moved for the second reading of this Bill.

took that opportunity of saying a word on the place of Joint Paymaster of the Forces, and of asking whether or no it was the intention of government to suppress it? It might be recollected, that when he had made a motion to that effect, he had been answered by the gentlemen on the other side, that it was perfectly useless, as a Bill was then in its progress in another place, to suppress sinecures, under which description the place alluded to would come. It was however known to all, that the Sinecure Bill had been lost, and it was equally notorious that the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Long) discharged all the duties of the situation, while the noble lord who was his assistant paymaster (lord C. Somerset) was employed elsewhere. In fact, the place was kept up solely for securing the interest of the duke of Beaufort. It was now too late in the session, to introduce a Bill for the suppression of that place; but as long as he should be honoured with a seat in that House, he would persevere in his efforts until he had attained his object. As to the other office to which he had alluded at the same time, he meant that of Paymaster of the Marines, he was glad to see that the intention of the Admiralty was to suppress it, at least he gathered so from the paper placed on the table of the House, and he had only to express his hopes that the other place would share the same fate.

denied that the Board of Admiralty had in contemplation to suppress the place of Paymaster of Marines. The paper on the table proved on the contrary, that they considered that office as absolutely necessary, and they merely intended to establish new regulations.

took that opportunity of explaining that in a former night's debate he had not said that the army in the peninsula was paid to the 24th of March, as had been reported, but to the 24th of February.

objected to the manner in which this Bill had been brought into the House, under a title, as he was informed, different from what it now bore, so that those persons who were most interested in its provisions, were absolutely ignorant that any such Bill was passing through the Commons. He understood that the Bill was founded upon principles nearly similar, if not exactly so, to the Auction Bill brought in last session by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and which was ultimately rejected by that House. That right hon. gentleman had, after that failure, in a manner pledged himself to the auctioneers, that no similar enactment should be attempted: but the Secretary of the Treasury, not at all deterred by the issue of the last attempt, had declared, as he was informed, that he would, notwithstanding, "try the experiment." He wished the Bill should be printed.

replied, that the Bill had never borne any other title, nor had it been clandestinely brought into the House. It had been before it several weeks. He solemnly denied he had, on any occasion, ever uttered the expression that he would "try the experiment." All the communications which he had with the parties interested in the measure had been free, open and amicable. He did not anticipate any opposition to the Bill. If it was the pleasure of the House that it should be printed, he certainly should not oppose it. The assertions of the hon. member, he contended, were totally unfounded. The city of London was deeply interested in passing this Bill; a deputation from it had waited upon him, to express their great desire for such an Act, and there were petitions from various parts of the country, speaking the same language.

said, the assertions he had used were no assertions of his; they were what he had received from respectable authority. He certainly had been most grossly mis-informed as to the title of the Bill. With regard to the expression of "trying the experiment," he would read to the House a sentence from a letter which contained that assertion. [Here he read, from a letter, a passage attributing those words to the hon. member.] He would suggest, however, as so much misapprehension had gone forth, whether it would not be better to print the Bill.

said, he certainly had intended to bring in a Bill similar to the present, but as his time was so greatly occupied, he had requested his hon. friend to take that trouble.

contended, that it was a Bill of great importance, not only as it affected individuals, but the revenues of the crown, and therefore he saw no reason why the hon. gentleman should not anticipate a discussion upon it. One of the clauses, he understood, enacted that all property put up to sale should be liable to duty, whether sold or not. There were other points, also, that required discussion, in his opinion.

said he had been totally misapprehended. What he had said was, that in the present stage of the Bill he had no reason to expect any discussion. Indeed he did not apprehend the Bill was liable to much objection; he had had frequent interviews with the principal persons affected by its provisions, and he had framed it, as nearly as possible, upon what he conceived, from those communications, would be most likely to secure the interests of the auctioneers in general. He would, however, propose, that instead of the Bill being recommitted on Monday, it should be committed now, with the amendments, and be taken into further consideration on Tuesday next.

wished it to be printed, together with the amendments.

said, that when he introduced it, he intended it should have been printed after having been committed. The Bill had been communicated to a great many members: and several of the amendments were in consequence of suggestions from those gentlemen. Mock auctions, indeed, had become an evil of such intolerable extent, that some regulation was imperiously called for.

spoke in favour of the Bill. He thought the evil of mock auctions, which were nothing but swindling transactions, had been confined to the metropolis; but he found that they now infested every part of the country.

said a few words in favor of the Bill; when it was committed. It was also ordered to be printed.

proceeded to make the motion of which he had given notice. As it respected the House and the public, he regretted that the motion had been so long delayed, but he was glad of this circumstance as connected personally with himself, because the further this description was removed from the sentence that had been passed upon him, the less could it be considered as one in which he himself was interested on his own account. During the progress of his trial it was never his intention to complain to the House. He was determined that sentence should be passed upon him. before he would state to parliament that, which, in his opinion, deeply affected the privileges of every man in that House and of all his successors. Strong as his feeling undoubtedly was on the subject, he would not now ask the House to come to any resolution on the case. He merely meant at present to lay the foundation for further and ulterior deliberation on this important subject, by bringing before the House a faithful narrative of all the facts and proceedings in this case, and as an inducement to the House to listen to him with attention, he would observe that this was the first case in the history of parliament, in which a member of parliament had been arraigned for words which were proved to have been spoken by him in his place in parliament, and in discharge of his public duty, let such words or speech have been afterwards printed and published by him or not. The facts were these:—Early in the last session of the last parliament, there was a discussion in the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company. He believed the question was the appointment of a committee to examine into those affairs. On that occasion he had urged the expediency of that which, in his opinion, would have been a preferable measure, viz. the opening of the trade with India to the out-ports. He had stated what from his own recent personal observation was the condition of one of those out-ports, the town of Liverpool. He had stated the evils which had resulted from the suspension of the trade with America, and from the other circumstances which had paralyzed the commerce of Liverpool evils, which a free trade to India alone was calculated to remedy. In the course of his speech he had mentioned in detail the misery which existed in Liverpool, such as the great and increasing quantity of poor, who were forced to apply for parochial relief. Shortly afterwards, during his absence on a visit to Liverpool, general Tarleton (then a member for Liverpool) declared in the House, that those detailed accounts were much exaggerated; and read a letter from a respectable merchant of Liverpool desiring him to contradict them. When he (Mr. Creevey) returned to London, it so happened that on the first day of his attendance in parliament, general Tarleton presented a petition from Liverpool, praying for a free trade to India. He (Mr. Creevey) then re-stated what he had before said (of the truth of which he had received ample confirmation during his visit); and, speaking of the distress of the town of Liverpool, took occasion to mention a great additional vexation lately inflicted on the inhabitants by new surcharges of property, which were attributed to an inspector of taxes, of the name of Kirkpatrick. Soon afterwards he saw very incorrect reports of this speech in several papers, and particularly in one published at Liverpool, and as his accuracy had been impeached by the declarations of general Tarleton, he thought it his duty, and conceived, and still did conceive it to be his right, to cause to be inserted, in that paper in which the incorrect account had been inserted, a correct statement of all that he had stated. He gave the printer of the Liverpool paper to which he had alluded authority to publish this corrected speech early in last March twelvemonth. It was printed in a few days. But it was not until the middle of October, at which period he was one of the candidates for the representation of Liverpool, after two sessions and the spring assizes at Lancaster had been permitted to pass by, that he learnt that an indictment had been preferred against him at the quarter sessions at Manchester, by the King, for a printed libel. He then thought, and he now thought, that he was completely justified in causing the publication of the speech in question. But with all due respect to the magistrates who compose the bench in the town of Manchester, who were most respectable persons, at the head of whom was a clergyman of high character, he did not conceive the quarter sessions was the proper tribunal to decide a question which involved the privileges of parliament; and he therefore moved his cause by Certiorari to the assizes at Lancaster. Last spring assizes it came on to be tried before Mr. Justice Le Blanc. It was admitted on the part of the prosecution, that all that had been written by him had been said by him in his place in parliament. The witnesses on the part of the prosecution proved, that he had directed it to be published for the purpose of correcting misrepresentation. No attempt was made to impute to him malice or private resentment: and an ulterior stage of the trial afforded him an opportunity of denying by his affidavit, that he had ever seen the prosecutor in his life, that he had ever had any private quarrel with him, or that he entertained towards him the slightest resentment.—His (Mr. Creevey's) counsel contended, upon the trial at Lancaster, that under all the circumstances of the case then proved or admitted, he was not amenable to the courts below; but Mr. Justice Le Blanc declared, that he must be bound by the case of the King v. the earl of Abingdon; that the privilege of parliament was entirely out of the question; that malice was not a necessary ingredient in a case of libel, that the only question was, if the words used were defamatory; and that in his opinion they were defamatory. On this direction, the jury, without hesitation, pronounced him (Mr. Creevey) guilty. Last term, he made an application to the court of King's-bench for a new trial, on the ground of his privilege as a member of parliament, and of misdirection on the part of the judge by whom he had been already tried. He was in court when the application was made, and he witnessed the unanimous declaration of the judges, that they were bound by the case of the King v. the earl of Abingdon. The lord chief justice (lord Ellenborough) said, that he had never heard a proposition so extravagant as the claim of a member of parliament to explain out of the House any conduct which he had pursued or any language which he had used within it. Mr. Justice Bailey considered the sending of a speech made in parliament to a newspaper as a degradation; although he must have known that it was the practice at all times, of the most distinguished persons, in both Houses, to publish their own speeches, and although he must have known that but a few months ago that highly respectable judge, Mr. Baron Wood, sent to a newspaper a copy of a charge to a jury which he had made, in order to correct a misrepresentation which had gone forth with respect to it. On the 20th of May, he (Mr. Creevey), was brought up in the court of King's-bench to receive judgment; when Mr. Justice Grose, in discharging that duty, pronounced sentence upon him, that he should pay a fine of 100l. to the King, and be committed to the King's-bench until the fine was paid. The learned judge almost made an apology for his lenity, by declaring that the printed paper which had been the subject of prosecution, was not so much a libel upon the tax-gatherer as a libel on Mr. Perceval, and a proceeding bottomed in disaffection to the state—thus, while passing sentence for a libel, most unjustly and most illegally libelling him (Mr. Creevey), by ascribing to him two offences for which he had never been tried. Now what was the nature of the case so strongly relied on as the ground of his conviction? Let it be compared with his own. In lord Abingdon's case no public subject was concerned. He had made a speech in the House of Lords, solely directed against the professional character of an individual, a Mr. Sermon, his attorney. It was proved on the trial that he had had a private quarrel with this gentleman, and that he bore him actual malice. It was proved on the trial that he had gone to the House of Lords with his speech ready written, that immediately after he had delivered it he caused it to be printed, and that he paid for such printing, and that he had evidently done all this with a view, under the shelter of the privileges of the House of. Lords, of making a personal attack on an individual. Such was the case of lord Abingdon. What was his own? The speech which he had made related to a public cause. His observations bore on a public servant, the propriety of whose conduct was most important to his Majesty's subjects—a collector of taxes. He had spoken of a grievance deeply affecting a great and populous part of the empire, with which by birth and residence and various other ties he was closely connected. No attempt was made to prove against him any private quarrel or personal resentment, and it was proved by him that so far from going to the House of Commons to make the speech for the purpose of having it printed, the speech would never have been printed if the inaccuracy of those to whom the standing orders of the House refused permission to publish the proceedings of parliament at all, had not rendered correction indispensable. So far, therefore, were these two cases from having any affinity, that they appeared to him to be in perfect opposition. With respect to the decision in his case, he begged the House to consider to what extent the doctrine might be carried if the law were such as it had been, declared to be. It would for ever put an end to all communication between the representative and the constituent bodies in this kingdom. That which he might not publish by writing he presumed he might not publish by speaking. If Mr. Justice Grose was right in proclaiming his offence to be bottomed in disaffection to the state (that was in proclaiming it to be a seditious libel), then, had he (Mr. Creevey), instead of printing his speech as he had done, waited until he became a candidate for the representation of Liverpool, and on the hustings there, either voluntarily or in answer to a proposed question, stated that which he in fact had written; and had that seditious libel been communicated to the Attorney General by some one who could have proved its utterance, the Attorney General would doubtless have filed an information, and, according to the justice dealt out to other libellers, he (Mr. Cree-vey) would most probably have expiated this offence in a distant gaol. Was this English law, or was it not? Unquestionably it appeared to him, that he was just as liable to be punished for a viva voce statement to his constituents, as for one written and published. If so, it was most extraordinary, that up to the present time, no one had ever heard of any member of parliament having been prosecuted for any statement or account that he might think it his duty to give to his constituents on any of the various subjects in which they might be supposed to be interested. It was well known that the greatest men had undergone parliamentary accusation. The great lord Bacon himself had not escaped impeachment. If any member of parliament of that day had told his constituents the reason's which had induced him to vote against lord Bacon, how could he have done so without using defamatory words? [The Attorney General shook his head.] The hon. and learned gentleman opposite seemed to dissent from this proposition. For his part, he was sure it could not be denied, and he should be glad to hear the Attorney General deny if he could, the truth of what he was stating or the inference he drew from it. He had voted for the expulsion of Mr. Hunt for the impeachment of lord Melville, for the address to deprive the duke of York of his situation as commander in chief. In all these cases he could not conceive how it would have been possible for him to account for his conduct to his constituents without using defamatory words, and thereby being guilty, according to modern law, of a libel. The absence of malice would be nothing, the bona fide nature of the proceeding and the discharge of his duty to his constituents would be nothing; if the words were proved to be defamatory, they would be considered as a fit subject for prosecution.—It bad long been considered as a settled point, that parliamentary reports should be given; so that according to the new dictum of the judges, the members of that House were at the mercy of the reporters for all they might say within these walls, and at that of the judges for all they might explain to their constituents with-out them. All accounts given, therefore, however correct, by themselves, to those who elected them, or by whom they sought to be elected, were attended with danger, and exposed them to the liability of prosecution. He was perfectly ready to admit, that he and every member of that House was amenable for misconduct to parliament itself. What alone he objected to was, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts over such cases. He had of course, before he brought this subject under the consideration of the House, looked for such light and instruction from precedents as the Journals and history of parliament afforded, and he would state such information as he found it, faithfully to the House. In the time of the Long Parliament, when the House of Commons was in the habit of debating with closed doors, the attention of the House seemed to have been first called to the subject of printing speeches. The House then ordered the speeches of their favourite members to be published. Amongst these was Mr. Solicitor St. John's speech on one occasion, and Mr. Pym's on lord Strafford's Attainder Bill. These were members which at that time were at the head of the party which had then most influence in parliament. King Charles the First himself, in one of his messages or speeches to the House of Commons, justifies himself against what he considers mis-statements or misrepresentations in a "printed" speech of Mr. Pym. The Commons, however, had laid down a rule only for one party, and not for their opponents, who began to conceive, that if what was said on one side might be published, that which was urged on the other was entitled to the same privilege. Accordingly lord Digby, who had made an excellent speech on one of the stages of lord Strafford's Attainder Bill, exposing in the strongest point of view the abominable and illegal cruelty of that whole measure, was afterwards induced to print it, Mr. St. John's and Mr. Pym's speeches on the same subject, but on the opposite side, being already printed by order of the House. Upon this the House of Commons, i.e. the prevailing party in it, took offence, and appointed a committee to inquire into the printing of speeches by members, and referred the report of lord Digby's to this committee. On the 13th of July, 1641, sir John Evelyn having produced the report, they resolved that the said printed speech contained matter untrue and scandalous, as it related to the proceedings in both Houses of Parliament; that it was a criminal offence against the legislature, and should be burned by the hands of the common hangman.^* He stated this case in order to shew that the printing a speech made in parliament was an offence, if an offence at all, cognisable by parliament alone. If subject to any other jurisdiction, how had it not occurred to Mr. Solicitor St. John to institute legal proceedings against lord Digby, who had gone so far as even to impeach in his speech the testimony of sir Harry Vane? The House did indeed soon afterwards address the king not to confer any more honours or marks of his favour on lord Digby, but never appeared to imagine that there existed any legal ground for a prosecution. An order was subsequently made interdicting any person from publishing any thing said or done in that House. This was certainly a strong example of the abuse of privilege, but it still served to shew that they always considered themselves as the only judges who had any control over their own proceedings. In the same parliament sir E. Deering printed a speech which he made in favour of the established church, which being contrary to the principles of the ruling party in the Commons, they voted that it should be burned by the common hangman, and expelled sir Edward Deering.† Now, in order to illustrate what he had before stated as to the inseparable connection between printed reports and viva voce statements of what was spoken in parliament, he would cite the case of Mr. Taylor, the member for Windsor. Mr. Taylor having been one of those who had resisted the attainder of lord Strafford, on meeting his constituents informed them of the language which he had used on that occasion, and in which he had described that proceeding as most atrocious. A paper was afterwards produced and laid on the table of the House, relating that Mr. Taylor had said at Windsor, that lord Strafford had been murdered, and that the murder was, in his opinion, the more foul because it had been committed with the sword of justice. The words were further proved to have been uttered by the testimony of Hall, the mayor, and others who were present at the time. It was immediately resolved, that Mr. Taylor should be expelled and rendered incapable of ever sitting again in parliament, and that he should make acknowledgment of his offence at the bar of the House and in the town of Windsor.^* It was evident, then, that the same law which took cognizance of libellous publications was equally applicable to verbal expressions. Mr. Andrew Marvell, who was returned to parliament at the beginning of the Restoration, and continued to represent the town of Hull from 1660 to 1678, was accustomed during that whole period to send in writing to his constituents an accurate account of all he did and said in parliament, and from his general character it might be inferred that the tone of his narration must have been pretty sarcastic. He was, however, never visited by king Charles's attorney general. In the year 1679, however, the speeches which sir Francis Winnington and lord Cavendish had made on the duke of York's Exclusion Bill were published, and the House having referred them to a committee, voted them to be false and scandalous. Still it was never supposed that there could be any legal prosecution in such a case. In 1693, a complaint was made of a publication of a speech containing very violent language that had been made in parliament by sir John Knight, against a very necessary measure at that period of king William's government, the Bill for Naturalizing Foreigners.^* It had the effect of spreading a flame through the country, and a copy of it being laid before the House, it was resolved that it was a false, scandalous and seditious pamphlet, and that it should be burned on the following Saturday by the hands of the hangman. Here was another proof that the crown officers of that reign never dreamed of bringing these cases into courts of law. Thus from the time of the Long Parliament to the period of the Revolution, the practice was uniform and consistent, and no individual from that period has ever conceived himself to be injured by it, till a collector of the taxes, of much greater sensibility than all or any of his countrymen who have preceded him, is determined to make a new experiment in trying the efficacy of the court of King's-bench. He knew that there were no less than thirty resolutions against reporting the speeches or proceedings in that House, yet by universal consent and a long established understanding, he conceived himself authorised in saying, that it had now become a legal practice. In the year 1771, the question was brought to issue, and the printers determined to settle the point.† On the motion of colonel Onslow the two printers, Miller and Wheeble, were ordered to be taken into custody, and a reward of 50l. offered for their apprehension. The magistrates before whom they were brought released them, and committed the officers of the House. The House in retaliation committed the magistrates, aldermen Oliver and Crosby, and ordered Mr. Wilkes, one of their members, and who had likewise as a magistrate released the printers, to attend in his place, who justly as he had before incurred the displeasure of the House, refused so to do, and no further proceedings took place against him. The public then felt that the House had shrunk from the contest; the right had never been since asserted, and should it be again set up, he doubted not that the public would again compel the House to abandon it. The reporters now published the debates, and it was of no consequence whether they did so by usage and sufferance, if that usage and sufferance could not be revoked. It then became the more important that the members of that House should exercise the privilege of correcting any inaccuracies that might be committed by the reporters, and that they should not be the only persons who were precluded from printing what they might say in parliament. As the law had been lately declared, any other individual might publish a member of parliament's speech; but if he ventured to do so himself it must be at the mercy of a judge, and the hazard of a gaol. It might be urged, that if the printer made misrepresentations, he might be reprimanded; but as for himself, he had no wish to punish misrepresentations. When they occurred, they were probably the result of haste and unintentional error, and in all events, a reprimand to the printer was no explanation to his constituents of what he had really said. He knew that many gentlemen, for whom he had the greatest respect, entertained an apprehension that the publication of speeches by members of parliament might be rendered a vehicle for the circulation of personal defamation. He conceived, however, that this objection ought rather to be made to reporting generally, for it was obvious, that if members were always to report their own speeches, they would be given in a more guarded as well as in a more accurate manner. But above all he insisted that the practice of printing members' speeches by others being now as it were law, it became a necessary and indispensable consequence, that if a reporter published for a member in his speech what he did not say, that such member in his own defence should claim the right of publishing what he did say. In speaking, however, of apprehensions or of jealousies, he must be permitted to say, he was much less jealous of members of parliament abusing their privileges to the prejudice of individuals, than he was of judges trampling upon such privileges to the prejudice of the liberty of the subject, and for the purpose of currying favour with the crown. When judges undertook to decide on privilege, they decided upon that which was originally constituted as a protection to the House against the usurpations of the crown; but at almost every period of our history, the judges have been found the willing instruments of the crown.—At the beginning of the reign of Charles 1, when the celebrated Mr. Selden, Mr. Hollis, and sir John Elliot, and others, had become obnoxious to the court, the surest way of getting rid of them was considered to be a prosecu- tion in the court of King's-bench. The judges then said, as lord Ellenborough now said, we cannot interfere with speeches made in parliament; but then they said these speeches are made in an unparliamentary manner, and tend to excite disaffection in his majesty's subjects, and therefore no plea of privilege can be allowed. Every one hated and abhorred the atrocious judgments which the judges of that day pronounced upon those most virtuous and distinguished members of the House of Commons; they were all sentenced to be imprisoned during the king's pleasure; and the ringleaders, as they were called (of whom Mr. Selden was one) were to pay 2,000 marks as a fine to the king. (Hear!)—Some of these gentlemen died in prison, and others, upon petition, were afterwards set at liberty, on condition of not coming within ten miles of London, and giving security in 2,000l. for their good conduct. This was a judgment given to satisfy the court at the commencement of the reign of Charles 1, because the court was then all powerful; but in the course of a few years the Long Parliament having become paramount in the state, the judges of the King's-bench thought proper to transfer their allegiance. The Long Parliament having an atrocious act to perform, turned their attention to the judges, in order to obtain their sanction to the illegal proceedings against lord Strafford; they were asked as to the constitutional nature of that attainder; and their infamous reply was, through the lord chief justice, that it was their unanimous opinion, that lord Strafford had deserved to suffer the pains and penalties of high treason according to law. There was another flagrant case of the subserviency of the judges. Sir William Williams, who had been speaker of that House, and published Dangerfield's Narrative against the duke of York as speaker, and by order of the House, was prosecuted for this offence, after the accession of James 2, and sentenced by the then judges to pay a fine of 10,000l.^* These cases he thought sufficient ground for entertaining a great jealousy of the judges; he thought too that his own case rendered it still stronger. The Attorney-General seemed to smile, as if he (Mr. Creevey, felt any soreness on this occasion. He could assure him that this was not the case—that he had no other feeling than that of pride and gratitude at the kindness and friendship which he had experienced upon this occasion.—He had no personal resentment of any kind to gratify, and had no object whatever but to induce parliament to take this question into its serious consideration. It was, in his opinion, connected with the most important privileges of parliament, and went to affect all future parliaments no less than the present.—And again he asserted that it was a case as much calculated to excite jealousy of judges as any of the cases he had mentioned. Having stated what he deemed to be the true and legitimate objects of jealousy with the House of Commons, viz. the crown and the judges, he had no hesitation in admitting that the House of Commons itself was too frequently a first object of jealousy with the people in the abuse or in the sufferance of the abuse of its privileges. In the course of the last parliament evidence had been tendered by members of that House of the ministers of the crown having violated privilege by trafficing in seats of parliament, and the House refused to inquire. But when an unfortunate man like Mr. Gale Jones attacked privilege, all was indignation, the Bill of Rights read, and the offender lodged in Newgate. When the duke of Cumberland and the duke of Leeds were accused and proved guilty of tampering with election, the good manners of the House suppressed every sentiment of disapprobation, but when Mr. Croggon was charged with precisely the same offence, privilege of parliament was maintained and the individual committed to custody. What he complained of was, not the exercise of privilege, but the direction of it against obscure persons who violated it, and an abject renunciation of it in cases where the parties happened to be high in rank or powerful in office. Privilege, rightly understood, was meant to be the protection of the people against the crown, but by the modern decision of the House of Commons, who ought to be its guardian, it is converted into an instrument of power in favour of the crown and against the people. To go back again to the judges and to his grounds of jealousy of them, he could mention one other case, which was extremely apposite, and illustrated most powerfully the variation in the opinions of the judges according to the character and situation of the accused party. In the case of the King v. Wright, it appeared that he, Mr. Wright, published the Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, charging Mr. Horne Tooke with high treason, of which he had been acquitted three years before. Mr. Horne Tooke sought his remedy in the court of King's-bench. Upon this occasion lord Kenyon suggested to the prosecutor, that if the copy of the Report was a correct copy, he had better not move for a rule, but that if the copy were untrue, the rule might be granted. Mr. Justice Lawrence observed, that the proceedings of courts of law as well as those of parliament, were regularly published, and, although often reflecting on the character of individuals, yet if those reports were faithful, it would be impossible to maintain a prosecution for their publication. Such was the observation of Mr. Justice Lawrence, whom no man, he believed, could rank below lord Ellenborough or any other judge for learning or ability. Mr. Justice Lawrence further remarked, in refusing this application of Mr. Tooke's, that if reports of proceedings in parliament or courts of justice were sometimes prejudicial to the reputation of individuals, it was an unavoidable evil, and not comparable to the general advantage gained to society by their publication. This free and accurate representation could not, however, take place if printers were liable to prosecution as libellers, in so acting. Lord Ellenborough on the other hand had recently said, that he had never before heard any thing so wild as the proposition that a member of parliament had a right to publish a correct account of what he had said or done in parliament. Whilst these two cases were before them, he would openly assert that there was in this country as manifested in these instances one law for one man, and one for another. Mr. Horne Tooke was refused his redress, because he was a person obnoxious to the state. His prosecutor had succeeded, because he was an officer engaged in the collection of the revenue. He, on the other hand, was well known-to have been actively engaged in parliamentary opposition to government. These circumstances convinced him, that it was highly proper that the attention of parliament should be called to the subject, and the contrariety of the legal decisions which had been made further convinced him of this propriety. He should conclude, therefore, by moving a Resolution containing a statement of all the circumstances which he had described, and, with a view of impeaching the record of the proceeding in the court of King's-bench, add, that Mr. Justice Grose, in pronouncing the judgment of the Court, stated, that the Court did not consider his offence merely in the light of an attack upon the character of Mr. Kirkpatrick, but as a libel upon the memory of Mr. Perceval, and as bottomed upon disaffection to the state, thereby illegally and unjustly pronouncing him, Thomas Creevey, to be guilty of crimes for which he had not been tried.

^* See the new Parliamentary History, vol. 2, p. 883. † Ibid. vol. 2, p. 1072.

^* See the new Parliamentary History, vol. 2, p 315.

^* See the new Parliamentary History, vol. 5, p. 849.

† Ibid. vol. 17, p. 58.

^* For the Proceedings against sir William Williams for the publication of Dangerfield's Narrative, see Howell's. State Trials, vol. 13, p. 1370.

said, that there certainly was no precedent of the House assenting to so long a narrative as that which had been read by the hon. gentleman without evidence, but although there had been no precedent for such a proceeding, it did not follow that such a question might not be raised.

The question having been then put,

said, he did not see that there was any thing in this Resolution which demanded the consideration of the House; he could not help thinking, from the statement of the case made by the hon. gentleman himself, that the privileges of parliament had been in no respect infringed. When he heard of a breach of privilege of that House, he was astonished that such a delay as from the 20th of March down to the present period, should have been suffered to take place before any complaint was made to the House. He would admit that this delay had in some measure been created in obedience to the wishes of different members, but if it was his own case, he should not have suffered twenty-four hours to elapse, before he communicated what he might consider a breach of his privilege as a member of parliament to the House, of the rights and independence of which he considered himself in some measure the guardian. Now that he had heard the grounds of the hon. gentleman's complaint, however, as he had delayed it so long, he was surprised he had not delayed it until the session had concluded. The claims of the hon. gentleman amounted to neither more nor less, than that every member of that House, might publish what he thought fit, and then justify himself by saying that it was a speech which he had spoken in his place in parliament, and that consequently he was amenable to no other jurisdiction than to that House. For such a proceeding there was not the slightest authority on the Journals of the House, and he was astonished that any person could wish to extend the privilege of parliament to so extraordinary a length. The privilege of parliament implied that every member should have full and uncontrolled liberty of speech within those walls; but it could not extend to any thing said or published beyond them, without giving to every member of the House of Commons a right to libel whom he pleased, under the pretence of discharging his parliamentary duty. If, as the hon. gentleman said, he had only corrected a misstatement, that was a question for the jury, to whom, by Mr. Fox's Libel Bill, it was reserved, and it was their duty to determine whether the publication were for the purpose of refuting a false account, or for that of injuring the character of an individual.

The cases which had been cited did not appear at all to bear upon the present question, or where they did bear were decidedly against it. The cases of lord Digby and of sir Edward Deering had expressly determined that no member was at liberty to print what was said in the House, either by himself or any other member, without a previous permission. This doctrine was again recognized in the case of Mr. Hollis immediately after the Restoration, who having been misrepresented by public report, felt it necessary to apply to the House before he presumed to print his own speech. In later times; when Cave, the printer of the Gentleman's Magazine, was brought to the bar upon the charge of printing the debates, and was questioned how he procured them, he replied, that many of the speeches were furnished by the members themselves.^* Yet this was not held to be any extenuation of his offence, though if members had a privilege to print their speeches, it would necessarily follow that all those who acted under their authority were equally justifiable.

The next argument which had been relied upon was, that for the publication of debates persons were indeed amenable to the authority of the House, but to no other tribunal. This was indeed true, so far as related to the offence against the privileges of the House, but it was very possible that the same paper which offended against those privileges, might be also a breach of the common or statute law, and therefore cognizable in the inferior courts.

^* See new Parliamentary History, vol. 14, p 60.

To prove this, he instanced the case of bribery, which was an offence against the most sacred privilege of the House of Commons, and which had repeatedly been punished as such, yet it would be rather an extraordinary exertion of privilege if the House were to object to a court of justice entertaining an information or indictment for that crime. If this principle required any additional illustration, it would be found in the numerous cases of libels which the House had directed to be prosecuted by the Attorney General; because, though breaches of privilege, they were at the same time violations of law.

The case of the earl of Abingdon appeared in every respect perfectly similar to the present; and the only distinction which the ingenuity of the learned gentleman had enabled him to take between the two was, that lord Abingdon had made his speech in the House of Lords maliciously and gratuitously; whereas, the speech, which was the subject of the present debate, had arisen out of the discussion of a question of importance. With this distinction a court of law could not concern itself. If it did, the privilege of parliament would indeed be infringed, as the court would then be trying the propriety or impropriety of the original speech, and not of its subsequent publication.

The case of the King v. Wright differed from this materially, inasmuch as the publication there complained of was not the account of the speech of an individual member, but a copy of the report of a select committee of the House, which having been placed on the Journals of the House, became a part of its proceedings. It should also be recollected, that it came before the Court of King's bench, not as in the present case by a motion in arrest of judgment, which it was compelled to decide upon, but by an application to exert its discretionary power of granting a criminal information, and superseding the ordinary process of the law.

He had now noticed all the cases adduced by the learned gentleman, which appeared to him to have the slightest relation to the present question. The fine imposed upon Mr. Williams, and since properly considered as illegal, was not for the publication of a speech of his own, originating from himself, but of a narrative, which the House of Commons had directed to be printed, and which he, as Speaker of the House, in execution of his office, had authenticated with his signa- ture. The case of Elliot and the other members was equally foreign to the present, since that related only to their conduct in the House.

If, however, there was a far greater weight of authority and precedent in favour of the argument of the learned gentleman, there was a recorded opinion in opposition which would more than counterbalance it,—he meant that of Mr. Fox, which, upon a question like the present, was, perhaps, the highest that could be cited. Among the many subjects to which the mind of that great man had been applied, there was none of which he was more completely master than of all which related to the law and privilege of parliament. Educated in the House of Commons, he had deeply studied and was enthusiastically attached to its rights. Of the liberty of the press, he was the zealous asserter, and by his Libel Bill he had reared the most effectual barrier to defend it against the inroads of power. Yet this illustrious character, the champion of the privilege of parliament and the liberty of the press, had, in the year 1788, expressly asserted, that "he did not hold the opinion, that because members in the House may not only with propriety, but with strict regard to their duty, hold certain language, and declare certain sentiments upon any topic under their consideration, the public prints were warranted in giving those to the world at large. The freedom of speech he considered as the first and most essential privilege of parliament, inseparable from its dignity and well being; and he could easily imagine many cases in which it would be a gross libel and breach of privilege in a newspaper to publish such words as he would find it necessary to make use of in his place."

It had been said, that if this claim of privilege were not allowed, members of parliament would be the only persons precluded from publishing their own speeches. He should contend, that on the contrary, they stood exactly on the same footing in this respect as any other persons. When the House had enforced the prohibition of any publication of its debates, that prohibition had applied to members as well as strangers, and since it had relaxed that strictness, it had overlooked this violation of its orders by all persons equally. It had still the power, if any unforeseen necessity should require, of again enforcing its regulations; but it was too much to say, that, on account of this forbearance, the members of the House or any other persons possessed the power of publishing libels on individuals, under pretence of reporting what had passed in the House. To this the privilege now claimed must amount if it were any thing. The person libelled had no opportunity of knowing whether the speech published had actually been spoken. A court of law had no means of enquiring into it, since it was well known no member could be compelled to give evidence of what had passed in the House. If the House itself were upon such an occasion applied to by petition, it could not upon the vague recollection of the individual members, try whether particular expressions had been used in a previous debate, nor could it discuss their propriety without violating that order of their own which directs that no words used in the House shall be questioned, unless objected to at the moment when they are used.

Upon the whole, he was convinced that if there was a settled design to overthrow the ancient and constitutional privileges of the House, no means could be found so effectual for that purpose as to extend them to a degree which would be burthen-some and oppressive on all the subjects of the kingdom, and which had never even been claimed in any former period. The privilege of freedom of speech, as it had always been claimed by Speakers at the commencement of parliaments and as asserted by the Bill of Rights, was confined to words spoken within the House, and it could not be carried beyond that limit so established by our forefathers, without the greatest danger to parliament and to the constitution itself.

spoke in favour of the motion. He argued, that the right of members to give their constituents an account of their sentiments delivered in parliament, implied a right to publish them to the kingdom at large.

said he could not vote for the motion of his hon. friend, in the shape in which he had brought it forward, though he should have voted for an inquiry to ascertain the right of parliament on the subject. In 1763, by a Resolution of the House, the privileges of its members were basely betrayed and surrendered;^* previous to that period the privileges of the House did extend to cases of libel; and he thought it ought still to do so, as libel was one of the most powerful engines in the hands of the crown against the privileges of the House.

^* See Parliamentary History, vol 15, p 1362

said, as he differed from his two hon. friends who had just spoken, and as he thought the question one of importance, he hoped he might be allowed to say a few words, and, as far as the law of the land was connected with the question, it had three times pronounced against the conduct of his hon. friend. The law considered the publication of the hon. gentleman's speech as a libel—such was the law, such ought to be the law, and it would be extremely disadvantageous to the public if it were otherwise. The decision did not restrain members from communicating their sentiments to their constituents, but it went to restrain members from publishing what the law of the land deemed a libel. He would uphold the liberty of speech as far as any man, but he could not support that supposed privilege which would enable any member of parliament to make what personal attacks he pleased on persons out of that House. He thought the privilege would be as injurious to the House as to the country; it would not be more inimical to the liberty of the people, than to the freedom of debate. If the proposition of his hon. friend were pressed to a division, he should certainly vote against it. From the great regard he entertained for his hon. friend, he most reluctantly came to such a decision; but he felt that he could not act otherwise without doing a material injury to the public and to the House.

did not rise to prolong the debate after those speeches, which must be satisfactory to every mind, and as he wished to avoid expressing any opinion on the subject, he would rather move the order of the day than give the proposition a direct negative. As he was on his legs he would say one word in answer to an observation of an hon. member (Mr. Western). The inference drawn by that hon. gentleman from the paper he had read was, that the House ought to be very jealous of any interference in their privileges by the judges, particularly in construing the publication of speeches into libels. He granted, that when the judges were so dependant on the crown, that the bench was considered to be the crown, there might have been reasonable grounds for fearing that the crown would attack the privileges of the House through the judges; but now, when the judges were so pure, and so perfectly independent of the crown, no such jealousy could be reasonably entertained; more particularly when it was known that the sentence of the judges depended on the decision of a jury; the argument of the hon. gentleman was, therefore, not applicable in the present times. The noble lord moved "That the other orders of the day be now read."

explained. He had said nothing to impeach the integrity of the judges, or to induce an undue suspicion of them; all he had said was, that before the year 1763 privilege extended to libel, and it was only by the resolution of that year that the House recognized the doctrine of libel.

would enter his protest against the doctrine of the noble lord, that the House must not be anxious to defend its privileges, because of the extraordinary purity of judges and juries. The privileges they had heretofore possessed, he should ever be prompt to defend. He considered them as necessary now as they had ever been; and he thought it would be fatal to the constitution of the House, if they should ever be lulled into a false security by the personal character of judges. With regard to the resolution of 1763, it was a proof of the doctrine he had maintained.

had not advised any surrender of their privileges, or any carelessness in defending them; but he had shewn, that the judges were not now likely to be influenced by the crown.

wished to say a few words on the question, and would preface them by declaring his intention to vote for the amendment of the noble lord. The question was one so great, and at the same time so delicate, that even the Speaker himself must feel gratified, that it was likely to be disposed of without coming to any direct decision. Within the three last years, questions of privilege had been carried to great lengths in that House, and parties had gone into extremes on them; for his own part, he had steered a moderate course, not regarding their privileges so high as some did, nor deeming them so unimportant as others: he had seen the effect of those struggles, for whenever they had attempted to suppress the publication of the debates, the House had been uniformly defeated in such an attempt; he hoped they always would fail, and he was sure they always ought to fail—because, when such a system succeeded, all the es- sential qualities of the House would perish in the destruction of the natural intercourse between members and their constituents. The case of his hon. friend was not the case of a member publishing a speech for malicious purposes, but of one correcting an imperfect report of his speech, by publishing a correct copy of what he had spoken, and the prosecution had not been commenced until many months afterwards, and then purely for election purposes. The hon. member then adverted to the trial of his hon. friend, and considered him to have been harshly dealt with. What he had heard when sentence was passed, convinced him of the fact; when he was convicted of a libel on Mr. Kirkpatrick, the judge had told him that he had libelled the late Mr. Perceval, and that he was disaffected to the government. If libels were not to be tolerated in members of that House, he thought they ought not to pass unnoticed in courts of law; and if a sentence, such as he had noticed, was not made the subject of inquiry elsewhere, he did not know how his hon. friend was to be defended against such attacks. He was glad the question had been brought forward, as it might be the means of bringing that sentence under consideration. Members had an undoubted right to communicate with their constituents, but yet individuals ought to be protected against attacks in that House; and the country would be in a frightful state if members were allowed to say any thing in that House, and afterwards to print it, only because they had spoken it. Upon the whole, although he could not vote in favour of the original motion, but should support the amendment of the noble lord, he thought that his hon. friend had done the country a considerable service, by introducing this important question upon the Journals of the House.

expressed his great surprize at the singular situation in which the House was placed, without any distinct motion before it; and only with the long narrative of the case of the King v. Creevey, upon the table. He called upon the hon. gentleman to state the nature of his subsequent proceedings, and when he would bring them forward?

protested against the claim of the hon. and learned gentleman to put to him any such interrogatories.

went on to conjecture the mode that would be adopted, suggesting the impeachment of the judges —an address for their removal, or for a copy of the record of the conviction of the hon. member. Perhaps all these motions would be attempted. Some most unfounded imputations had been cast, not only upon the judges, now so beneficially presiding in our courts, but even the dead had not escaped accusation. Lord Kenyon had been charged with having been swayed by personal enmity to Mr. Horne Tooke, in the case of the King v. Wright; and it had been more than insinuated, that lord Ellenborough would have pronounced a milder sentence on the present case, if the hon. mover had not been politically opposed to the existing authorities. These assertions were in themselves libellous and untrue, and it little became the decorum of the House to listen to them. The language supposed to have been employed by a venerable personage, who had just retired from the bench, had been noticed, but he (the Attorney General) would state without bias (for he declared, that having read none of the papers, he could do so) what, to the best of his recollection, were the words made use of, as well by Mr. Justice Grose as by the Chief Justice. The latter stated, merely in answer to the argument of Mr. Brougham, that he never heard of such a privilege as that claimed, that a member of parliament with impunity might libel all the King's subjects. It was childish to maintain that no malice existing no crime could be inferred; as well might it be asserted that Nicholson, the murderer of Mr. and Mrs. Bonar, was not punishable because he was not actuated by malice prepense against his master or his mistress. It was no answer for a man who, by accident, killed B, to say that his intention was to have shot A. With respect to what the venerable judge who pronounced the sentence, had said, he was persuaded the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) would admit the account he was about to give of it a fair one. The observations made by the judge were delivered as an apology for the leniency of the sentence. The sentence he was about to pronounce was marked with a degree of leniency, he observed, which looking at the record alone, it would be difficult to explain. The prosecution did not originate in any sense of public justice; the libel was published in March and this action was not instituted till the ensuing October; and, he added, that the object of the speech was rather an attack against a departed minister, and, through him, his Majesty's government, than against Mr. Kirkpatrick. These it was true were not the words of the judge, but this was a fair representation of his meaning. It was not certainly the intention of Mr. Justice Grose to make up for the leniency of the sentence by libelling the hon. gentleman. He wished the words had been more guarded, but they did not weigh a grain in the sentence. The rights of the House would not be at all trenched on by the decision.

in reply, said, had it not been for the very personal manner in which he had been treated by the Attorney General, he should have been quite contented to leave the question as it stood: he had done his duty to the House, the country, and himself, in bringing before them what he deemed a case of vital importance to the freedom of parliament, and of course to the country; he hoped that his jealousy of this case being the beginning or foundation of a new attack upon the privileges of parliament was unfounded, but as such he viewed it; and though he found little sympathy with him from the House on this subject, he should persist in recording upon the Journals of it the entire narration of these proceedings in his own case as he had moved it. It was a confirmation of his own opinion on this case, that the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Wynn) who was the only member that had introduced any research into the discussion, had not controverted any of the cases he had produced, or denied the justice of the application he had made of them. With respect to the learned gentleman, the Attorney General, he was really at a loss how to deal with him. In a question of all others that admitted of nothing but the most dispassionate consideration, he had contrived to transport himself into an absolute fury; any indifferent person entering the House and attending to his violence, would suppose his indignation could be directed against nothing short of the murderer of the late unfortunate Mr. and Mrs. Bonar. In a grave case of privilege of parliament, it might be expected that so distinguished a member of the law, of parliament, and of the state, as the King's Attorney General, a person too of his years and standing, would have produced from his research and stores of reasoning, some certain information to guide and direct the House. The truth, however, was, that the learned gentleman was utterly destitute of every kind of learning upon this subject. He had no doubts, he might safely say, that the King's Attorney General, speaking as he had done, so vehemently upon a question of privilege of parliament, had never in his life read one page of one of the many Journals of the House of Commons; in this helpless predicament and still determined to distinguish himself by taking a part in the debate, he very naturally resorted to his Old Bailey practice as his only ally: in the absence of all knowledge he contented himself with a kind of smart cross-examination of him (Mr. Creevey) as to the time and object of bringing forward this question, for all the world as if he had been a witness within his fangs on his former natural and favourite stage, the Old Bailey. He could inform the hon. and learned member, he was quite mistaken if he supposed this spirited sortie of his, on an occasion so little calling for it, when he displayed nothing else but his own track of information, had produced any sensation of alarm in him or respect in the House, and he should continue to exercise whatever he thought to be his rights as a member of parliament, without any apprehension of being proved to be wrong by such an opponent as the learned gentleman had shewn himself that night to be. As the majority of the House seemed desirous that the matter should proceed no farther, he was content on having his narrative of facts recorded upon the Journals. He would again state, that Mr. Justice Grose had said, the speech was less a libel against an individual than against the government, and that it was bottomed in disaffection.

Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Bennet confirmed Mr. Creevey's statement respecting the assertion made by Mr. Justice Grose.

The House then proceeded to the other orders of the day.