us, and that therefore we will allow ourselves to be reformed a little, and suffer the government to be brought something nearer the pure and perfect model of democracy that ought to exist in this House; they will rejoice at the principle we shall admit, but they will require, and justly require, that we should follow it up with much larger concessions; they will laugh at our moderate reform, and treat us with scorn for believing that, after having been so long kept out of their clear, and, by ourselves acknowledged rights, they will at last be satisfied by the restoration of a small and insignificant part of them. They will proceed, as indeed, to do them justice, they have openly and manfully declared, in their own way, and upon their own principles—principles utterly incompatible with that order of things under which we have hitherto lived, and under which, I am not ashamed to say, I am still desirous to live. We may purchase a truce with these persons, but there can be no real peace, no sub- stantial agreement between us. No concordat could be framed by which they can enter into our church, or we into theirs. Sooner or later the difference must break out, and the resistance must be made; and those which my hon. friend considers as timely concessions, and healing measures, are, in fact, only so many demonstrations of weakness and irresolution, which, though they may stagger the faith, and chill the zeal of the great body of the people who are still true to the constitution, will neither gain to us a single useful proselyte, nor retard our fate by a single hour.

Sir, I beg pardon for having detained the House so long, but I was anxious not to lose this opportunity of expressing my settled aversion to this and all similar measures. If for any thing that I have said I am thought less true to the principles of free government, or less attached to those with whom I have hitherto acted, it will be to me a matter of the most serious concern. I have always been, and still am a sincere and zealous friend to civil and religious freedom, and I have therefore been anxious that the conduct of affairs should be entrusted to persons resting upon some more solid and constitutional basis of power than mere court favour, and that some check should be given to the influence of the crown, so increased with our increasing establishments, and with these objects in view I have been naturally led to concur for the most part with those that opposed the ministers of the crown. But if these objects, the attainment of which I do not despair of under the existing order of things, are to be pursued by means of a change in the constitution of the country, if we are to put every thing at stake in order to remedy a partial grievance, why then, Sir, I can only say that "non hæc in fœdera veni," I have made no such engagement, I will embark in no such design, I will subscribe to none of these new articles of faith, borrowed from the Gallican Church to be added to our ancient creed, The "Borough System," as it is invidiously called, existed very nearly in its present form in what are justly considered as the best times. Perhaps the nature of liberty may be a great deal better understood now than it was by our ancestors, and it may be idle to appeal to the authority of Statesmen who flourished a hundred years ago. For my own part, however, I am not ambitious to live and die under a better constitution than that which was bequeathed to us by those great men that brought about the Revolution of 1688. These men were neither ignorant of the foundation upon which their rights rested, nor timid or lukewarm in asserting them; they were men capable of proceeding to the boldest deeds upon the most enlightened principles, and who had not hesitated in defence of their civil and religious liberties, to hurl their sovereign from his throne and begin a new æra in the history of their country. And, yet, Sir when the authors and supporters of that measure had accomplished their object, when lord Halifax, and lord Somers, and lord Godolphin, and lord Sunderland, the Cavendishes, and the Russells, when all the great families, and all the most illustrious individuals who acted upon what were then called Whig principles, imagined vainly, (as it has been lately discovered) and foolishly imagined, that they had reared a fabric under which they and their posterity might live to happiness and to glory; the people of England were just as imperfectly represented in parliament as they are now. In those days, as well as in these, the elective franchise was vested in decayed towns, and in small corporations, and as far as it can be ascertained, as many persons owed their seats to individual influence as at the present moment, and yet no person appears so much as to have pretended that these anomalies were in their nature grievances, or that it was necessary to render the House of Commons a purely democratical assembly in order to preserve the liberties of the people.—Be it right or be it wrong, this doctrine is not of ancient date, as some persons idly pretend, and without the least colour of authority from history or tradition, but is the mere offspring of the age in which we live. Whether or not it is to prevail, whether the present order of things draws to a close, or whether, notwithstanding some unfavourable appearances, the same good sense and good fortune which have conducted the people of England to that pinnacle of prosperity on which they now stand, will be sufficient to avert their minds from these delusive phantoms of imaginary happiness and unattainable perfection, I am as yet unable to foresee; I am willing to hope for the best, but there are symptoms in the mind and in the conduct of some of our most eminent public men that make me tremble for the worst.

said, that he felt some burthen thrown upon him in replying to the very elaborate speech of the hon. gentleman, which was so well delivered, and so agreeably pronounced, in which the hon. gentleman had attempted to shew, that the House, as it now stood, was a real representation of the people of this country; and who, in doing so, had used arguments not only in opposition to all the received points of our constitutional doctrine, but so wide and remote from them as to require no small share of ingenuity and eloquence to lend them even a plausible appearance. He should be obliged to shew, that the hon. gentleman was not more consistent with himself and his own arguments, than he had been with all the old recognized constitutional principles. He trusted as firmly as the hon. gentleman, that, by the constitution of the country, we might be enabled to hold, or rather to recover, the liberties of the country. But the arguments of the hon. gentleman were sometimes in complete contradiction to one another. At one time he contended, that the House did act in unison with the sentiments and feelings of the country, and therefore that the representation was a proper one. At another time he said, that if the House were returned in such a manner as really to represent the country, he should apprehend the greatest dangers from such a change in our system. If that were the case, he must conceive that the people were hostile to the interests of the country; and if so, would the hon. gentleman say that the House of Commons, in its present state, spoke the sense of the people? The hon. gentleman feared, that if the House of Commons were better constituted, and more truly represented the people of England, they would be liable to be shaken by every gust of popular opinion. He, for his part, would always stick up for the right which the constitution of this country gave to the people, of having their share in the government. If he were asked what their share was; he should answer directly, that the election of representatives in the House of Commons was the share of the government to which the people were entitled. Now the House had been told this night, for the first time, that those parts of the constitution which were hitherto considered the most unsound and rotten, were, in fact, those from which it derived the most advantages; and that it was the rotten boroughs that were to be considered as the soundest parts of the constitution. (Hear.) It was from the rotten boroughs, according to the hon. gentleman, that all the men of great information, talents, and so forth, got into parliament. If however, the House wished really to know what the state of the representation was, he would refer them to a Petition presented in 1793, the allegations of which were offered to be proved by evidence at their bar. That Petition stated, that the majority of that House was returned by twelve or thirteen thousand individuals, the greater part of whom had no property at all, and were not persons who ought to be even allowed to have votes for the election of members of parliament. If this was the real situation of the representation of this country, (and it had been offered to be proved that it was so,) he would say that he hardly knew any form of government that he would not prefer to it. He should rather that the crown was despotic at once, than it should be made despotic by this complicated machinery; which did not alter the despotic power of the crown, but made it much more expensive to the subject. He should prefer any sort of aristocracy to the sort of government he had described. Without looking to the statute book, or the ancient principles of our constitution, he would say that the modern authorities, (although imperfect interpreters of and commentators on that book and those principles) and particularly judge Blackstone, had laid down the right of the people to be fully and fairly represented, in such terms as would be hardly allowable now to use in the House. A right hon. gentleman (Mr. Elliot) who spoke early in the debate, appeared to consider, that to go very far back into the history of our constitution, for the purpose of altering its present practice, might be considered as great an innovation as any other. For his part, he would not allow that the Great Charter was an obsolete Act; but when he found in addition to that, the opinions of lord Coke and all the fundamental writers on the subject, and also statute after statute, saying, that taxes could not be legally raised but by the consent of the people represented in parliament, and that the elections should be free and fair,—when he saw all those authorities, ancient and modern, by the side of reason and common-sense, he must say, that it was the constitution to which the people of this country were entitled, that they should be fully, fairly, and freely represented in the Commons House of Parliament, and that taxes could not be fairly levied but by the consent of the people, expressed by their real representatives. It was said, however, that it was so hard to strike out a proper plan of Reform, that no set of reformers could meet upon the subject without disagreements among themselves. If this were true, it proved nothing, for would it he said that any other set of men assembled to discuss any other subject, perfectly agreed in their opinions? When ministers met, for example, to consider what taxes were to be raised, could it be supposed their opinions exactly coincided? When they met to plan expeditions, however, it was well known there were differences. It was not only required of reformers that they must perfectly agree in their opinions, but that they should also be much better than other men, and absolutely faultless. Those on the other side of the question conceived themselves entitled to support all manner of corruptions, if they could but shew that the reformers were not perfectly agreed among themselves, or that they were not absolutely faultless. Montesquieu, and all those writers who had celebrated most the English constitution, conceived the chief beauty of it to be, that taxes could not be raised except by the free consent of the people in parliament. If the people, then, were not fairly represented in parliament, they had no opportunity of expressing what was or what was not done by their free consent. A right hon. gentleman, now no more, (Mr. Windham) who was possessed of great talents, but who had been one of the most powerful opposers of the cause of reform in parliament, never went to the length which the hon. gentleman (Mr. Ward) had gone to. He never defender, rotten boroughs and corruption, as things good in themselves; but all his argument was, that the people were so thoroughly corrupted, from the top to the bottom, that he thought no plan which was proposed could be of any service. He had thought that there was no preventing the rich fro giving bribes, or the poor from takings them; and that if ministers had not also this power, the wheels of government could not go on. Now to him it appeared, that corruption was nothing more than giving an unfair advantage to a part, to the prejudice of the whole; and that to give this undue advantage to one, there must be a robbery of twenty. He conceived that the people could not have more crying evils to complain of than the corruption of parliament and the corruption of the representation. Against such corruptions our ancestors often drew their swords. It was one of the serious charges made against Richard 2, that by rewards and menaces he contrived to influence or pack a parliament. He knew that it was always said on the other hand, that we now were getting on much better than our ancestors did; but it appeared to him, that unless there was a real representation in the country, there was no check at all to the executive power, which was much the same thing as having no constitution at all. Because he contended as much as was in his power, that the people ought to have their share in the government, was that a reason why he should be charged with mischievous intentions, by those whose pockets were filled with the public money? It was somewhat strange that the hon. gentleman (Mr. Ward) should have been almost constantly found in opposition to the measures of his Majesty's government, which he now all at once discovered to be in unison with the general feeling of the people. That hon. gentleman had also given his opinion, that the government was completely disgraced by the Walcheren expedition, but stated that this was not the opinion of the public at large. If this were the case, who ought to be the judges of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers? Was the hon. gentleman to be the sole judge, or should not the people be allowed to judge by their real representatives? He believed that the hon. gentleman was quite wrong in his idea of the public feeling upon this Walcheren question, and that there could hardly be found a man who could mention it without a sigh, or some expression of deep regret at the numbers of lives sacrificed on that occasion to no purpose. The hon. gentleman was right in saying, that there were many persons who would laugh at what was known in that House by the name of moderate reform. He (sir F. B.) was certainly one of those persons who would not be satisfied with what was generally called moderate reform, but who went the whole length of wishing to see the people possessed of that share in the government to which the constitution and the law entitled them. At the same time he was not one of those captious reformists that would take nothing, if they could not get every thing they wished for. Any measure whatsoever, which appeared to him a reformation of abuses, or an amelioration of the present state of the representation, however short such reform might come of his wishes, should always meet his most cordial support. In talking of the great men who had got into parliament from the unreformed state of the House, the hon. gentleman seemed to have forgotten the many great men who had written and spoken in the cause of Reform. He seemed to have forgotten that lord Hallifax had written in favour of Reform, and that sir William Jones had asserted the right of the people of England to annual parliaments and free elections. If the hon. gentleman had, however, lived in the time of the Reformation, he would, probably, have been a decided enemy to it; if he had lived at the time of the Revolution, he must, on his own principles, have opposed it; or if he had lived when the Septennial Act was passed, he must have opposed that as a dangerous innovation. This Septennial act was passed as most bad measures are, from temporary alarm. It was then stated, that there was a Popish party struggling for power, which, together with the expence of elections, was considered a sufficient reason for departing from the ancient constitution of the country. Would the hon. gentleman have opposed the Triennial Act, if he had lived in those times? The earl of Devonshire, however protested against it, as unconstitutional; and the hon. gentleman had professed a great admiration of the Cavendishes, and the Russels. When we came to modern times, it would be recollected, the great lord Chatham, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, and many men most distinguished for talents, had strongly urged the absolute necessity of reform. He therefore conceived that both authority and reason were of the same side, and that the public good imperiously required it. The hon. gentleman seemed to say, that he would vote for reform in Scotland, if the people expressed a wish for it. Should not he, on his own principles, have only considered whether it was or was not for the public good, without considering whether there was a popular clamour raised or not? He had allowed that the amount of our expenditure was a grievance, and that the war was a grievance; but these were grievances not originating in the House of Commons. In this opinion he, however, totally differed from the hon. gentleman. He believed that the war, with its enormous expenditure, was a war of the House of Commons. He believed that that House had taken a weak alarm at certain opinions which they feared would make such progress in this country as to endanger the constitution. He was sure that this principle could never have made way, if the people were fairly elected, or if the protection of the country had been left to the armed property of it. He conceived that the armed property of the country would be a much stronger protection than a standing army. The government was said to be a government of King, Lords, and Commons. He did not know how it could be said to answer that description, if the Commons were not represented. Whom did the House of Commons represent at present? The members certainly very faithfully represented those who were their constituents. There was no man returned by a patron of a borough who would not be ashamed to vote contrary to his interests or the wishes of the person who sent him into parliament. He would therefore say, that most of them did faithfully represent those who actually sent them; but when they were to be considered (as was true in theory, but not in practice) the representatives of the people, then it was not surprizing that their votes should be in direct opposition to the wishes and feelings of the people. Thinking that any amelioration of the representation would be something gained for the general interests of the country, he should give his cordial support to the present motion.

could not help observing, that the hon. baronet was constantly in the habit of talking of the ancient and pure times of the constitution, and yet he never condescended to specify to what particular period he referred. But he had advised, as a part of his plan of reform, that the power of sending writs to new boroughs should be re-vested in the hands of the crown. This was one branch of the renovation which the hon. baronet recommended: but really he (lord M.) could hardly conceive any thing that would lead more directly to despotism, than the possession of such a power. With all due deference to the superior constitutional knowledge of his hon. friend who brought forward this motion, he Must contend that nothing was more unfounded than to suppose, that originally only such boroughs as were large and opulent sent members to parliament. The fact was, that while some boroughs had declined, others had flourished and grown more important; and what he deduced from all this was, that the state of the borough representation was in point of independence what it had been at all periods of our history, and even at those which the hon. baronet had so often represented as pure and uncorrupt. The great advantage of the present system was, that there could be found no description of persons in the country who were not represented in that House. The landed interest, and the commercial interest, with all its various ramifications, had each their representation. Under the present system, the East and West India interests had their claims supported. They had their representatives, through whom they could speak. His hon. friend's plan went to disfranchise a number of boroughs, and increase the representatives for counties; but with all the partiality which he (lord M) naturally felt for the landed interest, he should think it very unfortunate for the general prosperity, if no other existed in that House. It would seem to be the language of some gentlemen, that the House of Commons as now constituted, was nothing but a mass of corruption; or at least that such rottenness and unsoundness existed in parliament, as, if not lopped off, must entirely destroy the constitution. Now he should be glad to know in what particular part of the representation this rottenness was to be found. He liked to come to close quarters with these Reformers, for when they descended from general assertion to particular facts, they would be found to have little to say for themselves. What part of the representation, then, was rotten? We had members for counties, members for populous towns, and we had burgage tenures. (Hear, hear!) He understood what the cheering referred to; and, he would ask again, in what did the rottenness consist? Let the Reformers come and prove that corruption had been practised in a particular instance, and he would vote for disfranchising the borough. Had he sat in the House when the Cricklade and Aylesbury cases were decided, he should have voted for the abolishing of those boroughs. The present measure went to admit copyholders to vote for county members; and he would admit that many of that class were as independent as freeholders. The only reason why he refused this extension was, that the ancient constitution never gave the elective franchise to copyholders, and he was not aware that any new vivifying principle would be gained by their introduction His objections to change were radical, and were founded on a conviction, that all measures of this sort did not go to reform, but to alter the constitution. It was said, that the decisions of the House of Commons were generally at variance with the voice of the people, and the Walcheren vote was appealed to as an instance. He verily believed that there was, on that occasion, a diversity of opinion between the House and the body of the people; but although the people at large blamed the Expedition, which had been screened from censure by the majority of the House, it did not follow, that they were in direct opposition to the opinion of the majority. The vote of the House implied more considerations than a mere disapproval of the Expedition, a formal vote of censure would probably have occasioned a change of ministers, and the people were not so unanimous on that subject as on the other. But even after all the alterations which might be made in the constitution of the House, he very much doubted whether on every occasion its votes would represent the opinion of the people at large. The question of shortening the duration of parliaments was a matter of regulation, not of radical alteration, and did not appear to him so objectionable, though he was not called upon at present to consider it. Upon the whole, he would conjure the House to abstain from touching with sacrilegious hands an institution that had been raised by the wisdom of their ancestors. To the parliament as now constituted,—to a parliament which comprised representatives for Old Sarum, for Helston and all the Cornish boroughs, as well as for counties, the country was indebted for the defence of its liberties against the arbitrary sway of Charles 1.; and it was a parliament similarly formed, which, after innumerable struggles, ultimately confirmed the liberties of the nation by the Bill of Rights.

said this subject had been already so often discussed, that it was almost presumption for any person to imagine that he could throw any new light upon it. He confessed he was a little astonished at the manner in which the question had been discussed that night. A noble lord had expressed himself anxious to have an opportunity of coming to close quarters with the advocates for parliarnentary reform, and to drive them up into a corner. Good God! did the noble lord really think it would be so easy to drive such men as Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt into a corner? He for his part confessed that he had long felt the necessity of a parliamentary reform, for the sake of withstanding the influence of the crown; and every thing he had witnessed since he came into parliament, had served to strengthen him in that opinion. It was necessary, in his opinion, that something ought to be done; and it was more incumbent upon this parliament to do something than any former parliament, because they would not leave the constitution in the same state in which they found it. The Act of the 49th of the King, ostensibly to prevent the sale of seats, would materially increase the influence of the crown in the next parliament. It would give the crown a monopoly of all those places which were at present open to all parties. This was no doubt by no means contemplated by all of the majority who passed the Bill; but that the Bill would have this effect, no man who considered the matter fairly, and laid his hand on his heart, would venture to deny. He believed that the Bill had already produced its effect, and that many of the votes of the House might be now traced to it. An hon. friend of his had deprecated the choosing such a period of prosperity as the present for entering on parliamentary reform. This prosperity, he should think, was not so evident as his hon. friend seemed to suppose. A nation groaning under the weight of taxes, a distressed trade, and an excess of paper money, could hardly be said to be in a prosperous state. This argument had always been applied to every reform under every species of government. He remembered, that lord Clarendon stated the country never enjoyed such prosperity as in 1640, yet that was the period immediately antecedent to the civil wars, and when the country was suffering under taxes levied without authority, and under the most arbitrary decisions which ever disgraced courts of judicature. He thought copy holders having an equal security in their property with freeholders, were equally entitled to the right of voting.

was not inclined to offer many observations upon the motion, as it had been discussed much more eloquently than he could discuss it. The object of those who contended in support of the motion was to make the parliament a democratic one: but he would defy any of the gentlemen supporting the proposition to shew him that such a mode of representation would be better than a mixed form of government. He could sympa- thize as much as the hon. baronet could do with the situation of the people at present. But the proposed alteration would not benefit the constitution. Boroughs, and even close boroughs, he maintained, were coeval with the constitution, and he considered them as absolutely necessary to the safety of the constitution. In a country highly civilized, enjoying an immense wealth, and having a mixed form of government, it was absolutely necessary that the body which represented the people should be composed of the representatives of all the classes of men having an interest in the empire. It was impossible that an assembly, purely democratic, could exist with safety to such a country. Its measures would vacillate at every variation of popular opinion, however ill-founded; to use the expression of an hon. member, which he was not ashamed of repeating, "it would soon become the base pander of the basest passions of the people:" it could not co-exist with the other branches of the constitution, but must soon overwhelm them with irresistible fury, as had been the case in every other country. If assemblies of this description did exist, it must be at a distance from the metropolis, surrounded, and strictly guarded by an armed force, for they would most likely be apt to indulge opinions that the King was a cypher. The present state of representation was the very perfection of the constitution, and competent to all useful and necessary purposes. A democratical one would absorb the other branches. Could it be said, that Westminster would be worse represented, if it were less democratic? Conceiving that no practical benefit would be derived to the country from an alteration in the system of election, and that present concessions would only lead to fresh demands from the reformers, he should oppose the motion.

concurred with those who thought the question one of the most vital importance. If the proposition was acceded to, the result might be accompanied by total ruin to the country. He saw no good whatever that could arise from adopting it.—There never was a time in the annals of the country when a greater mass of honour, of integrity, and of talent were combined in that House. Notwithstanding what he had heard on various occasions, he must deny that the House and the people were at variance in opinion. At least, he could find nothing like it in his intercourse with his neigh- bours, the inhabitants of the county which he had the honour to represent. The hon. baronet might conceive himself a judge of the wishes and opinions of the people by those he was in the habit of meeting at the Crown and Anchor, and in Palace Yard. He (Mr. G.) must be allowed to form an opinion of his own constituents, who lived by the plough, who were not a set of men, who, like those at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, when other trades failed them, set about manufacturing speeches. His constituents did not wish for reform, and therefore he should vote against the motion.

declared, that ever since he had a seat in that House, he had uniformly supported Parliamentary Reform, and his opinions had been more and more confirmed from what he had seen year after year. He was somewhat astonished that the hon. member for Suffolk, (Mr. Gooch) should presume the opinions of his neighbours in that county were to be looked upon as a more fair criterion of the general sentiments of the country, than those of the persons whom the hon. baronet meets in a place, where all the intelligence of the country was generally supposed to be assembled. An hon. gentleman who spoke on the other side, (Mr. Giddy) was a most strenuous advocate of things as they were. This was not extraordinary, considering the prejudices of his Cornish neighbours, and also how natural it was for him to sympathise in their feelings. In Cornwall alone there had been snore corrupt sales of rotten boroughs than in all the rest of the kingdom; and, therefore it was not surprising that it should be the very nest of anti-reform. He regretted extremely that some of his hon. friends near him, and the noble lord, had expressed their total dislike of all Reform; and seemed to think themselves dishonoured and disgraced, if the voice of the people had an influence in that House. The arguments of the noble lord really went to treat the people as if they were nothing. That was their tendency; but the object of the Reform which he supported was, that that assembly should be both in body and spirit, the real representatives of the people. The present motion was not a desperate effort at improvement, which might endanger the very existence of the constitution. It was not an extravagant plan suggested by some wild reformer, but it had proceeded from the sagacious mind of his hon. friend, and it had been seconded by the lineal heir of the House of Russell. He was ready to acknowledge that these paltry boroughs had given to that House some of its most illustrious members: but what a difference of weight and influence was communicated to a member of parliament, by his being returned for a county or a respectable and populous city! Was it not the object of even Mr. Windham's ambition, on several occasions, to be returned for Norfolk and for Norwich? notwithstanding the Contempt which he chose latterly to express for popular opinion? Did not the late first lord of the Admiralty feel and know the difference between representing a county, and being returned for a paltry borough in Cornwall? It was very hard that when any question was brought forward, accompanied with Petitions, it should be alleged that those Petitions had their origin in faction; and that when no Petitions were presented in favour of any question, then that the people did not care for it. The argument drawn from time also would he presumed be so drawn until time should be no more. His hon. friend had said, that Scotland was perfectly satisfied with its state of representation; and an hon. gentleman opposite had nodded assent, as if for the whole of that people. One thing, however, was certain, that ever since the Union, the forty-five members from that country had been almost unanimous in voting one way. The decision on the Catholic question furnished an irrefragable proof of the influence of the crown, and shewed that the crown had that great question completely in its own hands. Would any person maintain that if the power of the crown had been exerted in its favour, it would not have been carried by as decided a majority as the abolition of the Slave Trade after a snuggle of 20 years, as soon as that measure was really taken up by ministers? This was a pregnant instance of the power of the crown. He had not a doubt, that on a dissection of the vote on the Catholic question, the truth would be found as he had stated.

The accomplishment of the production of the president Montesquieu, that the British constitution would be destroyed when the legislature should become more corrupt than the executive, there were a thousand reasons to believe approaching. Would the House recollect what the great lord Chatham had said, or what was said by Mr. Pitt thirty years ago? or what had been the declared opinion of Mr. Fox, and was also, he believed, the opinion of a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) then absent; but who would, he was confident, if present, have been the warm advocate of this motion. Would they recollect the opinion of other living authorities? Most of the great men in the state had given a similar opinion. But now all who supported a Reform, were held up as demagogues and visionaries: and nothing was to be done, because they did not all agree in a plan, though an hon. baronet had shewn, with much solidity of argument, and much eloquence, that a much smaller body than the reformers could not agree in their measures, but evinced a discrepancy that occasioned strong ferments and violent ruptures among themselves,—he meant the cabinet itself: Last night the minister passed his panegyric upon his own administration, as the most virtuous and excellent that could be formed; a subject on which he should only refer to the statements of those who had been ministers with him, to determine who was right or wrong. Much was said of the introduction of unpatronised talent into the House, under the present system; but this system introduced not merely talents, but wealth of any sort wherever it could find a market for a seat. Last year a person advertised against hunting over a particular district; but it was well known that if a certain borough were compromised, the hunting was to go on as usual; and that was the way in which the dispute was terminated. Was that a fit thing to exist respecting the mode of returning members to parliament? On some occasions the people of England were called, and he believed justly so, a most thinking people; but when Reform was spoken of, they were only viewed as wild and giddy. His hon. friend said that lord Grey had been driven out of Northumberland by the cry of No Popery; but that was not the case. It was owing to the American Intercourse Act, which was strongly opposed in that House by a worthy alderman, and by the Master of the Rolls, It was represented, that lord Grey's object was to destroy, with all his might and main, the shipping interest of this country: yet that very Act, against which the present ministers then raised such an outcry, remained, and not even a motion to repeal it had ever been made. There was another great influence used, against which lord Grey might not deem it prudent, in a pecuniary view, to enter on a contest. That county had become again vacant, while rats were swimming in shoals from one side to the other, and the Chiltern hundreds flying about in due proportion. Launceston was vacated; but it would be impossible to believe that a certain noble House, so full of wealth and honours, could be swayed by inferior considerations. He was far, however, from disputing the propriety of the Regent's conferring the honour which occasioned a vacancy in Northumberland. But ministers were, under the present system, obliged to have recourse to shifts. It was sufficiently known that such things were matter of barter. When delegation to that House was objected to, why did not gentlemen recollect that so many were delegated by patrons who arranged their votes with the ministry? It became, then, a case of conscience with a delegate. "True," said he, "I am here as your member; but feeling a difference of opinion, I resign my seat back to you from whom I got it." This happened perpetually. It was a new æra. If it could be said of some of those gentlemen who had lately gone over to the opposite side of the House 'cælum, non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt,' he thought he might safely at least, say this much for himself, that he had never shrunk from the people, but had at the same time never sacrificed his own opinions. He had been told by an hon. friend, that many good things had been said of him by the people, but not on account of his desire for peace, which might be true; but if the people spoke of him with any favour, it could be only for his being consistent and unsuspected. It had been contended, that all the wars during the last century had been popular. This might be true, speaking of their commecement; but if the people had caused wars to begin, they had certainly caused them to end. False impressions respecting taxation made the American war popular at first, but it was persisted in long after it was unpopular, and after means of stopping it had been rejected, which led to the acceptance of infinitely worse terms; and such would most likely be the termination of the present war. The voice of the people might be heard at last; but it was heard too late. If the House were the just representatives of the people, they would change gradually, when the opinions of the people were against their conduct, and not be finally reduced to yield to cla- mour. Mr. Bankes's success respecting sinecures was owing to public opinion. The same was the case respecting the barracks. He had heard that some hon. gentlemen had voted the other night contrary to their opinions, on account of an intemperate speech, by an hon. baronet, a speech which, he was happy to find, the hon. baronet had taken the opportunity of explaining. But, because the hon. baronet had thought proper to make that speech, it appeared that these gentlemen had thought proper to fine the country 90,000l. It was not true that the rotten boroughs returned Mr. Fox in 1764, for he was returned for Westminster, and kept out for a time by a scrutiny which the House put an end to. He would appeal to the Cornish gentleman (Mr. D. Giddy) whether that seat of corruption, Cornwall, did not furnish more litigation than other counties. Of the four members for London, three voted in favour of the Walcheren expedition: one of them, he was told, stood the matter very well before his constituents, but the citizens might yet have an opportunity to express their opinion on that subject. More county members voted against ministers on that occasion than for them. The constitution originated in the people; with them it was vested; by them it had been exercised, or the Prince Regent would not then hold the reins of government. With them was the sovereignty of the empire: for them the throne was created. The people had a right to the democratical branch of the constitution, which had, from time to time, been invaded, not by prerogative, but by influence, which might soon be overwhelming. If some seats were not now in the power of a few independent men, the influence of the crown would controul every thing. In the present state of affairs, all depended on the people: they should be treated with conciliation, and with all attention to their wishes. If there were not petitions on the subject, it was well enough known what the people thought upon it. They might refuse to reform parliament; but in the end the people would be heard.

thought that the House had sufficient democracy in its constitution, without reform. It represented, at present, property of all kinds.

declared that he had no objection to giving his vote in favour of the first Bill intended to be brought in by his hon. friend, that of extending the right of voting to copyholders; and as to the second Bill, he should equally support its being brought in, though he did not thereby mean to pledge himself to a support of it in its future progress. With regard to the general question of reform in parliament, no one was more sensible of the delicacy of the subject than he was; but at the same time it equally appeared to him, that no mode of attempting reformation could be more safe than by Bills. It was preferable to any sweeping measures, of which no one could anticipate the consequences. As to the necessity of reform, he would only say, that however excellent the constitution might be, no one would surely say it was so excellent and immaculate, or so sacred, that its abuses, Chen obvious, ought not to be removed.

said, that he had waited all the evening to hear a noble lord opposite (lord Castlereagh) deliver his sentiments in support of the motion. As, however, he had been disappointed, he would beg leave to read to the House the opinions of that noble lord upon a former occasion, when a similar subject was discussed in the Irish parliament. It was an historical document, and he had therefore a right to read it. On a motion of Mr. Grattan's, February 9, 1793, respecting a Reform in the representation of the Irish House of Commons, the noble lord, then the honourable Robert Stewart, "in an able speech, reprobated the little special pleading which had been used against the motion—a reformation in parliament he held to be necessary; the present system of representation he maintained was defective, and he advised ministers to meet the question fairly and freely; for a reform in parliament he would vote the money of his constituents, but he would not vote a shilling of it for the vices and follies of the government."

To do the noble lord justice, he preached his doctrines to an Irish parliament, who would not listen to them. He then took the rod into his own hands, and scourged the Irish into the measure of the Union. He gave the noble lord credit for what he had done, as he supposed that when he could not prevail on the Irish House of Parliament to reform itself, the noble lord thought he would gain his object by transplanting it into England; but, unfortunately for both countries, the plant lost its nurture on being removed. It was from the abuses of rotten boroughs the parliament of Ireland fell into contempt with the people of Ireland: and the same causes would produce the same effect in England.

was not the least indisposed to adopt the sentiments which the hon. baronet had read as his, though the opinions of early life were not always to be held to the test of a strict consistency. If, however, the same cause existed now as did in 1793, he should still avow the same sentiments. He begged, however, to state, that he spoke in reference to the parliament of Ireland, which was certainly at that time constituted in a manner most inadequately as to all the purposes of representation. If, however, the hon. baronet concluded, therefore, that his opinions, as to a reform, applied equally to the English parliament, he begged leave to assure him that he was completely mistaken. In the English parliament he did not see the same necessity, he did not even see the expediency for Reform; and therefore he should certainly vote against the question. As to the Union, he denied, that he had been induced to promote that measure by any motives but those of the most patriotic nature.

, considered the Union to be of most essential benefit to both countries. He expressed surprise at what he had heard from the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Ponsonby). From what that right hon. gentleman had formerly stated, it was to be expected that he would rather have opposed the motion. The borough interest had been most injurious to Ireland, and this had been principally in the right hon. gentleman's family, from whom it had been purchased at an expence of 60,000l.

had never said that the English constitution, excellent as it was, might not be improved, nor that abuses that might have crept into it ought not to be corrected. As to what the hon. gentleman had alleged of the injury done to Ireland by the borough system, and of 60,000l. having, been paid to his family to wrest the borough interest from them, the fact was that he formerly had possessed but one borough, and it was not common to give 60,000l. for one borough in Ireland. He had always thought the question one of the greatest moment, and one which ought to be approached with the greatest delicacy.

observed, that being sent to that House by the voice of the people in the purest possible way, he had no idea of scrutinizing the votes by which other gentlemen were sent there: but the Walcheren Inquiry had opened his eyes, and he should vote for the motion.

had never been present at a debate, in which he was less anxious to take a part, as the part which he should have been disposed to take had been sustained with such great ability by the right hon. gentleman, and the hon. gentleman opposite. He wished, however, to correct a misunderstanding and consequent misrepresentation of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) who had described him as having been, on the preceding night, the panegyrist of his own administration, as having stated it to be the most vigorous and the most virtuous of administrations, and as having bestowed on it many other superlatives. He had been but in a very small degree the panegyrist of himself, as he only used any thing like the expressions imputed to him when comparing it with an administration, which he could assure the hon. gentleman he had never been in the habit of extolling so highly, as to make it appear any thing like a presumption of extrordinary merit, that the present administration possessed greater vigour or greater virtue. In thinking that nothing very extraordinary was necessary to equal or surpass that, he was not very singular in his opinion, and he believed the people themselves were rather turning that way. Of this the noble lord (lord Milton) had given him a little testimony, as he had admitted that with all the faults of the present feeble and unsuccessful administration, and with all the demerits of the Walcheren expedition attached to them, they were preferred to the last splendid and vigorous and successful and brilliant administration. But then it was said, that they were saved from a defeat on the Walcheren question, by the influence of the crown. He begged to say, that in that very session, and previous to that vote, that same House of Commons had refused to wait three days for information upon the subject: and so far were they from being under the influence of the crown, that ministers were accordingly out-voted on that question, and the House got the information they called for at that time, in opposition to the administration. But the genmen opposite, flushed with this advantage, went rather too far. They called for an inquiry into the Walcheren expedition, which opened the eves of the House and of the public, and hence the vote which parliament afterwards came to was to be accounted for. An objection, however, was raised against the individuals who voted for government. He, however, had no objection to the lists of the majority and minority being dissected, if they could be procured. If this were done in order to leave none who were biassed by interest in favour of government, all the placement would be at once struck off as a dead weight. But if they struck off from the list all who were in possession of places on the one side, he hoped they would not object to strike off all who were in expectation of places on the other. And they would give him leave to couple with this consideration a request that it might be remembered that a place could be possessed but by one, but it could be expected by more than one. Let them then take away those who possessed places on the one side, and who expected them on the other, and he would be perfectly willing to go to a division with the rest. It had been imputed to him as an offence, that he had kept in office after being in a minority, while it was contended that the influence of the crown was greater during his administration than it had been in any other. He contended that the fact of his having been in the minorities, was a proof that the influence of the crown had not increased in proportion to the increasing influence of property in the country. He denied the position that a minister ought to resign because he was left in a minority on some occasions, while his measures generally had the support of parliament. He concluded by expressing surprise that the vote of the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Ponsonby) was to be given with all its weight to a question which the right hon. gentleman himself thought so delicate and dangerous.

The House divided, when the numbers were:—Ayes 88; Noes 215; Majority, 127.