brought up a Petition from Daniel Isaac Eaton, now a prisoner in Newgate, and sentenced to be imprisoned there for eighteen months, for publishing the third part of Paine's Age of Reason, complaining of the exactions of certain exorbitant fees, and of other abuses, in the prison. On the hon. and learned gentleman moving that the Petition be read,

expressed a hope that, after the instances which had occurred during the present sessions, the House would be peculiarly guarded in future in receiving Petitions, the truth of the contents of which was not in some measure verified by the member who might present them.

said, it would be utterly impossible for members to examine into the allegations contained in the Petitions which it might be their fate to present. If this was once considered indispensable, very few Petitions would ever be laid on the table of the House.

said, he did not mean to give any opposition to the bringing up of the Petition.

The Petition was then brought up, and read. It stated, that when the prisoner was conducted to Newgate from the Court of King's-bench, he was asked by the gaoler, in what part of the prison he would wish to be confined? and having answered on the state side, he was, after paying a fee of two guineas, conducted to that part of the prison. He was confined in a room with two other persons, and for the use of a bedstead, which was not sufficient to bear his weight, and which eventually broke down, and forced him to lie on the floor, a sum of seven shillings per week was exacted, and a similar sum was paid by his fellow prisoner. On remonstrating with the gaoler on this exorbitant and extortionate charge, he was given his choice either to go to the master felons' side, where he would only have 2s. 6d. per week to pay, or to the common felons' part, where he would have nothing to pay. If he chose to remain on the state side, he must pay the sum demanded,—and under the dread of being sent to herd with the lowest criminals, he had since continued to pay the sum demanded. When he was formerly confined on the same side of the prison, it was solely devoted to the reception of prisoners committed by parliament, by government, or by the Court of King's-bench. It was now, however, the receptacle of criminals of the most abandoned character. Assassins, persons charged with unnatural offences, and felons, who, on paying the fees and charges demanded, were thus indulged. Twelve rooms were appointed on the state side for the accommodation of the prisoners sent thither, but the greater part of those rooms were occupied by Mr. Astlett, a respited felon; a Mr. Lumley, charged with forgery, and other persons, who, by paying sums of two guineas per week, were allowed to monopolize in some cases two, and others, three rooms, to the great inconvenience and hardship of persons who were not equally able or willing to comply with such enormous charges. The house of the gaoler was divided into sets of chambers, for which sometimes fifteen, and at others ten guineas per week were demanded and paid; thus rendering the emolument of the gaoler a bar to the ends of justice. The Petition, after some further remarks on the injustice of such arrangements, prayed an enquiry into the state of the prison, in order that the manifold abuses which existed might be remedied.

The Petition was ordered to lie on the table.

moved, that the order of the day for resuming the adjourned debate, respecting the State of the Finances of the country, should be read. The order having been read accordingly, the hon. baronet proceeded to observe, that he was aware, from long experience, of the difficulty of obtaining the attention of any very numerous body of the members of that House to a subject so extremely dry and uninteresting as a detail of matters connected with the finances of the country. Nevertheless, it was a subject of such vital importance to the state, and upon which the very salvation of the country depended, that he should ill perform his duty to his constituents, if he could be deterred, by any apparent neglect on the part of others, from stating his sentiments on a topic so highly interesting. At the commencement of the session, he had taken the liberty of submitting to the House some propositions on the state of our finances, winch, however, did not meet with that degree of attention which he conceived they merited. He could only lament that those propositions had not come from the acute mind of his right hon. friend (Mr. Tierney), or from the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose qualifi- cations and abilities were particularly calculated for topics involving so many questions of difficulty. His object on the present occasion was, with as much clearness and perspicuity as he could, to shew to the House and country, the real situation in which they stood, with regard to their finances, and unless the House felt disposed to accompany him in such an investigation, he contended that it would be impossible for the country to go on. An inquiry of this description at the present momentous crisis, he deemed of the last importance, and one which, if neglected, would lead to the final destruction of the state. In order that his observations might be more easily comprehended, he should divide his subject into three parts; namely, into the Debt of the country, the Expenditure of the country, and the Resources of the country. He begged to remark, that his reason for commencing his statement in 1802, was with the view of continuing that series which had been so long and with so much ability, presented to parliament by his right hon. friend (Mr. Tierney) who, at that period, had most unfortunately ceased to make his annual remarks upon the subject. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had confined his statement in the Resolutions which he had submitted to the House, to the period between 1805 and 1812, but this diminution of the general view was of no material importance, as the conclusions upon the latter years must still be the same, and with the exception of one or two trifling errors their accounts were perfectly accordant. The same observation was applicable to the Resolutions of his right hon. friend (Mr. Tierney), although their arrangement was somewhat different.—The hon. baronet then proceeded to draw the attention of the House to the state of the Debt of the country, in doing which, he took occasion to observe, that no committee had ever been appointed to examine into the general state of the finances, although several committees had been appointed on detached points connected with it. He passed the highest encomiums on the adoption of the plan of a Sinking Fund, in the praise of which, he said, it was impossible to say too much. If, however, the present system was pursued, in spite of every plan, however meritorious, it would be utterly impossible to extinguish the debt of the country. Year after year had it progressively increased, and the prospect of its diminution was now more distant than ever. In 1802, the capital funded debt of Great Britain was, exclusive of annuities, 459,067,551l. and in 1812, it amonnted to 556,284,819l. being, in the course of eight years, an increase of the enormous sum of 107,217,268l. The amount of the unfunded debt in 1804, was 23,787,251l. in 1805, 31,515,548l. and in 1812, (including outstanding demands) 54,038,059l. being an increase of the unfunded debt compared with the year 1804 of 30,250,807l. and making the amount of the funded and unfunded debt, at the commencement of the present year, 669,556,245l.—Having thus stated the amount of the Debt of the country, and the enormous increase which had taken place, he proceeded to advert to the Expenditure of the country, which, he said, was proportionately enormous, and which he could see no rational mode of reducing, if the same measures now adopted were to be pursued. Here he could not help noticing an error which was committed by a noble lord (Castlereagh) on a former night, when he stated that the whole of the army expenditures of the last year had amounted only to 25 millions. So far was this from being correct, that the expenditures, from the accounts upon the table of the House, appeared to have amounted to 30,500,000l. To talk of 25 millions, was a fallacy which only tended to mislead the judgment of the House. With respect to the gross amount of expenditure, from the accounts on the table, it appeared that the sum raised for the service of the year 1804, was 58,500,915l. and for the year ending 5th January, 1812, 105,718,682l. being an increase in that period of 47,217,767l. The question now to be considered was, what could be done to reduce this prodigious expenditure, and whether the country could, by possibility, go on under such a system? He would submit whether, as we could not bring our income to our expenditure, we ought not to reduce our expenditure to our income? It might be that expenditures had taken place with too lavish a hand. This was a fact which required investigation; and this it was which impressed on his mind the expediency of calling the attention of the House to the subject. The third point of his enquiry was, as to the Resources which the country possessed, to supply the means of these expenditures. They were at present the permanent taxes, which in 1802, amounted to 14,497,000l.; and in 1812, to 40,986,860l. being an increase since 1806, of 26,689,000l. which, with the war taxes, amounting in the last year to 21,999,550l. and the whole of the revenue of every other sort, amounted to 66,849,000l. The hon. baronet then entered into a comparison of the amount of the taxes collected within the last years, from which he inferred that they had considerably fallen off in produce. With respect to the Income Tax, which he could never hear mentioned without considering it the most unjust and oppressive that had ever been invented; he remarked, that in 1811 the produce was 12,925,000l. and in 1812 it amounted to 13,145,000l.—here certainly was an apparent increase, but this increase was wholly attributable to the arrears of the last year having been collected with extraordinary rigour. The diminution in the commercial taxes he admitted might be occasioned by temporary circumstances and embarrassments, but upon a review of all the items he had enumerated, he could find no source from whence to derive hope of eventual prosperity. The whole of the income, as he had already stated, was only sixty-six millions, while the expenditure amounted to 101,000,000l. thus making an actual deficiency in the income, as compared with the expenditure, of 35,000,000l. He would ask, with this deficiency, was it possible for the war to be carried on upon the same footing as heretofore; or, if continued, was it possible to save the country from inevitable ruin?—The hon. baronet next alluded to the state of the funds, and attributed the great fall of stocks to the experiment which was made to place the whole loan in the 4 per cents. After which he entered into a general argument on the necessity of looking into the real state of the finances of the country, and of appointing a committee for that purpose. He also suggested the expediency, either of putting an end to the war altogether, or so far circumscribing our operations as to keep within our means; and not by involving ourselves in an overwhelming expence, lead to our eventual ruin. He could not conclude without alluding to the state of Ireland, which, he said, was unable to pay the interest of her debt by 500,000l.; and yet the House was continually occupied in the discussion of the propriety or impropriety of granting them Catholic Emancipation. To grant them this, he conceived, would be like putting a gold-lace hat upon a person without shoes or stockings. In conclusion, the hon. baronet again pressed upon the House the necessity of adopting some plan of rigid economy, and of enquiring, with the most scrupulous attention, into the state of our finances, and, above all things, he exhorted his Majesty's ministers to use every endeavour, consistent with the honour of the country, to procure to the people the restoration of the blessings of peace, as the only effectual means of relieving the burdens of the country, or of averting the, otherwise, inevitable ruin of its finances.—The hon. baronet concluded with moving the first of his Resolutions; for which see p. 956.

rose also to submit his financial Resolutions^* to the House. With due deference to the hon. baronet who had just sat down, he might be allowed to prefer to his resolutions those which he had himself framed, and which he was about to submit to the House. He had taken a great deal of pains in preparing them, and every man acquainted with financial subjects must know the difficulty of compressing accounts so complicated, in such a manner as to offer a clear and distinct view of the subject. His object had been to shew the true state of the finances of England, leaving to every one to form their own judgment. He had began at January, 1804, which, in a financial point of view, he considered as the first year of the war, and had established a comparison between that and every succeeding one, dividing them into periods of three years, which he had found was the fairest way to come at the average of revenue and of expenditure. His only view had been to make the matter intelligible to every one in the country, and to call the attention of the House to a subject of the greatest importance. His first Resolution went to establish as a fact, the gradual progress of the war expenditure during those nine years. The supplies voted for the navy, army, ordnance, vote of credit, and subsidies, formed the object of those calculations.

The proportion was as follows:

^* A Copy of Mr. Tierney's Resolutions will be found at the end of this Debate.

His next Resolution went to establish, on the same principles, the progress and the nature of the resources to meet that expenditure. Those resources were under the following heads: Money borrowed in Great Britain, for the service of Great Britain and Ireland: Amount of Exchequer Bills funded, together with the actual surplus of the Consolidated Fund: The Annual Duties and the Grant of War Taxes. The right hon. gentleman thought the average for each period of three years would prove that the proportion of supplies raised by revenue, compared with that raised by war, had gradually decreased, in each of the periods of three years. The right hon. gentleman complained especially of the too great issue of Exchequer bills, as forming a branch of those Ways and Means, and which, by anticipating the resources of the country, hurt the public credit, and injured the money market. His next Resolution would prove how inadequate the Sinking Fund was to the redemption of the public debt; for, in 1804, the Sinking Fund was in the proportion of 1–77th part of the debt, and in the same year the surplus of the money borrowed was 3,717,053l. But in 1812, the Sinking Fund was 1–44th of the debt, while the surplus of the money borrowed, exclusive of the loan to the East India Company, was 15,878,182l. His sixth Resolution went to state the amount of money by Exchequer bills funded, and the charges attending that debt, which, since January 1804, had been increased by a sum of 11,747,232l. His seventh Resolution related to the increase of charges on the Consolidated Fund, for war purposes, which had been raised from 843,784l. their amount in 1804, to 1,905,000l. their amount in 1812. His eighth and last Resolution spoke for itself; it stated the amount of the expences of the present year, which amounted to the enormous sum of 101,871,199l. The right hon. gentleman then commented on the several Resolutions, and specially recommended to the attention of the House the gradual increase of borrowed money over the supplies raised in the year. He would no longer trouble the House on each separate Resolution, but merely observe, that the account he had made, and which had cost him a great deal of pains, had, in his opinion, greatly simplified the business, and for his pains, at least, entitled him to some thanks. Gentlemen would observe, that, in taking the surplus of the Consolidated Fund, he had taken every thing for that surplus, comprehended every part of that Fund, which, after paying the interest of the debt, was applicable to other purposes. He was certain, that every one who would take the trouble of reading his Resolutions would be convinced, that he had exaggerated nothing from party-spirit. On the amount of duties he would say nothing, as they were liable to so many variations. And, as to the war taxes, he would observe, that although they were sometimes in arrear for six months, yet as the deficiency was made up by Exchequer bills, payable at six month also, the arrears in general were recovered in time to pay them off, and this offered a fair prospect, that six months after peace, which was the period at which those taxes were to determine, all accounts concerning them would be finally wound up. The comparative state of the public debt was, however, deserving of most serious consideration. It would be seen, that it had been gradually increasing, and yet public credit had been comparatively but little hurt by it; this was a circumstance for which he could not account. He had attempted to obtain a statement of the price of stocks, at different periods, but this he could not do in a manner satisfactory to himself, and he left the task to gentlemen better able to undertake it. This comparatively favourable state of the public credit could not, however, be attributed to the operation of the Sinking Fund, as he had shewn before. The nature of that fund was such, that it afforded no relief to the burthens of the country; it was intended to relieve, or rather to keep up public credit; but if it did not effect that purpose, and if public credit was held up by other means, it was a circumstance well worth attention, and it might be soon considered as useless. It was at the same time worthy of remark, that at the rate the loans were gaining on the Sinking Fund, there could be no hope of ultimately discharging the debt by that means. The right hon. gentleman next adverted to the state of the unfunded debt, which was daily increasing in frightful proportion, and had such a weight on the money market as to throw frequently the finances of the country at the mercy of the holders of those marketable government securities. What system of finance was this that was thus liable to every fluctuation which panic or cupidity might occasion? It was well known, for instance, that the Bank had insisted this year for the reimbursement of two millions of Exchequer bills, and that at the most unfavourable moment, when the country was, besides its immense expenditure, loaded with a loan of 2,500,000l. to the East India Company. In fact, his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was at the mercy of the Bank by that unfunded debt; and he wished most earnestly to call the attention of the House to that growing evil, and to the increased charges attending it, as likely to produce the most dreadful results.—The right hon. gentleman next adverted to the prospect of peace, which, far from affording relief to the finances of the country, as many people expected, would leave them without resources, as the war taxes would then expire, and the only fund unappropriated would be the surplus of the consolidated fund, which he had shewn totally inadequate to the purpose. Here the right hon. gentleman took a view of the different attempts under lord Sidmouth's administration, and when lord Henry Petty was Chancellor of the Exchequer, to raise supplies within the year; he complimented the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the share he had had in that wise practice under lord Sidmouth, and hoped that he would again recur to it, and abandon the wretched system of finances which had been followed for the last nine years. He did not pretend to say that we had reached the end of taxation; far from it—but of this he was sure, that things could not long go on in the present way. The readiest resource which offered itself, was economy. He gave every credit to his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his intentions on that subject; but although he did not intend to mix politics with the subject, yet he must observe, that a strong administration was necessary for that purpose. With the present Chancellor of the Exchequer he found no fault, especially as he had declared, that he had only brought forward the budget prepared by the late Mr. Perceval; but still he would insist, that a radical change in our financial system was absolutely necessary. The right hon. gentleman next adverted to the Resolutions proposed by the hon. baronet, and felt himself compelled to vote against them, on account of the last, which stated that nothing but peace could save the finances of the country. This he did not believe, nor was it the fact; and even if it was, he would hardly whisper it in a corner, instead of proclaiming it in the face of the world, and encouraging the presumptuous hopes of the enemy. The right hon. gentleman, after recapitulating his various arguments, urged the necessity of a strong financial system; the people were able and ready to support it, and he implored his right hon. friend to turn his thoughts to that subject before the next session of parliament.

said, that he agreed with the two hon. gentlemen who had spoken before him in that which, indeed, the appearance of the House sufficiently testified; namely, that the majority of the House felt a strong disinclination to turn their attention to subjects of the nature of that now under discussion. He could not, however, agree with the hon. baronet (sir T. Turton) that this disinclination arose from a conviction of the alarming state of public affairs, and an unwillingness to look into the real situation of the country. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not so belie the solid sense and manly fortitude of this nation, as to believe that like a bankrupt spendthrift, it was afraid to look into its accounts. He believed that the House had judgment to discern, and resolution to execute, whatever measures were necessary to the security of the country, however painful might be the sacrifices which those measures might involve. They had on former occasions shown themselves equal to the effort of making such sacrifices, and he did not doubt that, as often as the necessity should again arise, they would not fall short of their former conduct.

The hon. baronet, as the general remedy for the evils which he had deplored, had proposed the appointment of a committee to investigate the finances of the country. —He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) begged to remind the hon. baronet that several such committees had been appointed, and he was far from undervaluing the effect of their labours. He knew how much the country owed to that committee of which the Speaker had been the chairman, and how much it was also indebted to another, whose laborious exertions were not yet terminated. But if a committee were wanting, he thought the House, in the present state of its numbers, might well answer the purpose of such a committee, and the temper and moderation with which hon. gentlemen had addressed the House, would lead him to augur favourably of their deliberations.

But though he gave the hon. baronet the fullest credit for the intentions with which he had brought forward the resolutions which he had proposed to the House, and though he agreed in the accuracy of many of the statements contained in them, he believed that, so far as those statements were accurate, they would be found embodied in the series of resolutions which he himself proposed to submit to the House, when it should have decided with respect to those of the hon. baronet; and he also had met with so many errors and inaccuracies in the hon. baronet's statements, that he could by no means recommend to the House to adopt them as resolutions.

He should therefore adopt the course which had been usual on similar occasions, of moving the previous question upon them, except the last, which appeared to him so objectionable, that he could not consent to meet it otherwise than by a decided negative. It had, indeed, been condemned by the right hon. gentleman who followed (Mr. Tierney) and he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not conceive a proposition more calculated to damp the spirit of this country, and to encourage the hopes of the enemy.—Were the people of this nation indeed so reduced as to believe, and were their representatives ready to confess, that the total ruin of our finances could only be averted by peace? Could any thing be more calculated even to defeat its own purpose, and to destroy all hopes of a tolerable peace, while at the same time, it enfeebled the energy, and destroyed the resources of war?

He then pointed out some of the errors to which he objected in sir T. Turton's resolutions, and proceeded to observe, with respect to those proposed by Mr. Tierney, that he thought the tabular form in which the right hon. gentleman had stated them extremely convenient, as presenting to the view, in the shortest and clearest manner, the general result of the public accounts. For this reason he thought that if the House should be engaged in a similar discussion in a future year, it might be convenient to adopt the form he had proposed; but in the present instance, he could not consent to adopt the resolutions themselves, having discovered some considerable inaccuracies in them, and suspecting others, which the want of time had prevented him from tracing.

He should therefore move the previous question upon the right hon. gentleman's resolutions also, with a view of proposing others, prepared in a form to which, on other occasions, the House had given its sanction, and the accuracy of which had undergone official examination.

After some observations on those parts of Mr. Tierney's resolutions which he considered as inaccurate, and pointing out his reasons for differing from them, he proceeded to observe that he (Mr. T.) appeared to suppose that there was something extraordinary and mysterious in the present low state of the funds, and after much investigation, had at last pitched upon what appeared to him to be a very whimsical reason for it. The right hon. gent. intimated an opinion that the low price of the funds was occasioned by the greatness of the war taxes. This appeared to him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) to be one of those fanciful discoveries which sometimes insinuate themselves into an ingenious mind, while it was so far from having any real foundation, that it was the exact reverse of the actual fact. The public expenditure was defrayed, partly by sums raised within the year, of which the war taxes formed the principal branch, and partly by loan. Now it was obvious to common sense, that an increase of the loan must have a tendency to depress the funds. If, therefore, an increase of the war taxes produced the same effect, it would follow that the same effect might arise from contradictory causes, a species of logic which seemed to him very novel. To him it appeared that, without resorting to any mysterious cause, the great amount of the loan of the year, and, in particular, the great extent of our foreign expenditure, together with that want of confidence which could not fail to attend an unsettled state of public affairs, would sufficiently account for the depression of the funds. The sums raised by loan amounted in this year to no less than 35,000,000l. and our foreign expences in Europe only, besides naval and colonial expences, might probably not fall short of 15,000,000l. The same effect had, in former cases, been produced by the same causes. In the years 1795 and 1796, public credit was depressed to an extraordinary degree, under the same circumstances, of increasing loans and great foreign expenditure. The depression could not at that time arise from war taxes, because no war taxes then existed; but what was not less unfortunate for the right hon. gentleman's theory, in 1798 and 1799, war taxes to a considerable amount were actually imposed, and the funds, instead of falling still lower, rapidly rose.

The right hon. gentleman had made an observation on the conduct of the Bank, which the circumstances were far from warranting. He had accused that corporation of occasioning the unfavourable terms of the loan, by pressing upon the government, suddenly, and at a most inconvenient time, for a reduction of Exchequer Bills. The right hon. gentleman was wholly mistaken in the fact. The application of the Bank was so far from being sudden, that it had been mentioned to him by Mr. Perceval several months ago, and upon a reference to the books at the treasury, he found that a correspondence on the subject had existed for upwards of a twelvemonth. The increase of Exchequer bills, whether upon the whole expedient or not, was so far from originating in any proposition from the Bank, that it had been uniformly discouraged by that body. It appeared to have been adopted to avoid a greater increase of the funded debt, and in the hope, which events had disappointed, of an opportunity of converting them into stock to greater advantage. Mr. Pitt had acted several years ago upon similar expectations, and met with the same disappointment, and he could not think that any blame was to be attributed to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer on this subject, though his views had certainly not been realized.

The right hon. gentleman had alluded to another subject, on which he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had differed from his predecessor, namely, that of the loan of 1809, charged upon the war taxes; but he had, at the time, assigned his reasons for that difference of opinion, and did not wish now to revert to them.

He might be allowed shortly to touch upon the more pleasing view of those parts of Mr. Perceval's financial administration, which he thought deserving of public approbation. Mr. Perceval had brought to the conduct of the finances (a branch of business to which his early habits had not much accustomed him) the resources of a judicious, powerful and penetrating mind, and the most exemplary integrity and diligence; and his success, he believed, exceeded the expectations of the public, and certainly exceeded those which he (Mr. V.) had formed, much as he had known and respected the general powers of Mr. Perceval's mind. In two respects he thought his measures particularly deserving of commendation and imitation. First, in the plans for the suppression of frauds on the revenue, and for its more speedy and regular collection, in which plans he believed his predecessor had been ably seconded by the hon. gentleman on the floor (Mr. Huskisson.) The other point to which he alluded, was Mr. Perceval's care in limiting the nominal capital of the public debt by funding in preference in those stocks which bear a high rate of interest. He knew that there were many persons, and among them some whose opinions were very deserving of attention, to whom this appeared a point of little consequence. He could, however, by no means agree with them, for, in the first place, the effect upon public opinion was great. Even in this country, in which the nature of our funds is so well understood, the amount of our public debt was always spoken of, and its state at different periods compared, according to the extent of its nominal capital. In foreign countries this was much more decidedly the case, and no ideas were entertained by, or could be easily explained to, foreigners, of the difference of value between funds of an equal nominal amount. But there was another difference much more real and effective. Whatever might be the actual value received for any portion of stock which was created, it was, strictly speaking, only redeemable by the payment of its nominal capital, at par. It was not indeed probable that this extreme case would often happen, but it must usually occur that a sum borrowed in time of war would, in time of peace, be redeemed by a payment greatly exceeding the amount of the loan for which it was created. In sums of so large an extent, this excess of payment might amount to many millions, which would have been saved, if funds of a high rate of interest, equally redeemable by payment of their nominal capital, could be resorted to. This, however, could not always be the case; at least without a sacrifice with respect to the rate of interest, even greater than the inconvenience of increasing the nominal capital. These observations might be illustrated by the actual occurrences of the present year. The loan which he had lately contracted in the 3 per cents might probably in its redemption cost the public much more in proportion than that raised by his predecessor in the 5 per cents. But he had been precluded by a positive stipulation entered into when that previous loan was contracted, from attempting to raise any further loan upon a 5 per cent fund; and even if no such stipulation had existed, the state of the market would, he believed, have rendered it impossible to do so.

It was, however, true that the increase of the public debt had been limited, not so much by the particular mode of borrowing, as by the great efforts of the country to raise supplies within the year. Much had been said, in the course of the session, by different gentlemen, of the necessity of equalizing our income and our expenditure. He fully agreed with those gentlemen, in the importance of keeping this object in view; but he desired to point out to the House in how great a degree it had already been obtained by the spirit and resources of the country. In the ten years preceding the peace of Amiens, the amount of capital added to the public debt, was, upon an average, not much less in each year, than 28,000,000l. In the nine years between the renewal of the war and the 1st of February last, the annual average addition had been only about 8,000,000l. and the extraordinary loans of the present year would only raise the average to between 9 and 10 millions. He must, however, observe, that the loans of the present year, amounting, for Great Britain, to 28,000,000l. must not be considered entirely as an addition to the debt. The repayment of Exchequer Bills, amounting to 2,500,000l. and of 100,000l. Loyalty Loan ought to be deducted, leaving therefore an actual increase of debt, of less than 25 millions and a half.

Still, this was a great, and he must be allowed to say, an extraordinary extent of loan. The right hon. gentleman had observed that there was nothing extraordinary in the circumstances of the present year, to account for an unusual increase of debt. He was, however, of a very different opinion, and could mention two circumstances occurring in the present year, either of which had been usually found sufficient materially to diminish the incomes of the country, and which, when united, could not fail to have a very considerable operation; while, on the other hand, the extent of our military services had raised the amount of the public expences higher than at any former period. The first of these was the stagnation of trade; the second, the high price of grain. In one point of view, indeed, the effect of the stagnation of trade was rather of a consolatory than of an alarming nature. It was generally believed even in this country, but was universally admitted, as a sort of political axiom on the continent, that the resources of Great Britain were wholly dependent on her commerce. That this opinion was implicitly received by the ruler of France was evident from his measures. There was no extent of privation or suffering to which he was not ready to reduce his own subjects, when by so doing he could hope to embarrass or cripple our trade: in this attempt he had succeeded to a very considerable degree, and a combination of other causes had much increased our difficulties. Comparing the accounts of the last year with those of the two years which preceeded, it would appear that the exports of British manufactures had been diminished not less than one third. On learning this fact, the French Emperor would undoubtedly anticipate a similar reduction of our revenue; but what appeared to be the fact? The total produce of all taxes in the year ending the 5th of April 1812 had indeed fallen short of that of the preceding year, by about 800,000l. a sum by no means so great as to be alarming. But in the year ending the 5th of July, the produce of the taxes had actually exceeded that of the corresponding year. This was not less consolatory to us than alarming to those who flattered themselves that we were upon the verge of despair and ruin.

The nations of the continent had been ready to conclude that any depression of our trade must relax our exertions, but they now might see that this was not the case, and that we were still able to main- tain a long struggle, and disappoint those who wished for our destruction.

The effects of the high price of grain upon our revenue he need not point out; they were sufficiently obvious, and had been verified by all former experience.

He was ready, indeed, to admit, and no man had more strongly felt, or oftener avowed, his conviction, that a great and arduous struggle still remained before us, and that, however strenuous the exertions had been which the country had already made to equalize its income and expenditure, much might yet remain to be done. So far as this could be effected by a reduction of expence, he should consider it as the most unobjectionable mode, and he should be equally ready to devote his own attention to the investigation of this subject, and to listen to the suggestions of others. But he could not avoid agreeing with the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. T.) that any economy in expenditure which could be looked for, except by a reduction of the great naval and military establishments of the country, was not likely materially to diminish the scale of the public expences, though, in other respects, most important, so far as it could be carried into effect.

With regard to a reduction of those establishments, that must be considered rather as a political than a financial question, and must be viewed in relation to the whole system of the operations of government. Whatever further aid might be required for so important an end, he was convinced that on a fair proof of its necessity, the country would be ready to contribute. Here, however, he must beg leave to explain himself. He thought it necessary that the income of the country should be such as to bear, without an addition of debt, what might be called the ordinary and permanent expences of the war, by which he meant all those which were not immediately connected with great enterprizes abroad. A great foreign expenditure was not necessarily connected with a state of war, and unless, from peculiar circumstances, it appeared likely to be of long continuance, it was rather to be considered as a temporary and extraordinary exertion. To this therefore he considered the extraordinary means which our public credit afforded as peculiarly applicable, taking care, nevertheless, that those means should not be overstrained, nor any false indulgence prevent our having recourse to more burdensome measures, if the long continuance of such expences should render them necessary. To place the finances of this country in such a state of permanent security, vigorous efforts had been made at three different periods; the first, by Mr. Pitt in 1798 and 1799, when the first war taxes were imposed: the next by Mr. Addington, upon the renewal of the war: when the expences and income of the nation were so nearly equalized, that by following the same system, this object would have been completely attained in a few years. It was, however, in a certain degree deranged by the German war of 1805, and another effort became necessary, which was made by lord Grenville and lord Henry Petty in 1806. And this effort he considered as having nearly, if not absolutely accomplished its purpose; for he believed it would be found, that, from that time to the present, all our expences, with the exception of foreign operations, would be covered by the income of the nation. He was not, therefore, of opinion, that further measures of a very burdensome nature were immediately necessary, though, if he should feel their necessity, he should as little shrink from proposing, as he trusted parliament would from adopting them. If the support of public credit, which must, at all events, be upheld, or any extraordinary pressure of expence, should make a great temporary exertion necessary, measures might be resorted to, some of which had been practised in other countries, and might be accommodated to the use of this. One of these, which would be effective to a great degree, would be a tax on capital, as distinguished from income. This had been frequently employed in other countries, and particularly in Holland, where, to a moderate extent, it had been usual in time of war, before the Revolution; but where, after the French invasion, it had been so extended, that, by an accurate account which he had procured during the peace of Amiens, it appeared that every proprietor had, between the Revolution and that time, paid upwards of 30 per cent. upon the whole value of his property. But what was very remarkable, and proved the inexhaustible resources of industry and good order, Holland still remained at that period the most wealthy country on the continent, although, in addition to these enormous contributions, she had lost her colonies and the greatest part of her foreign trade, and was subjected to a government by no means agreeable to the people. He was far from contemplating the necessity in this country of resorting to measures of so severe a nature, though he was convinced that, in case of necessity this country would readily pay, in the cause of independence and honour, what Holland had been forced to submit to, amidst subjection and disgrace. He could not say on whom the task might fall of proposing financial measures to the consideration of parliament in the next session, but should it be his arduous duty, he should probably feel it necessary to propose some plan, whatever it might be, for the more effectual support of public credit. What particularly occurred to him would be to make some addition to the Sinking Fund for whatever portion of the loan might exceed the amount of the sum to be redeemed within the year. Such a plan had, to a small extent, been already carried into execution in the present session, with respect to the Indian loan, and he might probably have proposed some similar measure of a more general kind, if the immediate urgency of bringing forward the financial arrangements of the year had not precluded him from making any material alteration in the plans which he already found digested by his lamented predecessor. He concluded by moving the previous question on the first Resolution proposed by sir Thomas Turton.

thought that the House was much indebted to the hon. baronet for having called their attention to this very important subject; and conceived, that at some period of every session, it was proper to take into consideration the financial situation of the country. He thought upon the whole, that the view of our financial resources at the end of twenty years of hostilities, was calculated to give satisfaction to the country, and produce a feeling of exultation and pride. If ever there was a time in which the revenue of the country could be expected to have materially diminished, it was during the present pressure on our trade; and yet many parts of it (the Excise Duties particularly) had not decreased. We had the satisfaction to see that the ordinary taxes had not impaired the industry or resources of the country. That difficulty which had been always apprehended from the amount of taxation, we had not experienced. There was, however, another difficulty, and that a most serious one, in the pre- sent state of public credit. It was obvious, that some steps must be taken to raise the public credit. It was, therefore, necessary to consider every possible means of diminishing the loans. Retrenchment of expences was the means most generally spoken of. Nothing could be more fair, more respectable, or more likely to conciliate good will, than retrenching every useless expenditure. It must, however, be allowed, that no very considerable saving could be made, except by the reduction of some of our great establishments. He had long thought that considerable reductions might safely take place, particularly in our naval establishments. Reductions, he was convinced, might also be made with safety in our colonial expences, and in some of our military establishments, at home, as well as abroad. There had been a rapid increase of our navy lately, when the necessity was by no means apparent. In the year 1805, when there was a hostile fleet of 33 sail of the line in the harbour of Cadiz, and the Northern powers were doubtful—in that year, when the battle of Trafalgar was fought,—we had only 120,000 seamen; whereas now, instead of having diminished our navy in consequence of that victory, we employed 145,000. He certainly wished our naval superiority to be preserved; but there might be an unnecessary display of naval force, purchased much too dear by an excessive expenditure. But this was a question which should be left to the executive government. He believed, however, that there was a natural tendency in every department to draw as much as possible of the supplies of the year to itself. He considered this a very natural feeling; but at the same time the government should seriously consider whether the expenditure for the navy was not greater than any necessity required. He believed, also, that an unnecessary expence was incurred in many of our colonial establishments. He wished that this country would take a lesson from its powerful enemy, who always made his great exertions only for great objects; whereas if an equal degree of expenditure took place for every minute object, as well as for great ones, the resources even of this country might be found insufficient to produce any favourable results. Recommending it to ministers most seriously to consider whether there was not too great an expenditure in the naval and colonial departments, he would say, that the country must be prepared for greater sacrifices. As to peace, it was most evident that this country had no private object for continuing the war, if it could be concluded with safety and honour; but we must be content to make great sacrifices indeed, rather than make a peace in violation of our plighted faith to our allies, or such a peace as would degrade us to a second rate power in Europe. However peace must generally be wished for, yet annihilation would be better than giving up our honour, or our rank as a great power. He thought it absolutely necessary that our public credit should be supported, and raised from its present depression. By its depression there had been, in the course of a few years, a deterioration in the value of funded property of 20 per cent. This was a most serious loss to those who had purchased a few years ago. With regard to Ireland, it was a country rising very rapidly, which possessed a great capital, and which paid no direct tax. No income tax was paid there on the value of land, and officers living in that cheap country were exempted from a tax, which they must pay when upon foreign service, and in the dearest countries. This was most unequal, and, as he thought, oppressive to this country. The consequence of it as to public credit was this: that although the legal interest in Ireland was 6l. per cent, the Irish 5 per cents were at par, while the English were at 86. It was evidently necessary that the public credit should be improved in this country, and that government should be enabled to conclude their loans without paying more than the legal interest for money. To accomplish this, it would be necessary for the country to make great exertions and great sacrifices.

thought that it was a very happy circumstance, that this discussion had been carried on with so much candour, and without any party spirit. The real opinions of the men whose authority was principally looked up to on financial questions, had been most fairly stated to the House. It appeared from these candid statements, that their opinions differed but little, and that they were all agreed that some considerable exertion must be made towards equalizing the revenue with the expenditure. It had hitherto been an unfortunate circumstance, that in the rapid changes of administration, each appeared to think it more necessary to get through the busi- ness of the year than to look forward to future times. From the discussion of this night, however, it was evident, that whoever might be Chancellor of the Exchequer next year, he must propose some plan for equalizing the revenue and the expenditure. It certainly might have been expected, that our complete success in the East and West Indies would have enabled us to have made a considerable reduction in our naval force. It was on this account that those conquests were considered valuable. He conceived, that the resources of this country were fully sufficient to meet any sacrifices that might be required, for the purpose of equalizing the revenue and the expenditure.

was induced to make some observations, especially in regard to the measures of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, for whose reputation he was naturally anxious. Other gentlemen who had spoken, though all feeling admiration for the virtues of Mr. Perceval, had been, some of them opposed to him on all polical subjects, and all of them opposed to him as to parts of his financial administration. His hon. friend indeed (Mr. Huskisson) had so correctly explained some of Mr. Perceval's measures as to relieve him from the necessity of going at length into the discussion. In illustration, however, of what had been said by Mr. H. of the hope held out to the people in 1807, that they would have a respite of three years from taxation, Mr. C. had to observe, that the fulfilment of this expectation might in one point of view be considered as favourable even to the progress of the revenue. When that expectation was held out by lord Henry Petty, it was said, that by abstaining from new impositions, we should give fair play to the existing taxes, the operation whereof, unchecked by additions, might probably encrease so as to produce the same effect as an increase of taxation. And this certainly might be said to have happened, for it appeared that the Revenue existing in 1807, had produced

But his hon. friend having brought Mr. Perceval to the year 1809, there left him; (a laugh)—Mr. C. did not mean to allude to his political abandonment, but his abandonment in argument,—but Mr. C. wished to say, in reference to the measure of 1810, that the additional produce of the stamp duties, then made applicable to the interest of the loan, had been created by Mr. Perceval himself in 1808, so that there were in fact only three years during which the practice of abstaining from taxation prevailed. What had been said upon Mr. Perceval's adoption of a part of the famous plan of 1807 was quite erroneous. Mr. Perceval created the additional sinking Fund required by that plan, but without sanctioning the alienation, which that plan authorized, of the Sinking Fund in future.

Mr. C. then made a statement, shewing that, notwithstanding the abstinence from new imposts in several years, the progress of the revenue during Mr. Perceval's administration, taking together the increase of the old, and the produce of the new taxes, was very nearly commensurate with the increase of charge. The question, however, of how we were to proportion the burthen between the present and the future was certainly one of great difficulty, and he did not wish, any more than his hon. friend, to see a repetition of the measure of 1810.

With respect to the revenue in general, he did not think that even the Resolutions of his right hon. friend placed it in a sufficiently prominent point of view. He was desirous of shewing how it had continued to flourish. The taxes existing before the war had produced

that is to say, they were now very little short of the very flourishing year, 1802, and considerably higher than the average prior to the war. And this, notwithstanding the addition of new permanent and war taxes, to the amount of more than 15,000,000l., exclusive of the Property Tax!—These observations applied particularly to the Excise, a branch of revenue from which the prosperity of the country was especially to be deduced. The Excise, as it stood before the war, produced

the last year having been, in spite of all discouragements, the most productive that had ever been known.

The inexpediency of coming to the Resolutions proposed by the hon. baronet, he thought had been sufficiently shewn by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. On the speech and propositions of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Tierney), he would say a few words. That right hon. gentleman was quite incorrect in his statement respecting the Sinking Fund; he had represented it to be law at present, that the Fund should go on accumulating, until the whole debt of the country should be annihilated. It was not so; the consolidation which took place in 1802, applied only to the several Sinking Funds as they then stood, and which were thenceforward to be united, and jointly applicable to the redemption of the debt then existing. This consolidated Sinking Fund now amounted to nearly 9,000,000l., and would redeem the debt existing in 1802, in 15 or 16 years. This statement Mr. C. wished to be applied to Mr. T.'s second Resolution. He had stated the proportion of the annual supplies raised by the revenue, and that raised by money borrowed; and he had shewn that the money borrowed was becoming the larger portion. Now, if from his statement of the unmortgaged revenue, he excluded, as he had in fact done, the amount of the Sinking Fund, he ought to consider his statement as applicable only to the period in which that Sinking Fund would remain entirely inapplicable to general purposes. If, on the other hand, he omitted to take notice of the period at which the Sinking Fund would begin to operate in direct relief to the people, and considered the whole as perpetually accumulating, he ought certainly to add its amount to his estimate of our unmortgaged, or (as lord H. Petty had styled it) our free revenue. Having alluded to the Sinking Fund, Mr. C. was anxious to express his earnest hope, that no encroachments would be made upon it. Its efficacy arose from the strict adherence to it which had been so justly the praise of Mr. Pitt and subsequent ministers. This adherence was infinitely more laudable even than the original institution. He would here just hint, that if any very strong measure, such as those alluded to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were adopted, it might be expedient to put it in the shape of an addition to the consolidated Sinking Fund, so as to accelerate the period at which the very great charge of the debt in 1802 (more than 20,000,000l.) would be set free. Mr. C. had, at the time, expressed his disapprobation of the measure adopted in 1802, by which the period of direct relief from the Sinking Fund was postponed; he had, as he trusted his right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart) would do him the justice to recollect, protested elsewhere against any misapplication of the Sinking Fund, and he must beg leave to repeat and confirm that protest.

He had come to the House prepared to hear, that the state of our finances was such, that we could not continue to carry on the war upon its present scale; but he was most happy to observe, that, except from the hon. baronet, he had heard no such sentiment. Others only said that we could not continue it upon the present system of finance. Mr. C. was of opinion, that we could carry on the war upon a variety of financial systems; that if we wished to abstain for a longer period from new taxes, we could do so; or that we could raise new taxes if we determined to do so. The latter seemed at present the system, popular in the House and the country, and he had no doubt but that in the next year, his right hon. friend would be prepared with a measure of great exertion, by which all our difficulties would be removed.

regretted that the colleagues of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not been present, that they might have heard the important views which had that night been given of the state of the finances. What had become of the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and the rest, who had always vaunted so loudly of the prosperous state of the country, especially in the year 1810, which had been one of the worst years that this country had experienced,—a year of feverish activity, and hollow speculation,—the symptom of decline, and not the source of prosperity. The result of all, however, was, that we could not go on under the present system; but an hon. gentleman over the way had consoled the House by stating, that, at the end of 15 years, a considerable fund would be at our disposal; admitting, however, that it was not to be touched till the end of these 15 years, and not explaining very clearly how he intended to drag the nation on for that same 15 years. One had suggested a tax on coals, another a tax on iron, a third tax on wool; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer threw out a hint of a tax on capital, in addition to the tax on income. These were alarming symptoms. Measures like these could hardly have been in contemplation, unless our resources had appeared to be almost desperate; and if he were to form an estimate of the state of the country from what he had that night heard, he might conclude, to use a figure of a right hon. friend of his, that the scuttling time was almost come. All appeared to agree in this, that in the present state of our income, as compared with our expenditure, we could not go on. And if this was the case:—if this view of our situation had any foundation—ought not a wise government to shew some anxiety to enter into negociations for peace. The alarming depreciation of bank-paper ought also to be noticed. Our situation in that respect was now a great deal worse than when the House agreed to the whimsical Resolution of the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, that in public estimation paper was equal to gold. What would be the situation of the country, if, in addition to all our other difficulties, we should be involved in the calamity of a continued war with America? We were at this moment at war with America, though he hoped that it would not long continue. But if it did, and such taxes as they had heard of that night were to be imposed under the increased difficulties of the country, it might indeed then be said, that the scuttling time was come. He concurred in the resolution of the hon. baronet, recommending a due attention to the restoration of peace. But then it was said, the executive government ought not to be fettered. This was true, if the government had evinced an earnest desire to procure peace on honourable terms, which, he contended, it had not. Let them send to Buonaparté, and state the terms on which they were desirous to conclude a peace, as he had repeatedly sent to us. If they did not do this, they would probably be soon compelled to do it, by petitions from the people, and would thereby be forced to accept of worse terms. Why had not a diminution in the expenditure of the naval department taken place, when our fleets had so little occupation, and when our navy was so much more powerful than any thing that could be brought to oppose it? As a proof of that superiority, without keeping up such great numbers of ships, if any proof had been wanting, he might mention an anecdote of our admiral on the Scheldt station, who wrote to government that the Scheldt fleet appeared preparing to come out, begging at the same time that they should not think of sending him reinforcements; they had 16 ships; he had 12; if they sent him more, the French would not venture out; while he had only 12, they might; and he was sure of giving them a sound drubbing. The tax on wool was one which had never yet been in the contemplation of any of our financiers.—He then asked, what would be our situation, if, which God forbid, there should be occasion for another Regency? This, though unlikely, was not impossible, and might have the worst effect on public credit. He, however, was not to blame, for he had made the attempt to provide against that contingency. He also adverted to the seclusion in which the princess Charlotte of Wales lived, who was now out of her minority by law. Those who were to be her future subjects ought more frequently to see the princess, the hope and glory of England, as he trusted she would be. He concluded by again recommending a sincere attempt for the restoration of peace.

paid a high compliment to the memory of Mr. Pitt, who had rendered the finances of the country so clear, that they might be understood by the most ordinary capacities. He was anxious for peace. He was by no means disposed to say, that it was impossible to conclude peace with Buonaparté. This country must derive security from its strength and resources independent of any consideration of his character. But surely the hon. gentleman could not imagine that any peace could at present be made on the terms of leaving Spain in the hands of Joseph Buonaparté. He concluded by strongly recommending all possible retrenchment and economy.

denied that the Enst India Company would eventually become any burden upon this country. He only wished that the government of this country would take example by the system which had recently been adopted by the governor general of India, and keep their expenditure within their income.

observed, With reference to what had been said of the effect of an American war upon our finances, that he had no reason to think it would be so ruinous as had been supposed. We had been for some time past with America in a state little different from that in which we should be placed by a war, in a state which in some respects was worse than would result from a war of any duration. Though he differed much from those who asserted that war with America would be so ruinous to our finances, he readily assumed the converse of that proposition, that if a sincere reconciliation took place between this country and America, it would be a most important and beneficial event; and an event likely materially to contribute to ameliorate our present situation. With respect to what he had said of a tax upon capital, he had not spoken of it as of a measure which he had it in contemplation to adopt; but as one, which in a case of extreme necessity might be tried in this country, as it had been in others. A tax upon capital had been established in Holland; and he, at the peace of Amiens, had procured an account of its produce, from the time at which the French took possession of Holland, up to the period at which he procured the paper he spoke of. From this account it appeared, that the produce of the tax, in eight years, had amounted to no less than thirty per cent. on the total capital of the country; yet, under the heavy pressure of this tax, the United Provinces remained the most wealthy nation in Europe. This he mentioned as an example, not to be followed, but to shew, that even the pressure of such a tax would not inevitably ruin a country, nor, as some had appeared to think it must, wholly crush the spirit of its industry.

The previous question was then put and carried upon all the Resolutions moved by sir Thomas Turton, except the last, to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer was about to move a negative, when sir T. Turton agreed to modify it in any manner which might render it palatable to his Majesty's ministers. The hon. baronet then proposed to leave out all the words after the word "peace," which meeting the approbation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. gentleman proposed to meet the Resolution as he had done the former ones, namely, by the previous question, instead of a direct negative. After some conversation the gallery was cleared for a division, and, in the absence of strangers, it was agreed, that the previous question should be carried.

The previous question was then put and carried upon the Resolutions moved by Mr. Tierney.

then moved the following Resolutions, which were agreed to by the House.