said, he felt it proper to present the Petition of these individuals, as soon as possible; but as it contained some imputations against a learned gentleman (Mr. Palmer), who was not a member of that House, and therefore had not an opportunity of defending himself, he thought that he should have acted wrong, if he had introduced the Petition before he had communicated its contents to that gentleman. He therefore delayed presenting it for 24 hours; and in the interim he stated to Mr. Palmer the allegations contained in the Petition.—Mr. Palmer observed, in answer, that as soon as he was appointed to the situation, he applied for a proper place in which he might hold his court. It was necessary that it should be in a public situation, where all creditors of persons claiming under the Act should have an opportunity of attending. Some difficulty arose in procuring a place of this description, but the Guildhall of Westminster was ultimately appointed for the purpose. He had then determined on hearing twenty petitions each day, till the whole were disposed of—the total number intending to claim being 1350. He fete it a duty incumbent on him to make this statement; at the same time he thought it was necessary to present the Petition, as it was of so much importance to a great number of debtors, both with relation to themselves and to their wives and families.

did not rise to oppose the Petition. Those who had a right to expect any benefit under the Insolvent Act, might reasonably be supposed to feel much disappointment at its not having been carried into effect; and it was natural for them to think that the blame originated with the persons to whom its execution was confided:—A report had gone abroad, the source of which he could not imagine, that a noble relation of his (viscount Sidmouth), the secretary for the home department, had been the cause of the delay complained of. Now, in point of fact, no blame could be attached to that nobleman. When he said this, he by no means wished to shelter the conduct of his noble relative from enquiry; for he would undertake to prove and demonstrate to any gentleman, that every possible effort had been made by that noble lord in the execution of his official duties, to carry into effect the provisions of the Insolvent Debtors' Act, as far as he was concerned. Every unprejudiced man must see the difficulties which were to be surmounted, before the Act could be rendered effective. Much difficulty was experienced in procuring a proper person to investigate the various cases that would arise; and certainly no unnecessary delay had taken place in selecting the individual. Considerable difficulty was also encountered, in providing a situation where he could conveniently discharge his duties. The learned gentleman (sir S. Romilly), he was sure, did not mean to impute the blame of any delay in carrying the measure into effect, to his noble relative, or to the learned serjeant on whom the appointment of judge had been conferred; but still he thought it necessary to make these few observations, in consequence of certain assertions contained in the petition.

expressed a hope that no time would be lost in extending the benefit of the Act to those for whom it was intended. If only twenty cases were heard per diem, the object of the legislature would not be effected for a great length of time. Newgate was at present full of debtors, anxiously waiting for their deliverance; and they thought it extremely hard, that no proceeding had yet taken place under the Act. Much of the delay might, perhaps, have been avoided, if a salary for the judge had been mentioned in the Bill.

wished to put the worthy alderman right on the point to which he had last adverted The circumstance of no salary having been inserted in the Act, had not occasioned any delay. When it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State for the home department, he immediately stated the fact to the noble lord at the head of the Treasury, and the latter took upon himself the responsibility of paying an adequate salary; as he entertained no doubt that parliament would ultimately sanction his conduct.

said, when the Insolvent Debtors' Bill was before the House, he had distinctly stated, that, until the operation of the Bill was known, and the duty which was likely to devolve on the individual appointed to administer its provisions was fairly understood, it was utterly impossible to estimate the just amount of the salary to be granted. He had also stated at the time, that it was intended, at a future period, to make an alteration in the rules of the King's-bench and Fleet, where many persons at present lived in luxury on the property of their creditors, whom they set at defiance.

was very glad that the learned gentleman had made the statement which he had just heard, as it did away a gross mistake into which many persons had fallen. It was said, that the Bill had passed through that House, without any salary being annexed to the situation of judge, and that this circumstance was not observed at the time. Now this was not the fact. No neglect could be attributed to the House. Gentlemen were perfectly aware, that no salary was mentioned. They felt, that, as the duties of the office were quite uncertain, it was not possible to fix the salary at that moment. It appeared to them, that the same system might be pursued, which had been before acted upon in other cases; for instance, in the appointment of commissioners—that the question of remuneration should not be previously settled, but should be left for decision after the duties of the office were ascertained. They were of opinion, that the best thing they could do was, to leave the Bill in all respects as it was introduced into the other House, where, they supposed, it had received the tacit approbation of all the great law authorities.

said, he felt very great satisfaction in seeing that Mr. Serjeant Palmer (one of his oldest professional friends, than whom a more honourable or a more learned man was not to be found in Westminster-hall) was by the fair and candid statement of the learned gentleman (sir S. Romilly) absolved from blame. After the observations made by that learned gentleman, he would only say, that the consideration of fixing a salary for Mr. Serjeant Palmer had not delayed the measure a single hour.

said, that no delay whatever had been occasioned, in consequence of the non-insertion of the amount of the judge's salary in the Insolvent Act. When an application on that subject was made, he was directed to recommend to the crown, that such a salary should be forthwith ordered, as the nature of the duties attached to the office might appear to demand.

being come to the House, Mr. Speaker acquainted him with the Resolutions of the House of the 3d day of December, 1812, and of the 7th day of July last, respecting his services in the battles of Salamanca and Vittoria; and Mr. Speaker gave him the Thanks of the House accordingly, as followeth: "Major-general Anson; When last I had the honour of addressing you from this place, you came to receive our Thanks for your share in the glorious battle of Talavera. "Pursuing the same career, under the same illustrious commander, it is more gratifying than surprizing to see, that in succeeding campaigns you have reaped new laurels. "The badge of honour which commemorates your services at Salamanca, brings to our recollection those skilful operations in which you were engaged upon the Douro previous to that memorable day, and the destruction which your cavalry poured down upon the rear guard of the enemy in their flight. "In the battle of Vittoria the British cavalry also took their part; and, acting with the left wing of the allied army, under the immediate command of lieutenant general sir Thomas Graham, a name never to be mentioned in our military annals without the strongest expressions of respect and admiration, your squadrons contributed to cut off the enemy from their direct retreat into France; and all Europe has heard of their consequent rout and dispersion. "To you, Sir, I am therefore commanded to express the gratitude of this House; and, in the name of the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in parliament assembled, I do now deliver to you their unanimous Thanks for your distinguished exertions in the battle of Salamanca, upon the 22d July, 1812, which terminated in a glorious and decisive victory over the enemy's army; "And also for your great exertions upon the 21st of June last, when the French army was completely defeated by the allied forces near Vittoria, under the marquis of Wellington's command."

knight of the most honourable order of the Bath, being come to the House, Mr. Speaker acquainted him with the Resolutions of the House of the 7th of July last, and of the 8th instant, respecting his services in the battle of Vittoria, and in the subsequent operations of the allied armies in Spain; and Mr. Speaker gave him the Thanks of the House accordingly, as followeth: "Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton; "In this House your name has been long since enrolled amongst these who have obtained the gratitude of their country for distinguished military services; and we, this day, rejoice to see you amongst us, claiming again the tribute of our thanks for fresh exploits and achievements. "Wherever the history of the peninsular war shall be related, your name will be found amongst the foremost in that race of glory; by your sword the British troops were led on to the victorious assault of Crodad Rodrigo; by your daring hand the British standard was planted upon the castle of Badajoz, when the usurper of the Spanish throne who driven to make his last stand at Vittoria, your battalions med the centre of that formidable line, before which the veteran troops of France fled in terror and dismay; and by your skill, prudence, and valour, exerted in a critical hour, the enemy was foiled in his desperate attempt to break through the barrier of the Pyrenees and raise the blockade of Pampluna. "For the deeds of Vittoria and the Pyrenees, this double harvest of glory in one year, the House of Commons has resolved again to give you the tribute of its thanks; and I do therefore now, in the name and by the command of the Commons of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in parliament assembled, deliver to you their unanimous thanks for your great exertions upon the 21st of June last near Vittoria, when the French army was completely defeated by the allied forces under the marquis of Wellington's command; "And also, for the valour, steadiness, and exertion, so successfully displayed by you in repelling the repeated attacks made on the position of the allied army by the whole French forces under the command of marshal Soult between the 25th July and 1st of August last."

reported from the Committee of the whole House, to whom it was referred to consider of the supply granted to his Majesty, the Resolutions which they had directed him to report to the House; and the same were read, and agreed to by the House, are as follow: 1. That 140,000 men be employed for the sea service for the year 1814, including 31,400 royal marines. 2. That a sum, not exceeding 3,230,500l. be granted to his Majesty, for wages of the said 140,000 men for 13 months, at the rate of 1l. 15s. 6d. per man per month. 3. That a sum, not exceeding 4,572,750l. be granted to his Majesty, for victuals for the said 140,000 men for 13 months, at the rate of 2l. 10s. 3d. per man per month. 4. That a sum, not exceeding 3,913,000l, be granted to his Majesty, for the wear and tear of the ships in which the said 140,000 men are to serve for 13 months, at the rate of 2l. 3s. per man per month. 5. That a sum, not exceeding 637,000l. be granted to his Majesty, for ordnance for sea service on board the ships in which the said 140,000 men are to serve for 13 months, at the rate of 7s. per man per month.

, in rising to propose his plan for the new arrangements in the army, said, he should not dwell upon the expediency, at the present moment, of giving every possible efficiency to the disposable force of the country. On that subject there was but one sentiment in every part of the House; nor should he do justice to the strength and prevalence of this sentiment, if he were not to state his conviction, that it was the wish of every individual in the House and in the kingdom to use every exertion for securing the permanent honour and interests of the country, consistently with the necessary limits of our military and political resources. His object would not therefore be to recommend exertion, but to consider what direction it would be most advisable to give to that exertion, in order to make it most effectual; and to strike a fair balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the different degrees and modes of operation which our circumstances placed within our reach. In this view, then, he was not about to call upon the House to make any great or unnatural effort; or to call upon the country for any sacrifices greater than were made by the other states of Europe: all that he wished was, to urge them to use proportionable efforts, and to submit to equal sacrifices in support of the common cause, and for the purpose of giving a happy and glorious result to that sentiment which now animated the great confederacy of Europe, to check the ambition, and limit the power, without tarnishing the honour, of France. The assistance of Great Britain might be more effectually employed for this purpose, by indirectly aiding the allies by our resources, than by immediate and partial efforts of our own. He relied the more confidently on the propriety of this line of policy, because he was satisfied that it was owing to the continued firmness and moderation of our counsels that Europe was in its present state. It had been restored from the humiliation and ruin which overwhelmed it, to a proud height of honour and independence, by the prudence, not less than by the magnificence of our exertions. It was this wise and long-sighted forbearance, this determination not to push our efforts beyond our resources, that had given an increasing impetus and momentum to them; whereas by a premature and inconsiderate waste of strength, the spring of national spirit would have been broken down, and our career arrested in its progress. But now, when all the world was making one great effort for its redemption, it became the spirit of this country to take part, a proud part in it—not to overstrain or exhaust itself; but not to shrink back in the decisive moment, not to suffer all the advantages and all the glory which had been gained, to be lost a deficiency of cordial co-operation on the part of Great Britain. We stood now in the situation of having obtained all the objects originally proposed by the war, even beyond the most sanguine expectation. The independence of the peninsula, in particular, had been placed upon a firm and lasting basis. In the former campaigns, the success of the British arms under lord Wellington had been great and brilliant; but now that his victories were as numerous as the battles which he fought, that he had no longer any occasion to look back to the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras as a last resource; now that his great genius had accomplished all that his ardent and patriotic mind had proposed to itself, and had placed the liberties and territories of the whole peninsula under our protection, would it not be an abuse of confidence in the plans of that gallant leader, and an abuse of confidence in the success which almost uniformly attended the British arms, to turn back so near the end of all our labours and triumphs, and not to reap the fruits of victory which were put into our hands? He did not mean, by any thing that he had said, to insinuate a wish that we should expose what we gained to unnecessary hazard, or launch into a sphere which was better occupied by others: but, without explaining himself more particularly, he might be allowed to say, that there were points of the utmost consequence to this country, both in a commercial and political view, where a corps of 10 or perhaps 20,000 men co-operating with our maritime strength, might turn the tide of success in our favour. He did not think there could be any hesitation, where such a force would make the whole difference, whether an old and useful ally should be rescued from the grasp of the enemy, or left denuded of all support. He did not therefore recommend unlimited increased exertion, but mitigated increased exertion; that is, an increase of exertion proportioned to the importance of the end, and consistent with the extent of our means; and on this principle he would rest the merits of the plan which he was about to submit to the House. With respect to the supply of the army, all the advantages had resulted from the existing system which had been expected from it. It was gratifying to him to be able to state, that such had been the means placed in the hands of government in recruiting the army, and so little had been the waste made of human life, that both the regular army and the militia remained at as high a point of numerical force as ever, in spite of all the exertions we had made; and certainly no nation ever did push its exertions abroad, in proportion to its physical strength, farther than we had done in the last years of the war. It reflected the highest credit on the illustrious individual at the head of the war department, that such was the attention paid to the health and discipline of the army, that including the whole of our troops, colonial and European, our loss yearly did not exceed 1–7th or 8th; that is, in 230,000 troops, the general amount of casualties, not only of deaths, but discharges, desertions, &c. did not exceed 25,000, though the natural waste of an army was generally one-tenth or one-twelfth, even in times of profound peace. Notwithstanding the sanguinary actions and assaults which had taken place in the last year, our total loss was not, as far as could be collected, more than 30,000 men. The present mode of recruiting the regular army, independently of any extraordinary exertions, would be sufficient to maintain it in its present numbers: he did not think the supplies from the militia would continue the same; or that we could reason prospectively upon this part of the subject, from the results of past experience. But the plan which he should now proceed to lay before the House went upon the supposition of our being possibly called upon for extraordinary exertions, either on the side of the peninsula, or in aid of the allies, in any critical emergency in which our assistance might be necessary to bring the great cause in which we had hitherto so nobly persevered, to a prosperous and decisive issue. In what situation, continued the noble lord, would the country now have been placed, if the militia had not lent themselves, to the exertions which parliament from time to time called on them to make? Since the year 1805, when government first called on the House to allow the militia to enter into the line, they had contributed within 250 men of 100,000 to the disposable force of the country. If this measure of rendering the militia auxiliary to the regular army had not taken place, if the old prejudices with respect to that

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description of force, had been still kept up, and they had been prevented from entering the regular army, this country would not now possess the military character which it had acquired. We might have kept up our colonial policy, and made those exertions which were witnessed in former wars; but we could not have kept possession of Portugal, or have sent forces to co-operate in the deliverance of the peninsula at large, and to take up that menacing position on the frontiers of France which our army now occupied. We should have bees shut up within the hounds of our insular policy, and we could not have set that glorious example to other nations, or borne our share in the general exertions which have been made for the deliverance of Europe. Parliament ought always, therefore, to bear in recollection, that it is to the militia we owe the character we at present enjoy in military Europe; and that without the militia we could not have shewn that face which we have done in the peninsula. He wished it to be understood, that in what he had to propose, it was not his intention to transgress or go beyond those great principles which ought to be held sacred with respect to the militia. He had never been one of those who considered that there were any principles in the constitution of the militia which rendered that force inapplicable to the general service of the country, provided neither officers nor men were broken in upon either directly or indirectly. The militia might be broken in upon directly by law, and they might be broken in upon indirectly in a manner not less unbecoming; and any alternative which, though not compulsory on them, it might be painful to their own feelings to refuse, was very different from the mode of treatment merited by that respectable body. The most complete freedom of choice ought, therefore, in his opinion, to be preserved. But he never thought there was any thing in the militia which rendered them unfit for general service. They had supplied an assistance of not less than 100,000 men to the army, and the success of the whole contest had hinged on the exertions which this reinforcement enabled us to make. If the militia principles were in any respects changed, they were changed for the better; and at no period, he would venture to say, were the militia of this country either move numerous, more highly disciplined, or more capable of performing their proper functions, that is, of occupying a middle station between the local militia and the standing army, than they were at the present moment. He wished, therefore, the House to understand, that there was in contemplation no attempt to encroach on the constitution of the militia. No person would wish the militia lock up the service of any man who would rather serve in another description of force. The true military philosophy was, to give the greatest possible facility to individual exertion, that it might find its proper level. Men were actuated by various motives and inclinations to make choice of one description of service rather than another; and it was their business to facilitate the exertions of individuals, but not to attempt to impose on any men the necessity of adopting new arrangements by appealing to their patriotism or their feeling. So far from putting it to the militia, whether they would lend themselves to another sphere of service, he wished the arrangement to be considered not as an appeal, but merely as an offer of certain terms in those who were willing to enter into the regular service. Any of the officers and men might take that offer if they chose; but still there was to be no departure from what was formerly understood to be the constitution of the militia. There was every reason, indeed, to presume that unless some force were laid on the inelinations of individuals, a much greater number of men would be willing to go into the regular army than could possibly be accepted of. In point of fact, a very general disposition existed among the 70,000 men, of which the militia was composed, to enter the line. He was well assured, that a very large proportion of individuals, both men and officers, in the present interesting circumstances of the world, would consider it a favour to serve actively instead of passively. He wished merely to give such a due and reasonable degree of encouragement to this wish, as was not inconsistent with sound military principles. He would state, as the principle on which they proposed to act, that whatever number of men it might be the policy of the legislature to give to the disposal of the executive government, they might not be precluded from acting on that feeling which he considered to be so prevalent at present in the militia; and that if there should be a particular number of men disposed to accept of the measure, they should be permitted to enter into the extended service. He was quite aware that there was no regiment which had not a limited number of men, that, from various considerations, were not suited for foreign service.—His view was not, therefore to send the militia on foreign service, but merely to allow them to give such a number of men to the army as would enable us to sustain the attitude we at present held. It was his wish that no militia regiment should be left without such a proportion of men, as would be found necessary for carrying on the system of recruiting, and form, as it were, the basis of the regiment. His intention was to propose in the Bill which he meant to bring in, that in the number of men who might volunteer into the army, not more than three fourths of any regiment should be taken; and that one fourth part, at least, of every regiment should be preserved. He thought it advisable not to check the disposition which prevailed in the militia of entering absolutely into the line, because in no wise could they be so usefully employed as in the line, which was a more extended species of service. He was disposed, therefore, not to impede that mode of serving, but by a small additional bounty to encourage it; and if a certain number of men would go, to allow the officers to go with them. He was happy to state, that in the judgment of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, no injury whatever would accrue to the army by allowing the officers of the militia, up to the rank of captains, to pass into the line, and to receive half pay. His Royal Highness approved also of giving them this farther advantage, that after a certain time of service they should be considered as officers having permanent rank in the army corresponding to the rank which they held in the militia. In the first instance, they were to receive half pay, and after some time permanent rank in the army. The number of individuals admitted to those advantages would be in proportion to the number of men who went with them into the army: one hundred men to admit one captain, one lieutenant, and one ensign, who at first would be entitled to half-pay, and, after having served one campaign, to fill every situation of the army. He had thus been endeavouring to state the advantages of a transfer of service into the line; but there was no ground to presume that the class of men disposed to transfer their services would be found so numerous as to afford any thing like what the exigencies of the present moment demanded. He had, therefore, another plan to propose, of encouraging the desire of active service in the militia, which was more congenial with the principle of that body, and which would liberate rate a great number of both officers and men desirous of extending their services. He proposed, that they should also he permitted to volunteer to serve as militias men. The officers would be considered as still belonging to the militia of their country; but they would return home with this advantage, that having gone abroad at a critical period they would be entitled, on being disembodied, to the half-pay of the army. He thought there would be a great disposition among the militia to go on this service; they would go as militia-men, and they would continue to have all the advantages of militiamen. A man would be enabled to serve his country abroad, without leaving his wife in want at home. In England, indeed, all descriptions of people were entitled, in exigency, to relief from their parish, but in Ireland and Scotland there was no parish support. It was, therefore, proposed, that this class, who were merely a disposable militia, should continue to possess all the advantages of militia-men, and that the officers, as already stated, should have also the advantage half-pay. With respect to the manner in which they ought to be organised, and rendered useful, the precise rule to be applied could not be well laid down, till they saw what disposition existed in the militie to extend their services, and what offers might be made. As it was not however meant to allow the whole of any regiment to extend their service, the proportions accepted would be formed into provisional battalions of militia for foreign service; the sphere of their service would be limited to Europe, and the command of the battalions given to militia officers. He knew there were regiments in the militia service who were impatient to go abroad as regiments, and disposed to sacrifice any thing rather than derogate from their integrity as regiments. He was perfectly well aware of the disadvantage of separating one part of a regiment from another, and of doing any thing which had a tendency to extinguish the esprit des corps Giving every allowance to this feelings still, however, he was not disposed to think that these provisional battalions would be found, on comparison, to be less effective than other regiments. Lord Wellington gave it as his opinion, that some of the most effective battalions under his command, were formed of three or four reduced regiments, and sometimes a greater number, who were thrown together into one battalion, instead of sending them home to be recruited to their proper establishment. There were not more effective battalions in the whole army than those which were so formed. It ought to be left to the discretion of the commanding officer, whether the field officers should be taken from the militia or the line; but in all cases the lieut. colonel ought to be taken from the militia, that the character of militia regiments might not be lost. He had occasion to know that in Ireland provisional battalions, of a description like that which he had been stating, were found to be inferior to no troops in all the qualities for which soldiers are valuable. All the difficulties which frightened our ancestors, and which were important at one time in point of privilege, ought now to be lost and swallowed up in the necessity for exertion imposed on us by the present times. The great principle which ought now to be borne in mind was, that we were struggling in the defence of our own liberty, and the liberty of Europe. Fragments of regiments and minute parts of regiments might be brought together, and used as militia, with as great advantage as whole regiments. He hoped they would not be discouraged in undertaking the great effort which they had in contemplation, under the idea that they could not possibly get over all the embarrassments to which it would give rise. The proper principle for an Englishman to adopt was, that individuals ought to be allowed to exert themselves in the way which was most agreeable to their own inclinations. Having stated the outline of his plan, he would next proceed to state the expectations which he had of the numbers of men to be derived from it, and from the ordinary recruiting of the country.—The ordinary recruiting would not, in fact, be affected so much by the measures which were going on at the same time, as persons judging merely from theory might be led to suppose. He should propose, that the bounty for the transfer from the home to European service should be 10 guineas; and that for entering into the line 12 guineas should be given, for a service limited in point of years; and 16 guineas for a service for life; thus allowing two guineas for each part of the scale. With respect to the extent to which it might be prudent to give the executive government the power of receiving offers from the militia, he was not disposed to push the measure beyond what might be considered a healthful exertion for the country. He was aware, that there were various important duties for the militia to perform at home, in the services of the interior. The amount of force which he was disposed to take, would not, he conceived, operate as an unreasonable pressure on the country. He should propose, to take the quota which by the existing laws regulating the entrance from the militia into the line was placed beyond all hazard, and also a number equal to the quota for the succeeding year; and he had farther to propose, that the arrears of the numbers allowed to volunteer in former years might now be made good. The annual quota from the militia to the line amounted to 10,000—the double quota would therefore be 20,000—and the arrears of former years might be stated at 6,000—making, in the whole, 26,000; and that was the whole extent of the numbers which it was now proposed to take. The House would see what was the nature of the supply which this measure, if it succeeded to the expectations formed of it, would require. Supposing the measure to produce 26 or 27,000 men, and that the ordinary recruiting did not fall off from the usual number of 14,000, the government would be enabled to realize 40,000 men, exclusive of the recruits for the foreign regiments.—He had already stated the average waste of our army for the last four years to have been 25,000 men, and that the waste of this year might be presumed to amount to 30,000. He should in this manner be taking prudent precautions for the proper supply of our army. Such a supply was indispensable, in order that the great acquisitions which we had been enabled to make might not be committed to hazard, and that the executive of the country might have the power of striking some important blow in an interesting quarter, when occasion should admit of it. At no period in the history of this country had there ever been so great a proportion of our regular forces employed abroad as there now was; and that portion of our army which was stationed at home was reduced to narrower limits than ever. Notwithstanding the present happy temper of the country, which was in the enjoyment of the blessings of plenty, of the satisfaction derived from its exertions, and the prosperity which flowed from its industry, a temper of public mind congenial to Englishmen, still it would be unsuitable in the executive government, however slight grounds there might be for apprehensions of danger, to run any risks by stripping the country of the number of troops necessary for the preservation of the public tranquillity. During the time for which the plan of enlisting for the militia had been adopted, 32,000 had been raised for that body, or about 10,000 men annually. From this system having been so successful at the ordinary rate of exertion, he trusted that men enow might be raised to cover the draughts into the line, without resorting to the very onerous proceedings connected with a ballot. At all events, be was satisfied that there would be no necessity for any ballot, except at a period so remote, as to allow a proceeding of this nature without any extraordinary pressure on the country; for example, not until the expiration of the Bill which he should propose, which would be at the end of a year from next Christmas.—He trusted, however, that by the increased exertion of the lieutenancy and gentry of the different counties, the militia might be supplied by men raised by beat of drum, without resorting at all to the ballot. He conceived that he had sufficiently explained the grounds on which the Bill was founded, and the motives in the abstract which led to it, respecting which there could be but one feeling in the House; he should therefore close, by desiring to be distinctly understood as to the point which he had stated at the outset of his speech, that the government did not wish to appeal to the public spirit, or individual feelings of any of the militia men, but merely to withdraw obstacles which prevented them at present from following the bent of their own natural inclination to serve their country; and that the executive was desirous of holding out all fair encouragement to any men desirous of so doing. His lordship concluded by moving, for leave to bring in "a Bill, to enable his Majesty to accept the services of a proportion of the militia out of the United Kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war."

said, across the table, that there were some parts of the noble lord's (Castlereagh's) statement, which needed a little explanation. His lordship had not distinguished between the ten guinea and the twelve guinea bounty-men; as it did not appear, by his lordship's statement, for what term the ten guinea men, the militia-men serving abroad, were to be liable to be kept on foreign service. As to the term "one campaign", he (Mr. Whitbread) supposed that some specific time would be mentioned, as forming a campaign, to entitle the militia, who had served abroad, to half-pay. He wished to understand also, whether it was meant that the families of the ten guinea men, were to remain chargeable to the parish, while the families of the twelve guinea men were not? Did his lordship state, that a double proportion would be called out from the militia; and that to this would be added an arrear of 6 or 7,000 men, which was the amount of the difference between the numbers actually raised in the two last years, and that expected to have been raised from the militia?

stated, that the arrear of which he had spoken, was not on the two last years alone, but on all the time during which the system of draughting from the militia had been established—what the precise amount of this arrear was, he could not exactly say, but he believed it to amount to 6 or 7,000 men. The difference between the militia-men serving abroad, and those enlisting in the line for a limited period, was, that the militia-men would retain their privileges, while those who enlisted in the line would be on the footing of other soldiers. The exact time which would be considered as a campaign would be regulated by the Commander in Chief, according to the general acceptation of the term. The period during which the militia-men who had volunteered for foreign service might be called upon to serve abroad, would be until six months after the signing of a definitive treaty of peace; at which time they would be disbanded, even if their services as militia-men had not expired.

said, that as to the plan in general, this was not the time to stand still; and, to make any efficient exertion, a large additional force was necessary, which could be supplied from this source alone. I support, therefore, (said Mr. W.) the measure which has been proposed, in the just hope, that these increased means will only be applied to their legitimate object; and that no new project of ambition on our part, or on the part of our allies, will divert us from it. Such projects may arise; but I support this measure, hoping and trusting that the means it affords trill be applied to this object alone—the obtainment of a speedy and honourable peace.

accepted the support which the hon. gentleman proffered, and which was not the less valuable for the conditions which were annexed to it. He hoped, however, that this general spirit of amity with which the House regarded the measure would not prevent the most strict examination of the details.

said, that it might be better that this examination should take place after the Bill had been though a committee, and the blanks filled up; in which state it might be given to the members.