Skip to main content

Commons Chamber

Volume 23: debated on Tuesday 21 July 1812

House of Commons

Tuesday, July 21, 1812.

Ex-Officio Informations in Ireland—Case of Hugh Fitzpatrick

rose in pursuance of his notice, to call the attention of the House to the summons sent by Mr. Saurin, Attorney-General of Ireland, to Mr. Fitzpatrick, calling upon him to shew cause in the Attorney-General's own chambers, why a criminal information should not be filed against him for a libel. The vigilant eye of the House of Commons ought never to be taken off from the conduct of public men, and if he had allowed the subject to remain unnoticed, he thought that he should have forfeited entirely the consistency of his character. In adverting to this important subject, he should feel it necessary to occupy only a small portion of the time of the House, because he should not be justified in concluding with a motion of censure, or even of opinion, while the requisite documents were not before parliament. He concluded, that ministers, who on a former day had professed their ignorance upon the subject, had by this time obtained information from Dublin, and he concluded that they would not object to the production of the summons in question, which had been transmitted to Mr. Fitzpatrick, particularly since a noble and learned lord in another place had publicly declared, that had he been in the situation of Mr. Saurin, he should not have acted in the manner in which Mr. Saurin had conducted himself, although that noble and learned lord had at the same time imputed no blame to the learned gent. as having acted illegally. When this paper was upon the table it would be decided, whether the practice pursued by the Attorney-General was or was not legal, and supposing it to be legal, whether it ought to continue to be so. In his opinion, the power of judges to send criminals to distant jails for punishment, was very questionable, and that if it existed, it ought to be taken away he was certain; so with the step taken by the Attorney-General of Ireland; it might be strictly legal, but it was not strictly just. It had been said in answer to this complaint, that what had been done was rather an act of civility than of severity. Even admitting it to be so, it was a question of great importance, whether the Attorney-General ought to be allowed the discretion of shewing civility to one man and severity to another. The summons in its wording spoke of "a false and seditious libel," but in what that libel consisted, no information was, given. He called upon the other side of the House to adduce the false and seditious passages referred to. He had read the two parts of the "Enquiry into the Penal Code affecting the Roman Catholics," and he found that it contained a faithful and useful recapitulation of the disabilities under which the Catholics laboured; tracing all the differences and ill blood which existed in Ireland to the penal laws.

The book was an useful and elaborate publication. It would have been better for government to have replied to this book instead of prosecuting it: yet no attempt was made to deny the facts, or dispute the justice of the inferences in that work. Instead of this, a notice was sent to Mr. Fitzpatrick, requiring him to attend at the house of Mr. Saurin, to shew cause why a criminal information should not be filed against him for a seditious libel. The notice was dated the 3d July, and allowed four days for the appearance of Mr. Fitzpatrick. He knew not on what authority an attorney-general could require a man's attendance at his own house, but he knew that such a practice might lead to mischievous consequences. Mr. Fitzpatrick had indeed the best legal advice, and was not likely to be led into any error; he might throw such a demand into the fire without apprehension of the results; but suppose an ignorant man should be summoned to appear in a similar manner, the attorney-general might ask him to sit down, tête-a-tête with him, perhaps over a bottle of wine, in his nice snug little back parlour of a Star-chamber. A man in this situation might be induced to utter unguarded things, which might afterwards tend to his prejudice when he came to his trial; and the attorney-general became at once judge, jury, and accuser, in the same cause. He insisted that this proceeding went likewise to mike a man criminate himself, contrary to the sacred maxim of the law, that no man should be made his own accuser. But it was alleged, that attorney-generals are such honourable characters, that no abuse of power was to be apprehended. He was ready to allow their general good character, but the liberty of the subject was too sacred a thing to rest on such a basis. He always had, and always should object to precedents drawn even from the best of men, and the best of times. It was asked, what harm could be feared from men like lord Camden, lord Erskine, lord Eldon, and a hundred others, who, he supposed, would be all good in succession to the end of time? It was for this very reason, because good and upright men had allowed such practices, that they ought to be noticed. The errors of the great were subject to imitation, while no body ever thought of quoting the precedent laid down by a bad man. The example of such a person died with himself, and rotted in the same ignominious grave. If, therefore, Mr. Saurin had been a character of no estimation, he should not now have noticed his conduct; but it was because he respected that law-officer, and admired him for the earnestness with which he sought a seat in parliament, to oppose the Union, from upright motives; it was for these reasons that he thought it essentially necessary to examine the proceedings of such a man. He understood that Mr. Fitzpatrick did attend the summons of the Attorney-General, and that the Attorney-General had nothing to say to him. He supposed, that there would be no hesitation in allowing the paper moved for to lie on the table, that if the Attorney-General should appear to have acted improperly, some motion might be founded upon it. He should, therefore, move, "That there be laid before this House, Copy of a Notice from the right honourable William Saurin, his majesty's Attorney General of Ireland, dated the 3d instant, to Hugh Fitzpatrick, requiring him to shew cause before him, at his house in Stephen's Green, on or before Wednesday the 8th instant, why a criminal information should not be filed against him."

stated it to have been the ordinary practice in Ireland (a practice in favour of the subject) for the Attorney General to give notice to the party against whom an information was about to be filed, of such an intention, and to call upon the individual to shew cause why such information should not be filed. This was done not to enable the Attorney General to draw from him what he had to offer in his defence, or for the purpose of exercising any Star-chamber authority, but for the purpose of giving the party an opportunity of offering any explanation that might, in his opinion, induce the Attorney General to forbear from further proceedings. He had no doubt but his right hon. friend had read certain scientific letters which had appeared in the newspapers, signed "A Barrister." From one of those it would be seen that Mr. Fitzpatrick had appeared to the notice, but it having been signified to the Attorney General that Mr. F. had nothing to say to him, he (the Attorney General) had not seen him. This was of itself a proof that it was not the object of the Attorney General to draw from him what he had to offer in his defence, as, had that been his object, he would certainly have seen him, and attempted to draw him into conversation. The notice itself was not that official document which the right hon. gentleman seemed to think it was. It required the attendance of Mr. Fitzpatrick, it was true, but it attached no penalty to his failing to attend, and was only intended to intimate, that if he had any thing to offer that might induce the Attorney General not to prosecute, the Attorney General was ready to listen to it. The prosecution, he declared, had nothing whatever to do with the Catholic claims. The law, however, while the Catholic claims were discussed, was not to be considered as in abeyance; and if a libel were published, accusing the government of foul and base corruption, and charging the judges with murder, he was confident the right hon. gentleman would not say the Attorney General did his duty if, seeing this, he were not to prosecute the publisher. The work in question, after some general injurious remarks on the administration of the law, stated, as one tragical instance of its injustice, the case of one Barry, who was convicted at the summer assizes at Kilkenny, in 1810. This man is represented to be innocent. His innocence, it asserted, was established between his conviction and execution, yet he had been executed protesting his innocence. To this statement it added, "Some shocking facts are connected with this subject, which the duke of Richmond's administration may yet be invited to explain to parliament." Justice ought to be alike administered to every subject; but what would those now in confinement for libels think, if such a libel as this, so extensively circulated, when seen, had been passed over? What would Walter Cox, who was now in the Newgate of Dublin for publishing a libel called "The Painter cut," in the Irish Magazine, and what would the public think of such a distinction being made? It was impossible for him to agree to the paper being laid on the table. Other circumstances, which he had not yet stated, made it, in his opinion, impossible for the House at present to take up the subject. Trials were now pending on the question; and as the right hon. gentleman wished to ascertain how the law at present stood, he thought he could not do better than wait the result of those trials. Mr. Fitzpatrick, he could state for the satisfaction of the right hon. gentleman, had commenced an action against the Attorney General, and laid his damages at 1,000l. He thought it would be much better for the right hon. gent. to let the subject rest till next session, when it would be in his power to bring it forward more temperately, with more pleasure to himself, and in a way more satisfactory to the House. He thought the conduct of the Irish government in directing the prosecution perfectly correct, and that it was not for them to wait for instructions from England, in a case where charges were preferred, which, if proved to be true, would render the judges liable to be cashiered, and subject the lord lieutenant to an impeachment, and he was sure the right hon. gentleman himself would have been the first to impeach the Irish government had they neglected their duty in this instance.

disagreed in every point with the right hon. gentleman who last spoke. He thought that important advantages would result from a parliamentary investigation of this question. The summons of which such well grounded complaint was made, was, he feared, only a prelude to farther acts of hostility against the Catholics, and recollecting what had been the conduct of the Irish government during the last, and apprehending what it might be during the present summer, he felt that it was the bounden duty of the House, to insist upon the production of this document. He paid a high compliment to Mr. Saurin, and acquitted the duke of Richmond of any cognizance of, or concurrence in this transaction, since his grace had ever shewn an anxious desire to conciliate Catholics and Protestants, excepting in the injudicious issue of the proclamation of last summer. Allowing for the sake of argument, that the passage complained of was a libel, still it appeared to him, that the prosecution of Mr. Fitzpatrick was a very impolitic step; its only object was to re-kindle flames, which it was hoped were smothered; the disposition of government was by this act unmasked; the members of it shewed themselves in their hearts hostile to the Catholics, and he did not wonder that they were eager to put an end to the publication of works, the arguments of which were so incontrovertible, that if read, it proved them to be guided in their conduct to Ireland solely by ignoranee, and its blind companion, bigotry: that they were bigoted, the experience of past years could shew: that they were ignorant was proved from the declaration of one of the judges of the land, who declared that the whole penal code, as applied to the Catholics, could be regulated and arranged in a few hours, or perhaps a day. The summons was indeed an ill-omen, and portended nothing to Ireland but disturbance, persecution and misery.

It had been falsely reported the Protestants of England were against the Catholic emancipation. However, this assertion might be attempted to be supported, there was proof before the House, that there was not a Protestant in Ireland who was of that opinion; and, however a misguided government might act so unwisely, as to inflame the minds of the people of this country against those claims, he should not think it fair in him to conceal from the House and from the public, what was firmly impressed on his mind,—that those claims must be granted, though every Protestant in this kingdom were against them! He was decidedly of opinion, that if the House suffered the government of Ireland to go on as they had begun, all the advantage expected to result from the late vote of the House of Commons in relation to Ireland, would be lost.

said, that the hon. gentleman who spoke last should not provoke him to go into a discussion wholly foreign to the subject, though it was introduced as if the vote on this motion was not only to decide on the merits of the book which was the subject of prosecution, but also to decide the Catholic question; and he must protest against the practice of clothing every subject, no matter what it was, in Catholic argument. The hon. gentleman had enlarged on the ability and capacity displayed in the work in question, and appeared to think, that libellous matter was to be justified in a work in consideration of any useful information which it might contain.—The hon. gentleman, however, had made one admission, which afforded an answer to the greater part of what he had urged. He acknowledged that the government of the duke of Richmond had been marked by a system of conciliation, and that with the exception of the proceedings on the Convention Bill, he could not charge that government with a single act not honourable or conciliatory. It might therefore be fairly concluded, on the admission of the hon. gentleman, that this last transaction was not marked by a different character from the general tenour of the conduct of the present government of Ireland. In order to bring back the House to the particular question before them (though he despaired of succeeding in bringing back the hon. gentleman to the subject, for all questions whether foreign or domestic, whether they related to the Orders in Council or to peace or war, were made Catholic by him) he must remind them they were to pronounce upon a dry and single fact, unconnected with the Catholics, namely, whether the publisher of that libel should be prosecuted or not? He protested against including the Catholics in this consideration. If the hon. gentleman chose so to include them, he (Mr. F.) protested against it. Nothing could be so likely to injure the Catholic cause (to which it was known that he was friendly) than to identify that cause with a publication which accused the lord lieutenant and the government of Ireland of having hung an innocent man, knowing that he was innocent.

The Attorney General of Ireland had taken the steps which to him appeared to be legal, and he was sure the hon. gentleman would not impute to Mr. Saurin any disposition to fish out from any one that which it would be improper in him to disclose. How it could be deemed guilty in the Attorney General to endeavour to discover the author of the libel, he confessed himself to be at a loss to discover. What could there be of culpability in attempting to avert from the publisher—a man comparatively innocent—the expence and inconveniences of a legal prosecution, by detecting the real criminal? He perfectly concurred with his right hon. friend in his reasons for resisting the motion. He resisted it, because it had not been placed on the only grounds on which he could be brought to accede to it. It was not proved that there had been any interference with the impartial administration of justice; that there had been any oppression exercised towards any individual; or that the government of Ireland had been guilty of any arbitrary or despotic act which called for the interposition of parliament. To agree to the motion would be to prejudge the trials pendente lite, and he must therefore vote against it.

considered the proceeding of the Irish Attorney General as an assumption of power wholly unconstitutional and inconsistent with established legal practice. The hon. gentleman who spoke last had given his hon. friend a lecture for departing from the question, but he appeared to have been guilty of that error himself in a much greater degree. The question before the House was, whether a certain paper issued by the Attorney General of Ireland, and purporting to be a summons, was justifiable or not? The right hon. gentleman who spoke second in the debate, had given a powerful reason for not acceding to the motion, by saying, that he did not know whether it was usual to adopt such a mode of proceeding—

begged to set the hon. baronet right. He did not say that the practice was unusual, but he said that he did not know whether the summonses were worded in the same manner, although they were in substance the same.

resumed. He would have explained his meaning to the satisfaction of the right hon. gentleman if he had waited a little longer. He understood that it was the form of the summons which was complained of, though it appeared that the attendance was not compellable, and that no hardship had really been felt in the present case, yet it was quite sufficient that the power was capable of abuse, and the House ought to conclude that it would be abused, without considering the character of any particular person, which had nothing to do with the subject. But what he principally rose to remark, was, that the two gentlemen who had spoken on the opposite side, objected to any discussion pendente lite. There was nothing of the kind in the case; for the question was merely whether the notice was legal or not? Besides, it was rather extraordinary, that while those hon. members objected to any discussion on the plea of prejudging the case, they had themselves prejudged it most openly, by calling the work in question a gross and scandalous libel. This appeared a little inconsistent in his opinion. They had exhibited great delicacy towards the Attorney General, but none towards the printer, stating it as a fact settled and agreed upon on all hands, that, the work was a gross and scandalous libel. Was this fair? With respect to the power assumed by the Attorney General in this summons, if he chose so to bring before him a poor and ignorant person, and to question him under the impression of alarm, which such an individual must naturally feel, such an assumption could not be contemplated without indignation. "But," it had been asked, "will you allow such things to be published with impunity?" He would allow the press to be free. If the facts alleged should turn out to be true, how much did the country owe to the press, through which they were promulgated? How would filing a criminal information against the publisher, exculpate the government of Ireland? The government might certainly punish a man for publishing what they did not like should be published, but this would not acquit them. Did the hon. gentleman opposite imagine, that if Mr. Fitzpatrick were convicted, there would be a single man in Ireland less of those, who believed that the circumstances which he had stated were founded in truth? But for his part, he had a strong prepossession that this would not be the case, but that Mr. Fitzpatrick would prove his assertions; for he had put the affair into the course that must soon bring it to the test. Not having heard a single reason advanced for refusing the paper, he should certainly vote for its production.

reprobated any thing like party spirit in discussions like the present. He had himself found the advantage of a conciliatory spirit when he had a point of importance to carry. Among other instances, it had so happened, that by not taking up in a hostile party spirit the question respecting the Commissioners of Prisons in Ireland, but by consulting the Irish government on the subject, he had been the humble instrument of doing much good, and averting much evil. The right hon. gentleman opposite had advised him to postpone the present question, and had told him that he would return to it more temperately next session. He would not be so presumptuous as to compare his character for temper with that of the right hon. gentleman, but really he could not allow that the right hon. gentleman himself was accustomed to conduct himself with a total absence of all honest heat; especially on subjects connected with Ireland. The right hon. gentleman had said, that he would give him "the satisfaction" of knowing that Mr. Fitzpatrick had commenced a suit against Mr. Saurin. Now, if it was "a satisfaction" to know this, it was one which he had experienced at least 20 days ago. But he denied that it was any satisfaction to him. He deeply regretted to see such crimination and recrimination and irritation during that period which the Secretary of State here had promised should be spent in conciliation. "But," said the right hon. gentleman, "will you, pendente lite, stir this business?" What had the motion before the House to do with the trial of the libel? It was wholly unconnected with it. It related to the nature of the summons. The right hon. gentleman however had no hesitation, pendente lite, to pick a paragraph out of the publication, and to pro- nounce it the most atrocious libel that ever was written! Whether it was so or not depended upon whether the assertion which it contained was a fact or not. For if the man executed was innocent, if that innocence had been represented to the Irish government, and if mercy had nevertheless been sued for in vain, then was the publication no libel. But now the publisher was to go to his trial with the heavy weight of an unconditional declaration made by the minister for Ireland in the House of Commons, that he had been guilty of a most base and mischievous libel. But, it seemed, this publication had been extensively circulated. That, it appeared, was the crime of the publisher. His hostility to the conduct pursued by the English and Irish government with respect to the Catholics had rendered his work popular, and had circulated it extensively, and therefore he was a fit subject for prosecution! But, he would repeat, what had his motion to do with either of the suits which had been instituted? Whether Mr. Fitzpatrick was guilty or not had nothing to do with his argument. If Mr. Fitzpatrick were convicted, how could that affect the question, as to the power assumed by the Attorney General of sending for a man to catechize him in his own apartment? Would that conviction alter the legality or illegality of the Attorney General's conduct? He was glad to see the Attorney General of England in his place. He should like to know whether he would even accept of such power as that which had been assumed by the Irish Attorney General, had he been in that learned gentleman's room? Would he have attempted to call before him in his own parlour any poor, wretched, uninformed creature who might have been the publisher of a work containing some supposed libellous passages, in order to induce him to give up the author? He was sure that the right hon. and learned gentleman would not have done so. He was sure that he would have scorned such a proceeding. Supposing a justice of peace were to drag a man to prison without a previous deposition on oath, and on the way were to call him a rogue and a scoundrel; and supposing the man brought an action against the justice for these words as libellous, would he or any other member of the House be precluded pendente lite, from calling for the reason why the justice dared take the man to prison without a previous deposition on oath? The right hon. gentleman appeared to consider the notice as a kind of courtesy. If so, was it impartially exhibited? Did the Attorney General of Ireland manifest this courtesy to Mr. Walter Cock? He was sure not. Even on the ground of its being a courtesy he objected to it, as not a courtesy impartially administered. The right hon. gentleman had said, that he (Mr. S.) would have been the first man to impeach the Irish government if they had not ordered the prosecution of this libel. He really did not know what he had done in the course of his public life to make the right hon. gentleman suppose he was so fond of accusation or impeachment. The right hon. gentleman talked of "the government" of Ireland having directed this prosecution. Whom did he include in that term? Not he hoped the chancellor. Not he hoped the judges before whom the case might come to be tried and determined. Much had been said of the impropriety that there would have been in waiting for instructions from England before the institution of the proceeding. Why, who expected that? All that he had expected when he questioned the noble lord on the subject was, that the Irish government might have made some communication to the English government; and that the latter might therefore know something of the matter. He repeated his surprise and regret after the declaration of the noble lord, that the summer should be spent in conciliation, to find a prosecution instituted bearing such a vindictive character, and distinguished by such a new and illegal proceeding in its very commencement. He should take the sense of the House on his motion.

apologised for saying a few words after the reply of the right hon. gentleman. It was perfectly true that when the right hon. gentleman put a question to him on the subject recently, he knew nothing of what had occurred. The step however taken by his grace the duke of Richmond and the government of Ireland had the entire approbation of the government on this side of the water. It did not appear to him to cast the slightest reflection on the Catholic body to call for the investigation in a court of justice of a statement which if false was most libellous; and if true, reflected deeply on the whole character of the justice of the country. Every one must feel, that to pass by such a charge without notice, would be to acquiesce in it. It was but a due measure of precaution, that it ought not to be allowed to remain uncontradicted against the government of Ireland.

maintained, that the prosecution which had been instituted was an attack on the Catholics, and defended the publication alluded to. He denied that the notice of the Attorney-General bore upon the face of it the character of courtesy attributed it. The publication accused government of having murdered a Catholic. The two causes would come before a Protestant jury, although if the Irish government had any sense of justice they would impannel a fair and impartial jury out of the great body of the country, and not composed of Protestants alone.

could not conceive how a prosecution against a man charging the Irish government with the murder of a Catholic was an attack on the Catholic body. He believed that the summons was considered a matter of courtesy. As to the intimation that there was any disposition to pack a jury on the occasion, the hon. gentleman had exceeded even the ordinary licence of parliamentary discussion in advancing such a supposition.

thought, that the intimation which the summons contained might be of service to the subject. If it were compulsory he should object to it; but as it was not so, it was in his opinion desirable to introduce the practice in this country rather than to reprobate it in Ireland.

said, that he had been in some doubt whether he would put the House to the trouble of dividing, but the observation of the hon. gentleman who spoke last, and who seemed so eager for the introduction of similar measures in this country, had put an end to his reluctance, and he should there feel it necessary to take the sense of the House.

The gallery was then cleared for a division, when the numbers were

For the motion

23

Against it

67

Majority against it

—44

Overture for Peace From France

was apprehensive the House were already tired of him. However, he did not think it would be necessary to preface with many observations the proposition which in consonance to his notice he was about to make, as he understood that it would be acceded to by the gentlemen opposite. But, undoubtedly, considerable interest had been excited in the mind of the House by the intimation which they had last night received, that his hon. friend on his right hand, (Mr. Whitbread,) had hurried to town for the express purpose of declaring, that he conceived ministers to be entirely wrong, and that the late overture from the French government was the best opportunity that could possibly have been afforded, for entering into a negociation for peace. That the motives of his hon. friend were excellent, no one could doubt; his hon. friend had an unquestionable right to express whatever opinions he conscientiously held on this great question; but he confessed that he waited with considerable curiosity to hear how his hon. friend would attempt to establish his proposition. In the mean time he certainly felt great timidity. He experienced the sensation of a partridge or a pheasant, with a hawk hovering over him—for he very well knew his hon. friend's power, and he had therefore no little reason to dread the vengeance of his beak. But undoubtedly he must hear some very strong arguments to the contrary, before he could be convinced that the late offer of negociation from France did not deserve the character which he had given to it on a recent occasion; that it did not deserve to be called perfidious, insidious, and insulting. Perfidious, because it called upon us to be guilty of the grossest perfidy to our allies; insidious, because it was evidently written with the conviction, that the proposal which it contained could not be accepted, and was not meant as a bona-fide offer to us; for he exonerated the policy of the emperor or ruler of France (he cared not which he was called, and considered any dispute on that point as a matter of silly etiquette) from the imputation of holding our understandings in such contempt, as to imagine we should be induced to believe for a moment that the French government thought or meant that their overture should really be acceded to by the British. Insulting, because it affected, on certain flimsy pretences, to induce the British government to depart from the most sacred and honourable engagements, and to abandon her characteristic faith with her allies. To the reply of our government the ruler of France returned no answer. Some people were surprised at this. It by no means surprised him. Buonaparté never cared for any answer to his original proposition. The fact was, that when that proposition was made, he was in the heat of a negocia- tion with the Russian government, and feeling that the negociation was not going on so successfully as he could wish, he sent to Great Britain the overture which we had received, hoping that an impression favourable to his views might be made on the Russian cabinet, when they should find that to obtain peace with England he was willing not to push the boundary of his dominions beyond the Pyrenees, to guarantee the independence of Sicily, &c. but certainly not entertaining the insulting expectation that this stratagem could deceive the British government. In cases of this kind it was always important to look at dates. The French proposition was dated April 17; it was promptly replied to by the noble lord on the 23rd. By some mistake, however, the flag of truce in which our answer was conveyed, was fired at from Calais, and was obliged to proceed to Morlaix. This very much delayed the arrival of the British dispatch, and before it reached Paris the dispatches of the French government, which were dated the 25th of April, went off to Russia. Who then could be surprised that no answer was made to the noble lord's communication? He was persuaded that Napoleon would laugh at those who thought he seriously meant to carry on a negociation for peace with Great Britain. If we could penetrate into his thoughts, we should find the course of them running thus:—"I will send to the Russian cabinet to terrify them with the prospect of my concerting a peace with England entirely disadvantageous to Russia. I am compelled to go to go to war with Russia, and for the purpose of intimidating that power, I will desire the acquiescence of Great Britain in a pretended negociation for peace. I want 150,000 men out of Spain. I will tell England that I wish she would release them by withdrawing her troops, in order that I may use them in my designs against Russia. The answer of England will be, 'What is your quarrel with Russia?'—I reply, because she inexorably refuses to assist me in destroying that maritime strength, and those maritime principles on which alone your existence as a great nation depends. Because Russia will not join with me in destroying the sinews of your power, I make war upon Russia; I ask you, England, to lend me your assistance; and when I have achieved my object, I will come back to Spain, and shall be very much obliged to you." For his part, he could see no proper answer to a proposi- tion which veiled such intentions as these, but precisely that which the noble lord had given. To the proposition that the present dynasty in Spain should be declared independent, no other answer could be returned than that to accede to it would be inconsistent with the obligations of good faith on the part of Great Britain towards her allies. It was whimsical to hear the French minister, in his note of the 25th April to count Romanzow, the Russian chancellor, tell him that the emperor, "constrained to abandon every hope from Russia, before he commenced the contest in which so much blood must be shed, felt it to be his duty to address himself to the English government; and that the distress felt by England, the agitations which preyed on her, and the changes which had taken place in her government, had induced his majesty to take this course." Any one who could really suppose that the French emperor saw the state of our trade, and our agitation, as he termed it, with any thing like affection, or a wish to relieve us, must be more than ordinarily credulous. He gave credit to him (the emperor of the French) for not expecting that such credulity would be shewn by the British government. Indeed the noble lord might very well have replied to his majesty the emperor in these laconic and emphatic words, "Do you think me fool enough to believe you?"—If ever there was a time at which Great Britain might and ought to make a grand struggle, it was the present, when the enemy affected good will towards the country, and pity for its agitated state. Nothing but the Bill which had recently passed through the House could countenance the supposition that there was any thing like disloyalty or disaffection in the country; but notwithstanding that Bill, and notwithstanding the commercial and manufacturing distresses which really existed, he firmly believed that if the point at issue were the degradation of Great Britain by submission to France, there was not an Englishman who would not perish rather than consent to it. He was most happy to hear his hon. friend express himself lately in such strong terms against the conclusion of a dishonourable peace. He was sure that his hon. friend would act up to his professions. But did he recollect that to commence a dishonourable negociation was little less reprehensible than to conclude a dishonourable peace? Was it possible that his hon. friend could be blind to the sole object of Napoleon? Did his hon. friend think that the affairs of the peninsula, or of Sweden, or of Sicily, or any other comparatively minor consideration, prompted his policy and governed his actions? Was it not manifest that a long grudge was seated in his heart; for the gratification of which he alone lived; and that the real object of his ambition was to destroy the maritime superiority of England? Did he even conceal this object? By no means. He had repeatedly avowed it; he had made it the basis of his treaties with other countries. In his proposition to us, was there any expression of a contrite resolution on his part, to abate his hostility to those just rights which we inherited from our brave ancestors, and which it was to be hoped we should leave unimpaired to our posterity? They were rights which the enemy could not wrest from us by war. He (Mr. S) trusted that we should not be wheedled out of them by negociation. The acquisition of them, however, was Napoleon's sole object. With regard to those undeniable rights, he should like to ask if any other nation in Europe, had it possessed them, would have used them with equal moderation? Would the great emperor himself, had he the power at sea which England possessed, use it with equal moderation? It was a libel false as hell to say that Great Britain ever foully availed herself of her maritime superiority. "If there be those," continued Mr. S. "who think that any portion of these rights might be advantageously surrendered, I tell them that I for one, (and I am sure that I am only echoing the sentiments of the House), would rather scuttle this island of England, and allow it to be overwhelmed by the surrounding ocean, than I would surrender one iota of that charter which has appended to it the seal of nature herself; and which—I speak it with reverence—enjoys the guarantee of Providence, manifested in the high glory and prosperity of this renowned nation." To this point alone, however, were all Napoleon's efforts directed. He was at war with Russia for no other cause than that she would not cordially join with him in attempting the destruction of the British empire. Under these circumstances he felt himself imperiously called upon to applaud the conduct of the British government, in refusing to enter into the discussion of propositions which were evidently made with no other view than to have an effect on the politics of the cabinet of St. Petersburgh. Into the details of those propositions he would not enter. It would be time enough for him to do that after he should have heard the observations of his hon. friend, and after the documents should be laid on the table. At present he would content himself with repeating his conviction, that of all the insidious propositions ever made by one country to another, the late overture from the enemy was the most so; and that the worst consequences must have ensued, had any disposition been evinced on the part of the British government to entertain an offer so hollow and insincere. He concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, praying that he will be graciously pleased to order the proper officers to lay before the House copies of all correspondence or communications between the duke of Bassano, and the right hon. lord viscount Castlereagh, in the month of April last, or at any time subsequent thereto."

seconded the motion. He observed that if any person had entered the House immediately after the commencement of his right hon. friend's speech, he must have imagined that his right hon. friend was replying to some preceding speech of his—that he was answering opinions and sentiments degrading to the character of an Englishman, and incompatible with the honour and the rights of his country—that he was attacking one who had denied the validity of those maritime rights of which his right hon. friend had professed himself to be so fond, and which he declared he should wish to see nailed to the mast and sinking with the vessel—and, in fine, that he was repelling the assertions of a man who wished to lay Great Britain prostrate at the feet of France. All this, however, was the mere work of his right hon. friend's imagination.—Not a word of private communication, either verbal or written, had he had with his right hon. friend, from which his wishes or intentions, with respect to the motion before the House, could possibly have been collected; and he did not see, therefore, why an opportunity should be afforded of imputing to him opinions which he never entertained. He well knew that expressions, which he had never used, were already assigned to him in the reports, for the accuracy of which he was not accountable; but he defied any person to prove that he maintained opinions unworthy of an Englishman, or that be manifested any inclination to depart from that just assertion of his country's rights to which every man was bound. His right hon. friend had compared him to a hawk, ready to pounce on a harmless partridge or pheasant. He left it to the House to decide how applicable was the illustration. It was not for him to say how unlike his right hon. friend was to the timid innocence of the poor bird, or how he himself differed from the other part of the comparison. Of this he was certain, that if the opinions just expressed by his right hon. friend prevailed—if the House gave way to the eloquence with which they were urged—if the public at large adopted them, there must be interminable war between England and France; it would be impossible to make peace, it would be impossible even to treat for peace between the two countries as long as Buonaparté lived. His right hon. friend had said, that Buonaparté's object was the destruction of the rights of England. Admitted. Was not our object the destruction of the French government? What did we make war upon France for but for this, even before Buonaparté was born? Had not that been the object of our wars for the last century? Was it ever forgotten by the overweening ambition of England? Buonaparté, no doubt, was solicitous to overthrow the commerce and rights of England; but when countries went to war, such wishes were always reciprocal. His right hon. friend would fain persuade the House that, in the duke of Bassano's letter, there was actually some stipulation against what he called the maritime rights of England; but there was no such thing—there was not one word disrespectful to those rights, or derogatory from the pretensions of England. But he would ask his right hon. friend, and he would ask the civilians of that House, whether, with regard to maritime rights, there was one sort of justice for England, and another sort for the rest of the world? Were Englishmen to have one code of national law, and all the rest of the world another? When his right hon. friend maintained, that England had been wholly blameless in the exercise of her maritime power, and that she had never rendered it oppressive to other countries, he should like to ask his right hon. friend whether, even with respect to Spain, we had never used those rights oppressively? Did his right hon. friend already forget the seizure of the Spanish frigates? Did he forget the unjustifiable aggression which we then made on Spain? Did his right hon. friend also forget Copenhagen? Would his right hon. friend argue, that the stain of that horrible atrocity could ever be obliterated from the annals of Great Britain—or did he forget that it had been stigmatized even by his own powerful eloquence? Nor did the point in dispute between Russia and France concern the maritime rights of England. Russia had refused to continue the negociation unless France should previously evacuate Prussia. He was not the defender of the political immorality of France, any more than of that of any other country; but he contended, that the present was not the time to inflame the people of England by diffusing political errors—by nourishing a feeling of false honour—a feeling inconsistent with the real interests or the true policy of the country. But when he looked at the situation of the continental armies at the moment that such a boast was made about political virtue by his right hon. friend; when he saw that Poland was the scene of battle, it was impossible but that the recollections which that name awakened, must rouse every indignant feeling, and afford sufficient proof that all political iniquity was not confined to France.—It certainly did appear to him, that the late occasion was one, in which an attempt at negociation might have, been made with greater probability of success than at any former period. He knew he had always been considered as an enthusiast on the subject of peace; and he undoubtedly did recollect many instances in which there was just reason to think a fair opening appeared for negociation. It must be in the memory of the House, that at the commencement of the war in Spain, he had regarded that as a favourable moment when this government ought to have sent a minister to Buonaparté at Bayonne. When too, after four years of unsuccessful war on the part of France, Spain remained unsubdued, and France became encumbered by a contest with Austria, he thought that was another opportunity which ought not to have been lost, of attempting to negociate with Buonaparté. At the present moment also, when the emperor of France was distracted with a northern war, when he was disappointed in his reliance upon the person whom he had established as the eventual heir to the crown of Sweden, when he was beset with difficulties at home (similar to those which disturbed our own country) he did think that this was a most favourable concurrence of circumstances, and that it would have been prudent in ministers had they even advised the Prince Regent to send a direct proposition to France for the purpose of opening a negociation on the basis of good faith and sincerity. His opinion on the recent rejection of the overture from France was therefore evident. The flag of truce which returned with the answer of this country was indeed fired upon, but it was by mistake, and an anxiety was shown to apologise for it, there having been two messengers sent over for that purpose. He had learned at the time the nature of the correspondence, and it had since appeared in the public prints. He then thought, and he continued to think, that it was highly imprudent in the noble lord to return the answer which he did return. In saying this he begged to be understood as the last man who would submit to any thing derogatory from the national honour. But his right hon. friend would recollect, that had there been a single alteration in the terms proposed as they affected the person who was to be the monarch of Spain—had there been any opening left on that point—it was understood that the negociations would have commenced. The rest of the proposals it was acknowledged were such as deserved attention. But, his right hon. friend had told the House, that the sentence to which he had alluded was perfidious, that it was intended to ensnare us into a dishonourable discussion, that it was to entrap us into withdrawing our army from Spain, and that the emperor of France, having induced us to withdraw our army from Spain, would proceed in his efforts against Russia, and having vanquished her, would tell us that he was very much obliged to us, and would return to achieve the subjugation of the peninsula. Why, if this were the delusive design of the French ruler, he had gone very clumsily about it. He had conceded all the other objects for which Great Britain had gone to war, and for which the war was continued. The independence of Sicily was to be guaranteed. It was to be left to its own king. He recollected that a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning) in a former intercourse between the two countries, laid great stress on the kingdom of Naples being left to Murat, on the ground that by some secret convention Sicily would be included under the denomination of the kingdom of Naples. In the negociation of 1806 the independence of that island was deemed to be of so much consequence that it was pronounced a sine qua non by the British government. In the late overture however, Sicily was distinctly guaranteed to its own king. Malta too, for which we were expressly at war, was also relinquished. Sweden it must be considered was in the hands of a person, who though bred up in the school of Buonaparté, and raised by his influence to be heir to the Swedish throne, did not appear disposed to obey his mandates, but was likely to become much more formidable in co-operating with us to set bounds to the ambition of France than any preceding monarch of that country. Other objects were also conceded. The East Indies were to be all our own; and the West Indies also, with the exception of such colonies as we might choose to give up. Spain and Portugal were declared independent, and the armies of both England and France were to be withdrawn from those countries, under the understanding that the new dynasty found in Spain was to be recognized by England. His right hon. friend had intimated that he (Mr. Whitbread) was willing to proceed to a negociation even on that basis. He was willing to do no such thing. But there was a wide difference in his opinion between negociating upon that basis, and not negotiating at all. Were ministers prepared to proceed to any negociation? If not—if it was their determination to wage incessant war while Buonaparté continued the ruler of France, let them declare it in the face of Europe, let them shut the British ports to every flag of truce, and refuse every overture that might lead to peace. But if this was not their object—if they wished on the contrary to give repose to this harassed country and to the world—if they did intend at any time to proceed candidly in the business of peace, there must be some terms in their own minds upon which they would be willing as a basis to treat for peace. Now, looking to the recent offers on the part of France, what was the fair inference deducible from them? The emperor of France had conceded all the points which had been the subject of former negociations, he had left an opening for further discussion on points on which difference of opinion might exist; and was the conclusion just, that the whole was intended for delusion? Was it not rather to be inferred, that, finding himself pressed on all sides, unsuccessful in Spain, about to plunge into a war with Russia, and harassed by domestic difficulties, the emperor of France came forward at such a crisis and made proposals to this country in the real spirit of sincerity? Indeed, it was his firm opinion, that France had always been sincere in her overtures for peace. He knew that this was very unpopular doctrine in that House, he feared that it was unpopular doctrine in the country; but such was his decided opinion, and he would never hesitate to declare it. The answer he could have wished to have been returned to the overture was this: "Upon such and such terms which you have proposed as a basis for negociation, we are willing to treat; one however excepted, to which we cannot assent; the question with regard to the dynasty of Spain. We do not however ask you to recognize Ferdinand the 7th, any more than we will consent to acknowledge the dynasty which yea wish to found; but we ask that the existing authorities in Spain shall be parties to the negociation." Had such been our answer, and had the French government remained silent (as now), or returned a direct refusal, England would then have been completely justified in the eyes of reason, of justice, and of God. Thus far we were bound by the treaty concluded in 1809, with the Spanish authorities in the name of Ferdinand; for whatever might have been his sentiments with respect to that treaty, the deed was done, and it would be dishonourable to retract. But looking at the proposition in another point of view, he saw nothing that justified the jealous precaution of ministers. It was to be agreed that both nations should withdraw their armies from Spain. What then would have been the necessary consequence? Why, that king Joseph must have left Spain very soon after the French army, if indeed he had not found it prudent to retire in the midst of it. If the enthusiasm of the Spaniards in defence of their liberty were as great as it had been represented to be, (and he believed that the lower orders in particular had done wonders) if they were really attached to Ferdinand the 7th, or more properly speaking to his phantom, then it would be impossible to drive him from their hearts, and the retreat of the French must have been followed by the total abolition of the new dynasty. That part of the proposition therefore appeared so clearly tantamount to an actual renunciation of the views of Buonaparté with regard to Spain, that he saw nothing in it which could justly excite the jealousy of government. Thus he had shown all that he would have had ministers do; he had shown all the degradation and all the humiliation to which he wished this country reduced. Where then was the absurdity which the right hon. gent. seemed to anticipate from him when he laid down the proposition, that the Spaniards must be admitted to the negociation? The ruler of France had formerly treated the Spanish authorities as insurgents, as rebels against legitimate authority, and as not admissible to any negociations. Now he had consented to guarantee the integrity of Spain, to withdraw his troops, and in fact to allow the Spaniards the free election of their king. The war had now lasted so long, that members of that House who witnessed its commencement had grown old during its continuance. For his part he knew not why it was commenced, he knew not why it had been recommenced by the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and he knew not why a negociation for its termination should not now be entered into. As to the violent hatred against this country which his right hon. friend ascribed to Napoleon, no one would deny, that it could not be stronger than ours against him. As it happened in the case of Louis 14th, otherwise le grand Monargue, every person in this country seemed lately to have a sort of personal quarrel with Buonaparté, and to regard him as a personal enemy. To feed this national enmity the war had been carried on. It was nevertheless but a very unsatisfactory feeling to cherish in a nation, and had better be repressed, as leading to interminable warfare. No one would deny that Great Britain had made the greatest efforts against France, by leagues, by subsidies, and by the direct assistance of her arms. No one would deny that continental powers, when beaten in the field, had made treaties with Buonaparté, which, through our instigation, they intended to break at the very moment that they concluded them. If therefore, we persisted in this course,—if we placed ourselves in this position of irreconcilable hostility, and if our object was avowedly the destruction of the French ruler, then of necessity his object must be our destruction. A century had now elapsed since the treaty of Utrecht. Some time before its conclusion, Louis 14th was so humbled by the blows which the power of France had received, that his situation was almost pitiable. After a series of disasters, he was thrown at the feet of the deputies of Holland, who abused their success by trampling upon the proposals of this once mighty monarch who had threatened their existence. They thus drove him to an extremity, and by a change of measures in this country, and by the efforts produced by despair, Louis ultimately obtained the object which had cost the allies so much blood and treasure: he retained most of his conquests, and the family of the Bourbons was established on the throne of Spain, and even on that of Naples and Sicily. Examples of that sort ought to teach us the lesson of embracing proposals that had the appearance of fairness, for by aiming at too much we might lose every thing. His right hon. friend had talked of the refusal on the part of France, to evacuate Prussia, as a justifiable ground of war on the part of Russia. But it ought to be recollected, that Prussia was in effect a conquered country. And why was she so? Because, unmindful of her weakness, she had madly plunged into a war with Buonaparté, when he, in the negociations for peace with this country, proposed to take Hanover from Prussia, and restore it to the British dominions, in compliment to the British sovereign. Prussia refused to relinquish Hanover, and commenced a war which speedily ended in her irretrievable ruin. Had Buonaparté, in his recent overture, held out the offer of the restoration of Hanover, he (Mr. W.) should then have agreed with his right hon. friend, in considering the proposal wily and insidious; because it was a thing so highly insisted on formerly, and which would be so flattering to the crown of this country; although he conceived, that under the existing circumstances of Europe, such a restoration would be a most unfortunate occurrence. Taking another view of the late events, he would be glad to ask ministers how it happened, when they returned such a direct negative to all negociation, that they were so unprepared to avail themselves of the state of things in the north of Europe? His right hon. friend seemed to think, that we were indebted to Russia for her conduct,—nay, that she was even favourably disposed to our naval superiority and our maritime rights. In his opinion, however, Russia had acted from no feelings of friendship towards us. To her we owed no thanks. It was from the pressure of her own necessities alone, that she insisted on a commerce which was incidentally beneficial to us. His right hon. friend must have forgotten all history, if he thought that Russia wished to see our maritime power permanently established. Its preponderance was perhaps naturally an eyesore to all nations who had ships upon the seas, and the armed neutrality, of which Russia was the soul, could not be forgotten. It was an observation of the late Mr. Perceval's, that the enemy had converted commerce itself into a sword against this country.—Ministers, however, seemed to have been unprepared for the rupture between Russia and France. Lord Cathcart was now about to set out as ambassador to the Russian court, but, not being quite so sanguine as some hon. gentlemen, he (Mr. W.) should not be surprised if Buonaparté arrived at Peters-burgh before his lordship. And what was to be gained by the contest? What was the situation of the Russian finances? Was it to be again proposed that money should be drained from our pockets? Was the vote of credit to be expended in subsidizing Sweden and Russia? Judging from the experience of the past, were subsidies likely to effect any thing towards the attainment of a permanent peace? He would rather the country should perish than submit to any thing dishonourable; but let it not perish—let it not become the scene of internal convulsion, from, a false notion of honour. What too was our situation with regard to America at the moment when we refused to enter into this negociation with France? We had not at that moment revoked those measures which were hurrying us to destruction, and we were boldly maintaining that America could not—that in fact she dared not make war on us. Now, however, we had fatally found that she could make war on us, and that she had actually proclaimed war against us; and by the latest advices which had been received from that country, there was every reason to believe that the executive had added its sanction to the decision of the two houses of legislature. He sincerely hoped, however, that an actual rupture between the two countries would be avoided by the notification of the repeal of the Orders in Council. Some persons affected to think lightly of a war with America. He differed from them. He considered that it would be one of the greatest curses that could be inflicted on this country, and that in its consequences it would be much more prejudicial to us than to the Americans. He called upon our financiers to state how they would support such a war? He called upon them to state what would be the effect upon our finances of such a sudden check to the reviving manufactures and commerce of the country? Into what a scene were we plunging! A new coalition forming against France, and an obstinate refusal on our part to listen to every offer of accommodation!—He concluded by expressing his hope, that he had not advanced any of those absurd, extravagant, or contemptible propositions which his right hon. friend seemed to have anticipated from him, and that he had not recommended any thing derogatory from the character of the British nation. The motion was one of which he cordially approved; and he should himself have made it, had it not been made by his right hon. friend. He had no doubt that he should be misapprehended, as usual. For unpopularity he was prepared; but, whether his sentiments were popular or not, he experienced in having delivered them the satisfaction of feeling that he had done his duty.

observed, that it certainly was not his intention to oppose the motion, and that the speech of the right honourable gentleman who made it, was one that had considerably narrowed the discussion as far as related to himself. At the same time, some things which had fallen from the honourable member who spoke last, called for a reply; and he would put it to the House, whether it was not a violation of all sound reasoning, to consider the answer returned to the French government, as a direct negative upon all negociation; whether his Majesty's government were not bound to give the answer which they had given? and whether they would not have forfeited the good opinion, and incurred the contempt of Europe if, in proceeding to a negociation with the enemy, they had neglected to maintain good faith with their allies? He would say, that any other answer would have been a dereliction of duty. He was far from contending for the principle of interminable war, nor would he justify the proceedings of government upon any such principle; but at the same time, he thought they would study the lesson of the last twenty years to very little advantage, if they adopted the feelings of the honourable gentleman, who, so far from having any jealousy towards the French government, not only thought the present moment the most proper for negociation, but also contended, that every overture from France, during the last and present war, had been made with sincerity and good faith. He did not think any other man in the empire would affirm that proposition; and if the honourable member did really think so, he would say, that his mind must be practically disordered upon that particular topic. He (lord Castlereagh) thought there was something in the time of making the overture that seemed suspicious; for it had always been the policy of the French ruler to make propositions for peace to this country when he was about to place himself at the head of his armies for purposes of the most extensive conquest. The right hon. gentleman who made the motion had justly observed, that those propositions were seldom sincere, but that they were to be considered as one of the instruments in the shape of negociation to be turned against the enemy he was going to crush. The hon. gent. might have referred to a period when those with whom he himself usually acted were in the confidence of his Majesty. He might have stated that the earl of Lauderdale was sent to Paris to negociate; that Buonaparté was on the eve of his departure for Prussia; that he left the noble lord at Paris, headed his army, and the negociation terminated. If the hon. gentleman had referred to the period of the noble lord's journey to Paris, he might have obtained much illustration of the policy of opening negociations for peace with Buonaparté.

The hon. member had suggested the species of answer that ought to have been returned to the overture from France: but what was the answer that was returned? It merely required to know the meaning of the proposition; and that request was accompanied with the most distinct assurance, that if the basis proposed with regard to the Spanish dynasty was such as could be received by this country with due regard to its honour, we were perfectly ready to enter into explanations upon all the other topics, as preliminary steps towards pacification, anxious as the British government was for the general peace of Europe. We simply asked, do you mean the dynasty of Spain, as acknowledged by the Spanish nation, and as centered in the person of Ferdinand 7, or do you mean the dynasty attempted to be established in the person of king Joseph? Such was the nature of the reply, and what other reply, consistently with the dignity and good faith of the British government, could be returned? If the proposition was meant not to gain time, but to try the honour of the British nation, he would say that it was most insulting.

The government of Russia, he had no doubt, was inclined to peace; and although the honourable gentleman had assumed, that the war was occasioned by the demand on the part of Russia, that France should evacuate the Prussian territory, the real cause of the war undoubtedly was the numerous violations on the part of France of the treaty of Tilsit, and the conviction on the part of Russia, that it was the intention of France to heap every possible indignity on her, and to add encroachment on encroachment, and that as war at some time or other would be absolutely inevitable, it was better to fight them at the present time than after they should be less able. The honourable gentleman seemed to possess that confidence in the possibility of a peace at present, which had never once quitted him. In his (lord C.'s) opinion, nothing had a greater tendency to unhinge the country, and to paralyze its efforts, than all unwise attempts at peace at a period when no rational hope could be entertained of the realization of such an event. When the British government, however, was asked the question, he trusted the answer was such as shewed no aversion or unwillingness on the part of that government to enter upon discussions relative to peace. No person could possibly view that answer in the light of an insult; there was not one expression in it calculated to discourage the emperor of France from entering frankly on the discussion if he wished it. But when he shewed that he was not even prepared to disavow that part of his proposal relative to the appointment of Joseph Buonaparté to the throne of Spain; they were entitled to conclude that he considered this a sine qua non in any discussion. The matter was not left open to discussion; no person would pretend that it was. Now the hon. gentleman himself had said, that he would not recommend peace with France on such a sine qua non; and he contended, therefore, with perfect fairness, that he was entitled to the support of that hon. gentleman that night on the line, of policy adopted by the British government. The honourable gentleman had said, if the French were to withdraw their army from the peninsula, Joseph would no longer be king. He admitted it. But did it never occur to that hon. gent., that Buonaparté might not withdraw his forces from the peninsula? He never, in fact, could withdraw his armies from that quarter. By the line of conduct recommended by the hon. gent. we should have paralyzed all the exertions of our army, and lost all the advantages which they had gained for us; it would be attended, in short, by every possible disadvantage, and no one advantage. The efforts of Russia at that critical moment would have been paralyzed. It would have been easy for any one of his counsellors, if so disposed, then to hold this language to the emperor of Russia. "See, now Great Britain has withdrawn from the contest—there is no alternative. You must now crouch to Buonaparté—you must get the best terms with the great emperor that you possibly can." He would not enter upon the conduct of this country in former negociations; but he was convinced that a more disastrous proposition could not be imagined than any attempt towards negociating at present; and he was also persuaded, that the country from one end to the other was persuaded that peace could not be obtained on terms which it was possible for the country to accept, and that the only effect which any discussion upon the subject could at present have, would be to paralyze its exertions. He certainly did not mean to say, that the present ministry were resolved to wage an interminable war with the emperor of the French; but he thought they ought not to possess the confidence of the country if they did not, from a consideration of the nature and organization of his power, and the councils on which he acted, consider every overture which he might think proper to make to this country, with the utmost distrust. He repeated that he had no objection to the production of the papers moved for.

commenced by repeating the last observation of the noble viscount (Castlereagh), "that the evincing a disposition on the part of his Majesty's ministers to treat for peace at such a crisis, would be above all things objectionable, as the withdrawing the British troops from the peninsula would doubtless be degrading to the character and reputation of this country, and at the same time that such conduct could not but have the effect at this critical moment, of chilling the exertions of Russia." He (Mr. H.) expressed a sanguine hope that the noble lord did not mean to insinuate that any encouragement had been held out by this country to Russia, to recommence hostilities against France.

They must be greatly ignorant indeed of the real danger to which Russia was exposed, if they could contemplate the present situation of that empire with any other sentiments than those of regret, apprehension, and alarm. He was anxious to avow that no Russian subject could feel more interested in every thing connected with the welfare of that great empire than himself; nor more desirous for a successful termination of the tremendous contest in which she was engaged. He had not the smallest doubt that her brave troops would continue to sustain the honour and glory of her arms; that with whatever difficulties they might have to struggle, they would not fail to evince their wonted patience, discipline, and courage; he repeated that he wished them success from his heart, though he trembled for the result of the contest.

It had been observed that war had commenced between Russia and France, because the latter had declined to withdraw her troops from the Russian territories. This however was not the case; prince Kurakiu's letter demanded the complete evacuation of the Prussian states, of all her strong places, a diminution of the garrison of Dantzic, the evacuation of Swedish Pomerania, and an arrangement with the king of Sweden. Unfortunately Russia was in no situation at that moment to be entitled to make such demands. She had lost the opportunity when she might have held such language with effect; but having permitted the emperor of France to go the length he had, it was puerile to expect he would be disposed to accede to any terms such as those contained in that letter. No doubt Russia had sufficient provocation for making war, but she declared it too late, and in a tone ill suited to her situation; untaught indeed by experience must be those who can await the issue with any other than the most fearful anxiety. If ministers had in any way contributed to this war in the North, they were highly culpable. He had on a late occasion (the Vote of Credit) deprecated the application of the revenues of the empire to the purpose of exciting any of the continental powers to draw the sword against France. Such policy had unfortunately but too fatally operated in those countries which had been influenced by our councils, and had very essentially contributed to the embarrassed state of our own finances.

Finding Russia engaged in a war with France, we should no doubt be disposed to afford her assistance, but he begged to remind ministers of the fate of the late king of Sweden, who possibly lost his crown in consequence of our having furnished him with the means of persevering in a mad, unequal contest. He entirely differed from Mr. Whitbread, that "we owed Russia no obligation;" on the contrary, he was convinced that we owed her the greatest, and that her natural disposition and real interest, led her to wish a close connection with this country. He hoped that now at least, there was an inclination here to do her justice for the sincerity and manliness with which she conducted herself in the late war with France, which terminated at Tilsit, so fatally to her interest, though not ingloriously to her arms, and that we were at length ready to recall those base defamatory charges, with which we had not scrupled to outrage and offend the Russian court and people on the late breaking out of hostilities in 1807, when we compelled her to draw the sword against us, by a wanton violation of the neutrality of that power with which we were ourselves in amity at the moment, whose independence Russia was by solemn treaty bound to protect. He felt, therefore, that she had the strongest claims on us, while our past conduct had been offensive and irritating; but he should be indeed indifferent to her fate, and unobservant of her danger, did he not feel pain and apprehension at the passing events. He repeated that he feared she had lost the moment. So early as 1808, when in her capital, he advised (even at that period), the adoption of precautionary measures against her new friend and ally, whose ultimate views he then foresaw, and pointed out. But instead of husbanding her resources, her strength was wasted in Swedish and Turkish wars, thus leaving the most vulnerable part of the empire, that too where the enemy was sure to make his first essay, (as the event has proved), much weaker than it otherwise would have been, had not her confidence in France rendered her rash and unsuspicious.

The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) conceived that one of Buonaparté's objects in his late overtures, was to enable himself to withdraw a hundred thousand men from Spain for his war with Russia.—Surely on a comparison of the relative strength of the two powers now in the field, it must be very evident that Russia was already greatly overmatched. But the right hon. gentleman seemed much displeased, that any reference should have been made to the commercial and manufacturing distresses of this country,—to the local agitations—to the late change of ministry, and to our very serious financial difficulties.—This allusion of Buonaparté to the present state of England, the right hon. gentleman considered as 'trash.' What, though the present may not be deemed by our wise heads at home, a fit and proper moment to treat for peace, will any man gravely assert, that the circumstances alluded to in the French official paper, were not of a nature to be taken into consideration by a government, when proposing a pacific overture? But no, we are to reject with disdain all propositions for peace, in full confidence of our peninsular successes! Undoubtedly too much praise could not be bestowed upon the noble lord and the gallant troops he commanded; every thing which talent, discipline, and valour could accomplish, might be fairly expected from their exertions, but it would be idle to look for ultimate success, if that army were not greatly encreased, and Spain organized far differently from what she had hitherto been. He had often said in that House, and he repeated that Buonaparté could afford this contest still to linger in the peninsula, without having to dread an ultimately fatal result to his arms. He did indeed agree that this was a most critical moment, but he feared we should let it pass, as we had several others during this long protracted contest. It was by availing ourselves of such and every opportunity, that we could alone expect final success, but it would be too late to defer our preparations till the instant for action presented itself. With this view he had earnestly urged the House last year, and before, to carry their views a little forward, and to make such military preparations, as might enable the country to take advantage of any fortunate occurrence. He had then assured them that their exertions were not in any degree proportioned to their means, or adequate to the occasion. He had long since pointedly directed the attention of ministers to the formidable preparations of Buonaparté in the north of Europe, and particularly warned them as to his views in Poland, but after four years contest on the most favourable theatre for our exertions, ministers had not been able to afford lord Wellington an effective force of 40,000 men; nor would they now send his lordship adequate reinforcements, or any effectual support to the north of Europe, should circumstances render such an undertaking desirable. He was answered last year by ministers, that "they would rather be accused of doing too little than too much." We indeed talk this matter well, while we are acting like children. What have been Buonaparté's exertions?—We recollect his past achievements. Let us look to the magnificent military spectacle which he now presents to the view of astonished and degraded Europe. He at least foresaw his difficulties, and ably prepared to meet them. But the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) asks, "if we can discover in his proposition to us, any thing like contrition—any disposition to abate his hostility to those just maritime rights which we have inherited from our brave ancestors, and which he hoped we should leave unimpaired to our posterity, declaring it to be a libel false as hell, that Great Britain had ever foully availed herself of her maritime superiority, or that any other state possessed of such power would have used it with equal moderation and mildness." If the right hon. gentleman was not disposed to make peace, until the emperor should have marked his contrition for past conduct, and his readiness to submit to the maritime rights of England as at present exercised, the prospect of peace was gloomy indeed.—Contrition and Buonaparté! how reasonable the expectation! Without the smallest prejudice against the French people, no man had been more anxious to resist and restrain the greatly overgrown power of France than he had been,—he had proved his sincerity not by words alone but by actions, and on several occasions; but he was sick, and disgusted with this war of words. We seemed to have made alliance with falsehood and folly, and to be blind to the dangers which even awaited ourselves. In every thing relating to the strength of the enemy, we were most sceptical, whereas we as eagerly received and believed every report and conjecture to his disadvantage, however unfounded and absurd; at one moment all the French troops, in a state of disease, were detained on this side the Vistula; at another the greater part had deserted—general Moreau had headed the Swedish army which had placed itself in the rear of the French. Marshal Massena having joined the Russian standard had left Buonaparté and his troops, just issued from their hospitals, in a fair way of being starved to death in the forests and desolated plains of Lithuania, while the "unintelligible French bulletins" too evidently betrayed the terror and discomfiture of these tyrants. All this real "trash" was gulped down by honest John Bull, who believed himself invincible, because his eloquent and enthusiastic orators assured him that he was so. It was the fashion to paint the conduct of France in the most hideous colours; Buonaparté and his troops were accused of every vice, and every excess; while the immaculate conduct of Great Britain was constantly held out for imitation, and the theme of perpetual praise. He felt himself obliged to deny the mildness and moderation with which it is asserted we exercise our maritime rights—and with the member for Bedford he reminded the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) of our conduct at Copenhagen and the Dardanelles. If he were not apprehensive of wearying the House, he might instance a variety of similar instances of mildness in this, as in former wars; and he desired to know why we were at this instant at war with America, if such had indeed been the mild exercise of these maritime rights. The right hon. gentleman seemed to regret that ministers had not given a more angry and insulting answer to the late proposition,—he was sorry to hear such sentiments, which however he feared were but too indicative of the prejudices of the country. For one he was for war with energy, or peace with honour, and that speedily. And when he compared our war system with that of the enemy, he had no hesitation in thinking that it would be wise to predispose the public mind to peace. What were our objections to treat now with Buonaparté? By the treaty of Amiens we had abandoned the Bourbons, and recognized him head of the French govern- ment—Was it his title to the throne of France? No conqueror had ever established a better, or to all appearance, a more secure one. He perceived that this sentiment was not popular in the House, yet he repeated it, and would add, that he knew no conqueror of ancient or modern time, who had less exerted the great power he possessed in the commission of individual acts of oppression than had Buonaparté. Here again, he found himself interrupted by symptoms of displeasure, but he would abide by what he had said. As a conqueror, the greatest ever known, he had doubtless to answer for much outrage and misery; to conquer implies these—and they must be in proportion to the extent of such conquests—"What millions bled that Cæsar might be great." Did we forget our own conduct in the eastern world alone, when we thus loudly arraigned that of Buonaparté in Europe? Were we indisposed to peace from the dangers and difficulties in which we considered him at present involved in the North? They are indeed great, but it is to be feared, not too great for him to overcome. Was it his haughtiness to the powers of the continent that displeased us! Had we indeed to learn that this demeanour was unfortunately the too natural, however offensive, concomitant of prosperity, un, bounded as had been hitherto that of this extraordinary man. Or were we for the protraction of this contest, in the vain hope of thus being able to prevent France from possessing anavy! Look to the map. Were we for perpetual war, confidently relying upon our own resources and the exertions we were making? Was it upon the numbers we brought into the field that we relied? Look to their amount, and consult their distinguished and noble leader, as to their sufficiency for this terrible conflict, in which, however paradoxical it may appear, defeat seems little to weaken the enemy, or the most brilliant victories to advance the cause of the allies.

The noble viscount (Castlereagh) had alluded to the conduct of the French ruler, whose practice his lordship observed it had been to make propositions similar in effect to the one now under consideration whenever he was about to place himself at the head of his army for the purpose of extending his conquests. Mr. Hutchinson considered this conduct only as affording proof of his determination to seize every opportunity of marking that England had no right, nor any means of effectually interfering in the disputes and arrangements of the great continental powers, and that his being about to decide by arms a quarrel between France and any other of these powers, constituted no impediment whatever to his concluding a maritime peace with Great Britain. In this view of the subject he could not agree with the noble viscount in considering these proposals at such a moment as insidious or insincere.

, in explanation, said, that the language of this government to Russia was always that of caution, and not of excitement. It was always signified to her, that if she were to determine upon war, she must look only to her own resources, and not to this country. But, although this language had always been held, yet government could not avoid considering how far the overture made, was intended to the prejudice of Russia; and acting accordingly.

would have been induced by the state of the House, the period of the session, and the clearness of the question itself, to abstain from making any observations on the present motion, had not some of the hon. gentlemen who had spoken, applied such strong stimuli as to overcome his inertness on the occasion. It had been his intention to put a question to ministers on a point alluded to by the hon. gentleman who spoke last. The question, however, had been satisfactorily anticipated by the explanation of the noble lord. He was confident, indeed, before the noble lord made the explanation, that this country could never have so widely departed from the policy maintained by the government when he had the honour of being in office, as to induce a power, situated like Russia, to commit herself into a rash and hopeless contest with France. It had always been felt to be the interest of this country, to preserve as much as possible of the wreck of the ancient states, in order to afford a chance at some future period for recovering the independence of Europe; and every renewal of hostilities under circumstances which afforded no prospect of a favourable issue, could be considered only as an advancement of that consummation to which this mildest and most benevolent of all conquerors was most anxiously looking—the destruction of this country.—He was confident that the British government had not only held the language of caution to Russia, but also the language of advice—that they had told her that to engage in war, on the principle of all former European wars, relying alone on regular exertions, would be absolute madness—that unless the war was Completely national, and unless the government were disposed to sacrifice that which they were probably not disposed to sacrifice, she could have but very slender chances of success; and that unless she resolved not merely to fight a battle on the frontiers and then hasten to sign whatever peace might be obtained from the conqueror, but to wait until the injustice and oppression of the enemy should rouse the energy of the remotest parts of that great empire, she could entertain no hope of ultimate triumph. It was a great consolation to him to hear that this country was not responsible for having drawn Russia into war by its advice, and he hoped that we should not become responsible to the world for failing to give Russia whatever support it might be in our power to afford her. He had heard with considerable surprise the hon. gent. who seconded the motion maintain not only that the recent overture was made in the spirit of sincerity, but that all the former overtures of the ruler of France were made in a similar spirit. He had heard with still more surprise the hon. gentleman who had just sat down declare, that no person in ancient or modern times ever merited a crown better than Buonaparté. This was language which he would venture to say (without meaning any offence to the hon. gentleman) would be very ridiculous, did not the immorality of it render it highly dangerous. Hitherto it had been some security for the peace of the world, that the most successful usurpers had not in their life-time reaped the full fruits of their crimes; their successors indeed, inheriting their power without their guilt, might, when the deeds of their ancestors were in a great measure forgotten, establish an influence over the minds of mankind; but it remained for the present age to crown with praise an unhallowed conqueror, and to teach him not only to look without fear to posterity, but to demand applause and admiration from his contemporaries themselves. Such a sentiment was dangerous beyond the interest of the present debate. It was new to the House and to the country. It had never been hazarded by any historian of upstart power. No lover of liberty had ever advanced it; satisfied as he must be that the best security against oppressors and usurpers was to arm even with an impotent hand the minds of mankind against those infringers of their just rights, and to lay up in the exasperation of the present moment the materials of future punishment. An hon. gentleman appeared to find some justification of Buonaparté in the conduct of Louis the 14th. He had found a parallel not in that portion of Louis the 14th's life, in which the historians of his own country reprobated his ambition, but in that in which he was entitled to sympathy; the period when supplicating for peace at the hands of those whom he had been seeking to enslave and to exterminate, he was met by an ungenerous demand that he should not only relinquish all his conquests, but turn his arms against the throne of Spain. This demand Louis had still spirit to refuse; and it must be allowed that it was a demand which the allies, even in their triumph, had no right to make. But where was the applicability of this illustration? Were we to be expected to do now what it was deemed unfair to demand of Louis in his greatest distress? Were we to be required to turn our arms against that very throne in Spain which we had hitherto supported, and to the maintenance of which we were bound by every obligation of good faith? If we were to recognize the dynasty of Joseph as a preliminary basis, we should do the same thing which the hon. gentleman thought it so unfair to require Louis the 14th to do in his greatest distress. The fate of Spain was in suspence, it was at the issue of war; and neither France nor England therefore had a right in any negociation to assume that as a basis which the event of war alone must determine. Whatever advantage there might be in a peace with France, if there was a single point of dishonour in the proposals for such a peace, it became this country to forego all the advantage and make its stand on that point until it should be conceded. He had heard it somewhere stated, that by way of amiable mistake we might have entered into the negociation under the idea that the dynasty of Ferdinand the 7th was meant by the terms "the existing dynasty." Such a mistake would have done great credit to the candour and simplicity of the British government, but would have redounded very little to their judgment. It was one of the blessings of a free country that every thing was made the subject of discussion; but it was one of the disadvantages of such a country, that many subjects were discussed without full and perfect information. It happened therefore that on many questions the judgment of contemporaries and that of posterity were not the same. He made this observation with reference to a part of the correspondence recently published by Buonaparté, which gave him great pleasure and pride. Having been one of those who in 1807 participated in the order issued to seize the Danish navy at Copenhagen, it was certainly a great gratification to him to find that Buonaparté, by a slip of the pen, or not supposing that question was likely to excite any further interest in Europe, had avowed that by the treaty of Tilsit, it was settled between France and Russia, that if England refused the peace that was to be offered to her, Denmark was, to be compelled into a war against this country. What, he would ask, might have been the consequences had that blow not been averted? Now, although he was aware of all this at the time, and government were perfectly apprised of it, yet it was not generally known. It was certainly some consolation to him that all doubt on the subject should be at length removed, and that the confession of the ruler of France of the fact completely confirmed the arguments by which the cause of this country was at that period justified. Had the proposition made by France been founded on any practicable conditions, he admitted that the time would have been favourable for the negociation of a peace. Though Russia had been goaded to war by a series of oppressions and insults, he by no means was disposed to contend that her remaining tranquil, had it been possible, would have been much preferable. But our answer was correct; for no step could be taken till the preliminary point was settled. The war was talked of as if it turned on the mere evacuation of Prussia, and Prussia was called a conquered country; but if Prussia had been conquered by France, she was subdued only by perishing in her enemy's embraces. For three years Prussia had been held out as the most obsequious ally of France, and yet at last she was doomed to destruction in the midst not of her enemies, but of her friends. Great and magnanimous as this modern conqueror had been called when compared with those of former times, yet in the his- tory of those it might be seen, that if some of their opponents fell by war, others escaped total ruin by treaty. With Buonaparté, however, it was found, that those who ventured to oppose him in the field had some chance of safety, but those who relied on his friendship none—that hostility appeared sometimes to soften him, but concession never. What could equal that last disgrace of a great European state at present exhibiting—an Austrian army marching under the conscription of France against a power with whom Austria knew that she had a common cause! With regard to the conduct of Russia towards us, undoubtedly for some time past, she had stood in a situation which would have justified on our part the most vigorous measures. Perhaps we ought to have made her feel all the dangers of her connection with France, and feel what a war with England was, before she became enveloped in the toils of the common enemy. But were we, after all, the less bound to assist her? Would such coldness be characteristic of this country? Witness the case of Spain, with whom we were at open war when Buonaparté committed his aggressions on her. Let that example of our conduct be the signal to all other nations. He understood that his right hon. friend, whose speech he was sorry he had not heard, had objected to some part of the correspondence, as if the proposal concerning the keeping of those possessions which could not be re-taken by arms, involved the security of our maritime superiority. That possession was the very one, which, of all others, would be the most difficult to take from Great Britain by the force of hostility. An hon. member had alluded with great lamentations, to the state of war in which we were now placed with America. He (Mr. C.) equally lamented that event. No prejudice, nor mistaken hostility, nor other accident, should prevent him from using every fair means of recalling the two countries to a state of peace; but if we were doomed to defend ourselves against an accumulation of enemies, he might take the motto which had been adopted by a French monarch "nec pluribus impar:" yet would he more gladly subduct the war with America from our contests, than any other of those in which we were compelled to engage.

in explanation said, that the right hon. gentleman had misconceived what he had said throughout.

declared, that the right hon. gentleman had grossly misrepresented him. He was speaking of conquerors when he made the observation complained of; and had said, that all conquerors had been guilty of oppressive tyranny and cruelty, though he thought the ruler of France had been less guilty than the others.

had listened to the explanation, but retained the same opinions which he had expressed.

said, he understood that the right hon. gentleman accused him of being the champion of immorality and tyranny. The accusation was false.

observed, that he had never used the word "Champion". What he had said he would repeat.

said he might, perhaps, not be quite correct in supposing the word "Champion" to have been used; but he must repeat that—

requested the hon. gentleman to confine himself to the explanation of his own language.

then said, that it was a gross perversion of his argument, to assert that he had said any thing to make him appear either as champion, or advocate of immorality; and that such an accusation was grossly false.

could not think that any gentleman would think the hon. member an advocate for immorality or tyranny: and he could not suppose that the right hon. gentleman imputed to the hon. genman any such disposition. With respect to the overture which was the subject of discussion, he thought the language of Buonaparté could not be misunderstood. When he proposed that we should agree to recognize the present dynasty of Spain, it could not be doubted but he meant that dynasty which he had placed there; and this being the fact, it was impossible for us to treat with him on the basis proposed. No man wished for an honourable peace more than himself, but he was not anxious for a peace, to obtain which we must give up both our interest and our honour.—At the same time he expressed his regret that we had not accomplished greater objects in the peninsula, and that even while the French armies were so busily occupied in the north of Europe, the Spaniards were evidently unable to raise the siege of Cadiz.

said, he would not occupy much of the time of the House in reply, though he had taken pretty full notes of the speech of his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), intending to answer every article of it. But, passing that by, he should come to the speech of his right hon. friend opposite (Mr. Canning), who had commented on a speech of his (Mr. S.'s) which he did not hear. He did not mean to find particular fault with him for not being present; he himself was often absent: but he believed he never answered speeches which he did not hear. The right hon. gentleman seemed to think he had magnified the conduct of Russia. He could not state any thing very particular respecting the disposition of Russia; nor did he know whether she was prepared to renounce the principles of that armed neutrality, of which the object was to strip us of those rights which, he was proud to say all the efforts of the powers of the North could never do: but it did appear from the papers published, that Buonaparté made it a chief ground of complaint against Russia, that she had refused to join him in stripping us of that great charter which was the life and soul of the power and independence of this nation. The idea was preposterous that Buonaparté should ask us to give him the means of relieving his army in the peninsula, by negociating a peace, while he took Russia's refusal to aid him in his meditated destruction of our maritime right as a cause of war against her. His right hon. friend said, that now he could give us a justification of the affair at Copenhagen. That act had never appeared justifiable on any principles of political morality or national honour, and was only said to have been committed for the sake of our safety; but if his right hon. friend knew of the existence of a secret article in the Treaty of Tilsit by which Russia was bound to compel the Danish fleet to join in the war against us,—why had he not told parliament of it, when he might have used it as a justification? How came he to conceal it from the House of Commons? He could have said he got the secret from a spy, perhaps; but yet, he might have told us that he knew it. Nobody reprobated the seizure of the fleet more than he did; but it would have become his right hon. friend quite as well if he had revealed the matter at the time, and had taken off much of the displeasure and horror that were felt. His hon. friend behind him, (Mr. Hutchinson,) had said strange things of the pure Napoleon, and his gallantry doubtless would make him abide by his assertions. If he (Mr. S.) had seen some mighty conqueror sword in hand, marching over Europe, and smiting down one state after another, he might have respected the valour of the man, while he deplored and detested his wasteful ambition; but what must he think of a being who, to attain his vast objects, violated every principle of honour and morality among nations, perpetrating every species of public crime; who, while he subdued some states by his arms, descended to cajole and trick others out of their liberty? It was said, that it was natural enough for us to hate Buonaparté, from the provocations he had given us: but what could be said of his conduct to Spain? There he went as an ally, introducing his own armies into the country on various subterfuges and pretences, getting the army of Spain into the North of Europe in his own possession, instigating disorders and bribing the king, and then getting both the king and the prince of Asturias into France, and there compelling the queen to the disgraceful act of bastardising her own son! This conduct was destitute of the manners and feelings of a gentleman; and he could hardly conceive any thing in the shape of a gallant soldier that could have been capable of such debasement. And was this the man, was this the conqueror, who was so worthy of a crown? Let not the people of England stoop to panegyrize such a man! let him have his French crown; but let it be our business and our duty to take care that he never should gain the crown of England! he had heard much said about the character, and genius, and renown of Buonaparté; but he wished to see this practice of extolling him discarded. Although no sycophant, or supporter of the present ministers, he must yet say that he thought they returned a right answer to Buenaparté's proposal. His main object was not Sicily or Spain, it was to fight against and overturn that maritime power of Great Britain, which he (Mr. S.) would deny having been so much abused as was pretended, though exercised occasionally with some roughness and error. How did gentlemen think that power would be used if it were placed in other hands? Shew him the safe and honourable way to a reasonable peace, and none would be more forward to pursue it: but he must deprecate all those arguments and representations that indisposed men's minds to war, before they had the prospect of obtain- ing a secure and honourable termination of hostilities. The pressure of the times, and the extent of taxation, were topics always ready. It was said, shall we send subsidies to Sweden and Russia? The same was said before, about sending subsidies and men to the peninsula, and it was asked what good could come of it? What good had come of it? Take Buonaparté's own confession for the answer. He had been brought on his knees on the subject of the peninsula. He was ready, in his professed desire for peace, to concede and guarantee the independence of the peninsula; and why? Because we had taxed our own country, and had subsidized the peninsula, and had shed much of our brave blood, as well as expended much of our treasure, in the struggle for independence. He was for taking no basis of treaty that did not retract the principle of Buonaparté's war against us. He had a right to expect some contrition. He expected none from him, for his ambition, for his crimes, and his murders; but he could already see some contrition for his arrogant threats of subduing the peninsula at once, and driving our brave army into the sea. When he saw contrition for these things, was it not possible that he might yet see it for that most presumptuous of all his boasts, that he would conquer a maritime peace, which meant merely that he would tear from Great Britain the chartered rights of her naval dominion? He was not one who thought of interminable war with him; but he would say, that the way to treat with him was to refuse all hollow insidious overtures. He defied any body to excuse the conduct of this great pacificator as he was called, who sent to us, talking of the sincerity of his heart, and the other cant with which he was familiar. In common honour, why had he not sent over an explanation in answer to our letter. He tossed his own letter into a boat, and sent it out to sea to take its chance of finding lord Castlereagh. Lord Castlereagh sends back an answer; and, by one of those accidents not at all unlikely to happen, the messenger was fired at by the only man worthy to wear a crown! Buonaparté's proposition was in the mean time sent off to Russia without our answer. He would say to Russia, "See what a bribe I have offered to Great Britain in this time of her distress. She is ready to enter into negotiation." But how would it operate in Spain? Why by infusing suspicion and disgust into the minds of all those who adhered to Ferdinand, and who had been taught to look to us for aid in their resistance to the common enemy and oppressor. Our true road to any safe peace was not by hearkening to such shifts and tricks and cajoleries; we should cultivate the friendship of the powers of the north, and if there were a new alliance, strengthened by our assistance, we should see, that it was not founded on the old fashioned cool principles of regular resistance, but on the principle of fighting for existence itself. To talk even then of the certainty of success, would be ridiculous. The immortality of nations was not consigned to mortal custody; but to fight bravely and to perish gloriously was so. And such must be the example of Great Britain. Take the condition of this country with all its faults, and we should find it the best that ever existed in any nation. Take our constitution, wanting certainly as it did many reforms, yet, practically, it afforded the best security that human wisdom had ever given to man. Yet with all this to contend for, we might not be able ultimately to command success. Even Great Britain, for her rights, and her honours, might spend her treasures, shed more and more of her best and bravest blood, and yet, at last, might fall. Yet after the general subjugation and ruin of Europe, should there ever exist an independent historian to record the awful events that produced the universal calamity, let that historian, after describing the greatness and glory of Britain, have to say, "She fell, and with her fell all the best securities for the charities of human life, for the power, and honour, the fame, the glory, and the liberties of herself, and the whole civilized world."

The question was then put and carried.

The following is a Copy of the said Correspondence:

Correspondence with the French Government, Relative to Peace

No. I.—Copy of a LETTER from the Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris, to his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; dated Paris, 17th April, 1812.

Monsieur;

Sa Majesté L'Empereur et Roi toujours animée des mêmes sentiments de modération et de paix, a voulu faire de nouveau une démarche authentique et solemnelle pour mettre un terme aux malheurs de la guerre. La grandeur et la force des circonstances dans lesquelles le monde se trouve aujourd'hui placé déterminent Sa Majesté. Elle m'autorise, Monsieur, à vous entretenir de ses dispositions et de ses vues.

Beaucoup de changements ont eu lieu en Europe depuis dix ans: ils ont été la suite de la guerre qui s'était allumée entre la France et l'Angleterre: beaucoup de changements arriveront encore et ils résulteront de la même cause. Le caractére particulier que la guerre a pris peut àjouter à l'étendue et à la durée de ces résultats; des principes exclusifs et arbitraires ne peuvent se combattre que par une opposition sans mésure et sans terme, et le système de la préservation et de la résistance doit avoir le même caractère d'universalité, de persévérance, et de vigueur.

La paix d'Amiens, si elle avait été maintenue, aurait prévenu bien des bouleversements. Je renouvelle le vœu que l'expérience du passé ne soit pas perdue pour l'avenir.

Sa Majesté s'est souvent arrâtée devant la perspective des triomphes les plus certains et en a détourné ses regards pour invoquer la paix. En 1805 toute assurée qu'elle était des advantages de sa position et quelque confiance qu'elle dut à des presages que la fortune devait sitôt réaliser, elle fit au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique des propositions qui furent éludées sur le motif que la Russie devait être consultée. En 1808, de nouvelles propositions furent faites de concert avec la Russie: l'Angleterre allégua la nécessité d'une intervention que ne pouvait être que le résultat de la négociation ellemême. En 1810 Sa Majesté ne pouvant se dissimuler plus longtems que les Arrêts du Conseil Britannique de 1807, rendaient la conduite de la guerre incompatible avec l'indépendance de la Hollande, autorisa de ouvertures indirectes qui tendaient également à la paix, elles n'eurent aucun effet, et de nouvelles provinces durent être réunies à l'empire.

Le moment présent rassemble à la fois toutes les circonstances des diverses époques où Sa Majesté montra les sentiments pacifiques qu'elle a constamment éprouveés et qu'elle m'ordonne de manifester encore aujourd'hui.

Les calamités, qui désolent la Péninsule et les vastes contrées de l'Amérique Espagnole, doivent exciter l'intérêt de toutes les nations, et les animer d'une egale solicitude pour les voir cesser.

Je m'exprimerai, Monsieur, d'une manière que Votre Excellence trouvera conforme à la franchise de la démarche que je suis chargé de faire, et rien n'en montrera mieux la grandeur et la loyauté que les termer précis du langage qu'il m'est permis de tenir. Dans quelles vues et pour quels motifs m'envelopperai-je de formes qui ne conviennent qu'à la foiblesse, qui a seule intérêt de tromper?

Les affaires de la Péninsule, et des Deux Siciles, sont les différens qui paraissent les plus difficiles à concilier. Je suis autorisé à vous proposer d'en établir l'arrangement sur les bases suivantes:

L'intégrité de l'Espagne serait garantie; la France renoncerait à toute extension de ses limites du côté des Pyrénées; la Dynastie actuelle serait déclarée indépendante, et l'Espagne réglée par une constitution nationale des Cortes.

L'indépendance et l'intégrité du Portugal seraient également garanties, et la Maison de Braganse règnerait.

Le Royaume de Naples resterait au Roi de Naples.

Le Royaume de Sicile serait garanti à la Maison actuelle de Sicile.

Par suite de ces stipulations, l'Espagne, le Portugal, et la Sicile, seraient évacués par les troupes Françaises et Anglaises, de terre et de mer.

Quant aux autres objets de discussion, ils peuvent être négociés sur cette base; que chaque puissance gardera ce que l'autre ne peut pas lui ôter par la guerre.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les bases de conciliation et de rapprochement offertes à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi ne calcule dans cette démarche ni les avantages ni les pertes que la guerre, si elle est plus longtems prolongée, peut présager à son empire, Elle se determine par la seule considération des intérêts de l'humanité et du repos des peuples. Et si cette quatrième tentative doit être sans succès, comme celles qui l'ont précédées, la France aura du moins la consolation de penser que le sang qui pourrait couler encore, retombera tout entier sur l'Angleterre.—J'ai l'nonneur, &c.

(Signe) LE DUC DE BASSANO,

Ministre des Relations Extérieures. Paris, le 17 Avril 1812.

Translation of a LETTER from the Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris, to his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir; his Majesty, constantly actuated by the same sentiments of moderation and peace, is pleased again to make a solemn and sincere attempt to put an end to the miseries of war. The awful circumstances in which the world is at present placed have determined his Majesty. He authorizes me, Sir, to explain to you his views and intentions.

Many changes have taken place in Europe during the last ten years, which have been the necessary consequence of the war between France and England, and many more changes will result from the same cause. The peculiar character which the war has assumed, may add to the extent and duration of these results. Exclusive and arbitrary principles cannot be combated but by an opposition without measure, and without end: and the system of preservation and resistance should have the same character of universality, perseverance, and vigour.

The peace of Amiens, if it had been maintained, would have prevented much confusion. I repeat the wish, that the experience of the past may not be lost to the future.

His Majesty has often stopped when at the prospect of the most certain triumphs, and turned from them to invoke peace. In 1805, secure as he was by the advantages of his situation, and notwithstanding the confidence which he might have in anticipations which fortune was about to realize, he made proposals to his Britannic Majesty, which were eluded on the ground that Russia should be consulted. In 1808 new propositions were made in concert with Russia: England alleged the necessity of an intervention which could only be the result of the negociation itself. In 1810 his Majesty, no longer able to conceal from himself that the British Orders in Council of 1807 rendered the conduct of the war incompatible with the independence of Holland, caused indirect overtures to be made towards procuring the return of peace. They were fruitless; and the consequence was, that new provinces were united to the empire.

At the present moment are to be found united all the circumstances of the various periods at which his Majesty manifested the pacific sentiments which he has ever felt, and which he now orders me again to declare.

The calamities under which the penin- sula, and the vast regions of Spanish America suffer, should naturally excite the interest of all nations, and inspire them with an equal anxiety for their termination.

I will express myself, Sir, in a manner which your excellency will find conformable to the sincerity of the step which I am authorized to take; and nothing will better evince the grandeur and sincerity of it, than the precise terms of the language which I have been ordered to use. What views and motives should induce me to envelope myself in formalities suitable only to weakness, and which alone can find its interest in deceit?

The affairs of the peninsula, and the two Sicilies, are the points of difference which appear most difficult to adjust. I am authorized to propose to you the arrangement of them on the following basis:

The integrity of Spain shall be guaranteed. France shall renounce all idea of extending her dominions on the side of the Pyrennees. The actual dynasty shall be declared independent, and Spain governed by the national constitution of the Cortes.

The independence and integrity of Portugal shall also be guaranteed, and the House of Braganza shall remain on the throne.

The kingdom of Naples shall remain in the possession of the king of Naples.

The kingdom of Sicily shall be guaranteed to the present family of Sicily.

As a consequence of these stipulations, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily, shall be evacuated by the French and English land and naval forces.

With respect to the other objects of discussion, they may be negociated upon this basis; that each power shall retain that of which the other could not deprive it by war.

Such, Sir, are the grounds of conciliation and amity offered to his royal highness the Prince Regent.

His Majesty the Emperor and King, in taking this step, does not look either to the advantages or the losses which his empire may derive from the war, if it should be prolonged; he is influenced solely by the consideration of the interests of humanity, and the repose of mankind; and if this fourth attempt should be without success, like those which have preceded it, France will at least have the consolation of thinking that whatever blood may yet flow, will fall upon England alone.

I have the honour, Sir, to offer to your excellency the assurance of my high consideration. LE DUC DE BASSANO,

Ministre des Relations Extérieures. Paris, 17 April 1812.

No. II. Copy of a LETTER from Viscount Castlereagh, to the Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris; dated Foreign Office, 23d April, 1812.

Foreign Office, 23d April, 1812.

Sir; your excellency's letter of the 17th instant has been received, and laid before the Prince Regent.

His Royal Highness feels it due to his own honour, before he can authorise me to enter into explanations on the overture, which your excellency has transmitted, to ascertain the precise meaning attached by the government of France to the following passage in your excellency's letter: "La dynastie actuelle serait dé clarée indépendante, et l'Espagne réglé par une constitution nationale des Cortes."

If, as his Royal Highness apprehends, the meaning of this proposition is, that the royal authority of Spain, and the government thereof, shall be recognised as residing in the brother of the ruler of France, and of a Cortez formed under his authority; and not as residing in the legitimate sovereign Ferdinand the 7th, and his heirs, and the General and Extraordinary Cortez now representing the Spanish nation; I am directed frankly and explicitly to declare to your excellency, that obligations of good faith preclude his Royal Highness from entertaining a proposition for peace founded upon such a basis.

If, however, the expressions referred to apply to the existing government of Spain, acting in the name of Ferdinand the 7th, upon an assurance from your excellency to that effect, his Royal Highness will be prepared fully to explain himself upon the basis that has been transmitted for his Royal Highness's consideration; it being his Royal Highness's earnest desire, in concert with his allies, to contribute to the repose of Europe, by bringing about a solid and permanent peace, which may be at once honourable, not only for Great Britain and France, but for those states with which they are respectively in connection.

Having, without reserve, explained the Prince Regent's sentiments upon a point, so necessary to be understood previous to further discussions, I shall best fulfil his Royal Highness's instructions, by declining any unnecessary and recriminatory observations on collateral topics: I may safely trust the justification of the conduct pursued by his Majesty's government at the several periods referred to in your excellency's letter, to the correspondence which took place at the time, and to the judgment which the world has long since passed upon it.

With respect to the particular character which the war has unhappily assumed, and the exclusive and arbitrary principles, which your excellency describes as having marked its progress; whilst I disclaim, on the part of the British government, that those evils are attributable to its conduct, I am authorised to assure your excellency, that it sincerely deplores their existence, as unnecessarily aggravating the miseries of war; and that it is the anxious desire of Great Britain, whether in war or in peace with France, to see the intercourse between nations restored to the liberal and accustomed principles of former times. I have the honour to be, &c. CASTLEREAGH.

To the Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris.

Frame-work Knitters Bill.]

The order of the day being read for the third reading of the Bill "For preventing Frauds and Abuses in the Frame-Work-Knitting Manufacture, and in the payment of persons employed therein,"

; I rise to oppose the further progress of this Bill, because it appears to me that it is objectionable or useless in all its clauses, and that the principle upon which it is founded is altogether erroneous, and contrary to those axioms of sound policy which have been approved of by the ablest political economists, and which have, by experience, been found most conducive to the increase and prosperity of trade.

It would be presumptuous in me to detain the House at present with a detailed statement of these principles; but I may be allowed to assume as correct, that opinion which is entertained by all merchants and men who have taken an enlarged and comprehensive view of commerce; that the more free from the regulations and restrictions of government trade is, it will flourish the better, and all things sooner find their own, that is, the proper and salutary level.

In a mercantile country, such as Great Britain, of which the greatness, and riches, in a great degree, depend upon commerce, it is highly necessary that the true principles of commerce should be well and generally understood; and, that all the laws respecting trade should be enacted on those general principles.

The Bill now before the House has been so cut down, and so much altered since I first opposed it, that I can scarcely call it the same Bill.—It was brought in principally to regulate the hosiery business and workmen; but the absurdity of every clause, as relating to that trade, was so satisfactorily demonstrated and proved in the committee, that they were all struck out of the Bill.

The principle and practice are equally erroneous when applied to the lace, as to the hosiery trade; and I was equally averse to the one as to the other: but the committee thought proper to recommend to the House the Bill as it now is; and it is, because I am convinced of the impolicy of such an enactment, that I must, as much as lies in my power, protest against its being now passed by the House.

The promoters of the Bill expect that the lace trade will be much increased by the proposed laws, and that the disputes between masters and workmen will be prevented; but, I entertain a very different opinion, and think that this branch of trade would be injured by such restrictions, and that the provisions of the Bill would only increase the differences between the artizans and their masters, unless perhaps (which, in case the Bill should pass, would be the best thing that could happen) it should not be acted upon at all.

In opposing the Bill, therefore, I am actuated by a fear lest, if passed into a law, it should prove, like many acts in the statute-book, which have been passed at different times, on account of some urgent local or temporary causes, and have either operated unfavourably to the branches of trade for the regulation and improvement of which they were enacted, or have remained a dead letter upon the statute-book.

It is an erroneous, and yet very generally received opinion that, because there are distresses and tumults in particular trading districts, from whatever causes they may have originated, we are called upon to pass some act of parliament, on the spur of the moment, to regulate them, even if we should thereby violate the general laws of trade; and it will be found that almost all the acts which have been passed for the regulation of particular trades, are of such a description. It is worthy of observation, that disputes between men and masters in those trades, regarding which specific acts have been passed, as those of tailors, leather-workers, &c. have been as frequent, subsequently to the passing of the laws, as before; which proves very decidedly, that some other remedy must be looked for to prevent the mischief.

I am so strongly impressed with the imperfect state of, and erroneous principle upon which, the existing laws regarding trade proceed, more especially respecting those trades carried on by the capitalists and artizans, that it was my intention, some time ago, to have submitted to the House a motion for a committee being appointed to take into consideration the state of all the existing laws respecting masters and workmen, with a view of ascertaining their utility or inefficacy in general to effect the objects expected from them, and with a view of proposing a modification or repeal of the whole of them. I would have done so, if there had not been a committee then sitting on the frame-work-knitting trade, and a trial by appeal carrying on, in the Court of King's-Bench, by the working weavers of Carlisle, to ascertain the intent and power of the existing statutes respecting wages.

It would give me much satisfaction to know that some member of this House, better qualified than I am for such an enquiry, would take up the subject at an early period of the ensuing session; as it is of much importance that the actual bearing and practical effects of all such laws should be clearly understood and well known, in order to prevent the recurrence of disputes and disturbances between masters and their workmen; and if any one will undertake that task, I shall most certainly endeavour to assist him in bringing forward whatever may tend to place so important a subject in its proper light.

Many think, that all acts of the legislature respecting trade should be founded on the principle which was so admirably expressed and enforced by the merchants of France to the minister, when he demanded from them what regulations could be enacted so as to render the trade of France prosperous, and received for answer, "Let it be protected, and leave the rest to be managed by ourselves." It is upon that principle, that I would exhort the House to act on this, and on all similar occasions; to protect both masters and workmen, and allow every individual to exert himself in employing his capital and labour in such an honourable manner as he may think best; every one in general being the best judge of his own abilities how to employ his stock in trade.

All the laws connected with our manufacturing system, appear to be founded on one erroneous principle, that the capitalists or masters are the only part to be protected against combination and injustice, though the artizans or workmen have an equal right to be protected in their property or skill, in which the wealth of the country so essentially consists, as the masters in regard to the capital that employs that art: they have an equal right to sell their labour and skill to the highest bidder, as the masters have to get their work done at the lowest rate.

The artizan is liable to punishment by various laws, if he combines with others, or endeavours to raise his wages; in other words, to sell his skill to the highest bidder: but none of the laws punish masters for a combination to lower the rate of wages to their workmen, or, in other words, to withhold from them what the demand for their labour entitles them to receive.

It is more difficult to prove a combination or agreement amongst masters than amongst workmen, from their comparative numbers; but, I am of opinion that a great many of those disputes which from time to time disturb the public peace, originate as much from the faults of the masters as of the men; and that the laws ought, in strict justice, to apply equally to both. As an example, I would mention what passed in London a short time ago, when the journeymen shoemakers quarrelled with their masters about their wages. The masters came to an agreement with each other, that is, combined against their workmen, not to pay above a certain rate of wages which they had taken upon themselves to fix, for work to be finished by the workmen; and for some months both parties held out against one another, until the demand for labour became so urgent, that the masters were obliged to pay the increased rate of wages in order to get their work done. Every exertion, I un- derstand, was used by the masters to find proof of a combination amongst the workmen, in order to bring them to trial, (as was done about the same time with some curriers and workers in leather), without success; and the men by their regular and firm conduct carried their point; whilst the masters published in the newspapers that they were obliged to give up their combination against their workmen, because one or two of the masters had broken their agreement, perhaps from conviction of the injustice of the proceeding, and resumed their usual business at such rate of wages as they could get the men to work for.

Any such proceeding on the part of the men would have brought them all to jail, whilst the masters can act thus with impunity.

I believe that such practices take place also in other trades, though not in so barefaced a manner; and, it is not surprising that men should occasionally be urged to acts of violence, and the public peace be disturbed by quarrels and disputes between capitalists and artizans, whilst such partial laws continue in force. It becomes therefore this House to take into its serious consideration the means of preventing such disputes; and, I am inclined to think that nothing will conduce more to that end, than rendering the property or capital of an artizan, (I mean his skill and art in trade) of as much consequence and comparative value to him, and equally disposable, as the property or capital of his employer; and, in a country where the laws apply equally to the rich and the poor, in every thing except where trade is concerned, it is but just and reasonable that the artizan should have equality of protection extended to him; and, that it should be equally criminal in the masters to lower the wages by any combination or agreement amongst each other, as it is for the workmen to combine to raise them. Viewing capitalists and artizans equally as traders, I consider an uncontrouled competition as beneficial to both, and the strongest spur to ingenuity and industry; and am consequently unwilling to agree to any limitation of wages in any trade whatever. I therefore am of opinion that all statutes, for the purpose of fixing wages or preventing the artizans from obtaining the highest pay for their labour, have been productive of injustice, and have operated as positive impediments to the progress of trade, and the perfection of art.

Every one acts and trades for his own immediate profit and advantage; and, the property of all ought to be equally protected by the laws, whether it consists in skill or in cash.

The master is anxious to engross as much business as his capital will admit of; and, his own interest will urge him to employ, at the same time, the best workmen, at the lowest rate of wages for which he can get the work finished; whilst the artizan, aware of his own skill and of the demand for his labour, will require as much for it as he can get; thus, a fair equality of price and demand will soon take place, as it ought to do; and nothing, that any one can suggest, will conduce so effectually to that end as the repeal of all the coercive laws respecting wages, and freedom to both parties to make what bargain they may think proper without disturbing the quiet of the country.

By the schedule in the Bill, the rate of wages is to be fixed from time to time by the masters, under penalties, if they shall give more or less than the prices that have been affixed in the schedule for each particular article; and, if it was for a quantity of brutal exertion, as the transportation of a cwt. of goods from one place to another, such a schedule might be proper; but, in all arts or trades, where skill and ingenuity are requisite to perform the task, it is extremely difficult to get two workmen to finish their work equally well, and it would consequently be unfair to pay them alike, as the schedule proposes to do. Every rule, which would prevent the master from paying more wages for the best, than for an indifferent article, must prove a direct and serious check to the exertions of the industrious, and to the improvements of the ingenious; and I know no means that could be devised likely to be more effectual to prevent that gradual progress towards perfection in every art which emulation and reward encourage.

The House ought not to enact as a law or rule for trade any schedule which it does not understand; I therefore object to the schedules annexed to the present Bill, because no member of this House, and I speak without the fear of contradiction, understands the nature or tendency of these schedules, which have been prepared by the workmen, the promoters of the Bill; and, for want of the evidence from master manufacturers, we are unable to form an opinion whether they are proper or not.

Admitting, as some do, that forms of schedules might be used with advantage to all parties in trade, (which, however, I deny,) it is but reasonable that they should be such as the masters could accommodate themselves to; and, being unable to decide, whether they are so or not, I must object to them altogether.

Every manufacturer should, in my humble opinion, be permitted to make such kind of wares as he may think proper, as the object in view by preparing them is evidently to sell them with a profit; and, if there is not a demand for them, it will follow as a matter in course, that the manufacturer will discontinue the making of them without any legislative enactment. I cannot, therefore, see the propriety of the clause in the Bill which prohibits the manufacture of those articles which are considered as of an inferior quality; but which must be productive of a profit to all parties, in order that the manufacture should be continued: and I really am unwilling to give up a good article of trade, because it is low-priced. Many articles are purchased with the view of being but little or seldom used, and, in all such cases, it appears but fair that such individuals should be at liberty to buy these slight articles if they suit their purpose, at the cheapest rate, instead of paying a high price for a very superior article, which, though capable of affording much wear, yet, not being requisite, the whole of the difference of price is lost.

This consideration often holds in lace-work, and, therefore, the clause in the Bill would prove a positive exclusion of an extensive, though slight and low-priced article, from a market in which the strong and more valuable articles are not demanded.

It is certainly improper that an inferior article should be dressed up and prepared so as to resemble the best kind, and to be sold to the inexperienced for the highest prices. All such practices deceive the purchaser, and have a direct tendency to bring the whole manufacture into discredit; and the legislature might with great propriety interfere and compel the manufacturers to affix, if possible, proper distinguishing marks to each kind according to their texture and quality, so as to prevent the fraud.

It appears to be a general opinion with the workmen, that the want of such marks has been the cause of the disrepute into which the lace has lately fallen; and, if we might judge from the good effects produced by the Tewkesbury Act, the 6th of George 3, c. 29, on a similar occasion, where inferior English two-thread cotton yarn had been sold as India four thread yarn, I should submit the propriety of extending the provisions of that act, if practicable, to the articles now complained of, as the best means of obviating the mischief if it really exists.

In Turkey the woollen cloth market is comparatively a monopoly in the hands of the French, notwithstanding the great difficulty and expence they have in sending it to that country, because their manufacturers prepare a very slight and flimsy, soft, showy kind of cloth, which would, on the principle required in this Bill, be prohibited from being manufactured in this country, though it can be sold there for a much higher price, (the quality and quantity of the material being compared,) than the commonly prepared English cloth. As every market has its own demand, it is proper that our manufacturers should be allowed to prepare what they find will suit these markets best, though it is possible that any attempt at imposition, by introducing an inferior article under fraudulent appearances, may injure the general trade, and therefore deserves care and consideration.

Every Turk, who can afford himself a new dress, must have one every year, whether his former dress may be worn out or not, and he will consequently purchase that kind of cloth that will wear for one year, look as good as the strongest kind would do, and be at the same time the cheapest. The French cloth is such as will answer his purpose for one year; and, being one-third cheaper than the English, will be therefore preferred, though a purchaser in England would prefer one dress of English cloth to two of French, from the greater service he would receive from it. It is, I think, from a want of attention to these and other particulars connected with that market, and in some degree to the restrictions of the Levant Company, that the English woollens are not so very generally used in Turkey, and also in other countries, as they would be, if our manufacturers would prepare the light and cheap cloths to suit the climates and customs of these countries. Some people have supposed that the French cloths were preferred on account of the superiority of their colours; but I have no reason to think so from the statements of the Turks themselves, and of merchants residing in Turkey and Egypt.

In June 1810, I saw at Cairo French cloths that had been manufactured in Languedoc, and transported by land through Italy and the territories of Austria and the Porte to Constantinople, whence they were shipped for Egypt, and sold, after paying all expences, at a profit of 30 percent, to the merchant, though strong English cloths would not at that time bring the prime cost and expences.

I have mentioned this only as one instance, out of many which I could adduce of the necessity there is—not to prevent the manufacturer from making all such goods as he finds will suit the markets to which he sends them, and can sell them to a profit.

I cannot shew the impropriety of our entertaining the prohibition in the manufacture of cheap lace, better than by stating that if the weavers of woollen cloth were now to apply to the members for Yorkshire to get a Bill passed, to prevent any woollen cloth from being made at a lower price than 15 or 20 shillings per yard, under the idea that, if there was no coarse cloth at 5 or 10 shillings a yard, the poor people would be obliged to purchase the cloth at 20 shillings to make their coats of. The workman may perhaps get more wages for fine cloth, in proportion to the labour, than for coarse; but, I leave it to the House to determine whether so many hands would be employed, or, whether the poor would be so well clothed if such an act was to pass. In the same manner therefore with lace: many persons in foreign countries who can get the cheap single-press lace or two-course warp net to purchase, will wear it; but cannot afford to buy the dear kinds, and will therefore discontinue the use of lace altogether.

The trade will thereby be lost; and, when I inform the House, that many thousand hands (men, women, and children) are now employed in making and embroidering that lace, and that one house alone employs 400 frames in making these articles; I hope the Bill will not be allowed to pass, at the request of those who cannot be supposed to be proper judges of such a measure.

I have been informed that one house alone has sold 200,000l. of the two-course warp net within these two or three years.

Many acts have been passed at different times for the regulation of different trades, as those of tailors, leather-workers, silk-workers, &c. without their having in any case, I think, had the desired effect; nor, can any act of that kind be productive of any good, until the artizans are equally protected and considered in their rights as the masters. I will shortly notice the act of the 13th George 3, c. 8, for the regulation of the silk-weavers' wages, and the consequences which have already resulted to that trade from the operations of the act; and the consequences that would, I fear, follow, if the same principle were extended to other trades and modes of employing capital. In 1766 the silk trade was very dull in Spitalfields, work became scarce, and some workmen, rather than be idle, were induced to work for wages lower than they had received when trade was brisk; an outcry was raised by the body of the workmen against the reduction of their wages, and the riots which took place terrified the government, and induced them to pass that act, the 13th of George 3, c. 8, empowering the magistrates to fix and regulate the wages, from time to time, agreeably to the demands of the workmen or masters; on the erroneous opinion that any law could oblige a manufacturer to pay, for any considerable time, a higher rate of wages than the trade could afford.

When trade was brisk, it was very easy for the men to get their wages raised by the magistrates; but, when any stagnation, or want of demand ensued, the masters always found it a very difficult matter to get any reduction made, The natural consequence followed, that the masters, rather than manufacture to a loss, left off by degrees particular branches of their trade, and the workmen themselves experienced eventually the greatest loss; for the trade of ribbons was removed to Coventry, Leek, &c.; gauze to Paisley, Reading, &c.; where the rate of wages was such as would enable the merchant to manufacture to a profit; and the number of weavers in Spital-fields have gradually decreased from 50 to 22,000 hands, chiefly from that cause.

Every individual has certainly the right of employing his capital, either in land, commerce, or manufactures, in such manner as his own inclination may lead him, or his abilities be most competent to conduct. It would be considered a monstrous proposition, if I, extending the principle of the 13th of George 3, were to propose to introduce a Bill into this House to compel landlords to let their land to farm at such a rate per acre as two or more justices, on the requisition of the tenants, should think proper to fix, without any provision being made for the different rates which different kinds of land ought to afford; and, without leaving any kind of discretion with the landlords how to act, otherwise than, either to agree to let their land for the rates fixed by the magistrates, or to allow the land to lie uncultivated; and, I believe, that it would be considered equally objectionable if the Bill should compel all farmers to take the land for cultivation, and pay such a rate of rent for it as the justices might, upon the requisition of the landlords, fix and determine, without leaving any discretionary power with the farmers, whether such rate of rent was more than they thought they ought to pay, or such as would permit the land to repay them for their industry and skill.

However objectionable these principles may appear to be when applied to land, they are equally so when applied to masters and workmen, (as by the 13th of George 3, c. 8, and many other acts,) and should all, I think, be removed from among the statutes.

Every landlord lets his land in such manner, and at such rates, as he thinks proper; every farmer rents land at such rates as he thinks will repay his skill and labour; and, by open competition, both acquire a fair and just value in the market.

Every master or capitalist in trade, and every artizan or workman, ought in justice to be allowed the same discretion and freedom in the employment of their capital and labour, as the landlord and the tenant enjoy; but which the present Bill would prevent.

By such freedom to the landlords and tenants to act as they should think best, the rents have been much increased, and agriculture greatly improved; by extension of that freedom and competition in trade and manufactures, the profits will be much augmented, and the different branches of manufacture advanced towards perfection; but, all restrictions, under the title of regulations for trade, are detrimental to its progress, and should be avoided as much as possible.

It is very satisfactory to learn, that those who have had the best opportunity of observing the practical effects of the different laws enacted for the regulation of trades in and about London, do agree with me in the opinions which I have stated, as to the propriety of leaving every kind of trade to find its own level. Mr. Colquhoun, a most intelligent and able magistrate, to whom the country is much indebted, after an experience of 20 years, declares the act of the 13th of George 3, respecting the silk-trade, prejudicial to the country, and to all classes engaged in that trade, and deprecates the idea of such a principle being extended to any other manufacture; and I hold in my hand a letter from him to that effect.

The different committees of this House which have had before them the petitions of masters and workmen engaged in several manufactures at various times, have agreed in that principle; and I will, with permission, read an extract of the opinion expressed in the Report of a committee to the House on the 13th of June, 1811, as an example of the tendency of others.

The Committee are of opinion "that no interference of the legislature with the freedom of trade, or with the perfect liberty of every individual to dispose of his time and of his labour in the way and on the terms which he may judge most conducive to his own interest, can take place, without violating general principles of the first importance to the prosperity and happiness of the community; without establishing the most pernicious precedent, or even without aggravating, after a very short time, the pressure of the general distress, and imposing obstacles against that distress being ever removed; or, if the interference were extended to all trades and occupations, as it manifestly must be when the system has been acted on in any, without producing great public mischief, and being destructive of the happiness and comfort of individuals."

To come, however, more immediately to the particular manufacture which the present Bill purports to regulate, I think it is of considerable importance to observe, that provisions, similar to those of this Bill, were formerly enacted for the regulation of the hosiery trade, by 15th of Charles 2; but, having been found, in their operation on that trade, either prejudicial or useless, they have been allowed to remain a dead letter in the statute-book; and, we should be cautious how we now enact for the lace, what did formerly fail to have the desired effect in the hosiery trade.

It appears from various records, that, about 1664, considerable distress prevailed in the stocking trade; and the workmen then thought that the want of demand for their goods, was owing to some articles in the trade having been made of an inferior quality, and having thereby brought their goods into disrepute; and, it is curious that the very same opinion is entertained by the workmen at the present moment as to the cause of the present stagnation of trade, without making any allowance for the failure of our foreign markets. In 1664, the government acceded to the demands of the men, and granted them a charter to form a company of frame-work knitters, with exclusive privileges, and the power of enacting bye-laws for the good of the whole; they had the power of prohibiting every unworkmanlike article from being made, and of searching the houses and shops of manufacturers for such kind of articles, to destroy them.

No charter was ever more particular in its enactments to make strong and good wares only; and, if any such results as were then wished for, and are now wished for, could have been effected by regulations for that trade, that charter would certainly have answered the purpose. Charters were at that time considered as the only way of encouraging trade, and were consequently granted to many sets of men; but all of them, by their results, prove how different their effects have been from what were expected from them. The futility, or mischief of these regulations was soon experienced, and they gradually fell into disuse until 1753, when, from the activity of some individuals in exercising the powers vested in the Frame-work-knitters company, the whole of the trade were roused to petition the House of Commons against the provisions of that charter, and the House, on the 19th of April, declared the whole of the provisions of the charter injurious to the trade and the interests of the country, and they have never been acted upon from that period to this. Is it therefore proper for us now to enact such regulations, for the lace trade, as did formerly produce so much mischief to the hosiery trade?

The masters appear, by the Resolutions they entered him in 1808–9, whether seriously or not I cannot say, to have acceded to the opinion of the workmen, that injury accrues to the trade by the manufacture of inferior and fraudulent wares, by the agreement not to manufacture any more of them; but they have been una- ble to keep their engagements, by the profits arising from the manufacture and sale of these articles having been great; and, can it be expected that an act of parliament will effect that which the trade itself could not perform? The only measure which can be adopted to check fraud, would be, as I have before pointed out, to amend the 6th of George 3, (commonly called the Tewkesbury Act) and compel manufacturers to mark every kind of goods with a particular distinguishing mark.

The other clauses in the Bill, to prevent the payment of the wages to frame-work-knitters in any thing but money, appear to me unnecessary, and directly contrary to the natural order of things.—In earlier times, every purchase of goods was effected by an exchange of one article for another, whether such were food or goods; and the subsequent introduction of cash was only, as a convenient medium of exchange, between the parties having superfluities to part with and wants to supply; I cannot, therefore, discover the wisdom of these statutes, which have prohibited the payment of wages in any thing but cash.—From an early period of our history, the legislature have thought proper to interfere in that way, particularly by the 5th of Elizabeth, c. 4, the 1st of James, c. 6, the 13th of Charles 2, &c. &c.; and, in almost every statute respecting trade, the same provisions have been made; and, were any such provision necessary, the act of 12 George 1, c. 34, being extended to the frame-work-knitters trade, as effectually as can be done by the clauses in the present Bill, renders any similar enactment superfluous. In many parts of Great Britain, the husbandry servants are paid for their labour, partly in food and partly in cash, and no inconvenience arises therefrom, though, by the statutes now in force, such practice is criminal in England, and could be punished.

These statutes respecting the payment of wages in cash only, appear to have been intended to destroy that feudal dependance which then existed between servant and master, and may then have been very proper, as servants were more easily paid in food than money, and it was an object with the government to reduce the influence of the barons over their followers; but, at the present time, all such interference appears to me improper and unnecessary. If it should be more convenient or profitable for a workman to re- ceive payment for his labour partly or wholly in goods, why should he be prevented from doing so? for if such a practice is inconvenient or injurious to any man, he will not work a second time for the master who pays him in that manner. If, however, it happens, that on calculating the value of the goods and cash, they are more advantageous to a workman, than what he can receive for his labour in cash alone from any other person, it would certainly be an injustice to him, to prevent his using his own discretion, in choosing in what manner he should think proper to be paid.

From the evidence taken before the committee of the House of Commons it appears, that only the lowest class of manufacturers, called Bag Hosiers, have been in the practice, in times of distress, of paying for their work, partly in goods and partly in money; and it is a doubt with me, whether, in that way, they did not employ many workmen who would otherwise have remained idle. Was there any barns in having done so?

As to the measurement of lace by the instrument called the rack, there can be no objection to it, unless that it is more a regulation between the masters and workmen, than one which the legislature ought to interfere with.

Whether the lace known by the name of "single-press cotton lace, and two-course hole warp," should be permitted to be made or not, I have no hesitation in answering, that they should all be manufactured and sold, as no manufacturer will make them unless he can sell them with a profit. If inferior articles are sometimes fraudulently sold for better ones,—this happens in all trades; and if it be worth while to interfere,—the proper remedy is a distinguishing mark.

In the event of the laws, as far as capitalists and artizans are concerned, being taken into consideration with the view of revising them, and enacting such as should place both sets of persons on the same footing in respect to their engagements about wages, I should wish to call your attention to the benefit societies which have been formed by the members of different trades.

The intention of these societies in forming a fund, was to provide for such of their members as should, by disease or want of work, be without the means of support; and more useful and praiseworthy establishments could not be formed: but, from various statements that I have heard, there is reason to fear that the funds of some of these societies have been appropriated to support the most needy of the society during periods when the whole trade have struck for wages; and, by means of such funds, the men have been able to support themselves for a longer time than the community could dispense with their labour, and, by that means effected an undue increase in their wages. It is highly necessary, and would be easy to prevent any such occurrences on the part of the workmen, so as to allow the labour of every class to come to market with free and open competition, by which labour in every instance would find its proper and fair level.

It certainly is worthy, the attention of the legislature to consider what mischief has arisen, and may hereafter spring from the extent and organization of these societies in different parts of the country, and to take measures to prevent any serious evil from taking place.

It was my intention to have observed more fully upon every clause of the Bill in succession, and to have pointed out those provisions most obnoxious and most objectionable; but, for the present, I must not any longer, at this hour of the night intrude upon your time, except to observe, that the clause authorizing search-warrants on suspicion of prohibited goods, opens the door to too much trouble, and to an infraction of that privacy and security in his own house, which every Englishman considers his birth-right, and which, as, being one of the blessings of a free state, ought not to be interfered with except in cases of the greatest emergency.—I object therefore to that clause, as being quite unnecessary, because the goods when offered for sale will be liable to seizure; and it does not appear to me that the peace of families should be open to disturbance, on the whim or spite of every angry workman against his master, for the sake of detecting perhaps a yard of fourpenny lace.—It is legislating for trifles, in a way which ought not to be adopted; and, for that, and all the other reasons which I have offered to your notice, I protest against the Bill passing into a law, and would take the sense of the House upon it, but that it might be thought that I took the advantage of there being so few members present.

The Bill was then read a third time and passed.