brought op the Report on the Sinecure Offices Bill. On the question for reading the amendments of the committee a second time,

said, that he felt so many objections to the principle of the Bill, that he could not content himself with giving a silent vote. The principle of the Bill appeared to be, to substitute as the reward of services a fixed pension to be allotted by parliament according to the length of service, in the place of those rewards which the crown was enabled to bestow in the shape of those offices that were now sought to be abolished. It appeared to him, that it was of great importance to the state, that the highest civil offices should be discharged by men of eminent abilities. The individuals the best qualified for those offices were generally to be found among that class of men, who for the provision of their families, were under the necessity of looking in part to the fair remuneration which was due for the exercise of their talent. If a high qualification in point of property were necessary to enable a man to hold any of the higher offices of the state, the great probability was, that they would not be so well filled as under the existing system. The criterion of merit and re-ward appeared, by the present Bill, to be appreciated merely by the length of time during which a man had filled certain offices. This criterion seemed to him to be most inapplicable to those men of great talents, whom the country would wish to see placed in important situations. Supposing a man of great talents, who could not agree in all the measures of the administration with which he was connected, and who, therefore, thought it his duty to divest himself of office, would it be said, that such a man should never, under another administration, receive the reward of his services and talents, merely because he had not continued in office for the time specified in the Bill? or was it desirable that such a man should be obliged to continue in the administration for the purpose of obtaining the reward due to his past services? He thought that it was taking a very narrow view of the subject, to measure the merit of public men, and their claims to remuneration for their services, merely by the length of time that they had filled any particular office. Some gentlemen looked to this Bill as a diminution of the influence of the crown: but he could not bring himself to view it in that light. As the favours of the crown were bestowed from the recommendations of its ministers, it would be found, that the gratitude which was occasioned by those gifts was usually paid to the minister who had procured the grants more than to the crown, and in the changes of administration which took place, persons thus favoured acted with those to whom they considered themselves indebted; and thus, in fact, a counterpoise to the power of the crown was formed. He thought that it would be much better that the power of rewarding civil services should remain with the executive, and be exercised at the responsibility of ministers, than that such claims should be canvassed among the different parties in that House, who could be no judges of the value of the services, and who could not be supposed to be quite impartial in their estimation of them. He was aware, that the reward of military and naval services, had, not un-frequently, been made the subject of debate in parliament. But, in those cases, the splendour of the achievements spoke for themselves, and the voice of the public generally out-ran the determination of parliament. This was very different from appreciating the merits of civil services, because the House could know very little of the interior arrangements of public offices; nor could it be expected that strict justice would be done between parties who had been political rivals. This was borne out by the case of Mr. Perceval. That excellent man had given up a most extensive practice to attend to public affairs; but yet, when provision was sought to be made for his family, it was observed that it was not on account of that sacrifice that provision should be made, but in consequence of his melancholy fate, which was unparalleled in the history of this country. He had reserved his opposition to the present stage of the Bill, because he was convinced his objections could not be cured in the committee. He looked upon the number of places specified in the Bill, as excepted from its operation, to be by far too few. The first commissioner for the affairs of India, was an office quite as laborious as any mentioned in the Bill; the secretary to that office had a duty to perform no less important; there was also an office which he (Mr. Holford) formerly held, which, if it were excluded from the list contained in the Bill, because there were no considerable duties annexed to it, he could assure the hon. gentleman, was entirely mistaken and misunderstood. There were various situations which called for rewards, that could not be enumerated in the Bill.—For instance, some offices were more effective at one time than at another, and were rendered more effective in some hands than in others. He thought that no way of rewarding services could be worse than an inflexible parliamentary rule, which regarded only the length of time that a man had been in office, and not the services which he had rendered to the country. He hoped that this Bill would not be resorted to merely on the ground of popularity; for if the House were now to give way merely on that ground, a future set of reformers would quarrel with pensions, and others would insist that the honour of holding civil situations was sufficient, without any salaries being annexed to them. He conceived that the adoption of the Bill would be an unworthy sacrifice to popularity, and not likely to be productive of any public good. As he held no office himself, his opposition could not be attributed to any unworthy motive. He concluded by moving as an amendment, that the amendments should be read a second time that day six months.

A pretty general cry of question, question, then took place, and no other member shewing any disposition to speak,

rose and said, that he had waited in the hopes of hearing the sentiments of other gentlemen upon this subject. He thought that the hon. gentleman had mistaken, in many points, the object of this Bill. It was by no means his wish to take away the power of giving pensions from the executive, in whose hands alone it could safely be left, subject to the responsibility of ministers. Nothing could be more extravagant than to bring before that House a discussion on merits of individuals holding high civil offices, or the value of their claims for remuneration. Different parties would necessarily think differently on that subject, and the House could be in no condition to form a correct judgment. The hon. gentleman was also mistaken, if he thought that the present Bill gave an absolute and indefeasible claim to every person who had filled certain offices for the time therein mentioned. The Bill only vested a power in the crown of conferring such rewards, if they should appear to be merited; and he did not suppose that any minister would recommend the same rewards for ignorance and inattention as for talents and meritorious services. The hon. gentleman had said, that many meritorious persons would go without reward, if they had not remained in office, for the time specified in the Bill: but was it not now the case, that many persons equally meritorious on the other side of the House, and who had not been in office at all, or only for a very short time, were without any reward for their public services? Those places fell to the lot of but very few, and there were many very deserving men in that House who had no chance of obtaining them. His idea was, that salaries should only be given to efficient offices, and that the rewards for merit and services should be conferred in another way. As to the principle which the hon. gentleman had thrown out, that many a man would prefer a smaller provision for his son to a larger one for himself, this was not generally to be adopted. Although the country owed rewards to wounded soldiers and broken down sailors, would it be contended that those men should be allowed to substitute a young life in their place to receive those rewards. He certainly thought that it was necessary that proper rewards should be given for civil services, or otherwise men who were the best qualified to perform them might be discouraged from coming forward into public life. He only meant to follow up the principle which Mr. Burke had adopted in his Bill of 1782, and which had afterwards been pursued by Mr. Pitt. If gentlemen would consider the number of offices that had been put under regulations since the year 1782, it would appear that the question which now remained for their consideration was, why the other places should not now be placed under similar regulations? He rather more agreed with the ideas of Mr. Pitt than with those of Mr. Burke, who had brought in his Bill of 1782, avowedly with the object of diminishing the influence of the crown. Mr. Pitt had merely wished to proportion the salaries to the services performed; and this was the object he had in view, without considering the question as it bore upon the influence of the crown. There was no friend of rational reform who would deny that public services were entitled to reward; and although distinguished military and naval services had more of splendour in them, and therefore came forward in a more prominent point of view, yet laborious sacrifices in high civil situations were certainly deserving of remuneration; and if they did not obtain it, the country might lose the benefit of the best talents it produced. He thought, however, that no office should be either created or continued merely for the sake of increasing the influence of the executive. He was also of opinion that in the great extension of the public expences, it would be right to shew the people, that while large sums were voted for public services, the House was equally attentive to save whatever could be spared in the general expenditure. The hon. gentleman had stated, that this Bill was an unworthy sacrifice to popularity. He denied that any such sacrifice was intended to be made. He conceived, however, that it was fit to pay salary only for services performed; and in that opinion it was very natural for the public to coincide. But, he was sure, any person who looked at the question with a statesman's eye, would see the propriety and necessity of such a Bill; and he was no less convinced that neither the hon. gentleman, nor any other individual, could ever hear an unconstitutional proposition stated by him, nor by any of those whose assistance he had availed himself of in the progress of the measure. They had taken the case into their rational consideration, and he never heard the principle defended by one of them, that no subsistence should be granted to those, who, either from age, from accident, or from political changes, should be necessitated to give up their situation, provided they had deserved well of the public. The just way of looking at the Bill was, not to compare it with any system of ideal perfection, but to examine its capacity with reference to the evils it was intended to remedy. He and his friends had performed their duty, and it remained for those who objected to the measure, to shew why those officers, which were useless, should not be removed. He hoped the conduct of the House, that night, would not disappoint the hopes of the country.

expressed his intention of opposing the principle of the Bill. He felt, as a minister, the disadvantages under which he rose to oppose any measure which stood on the professed ground of reform, either as a question of economy, or with reference to a regulation of the powers of the crown. He felt also an additional disadvantage in opposing it, because a similar measure received the support of the House, in a former parliament. That support, certainly, was not of a very decisive nature, since the Bill was only carried by a majority, he believed, of not more than ten or twelve. He owned that he had been at first completely deceived as to the objects the Bill had in view, for he conceived that it went to save expence: but he would appeal to the judgment of his hon. friend (Mr. Bankes), whether or no he could entertain any rational hopes of lessening the expenditure of the country by the Bill he had introduced into parliament? He also appealed to his hon. friend for his opinion of the chance of success he might promise himself from his perseverance in that measure, when he recollected the reception his Bill had met with last year in another quarter. It was well known to his hon. friend, that the House of Lords—(Here the Speaker called to order, and the noble lord apologized)—but he would resume his argument, and maintain, that by this Bill, the expences of the country would be considerably increased, with this difference, that instead of coming directly from the crown, and in the old constitutional way, they would have to flow through a more circuitous channel. He then adverted to the places in the West Indies, which could not be reduced otherwise than gradually, and at a distant period of time; these he considered as a fair subject for future regulation; he thought it right, for example, that none of those places should be held by deputy, and should the Bill miscarry, it was his conviction, and that of the rest of his Majesty's servants, that some measure to enforce the residence of the principals should be resorted to in respect to those offices. The sum of pensions claimed for a certain duration of service would be immense, nor could any of the applicants be well refused without an implied censure on their conduct, or even a direct charge that they had misbehaved while in office. In the present system, the same inconveniency was not felt. The crown granted sinecures for the reward of civil services, but this grant was not considered as obligatory, nor did the refusal of it cast any imputation on the persons who might suppose they had a claim thereto; but by the present Bill a door may be opened to grant pensions to any one who had ever been in office for a certain length of time, and this would bring on the nation such an addition of expence as was never known before. Another objection was the practical, and indeed insuperable difficulty, which must of course be felt from abolishing at once 350 offices, and in his opinion his hon. friend had not paid sufficient attention to that point. He found another reason to oppose his hon. friend's Bill, in the power which it would give one party over another. He deprecated party spirit as much as any other man, still it was known to exist; and he thought that it would be wrong to submit to the decision of one party the rewards to be adjudged to the political services of another. He thought, for instance, that the services of the hon. gentlemen opposite, although not so long in office, equally valuable to the state, by the share they took in the debates of that House, and by their strenuous efforts to elucidate every question brought before them; and he would admit of no principle by which they should be debarred from enjoying the just recompence of those services. The opinions of Mr. Pitt and of Mr. Burke had been quoted in support of the Bill; but they had acted on the principle of limiting the patronage of the crown, while the present Bill went to do it away entirely, and was of course altogether novel. The grant of pensions might besides be considered as a fair compensation for gentlemen already in public life, but it could not be considered as such for men, called from lucrative employments in private life, to fill offices in the state, and who often made considerable sacrifices, for which they were entitled to adequate compensation. Should this Bill pass, the state must for ever lose the services of gentlemen of that description. To measure merit by time might do well enough in private life, or where the duties of the person were confined to mere industry and application; but when they looked to the larger talents necessary for the highest political offices, and to the great sacrifices often made—to weigh such talents and sacrifices with reference to the period of service, was the most unsound principle that could be acted upon, and one which would preclude the public from availing itself of the services of persons of the most splendid abilities. The House was not of that aristocratic spirit that would deprive men of humble birth, but of great talents, of any participation in the administration of the state. The arrangements proposed by the Bill appeared to him not only defective, but even unconstitutional, and tending to throw the whole power of the state into the hands of a few individuals of elevated rank, for the Bill did not provide for the diminution of offices, but for a new mode of rewarding services performed in them, and which essentially belonged to the head of government. Much had been said about the patronage of the crown, but it would be found that, instead of increasing, it had been much lessened; and this would appear evident to any one who would consider the present state of the country, and the reduced value and estimation of political remunerations. Under all those circumstances, and considering that the hon. gentlemen opposite, who had not been in the habit of being so long in office, might suffer by a measure which should regulate pensions by the time of service, he would most decidedly oppose the measure.

having given his support to a measure similar to the present in the last parliament, and having seen nothing that induced him to alter his opinion respecting it, declared that he should give his vote in its favour. He thought the Speaker had most properly restrained the noble lord from adverting to the opinions entertained in another House of Parliament, because it was not only irregular, but was bad as an argument altogether. There had been many instances, and he referred particularly to the case of the slave trade, when, notwithstanding the known hostility which prevailed against the decision of the House of Commons, in another assembly, by the exercise of a laudable perseverance, the measure was finally accomplished, and crowned by the sanction of the entire legislature. The noble lord had naturally enough taken a double view of the Bill, both as it related to the financial arrangements and economical interests of the country; and as it involved considerations of a wider and more general nature, it might not be useless to apprise new members that this was a question which had been for a long period annually agitated within those walls, that it had been contended on one side, that sinecure offices were the nurseries of undue influence, that they were pregnant with abuse, and, ex vi termini, had no connection with the service or interests of the state. To this it was answered, and, in many respects, truly answered, that those great reformers of the public expenditure, Mr. Burke and Mr. Pitt, had considered these offices as furnishing the means of remunerating efficient service, that they were generally bestowed in reward of great talents and great exertions, and that to those great sinecures which belonged to the Exchequer, except in one instance, this description accurately applied. If, then, the object and operation of this measure would be to exclude from the paths of public life and political exertion all those who were not born to hereditary opulence, or supported by powerful connections, he should give it his strenuous opposition. He was sure that such a measure could not be adopted, nor the crown disabled from selecting and rewarding the talents which might be produced in humble life, or compelled to limit the exercise of its bounty to an aristocratical confederacy, without deeply injuring the practice of the constitution. The noble lord had applied himself to the task of courting opposition to this Bill from those against whom he was generally committed in opinion. The noble lord had talked of those who were most in the habit of being in the possession of power, and had, undoubtedly, evinced a great share of liberality and consideration for those parties which had not the same good fortune or perseverance. He confessed that he was no zealot in this cause, but when he saw sinecures fall into disrepute, he considered it to be good policy to provide in some other way for the reward of public merit. The noble lord had complained that the duration of service was set up by the Bill as a measure of the claim of individuals engaged in public employments. Now, there must necessarily be some test and some limitation upon the exercise of this prerogative of the crown. It might, indeed, be left to chance, but it remained for the noble lord to show that chance was a more eligible test than that of time; surely it was better to have a certain and definite, than an unlimited and contingent measure of rewarding public service. To complete this system the noble lord ought to repeal the Reversion Bill. It might happen, that a minister of transcendant talents might be dismissed into poverty because all the sinecures were full and granted in reversion. Parliament had made a special provision for Chancellors, because they were taken from a lucrative profession, but in any other office and appointment had left time and duration of service as the measure and criterion of the service. He held in as much scorn as any man those doctrines which would strip the monarchy of its noblest attributes and appendages, and when he voted for the Bill under discussion, it was because it merely proposed a more popular substitute for that which Mr. Burke himself, in his admirable speech on economical reform, had admitted and re- cognised, as an useful source of remuneration for great and important service, and as almost uniformly flowing in that channel. The principle of time unquestionably applied to mere technical services and exertions, and it had also been applied to the duties of foreign ministers, in a Bill brought in by Mr. Perceval in the year 1810. It was by these regulations possible that a man should acquire a provision for the whole of his life, by remaining for a certain period in some sleepy German court, (he spoke of former Germany,) and performing no other achievement than that of hunting; or pass perhaps thirty years in the court of Naples, without once writing a dispatch, or recording any other fact than the quantity of game which his Neapolitan majesty had destroyed. He would not then attempt to put in competition with these occupations, the claims of him who might be called on to discharge the functions of that office now held by the noble lord, and which he himself had once the honour to hold, who might go forth to allay the storm which had desolated Europe, and mature some mighty plan to shake the tyranny of Buonaparté to its centre, and re-settle the foundations of the world. He confessed that he saw no limitation but that of time, which was not open to objections, paramount to any which he had heard urged against that criterion. Any attempt to enquire into the different species and degrees of service, and to adjust with nice proportion, the rewards or the indemnifications which had been earned, must be an infinitely productive cause of invidious feelings and complaints. He certainly did not think the present Bill perfect of its kind, or calculated to render the country any essential good, but as a decision must be formed upon it, the views and impressions of his mind would certainly incline him to give it his support.

thought, that in endeavouring to steer clear of the difficulty of not diminishing the power of the crown on the one hand, and to do away all ground for popular misrepresentation on the other, the framers of this Bill had fallen into still greater inconveniences. On the subject of appointments in the colonies, he agreed that some legislative enactment should take place to limit the licences for absence, and noticed that the noble lord at the head of that department, had, however, done as much as individual exertion could accomplish to remedy the evils which existed, and to render the offices effective. Putting this aside, and looking at the general question, he characterised it as a sweeping measure to alter the whole patronage of the crown. He was surprised the honourable gentleman should refer to Mr. Burke as an example. Mr. Burke who had done what he thought right, and then held his hand, left untouched, and recognized those offices, as fit, proper, constitutional and right, at which the hon. gentleman aimed his reforms. With regard to the argument as to time being a proper measure of public service, he maintained that where it had hitherto been applied, it had acted as a check upon the crown, and not in the sense contended for by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning). As it was, it would be easy to state many cases in which the public service, even in subordinate offices, suffered from its application. He thought that in the estimation of the public, pensions were more odious than sinecures, and concluded by giving his decided negative to the Bill.

thought that the hon. gentlemen, on the opposite side of the House, dealt rather hardly with his hon. friend in giving a direct opposition to his Bill, while in some of their arguments they admitted that there were parts of it which were deserving of their support. If they meant to deal candidly by his hon. friend and by the House, he thought they ought rather to have made a motion for the recommittal of the Bill, with a view to making such amendments as they might think expedient, than to negative it altogether. The right hon. gentleman who had last spoken had objected to the mode of rewarding meritorious services by pension, and had contended, that this plan would be liable to more public censure, would be more invidious and less honourable than the present system of granting sinecure offices. He (Mr. Ponsonby) was, however, prepared to contend, that the public would be better pleased to see persons obtain rewards in this manner; and apprehended if any ill opinion had arisen at the disposal of the public revenue heretofore, it originated in the many instances which had occured in which persons who had not merited reward by their public services, were distinguished by the gift of most profitable offices. He was convinced that the public were too just and too generous to find fault with the grant of proper remuneration, where they saw a legitimate claim. The right hon. gentleman had talked of the dignity and state which was attached to these sinecure offices, but for his own part he could not comprehend where the dignity or state could consist in offices in in which there was no duty to perform. He could wish that the right hon. gentleman had been more explicit, and had described in what manner the dignity of the crown was to be upheld, by having the power to grant offices to which no duty was attached. He could see no dignity whatever arising to the crown from such a power. The House would be inclined to imagine, from the manner in which this Bill had been entertained, that it was merely calculated to make arrangements for granting pensions, when, in truth, many regulations were proposed of still greater importance, and in which the public were peculiarly interested. He could only lament that this Bill had not been passed a year ago, as he was satisfied, that if this had been the case, many sums would have been saved which had been uselessly and unprofitably applied to persons who had no claims whatever on the generosity of the country. As to the proposition of the noble lord, it went simply to leave things as they were before the House had interfered. The true merit of the Bill, as it was now constituted, was, that it gave to the crown the power of rewarding real services, and took from the crown the power of giving that which ought to be reserved for real services to those who had done no services whatever. In his opinion, the best mode of reward was by pension—it was more economical, more for the advantage of the advantage of the public, more notorious, and more intelligible, than any other mode which could be adopted. It was the duty of the people to enable the crown to reward public services, but this should be done in a manner so fairly and so openly, that the public might be able to judge whether the reward had been rightly bestowed or not, and that every man who paid his quota towards that species of expenditure should see why and on what ground the reward had been given. The noble lord had expressed his concern, that he, and those who acted with him in opposition to ministers, should not have the power of granting offices for five years. From the tone and manner of the noble lord, he was almost led to believe he had an idea of retiring from office; but he had at last qualified his speech, by adding—"if they should ever be thought fit to become mi- nisters of the crown." Those who sat on his side of the House, were, however, very little obliged to the noble lord for his tender concern; but he hoped, whenever they did come into the service of the crown, they would never be found eager to hunt after places, pensions, or offices; but would exert themselves in exercising their abilities for the welfare of their country, and the honour and dignity of the state. The great merit of the Bill was, that it would give power to parliament to reward real merit, and would put it out of the power of the crown to give sinecure offices where there was no merit at all: as such he thought it worthy of his support, and of the approbation of the House.

objected to the Bill, because it went to cancel all previous merit. If persons had rendered the most eminent services to the state, and to the country, during four years, and at the end of that period quitted office, it would be out of the power of the crown to reward them, for their past services. He alluded to what a right hon. gentleman had laid some stress upon, viz. an adherence to office in the noble lord and his friends. The right hon. gentleman had himself been one of those friends for some years, and he could wish to see him once more pass the narrow strait between his present seat and that of the noble lord, though he should be sorry that his services should go unrewarded for five years. It had been said elsewhere, that opposition had the right hon. gentleman's speeches, but ministers had his votes—

"I take her body, you her mind,

Which has the better bargain?"

He (Mr. S.) should, however, be glad to have both body and mind in this ease; and that, when the right hon. gentleman gave his side of the House his vote, he would cease to favour opposition with the assistance of his speeches. The right hon. gentleman had said, that sinecure places ex vi termini were opprobrious, but that pensions were not so. On this point he differed with him in opinion; he thought there was nothing offensive in the one more than in the other. That high authority doctor Johnson, in the first edition of his Dictionary, had defined the word, 'pension' to mean "wages given to a state hireling for treason to his country;" and though by his leaving it out of the second edition, it appeared that great lexicographer had changed his opinion, he was afraid the public had not done the same, but that the impression of the first still remained. He then adverted to that part of the Bill which proposed the abolition of West India sinecures. The salaries of these offices, which were generally held by deputy, while the principal resided in England, mostly arose from incidental fees in law suits, which were not much felt by the litigants, while, in other cases, as in the Admiralty courts, great part of them was paid by foreigners. In some cases it was an advantage that the principal should be resident in this country. From the notorious abuses which existed in courts of justice in the West Indies, it, was most important that creditors should not depend for the recovery of their debts on the deputy marshals of courts of justice in the West Indies, but should have a principal resident in this country, where justice could be readily enforced, and who should be responsible for the money placed in the hands of his substitute. On these grounds he must oppose this part of the present measure.

spoke in favour of that part of the Bill, which related to our colonies. He thought sinecure places a burden upon the public, because often confeared upon unworthy persons. When a sinecure office became vacant by the death of the holder, it very seldom occurred that there should be at that exact time any person who deserved the place on account of services performed for the benefit of the country; the consequence was, that the office was conferred upon a person totally undeserving.

thought, if there was any thing in the objections made to the present measure, that the remedy was to be sought in a recommitment of the Bill, rather than in the opposition given to it in its present stage. Even if it might seem necessary to the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman opposite that the 15 great offices should be retained, might they not move an amendment to that effect, allowing the other offices, which amounted to 300 in all, to be abolished?

said, that whatever objections might be made to particular clauses of the Bill, it appeared to him that against its principle no sound argument had been adduced. Length of public service was, perhaps, the best criterion by which to judge of a man's title to the reward of a pension; while on the other hand the expectation of obtaining sinecures might often prove fallacious, and it was placing a man in a cruel situation by making him thus dependent on contingencies. The expectation of reversionary giants which his noble friend had talked of, might prove still more fallacious. It was converting public rewards into a sort of lottery, where every thing depended on chance, and not on merit or service. He did not think the Bill diminished the influence of the crown; but he supported it because it provided rewards for public service in a manner more acceptable to the people than the present mode.

said, he should not do his duty to that material part of the united kingdom from which he came, unless he supported the Bill. Sinecures without number had been imposed in Ireland; he knew constables of castles with 800l. a year where there was not the vestige of a castle.

concurred in the view taken of the Bill by his right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer.) An hon. and learned gent. seemed to think that the best way of supporting the West India offices, was by fees and perquisites. Were this the case, then the course pursued for the last 30 years, of abolishing fees in the various offices under government, such as the customs, the navy board, &c. was wrong, and ought never to have been sanctioned by parliament. But if the plan of fixing salaries, instead of perquisites, was a good one, then it ought to be followed up in every instance, and extended to the West Indies also.

objected to the Bill, as being the same in shape as that which had before appeared to the House to be objectionable in parts. To prove his assertion, he would advert to the clause which related to the Irish pension list; that clause was similar to one on which he last session moved an amendment, which was carried by a majority of one; it went to reduce the Irish pension list to 40,000l. which, at the Union, had been fixed at 80,000l. This he considered to be a gross violation of the compact between the crown and the parliament, and he would oppose the Bill as an attempt to transfer to the parliament the legitimate prerogative of the crown.

explained. In such a state were the revenues of Ireland, that they would not allow of a pension list of 80,000l. He read the Act settling the pension list to shew that it did not amount to a compact indissoluble.

said, the hon. gentleman had not read the whole of the passage which he had quoted,—he would read the remainder, which he contended proved that the compact must continue during the life of the King, and that the parliament might make a new bargain with his successor. He then read the paragraph in question, and at some length opposed the principle of the Bill.

thought the objection which had been just started, was a last resource against the Bill, the principle of which was so clear, just, and unexceptionable, that no man in private could look another gravely in the face, and controvert its expediency. This Bill had received the sanction of the last parliament, and one reason why he was particularly desirous that it should now pass was, lest an aspersion might be thrown out, that parliament was more willing to enquire into, and correct abuses, when they were about to meet their constituents, than when they had just parted from them.

was decidedly in favour of the Bill.—Whatever might be said of the splendor of the crown, it ought not entirely to outstrip the resources of the country. Besides, the offices in question added nothing to the splendor of the crown. They might have had this effect, and really were of that nature in their original constitution, but it was long since they had ceased to answer any purposes either of ornament or use. One or two instances had, he was willing to admit, been pointed out, in which sinecures had been beneficially bestowed: but one or two exceptions could not justify a whole system of corruption. He could not but notice the monstrous assertion that the House of Commons stepped out of its proper sphere, and invaded the prerogative of the crown, in remonstrating against the improvident waste and misapplication of the public resources, in short, he considered these offices as equally useless to the crown and to the country. He looked upon them as decayed and rotten branches of the constitution, which incumbered, enfeebled, and disfigured the parent-stems, and by taking away which, we should add greatly both to its beauty and it's strength.

opposed the Bill, on the ground that it trenched upon the privileges of the crown. He was always of this opinion, and he saw nothing in the arguments that had been offered this night, to induce him to retract it. The instance of the place given the other day by the Prince Regent should be reflected on by gentlemen before they voted for the present Bill. The public had been deluded into a belief that it would diminish their burthens, but they were now beginning to get rid of that delusion. The Bill would only introduce a mere change of name, from placemen to pensioners.

gave his cordial support to the measure, and was glad to take this opportunity of meeting the challenge of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) to the new members. He should be sorry if any vote of his was cited as a proof of degeneracy in the present parliament.

regretted that he had not time, or that the patience of the House would not allow him to go into detail to prove that almost all of those places which in this Bill were inadvertently and incorrectly stated as sinecures, were really efficient and important departments of the public service.

pointed out the inconsistency of the last speaker, who was confident, that if opportunity was given him, he could detect the inaccuracy of the Bill in almost every particular, and yet objected to its commitment, when he would have all the opportunity he wished. He could not tell whether the arguments of ministers satisfied their own minds, or whether they would satisfy a majority or that House; but he was quite sure that they would satisfy no one out of it.

The House then divided—

On our re-admission into the gallery we found

speaking against the clause for limiting the Irish Pension List to 40,000l. per annum. He had formerly opposed the clause; he would oppose it now, because there was a compact with the crown to which he had been a party, fixing the Pension List at 80,000l. Previously to the Act which had been alluded to, the revenue of the crown applied to pensions had amounted to 162,000l.; and it was agreed that the crown should give up that hereditary revenue for the life of the King, on condition of receiving 80,000l. per annum. Another and a more important clause was, that the crown should accept a civil list for the mainte- nance of the Irish government. This was thought, at the time, a good bargain, and to those who now thought it otherwise he would say, that there was great difficulty in obtaining it. The compact was a solemn one, and he did not think it good policy to break the faith of parliament, as the crown would struggle to make matters even. Being a party to the compact, he would abide by it, and he should expect the crown to do the same. He would hot give his support to the clause.

congratulated himself on the support of the right hon. gentleman, and said, he would leave the question to that support.

concurred with his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), not so much on account of his great authority, as on account of his testimony, which was valuable as one who was a party to the compact; and he thought it would be better to depart from the clause than to commit the smallest violation of the faith of parliament.

not finding the opinions of his friends in coincidence with his own, would withdraw the clause.

read a clause of the Act, to shew that the crown had not kept the bargain it had made, and asserted that 30,000l. had been voted by parliament for the use of Ireland, which was provided for by the civil list.

said, if the money had been improperly voted, the hon. baronet had been a party to that vote.

The clause was withdrawn without a division, and the third reading appointed for Thursday.