moved that the House should go into a committee on the Victuallers' Bill.

opposed the Speaker's leaving the chair, on the principle that the object of the Bill was beneath the attention of the legislature. A sounder maxim could not be laid down than that well known one, De minimis non curat lex. It also interfered improperly in a private transaction between individuals, in itself perfectly harmless, for their mutual accommodation. It was said in the preamble, to be one object of the Bill to take away the temptation to the crime of stealing pewter pots, to which children were now regularly trained, and for which they were constantly convicted. He had looked at the ages of some of those infants, whose morals the right hon. gentleman was so anxious not to have contaminated, and he found some of them as follows:—John Jones, 73; Sarah Davies, 69; Thomas Ladbrook, 54, &c. Upon an average, the ages of the supposed infantine offenders exceeded 50. So much for the care of the friends of this Bill for the rising generation. Besides, if the mere possibility of the temptation to commit crime were a sufficient ground for a law of this kind, we might shut up the jewellers' shops, and ought not to carry watches or silk handkerchiefs about our persons. He believed the secret motive for the desire of the publicans for the Bill, was the hope that by preventing the sending out of beer in pots, it would lead to tippling in ale-houses. He moved as an amendment that the Bill should be committed on that day three months.

said, that notwithstanding the contempt with which the hon. gentleman had treated his Bill, an Act of the same kind had passed in the reign of George 2, under the auspices of no less men than sir R. Walpole and lord Hardwicke. This Act did not now operate, merely because the King's printer had, by mistake, written over against it 'repealed.' The injury to the publicans, which he wished to prevent, was not a possible or imaginary evil. They had the positive allegations of a hundred individuals, that they suffered a loss amounting to about 35l. annually by this practice. The reason why most of the persons by whom the offence was committed appeared in the returns to be old people, was, that it was generally committed by children, who were too young to be prosecuted.

ridiculed the idea, that this offence was committed generally by children, though the returns gave us only a list of veteran delinquents. He denied that any such Act as that which the right hon. gentleman had said was repealed by the King's printer, had ever passed. In one of the Excise Acts of sir Robert Walpole, indeed, a clause was inserted to prevent publicans from sending out beer in any vessel, whether pewter, silver, or otherwise, in less quantity than one or two gallons, but this had nothing to do with the species of vessel used. The hon. gentleman then entered into a general argument against the present Bill, for the necessity of which he contended no just cause had been assigned. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Rose) himself knew nothing of those who had signed the allegations. He (Mr. Croker) thought the foundation of the Bill was altogether as unsound as the superstructure was ridiculous.

defended the Bill, and read a part of the former Act, which he contended was expressly directed against stealing pewter pots. He said, he was sorry the hon. gentleman seemed disposed to add insult to injury.

said that, as he had been unexpectedly made an umpire in this dispute, he must say that the word 'pots' appeared to be in the former Act. Mr. Croker had objected to his right hon. friend, that he had no acquaintance among the class of persons whom the Bill professed to relieve: he would, perhaps, object to him, that he had too much acquaintance among them, though he by no means thought so, and wished to extend it as much farther as possible. But he could say from personal knowledge, that the present practice was a serious injury to the publican, and he should strenuously support their claim to relief.

The House then divided, when there were for Mr. Giddy's Amendment, 42; Against it, 67; Majority for the Bill, 25.

thought this a proper opportunity to ask the right hon. gentleman whether it was intended by the present Bill to prohibit the circulation of the local tokens of copper? Of this description of tokens there was an immense quantity issued in various populous neighbourhoods in the country, and from the spurious metal of which they were formed, they had a direct tendency to enhance the price of the first necessaries of life to the poorer classes of society. These tokens, which were generally issued by large manufacturers, and were exchanged at par for bills at twelve months after sight, so that when they were taken by shopkeepers in payment for the commodities in which they dealt, it was natural that these men should place such a price on their goods as would indemnify them for the interest of their money, which it was seen would be locked up for twelve months, and secure them against the possible risk they might run from the probability of failure on the part of the house from whence the tokens might be issued. The labouring classes were obliged to submit to the imposition which was thus practised upon them from the difficulty of procuring employment.

said, that the Bill, as it was at present framed, did not at all apply to copper tokens. The suggestions of the right hon. gentleman were extremely important and very just, and he should be extremely happy to attend to any propositions which he might think proper to make in the committee.

was not aware of the existence of the practices which had been adverted to by his right hon. friend, but he certainly thought they were of such a complexion as to call imperatively for legislative interference.

expressed his astonishment that any necessity should be felt for introducing the present Bill, after the intimation which had been given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the probability of a favourable increase of exchange between this and foreign countries, before the expiration of the present session of parliament.

thought the evil which had been complained of by the right hon. gentleman opposite might be remedied by the government putting in circulation a sufficient quantity of the copper coin of the realm. Whatever scarcity there might be of silver and gold, there surely was no scarcity of copper.

said, there had been that favourable change in the exchange between this and other countries which he had anticipated, and there had also been considerable arrivals of bullion. Although this had been the case, however, the nature of our expenditures upon the continent had been such as to preclude the possibility at present of making any advantageous alteration in our current coin. With respect to the copper currency which had been alluded to by the hon. gentleman who had spoken last, he apprehended there was no want of the legal copper coin of the realm. In Lon- don, the circulation, he believed, was too prolific, and if the coin was wanted, he had no doubt it could be procured in any quantity.

The Bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be committed on Monday.

before the debate commenced, was desirous of asking a question of the noble lord opposite, which it was extremely desirable the House should have answered. The second article of the Treaty between this country and Sweden was as follows:—"The said courts having communicated to his Britannic Majesty the engagements subsisting between them, and having formally demanded his said Majesty's accession thereto, and his Majesty the king of Sweden having by the stipulations contained in the preceding Article, given a proof of the desire which animates him to contribute also on his part to the success of the common cause; his Britannic Majesty being desirous, in return, to give an immediate and unequivocal proof of his resolution to join his interests to those of Sweden and Russia, promises and engages by the present Treaty to accede to the conventions already existing between those two powers." The Convention here alluded to, between Sweden and Russia, it appeared, had been signed in March, 1812, and that with his Britannic Majesty not until the 3d of March, 1813. He was desirous of being informed by the noble lord, at what period the Convention between the two first-mentioned powers was communicated to his Majesty's ministers?

answered, that he could not speak to the precise time, but he believed it was some time in July, 1812. The noble lord then moved, first, "That the House should resolve into a Committee of Supply;" and next, "That the Treaty with Sweden, presented to the House by command of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, be referred to the said Committee."

rose and said:—Sir, on the present occasion, I conceive the most convenient method of raising the debate on the merits of the Swedish Treaty, is to proceed with the discussion prior to your leaving the chair:—because, in the Committee of Supply, if we were to take its merits into consideration, we could finally do nothing more than come to a vote for or against the proposed subsidy—we could present no Address to the throne on the subject—nor could any of our proceedings, beyond the mere vote of Supply, appear on the Journals. As it is my wish to present to the crown an Address from this House, on the subject of the Treaty, calling on the Prince Regent to take such steps as may be consistent with the honour of the crown and the public faith of the country, to suspend the execution of such parts of the Swedish Treaty, as may be suspended; and, finally, to enter into negociations to disengage himself, if it be possible, from the Treaty altogether, I think the most proper period for moving such an Address, is previous to your leaving the chair. Sir, I believe this is the first instance in which a treaty, containing the cession of a valuable possession of the crown of Great Britain, has been laid on the table of either House of Parliament, the minister of the crown in such House not having expressed a desire to take the sense of parliament upon it.—If it were merely a treaty of subsidy, the necessity of that subsidy might be examined in a Committee of Supply; and the House, by granting or withholding the subsidy, might signify their approbation of, or dissent from, its propriety. But the present is not merely a treaty of subsidy; it is also, among other things, a treaty of cession on the part of Great Britain, for the island of Guadaloupe. And I did suppose, when a treaty for the cession of that island was laid on the table, that his Majesty's ministers would immediately have moved an Address to the crown, by which the House would have had an opportunity of expressing either its satisfaction or disapprobation, with reference to that cession. The noble lord has, however, followed another course. In the other House of Parliament, as far as we are cognisant of its proceedings, the minister of the crown cannot pursue the course adopted by the noble lord. He must move an Address to the crown, either approving or disapproving any treaty which it may have entered into—and, on that motion, the sense of the House may be taken. But, in the present case, where the minister of the crown has forborne to move any Address—in the present case, where his Majesty's cabinet have remained silent on that subject—I am obliged to have recourse to this rather unusual mode, for the purpose of taking the sense of parliament on the merits of this treaty. Sir, the first and most re- markable thing in the treaty concluded between Sweden and Russia, to which treaty his Majesty was advised to accede, the most remarkable thing that strikes us in that treaty is—the object of it—as professed by the two contracting parties. The object of that treaty (as stated in the document laid before the House, which the noble lord has told us comprises the substance of the Convention) is "for the purpose of securing reciprocally their states and possessions against the common enemy." This is the professed object of the stipulations of the treaty concluded by the emperor of Russia and the king of Sweden, "the security of their states and possessions against the common enemy;" meaning France; for, I believe, there is no other power with which they were then unitedly at war. Sir, in the course of the last war between Russia and France, which was terminated by the peace of Tilsit, certain negotiations subsisted between these governments, and a certain understanding took place between them on particular subjects, which were not then divulged to the rest of Europe. But soon after the conclusion of peace, Russia attacked Sweden, and acquired the dominion of Finland; a dominion long desired and ardently sought for by that power, in the course of different wars and negotiations. Russia having obtained Finland, by the connivance, if not by the open assistance of France, as soon as ever she found herself likely to be involved in a new war with that power, she determined to secure herself in the possession of Finland, which she had acquired from Sweden. That object she did not attempt to attain by force, but by buying over and conciliating the state to which the province originally belonged—by transferring to her part of the dominions of another power. In order to induce Sweden not to insist on the restitution of Finland, Russia entered into an understanding with her, and ultimately concluded the Convention, the substance of which is contained in the paper laid before the House. By this Convention it is stipulated, that the cession of Norway to Sweden, by the crown of Denmark, is to be procured either by treaty or by force—And, for this purpose, Russia is bound to provide a force, of from 15 to 20,000 men, to co-operate with Sweden. By a subsequent convention, dated the 30th of August, 1812, the Russian auxiliary force is to be carried to 35,000 men. This latter convention, I believe, was entered into at the very time when his Majesty's ambassador, lord Cathcart, was present at Abo. Now, Sir, to induce Denmark to make the cession of Norway to Sweden, what steps were taken by the two contracting parties to that treaty? They expressed themselves thus:—"As the king of Sweden cannot make this diversion in favour of the common cause, consistently with the security of his dominions, so long as he can regard the kingdom of Norway as an enemy, his majesty the emperor of Russia engages, either by negociation, or by military co-operation, to unite the kingdom of Norway to Sweden." Here is a stipulation, not to procure for Sweden any territory to which she has a just claim—not to procure for Sweden any security which she might demand against the forces of Denmark—not to procure for Sweden the possession of forts or fortresses—not to procure for her what is called military possession of Norway, to prevent any attack from Denmark in that quarter—No, this stipulation is to procure, either by negociation or force, the perpetual cession of Norway itself. The treaty goes on to say, "The two contracting parties being unwilling, if-it can be avoided, to make an enemy of the king of Denmark." If it can be avoided! How modest are their expressions! how gentle their manners! how kind their intention! Being unwilling to make an enemy of the king of Denmark! Unwilling to make an enemy of whom? of a monarch with whom neither of the parties pretended to have the slightest cause of quarrel. Feeling this virtuous reluctance, what do they propose to do—"they will offer to his Danish majesty, to procure for him a complete indemnity for Norway, by a territory more contiguous to his German dominions, provided his Danish majesty will cede for ever his rights to the kingdom of Norway." Here are the deliverers of Europe, contracting between themselves, for the purposes of their own base ambition, to take from an unoffending potentate a portion of his ancient territory—to tear from him who wore the crown of Denmark, a most valuable part of his dominions, that it might be given to one of these parties, as an equivalent for that which had been wrested from him by the other. But, it seems, they are to give to the king of Denmark a full compensation for Norway. That is, by granting to him "certain other territories, more contiguous to his dominions, in Germany!" I do beseech you, Sir, to look to the circumstances under which this flagitious offer was made. France was to be driven back to her ancient boundaries: Germany was to be delivered—all Europe was to be freed from the grasp of the French emperor, by the united force of Russia and Sweden! and in order to induce the people of Germany to make an effort against France, how did these liberators act? They take a part of Denmark and give it to Sweden—a province to which neither had any claim—and they offer to indemnify the former power by some dominions contiguous to his German territories. The policy of this stipulation, which must disgust the people of Germany, is equal to its justice. And how any cabinet in this country, acting under a monarch, remarkable for his own good faith, and high sense of honour—remarkable for his own scrupulous attention to the dictates of justice—a monarch, the greater part of whose reign has been spent in carrying on a bloody and expensive war, to prevent France from establishing the very principles contained in this treaty, a monarch, placed at the head of a nation, remarkable, I hope, for probity and rectitude—a nation, which has borne its burdens and privations with unsubdued magnanimity, because they appeared necessary for the support of the rights of mankind—for the re-establishment of the public law of nations—for the interests of honour and justice amongst the human race—that the ministers of such a king and such a nation could have the hardihood to call on that monarch and that people to accede to a treaty like that entered into between Russia and Sweden, exceeds any thing to be found in the history of courts, or of the world. Sir, if the ministers of this country absolutely wanted to establish the system of France throughout Europe—that system so often and so justly reprobated—they could not have adopted a proceeding better calculated to produce that effect, than by advising the crown and the parliament to sanction this convention. Do we, Sir, throughout the whole of it, find any one sentence expressive of an anxiety for the liberties of mankind, or the general interests of the world? Yet, Sir, notwithstanding the abominable and atrocious stipulations which this convention contains, we are made to say, in our treaty with Sweden, which recognises the convention; that the transfer of Norway from its rightful monarch—that the separation of the people from their lawful sovereign, "shall take place with every possible regard and consideration for the happiness and liberty of the people of Norway." But, Sir, can we discover in all this any principle which is likely to excite Europe to an opposition against the power of France? The spirit of this treaty—its stipulations—its various objects—are all conceived exactly in the same policy, in which the former most unprincipled, disgraceful, and ruinous conduct of Russia, in the partition of Poland, was conceived. That conduct which banished the law of nations from Europe, and introduced, in its stead, the law of the strongest.—This system, too, was persevered in at a time, when the assistance of the Poles themselves was wanting against the common enemy. For no greater engine could be placed in the hands of the French ruler, than the power of terrifying Russia, in the present war, by pointing to the doubtful allegiance of those very people. This treaty speaks volumes to the Poles—this treaty speaks volumes to the people of Germany. And, when these papers are read on the Continent, what will the minister of any independent power say to the noble lord, when he speaks of the rights of nations, of the freedom of Europe? Will he not say, that England, by acceding to such a treaty, has assisted in destroying them? Now, Sir, what is the professed purpose of our treaty of cession? The contracting parties, "penetrated with the urgent necessity of establishing with each other a close concert, for the maintenance of the independence of the North, and in order to accelerate the so-much-wished-for epoch of a general peace, have agreed to provide for this two-fold object by the present treaty."—So the independence of the North is to be established by wresting a part of his dominions from one of the most independent and ancient of the northern powers, and a general peace is to be brought about by transferring a portion of Germany to the king of Denmark, from whom you propose to take the kingdom of Norway. In short, you will effect the two avowed objects of this treaty, by making yourselves accessary to a state of things which were calculated to produce war if none had existed before. But it is for the interest of England, that Norway should be taken from Denmark? I have always understood that Norway was as happily placed for the security of England as it was possible for any country to be. There was, therefore, no private interest, to create a desire in England that Norway should be so disposed of. But then "the independence of the North" is most hypocritically and deceitfully placed in the front of this treaty, as a public ground for agreeing to the cession of Norway, at the very moment, when that independence is violated in the most essential point!—(Hear). And, after this act, to talk of a desire of accelerating peace, when it was thus placed farther off than ever, exceeds, in my opinion, all that the most confident ministers, before the present day, ever thought of inserting in a public instrument! The king of Denmark is to be compensated for this loss of territory. He is to be induced, or compelled, to give up Norway. Some few days since, I moved for an account of the correspondence between the government of this country and that of Denmark. And I was then told, by the noble lord, that the public service rendered it improper to make such a disclosure. How the public service could be affected by it, is difficult to be conceived. Is it because either Denmark or France must be so nearly concerned in this correspondence, that the noble lord felt himself called on to withhold the transaction from the public? Denmark, being one of the parties, must of course be in possession of all the circumstances. And does the noble lord imagine that France is ignorant of what passed on that occasion? Could the noble lord suppose this, when it was well known that a French general was resident at the court of Copenhagen at the time? It is impossible to suppose it. No, Sir, a very different cause can be assigned. Left as we are to conjecture on this information, I do conjecture, that there was much discussion on the subject of compensation, for the cession of Norway, with the minister of the king of Denmark. And this, I conceive, is the point which his Majesty's ministers do not wish to make public.—I may be wrong in this opinion—possibly I am wrong; but I think the great reluctance to produce the correspondence, is full as likely to have arisen from this, as from any other cause. It cannot be supposed, that it originated either in any fear of the power of France, or in any apprehension lest the interests of Denmark should suffer; and I certainly shall not recede from this belief till very strong reasons are adduced in support of a different opinion. There is, Sir, in the 2d article of the treaty, some- thing extremely curious, and particularly worthy the attention of the House. The wording of the article is exceedingly remarkable; one should suppose, on the first view of it, that an option was given to the king of Denmark, either to concede Norway to Sweden or not, just as he pleased. Now, Sir, the exact reverse of any such option is the truth; for, by the stipulations existing between Russia and Sweden, Norway must be given up—there is nothing optional left. His Majesty is made a party to these stipulations, and in the treaty with Sweden is made to say—"that he will not only not oppose any obstacle to the annexation and union, in perpetuity, of the kingdom of Norway, as an integral part, to the kingdom of Sweden, but also will assist the views of his majesty the king of Sweden to that effect, either by his good offices, or by employing, if it should be necessary, his naval co-operation, in concert with the Swedish or Russian forces. It is nevertheless to be understood, that recourse shall not be had to force, for effecting the union of Norway to Sweden, unless his majesty the king of Denmark shall have previously refused to join the alliance of the North." Thus, Sir, on reading this paragraph, it is so worded, that you might imagine the king of Denmark to have the option of joining the alliance of the North, and of retaining Sweden. Whereas, if you look to the stipulations of the treaty, you will find, that nothing will satisfy Sweden, but the cession of Norway; and all the option left to the king of Denmark, is, to receive the compensation marked out by Russia and Sweden. But, as to keeping Norway—as to retaining one of the most valuable possessions of his crown—as to continuing his reign over subjects remarkable for their affection to his person and government, no such choice is given to him. He must give up that territory—he must part with those affectionate subjects—and, in return, he must receive a country of which he is ignorant—he must be content to accept strangers, who never owed to him the duty or the allegiance of subjects. I defy the noble lord or any other person in this House to deny the statement. Under these stipulations, nothing can, by possibility, satisfy Sweden and Russia, but the cession of Norway—and the sole option left to the king of Denmark is, to resist force by force, or to content himself with whatever these powers are disposed to give him, Now, Sir, as to the principle of this treaty for the partition of Denmark (the true and legitimate offspring and successor of the partition of Poland.) I know not what there was that could induce England to assent to it. That this country should so far accede to a treaty, formed and conceived in violence and fraud, was what no interest, no prospect of advantage, should ever have induced her to do. But what profit is she to derive from giving it her sanction? The alliance and co-operation of Sweden! But, does she not, at the same time, call down the provoked and aggravated hostility of Denmark? Thus, if you gain Sweden, you lose Denmark—and the one power, I believe, is very nearly as great as the other—but, it is said, "we were at war with Denmark, and, therefore, we were justified in annoying her as much as we could." Now, Sir, let us examine this argument—let us fairly investigate it. The only legitimate object of war (as laid down by any writer on public law, or by any author of great character,) is stated to be, the attainment of peace. It has never been acknowledged by any government, whatever its practice may have been, that it waged war for the extinction of that nation, with which it was embroiled; that it prosecuted hostilities for the sole purposes of subjection and slavery. Every government asserts, that it has just cause of complaint, and that it seeks, by war, for a proper satisfaction:—or else it sets forth, that it fears some sudden act of hostility, and desires to have security against that power, from which it apprehends any latent danger. Now, in the negociation which this country carried on with Denmark, the first duty of the minister, by whom it was conducted, was to have endeavoured to produce that state of things, between the two countries, which would have rendered the return of peace, not only possible, but near. Instead of abetting a treaty, by which the powers of the North were to be forced into fresh hostility against each other, a wise statesman in the present posture of affairs, would have joined all the northern states in one common interest, and directed their united force against the usurpations of France. But, Sir, the stipulations of the Swedish treaty render such an union impossible. The justification for these stipulations, is, "We were at war with Denmark." But, surely, Sir, we were not at war for her extinction. We went to war with her, because we feared that France, with her usual disre- gard of justice, would seize the naval power which Denmark then possessed, and turn it against us—therefore, it may be said, we were compelled, by the dictates of self-defence, to proceed as we had done. But, Sir, if I admit the truth of this allegation, what is there to justify eternal war against Denmark? What is there to justify this country in joining in a treaty, by which Denmark is to be deprived of a portion of her territory, and by which fresh dissensions will be produced in Europe? In order to obtain this alliance and co-operation of Sweden, Russia has stipulated to place a force of 35,000 men, at her disposal, for the conquest of Norway. This force she was permitted to unite with her own; and she was then allowed to make use of it against Denmark, before she commenced any direct operation on what is called 'the continent,' that is, Germany. This was the stipulation which ministers found existing, when his Majesty was invited to accede to the terms of that treaty. It was not, however, suited to the views of this country, that Sweden should employ her own forces, and those of Russia, in conquering Norway, before the general interests of the allies were consulted; because the blindest and most inexperienced statesman must see, that if those troops were to be employed in Norway, against the Danes, we should only have bought, at a very great ex-pence, a diversion against ourselves, in favour of France. It was not a matter of any importance to the ruler of France, what forces were combating the Danes in Norway—his great object was to prevent a coalition between the northern powers against him. This being the case, ministers were desirous of changing that stipulation in the Russian Treaty, by which Sweden was at liberty to advance her troops, and those of Russia against Norway, in the first instance. And how, Sir, did they effect this? Sweden, the friend of enslaved Europe—Sweden, on whom we relied so much, at that moment, and on whom, perhaps, many still rely, for an efficient and useful co-operation against the common enemy—Sweden, the enemy of tyranny, refuses to give up her intended attempt on Norway, unless greater benefits are proffered to her, than those held out by Russia; and in order to induce her to act in that way which ministers desired, we agree to give her a million of money, and to cede to her the island of Guadaloupe. In short, we buy off and do away the stipulations which existed between Sweden and Russia, by which the former power was permitted to conquer Norway, before she joined the common cause, and we induce her not to employ her forces for the subjugation of Norway, but to assist with her arms the operations in Germany. So here, Sir, we have a tolerable specimen of the disinterested conduct of Sweden. If we wanted any additional proof of the motives which actuated the ministers of the king of Sweden, we should find it in this transaction. But his Majesty's ministers having obtained this point, the promised, the supposed co operation of Sweden in Germany, we are now to consider what benefit has resulted from it? Why, Sir, the Swedish troops arrived on the continent exactly in time to witness two defeats of the allied powers! and to be idle, useless and immoveable spectators of the armistice which has just been concluded!—This, Sir, is what we have got for a million of money, and the island of Guadaloupe. Certainly, the wisdom which procured such advantages, is equal to the probity that advised his Majesty to become a party to the treaty between Russia and Sweden! But, it appears, we have received other advantages; we are invested with a right of entrepôt, in three of the principal towns of Sweden, Gottenburgh, Carlsham, and Stralsund, for the space of twenty years. Have we obtained this right, in perpetuity, from Sweden, in the same way as we have given up Guadaloupe? No such thing. We cede Guadaloupe for ever; his Majesty gives it up, as far as he can possibly make over his right—and we are presented with the privilege of entrepôt in these towns, for twenty years only. I believe, Sir, it is declared, by all writers on the law of nations, that where a state possesses itself of that which belonged to another country, and the war still continued—where one state acquired, and one state lost—it is generally held that the acquiring state cannot be considered in full and lawful possession of the territory, so as to have a right of transfer, until a treaty has taken place, and that it is ceded by the party to whom it originally belonged. But we, in the very same war in which Guadaloupe was captured, without, I may undertake to say, any negociation having been entered into for that purpose, are called upon to give up all his Majesty's rights in that island, as far as they can be ceded, to Sweden. Guadaloupe, certainly one of the most valuable of the West India islands, and situated in a most favourable position to annoy the trade of Great Britain, if placed in the hands of a maritime power, is ceded without any prospect of present or future advantage. Now, Sir, let us examine this boasted right of entrepôt—which must be considered both with reference to a time of peace and a time of war. Suppose this country at peace with the world—suppose a general peace concluded on the continent to-morrow—what use then would this right of entrepôt be to this country? We could then send our goods and merchandize directly to those ports where we wished to establish an entrepôt—surely we should not require the interference of his Swedish majesty? Surely we should not want a variety of stages in our commercial transactions? Suppose the war with this country to continue, and that France succeeded in one of her great objects, that of compelling the different powers, at the conclusion of peace, to receive the continental system again—I do not think that the right of entrepôt will then enable us to force our goods through the continent; I do not think this right will be at all beneficial to our commerce. In time of peace it is useless, in time of war it is unprofitable,—so that we have given up this million of money, and the island of Guadaloupe, for that which is worth nothing. Sir, it will be said, that it is a very unusual thing, in either House of Parliament, to interfere with the prerogative of the crown in concluding treaties. I grant that it is unusual, but it is not unprecedented; and even if it were unprecedented, it would be right, on this occasion, to have recourse to such a proceeding, because the treaty, with reference to which we wish to apply this unused power, is itself unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy. I do not mean to go the length of a direct interference.—I do not mean to refuse to the Prince Regent the means of discharging the subsidy which he has stipulated to grant to Sweden—but I will propose to the House, that his Royal Highness shall be enabled, if it must be so, to follow up the treaty he has made.—At the same time that I would advise him to suspend, if he can, consistently with the honour of the crown and the public faith, the execution of that treaty; that he may disengage himself, finally, if possible, from the whole of its stipulations. When we vote the sum proposed to the crown, we enable the Prince Regent, if he thinks proper, to discharge the subsidy; and, when we inform him of the nature of this treaty; when we tell him that we wish, consistently with the public honour and faith, that it should be rejected—we do all which it is in our power to do.—We give his Royal Highness an opportunity of preserving the treaty, if it must be preserved—but we advise him, if it be possible, to relieve himself from its stipulations. He can, I suppose, enter into fresh negociations with Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, on this momentous subject. The treaty is not of such a nature that he cannot proceed further. If this is the meaning of the 7th article, the House ought to look with attention to the situation in which England is placed. That article says—"From the day of the signature of the present treaty, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the King of Sweden, reciprocally promise not to separate their mutual interests, and particularly those of Sweden, which are referred to in the present treaty, in any negociation whatever with their common enemies." If, Sir, the words of this article import an actual guarantee to Sweden, of the possession of Norway, which is to be adhered to under all circumstances—if, when we enter into negociations with the continental powers, we are not even to mention the separation of Norway from Sweden—if such an engagement as this has been made between two powers, before the war is at an end—if no negociations are to be admitted on this point—if no stipulation of other territories, is to be allowed, in lieu of Norway, when the period for treating of a general peace arrives—then, Sir, I am justified in saying, that this improvident treaty is unparalleled in the annals of the world. Here is a stipulation, in express terms, by which it is decided that nothing shall be done in contravention of this particular provision—by which England is bound to guarantee Norway to Sweden. (Lord Castlereagh here motioned dissent.)—The noble lord seems to dissent from this—I wish he had expressed himself in an intelligible manner, for the words of the treaty cannot be mistaken. In that article, what is referred to? The cession of Guadaloupe, and the acquisition of Norway—and we are bound, on no account to stipulate, in any negociation, so as to separate our interests from those of Sweden on these two points. But, Sir, let us see what the effect of this treaty will be in another point of view. Does France derive no advantage from it? Is it not affording her an argument, in justification of her frauds and violences against other European powers, when you give her an opportunity of pointing at England, as having acceded to a treaty conceived in baseness and perfidy?—(Hear, hear.)—Is it not an advantage to France to have it in her power to say to those nations which accuse her of injustice, "I am not worse than England; she engages in treaties with contending powers—she employs her money—she cedes her possessions—she does all this, to further the object of one nation in its robbery of another—while those who commit the robbery, have no ostensible cause for their conduct?" After this treaty, in what respect will our character stand higher in the estimation of the other powers of Europe than the character of France? If this House agrees to the treaty, I maintain that our character will stand in a worse light than that of France, because in France the people, living under a despotic government, must accede to whatever is done by those in power; and it is so in all absolute governments. But, in free governments, where the minister who acts may be called to an account for his conduct, it is in the power of the people to redeem their character, by compelling the minister to recall that which is obnoxious. If, in the present instance, the matter has gone too far to leave it in our power to compel an abandonment of it, at all events, it is not too late to express our opinion on the subject. And, if the House of Commons do not express their sentiments plainly to the Prince Regent, on the occasion, they become partners to the crimes and follies of this treaty. It is one of the great advantages of a free government, that it elevates the character of mankind—fills them with great and noble sentiments—teaches them to carry on war as it should be carried on in civilized states—instructs them in forming treaties with their neighbours, on principles of mutual honour—and takes care to bottom all its proceedings on the foundation of rectitude and probity. But in the present case, the stipulations of this treaty are founded in force and fraud, and they inflict a palpable injustice on an unoffending nation, which has done no injury either to the one party or to the other. I, therefore, entreat the House to pause before they sanction it. Before I sit down, I would draw your attention to the recent state of the continent. Germany, we were told, was about to resist the power of France—an insurrection was certain to take place, if the people were encouraged and protected by a force sufficient for that purpose—Hamburgh and Hesse were to rise—all the small states of Germany were to rise—a holy insurrection was to rescue the German empire. And now, Sir, what must they say to their liberators? to those who called on them to encounter and to provoke the hostility of France? What temptation do they hold out to the German people to act? The transfer of a portion of those very Germans, as a compensation for an unprincipled robbery. What is the protection they receive? The landing of an army of Swedes, at Stralsund, after the allies were defeated. But what was to form the compensation to be given to Denmark? Is it a secret? I presume the noble lord is well acquainted with the fact. It would be curious if he were not. That compensation was not to be taken from any part of the Swedish dominions. It was not to be Hamburgh—it was not to be the Hanse towns, nor any territory around them. I know, Sir, it is said, and many persons believe it, that the compensation was to be derived from that quarter. Now, let us look at what was going on there, at the time of the negociation. Hamburgh was made the very centre of that insurrection which was to free Germany—at the precise moment, when, it is said, we were willing to transfer it as an indemnity to Denmark.—Sir, I cannot believe it. I cannot imagine that this town, which was the heart and soul of the German confederation, was to be made an article of barter, as you would sell one beast for another—I cannot suppose that any intention existed to give it up to the king of Denmark, at the moment that it was shedding its best blood in the cause of Europe.—There is a baseness, a wickedness, a depravity, in such conduct, that is beyond credibility. Sir, the Address, which I shall have the honour to move, is somewhat longer than may be thought necessary; but as it is, in some measure, interfering with the prerogative of the crown, by advising the Prince Regent to disengage himself, if possible, from the stipulations of the treaty, it is the duty of the House to make a representation of some length, to explain the motives by which they are actuated. This, Sir, I hope, will be received as an apology.

The right hon. gentleman then concluded by moving an Address, which embraced the various topics urged in the course of his speech, and concluded by intreating his Royal Highness, if practicable and consistent with the honour and good faith of the crown, to take such measures as would disengage him from the stipulations with which he had been advised to enter into the Treaty with Sweden.

seconded the Amendment.

said, the course which the right hon. gentleman had felt it his duty to take on this occasion, with respect to the mode of bringing forward the subject under the consideration of the House, was one unusual in parliament, though it was one which adequate circumstances might justify; but it was something more than unusual to pronounce an unfounded judgment, not only on the ministers of the crown, but on the allies of this country, before an opportunity had been given to the former to submit to the House that explanation which they were ready to offer. He thought it required the peculiar view of the subject, taken by the right hon. gentleman, to justify the adoption of such a course, before the minister had called for the supply required. The right hon. gentleman said he was not disposed to stand between the crown and the execution of the Treaty as far as related to money, but he was prepared at once to degrade the ministers by whom it had been concluded, and to degrade the powers who were parties to it. He would put it to the right hon. gentleman if this was pursuing a course very amicable towards the emperor of Russia and the king of Sweden? The unusual course he (Mr. P.) had taken, placed him (lord C.) in a situation, which, without the special indulgence of the House, would be most painful, as it imposed upon him the task of attempting that explanation of the circumstances connected with the Treaty, the detail of which he had only expected to be called upon to give in the committee, as explanation might be required. He was certainly extremely astonished at the language held by the right hon. gentleman when speaking of the treaty, as when he had first called the attention of the House to this subject, he had made use of no such words as "atrocious stipulations," when speaking of that part of it which related to Norway; and he had understood him to be of opinion, that there was nothing immoral in the conduct of this country, seeing that we were at war with Denmark, in turning her arms against any part of that kingdom, not merely for our own advantage, but also for the advantage of those who might be united with us in alliance. He had believed it was the intention of the right hon. gentleman to bring it forward only for the purpose of arraigning its policy. Saying this, however, he by no means meant to give up the political morality of the treaty, which, on the contrary, he was fully prepared to defend, but he had understood the right hon. gentleman to say, the engagements entered into with Norway were not to be questioned on that ground, but on the policy by which they had been dictated. He declined entering on the present occasion into the late negociations with Denmark. These, if the issue of them had been to unite Denmark with the allies, would not have justified the treaty, if it were not justified by the circumstances of the time, or antecedent to the time at which it was concluded. That which had subsequently occurred could not affect it, as, if it were not justified by the circumstances of the 3d of March, it could not be successfully defended at all. On this ground, he (lord C.) had refused the papers called for by the right hon. gentleman, and on this ground he should have opposed the production of papers relative to the negociations with Sweden; feeling as he did, that nothing was so injurious to this country in the eyes of foreign nations, as the premature production of such documents—(Hear, hear!) and, in his opinion, to grant such merely to vindicate individuals, was a line of conduct most unworthy and unjustifiable. If, however, the right hon. gentleman had called for papers relating to Sweden, though he should have opposed their production, he should have understood why they were asked. They might in some measure bear on the subject. Those called for respecting Denmark could not. He could not but feel that he owed some explanation to the House, on the subject of a treaty being concluded with any foreign power, and considerable advances made on that treaty, parliament being sitting, without making any communication to them respecting it. He apologised for this, and hoped the House would be satisfied when he had stated the cause of it. The ratifications of the treaty, through certain fatalities which attend our communication with the North, were not received till the 10th, of May. He should have felt it his duty immediately to advise the Prince Regent to communicate it to parliament, had he not thought nothing could have been more unsatisfactory to them, or injurious to the negociations then going on, than to have this treaty discussed at that time while negociations with Denmark were going on. These negotiations continued pending for some time, and he did not know the final result, till the evening of the day on which the House broke up for the Whitsun holidays; and he believed he had presented the treaty to the House on the first day but one after the recess. If the stipulation for bringing Sweden on the continent was worth any thing, he thought it would be admitted that its armies ought not to have been suffered to remain inactive for want of means. Assistance from this country was indispensable to prevent this; and one month's proportion of the subsidy, 200,000l. had therefore been advanced. The delay which had taken place in conveying the Swedish troops to the continent, was in no part attributable to the Swedish government. The troops had been got ready before the English government had a right to expect they could be got ready, and they had crossed over to Stralsund sooner than it had been calculated they could reach that place. The delay which had occurred, did not rest with Sweden, it had been occasioned by their waiting for English transports, and for this delay the Transport Board were so far from feeling themselves answerable; that the transports had actually sailed from Gottenburgh three weeks sooner than they would take upon themselves to answer for their sailing; but the wind had been so unfavourable, that it had taken them five weeks to get round from Gottenburgh to Carlscrona, where the Swedish troops were waiting for them. In examining the present treaty, he did not know that he was bound, under all circumstances, to justify engagements entered into between Russia and Sweden; and even though exceptions might be made to their propriety (he did not say such were to be made in the present instance, that he should come to presently), yet if such exceptions were to be taken, still at the period at which England had acceded to the treaty, her conduct might be per- fectly justifiable and wise. He, however, did not condemn the part which the allies had taken; he would contend that their conduct was justified by the necessity of the case, and no part of the speech of the right hon. gentleman had given him so much pain, and appeared to him more unwise from one who wished to see this country get well through her difficulties (as he was satisfied the right hon. gentleman did), than that where he had run direct at the allies, and condemned their conduct, without waiting for that explanation which could be afforded. The right hon. gentleman had particularly commented on the engagements between Russia and Sweden having been entered into in March, 1812, and acceded to by England in March, 1813. If the House would permit him, he would recall to their recollection what had been the state of things at the period when Russia and Sweden entered into the treaty alluded to. It was concluded just on the eve of the approach of the French armies to Russia. Buonaparté, it was true, had not left Paris, but it was not concluded before his perfidy (perfidy unparalleled in the history of the world) was manifest to all. It was no secret for what the great armies he had collected in the neighbourhood were assembled; and his great grievance—his chief cause of complaint against Sweden and Russia was, that being at war with England, they did not push their hostility to the greatest possible extent in order to effect the ruin of this country. This was the ostensible cause of the war, but he (lord Castlereagh) believed that Buonaparté's tarnished reputation in Spain had in no small degree urged him on to seek compensation in the North, for the defeats his armies had sustained in the peninsula. He however demanded of Russia and Sweden, that they should abstain from all intercourse with England, and adhere with the utmost strictness to what was called the continental system, at the very moment when he (Buonaparté) was relaxing it for himself, for his own benefit and enjoyment. In pursuance of the plan he had formed he invaded Swedish Pomerania, but intimated to Sweden, that if she would assist him to conquer Russia, by attacking her with 40,000 men on the side of Finland, he would give Finland to her, and in every thing else support the interests of Sweden. What then was the situation of these two powers? He thought the House must feel, that if Russia had not been enabled to secure herself against an attack on the side of Finland, while Buonaparté led his armies against her on the Vistula, she must have so divided her forces, as to make herself wholly incompetent to meet the arms of France—successfully to withstand the mighty shock. He thought the individuals forming the Swedish government, in the circumstances of that country, having lately lost Finland, were bound well to consider on what grounds of policy they should refuse to accede to the propositions of France. He held a vain anxiety for territorial acquisition to be an unworthy feeling; but contended that Sweden had a right to look for military security on the side of Norway. If they looked to 1808, they would see that France, to force Sweden to come into the continental system, had compelled Denmark to go to war with Sweden, and to threaten her with an invasion from Norway. Such was the means taken by France to coerce Sweden to conform to her measures and submit to her decrees. He would ask the right hon. gentleman then, if the assistance of the Swedes was of any importance to Germany, how could they go there without first obtaining security on the side of Norway? He could not see how they could go without. The affairs of Europe had been so changed, that Denmark, whatever she was formerly, could not be independent. She must bend to the influence of France, and feeling this, the most rational course which Sweden could pursue, was to endeavour to exclude French influence from all the northern shores of the Baltic. He now came to state what had been the effects produced by the friendly disposition of Sweden on the last campaign. The Russian army of Finland regularly amounted to eighteen thousand men. What then would have been the consequence, had Sweden, with her increased military force (for since that individual, who now principally ruled her councils, had been made her Crown Prince, a great increase had been made in this respect; and as a military power she was now very different from what she had been) what would have been the consequence had she closed with the overtures of Buonaparté, and gone over to him? Could Russia have done what she had done if Sweden had acted thus? If Sweden had not been embarked with Russia, she might have marched her armies to the frontier, and kept that Russian force of eighteen thousand men occupied in Finland, which her friendship released and sent to the theatre of war, where they fought under general Wittgenstein. If Sweden had acted differently, the issue of the last campaign would not have been such as it was. Had Sweden acted an ungenerous part, the victories of general Wittgenstein on the Dwina would never have taken place, as by means of the troops thus sent to his aid the actions in which he was engaged were determined; and the retreat of the French from Moscow was rendered much more disastrous than it would otherwise have been. But for the close and intimate alliance of Sweden, Russia could not so successfully have repelled the enemy; the retreat of Moscow might have been destructive; but not so destructive as it had been, had Sweden given her weight on the other side, instead of thus contributing to the successes of Wittgenstein. From the character which belonged to Denmark, from her conduct in 1808, when she actually declared war against Sweden in obedience to the mandate of France, it was impossible Sweden could be safe without excluding French influence from the Northern shores of the Baltic. It was for the Swedish government to determine to close with France to get Finland restored, or to resolve to stand or fall with Russia. Uniting with Russia it was necessarily their policy to exclude French influence from the North, and not to calculate on what might be the timid policy of Denmark. Russia, he contended, had a legitimate cause of war with Denmark if she had thought proper to act upon it; at the time the treaty was concluded between her and Sweden. At the period to which he alluded, so predominant, so terribly predominant, was the power of France in Europe, that its greatest military powers were constrained to march their armies as auxiliaries to assist in the subjugation of Russia. Denmark was called upon to assist in this undertaking; and though she could not send an army into the field, to unite with the French armies, she was obliged to furnish her contingent accommodation. She agreed to line the shores of the Baltic with her troops, to complete the destruction of Russia, and the exact spot was pointed out which they were to occupy. They were to occupy the duchy of Oldenburgh, a place which was almost Russian, and which, if not actually Russian, was so connected with Russian families and Russian interests, that Russia had a just cause of war with Denmark on this point, if she had thought proper to act upon it. Sweden did not want a cause for war. Her conduct was justified by the necessity of the case. To preserve every thing dear in Europe, it was necessary to exclude French influence from the northern shores of the Baltic. This effected, Sweden could be independent if she chose: and she did choose to be so, and, he trusted, had already made considerable advances towards independence. He came now to speak of the part which this country had taken. The treaty entered into by Sweden and Russia was communicated to the English government in July last year. Had not the war exploded in the North, it was probable they would never have been acquainted with its stipulations, and it was also probable they would never have been acted upon. Had not such a war broke out, it was likely they would have been considered as having been entered into for their mutual conservation, and as that which was not to be resorted to in times of safety. The English government received strong representations from both the Russian and Swedish governments, claiming their accession to the treaty, and desiring to know if England would embark with Russia and Sweden in the plan which they had formed. The answer of our government to this had been, "they could see nothing that merited reproach in the conduct of the governments of Russia and Sweden. That they were justified by the necessity of the case, that they would act with them, and give what assistance they could to the parties." They, however, had declined becoming a party to the treaty, unless entering into such an engagement they could do something for the common cause of Europe. The Russian armies were at that time retiring, and felt the necessity of making a demonstration in Germany, to prevent the whole mass of the French armies falling on them at once. The English government proposed to the Swedish government to effect this, and offered in that case not only to accede to the treaty in the qualified manner in which she had done, but to become a party to it, and to assist Sweden with a subsidy. Sweden, though she had required the cession of Norway as a preliminary, had relaxed in her demands, so far that it had been hoped Denmark would be induced to join the league against France. Ministers, pressed as they had been by Russia to conclude the arrangement with Sweden, had found Sweden desirous of giving effect to the wishes of Russia, but the obstacles which had stood in the way, not only justified the conduct of Sweden, but made it impossible for her to exert herself more than she had done in opposition to France. The armament which Sweden had prepared in the last campaign, had such an effect on Buonaparté, that he had kept two corps d'armee to watch it, between the Vistula and the Danish territories, the one at Stralsund, the other at Konigsburgh, and thus no fewer than 60,000 French troops were kept in Germany, which would otherwise have marched into Russia. It was not till the season was very far advanced, that Buonaparté ventured to move one of these corps; and when it at length marched into Russia, it did not join the French army till after the battle of Borodino. Sweden had therefore not only essentially served the cause, but had contributed largely to the salvation of the Russian empire. No military man could do other than approve of the conduct of Sweden in the last campaign. If the English government had done other than assent to the treaty concluded between Russia and Sweden, it would have shook the whole alliance of the North, and a relaxation in their efforts would have taken place, instead of the most united exertions ever made in the history of war. In the last campaign, the English government refused to advance the subsidy which Sweden required. The language then held was, "We cannot withdraw any portion of the resources of this country from the allies of England, who are now actually in the field to assist you, but from the moment, when you can convey yourselves to the continent, you will be on a par with those who are already fighting the common enemy, and that assistance which we can afford we will. You know the principle on which we act; that complied with, we shall be happy to give you any aid in our power." In the month of February, a new representation on the subject of Sweden was received from Russia.—In justice to Russia he felt it right to state, that her conduct had in no instance been selfish. Never had any country engaged in so mighty a struggle pressed so little on an ally for pecuniary aid. It was not till she was pressed on her own frontier, that her representations were strong on the subject of Sweden. A country placed in her situation, to guard against a recurrence of the necessity for making so great an effort for her salvation, was justified in calling on all connected with her for the greatest aids they could supply. She stated herself to be ready to call forth her resources to the utmost, to try to rescue Prussia from the situation to which she had been reduced; but it was stated with much military intelligence, that she was fearful that when the French army retired on the Prussian fortresses, and particularly on the line of the Oder, that unless a military diversion were made in her favour, she might not be able to force the French line. This diversion she wished us to prevail on Sweden to furnish. Sweden in the last campaign had refused to put herself in the rear of an army of 350,000 men, the best soldiers in Europe. It was now represented to her, that acting in the rear of the French she would be in a different situation, as she would act against a force reduced in numbers, reduced in efficiency, and above all reduced in military reputation. To place herself in this situation, however, was to risk great peril; and agreeing to do it, she required of England to endeavour to confine the Danish force at present in Zealand to that island, to give a subsidy, and then mentioned what had been brought forward before, her wish to possess an island in the West Indies. In gratifying her in this respect, by giving her the island of Guadaloupe, we did not bind ourselves to secure it to her for ever. Except by offering our good offices with France, we could not secure it to her on the return of peace. The cession of this island was of great advantage to Sweden, but an advantage equally great was obtained by England; for nothing was more important to England, than to give other nations an interest in struggling with her for the conservation of the liberties of the world. Two objects were gained by this cession: in the first instance we gave Sweden a natural interest to be friendly with this country, and in the second we gave her a particular interest in opposing the projects of France. He felt it quite unnecessary to offer any apology for this part of the treaty. After the great military discussions that had taken place, in which an officer who had again left this country (general Hope) had taken a distinguished part, and displayed great ability as to the mode in which the operation of Sweden could be most useful to the common cause, Sweden had determined on acting a most gallant part. Her object was to give the Russians the power of advancing further into Germany than they could otherwise have done. After the calamity which befel the French army, which was of the greatest magnitude, as diseases thinned their ranks when the sword had ceased to destroy, and reduced their once grand army to a mere wreck, they were unable to take up the line of the Oder, and the Russians were enabled to penetrate this grand military barrier, without assistance from Sweden; but the House would see that the proposed aid of Sweden might have been most important. He hoped the House would not think what had been given to obtain such co-operation had been unwisely conceded. What had been given had been given with a view to secure some great advantage to the common cause, but in all the arrangements which had taken place, an eye had been had to the possibility of detaching Denmark from the interest of the common enemy. Of this, however, sanguine hopes could not be entertained, as Denmark was a power which had always been in the habit of seeking safety in submission to France. A knowledge of this ought to save Sweden from reproach, as it must be remembered that she had been exposed to invasion through it, and that sir J. Moore with 10,000 men had been sent to Sweden, to co-operate with the Swedes in repelling an attack from that point. Still, however, the possibility of detaching Denmark from France, had been kept in view by the British government, and modifications had been proposed to Sweden with respect to Norway, to as great an extent as the right hon. gentleman opposite could wish. Sweden had intimated to Denmark, that she was ready to discuss with her the point in question. Denmark had been apprized of the engagements of England. He (lord C.) had particularly instructed Mr. Thornton to state these to the Danish ambassador at Stockholm, that his government might not be kept in the dark on this subject. Sweden had manifested a disposition to relax as far as she could. (What relaxation did she make? was asked by Mr. Ponsonby.) He (lord C.) would tell the right hon. gentleman. The great stumbling block in the way was not the cession of Norway for an equivalent, but the cession of it as a preliminary as required by Sweden was the great obstacle. The right hon. gentleman seemed quite provoked at the mention of an equivalent, but when had a treaty of peace been concluded of late years without equivalents? The doc- trine of equivalents threw no difficulty in the way, but the difficulty arose from Norway being required as a preliminary, absolute, and not contingent. Sweden, however, had so far relaxed as to say, "though I feel the whole of Norway necessary to my security; yet if the power of France be diminished, I will be content with the bishoprick of Drontheim." Sweden in making this proposition, was not actuated by a sordid desire of acquiring territory, for she intimated that she was not indisposed to alienate Pomerania. If Denmark, from a feeling that her honour was affected by the cession of the crown of Norway, raised a difficulty on that account, Sweden was ready to enter into her feelings, and say, "this shall be arranged at the conclusion of a general peace, and I will leave it to Denmark to take Norway, or the equivalent tendered, with an understanding that she will not refuse to cede to me Drontheim if she prefer Norway." Sweden, he contended, was actuated by no base and sordid motive. In the first campaign she had sacrificed her own objects to the common cause, in this she had raised her auxiliary force from 15 to 35,000 men. He felt it a duty to protect her character and repel the unfounded attack which had been made upon her and Russia. He noticed and lamented the fall of Hamburgh, but observed, the government had at least the satisfaction of knowing they had excited no false hopes. They had promised no aid which they had not afforded—they had done all that had been required of them in sending arms. He explained the conduct of the Swedes at Hamburgh much to their credit. When but 12,000 men had landed there, they were fearful of placing themselves between the French and the Danes in the situation in which Sweden and Denmark had stood with respect to each other. The Swedish commander however, with the feelings of a brave soldier, imprudently (as it had been thought) advanced to the assistance of Hamburgh, and had ultimately been obliged to retire by night to avoid being cut off with his corps, a conjoint movement having been made by the French and Danes for that purpose. A great disposition existed to believe that no obstacle had existed to the union of Denmark with the allies but Norway. The right hon. gentleman had said the Danes had been committed against the French in Hamburgh. The acts of the soldiers he would observe might not be the acts of their government, any more than were the acts of the Saxons, who were at one time seen assisting the Prussians in besieging the French in the fortresses, and at another fighting against the allies. No rational conclusion was to be drawn from this, any more than from the conduct of the king of Saxony, who was seen one day flying to Austria for protection against France, and the next flying from Austria into the arms of Buonaparté. It was not clear that what had taken place at Hamburgh was authorised by the Danish government. Buonaparté did not appear to view it in that light. He did not assume from that that the government of Denmark was alienated from him. This was plain from his conduct: for on the 16th May, count Bubna arrived at his head-quarters with certain propositions from the court of Austria. He returned on the 17th with an answer from Buonaparté, stating he was ready to agree to a congress being held at Prague, where all the great powers should be represented. He enumerated those for and those against him, and it might have been expected, that if he had not known Bernstorff was charged with propositions to which England could not accede, he would at any rate (knowing what had taken place at Hamburgh, and knowing that Bernstorff was in London), have omitted the name of Denmark among his allies, as he did that of Austria. Instead of doing this, however, Denmark was placed the second on the list, being only preceded by the United States of America. This, too, at a time when it was impossible for him to have been informed of the British ambassador's return. He believed Denmark, though at heart no friend to France, was at present afraid to risk offending Buonaparté. The first proposition made from Denmark to this country, was on the 25th of February; the basis offered was, that we should make a separate treaty, and if we acceded to this, that we should surrender all our conquests without receiving an equivalent, make complete restitution of her fleet, and indemnity for its seizure. We were thus to go down upon our knees to Denmark, give up all we have gained, and make atonement in every respect. Did these propositions seem dictated by a sincere desire for peace with England? His sincere belief was, that the object of Denmark had been merely to gain time. Our answer therefore was, that we could only view her proposition as indicative of a disposi tion to change her policy, and that six weeks before full instructions had been given to Mr. Thornton (who was then at Stockholm), to treat with Denmark, so that negociations could be entered into with him without loss of time. Denmark would not negociate with Sweden, and her first proposition was, that we should violate the engagements we had entered into with Russia and Sweden, by entering into a separate treaty with her. The propositions were so intolerably insulting, that it was difficult to listen to them with temper. By way of preface, she demanded, that we should violate our engagements with our allies; and then she demanded, that we should surrender all our conquests gratuitously—surrender her fleet—make compensation, and guarantee the integrity of the whole of her dominions, but more especially of Norway, which she knew we had engaged to assist Sweden to obtain. He offered this explanation to vindicate the allies from the very unjust, imprudent, and severe imputations which had been thrown on them. Some jealousy seemed felt, with respect to the individual who had become the Crown Prince of Sweden. It was a bold thing to answer for the conduct of any man in so high a situation, but with respect to this individual they had some means of judging of his character. He (lord Castlereagh) had never heard any thing of him which was not honourable to him as a man, and which did not tend to establish the integrity and purity of his character. He had never heard of his conduct in any country into which he had formerly carried the arms of France, which was not eminently advantageous to his personal character. For a considerable time he had exercised the highest office in Sweden, with the greatest justice and lenity, and without any view to his own emolument. It was natural for him to have felt attachment to France, but when the conduct of France went to overturn the whole system of things where he was, he fairly told Buonaparté, that he (Bernadotte) must act for the interest of the country which had adopted him. He came to Sweden with attachments to France, but he did not come to betray her. When the tyranny of France was carried so far that resistance was necessary, he did not hesitate to oppose Buonaparté, and that too at a moment which was the last he would have chosen to do so, had he not been a bold man,—that at which flushed with success, the ruler of France threatened to overwhelm Russia. He had acted faithfully and honourably up to the present time, and he (Lord C.) would not be the man to augur that he would now depart from that line of conduct. He hoped the House would not hesitate to reject the address of the right hon. gentleman, as the allegations it contained were unfounded. It went to cast such a censure on the conduct of ministers, that if it were agreed to, it was impossible they could retain their situations. If they could be content to remain in office after such a censure were passed upon them, they would prove themselves wholly unworthy the confidence of the country. He objected to the address as casting an unmerited stigma on the treaty, as unjustly condemning the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, but above all he objected to it (and in this he trusted the House would feel as he did), for the language it held respecting our allies, for the unwarrantable aspersions it went to cast on the conduct of Sweden and Russia. He trusted he had shown that the allegations contained in it were unfounded, and it was scarcely necessary to add, that if the censure which it involved upon ministers were just, they not only must be considered as unfit any longer to conduct the administration of the government, but must be sent condemned and disgraced to the allies to revoke those conditions which they had so recently recommended as wise, politic, and conducive to the promotion of those great and common interests for which they were united. He hoped he was not too sanguine in presuming, after the statement which he had made, that such would not be the decision of the House.

said, that the nature of the subject, and the situation which he had formerly the honour to hold, made it natural for him to wish to give his opinion to the House upon the present question. He could not avoid troubling them with some observations upon the topics with which the noble lord concluded his speech, although he must say, that he did not seek subjects of conflict with him. Indeed he was the more disinclined from seeking for subjects of personal controversy with the noble lord, from the frank, manly, and useful co-operation which he had received from him, in a cause (the Catholic Question) which was nearest to his heart. He must say, however, that his first feeling upon reading this treaty, was a feeling which he believed most persons entertained on the first reading of it,—a sense of shame, regret, and indignation. The explanations which the noble lord had given, had much diminished this feeling, without altogether removing it in substance. The House was to consider whether the interests and honour of the country had been sufficiently guarded in those documents which were before them, and in those stipulations which had been embodied in a treaty that was now before all the powers of Europe, and which must go forth to the world unaccompanied by the explanations of the noble lord: and posterity, in examining its features, would look to what appeared on the face of it, as that House was bound to do. We were certainly bound to look attentively to the situation of the other powers of Europe, for it was only by a combination of those powers we should be able to work out our own and their deliverance from the evils with which Europe was now surrounded. If in giving their opinion of the nature of the engagements acceded to, the House should feel it their duty to pass a strong condemnation on this treaty of accession, they would not, on the one hand, travel out of the question before them to consider of the engagements between Russia and Sweden, neither should they, on the other hand, be so fastidious' as to decline examining the conduct of their own government, because it was connected with engagements which other powers had first entered into, and to which they had only acceded. In the treaty between Russia and Sweden (to which our government had acceded) there were many ambiguities which he should wish to hear explained. The noble lord had alluded to projects of hostility having been formed against Norway, when he (Mr. Canning) was in office. It was true such projects were formed, but they were formed on the principle that Denmark was an enemy to this country, and that, therefore, we had a right to form hostile projects against her. He perceived, however, a very wide difference between a military expedition against a province belonging to a country that we were at war with, and a stipulation about what was to be the permanent state of that province after peace should be concluded. If there was any principle in the conduct of France which we inveighed against more than another, as a violation of the common law of nations, it was that of premature annexations of ter- ritory, and of pretending to settle the future fate of countries that had not been ceded to her by any treaty. It was a principle laid down by all the writers on the law of nations, that territories acquired in war could not be transferred before a peace; and that conquests by the sword required the adjudication of treaties to confer upon them a valid title. In the engagements now entered into, it was not merely the military occupation of Norway which was to be given to Sweden, but the permanent possession of it was to be guaranteed. This was what our state of war with Denmark gave us no power to do. If, indeed, Norway had of itself shewn a disposition to separate itself from Denmark by its own act, and to unite itself to Sweden, then he would allow that it would not be inconsistent with the law of nations to recognise such an act; but he thought it was inconsistent with the established law of nations to add Norway, against her will, to the dominion of another power. As to the origin of the war with Denmark, he should refer to every thing which had passed before that House and the public, whether that measure had not always been justified, at the time, upon the ground of paramount necessity; and whether it had not been most expressly stated, that the hostility which necessity had created should be confined and limited by that necessity. It had been always asserted that such hostility ought not to be pushed beyond the measure of necessity. If, however, the origin of the war with Denmark was minutely enquired into, and it were asked, why did we go to war with Denmark,—the answer would be, that it was in consequence of engagements to which Russia had been a party. If we were to ask, why an indemnity must be found for Finland,—the answer was, that Russia had wrested that province from Sweden, and would not give it up. This consideration should have made us hesitate in acceding to engagements for dismembering Denmark. He was willing to allow that the Crown Prince of Sweden had very generously abstained from calling for the force which Russia had engaged to furnish him with, for the conquest of Norway: and that by this abstinence on his part, and his determination not to give Russia any trouble in Finland, he did allow a great body of Russian troops to be free and disposable, and in this manner rendered an important service to the common cause. If Sweden set up a claim of remuneration for those services, he did not dispute the claim; but only meant to say, that we should not have paid it in that way. He could not see, however, how the plea which Sweden had first set up was borne out by the fact. At first it was stated that Sweden could not co-operate on the continent, for fear of Norway. Although this was the very foundation of the treaty between Russia and Sweden, it now appeared that Sweden could co-operate on the continent without apprehending any danger from Norway, (Hear.) As to the second article of our treaty (although the word guarantee was not expressly mentioned) yet he conceived it to amount to a guarantee. If it had been intended not to guarantee, that should have been expressly mentioned. As to the co-operation which was stipulated, in order to give Sweden military possession of Norway, he saw no objection at all to that in point of principle, if there was to be no guarantee of the permanent possession of it. The only objection which he could see to this would be the diversion of so considerable a part of our naval force, at a time when it might be so much wanting in other quarters. If, however, there was no guarantee of the permanent possession of Norway, he must allow that his principal objection was removed. He did not think it necessary to argue on the propositions which Denmark made to us, but he wished to know whether any propositions were ever made by us to Denmark, by which any option was left to her of ceding Norway or not? He understood that this cession was a sine qua non, and that Denmark had no option but either to cede Norway with good will, or have it taken from her by force. He wished also to know if on acceding to the treaty it was understood that we were to lend our aid to a military operation, and not to a guarantee. The principal article of our treaty obliged the king of Sweden to furnish a force of 30,000 men for a direct operation on the continent, in conjunction with a stipulated force to be furnished by Russia. Now if the Crown Prince performed his part of the agreement, but Russia did not send the stipulated force to join him, would he not in that case be fully entitled to every thing we had engaged to do for him, even although he had not struck a single stroke against the enemy? If the treaty was tripartite, then the failure of one of the parties exonerated the other two; but in this treaty with Sweden, if Russia did not give the force that she en- gaged to give, was not the Crown Prince still entitled to all the benefits of his engagements with this country? In former negociations for peace with France, we declared, that we only looked to the restoration of Europe, and that to purchase the restoration of her ancient states we were willing, from the lap of victory, to give up what we had conquered by our arms. If there were now a negociation for peace, Great Britain could no longer speak of the re-establishment of the ancient states of Europe, if she was pledged to the dismemberment of one of the most ancient. He would wish to know, whether, if the present armistice should put an end to the possibility of any operations of the Crown Prince in Germany, would this country be still bound by its engagements to assist him in the scheme of conquering Norway? If, however, he was told that what we had promised was limited to the continental war, his great objection would be done away, and he would only say he was sorry the matter could have been so misunderstood. With respect to Guadaloupe, he agreed that the reasoning of the noble lord was good on the subject of general commerce, and if a compensation for services, this island might be as cheap a mode of remunerating Sweden for the service which she had undertaken to perform, as any other. He had, however, the same objection, in point of principle, to transferring during a war a conquest to which we had acquired no right by treaty. This, according to Vattel and the other writers, was contrary to the law of nations. It might be said, that while he was in administration, it was also in contemplation to cede a conquered colony to Sweden. It was true that such was the case, but it was a Dutch colony, the colony of a power that had ceased to exist. Even then, however, he had stated that it could not be done during war, and that the only engagement Britain could enter into, was to do her utmost to obtain it for that power at the conclusion of a peace. To do otherwise was contrary to the law of nations; and he objected to it, not on the score of immorality, but as putting an obstacle in the way of peace. Guadaloupe could not enable Sweden to make a greater stand on the continent: and without wishing to express an illiberal opinion, he would say, that England had experienced enough to teach her not to put out of her hands that which would enable her to secure continued co-operation. By ceding this island, we would have to pay the enemy dear in making peace, and from coming to the market with fewer compensations to offer, we would be the less able to make our arrangements for Spain, Sicily, and the East Indies, especially considering that, after last war, Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope were the only equivalents we could obtain from France. His great objection was not to the assisting Sweden to gain military possession of Norway, nor to the cession of a colony to her as the price of her active co-operation in the continental war; but to the principle of guaranteeing what we had no right to guarantee, the permanent possession of that to which the right had not been established by treaty. The right hon. gentleman then offered a few remarks on the mode in which the sense of parliament could be taken on a subject of this description: and concluded by condemning a part of the conduct of ministers; but stating at the same time that he could not think it right to record that portion of the right hon. gentleman's amendment which in a complicated manner referred to the actions of our allies.

replied, that as to the doubt upon which the right hon. gentleman laid the greatest stress,—whether the engagement did or did not amount to a guarantee, he was surprised that such a doubt should enter into a mind so well disciplined in diplomatic matters as that of the right hon. gentleman. He could assure him, however, that no such doubt was in the mind of the Swedish government, as the question of guarantee or not guarantee had been fully discussed in the negociation, and this government had expressly refused to guarantee. (Hear, hear.) Russia indeed, had engaged with Sweden not only to furnish an army to assist in the occupation of Norway, but also to guarantee the possession of it. As to Guadaloupe, we were to give it up to Sweden, but we did not guarantee the permanent possession of it. The king of Sweden was only put in the shoes of his Majesty; the island was to be ceded to him; and although we hoped that he might retain it, there was no guarantee. It was natural, however, to suppose, that two powers who fought together would treat together, and that each would be anxious to obtain for its ally the best terms that circumstances would admit of. We were bound not to oppose the conquest of Norway, but to exert ourselves for the common interest. With regard to the waver of Norway, it had been made by general Hope, Mr. Thornton, and a Swedish minister, with full powers and officially enabled to come to a conclusive arrangement on that point. As to the Crown Prince venturing a co-operation on the continent now, which he thought dangerous last year, it must be supposed that after the event of the last campaign, he did not apprehend the influence of France over Denmark to be so great this year as it was at that period.

said he had not, in the worst times of the French Revolution, heard arguments more hostile to good government, than those which had fallen from the right hon. gentleman this evening. As well might France say that Ireland was disaffected from the government of this country, and that, therefore, she was warranted in endeavouring to effect the junction of that country to Spain, as we were warranted in saying that Norway was not well affected to Denmark, and, therefore, that we were entitled to enter into a treaty to separate her from Denmark, and to render her subject to Sweden. He had come down to the House, full of all those prejudices against the treaty which it was naturally calculated to produce; and though the noble lord (Castlereagh) had made what he might call an exceedingly good speech, he had not taken the sting out of it, nor enabled him (Mr. Whitbread) to say that he did not still condemn the treaty. We had now been at war for twenty years, in the struggle in which we were now engaged, and in this struggle we had acted various parts, and the part we were now acting was at variance with all our former professions. He then took a short view of the conduct of Russia in possessing herself of Finland. Taking advantage of the imbecility of Sweden, she had conducted herself in the basest manner towards that government, to which, imbecile and insane as it was, the ministers of that day consigned a great armament. Russia was not willing to atone: and her stipulation with Sweden was one of mere barter: "we keep Finland, and give you Norway." If Russia would have restored Finland to Sweden, would there have been a single question about Norway? We had seen Russia, without complaint or remonstrance on our part, in the basest manner, deprive Sweden, whom we now jointly pretended to regard as a friend, of her territory.— The time had now come that Russia was afraid of the encroachments of France—it then became necessary for her to endeavour to make a friend of Sweden; but to do so, she did not say that she would restore to Sweden Finland, but that she would assist Sweden in wresting Norway from Denmark. The noble lord had spoken tauntingly and slightingly of the Danes, of whose injuries the hon. member could never think without the deepest regret; but we had often measured our strength with them, and even lord Nelson acknowledged that there were no harder battles fought than those in which the Danes were engaged. The attack upon Copenhagen had been defended on the plea of the secret article of the treaty of Tilsit, and yet the armament there employed had sailed six days before the nature of that secret article was known. It was to be observed, too, that Denmark must feel more indignant against this country than against any other power in Europe. The count Bernstorff, in the late negociations, had demanded the restitution of the Danish fleet, and who, when this was refused, was the colleague of the noble lord opposite, but lord Sidmouth, who had declared by a motion, recorded in the House of Lords, that it was his opinion, that they ought to be returned as an act of justice; and that to effect the pacification of Europe, without first doing it, would be most unjustifiable. Yet this was stated to be an insulting proposition when made to the present ministers! They then objected to the proposition that Norway should be guaranteed to Denmark; but did the noble lord think that more unreasonable than it would have been in him, in a similar case where England was a party, and where he was her minister, to have stipulated that Ireland should be guaranteed to this country. He conceived the present treaty to be a most unworthy act of diplomacy. It had been said that, after all, Sweden was not able to stir a step in the common cause; but he had just read an official bulletin, without date, importing that the Swedes had entered Brunswick; was it true? [Lord Castlereagh said, he did not know to what the hon. gentleman alluded.] Mr. Whitbread then read the news from an evening paper, which said, after stating that the allies had beaten the French at Halberstadt, taken 14 pieces of cannon, and entered Brunswick, that lieutenant general Tettenborn had put himself in communication with the Swedes, and that he had 10,000 men under his orders. [Lord Castlereagh said that the Swedes were not engaged in this victory.] So then, (said Mr. Whitbread) there were no Swedes engaged in point of fact, and this bulletin was perhaps only issued for the purposes of to-night's debate. The hon. member would not detain the House longer than to observe upon the noble lord's panegyric upon the Prince Royal of Sweden. That nation had followed an example set by this country, of sending from the throne a being unfit by folly and mismanagement to reign, by a revolution without bloodshed or the disturbance of property; and he was happy to find that the founder of the new dynasty in Sweden was a man of so mild a disposition, and one who "bore his faculties so meekly." The noble lord could form no expectations of what any crowned head could do, but in the praises of Bernadotte, he spoke with perfect confidence. He was happy to hear the person alluded to was so deserving of commendation; but he would rather not have seen him a party to such a treaty as the present, to which he (Mr. Whitbread) could not give his support.

rose to move as an amendment, that while the House assured his royal highness the Prince Regent that they would without delay take his most gracious message into consideration, they must request of his Royal Highness to cause inquiry to be made as to the nature of our engagements with Sweden, relating to the conquest of Norway, in the event of the return of peace.

said the amendment already before the House must be disposed of.

continued of opinion, that nothing could make amends to the character of this country for the adoption of such a treaty as the present.

The House divided on the original motion.—For the Motion 115; For the Amendment 224; Majority against Mr. Ponsonby's motion—109.

The House again divided on Mr. Canning's Amendment.—For the original Amendment 225; For Mr. Canning's Amendment 121; Majority in favour of the original Amendment—104;

The House then went into a committee, when the vote was agreed to, and the Report ordered to be received on Monday.