presented to the House, pursuant to their Address to the Prince Regent, the following

then said, that he had a similar petition to present from the lord mayor and liverymen of London. He had been present when the petition was agreed upon, and he could bear witness that it had been considered with great temper and moderation, by a very respectable meeting. The citizens of London were convinced that the tax against which they petitioned could only be warranted by the necessities of a war. While those necessities lasted, they had cheerfully borne it, but now they could not with the same cheerfulness support a tax which was in its nature so peculiarly oppressive to the trading part of the community.

The petition was read, setting forth,

"That it appears to the petitioners that the tax upon income, commonly called the property tax, was adopted, under very pressing circumstances of financial difficulty, as a war tax only, and that its first enactment was accompanied by the most unequivocal and solemn declarations that the same should be withdrawn immediately after the termination of the then existing hostilities; and that, having witnessed the restoration of peace, and having been assured by the commissioners of his royal highness the Prince Regent, in their communication to parliament on the opening of the present session, of their conviction that the measures adopted by the allied powers would secure its continuance, the petitioners have observed, with surprise and indignation, that his majesty's ministers have it in contemplation to propose to parliament the continuation or renewal of this most oppressive and odious tax; and that although a reduction should be made in the amount, yet the principle remaining unchanged, the petitioners are decidedly of opinion that its operation would still be most galling to the feelings and spirit of Britons; and that the change from ten to five per cent. so far from being likely to render it less vexatious, will produce the contrary effect, and be the occasion of the most degrading and inquisitorial proceedings, worse, if possible, than have been experienced under the former pressure of this heavy burthen; and that the livery of London, upon the first proposal of this tax, did express, and, since that memorable period, have reiterated in the strongest terms their detestation of a system of taxation so partial and oppressive, and so contrary to the principles of the British constitution; and that the petitioners, feeling the unhappy effect of the unjust and arbitrary exactions which his majesty's subjects have so long endured under this hateful system are convinced that its continuance, under any modification or reduction whatever, will be altogether intolerable; and that to at- tempt the renewal of a tax so oppressive and unconstitutional, now that peace is obtained, after the loud and united expression of the public opinion, and after the pledge given by administration that it should continue as a war tax only, appears to the petitioners to be a violation of the most solemn engagement, highly irritating to a loyal and generous people, and calculated to produce consequences of the most alarming nature; and praying the House to refuse its sanction to any proposition that may be made for renewing, under any circumstances whatever, a tax so universally detested."

observed, that the common-hall which voted this petition was legally and constitutionally assembled. There was a very respectable attendance, and all the proceedings were carried on with much temper. With respect to the prayer of the petition, he believed that he spoke not only his own sentiments and those of the common-hall, but also those of the great majority of the citizens of London. The language and the prayer of the petition were also theirs. It appeared to them and to himself that the renewal of the tax was unnecessary, though, during the great struggle which had now closed, they had supported it as being necessary to the prosecution of the war. Now, however, that we had arrived at peace, they thought differently; and the more so, because there was at least an implied pledge between the House and the people, that the tax should cease when peace was restored. He also objected to the tax, because in his conscience he believed that the people could not at present afford to pay it. From every means of information which he could derive concerning the state of the country (many county members of course must know the matter better), he believed that the agricultural interest could not at present afford it. He felt perfectly convinced that the trading interest could afford it as little. He thought, that if there was any other remedy by which the money might be procured, it would be fair to state it. He wished to mention to the chancellor of the exchequer, that he thought it would be a better mode of obtaining the 6,000,000l. to make a small loan, and to pay the interest of it out of the sinking fund, by which the country would at least be relieved for one year—a relief which it had a right to expect. Many persons conversant with the money market had told him that such a loan would be productive of no injury, but might, on the contrary, be beneficial.

The petitions were ordered to lie on the table.

expressed his entire dissent from the financial plan which had been last night developed by the chancellor of the exchequer. He dissented from the whole scale of establishments there laid down. He said, he had throughout the war supported ministers in their measures for effectually carrying on the war, and had objected to all premature proposals of peace, because on all former occasions he had been persuaded that a peace, if concluded, could not be durable, that it would be but an armed truce, and therefore that it would be better to carry on the war, till we might enjoy the real blessings of peace—low establishments, and a general reduction of expenditure. But what had we now? We had a large war establishment under the name of peace—we had 149,000 men in arms—a military force four times that which had ever before been kept up in time of peace. We were told that our conquests needed garrisons. This surprised him, because on former occasions he had rejoiced in those conquests, not on the ground of the assistance they would give our trade—for we had colonies enough before—but because by taking from the French their military positions, we should require smaller garrisons in our own settlements. In how much superior a situation were we now to that in which we stood at the close of the American war. France had then a navy equal to our own—Holland had also a navy, and was in the French interest—Spain was in the same situation—Austria was connected with France by marriage, and followed the steps of that country—Prussia was in the same connexion. But now the French navy was no more—the army of France was disbanded—no nation in Europe had a fleet. Yet we were to have a peace establishment quadruple that which was deemed sufficient at the former period. Now, both in the East and West Indies a smaller force would be necessary than formerly. We had possession of the Mauritius, which made the East Indies more secure; and as for the West Indies, it would be hard to say that the French could build a navy and equip an armament for that part of the world, before we could send one to meet it. However, in Jamaica there were to be 4000 men, though in all the years after the American war there had never been more than 1900 men. Some explanation should be given, why such increase of our establishments was necessary. Why might not our establishments be reduced below what they were after the American war? There was, it seemed, a union of three great powers, for the professed end of supporting the Christian religion. This was a pretty wide object; but if it had any meaning, it was to maintain peace by mutual pledges, and to enable Europe to return to a general peace establishment. What powers did we now apprehend? America? Were we afraid of her resolution to build one ship every year? Then we might build two. But the main branch of increased expenditure was the army. The expense of the ordnance was to be two millions, which at the period he had alluded to was 318,000l. only. The hon. gentleman concluded by expressing his strong disapprobation of the proposed enormous peace establishment; that was the great evil of which he complained, and one against which our forefathers had uniformly directed their steadiest and most persevering efforts.

said, that as he was one of the first to concur in the enactment of the property tax, at a moment of national exigency, so he was now among the foremost of those who called for its repeal, when the necessity for its enactment no longer existed. He said, he could see no reason against the introduction of a temporary loan. If the surplus of the money-market was not thus employed, it would go into other channels, for it was in vain to deny that many of the foreign loans were negociated in this country; the purchase of Louisiana, for instance, and the late contributions upon France, were, it was understood, in a train of arrangement here. If great relief would follow the reduction of 5 per cent. of the property tax, what would not be the benefit if the whole were repealed? At all events, it could never be collected from landlords whose tenants were unable to pay their rents; from traders, who could make no profits; and from merchants, at an average of five or six years profits, when pro- bably during the last year the produce of the former had been wholly absorbed.

said, he concurred in much of what had fallen from the preceding speaker. He would, however, take that opportunity of asserting, that the people could not be relieved from their present appalling difficulties in any other than one way; namely, by a reduction of the proposed peace establishment. It was in vain to listen to the suggestions of those who recommended a little loan; suggestions which, by the way, might be merely intended to sound the House upon the practicability of such a mode of proceeding. All this was a plain and palpable delusion; the difficulties of the country were most urgent and pressing, they must be met, and if ministers could show that there really existed a necessity for the maintenance of the proposed system, he, for one, would not hesitate to vote for the property tax. But he was firmly satisfied they were totally incapable of establishing that necessity. He had indeed consented to the enactment of that tax during the war, although persuaded of its odious, oppressive, burthensome, inquisitorial character, because he felt the force of that policy which compelled its existence. Those times had now passed away, and the real question for the Commons of England, in the exercise of their sacred trust, was at once to say aye or no to the momentous proposition now submitted to their consideration. Was it necessary to support 50,000 troops for the British isles? Was it necessary to erect a peace establishment of 150,000 men? In his opinion, he would reply, no; and he would affirm and maintain that negative through every part of the details which it was said were to be forthcoming. The situation of the country was not what it had been but a few years ago. Was the necessity of defence, he would ask, greater or smaller than at the period to which he would allude? France, at the close of the American war, had a navy almost at our shores, and superior, perhaps, to the fleets destined for our protection. Spain and Holland had also a maritime strength of no unimportant station. All these external considerations had happily disappeared, the safety of our colonial settlements was also placed on a steady footing, and yet the country was required to keep up a military force of an enormous and most unexampled extent. If such a peace establishment as this were listened to by the people of England, he would predict, in a very few years, from a measure so alien to their system, the downfall of their liberty and constitution. It was nothing less than a project to alter the uniform policy of Great Britain, and to amalgamate her character with that of the military states in Europe, by a total subversion of the principles of her constitution. By the lot of her insular situation, she was by nature a naval and maritime state, and to the preservation and cultivation of the advantages necessarily belonging to that state, she was paramountly bound to adhere. She might, indeed, be dazzled with the newly-acquired glories of her army; she might take her rank with the despots of the continent; but in vain could she expect to prolong the native pride of her free character. The two systems were incompatible. Either the government or the military establishment must give way, and when the question was a struggle for ascendancy between liberty and the constitution on one hand, and power and despotism, upheld by a military establishment, on the other, the warning experience of history proclaimed, that the struggle was short, and the termination most ruinous. Independently of these, to him conclusive reasons, against the adoption of the present measure, the financial state of the country presented an unanswerable argument on the same side. He would therefore protest against it altogether, and insist that it was a mere delusion to talk of expedients, and to hope for a diminution of burthens if the proposed establishment was to be maintained. If the people were to hope for relief, they had but one chance of having their expectations realized, and that was by a reduction of the peace establishment.

said, he felt himself called on to say a few words. In consequence of an expectation held out, he had already given to the House some general information respecting his views of our financial affairs. He was happy to find that gentlemen were likely to come to the approaching discussion with candour. On the question of the necessity of the establishments, the arguments of ministers must stand or fall. The hon. and learned gentleman admitted, that if they could show this necessity, he would allow it, and that it was not by any shuffling expedient that relief could be procured. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had before said, that we only required a further exertion of that perseverance and firmness which we had displayed during the contest to bring us through our difficulties. As to the propriety of maintaining the proposed establishments, he could only say, that government would be ready to substantiate their propositions, and to discuss the subject candidly. He should therefore make but one more remark; he was rather surprised to hear, when our liberties had been so long upheld, that they would be endangered by an additional force of 25,000 men.

said, he did not think, as the right hon. gentleman had observed, that the increase of our military establishment from twenty to twenty-five thousand men would be forthwith detrimental to the peace and security of the country. He did not believe that their arms would be immediately turned against their fellow citizens, or that they would be employed to cut our throats. Still he was not the less relieved from the dread which they inspired. He dreaded the power of the Crown, supported by such an enormous establishment, he was alarmed for the danger that ultimately threatened the liberties and constitution of England. He felt this alarm himself, and wished he had a voice to sound it from one end of the nation to the other. The people should be warned of their situation—they should be advertised of the designs their government had in view. The House would disgrace itself, if on such an occasion it did not demand a call of its members. If ever there was a time when the representatives of the people should be universally assembled to examine the measures of administration, and to declare to their constituents the dangers which threatened them, and the way in which those dangers were to be averted, what had occurred last night pointed out this as the period. They should be assembled to oppose the measures in contemplation and to decide upon the monstrous statement delivered by the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer, within the walls of that House. The noble lord opposite might smile at what he now said. He probably felt himself secure in his situation, he was confident in his overpowering majorities, and might anticipate no danger from within doors. He (Mr. Tierney) trusted, however, that he would not see himself so secure in all quarters, and that an opposition would arise from without which would induce him to change his system. The people must be roused to attend to their own interests; they must be excited to take every constitutional method of resisting schemes which would not only empty the purses, but endanger the liberties of the nation.

The chancellor of the exchequer had admitted, that his hon. and learned friend had argued the question fairly and ably, (as he must be allowed to do every question on which he delivered his opinion in that House), and that he had placed his resistance to the proposed measures upon a proper foundation. His hon. and learned friend had clearly shown that there must be a reduction of our establishments, and that, without such reduction, any attempt to relieve the country by financial palliatives would be a mere deception practised upon the people. He had given it as his opinion, and stated very satisfactory grounds for believing, that there was no necessity for the enormous army which was proposed to be supported. When we had gained so many victories, and acquired so much military glory—when no external enemy could be pointed out as likely to trouble our repose, why were we to be at such an immense expense in maintaining useless troops? When the noble lord had by his negociations pacified Europe; when he had exercised his wisdom in settling the affairs of the continent, and disposed all its states to entertain sentiments of moderation and tranquility, what pretence could there be for supporting an army of nearly 150,000 men? Had not the noble lord taken credit to himself for the result of his counsels. Had he not received a blue ribband exclusively for his great services on the Continent? And were we now to be told, that the only advantage the country could derive from them was to see their resources wasted, and their liberties endangered by a standing army, upon the pretence that the state of Europe still rendered it necessary for us to maintain a formidable attitude? When the question arose concerning the necessity of an establishment, he would ask what were the advantages secured to us by the noble lord's negociations? When the noble lord came forward with a proposition for maintaining a great army, he would ask, "what then is the use of your blue ribband?" [Loud cries of Hear, hear! and a laugh on the opposition benches.] The situation of the country at present, and its situation in the year 1792 had been compared. The times were indeed changed since then, but these changes had all a tendency to show that our establishments, instead of being prodigiously increased, should be materially diminished. Our army then was not more than a fourth part of what it was now intended to be, while our navy was nearly as great as the present estimate. We had been fighting for these twenty-three years to obtain security; we had gained great victories; we were placed beyond the reach of danger, and yet our army was to be kept up, as if we were on the eve of the most alarming crisis. There was no such intimation with regard to the navy, on which this country had formerly been accustomed to rely for its protection and security. What did this predilection portend? What intention did it point out on the part of the executive? He would not hesitate to say, that in his conscience he believed it was the object of his majesty's ministers to make us a military nation. He would not hesitate to say, that this great peace establishment was the commencement of the execution of a design entertained, to assimilate this nation to the great military powers on the Continent. This system, he believed in his conscience, was the one on which they were bound to act, if they wished to retain their places. His majesty's ministers were bound to support the measure of a great standing army, by the very terms on which they held their office. They might use any fredom with the navy, but they had no power to reduce the army; they might pay off ten ships of the line sooner than disband one regiment of hussars. The progress of this system might be traced for years in all our measures. Every day this propensity seemed to acquire strength. The proper defence of the country, which resided in our navy, was neglected for a more splendid and showy species of force. There was, he confessed, something peculiarly captivating to some persons in the array of a numerous army—in the spirited horses, the splendid equipments, and rich dresses of the cavalry force, and in the brilliant appearance and regular evolutions of great masses of infantry, in all the pomp and parade of a review. He was not surprised that a preference was given, when mere external decoration was concerned, to an officer of hussars, with his fur cap and whiskers, over a plain jolly sailor, who could neither boast of the splendor of his dress, nor the refinement of his manners. The noble lord himself must have seen, that in circles where he had been, composed of high personages, no topic of conversation excited such lively interest or curiosity as his accounts of the reviews at which he had been, the varieties of uniform he had observed, the brilliant manner in which the troops performed their exercises, and the great concourse of eminent persons that were delighted with the spectacle. He must have observed how eagerly he was listened to, while he described the different species of force in the service of our allies—this regiment of guards, that of hussars, and another of cuirassiers. All this might be very captivating, if it could be procured for nothing; but, unhappily, the day of reckoning and payment came, and we had to bear the expenses of these brilliant spectacles.

The right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer could last night keep a firm countenance while he spoke of our taxes and our distresses. He could talk as coolly of millions of pounds as others could do of hundreds. Nothing seemed to move him, in the statement which he gave, as either extraordinary or striking; but he (Mr. Tierney) could conceive nothing more unexpected and alarming. The right hon. gentleman had congratulated the House on the flourishing state of our finances, and had mentioned, as an evidence of this prosperous condition, that instead of being obliged to make any loan this year, there would remain 14 millions arising from the sinking fund, to be applied to the support of public credit. There was, however, one objection to this statement, which was sufficient to destroy the satisfaction which it might otherwise yield. The right hon. gentleman had not disclosed the whole of our condition to the House, and had therefore left an impression that this sum was free of all deductions. Last year there had been about 36 millions by way of loan voted, and 12 millions of this still remained unpaid. This amount of 12 millions was to be placed opposite the 14 millions to which the right hon. gentleman's speech referred, and would nearly neutralize his prosperous statement. He spoke this under correction, as he had not ascertained exactly the sum; but he had reason to believe that if not 12 millions, it amounted to more than 11½ millions. The great loan of last year remained thus nearly one-third unpaid, and if the bank had not agreed to prolong the term of payment, the right hon. gentleman would have no reason to boast of his 14 millions. The bank, he admitted, might have good motives for the assistance they lent to government (and none were more willing than he to do it credit, when he thought it deserved it), and this assistance might be useful to the country without injuring that corporation itself; but the right hon. gentleman had no right to say that the nation was relieved, till every farthing of this was discharged. The bank itself was perfectly secure while omnium stood, as at present, at a premium of between 13 and 15 per cent. Here the right hon. gentleman entered into an explanation, which he conceived might be useful to those who had not particularly attended to the financial arrangements of government, with regard to loans, for the purpose of showing how the instalments are paid during the currency of the year; and proving that the bank could not be a loser by advancing these instalments, while omnium continued at so high a premium as it had done lately. He contended that the right hon. gentleman had not dealt fairly by the House in concealing from its view this unpaid balance of last year's loan, and asked, what good would the throwing of fourteen millions into circulation produce, when twelve millions were to be taken out of it?

With regard to the peace establishment, Mr. Tierney said he would now make a few observations. The supplies for the year were stated at something more than 29 millions; and a great proportion of this sum might be called establishments. There was 23,738,000l. of this for our army and navy alone. The noble lord opposite, had given it as his opinion, that a reduction of this sum to the extent of three millions might be expected in future years. He was even disposed to go further, and to anticipate the saving of four millions. Thus the 29 millions required for this year being reduced by the sum of 1½ million paid to the bank, two millions paid in discharge of exchequer-bills, and the 900,000l. of debentures, together with four millions that might be withdrawn from the support of the national forces, would leave upwards of 20 millions, which would be the lowest to which it could be expected to arrive. "Well, but," said the chancellor of the exchequer, "of this large sum you have forgotten that more than 2½ millions will be furnished by Ireland." This he considered as fallacy the second, for where was the Irish proportion to come from? He should be glad to hear that Ireland could furnish this supply, and wished to know where the ways and means were to be found. If his right hon. friend, the late chancellor of the Irish exchequer, had been in his place, he would have applied to him for an answer, but not finding him, he would appeal to the British chancellor of the exchequer, and ask what probability there was that this sum could be raised in Ireland as her proportion of the necessary revenue? He did not believe that in her present circumstances, that kingdom could contribute any proportion of the sum imposed upon it; he might almost say, that instead of being able to yield 2½ millions for a peace establishment, it could not afford a single pound. If he were now asked, how Ireland had contributed before to the wants of the state, he would beg gentlemen to recollect that it was principally by loans that her proportion had been paid. Indeed, in such a state was that unfortunate country at present, that Great Britain would be under the necessity of assisting it, rather than receiving any assistance from it. He had no objection that we should even make some sacrifices for the assistance of the sister kingdom, and he would hail the day when she should be able to return the benefit, but he saw no reason at present for believing that either we could advance the Irish contribution, or that Ireland itself could do it.

The right hon. gentleman now begged to make a few observations on the ways and means. He would have given the ministers credit for their conduct, had they followed the more prudent, familiar, and homely course of stating the ways and means before the supplies. He admitted that it was a homely and vulgar rule to count the cost before we entered upon an expensive undertaking; but he nevertheless could not help thinking that there was some wisdom in it; that it was applicable to states as well as to individuals, and might be equally beneficial in the affairs of both. It was easier, however, and more striking, for the right hon. gentleman to come down to the House, and, after giving a pompous description of our victories, after calling for our congratulations on the dignified attitude we occupied among the nations, and telling us of our flourishing condition at home, and the respect in which we were held abroad, to propose a vote for a great navy and army establishment, with all its ordinaries and extraordinaries, leaving the ways and means of paying it for future consideration. What had we now got for the supplies of the year? What appeared to support our establishments, even upon the right hon. gentleman's own showing? Why, there were three millions of surplus grants—and the House heard a great deal of congratulation on so fortunate a circumstance. Mr. Tierney said he was not surprised at this piece of good fortune; he was rather surprised that the surplus was so small. The war did not last above two months, and there was great hurry manifested in refitting the navy. Instead of being so well satisfied with the surplus as to require no further explanation of how the immense sums last year voted were expended, he should demand the accounts with a suspicion that many of them would not meet with his approbation. The right hon. gentleman had said, that 21 millions had been employed in paying off arrears, and seemed to take credit to himself for the gratifying information; but he would ask, was there not a vote appropriating such a sum for that purpose? An explanation might likewise be given of the sum expended in discharging exchequer-bills, which would deprive the right hon. gentleman of any credit for that service. He would call upon ministers to state how they had disposed of the other enormous grants voted by this House last session. How had the noble lord opposite, in his negociations abroad, disposed of our money? He seemed very lavish of it, as would appear by the treaties before the House. He could not keep the purse of this nation shut, when transacting business with such high personages as those with whom he had lately negociated. Russia said to him, "I have brought into the field upwards of 100,000 men more than my stipulated quota." Have you, said the noble lord? why, then, here is half a million for you [Hear, hear! and a laugh.]

The right hon. gentleman then went on to examine the statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and contended that his account of the whole revenue yesterday did not tally with what was given last session. There was a falling off rather than an increase. He was convinced that the right hon. gentleman had stated an error on this subject, and that he himself was conscious of it, from his having taken the surplus of the consolidated fund at 2½ millions this year, while last year he took it at three millions. Taking this and the other items of permanent taxation, we had no more than 5½ millions provided for out of the 20 millions necessary for our peace establishment. This information, he conceived, was of a kind to make the House look about — to make it pause before it gave its support to the propositions of ministers. When there was only so small a sum to be calculated upon, and so great an expenditure in contemplation, he thought the very circumstance would be sufficient to rouse parliament and the country to a sense of their dangers and difficulties. But then, said the chancellor of the exchequer, we can resort to the war taxes for the support of our establishments. It was never intended that these taxes should continue in time of peace. To continue them would be breaking faith with the country, even if it were possible to make them productive. This was a circumstance, however, which could not be expected. These taxes could not be collected in time of peace to any amount. The temptations to smuggling would be so great, the methods of evasion so numerous, and the ingenuity of persons who engaged in attempts to defeat the revenue laws so much sharpened by the importance of the objects they followed, that the taxes, though they remained, would not be productive. He would only instance the tax upon tea, and if he saw any of the honourable directors of the East India company in the House, he would ask them if they thought that in time of peace 95 per cent. could be levied upon it, without creating an irresistible effort to smuggle that article? If we meant to continue the war taxes of the customs and excise, we must add to our navy a very great force of small vessels, to prevent frauds upon the revenue. All the war taxes of customs and excise together could not, he thought, be taken at more than four millions, which, in addition to the sum already specified, would not exceed eleven and a half millions—a comparatively small proportion only of the twenty millions stated to be necessary.

After having made some further observations on this subject, he said, that if ever there were circumstances in which a call of the House was necessary, those circumstances had now occurred. If nothing else was done, a committee should be appointed to inquire into our expenditure, and to suggest the means of relief. A hope had been expressed, that some of our taxes would improve. This hope, he thought, could not be rationally entertained. He believed taxes seldom or never improved in time of peace. Take the tax upon leather for instance, which the farming interest felt so oppressive, and he would ask, could that be expected to improve? It was needless to run over the other sources of taxation, to show the fallacy of this expectation. He again called upon the House to pause before it agreed to the propositions which it had heard last night. The right hon. gentleman oppposite, by way of composing public feeling, and lulling the vigilance of parliament, had stated that he did not intend to fix the peace establishment by the views he had given. This was the proper time, therefore, for sounding the alarm before the burthens of the people were fixed upon them for ever, and before their liberties were put to hazard by the establishment of a great military force. If his voice could reach all corners of the country, where assemblages of the people were every where collecting to petition for the removal of their grievances, and of that great grievance the property tax, he would advise that there should not be a single application presented to the legislature without containing a prayer and a remonstrance against the existence of such a monstrous military establishment in time of peace as was now threatened to be imposed on us. He might raise his protest in that House, but, without some assistance from without, he could do nothing. The noble lord might smile at the security of his situation; he might congratulate himself upon his triumphant majorities, while he was merely opposed by the speeches within doors; but he hoped the sentiments of the people, constitutionally expressed, and followed up with the measures which they might be expected to take, would teach him an important lesson. He hoped the nation would declare themselves—that they would show to government that we were not to become a military people—that the liberties of England were not to be sacrificed, and its resources depressed, by maintaining an unwieldy and oppressive military establishment Ministers, he repeated it, might count, as they always did, upon a majority; but he confidently believed that that majority would receive in- structions from their constituents as soon as they were informed what was going on, and that they would deem it proper to obey them. At any rate ministers must soon give the most explicit information; they will have to inform the House why it is that the military establishment of the country had been made so much to exceed the naval establishment, and why Great Britain is to be loaded with expense through entangling herself in continental politics.

With regard to the property tax, he would declare it to be his firm opinion, that if the people of England would submit to bear half of it, they were folly entitled to be saddled with the whole. He would say again to ministers, you must reduce your establishments to a proper peace establishment, which will be the only real earnest you can give the public of your good intentions. Nobody could believe, if it was determined to maintain those establishments on the indicated footing, that there was not some secret object for such immense regulations. If peace had been accomplished for Europe, and that peace bid fair to hold out, it was incumbent on ministers to show upon what possible ground we could wantan enormous military establishment of not less than 150,000 men. Was the noble lord keeping in a state of preparation for war? Had he any suspicions that the peace in which he endeavoured to fix our confidence would be of short duration? The great armaments still supported by the sovereigns in alliance with us seemed of evil augury, and showed that peace was established without the spirit of peace. Did they already entertain jealousies of one another? and might they not feel alarmed at the preparations of England? If a motion of a hon. and learned friend of his (Mr. Brougham) had been agreed to with regard to the production of a treaty against Russia, we might have some data for determining the temper with which the allies were animated. The right hon. gentleman concluded a most able speech with deprecating the continuance of such an army as would tend to make us a military nation, and fix upon us the burthens of war in a period of tranquillity, or lead us soon to the rupture of the peace which had been so long prayed for and so happily established.

, in rising to answer some points of the right hon. gentleman's speech, assured the House, that the only difficulty imposed on his majesty's ministers by the speech of the right hon. gentleman was, a doubt whether this was a proper time for entering into such large considerations, when no practical result was to arise out of the discussion. The question on which the House was called upon to vote, was not a question involving any of those topics of general, and domestic policy upon which the right hon. gentleman had adverted at such length; and although the opportunity furnished by the financial plan disclosed by his right hon. friend yesterday had been eagerly seized on the other side for the renewal of their usual arguments, he hardly felt inclined to anticipate questions which would come so shortly, and in so much more convenient a form, under parliamentary investigation. Averse, as he naturally was, to address the House on subjects purely financial (and he was ready to admit, particularly so when he had to cope with the right hon. gentleman, whose skill and knowledge in subjects of this nature were well known to the House), he still, however, felt it to be his duty to offer some observations in reply to the reasonings and principles set forth in the right hon. gentleman's speech. He was not a little surprised, indeed, to see the right hon. gentleman do so much injustice to his own talents and so surrender up his knowledge of principles, as to suppose for a moment that he had satisfied the House that the plan of finance suggested by his right hon. friend, because it had discarded all idea of a new loan, was altogether unwise, and founded on a wrong basis. [Here Mr. Tierney assured the noble lord that he had never said any such thing.] He could wish that the right hon. gentleman would rather reply to than interrupt him. What he had understood to have fallen from the right hon. gentleman was, that he first objected to the renewal of the property tax, and then added, that twelve millions of the last loan were not yet taken up, which ought therefore to be considered as a loan to that amount for this year. The right hon. gentleman wished to deny the property tax to the Crown. Could he point out any other effectual means of sustaining the money market? and burthened as the country was, was it not indispensable that that market should be sustained? Was there any other mode of pouring that influx of capital into the circulating system, by which alone relief could be given on indi- vidual security? The largest loan that ever was made took place last year, and because there remained ten or twelve millions of that loan to be paid up, was this an argument to authorize the right hon. gentleman to attack and break down the whole system of taxation of the country, and endeavour to destroy the public confidence? If the markets were not sustained, it was impossible to expect to have the influx of capital which the right hon. gentleman argued last year we could not have. His right hon. friend had gone candidly through every item of the ways and means; he had concealed nothing, nor had he taken credit for the surplus in the supply of last year, as applicable to any establishment except that of this year. The right hon. gentleman, however, took the ways and means of the year, went through the war taxes, and argued against their being productive. The right hon. gentleman's arguments bore that tincture of despondency which had pervaded them on almost every occasion for the last fifteen or sixteen years: but he was happy to say that this ague of the right hon. gentleman had not affected the tone of nerves of the country. From the dangers so often described on the other side the country was happily delivered, and he was sure that the right hon. gentleman rejoiced in being relieved from that alarm which had been the source of so many fallacious predictions. So long as public credit was supported, there was no reason to despair of the public resources. Every successive year would present resources of its own, so long as the spirit of the country remained unbroken, and public credit was secure. He trusted that the people would not be disheartened, therefore, by the gloomy prognostics of the right hon. gentleman, now that we had surmounted our difficulties, and that all the great objects of our foreign policy had been accomplished. He hoped they would not rush upon their ruin, by giving themselves up to the delusion attempted by the right hon. gentleman, nor hazard the dearest interests of the country in compliment to the speeches on the Other side, when the reasoning employed by the right hon. gentleman himself on the subject of loans was an unanswerable argument in favour of continuing the property tax for some time longer. The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Horner) had placed the question between them on a fairer and more liberal issue, in admitting, that if it could be shown satisfactorily that the expenditure proposed was necessary, the property tax was necessary also. Upon this ground he was willing to join issue. It was true that the property tax was an evil in itself; and the same might be said of every species of taxation, when separated from all considerations of their necessity or application But the question was—Was there any other mode, supposing (which he trusted he should be able to make out to the satisfaction of parliament, when the proper period should arrive), that the proposed establishment was necessary, by which a sum of six millions could be raised so easily, and with so little oppression to the subject? With regard to this question, he was by no means disinclined to go at once into a detailed consideration, were it possible that it could lead to any operative decision. He must do this justice to the right hon. gentleman, that he had fairly stated the general amount of what was proposed as a peace expenditure, in taking it, not at thirty, but at twenty millions. But when the right hon. gentleman proceeded to argue, that this afforded evidence of some intention of changing all the former principles of our public policy, he entirely misunderstood the views of his Majesty's government. They had never aimed at any thing so new and alien to the constitutional policy of this kingdom, as to ape the military character of other state, or to approximate our own system to that of countries so differently situated in every view of European policy. But it was easy, he apprehended, to perceive a broad distinction, as he should hereafter more fully labour to prove, between a new military system, adverse to our commercial and maritime character, and an establishment giving a faculty of naval and military strength, adequate to our security against all emergencies. He certainly thought the peace such as ought to create confidence in its continuance and stability; but he, for one, should never think the tranquillity of the world sufficiently established, till he saw every where a respect for civil institutions taking place of a military spirit, and the civil principle enthroned as it were, paramount, to the military views and policy of other states. To him the most alarming symptom of the times we lived in was, that out of the great efforts made by the confederacy of Europe against the thraldom with which they were menaced by one particular power, so general a military interest had been created, that it was impossible to consider Europe as perfectly tranquillized until those armies which had been put in motion should have sunk to their natural level. He could not recommend it to the country to disarm altogether, whilst the continent was still covered with camps and armies, or to leave itself without the possible resurrection of its strength, if it should suddenly become necessary. The right hon. gentleman had been closely connected with the government that negociated the peace of Amiens, and framed the subsequent peace establishment. He could not have conceived that establishment as too extended, and yet it consisted of 23,000 men for Ireland, instead of 25,000, as now proposed; and of 47,000 for Great Britain, instead of 25,000, according to the estimate of the present year. The circumstances of the two periods corresponded [Hear from the opposition.] He must contend, that whatever advantages might, in some respects attend our present situation from the reduction of the power of France, a continued jealousy was highly necessary, particularly when it was considered that the French army was not extinguished, and that, although it had been disbanded, its component parts were still in existence.—Upon all these points he was prepared to enter into the minutest detail, and felt as much anxiety as the right hon. gentleman for a full attendance of members. He should make no opposition to the motion for a call of the House, should it be made within such time as not to interrupt the progress of parliamentary business. But when he listened to that sort of appeal to the country, by the right hon. gentleman, and to his professed design of sounding an alarm to the public (appeals common enough from him, and yet chiefly made when he felt himself destitute of all foundation in fair reasoning), he must express his hopes that the country would not be induced by such attempts to withdraw its confidence from a government which had carried it through so many difficulties. Appeals, indeed, of this nature ought to be looked upon as forming part of the tactics on the other side, and not being inconsistent with parliamentary practice, to constitute one of the regular modes of attacking an administration. The right hon. gentleman abounded in these appeals; but he trusted to the good sense of the people, that no eloquence would tempt them to abandon that course of conduct to which they had adhered so long, or to shrink from the exercise of that perseverance which was necessary to secure what had been acquired. He felt assured that the people of England would not, from an ignorant impatience to be relieved from the pressure of taxation, put every thing to hazard, when every thing might be accomplished by continued constancy and firmness. He would venture to assert, that they did not desire relief from their burthens more than ministers desired it for them, and that no opportunity would be neglected, or time lost in carrying their disposition into effect.—The right hon. gentleman had had recourse to his usual custom of complaints against the influence of the Crown. This, when no other topic suggested itself on the opposite side of the House, was the ground always occupied. It was the citadel to which the gentlemen opposite retreated on desperate occasions, and in which they shut themselves up, as their forlorn hope.—But with regard to military patronage, he did not think that those who knew how admirably and impartially the affairs of the army were administered by the illustrious personage at the head of that important department would be led away by any false insinuations. Every body knew that that illustrious personage was as little influenced by considerations of patty, as any man alive; and the right hon. gentleman and his friends knew well, although they were not in the government, that they could go to his royal highness and recommend any officer of talents, without ever meeting with a negative. In fact, if there was any one branch of the government against which, more than another, the charge of undue patronage would not in any way lie, it was the one in question—it was the one above all others in which such patronage could never be obtained.—Reverting to the subject of the military establishment, his lordship observed, that this was not the occasion on which he could submit the local considerations which influenced government why a particular number of men were appointed to one service more than to another, but he would pledge himself to show, by comparisons between the peace establishment of 1792 and 1802, what the expense of the right hon. gentleman's army in the latter year would have been to the country. At present, instead of the bugbear of the peace establishment costing the country thirty millions, the right hon. gentleman had relieved us from the night-mare of ten millions. But he (lord Castlereagh) wished to reserve the full consideration of the subject for the present, and when it came to be discussed, he would freely state what the considerations were that rendered necessary so large an establishment; after this he trusted the right hon. gentleman would be prepared to state in what branch any reduction could be made. But at all events, he apprehended he would not be able to shake the policy of having 25,000 men in Ireland, and 23,000 in England, with a view to casualties and our necessary security. He felt certain that whatever the course of objections might be that would be made on the other side, they would prove unsound, and he was sure that the country would wait on this occasion, and bear the necessity that existed with the same patience and good will as it had displayed throughout the war. The good sense of the people would induce them tranquilly to wait till the subject had been amply discussed by their representatives, without suspicion that government would lend themselves to force any unnecessary establishment on the nation, which had so nobly sustained itself throughout the long and trying contest, and without assuming, gratuitously and unreasonably, that the ministers of the Crown entertained any designs destructive of their interests, or hostile to the constitution of the country.

was of opinion, that if, as had been asserted by the noble lord, the present state of this country was really analogous to what it was at the peace of Amiens, its situation was far from enviable. What was said of that peace at the time, by the gentlemen opposite? They said, that only nature's fools could have supposed it likely to last. At the last mentioned period Holland and Spain were under the direct influence of Buonaparté, who possessed an unbroken army. At present Holland was our ally, Spain was our ally, and Buonaparté was at St. Helena. With respect to what the noble lord had said of the hostility to patronage as being the citadel of opposition, he had been bred in a different school from the noble lord. He had always understood that it was the duty of that House to watch with jealousy the patronage of the Crown, and not to confide in any measure from personal respect towards the individual, whether commander-in-chief or otherwise, in whom it might originate. With- out any reference to the acknowledged merits of the present illustrious commander-in-chief, it was well known to be in the nature of things impossible, but that the possession of military patronage must be a source of great influence to government, who had therefore an interest in extending it in all its various departments.

The second resolutions were then put and agreed to.

On the motion of Mr. Horner (acquiesced in by lord Castlereagh), an humble Address was ordered to be presented to the Prince Regent, praying that he would be pleased to order that there be laid before the House a copy of any agreement made with the allied powers respecting the proportion and nature of the force which is to form the army of occupation in France.

referring to the opinion yesterday expressed by the right hon. gentleman opposite, of the legality with which the contribution paid to this country by France might have been considered as droits of the Crown, wished to know whether the right hon. gentleman had founded that opinion on any consultation with the law officers of the Crown?

said, that under the circumstances of the case, he had not thought it necessary to require any legal opinion upon it.

inquired as to the amount of the contribution which had been actually paid?

replied, that out of 700,000l. due, 500,000l. had been paid into our military chest at Paris.

contended that the House ought to assert its control over this money.

pressed the question which had been put by his hon. and learned friend; namely, whether any legal adviser of the Crown had been consulted as to the liability of this money to the character of droits of the Crown.

deprecated the discussion of a question which could have no practical result. As to the appropriation which had actually taken place of this money, the House would have an opportunity of considering whether it had been proper or not. The Crown had only acted as trustee for the army which had fought under the duke of Wellington, and which consisted not of British troops alone, but of four other nations.

rose and spoke as follows:^*

Towards the close of the last session of parliament, I gave a notice that I should, at an early period in the present session, submit to the House a proposition founded on papers and documents which have been printed, and in the hands of members since the month of July last; having reference to certain transactions and agreements, subsisting betwixt the public and the bank of England.

It is for the purpose of redeeming that pledge, Sir, that I have now the honour of addressing you. And if I was of opinion, when first I took the liberty of calling the attention of parliament to this subject, not only that it was more consistent with what might be due to the bank, and to our engagements subsisting with it, but that also with a view to the ultimate success of my own object, it was more expedient, that I should propose nothing, at that time, that should have any immediate operation upon these transactions or agreements; but, that I should strictly limit and confine myself, as I trust I have done, to an application to the House for such information—for such details, as appeared to me best calculated to enable both the House and myself to form and arrive at correct conclusions upon the whole of this important subject; if such, Sir, I say, were the sentiments which I entertained at that period, the opportunity that the recess of parliament has since afforded me, of examining into, and combining the information contained in that mass of papers now upon your table on this subject, has not only satisfied me of the propriety of that course of proceeding, but at the same time strengthened and confirmed the opinion I have entertained on this subject from the commencement—namely, that the terms and principles upon which these transactions have been for many years past, and are now carried on by the bank for the public, are in their nature extravagant, exorbitant, and therefore in their effect and operation injurious to the public interests. And as we are now arrived at the eve of that period when all agreements, having reference to these transactions will expire—namely, on the 5th of April next:—if I should be so fortunate as to find the House concurring in the view I have presumed to take of this subject, I am confident they will feel it to be their duty to take care, that these transactions be conducted in future, upon such a footing, as shall be just towards the public, without being, in any measure, unjust towards the bank of England. It being the conviction of my mind and I entreat the House to believe, that I state what I am now about to do, not rashly, not vaguely, nor without the most anxious and repeated consideration, that the result of arrangements, founded on these just principles, must be to secure for the public a saving of public money, amounting to hundreds of thousands of pounds per annum, without doing any thing that could be construed by the most scrupulous into a breach of the public faith, without committing the slightest degree of injustice on the bank of England; but still giving to the bank, what I shall always wish to see it receive, an adequate, ample, liberal compensation and remuneration—proportioned, however, always to the nature and value of the service performed by the bank for such remuneration; and still leaving that great corporation what it now is, and what, as a member of that body myself, it must always be my interest, as it ever will, on public grounds, be my wish to see it, namely, the most wealthy and opulent, the most thriving and prosperous, the most profitable banking institution that now exists, or that ever has existed, in this or in any other part of the commercial world.

^* From the original Edition printed for John Murray, Albemarle Street.

Before I enter, however, upon this subject, I wish to disclaim all intention of meddling, or interfering, with any of those transactions of the bank of England, which may purely and properly be considered as exclusively their own. With the private concerns and transactions of the bank, I presume, generally speaking, this House can have nothing to do, and, therefore, except under circumstances of a very peculiar nature indeed, never will meddle or interfere. But in all transactions in which the public are directly interested with the bank, in which the public are to be considered as one of the contracting parties, and the bank the other,—not only do I feel that we are compe- tent, but, if I know any thing of the practical functions of the House of Commons, it is our bounden duty, as the constitutional guardians of the public expenditure, to take care and satisfy ourselves and the public, that those transactions are conducted in such a manner, and on such terms and principles, as the public are entitled to, and have a right to expect. I am also desirous of stating—what, indeed, I have stated upon a former occasion—that, in calling the attention of parliament and of the public to this subject, I am influenced by no motives of personal hostility towards the directors of the bank,—for whom, individually, I feel the respect that is due to their characters and stations: the hostility I feel, if such a term be applicable to my feelings, is one that I do not shrink from the avowal of—it is hostility to a system, established, perhaps, not by the gentlemen who at present conduct the affairs of the bank, but, for any thing I know to the contrary, by their predecessors,—but a system, by whomsoever established, or by whomsoever acted upon, which I oppose, and am in hostility to, because, in my conscience, I believe it to be a system hostile to the interests of the country. Neither have I been so inattentive an observer of what has passed within the circle of my own experience during the last thirty years, nor am I so ignorant of the principles upon which this great commercial country rests, as to be either insensible or indifferent to the many and important advantages which the public have long derived—which we now enjoy—and which, I trust, shall long continue to derive, from this our great national bank: nor am I, in any degree, desirous of limiting, curtailing, or abridging its fair legitimate profits; but, convinced as I am, from every consideration I have been able to give to this subject, that, in our transactions with the bank, particularly of late years, we have contributed towards those profits in a most undue and uncalled-for degree; to an extent, unwarranted either by the nature or value of the service performed by the bank: satisfied, too, that we may secure to ourselves a continuance of those, and indeed of all other advantages, which the bank is capable or susceptible of affording to us, without our being subjected to such immense pecuniary sacrifices as we have hitherto made for those services—such, I say, Sir, being the honest conviction of my mind, I trust the House will do me the justice to believe, that in submitting this subject to their investigation, I am actuated by no motives but such as are of a public nature: that I am desirous, ambitious, if you please, (no blameable ambition, I hope) to accomplish, upon public grounds, an important saving of the public money. Whatever, then, the feelings of the directors of the bank may be, on this occasion; whatever motives, however erroneous and unfounded, may be imputed to me, I shall not shrink from the task I have undertaken; but, so long as I shall be conscious, as I now am, of the rectitude of my own intentions; and, above all, so long as I may receive from this House that forbearance and indulgence, of which I feel I stand so much in need, whenever I presume to address them, I shall persevere; satisfied that I stand on firm and tenable ground; that the cause I have undertaken is a good one; and that, under the favour and indulgence of this House, I cannot fail to bring it to a speedy and successful issue.

Having detained the House, longer than perhaps I ought to have done, with these preliminary observations, I will now proceed at once to the discussion before me; and, in doing this, I shall endeavour to confine myself, principally to two branches, or heads of the public service, into which the subject seems naturally to class and arrange itself; to which the papers on your table mainly apply; and to which alone I look, as the sources of that public economy and retrenchment, which are the only objects I have in contemplation.

The first of these two branches then will refer to the deposits of public monies lodged at the bank, acting, in this respect, as the bankers of the public; which monies (precisely as is the case with money deposited by individuals with their private bankers), are wholly unproductive to the public, but productive of advantage and profit to the bank to the extent, as I venture to contend, as was successfully contended by a committee of this House in the year 1807, and immediately afterwards, not only successfully but practically, contended by Mr. Perceval in the arrangements made by him with the bank in the year 1808; and, as I do not now expect to hear denied, even by the directors of the bank themselves, productive then, I say, to the extent of about five per cent. per annum upon their whole aggregate amounts; which aggregate amount, estimated upon an average fairly taken during the last ten years, that is, from the year 1806 down to the present time, I state to have been about eleven millions and a half sterling. When I say from 1806 down to the present time, I beg to be understood, with reference to this and to every other part of the subject, where I may have occasion to use the same expression, as meaning, down to the latest period to which any account upon the subject has been laid before parliament; and all such accounts come down to a late period in the last session: what may have happened since that time I know not, nor would any variation in these accounts, which may since have taken place, either alter my view of the subject, or in any manner affect the argument I mean to hold upon it.

The second branch of the subject, to which I shall apply myself, will be the commission or charge paid by the public to the bank for the management of the public debt, amounting, upon the debt as it now stands, including the loan, and other financial operations of the last year, to an annual sum of about 275,000l., to which must be added, a further charge paid to the bank of 800l. per million, upon the whole amount of every loan; and of 1000l. upon every lottery contract; which two items of charge, amounted in the last year to a sum exceeding 30,000l. and in the year preceding, that is, in 1814, to a sum exceeding 42,000l.

There are three other items of charge made by the bank against the public, of comparatively trifling amount, but upon which I shall wish to address a few short observations to the House:—the first is a sum of 4000l. per annum paid to the bank, from the original grant of its charter, under the denomination of "an allowance to the bank towards its House expenses." The second is a sum of 1898l. per annum, charged for management on four millions of the public debt, purchased by the bank of the south sea company in 1722, and which now forms a part of the bank capital lent to the public at three per cent. The last item is a charge paid to the bank since 1806, as a commission of one eighth per cent. or half a crown in the hundred pounds, upon such portion of the property duty, as persons, assessed for trades, offices, or professions, voluntarily take to the bank, and deposit there, on its way into the exchequer. The several items just enumerated, and comprised under this second branch of the subject, form together an annual aggregate charge exceeding 300,000l.

There is, however, another part of this subject, another source of immense wealth and profit to the bank, to which in an inquiry of this kind, it is impossible that I should not advert, though I beg to be distinctly understood, as not meaning, at present, to propose, or even to recommend, any participation in those profits on the part of the public. What I allude to is, the immense increase in bank profits, arising out of the increased circulation of their paper, since the year 1797, and in consequence of an act which passed the legislature in that year, commonly known by the name of the "Bank Restriction Act;" an act, the title of which was, "An Act for restraining the bank of England from paying its obligations in cash;" but which, I confess, it has frequently occurred to me, would not have been inaptly intituled, "An Act for relieving the bank of England from the necessity of paying its obligations in cash;"—and as this part of the subject does not necessarily connect itself with either of the other branches to which I have just referred, and as what I shall have to say upon it will be very short, perhaps I shall best consult the convenience of the House, as well as my own, if I dispose of it at once, and in this part of the discussion.

It appears then from papers which are on your table, that the circulation of bank of England paper, estimated upon an average of years prior to the restriction act, amounted to a sum fluctuating betwixt eleven and twelve millions. I am indeed aware, that at the period when this act passed, and for some time previously, the bank circulation was reduced considerably below this average; but as I do not wish to deceive myself or the House, by taking an exaggerated view of any part of this subject (for in truth, if I were so disposed, or capable of doing it, the case before me appears to me to require no exaggeration) I am willing to consider this as a depression arising out of temporary circumstances, and to take the average circulation prior to 1797, at the sum of eleven or twelve millions. Now, it appears, from papers which are also before us, that this circulation, as might indeed have been expected, has gone on gradually increasing ever since; till it reached, at one period in the last year (the year ending in June last) the sum of 31,300,000l. and the average of the whole of that year may be fairly stated as fluctuating betwixt twenty-seven and twenty-eight millions. Here, then, the House will perceive, is an increase in the bank-paper circulation at present as compared with what it was prior to the passing of the restriction act, of no less a sum than sixteen millions, yielding of course a corresponding increase in the gross profits of the bank of 800,000l. per annum! Now, Sir, as I have before observed, it is not my intentention to propose any participation, on behalf of the public, in these enormous profits, in the present state of things. I say, in the present state of things; because, presuming to think as I do, that from the moment the restriction act passed, the public acquired an equitable claim upon the bank for a participation in the profits, which that act had created; and, that if we have hitherto abstained (as I think we have wisely done) from urging that claim, it has been from considerations of policy and expediency, and not from any question as to the rights of the public, with reference to such participation; holding this opinion, Sir, I have no difficulty in stating, that if this system, which has now gone on, without any interruption, during the last nineteen years, and which has been such an abundant source of wealth to the bank exclusively, should become the permanent system of our currency; nay, if its duration should be protracted, as from something that has lately passed, we have reason to expect, may be proposed to us, even for one year beyond the 5th of July next, to which this system by the law now in force is limited; in such an event, I trust some member of this House of more weight and authority and more competent to the undertaking than myself, will come forward, and offer us a proposition, the object of which will be, in some way or other, to give to the public a participation in these profits in future. At present, however, I have nothing of that kind to propose to you; and I have referred to the subject chiefly for the purpose of bringing under the notice of the House the two following facts:—first, that the bank are now deriving an increase in their profits, from the circulation of their paper, as compared with those profits before the restriction act passed, at the rate of 800,000l. annually; and secondly, that they are indebted for these increased profits, in a great measure (I will not say altogether, because the increased trade and circulation of the coun- try must have operated in some degree upon their profits) to an act of the legislature. Surely, then, I may contend, that if we have thus far forborne from claiming our right to a share in those benefits, the public had at least to expect, that in all its dealings with the bank, the bank would have exercised a corresponding forbearance in point of charge; that it would have acted towards the public, at least upon a system of moderation—aye of liberality and generosity. How far this has been the system upon which the bank has conducted itself towards the public, the House will judge for itself, from what I am now about to submit to them: and first with reference to the first branch of the subject, namely, the balances of public monies deposited at the bank, acting as the public bankers.

In order to submit to the House my view of this branch of the subject, and to render myself intelligible upon it, I feel it necessary to state, in the first place, that in the year 1800, when the charter of the bank of England was removed, Mr. Pitt, conducting the negociation on the part of the public, claimed, as he was entitled to do, from the Bank, a direct participation for the public, in the then existing profits of the bank, arising out of its exclusive privileges of banking as a corporate body; and convinced, no doubt, as he must have been, that all deposits of public monies must be productive of profit to the bank, to the extent of 5 per cent. per annum, so long as the bank shall be in the practice of giving its paper in exchange for securities, bearing 5 per cent. interest, Mr. Pitt applied his principle of participation to the balances of public monies deposited at the bank.

I have, in the next place, to state, that the only deposits of public money particularly adverted to, or calculated upon, in that negociation, were two;—the one, arising out of the quarterly issues from the Exchequer to the bank towards the payment of the growing dividends, which was stated in an evidence given by the bank to a committee of this House, in the year 1807, and as I have a right to infer, so represented to Mr. Pitt in 1800, to have amounted to an average balance of two millions and a half; the other and only other remaining deposit, calculated upon, on the renewal of the charter, was that which arises from the issues of money from the exchequer to the bank, at the commencement of each quarter, for the reduction of the national debt; amounting, according to a paper laid upon the table of this House, in the month of July last, and for the production of which, as well as of other valuable documents, from which I have derived much information upon the whole of this subject, I am indebted to the governor of the bank, who moved for them; amounting then, according to this paper, to the sum of 615,000l.

The combined amount of these two deposits was 3,115,000l., and I have the authority of the bank of England itself, solemnly given in evidence before a committee of this House in the year 1807, for stating, that these two were the only deposits of public money at the bank, that were calculated upon when the charter was renewed, as all other deposits—(I will use the very words and language of the bank of England itself on that occasion,) "As the other public accounts were at that time of trifling amount."

Now, Sir, I am under the necessity of stating, what, indeed, must be obvious to every gentleman who has investigated this subject, that this evidence of the bank, given to the committee in 1807 as the statement of what passed in the negociation with Mr. Pitt in 1800, is directly at variance with, and in contradiction to, the contents of the papers which I now hold in my hand, and which the bank has now thought proper to produce, having reference, precisely, to one, and the same subject: for it appears from the papers now produced, that though the only deposits adverted to when the charter was renewed, were the two I have enumerated, the combined amount of which, as stated by the bank, was about three millions one hundred thousand pounds; it now appears, that one of these two balances described by the bank as amounting to 2,500,000l. exceeded in its amount the sum of 3,600,000l., and that the other deposits, stated not to have been noticed because they were "of trifling amount," amounted to a sum of 1,947,000l.; and that the combined amount of the whole, instead of 3,100,000l., as stated by the bank in 1807, exceeded, according to the statement now made by the bank, the sum of six millions!

Sir, I can easily understand, when in the year 1800 Mr. Pitt was claiming a direct participation with the bank in the profits derived from these deposits, that it must have been an object with the bank—nay, that it was their duty, to take care that there should be no exaggeration on this subject, that not one shilling should be exhibited as a deposit, which did not actually exist: so, Sir, it is equally intelligible now, with reference to the discussions which took place upon this subject in the last session of parliament, as well as to the object I have in view, that the bank should now be anxious, that none of the deposits which actually existed in their hands in the year 1800, should at present be suppressed or kept out of view. Now, I do not mean to charge the bank of England with having intentionally misled either the committee in 1807, or Mr. Pitt in 1800: I merely state the facts, such as they present themselves in the papers now before us: and it is for the bank of England, and not for me, to account for and to explain, the difference that exists between the two statements which they have laid before us, both having reference, as I have before observed, precisely to one and the same subject. It is sufficient for me to have shown, as I trust I have done, to the satisfaction of the House, sure I am, that I have done so upon such authority as cannot, will not, be questioned, controverted, or denied, by the bank itself, that the only deposits calculated upon, when the charter was removed, were the two I have mentioned, amounting together, as then stated by the bank, to a sum of about 3,100,000l.

In the profits resulting from these two deposits then, Mr. Pitt claimed a participation; and, after several discussions, the negociation ended in an agreement, on the part of the bank, to advance to the public a loan, as it was called, of three millions, for six years, without interest, upon the distinct and specific ground of thereby giving to the public a participation in the profits which the bank was deriving from the possession of this public money; and also in other benefits derivable from their exclusive privilege of banking as a corporate body, the particulars of which are not described, and upon which, therefore, I will not hazard a conjecture.

Now, Sir, before I proceed further, I am anxious that the House should notice, and bear in mind, this transaction, as a direct recognition on the part of the bank, of the productiveness of profit, resulting from the possession of this money—a recognition, indeed, upon which I should be disposed to lay little or no stress, because it appears to me to be nothing more than the recognition of a self-evident pro- position, and to which I certainly should not be desirous to point and direct the attention of the House, if the bank had not, since that period, most strangely, most unaccountably, I may add, most whimsically, endeavoured to set up and maintain a doctrine, which, had they been successful in establishing it, would have gone to the utter subversion and denial of a principle so plain, simple, and self-evident, as this principle appears to me to be; but, Sir, this transaction not only admits the profits which the bank were deriving from the possession of this public money, but it recognizes also, what is of more importance to the public—the right of the public to a participation in them.

Under this agreement then, and with the usual covenant for continuing the whole of the bank capital, amounting to a sum of about 11,600,000l. in the hands of the public, at the three per cent. interest (at which rate of interest the public have held this capital ever since the year 1742, and the advantage of which to the public has always been considered as a part of the price paid by the bank for its charter), the charter of the bank of England was renewed for a period of twenty-one years, from 1812; extending its duration, therefore, to 1833—of which, consequently, seventeen years now remain unexpired.

In the year 1806, the loan of 1800 for three millions became payable; but, instead of discharging it, the government of that day, lord Grenville and lord Henry Petty being at the head of the treasury, and the right hon. gentleman, the present chancellor of the exchequer, filling the situation of one of the secretaries of the treasury in the finance department, entered into a negociation with the bank, which ended in an agreement for prolonging the period of this loan for the duration of the then existing war: not without interest, upon which terms the loan had been made in 1800, but subject, on the part of the public, to interest at three per cent., or, in fact, to the payment of 90,000l. per annum for the use of it. Now, inadequate as I think this arrangement was, to what the public had a right to expect, unreasonable on the part of the bank to require, and improvident on the part of the public to accede to these terms, it nevertheless was a transaction by which the public acquired the use of three millions, at three per cent. interest, instead of paying five per cent. for it; and, in this point of view, it may be considered, and was a saving of two per cent. upon three millions, or of 60,000l. annually; and, as such, I wish the House to notice this transaction, as a second admission, on the part of the bank, of the profits they were deriving from the possession of these public deposits, and also as a recognition of the right of the public to a farther participation in these profits: a participation beyond that which the public had acquired at the period of the renewal of the charter.

But there is something in this transaction so objectionable in my view of it,—something that so strongly marks and characterizes the spirit in which the bank has conducted itself in all its transactions with the public of late years, that I cannot suffer it to pass by me, without entreating the leave of the House to offer one or two observations upon it. I have no information of what passed betwixt the government and the bank in the progress of this negociation, It must, indeed, have been notorious then, as it is now, that a considerable increase had recently taken place in the amount of public deposits at the bank, in consequence of the recent detections and discoveries of mal-practices, and mal-appropriations, of the public money, on the part of certain public accountants, and of other gentlemen in office, to whom the public money had been entrusted; which very properly induced the government, supported by the legislature, in all cases where legislative interference was necessary, to place the public treasure beyond the reach of loss or hazard in future, by directing it to be deposited, in all cases where it was practicable, in the hands of the public banker—the bank of England. But it was not till the year subsequent to that in which this arrangement took place, namely, till the year 1807,—that either this House or the public, or, as I think I may venture to assert, the executive government itself was aware, either of the enormous magnitude to which these monies had accumulated in the hands of the bank, or of the enormous profits which the bank were at that time, and had, during a considerable time previously, been deriving from the possession of this money. Why, Sir, at the very moment, in 1806, when the bank required, and the public most improvidently agreed to pay, 90,000l. per annum for the use of three millions of money, the bank held, and were in possession of a treasure belonging to the public, amounting to a sum little short of twelve millions! wholly unproductive to the public, but productive of advantage to the bank: which treasure, too, I would observe, in passing, has remained with the bank of England, with little or no diminution ever since.

Now I would ask the House, whether it is possible to believe, without imputing to the government of that day, what I should be most backward in imputing to it or indeed to any other government under similar circumstances; I ask you, whether, without imputing to that government, the grossest negligence, or the most culpable indifference to the interests of the public, it is possible to believe, that they would have agreed to pay the bank 90,000l. per annum, for the use of three millions of money, if they had been aware, that they possessed at that very time, an aggregate amount of public monies in the hands of this very same bank, amounting to a sum little short of twelve millions? Sir, the thing is absolutely impossible. It has been the fashion to call this, and other similar transactions, "loans" from the bank. "Advances of money forsooth, from the bank to the public:"—this term has always appeared to me, I must not say, intended, because it is a term applied to the subject, in an act of the legislature, but I may say, if not intended, calculated to mislead and deceive the public, as to the real nature and character of the transaction itself: and I confess it seems to me, that instead of calling this operation a loan, or advance, from the bank, it would be much more correct to say, that it was a liberty given to the public,—or—what I should like still better, a right assumed by the public, having a sum of near twelve millions in the hands of its bankers, to draw out and apply three millions of that sum to the public service, without, however, subjecting the public to pay 90,000l. per annum for the exercise of that right. Such, however, was the agreement, and it has been, as all agreements ought to be into which the public enter, whether improvidently or not, strictly and rigidly performed: and this loan, as it is called, went on from the year 1806 to the year 1814, when it became payable, and when it was discharged, together with the interest upon it, which amounted, during the eight years and eight months that the loan was in operation, to the sum of 780,000l. which sum I maintain was paid by the public, for the use of three millions of its own money, during a period, in which the bank held constantly, exclusive of these three millions, an aggregate amount of public balances, fluctuating betwixt 5½ and 8½ millions; and this is one, I am sorry to add, of the many transactions, in which the public interests have been most improperly and unjustly sacrificed, to swell and aggrandize the already enormous treasures of the bank of England.

We now come to the year 1807; a memorable year in these transactions. In that year a committee of this House, known by the name of the committee on public expenditure, applied itself to the investigation of these and of other transactions subsisting betwixt the public and the bank. This committee was presided over by an hon. gentleman, now in his place, the member for Corffe Castle (Mr. Bankes), whose zeal, abilities, and perseverance, are most particularly conspicuous on all subjects connected with the finances and public expenditure of the country. The committee was also most powerfully assisted in its labours by an hon. member of it, now, unfortunately for the country, no more, I mean the late Mr. Henry Thornton, whose practical knowledge and experience, industry and habits of life, pre-eminently qualified him for investigations of this nature, and whose private character gave a sanction to every act of his public life; and in the very able and clear report, ^* which was presented from that committee, will be found, the first combined view that ever was given to this House or to the public; the first combined view I venture to assert, that ever met the eye of the executive government; stating the aggregate amount of these deposits in the hands of the bank; accompanied too, with what was not the least valuable part of this valuable report—a perspicuous, unanswerable argument, showing the extent to which the possession of these deposits was profitable to the bank; demonstrating, that the bank was deriving a profit from these public monies, equivalent to about five per cent. per annum, upon their whole aggregate amount; and that the benefit at that time, and for some time previous to it enjoyed by the bank from that source, amounted to a sum fluctuating betwixt five and six hundred thousand pounds annually. And to this report, and to the labours of the enligtened members by whom it was framed, are the public indebted, solely, and exclusively, for the advantages derived immediately afterwards under the arrangement made by Mr. Perceval with the bank in 1808; advantages however inadequate, as I know they were in the estimation of many of the most distinguished members of that committee, to what the public were entitled to receive — short in my view, by at least one half, of what the public ought to have enjoyed, amounting, nevertheless, to a public saving of between two or three hundred thousand pounds per annum—for the whole of which, I repeat, we are indebted to the committee of 1807.

^* For a copy of this report, see Vol. IX. appendix p. lxxxvii.

This report no sooner made its appearance than Mr. Perceval, as chancellor of the exchequer, came forward, and, with the report in his hand, claimed from the bank a further participation in the profits deriveable from these deposits, and also a reduction in the charge for the management of the public debt. The communications and correspondence which took place between Mr. Perceval and the bank on that occasion, were laid upon the table of this House; they now form a part of our parliamentary records, and are of course accessible to any member who has a taste for investigations of this nature. I abstain, therefore, from troubling the House with any details with respect to this negociation, observing only, that in the papers produced, will be found much curious and important information upon the whole of this subject; and, that after many discussions, in which the bank resisted but as it appears to me very feebly resisted Mr. Perceval's claims, the following arrangement was concluded. The bank agreed to advance immediately another loan (as it was again called) of three millions to the public, without any charge of interest: The bank also acquiesced in the withdrawing of a sum of half a million from the balance of unclaimed dividends in their hands, to be applied to the public service, where it has remained ever since; they also agreed to a reduction equal to about one fourth in the then existing charge for the management of the debt; and the whole saving, effected by this arrangement, amounted to the sum of about 242,000l. per annum.

In reviewing this arrangement of 1808, when the bank advanced three millions without any charge of interest, and contrasting it with what happened only about twenty months before, when the bank required to be paid ninety thousand pounds per annum for a similar loan one cannot avoid asking, what was the cause of this different conduct of the bank at those two, not very distant periods? The amount of public money possessed by them, (the only ground upon which both the arrangements were founded) was nearly the same in both instances: nay, it appears from a statement formed from the documents now before us, that the aggregate amount of deposits possessed by the bank was something higher in 1806 than in 1808: and nevertheless they charged the public with 90,000l. per annum, in 1806, for doing what, in 1808, they did for nothing! To what principle is this to be attributed? Can we discover in it any of that spirit of moderation, which I think the public had, and have a right to expect from bank? Any thing of that unceasing anxiety to promote the interest of the public"^*—about which we have heard so much, and seen so little? or is it not rather to be traced to another principle?—a principle, that I have heard avowed, maintained, and defended, not only by many proprietors, but also by directors of the bank elsewhere? and which is this—"that the bank of England are a trading company—that their directors are bound not only by their interests, but by their oaths, by all lawful means" (and God forbid I should be supposed to impute to them any means which are not strictly and rigidly lawful!) "to make all the profit they can for their proprietors? and that, acting upon this commercial and mercantile principle, in all contracts and agreements with the public, it is their business to make the best bargain they can for themselves." The House will determine to which of these two principles to ascribe the conduct of the bank, with reference to these two transactions in the years 1806 and 1808.

Another observation here occurs to me. The bank advanced loans in 1800, in 1806 and again in 1808, upon the distinct ground of thereby giving to the public a participation in the profits they were deriving from the possession of these public deposits and yet it is not less curious than true, that neither the committee of 1807; nor Mr. Perceval in 1808, could extort from the bank any admission of the existence of these profits: the evidence of the directors before the committee, amounts indeed, to a positive denial of it; and Mr. Perceval, in his letter to the bank in January 1808, though he gets the three millions from them, laments "that he should not have been so fortunate in the several conferences which he had held with them as to convince them of the truth and accuracy of his principle, with reference to the advantages derived to the bank from these deposits."

^* Vide the letter from the bank to Mr. Perceval in the "Papers relating to the bank of England," presented to the House in February 1808. Vol. X, p. 242.

But, though the bank have refused us all verbal admissions, these several loans are practical admissions of the existence of such profits, and also of the right of the public to a participation in them. Nay the arrangement of 1808, particularly that part of it which refers to the reduction in the charge for the management of the debt, goes still further; for it is a precedent to which we may now, or at any future period during the charter, refer if necessary, to show that nothing passed at the period when the charter was renewed—that no terms or expressions are to be found in the act of 1800, upon which the renewal of the charter was founded which operates as a bar to our making any regulations either with respect to the deposits of public money, or to the charge for the management of the debt, which the legislature in its wisdom may judge conducive to the interests of the public.

I am not now aware of any thing having occurred with respect to this branch of the subject, betwixt the years 1808 and 1814, upon which it will be necessary for me to make any observation to the House In 1814 the loan of 1808, limited like that of 1806, to the duration of the war became payable; when the right hon. gentleman, the chancellor of the exchequer, proposed to the bank, that it should be prolonged to the 5th of April next,—distinctly stating that he made this proposal upon the grounds of the public balance having remained "undiminished" in the hands of the bank since 1808, and expressing, at the same time his strict adherence to all the principles, and all the reservations, with which Mr. Perceval had thought it necessary to guard himself in his arrangement with the bank at that period. The bank (as well, indeed, they might) agreed without hesitation to this proposal of the chancellor of the exche- quer: and this brings us down to the fifth of April next, when all agreements on the subject of these transactions will expire, and when we shall be competent to propose any other arrangements respecting them, which the interests of the public may appear to require.

If I do not fatigue the House, I should now wish to submit to them a brief recapitulation of the advantages gained by the bank, and of the corresponding loss in interest of money sustained by the public, arising out of the possession by the bank of these public balances since the year 1806, assuming their aggregate amount, during the whole of this period, to have been eleven millions and a half.

In 1806, as I have already shown, the bank advanced a loan of three millions to the public, at three per cent. which reduced the aggregate amount of the deposits from eleven millions and a half to eight millions and a half.

From 1806 then, to 1808 the bank held a public treasure, amounting to eight milions and a half, and made a profit thereon; or, the public lost thereon in interest of money at the rate of 515,000l per annum.

In 1808, the bank advanced another loan of three millions, which reduced the deposits in their hands from eight millions and a half to five millions and a half.

From 1808 then, to 1814, the bank held a treasure belonging to the public of five millions and a half, and made a profit, or the public lost in interest of money thereon, at the rate of 365,000l. per annum.

In 1814, the loan of 1806 was discharged, and the amount replaced in the possession of the Bank, by which the aggregate amount of deposits was again raised from five millions and a half to eight millions and a half.—The interest on this is per annum, 425,000l. From 1814 then, to the 5th April, 1816, the Bank will have held a public treasure of eigth millions and a half, and we shall have been paying to the bank at the rate of 425,000l. per annum, for taking care of it.

Having now endeavoured, very imperfectly, I am afraid, but in the best manner I have been able, to put the House in possession of the nature and progress of these public deposits at the bank, together with the effects produced by them, both upon the bank and upon the public; having stated, that the profit derived by the bank from this source, and the loss sustained by the public in interest, during this period, has fluctuated betwen 365,000l. and 515,000l. per annum, and that its present annual amount is about 425,000l.; it seems natural that we should inquire, and it is an inquiry to which I presume to invite the House, what is the nature and value of the service performed by the bank, that can have entitled it to so large, so ample, so munificent a remuneration? And, in the investigation that I have felt it my duty to make on this subject, I can assure the House, that I have spared no pains, that I have shrunk from no labours, and that, anxious neither to deceive myself, nor mislead the House, my greatest anxiety has been to arrive at the truth: after having then carefully examined every document produced to us upon this subject, and after communications thereon with honourable friends of mine, and with practical men of business, whose judgment on these, and on all other subjects, I know to be greatly superior to my own, the result of all my inquiries has been to satisfy—to demonstrate to me—that the service performed by the bank of England, for which the bank has received, during the last ten years, a remuneration exceeding four millions sterling, is nothing more than a common ordinary banking transaction; in its character precisely the same as that which probably subsists betwixt every gentleman who now hears me, and his private banker: simple in its nature, free from all complication, exposing the bank to little risk or trouble, and neither requiring, nor in point of fact having any extensive establishment of clerks or officers necessary for carrying it into execution.

I have also, Sir, felt that it might be advantageous to ascertain, so far as it may be practicable to do so, the rate at which, it is probable this service would be performed for the public—if there were any competition to which we might resort; if, to use a homely expression, there were a "second shop," to which we might go; if there were for instance, a second bank; or if it were advisable to employ private bankers for transacting this public business. Now, Sir, I beg not to be misunderstood in what I am here saying: I am not advising the establishment of a second great national bank,—though there is no mean authority, and of modern date, in recommendation of a measure of that kind; nor am I proposing that private bankers should be employed on this occasion,—although, if the unreasonable conduct of the bank should force us to resort to such an alternative, I am confident there would be no difficulty in making such arrangements, with four or five of the principal banking-houses of this metropolis—in establishing such a system of checks, control, and securities, as would practically render such a deposit in their hands just as safe as it now is with the bank of England: I am however, recommending nothing of the kind; and I make this reference merely for the purpose of forming a sort of standard, by which we may be enabled to measure and ascertain the value of this service performed for us by the bank; and, Sir, I venture to affirm, as the result of various communications which I have had with many of the principal bankers in London and Westminster, on this subject, that if private bankers were employed in this service, there is not a banking-house in the metropolis that would not consider its prosperity established upon the most solid and permanent basis, and its fortune in a manner made, if this branch of public business were secured to it, with a remuneration of 26,000l. per annum! If, then, I am correct in what I now state, as I most conscientiously believe I am, what have we been doing for many years past? Why, we have been paying to the bank half a million per annum, and are at this moment giving to them 425,000l. for a service, which, if there were any competition, would be performed for, and which is, therefore, worth no more than 25,000l.

Why then, I here call upon the House, I ask directors of the bank, who are members of this House, and who, as legislators and representatives of the people, have duties to perform to the public, as well as within the narrow circle of their own proprietors, I ask them, whether, under any circumstances in which the country could be placed, but particularly referring to the circumstances of financial difficulty and pressure in which we have been during the last twenty years, groaning under the weight and burthen of taxation—unavoidably so, if you please—vexed, harassed, and tormented, by a swarm of petty, paltry, teazing taxes, the combined produce of which falls infinitely short of the sum that we have been thus lavishing on this great corporation, already bloated with wealth and prosperity—I ask you, whether it be a thing fitting and becoming in itself?—oh the contrary, whether it is not a most ungrateful return to that people, who, with a manliness and fortitude, which have no parallel, have borne up against and supported a weight and pressure of taxation that is without example in the history of the world—does it not, I say, excite in us feelings of disgust and indignation, that we should be squandering upon this wealthy, this opulent company, so large, so vast, so extravagant a remuneration, for the performance of a service so simple, so limited, so circumscribed in its nature and operation, as I have described, and in my conscience I believe, truly and correctly described, the nature of this service to be; and with this observation I shall close, Sir, what I have to submit to you on the first branch of this subject.

I have already trespassed at such length on the time of the House, that I can truly assure them, that it is not less satisfactory to myself to state, than it will be to the House to know, that in what I shall have to offer them on the second branch of the subject, namely, on the charge for the management of the public debt, I shall be comparatively short. But before I submit to you any observations hereon, I am anxious to express the sense I entertain, in common, I believe, with every individual in the country, as to the very able, judicious, and satisfactory manner to the public, in which this important and extensive branch of our public business is carried on at the bank. No person is more sensible, no person more ready to acknowledge, than myself, the perfection of that system, under which this great machine, if I may so express myself, is managed and conducted by the bank of England. But perfect, Sir, as this system may be, and I believe is, satisfactory as I know it is to the public, we have nevertheless witnessed within our own times two instances, in which a considerable reduction has taken place in this rate of charge: and as the national debt, upon which it operates, has increased since the last arrangement was made upon this subject in 1808, with a velocity and to a degree that has neither parallel nor precedent in any former period of our history, during the same space of time—it will now be for the wisdom of parliament to consider—particularly referring to the situation in which the country now finds itself, when, without subjecting myself to the imputation of despondency, (for I am not one of those who despond of the country) I nevertheless feel myself warranted in asserting, that unless a system of economy, liberal if you please, but at the same time strict and rigid, pervade every department of the state, it will be impossible for us to go on and keep our faith with the public creditor:—under those circumstances, Sir, it will be for the House, in its wisdom, to consider, whether we are not entitled to look to the bank for a further, and still more considerable reduction than took place in either of the two former instances to which I have alluded, in this item of our public charge. And in the hope of affording some assistance to the House in forming its judgment upon this subject, I beg leave to submit to them the following facts:—

In the year 1786, Mr. Pitt reduced the charge for managing the debt, from 562l. 10s. per million, at which rate the bank had been paid from the year 1742, to 450l. per million, operative upon the whole amount of the unredeemed debt, which at that period was about 224 millions, and the charge of management upon it, at this reduced state, amounted to about 100,000l. per annum. Now, Sir, I know it to have been the opinion of many well-informed and enlightened persons in those days, that this reduction did not go far enough; and there is, in particular, a letter on this subject, amongst our parliamentary documents, addressed to the treasury at that period, by the commissioners for auditing the public accounts, to whom the subject had been specially referred, from which, if the House would indulge me, I should wish to read to them a few short paragraphs, as describing, in terms better than I can do, the nature and value of this service; and also as containing some observations on the necessity of public economy and retrenchment, which, if applicable to the situation in which the country then stood, with a public debt of something more than two hundred millions, and with a peace establishment of little more than five millions, will, I think, be found to apply with tenfold and accu- mulated force to the present state of the country, when our debt exceeds eight hundred millions, and when we have lately heard of a peace establishment of nineteen millions. The letter is dated 18th January, 1786, signed by these commissioners, addressed to the treasury, and contains what follows;

"My lords; your lordships having been pleased to refer, for our consideration, the enclosed memorial of the court of directors of the bank of England, praying the annual allowance of 6182l. 4s. 10d., for the charges of management on 10,990,651l. 10s. 4d., five per cent. annuities, funded at the bank of England, from navy, victualling, and ordnance bills; We have, with due attention, considered the said memorial, and find the sum prayed for, properly calculated, according to the rate usually allowed for the like service.—We think it, however, our duty upon the present occasion, to represent to your lordships that the annual sum now paid to the bank for the charges of managing the public annuities, is of considerable magnitude. If the rate hitherto adopted continues to be allowed, it will amount to upwards of 120,000l. annually; a charge which has increased with the public necessities, and is now, in our apprehension, much beyond the probable expense attending such management."

These commissioners then state different rates of charge for the management of the debt, allowed betwixt the years 1714 and 1742, and particularly advert to an allowance fixed by sir Robert Walpole in 1726, of 360l. per million, after which they proceed with the following observations:—"As the right honourable person" (sir Robert Walpole) "who presided at the treasury board in 1726, had acquired the public confidence by his eminent skill in adjusting and retrieving the national finances from the ruinous state after the South Sea scheme, it would be presumption in us not to subscribe to his judgment that 360l. per million was then reasonable and fitting for charges of management; and we take the liberty to suggest (what is indeed very obvious) that the commencement of every undertaking is usually the most expensive, and consequently when the bank had once provided additional clerks, and incurred such other new expenses as might be necessary in 1726, the same persons and accommodations (or nearly the same) would be sufficient to transact the payment of the dividends in several additional millions, without much increase of charges of management.—We believe that most other contractors have found that a moderate sum gained on a large quantity of any commodity, generally produces a greater profit than a higher price on a less quantity; therefore, if 360l. was a sufficient allowance when annuities on a capital of one million only were created, it should seem that the bank could well undertake the like service at a much lower rate; not only when the public necessities have unfortunately increased the capital of the national debt to the enormous load of ten hundred millions, but also when the consolidation of a variety of annuities must have lessened both the trouble and expense attending the management thereof.—In these times when the situation of this country requires every practicable retrenchment of expense, not only by abolishing useless offices, but also by reducing every necessary expenditure within certain and reasonable limits, we cannot pass unnoticed this heavy charge for management of the public debt, in addition to the allowances given to the bank after the rate of 805l. 15s. 10d. per million on the money received for the original contributions to annuities: and of 1000l. and sometimes more for receiving contributions to the lottery, together with the increasing advantages derived by the bank from the accumulation of unclaimed dividends and lottery prizes; and the very advantageous terms upon which they contract for the circulation of exchequer-bills, as well as the recent advantage of the custody of the cash for the navy and army services. Formerly the payment of annuities was transacted by the officers at the exchequer, and the lottery prizes were paid by a paymaster appointed under the lottery acts. These businesses therefore were probably transferred to the bank, under an idea that they could be done there cheaper, or with greater accommodation to the public. If they continue under the same arrangement, and all the allowances to the bank for charges of management are reduced to 360l. per million, as was settled in 1726 (though in our opinion that corporation ought to take less), they will receive a most ample sum of 76,000l. per annum, and yet there will be a saving of about 44,000l. per annum, which is nearly the interest of one million and a half at 3 per cent. But in case they should not accede to such reasonable abatement as your lordships shall think proper, we think it our duty to suggest to your lordships, that the service may, as we conceive, be performed in a separate office for a sum less than one-third of the present allowance to the bank, if it should not be thought proper that this business should revert to the exchequer.—The fund for the reduction of the national debt must be the surplus of the annual income above the annual expense. Every improvement that can be added to this fund by the strictest frugality, will lessen the necessity of increasing the national burthen by new taxes, and the subject will more cheerfully contribute his share to the public exigencies, when he sees that a spirit of economy is diffused through every branch of the receipt and expenditure of the revenue."

The House will perceive from what I have now read to them, that these commissioners, to whom Mr. Pitt specially referred the subject, who had, too, four years previously gone into a particular investigation of it, and who, of course, had access to every official source of information calculated to lead them to correct conclusions upon it, not only state that 360l. per million would, in their judgment, be an ample compensation to the bank for the performance of this service, but express an opinion, that the corporation ought to take less. The commissioners further assert, as a fact, that if the bank should not accede to such terms as the treasury might think reasonable, the service might be performed by government, either in a separate office, or at the exchequer, where this business was formerly conducted, for a sum less than one third of the allowance hitherto made to the bank; that is, for less than 187l. per million.

Mr. Pitt, however, from motives of which I am ignorant, instead of 360l. agreed to allow the bank 450l. per million—which allowance was sanctioned by an act of parliament, passed in the year 1791 (31 Geo. 3, cap. 33). And, from that period, down to the year 1797, the subject seems to have attracted no particular notice, either on the part of the legislature or of the public.

In the year 1797 the finance committee over which you, Sir, presided, with so much credit to yourself, and so much permanent advantage to the country, investigated the subject, and reported upon it; expressing, in their report, an unequi- vocal opinion as to the expediency of effecting a further reduction in this charge, but submitting the subject to the consideration and wisdom of parliament. This suggestion, however, as too often happens with other valuable suggestions from committees of this House, appears to have passed wholly unnoticed, from the year 1797 down to the year 1807, when the committee on public expenditure again examined and made a report upon it. I will not now consume the time of the House by going into details, which will be found much better given in the report itself; but there is one fact mentioned in it which appears to me to be so important for the House to notice, that I would entreat their permission to state and bring it to their recollection. The committee took a comparative view, made a comparative estimate of the increased expenses of the bank arising out of this particular branch of their business, during the antecedent eleven years, that is from 1796 to 1807, and contrasted it with the increased profits of the bank derived from the allowance for the managing the debt, during the same period. They state that they find the increase in the number of clerks (of all the expenses of the Bank by far the greatest) to be 137; that the salaries of those clerks may be estimated upon an average at 135l. each, but that 170l. for each clerk would be sufficient not only to cover the salaries actually paid, but also to provide a superannuation fund for the maintenance of those, who, from age or infirmity, might become no longer serviceable to their employers: 137 clerks, then, at 170l. each, create an annual charge upon the bank of about 23,000l. The committee further observe that one half, or at most two thirds, of the expense of clerks, would meet every other incidental charge of the bank, applicable to this branch of the business—such as law-expenses, losses from frauds and forgeries, annual allowance for buildings, &c. &c. Two thirds of 23,000l. or about 15,000l. would bring the whole amount of the increased expenses of the bank to about 38,000. per annum. The committee next proceed to show, that the increase in the allowance, payable by the public to the bank for the management of the debt during the same period, exceeded the sum of 155,000l.—on the side of increased expenses, then you have 38,000l.—on that of increased profits 155,000l.—leaving to the bank a clear net additional income of about 115,000l. per annum, arising wholly out of the increased burthens and pressure upon the country!

Mr. Perceval, therefore, in consequence of what was stated in this report, claimed on the part of the public a further reduction in this charge, and the negociation ended in an agreement with the bank, which reduced the allowance from 450l. to 340l. per million on six hundred millions of the debt, and to 300l. per million on all excess beyond the six hundred millions: at this rate the bank have been paid since the year 1808—and the annual amount of this charge at present is, as I have before stated, about 275,000l. But this is not all—the bank make a further charge of 800l. per million upon every loan raised, and a sum of 1000l. is paid to them upon every lottery contract: the amount of which two items in the year 1815, exceeded 30,000l. Upon these two charges I will only observe, that as every loan raised, lays the foundation of a future and permanent source of annual profit to the bank, it seems unreasonable that any allowance whatever should be made to the bank, merely for receiving the instalments on such loans;—and on the subject of the lottery, one might imagine that the benefits which the bank derive from the balance of unclaimed lottery prizes constantly in their possession;^* would form a very adequate compensation to the bank, for transacting all they have to do, with reference, to the lotteries.

There are three other charges made by the bank against the public, trifling certainly in amount compared with the sums to which I have been just adverting, but which appear to me to be so objectionable in principle, that I must request permission of the House to make a short observation upon each of them. The first is an allowance of four thousand pounds per annum paid to the bank under the denomination of "an allowance to the bank for its house expenses!" "house allowance" as it is sometimes called: what the ground was upon which this claim was originally made upon the public, I have not been able to discover. All I know of it is, that when the bank was first established, they lent their whole capital to the public, at that time consisting of one million two hundred thousand pounds, at eight per cent. interest, making an annual charge for interest of 96,000l. to which was added this sum of 4000l. for "house expenses," constituting together, that annuity of one hundred thousand pounds referred to in every act of parliament, since the year 1695, that has reference to the bank charter. I am aware, Sir, that if the bank stand rigidly upon their chartered rights, we cannot deprive them of this allowance of 4000l. for "their house expenses:" but Mr. Perceval, in his arrangements with the bank in the year 1808, felt, what every person must do, in referring to the present situation of this great corporation, such a disgust at this charge, that he made a distinct proposal to the bank for its suppression. The bank, however, appear to be very much attached to this allowance, and refused to part with it; giving as the only reason for their refusal, that they have been in the possession of it ever since the year 1695.

^* Amounting upon an average to a sum little short of 100,000l.

The second item to which I wish to advert is one almost as venerable as that which I have just discussed, in point of antiquity, equally objectionable in principle; but differing, as I humbly conceive, from the other in one respect, namely, that the bank cannot contend for its continuance, upon the ground of their chartered rights. It is a charge of 1898l. per annum made for the management of four millions of the public debt purchased by the bank of the South sea company in the year 1722, and which now constitutes a part of the bank capital lent to the public at 3 per cent. interest. I will only observe upon this item, that as here no longer exist any transfers or payment of dividends applicable to this part of the public debt, there appears no reason whatever why any charge should be allowed to the bank for the management of it.

The third and last item, to which I wish to call the attention of the House, is a charge that appears to me to be of a most unwarrantable nature indeed, and upon which I could, and should be tempted to say a great deal, if, after having occupied so much of the time of the House as I have done, I did not feel it imperative upon me to come as soon as possible to a conclusion. The charge in question, Sir, is an allowance paid to the bank since the year 1806, of one-eighth per cent.—half-crown in the hundred pounds—on all sums of money voluntarily taken to the bank by persons assessed to the property duty, for trades, offices, or professions. And the history of this charge is shortly this:—In the act of the 46th of the king (cap. 65.), the property duty act of 1806, there is a clause which gives an option to individuals assessed for trades, offices, and professions, either to pay their tax in the ordinary way to the parochial collectors, or, if they prefer it, as some do from a notion (a mistaken notion as it has since proved) of thereby keeping their return of income secret, to pay it into the bank of England. There is another clause in this act, enjoining the bank to pay over all money thus voluntarily brought to them, into the exchequer, within one week from the time of its receipt. The bank have nothing whatever to do with the assessment, and the whole transaction on their part consists in receiving the money thus brought to them, giving a receipt for it, allowing a discount, in cases where the payment of the duty is anticipated, and in accounting for it within one week to the exchequer. Now, Sir, when we consider the great benefits enjoyed by the bank from its other transactions with the public; and when, in particular, we advert to this year 1806, when the bank was receiving more than half a million a year merely for acting as the public banker, as well as other immense profits, of which, in less than two years afterwards, they agreed to make an abatement to an extent exceeding 240,000l. per annum—one might have expected, that this trivial, this insignificant service, would have been performed by the bank gratuitously. No such thing, Sir, the bank condescended to ask, and the government agreed to pay, a commission of one-eighth per cent.—half-crown in the hundred pounds, a stockbroker's commission—for a service for which, as it appears to me, the bank were not justly entitled to receive one shilling. The charge for this trifling service, during the last ten years, has amounted to a sum exceeding three thousand pounds per annum; and so strongly do I feel the objection to it in principle, that if the property tax should unfortunately be prolonged beyond the present year, and unless the continuance of this allowance to the bank should be distinctly disavowed, I pledge myself to bring forward a proposition for its future and entire suppression.

Having now, Sir, gone through every item of charge made by the bank against the public, to which, as it appears to me, a principle of economy and retrenchment, may, and in justice to the public, ought to be applied; having shown you that we are paying to the bank annually a sum of not less than 425,0001. merely for acting as our banker; that in addition to this, we allow the bank upwards of 300,000l. per annum, for the management of the public debt, for receiving contributions on loans and lotteries, for their house expenses, and other charges enumerated under the second branch of this subject; and, that besides these two sources of profits, the bank are at the present moment deriving, from the increased circulation of their paper since the passing of the restriction act, an additional income of 800,000l. per annum; making altogether an aggregate amount of gross profit, derivable by the bank of England, and arising out of its connexion with the public, exceeding annually, one and a half million sterling; having stated all this, I am aware that it may be said to me, "admitting every thing you have asserted to be correct and true, and regulations to be proposed, calculated for the accomplishment of your object, where will be your remedy if the bank of England should resist?" And this, Sir, is a feature in the subject, which I should have considered it extremely remiss on my part, to have overlooked: the first answer, then, that I should be disposed to give to an inquiry of this sort, would be this—that I do not believe the bank of England would resist, if the House of Commons, exercising its undoubted and constitutional privilege of vigilance and control, shows a resolution—a determination—to watch over, uphold, and maintain, the just and legitimate rights of the public, with reference to these transactions: under such circumstances, Sir, my belief is, that the bank would not resist; I say, if this House shows that determination, not the chancellor of the exchequer, not any chancellor of the exchequer: for in the times, and under the circumstances, in which we have lived during the last twenty years, and now live, the conviction of my mind is, that no chancellor of the exchequer is, or can be, a match for the bank of England, in negociations of this nature. Why, Sir, is it not notorious, that in all such negociations, there exist certain influences on the side of the bank (the particulars of which, I purposely abstain from specifying), but which, though all-powerful, irresistible, in Downing-street, would be impotent and unavailing within the walls of this House? Is not your whole financial history, during the last twenty years, filled with proofs of this? and if any evidence were required to show practically, the benefits which the country is likely to derive from the interference of parliament, in transactions of this kind, I have only to refer you to what passed no longer ago than in the last session, on the subject of the Stamp duties; when I maintain, without fear, if not of contradiction, at least of refutation, that in consequence of this subject having been merely mentioned by a noble friend of mine in this House,^* and of the repeated discussions which the House was afterwards pleased to go into upon it, the public are at present enjoying a saving to the amount of between 30,000l. and 40,000l. per annum, upon the single and insignificant article of the composition payable by the bank, for stamp duties on their notes; and this, by the establishment, for the first time, of a principle, as just as it is obvious, namely, that the bank of England should pay to the stamp duties, as all other issuers of paper throughout the kingdom pay, that is, in proportion to the amount of their notes in circulation—which principle was wholly overlooked, or neglected (or, perhaps, its accomplishment prevented by the exercise, on the part of the bank, of those influences to which I have just alluded), in the two former negociations, which took place in 1804 and in 1808 on this subject—negociations—I desire the House to observe, conducted altogether in Downing-street, and which never particularly attracted notice, or produced any discussion in this House—but, in consequence of which neglect, or oversight, the stamp revenue has been deprived of, and the bank have, improperly as I conceive, put into their pockets, between the years 1804 and 1815, a sum amounting to 535,000l.! I assert this from a calculation founded on parliamentary documents, now on your table; I pledge myself for its accuracy; and I undertake to prove it at your bar, if required.

It is then in this House, and through the medium of this House only, that the interests and rights of the public can be secured in all negociations of this nature with the bank; and I repeat it, if the House of Commons will interfere, my conviction is, that the bank will not resist. If, however, I should be disappointed in this expectation; and if the bank, un mindful of what it owes to the public, forgetting that it has duties to perform towards the public, as well as within the limited circle of its own proprietors—I will go farther, and, as a proprietor of bank stock myself, add, that if the bank, taking a narrow, contracted, selfish, and therefore mistaken view, of its own real permanent interests, should resist regulations founded in fairness, equity, and justice,—in such a state of things, Sir, I say it must be a consolation to us to know, and I assert it confidently, that we have a remedy within our own reach; and, though I, for one, should certainly prefer to see these services continued under the management of the bank, provided the bank would henceforth conduct them upon a system of fairness and moderation, it is, nevertheless, a remedy not only practicable, but free from much difficulty, and one which, I trust, parliament will have the courage and wisdom to adopt, if the conduct—or, I should rather say, if the misconduct—of the bank should drive us to the necessity of resorting to it.

^* Lord Archibald Hamilton.

I will not now trespass upon the time of the House, by going into all the details of those remedies to which I have just referred, as being within our reach: because, if the motion I am about to submit to you, for the appointment of a select committee for the investigation of this subject, should be acceded to, such details would be considered much more advantageously, in the first instance, in such a committee, than in the House itself. I would just observe, however, that one of those remedies,—namely, that by which the exchequer deposits might be made available to the public service, is given in detail in the correspondence now on your table betwixt Mr. Perceval and the bank, in 1808; and I will venture to add, that nothing would be found more practicable or easy than the application of economical regulations and arrangements, to other government deposits, now constantly unproductive to the public, in possession of the bank: from which a very important saving in interest of money might and would be effected. For instance;—let us suppose a balance in the bank to the credit of the treasurer of the navy of 500,000l. and that, at the same moment, the account of the treasurer of the ordnance should be exhausted and want replenishing,.—what happens, according to the present practice? Why, this happens: exchequer bills are sent into the market—bought up, perhaps, in many instances, by the bank itself—but, by whomsoever bought, instantly creating a charge of interest upon the public; and, in this manner, the wants of the ordnance department are satisfied. Now I want to know what possible objection could be urged against the ordnance (in the case I have supposed) taking from the navy fund, at the bank, whatever cash the navy could spare; always depositing, in exchange for such cash, a corresponding amount in exchequer bills on the navy account? by which operation the exchequer bills would be kept out of the market, and interest thereon saved, for a time at least. But then I may be asked, what is to become of the navy, when that department shall want the money? to which I answer, that possibly there may, by this time, be on the ordnance cash account at the bank the means of repaying to the navy the sum originally obtained from it: but, if that should not be the case, let an examination be made into the state of the other government cash accounts, and the deficiency on the navy account might be supplied from an abundance of any of the other balances:—and thus might this economical principle, from time to time, be applied to and pervade the whole range of the public accounts at the bank of England. But it will be said, perhaps, what will be done, when no more cash can be spared by any of the government accounts at the bank? Why, this will be done: You will, in that case, resort, in the last instance, to that which you now do in the first; namely, send your exchequer bills to market! But this will not have taken place, till you shall have absorbed in exchequer bills, and rendered available to the public, perhaps, from four to five millions of cash, which, according to the present practice, is employed for the sole and exclusive advantage of the bank of England.

There is only one other observation, Sir, which I should wish to offer to the House, before I submit to them the proposition with which I am about to conclude. It has been observed, and by an hon. director, in this House, that this discussion to which I have felt it to be my public duty to invite the House, is calculated to be injurious to the public credit of the country. An assertion, than which one more absurd, or unfounded, appears to me never to have been made, upon this, or indeed upon any other subject. What, Sir, are we to be told, and by a director of our great national bank too, that a discussion, which has for its only object a considerable saving of the public money, can be injurious to the public credit of the country? Is, then, public credit better supported by public extravagance, than it is by public economy?—or, is it essential to public credit, that the bank of England should continue to divide amongst its proprietors, as it has done during the last seventeen years, under the denomination of bonuses and increase of dividends, millions and millions of money, in addition to, and over and above its old ordinary dividend of seven per cent.?—which ordinary dividend of seven per cent. be it noticed, was the highest rate of dividend that the bank ever was enabled to give to its proprietors from the year 1730, down to the passing of the restriction act!—a period of seventy years, during which we have seen the ordinary bank dividend as low as six and a half, as low as five and a half, and, during eleven years of that period, as low as four and a half per cent.! Is this, I ask, essential to the public credit of the country? Or, are we to understand that the market-price of bank-stock is the criterion, the standard by which we are to measure the public credit of the country? Why, Sir, we know very well that bank stock has risen in value, and is, on this very day, that I have the honour of addressing you, 125 per cent. higher than it was on the average of the whole year 1797, notwithstanding that, since that year, the bank has distributed amongst its proprietors upwards of seven millions of money, in addition to its ordinary dividend of seven per cent. In a word, is our public credit identified and dependent on the exorbitant profits of the bank of England? If, indeed, directors of the bank had come down to this House, and said to us, "If you deprive us of these profits, you will lower the market price of bank stock," they would have been intelligible—I should have understood them—but this would have been no argument whatever with me, for leaving these enormous profits in their hands. Or, if the directors were to state to us the very reverse of what we believe, nay, I may venture to say, of what we know to be the fact—if they were to tell us that the bank of England, instead of being as it is, the most flourishing and opulent mercantile body in the world, possessing, and deservedly possessing, the most unli- mited degree of commercial credit and confidence, not only at home, but throughout every part of Europe, if, Sir, I say, instead of this, which we confidently believe is the situation of the bank, the directors were to show us, that the bank is in a state of depression—that it is struggling with difficulties—that it requires the utmost exertions on the part of its directors, to provide a moderate rate of dividend for the proprietors—and if, in such a state of things, the directors were to say to us, that the loss of such profits would be injurious to the credit "of the bank," here, too, they would be intelligible: but does any person believe, that the credit of the bank is in any danger, or that the public credit of the country can be affected either by this discussion, or even by the accomplishment of my object, in any other manner than to be improved by it?—Sir, I entreat the House to believe, that there is no individual, who appreciates more highly than I do, the public credit of the country. I consider public credit as the external evidence, not only of public prosperity, but of public character—as a commercial nation, it is one of the brightest jewels that belongs to you—it is that rock upon which our national greatness was originally founded—upon which it now rests—and by which alone we can perpetuate and hand it down to our posterity.

I have now done: and all that remains is for me to submit to the House the proposition that I now hold in my hand: and after having troubled the House at such length as I have done upon this subject, it will be unnecessary that I should say any thing as to the proposition, which is, indeed, of a nature and character that will explain itself; I find it necessary, however, just to bring to the recollection of the House, that after the production of a variety of papers in the last session of parliament on this subject, moved for by the governor of the bank and myself, I submitted to the House, certain resolutions of fact,^* founded on the information contained in those papers; and that the governor of the bank also presented his resolutions,^* exhibiting the view taken by the bank of England of this subject. I will not at present enter into any discussion with reference to these respective resolutions, further than to observe, that in the resolutions of the bank no attempt is made to disprove or even to deny, any of the facts stated in the resolutions which I had the honour of submitting to you. The late period of the session at which these two sets of resolutions were tendered to the House precluded the possibility of any satisfactory discussion upon them at that time—and a mutual understanding took place, that the further consideration of the whole subject should be deferred, with a view to its being resumed in the present session. In conformity to that understanding I have framed the motion which I have now to offer to you, and in doing this I think I am entitled to rely upon the support of every director of the bank of England, because my proposition does nothing more than carry into effect, the last of the nine resolutions presented to us by the bank in the last session, which I will now beg leave to read to the House, and which is in the following term; "That, whenever the engagements now subsisting between the public and the bank shall expire, it may be proper to consider the advantages derived by the bank from its transactions with the public, with a view to the adoption of such arrangements, as may be consistent with those principles of equity and good faith, which ought to prevail in all transactions between the public and the bank of England."

^* See vol. 31, pp. 763, 1001.

In the motion I now submit to you, Sir, the House will perceive that I have adopted not only the spirit, but the very language of this resolution of the bank of England. It is, however, impossible for me to sit down, without expressing the regret I feel, at having occupied so large a portion of the time of the House, as I have done, or without assuring them, as I now beg leave to do, of the gratitude I feel, for the forbearance and indulgence with which they have been pleased to receive what I have addressed to them upon this subject. I beg to move, Sir,

"That a select committee be appointed to inquire into the engagements now subsisting between the public and the bank of England, and to consider the advantages derived by the bank from its transactions with the public, with a view to the adoption of such future arrangements, as may be consistent with those principles of equity and good faith, which ought to prevail in all transactions between the public and the bank of England, and to report their opinions thereon to the House."

said, he wished as much as possible to give credit to the hon. gentleman for the reasons of public duty which induced him to make this motion. He was much pleased with the very able manner in which the argument had been conducted; but at the same time he felt it impossible to coincide with the hon. gentleman in the propriety of the motion, considering, as he did, that it was unnecessary—and event dangerous to the public credit. It was unnecessary, because he conceived that the transactions between the government and the bank had received such an elucidation by the committee which had fully investigated this subject in 1807, and to whose proceedings the hon. gentleman had so much referred, as to require no further explanation. The accounts laid before that committee had been annually renewed ever since, by which means an entire view had been taken, from time to time, of the progress of the subject. He should in a few days submit to the House some propositions with regard to future financial arrangements with the bank; he should now, therefore, only make such comments on the statements of the hon. gentleman, as to him appeared necessary. He would readily admit that the public were entitled to participate in the advantages arising from the deposits placed in the hands of the bank of England. But with respect to the restrictions on the cash payments of the bank, it was on public grounds that these restrictions had been imposed by parliament, and not with any view to the advantage of the bank, and yet, if he had understood the hon. gentleman (and if he was in an error, he hoped he might be corrected), it was asserted, that of the million and a half which the hon. gentleman had chosen to state as the profit derived by the bank from its dealings with the public, and in which he had claimed a share on the part of the public, no less a sum than 800,000l. had been stated by him to be derived from the increase of the circulation of bank paper arising out of the restrictions.

was sorry to interrupt the right hon. gentleman, but he wished to be clearly understood as to the extent of any participation on the part of the public. He never meant his observations to apply to those profits which had arisen from the increased circulation of paper, though if those should be continued through such increase becoming a permanent currency, after July, he hoped some member in that House would consider it his duty to propose a regulation for the future. But this was no part of his proposition, which was confined to those profits which were produced from balances in their hands and their being managers for the public.

was glad to find, that he had at least gained this point, that this large portion of the profits of the bank, as estimated by his hon. friend, must be put wholly out of the question. Upon the ground of this confession he would proceed to show, that from the appointment of a committee no benefit could be derived. The hon. gentleman had at much length stated the course of the various transactions that had taken place between the public and the bank, and had particularly alluded to the proceedings of the year 1808. The complaint then was, that the allowance to the bank for the management of the public debt was too high; but in that year a permanent and fixed allowance was made, to the effect, that until the unredeemed debt should amount to a sum of 600 millions, the allowance should be 340l. per million, instead of 450l. at which it previously stood. At that time the debt was not so high; but it was stipulated in the fourth clause of the act passed at that period, that from and after the 5th of April 1808, the sum to be paid for the management of the unredeemed debt, above 600 millions, should be only 300l. per million. Looking therefore, at the present state of things, he maintained that, during the continuance at least of the bank charter, there was no occasion to recur to the state of the management, as it was evident we could have no better bargain than we had at present. With respect to the other part of the argument of the hon. gentleman, the question as it appeared to him, divided itself into two heads; first whether the arrangements made in 1808 were founded upon fair principles? and second whether supposing that they were so founded, any circumstances had since occurred which might lead the government to expect from the bank a participation of profits to a larger amount than that already given? In stating a question like the present, he was fully aware that he was placed in a situation of difficulty and felt something of a collision of duties: on the one hand he must contend for as large a participation as the public could possibly obtain, and on the other, he had a debt of justice to perform, in not pressing upon the bank any claim which might be considered not to be well founded. The arrangements of 1808 had, as it appeared to him in their very nature, an appearance of fairness and rectitude. The committee of public expenditure had investigated the subject in a manner, he believed never to be exceeded; and, under such favourable auspices, the arrangement had been concluded by Mr. Perceval. Three millions at that time were accepted as a consideration for the public balances placed in the hands of the bank, and upon which no interest was charged. He wished to consider how far this grant was founded in equity. It appeared to him that the hon. gentleman had stated the case with some, he had no doubt unintentional, exaggeration; for it appeared as if he had thought that five per cent. could be obtained for the whole of the money placed in the custody of the bank. Assuming that the bank thought it necessary at least to reserve one quarter of the balances, then only upon the other three-quarters a profit could be made. Supposing, then, that upon eleven millions in the hands of the bank, eight millions might be turned to account, it was to be recollected, that the bank had advanced three millions without any kind of interest and gave up thereby nearly half of the advantages which they could gain. Considering, therefore, these deposits as capable of being lodged in no other hands he could not conceive that to give half the profits was too much for the trouble and expense occasioned. A distinction must be made between the balances lodged in the bank by the different departments in order to carry on the public service and the exchequer balances belonging to the Consolidated Fund. The former were deposited at the bank under the authority of various acts of parliament, as a security against misapplication or embezzlement. But the amount of those balances depended, in no degree on the bank, but was regulated entirely with a view to the public service, nor could the bank object to any economical arrangement by which it might be reduced. The mode suggested by the hon. gentleman appeared indeed to him objectionable, as tending to throw all the public accounts into confusion. If the paymaster-general, for instance, could draw upon the treasurer of the navy, the navy upon the ordnance, and the ordnance upon both in return, he thought such a scene of confusion would be introduced, as to produce effects the very reverse of public economy. But he admitted that it was the duty of every department to keep its balance as was consistent with convenience, and that of the treasury to control and check the whole. With respect to the exchequer balances belonging to the consolidated fund they were appropriated for the security of the public creditor, and it was admitted in the negociation between Mr. Perceval and the bank in 1808, that the public were entitled to the use of them, if they could be employed consistently with that security. But he (the chancellor of the exchequer) was convinced that the plan suggested to Mr. Perceval was in itself impracticable, and he had never met with one which could be carried into execution, without the concurrence and assistance of the bank. It must also be remembered, that any arrangement which involved the security of the public creditor was a subject of the greatest delicacy and difficulty (and he entered at some length into an explanation of his reasons for thinking so). If, then, the bank in 1808 granted nearly half of the profits they could possibly make, he thought that Mr. Perceval and the parliament were deserving of the approbation of the nation for having concluded so advantageous an arrangement. It remained, then, only to consider the second point, namely, whether, since the year 1808, such an increase of profits had been derived by the bank as justified a more extensive plan of participation? If gentlemen would refer to the accounts before the House, it would be seen, that instead of a great increase of the public balances in the hands of the bank since 1808, the average amount had diminished rather than increased. The annual average of the balances of public money, from February 1807 to February 1815, was, on the whole, 10,976,000l. being 850,000l. less than the medium of the same accounts for the year ending 1807. The balances then, it appeared, since 1808, were diminished rather than increased, as the hon. gentleman seemed to insinuate. What reason had we, then, to press the bank for any further participation? [Hear, hear!] Further—it must be owned, that the profits of the bank must be much greater in time of war than in time of peace; and instead, therefore, of the profits being greater, they would be much diminished, as in time of peace the interest and profit of money would proportionably decrease. On all these grounds, it appeared to him, that the hon. gentleman, instead of saying that it was to be expected that an increase should be made in our participations, might with more truth have expected a diminution. From all this it would be seen, that in 1808 an advance was made by the bank of three millions without interest, which was by a recent agreement still to be continued; and as he had the honour of stating last night, an additional loan of six milions, at only four per cent. had been obtained from the bank, which appeared to him a much more advantageous bargain for the public, under the present circumstances, than the advance of three millions, which had been continued during the war under the agreement made with lord Lansdowne. He would ask, what should hinder the bank from making 5 per cent. of the six millions so granted, by purchasing exchequer bills, instead of only taking four per cent.? He was sure no charge could be justly made against the bank directors, for he could bear testimony that the government had always found that the bank of England would willingly lend themselves to the public service, and afford every accommodation in their power, whenever occasion required it. With respect to the allowances alluded to, they were secured to the bank by the charter. [Mr. Grenfell inquired as to the last.] The chancellor of the exchequer said the last was adopted on the principle of those allowed by the charter. But there was one circumstance which he could not omit, and which gave a flat contradiction to what had been stated as to the exorbitant profits of the bank for managing the public money. What be alluded to was the mode in which they calculated the deductions to be made on the dividends, on account of the income tax. This operation rendered necessary at least 110,000 calculations, for which the bank only received 3000l. a year; whereas, had the same duty been performed by the collectors of government, the expense would have been at least 55,000l. He had thus shown that we had in 1808 received a participation in the profits, which was then found satisfactory to parliament after the fullest investigation, and that since that period an actual diminution had taken place in the balances deposited in the hands of the bank. Upon these grounds, then, he considered that to go into a new committee would be wholly unnecessary, and would take up the time of the members for no useful purpose. He could not help thinking also that such a committee would be dangerous to the public credit; and he hoped to show in a few days, more fully than he had done this night, that as advantageous an arrangement had been made as could reasonably have been expected; but at present it would be premature to discuss that subject. Conceiving, herefore, as he did, that it would be not only unnecessary, but dangerous, to form such a committee as was proposed he must give it his determined opposition.

said, that of all men in the House it could be least supposed that he would not be gratified by the compliment paid by the right hon. gentleman to the committee which sat on the public expenditure in 1807. He owned, however, that he had never supposed what that committee had done was so perfect and complete in every respect as to preclude the House from entering at any future time on an investigation into the same subject; or that they had left nothing for others to do after them. He could say that Mr. Perceval had not for what he had done the authority of that excellent man the late Mr. Henry Thornton, who, as well as himself, thought that what had been concluded with the bank fell short of the just expectations of the country. There was nothing in the act of 1808 declaring the bargain to be permanent. It was but too well known that parliament were always passing bills apparently perpetual, and as perpetually repealing them. The hon. gentleman then quoted the language made use of by Mr. Perceval to show that he did not consider the bargain made by him co-existent with the charter. The principle of permanency did not belong to any legislative enactment, and least of all could it belong to such a measure as the one in question. The right hon. gentleman had told them that it would be inconvenient and dangerous for a committee to interfere with the arrangement between the bank and the public; but advantages had been already obtained to the public from the bank, through the medium of a select committee of the House; and those advantages would not have been obtained without the labours of that committee. Had Mr. Perceval only lent himself a little more to the opinion of that committee, it was the opinion of Mr. Henry Thornton that much greater advantages would still have been obtained. The labours of a committee of the House might not be altogether without utility to the right hon. gentleman, any more than to his predecessor. A former committee had shown, that Mr. Pitt, lord Grenville, and Mr. Perceval were ignorant of the manner in which the transactions with the bank were carried on, judging from their public declarations. He wished to be placed in the same situation with the right hon. gentleman, and to possess the same information relative to the bargain concluded with the bank; and the examination would be best carried on through a committee. The former committee having sat with so great benefit, he did not see how the right hon. gentleman could resist that committee now. He hoped he was fully sensible of the advantages derived by the public from the bank of England, which he hoped would long subsist: but still it was the duty of the House to take care that the bank were not paid more than was proper for their services. Things could not be allowed to go on much longer, without a full investigation taking place into the circumstances of the transaction with the bank.

said, he could not give a silent vote on this question; and whatever might be his interests derived from his connexion with the bank, he felt that he had also a duty to perform to the public as a member of that House. On the general subject he thought it unnecessary to go into detail; but he could not help saying, that the whole of his hon. friend's speech, introductory to the motion, was an inflamed representation of one side of the question only, in which he exaggerated the benefits which the bank enjoyed, and left out of view all the advantages which it returned to the public. If, as was the fact, the bank had divided of late only 10 per cent. on their capital without any bonus, making a dividend of 1,100,000l. how was it possible that they could derive, as his hon. friend stated, 1,500,000l. annually from the public, exclusive of all the profits arising from their other business? He would beg leave to call the attention of the House to a few of the profits which the public had derived from the bank. In the first place, on the last renewal of their charter, they advanced to the country three millions, without interest, for five years; next, the whole of their capital of eleven millions was advanced to government at the very moderate interest of three per cent.; next, for several years they had lent the sum of three millions without interest; and, upon the whole, taking other items into account, he thought himself justified in estimating, that a sum of between seven and eight millions had been paid by the bank to the public since the last renewal of the charter. Whether in 1808 it was or was not a proper compensation that was given by the bank for the deposits of public money, he would not now consider; but unquestionably it was a bargain, understood to last during the continuance of the charter. He would not now speak at any length of the general facilities afforded by the bank to government: one of these, however, that it gave a silver currency at present, to the whole country solely at its own expense, and which was likely, when replaced, to be attended with much additional expense. The bank had also, at very critical periods of the Peninsular war, furnished government with considerable sums in guineas, at the rate of twenty-one shillings each, which, if necessity had compelled their purchase in other quarters, could not have been obtained without a considerable sacrifice. He would add also, that by its charter the bank was entitled to be the depository of the public balances; nor was it then understood, in the ordinary times of peace, to be under any obligation to give a compensation to the public. It was true that government, by its own arrangements, might have greatly reduced these balances, but it would not have obtained equivalent safety and facility. He denied the assertion of his hon. friend, that the balances kept in the bank could produce to it any thing like an interest of 5 per cent. These balances were fluctuating in their nature, and could not, the moment they were deposited, be profitably employed. Speaking as a merchant, he never gave more than four per cent. for any money that might casually be placed in his hands. Whatever might be the case in the country, he knew no banker in London who allowed any interest for the balances in his hands; the bankers who had set out upon another principle had failed, and he should not be fond of depositing his money with any banker who allowed interest. The fair question then was, what was the amount of the extraordinary balances created by the war expenditure? for he conceived that the bank by its charter, was entitled to the advantage of the ordinary balances. He reckoned the extraordinary balances at little more than five millions, and of this sum the bank allowed government three millions (more than the half), in the shape of a loan without interest. Besides this, it had agreed to lend government six millions of exchequer bills at 4 per cent., which was in fact equivalent to a loan of 1,200,000l. without interest; so that out of the five millions of extraordinary balances, the public got 4,200,000l. without interest: and this was the whole amount of that outrageous bargain which the bank had got. His main objection to the motion arose from the exaggeration with which it was prefaced, and the sort of spirit with which it was proposed. Besides, nothing new could be discovered by a committee; the whole could only turn on the amount of the balances, and for these we either had or were about to have, the necessary accounts on the table. In fact, he thought the late bargain one of rather considerable hardship to the bank, as the balances must necessarily decline in peace.

said, he would trespass but a few moments on the attention of the House. He would not detain them by going into any details, in which he should do more harm than good, for he was quite sure that a more clear statement never had been laid before a British parliament, than that of his hon. friend who made the motion; and therefore if in any degree he should attempt to follow him, he would only be liable to the imputation of weakening what had already been so ably stated. All that had been urged by the chancellor of the exchequer were only so many grounds for going into a committee. Whether the right hon. gentleman or his hon. friend were right or wrong it was not for him to know. A sum was stated which might be saved to the public—this was enough to call for the investigation of a committee; for whatever expense was saved was something taken from the amount of our taxation. The question divided itself into two branches; first, The management of the national debt: secondly The balances in the hands of the bank. As to the first, the chancellor of the exchequer had answered, that there was a difficulty arising from the charter. But this again was denied by as good an authority, the chairman of the finance committee (Mr. Bankes). At the recommendation of the committee, the act of 1791 had been altered; and it would be an extraordinary circumstance indeed, if in 1816 they could not exercise the same authority over an act passed only eight years before, as had been done in 1808, over an act passed so long before as 1791. This was a reason for going into a committee; and whether such was or was not the case, the report of the committee would be satisfactory. The chancellor had asserted, that something conclusive had been arranged in 1808; but here again he referred to another authority which he thought rather better than his. The chancellor of the exchequer had a divided duty to perform. On the part of the public he would be naturally desirous of making the best possible bargain; but it was to be recollected, also, that he was a sort of middle man between the public and the bank. He could hardly lose sight of the many advantages he had derived from the bank, or avoid taking into consideration, out of how many difficulties the bank had relieved him. It was for the committee to consider whether the bargain was one which was proper and advantageous for the public. His hon. friend who spoke last had alleged, that the profit in the balances was overstated; for no banker ever made the full amount of interest on the balances in his hands—never more than three-fourths. This might be true with respect to private bankers; but the case was altered, when a body on a million being asked from them, had only to set down a million, and they could make the million. The deposits in the hands of the bank of the public money, whether they were aware of it or not, were an additional source of profit, at the rate of five per cent. The bank were certainly right in trying to make the best bargain they could; but the House on the part of the public, were also entitled to make the best bargain they could. The chancellor of the exchequer had talked of the moderation of their charge for the incredible labour of no less than 110,000 calculations necessary to be made in receiving the property-tax on dividends. Now, he had learned at school that a division by ten was one of the easiest operations. But the right hon. gentleman added, that the same amount of calculations made by the usual collectors of taxes would cost 55,000l. instead of the 3000l. charged by the bank. By-the-bye, if the bank directors were thus collectors of the public money, they had no business in that House: this, however, was a matter in which he would not turn informer against them. But, as has been justly observed in a late able pamphlet on this subject, the bank appeared to consider the rule by which they are to measure the moderation of their charge to be the saving which they effect to their employer, rather than a just compensation for their own trouble. What, added the writer, would they think of an engineer, if, in his charge for the construction of a steam engine, he should be guided by the value of the labour which the engine was calculated to save, and not by the value of the labour and materials necessary to its construction? In his opinion, a stronger case for inquiry before a committee had never been laid; seeing that the former inquiries had only partially investigated and partially remedied.

thought it his duty to state the grounds on which he should resist the motion. The question was, whether or not any satisfactory reason had been stated why the House should appoint a committee? He was not satisfied with the grounds on which the hon. gentleman rested his motion. The hon. gentleman had preferred making a motion for a committee, to proposing to the House any specific measure, and had thus got over the difficulty in a very easy way; but the principle of parliament required that in such a case some specific measure should be proposed. For the sake of the public credit, it was necessary that the bank should be kept in a flourishing and independent situation: now, it was plain that any unnecessary inquiry into its affairs would be to its prejudice, and, so far, to the prejudice of the country, by affecting the public credit. One of the great characteristics of the bank of England was, that government did not interfere in the management of its affairs. In 1808 there had been an inquiry into the general state of the country, including the affairs of the public, with which the bank was connected. All the facts of the case, as between the public and the bank, had been as fully laid before the House by the report of the committee then appointed, as they could possibly be by any committee now to be appointed. It only remained for the House to consider whether, at present, the public had a fair participation in the profits of the bank; and he thought that the appointment of a committee was not necessary in order to enable the House to make up its mind on this point. The great feature in the profits of the bank, at which the motion of the hon. gentleman aimed, was that derived from the circulation of their notes. On this subject he most strongly deprecated parliament doing any thing to make a profit of what was to be considered as a public calamity. If such a notion went forth as that parliament intended this, it would produce a most mischievous effect. This was clearly what the hon. gentleman pointed at, although in his explanation he had qualified it by saying, that he only meant the public to participate, in case the bank restriction act was made more permanent. Now, on this subject, he was clearly of opinion, that the only security which the public could have was, that parliament on its behalf and as its representative, should have no interest in the continuance of that act. He was not quite prepared to say that it would be a breach of faith with the bank to alter the regulation of 1808; but that arrangement had been made with so much deliberation and patient investigation of the subject, that unless a very grave case of expediency was made out, it would not become the House to alter it. The noble lord then took a view of the benefits which the public received from the bank. The annual amount of its advances to the public was 443,000l. The public received in all more than one half of the total profits of the bank: 280,000l. was all the charge made by the bank for the whole administration of the public funds of the country, and it was to be considered that the bank was the only establishment that could undertake this.

spoke shortly for the motion. The inquiry for which his hon. friend wished was simply, whether in certain dealings between government and the bank of England, the latter gave a proper remuneration for the profits secured to it? How, then, could it be said that the public credit or the credit of the bank was implicated by any such inquiry? In talking of the benefits which the public received from the bank, it was to be considered, that when the bank had originally agreed to lend its capital to the public at 3l. per cent. it was abundantly compensated by a provision, restraining any other corporation from rivalling it or entering into any competition.

adverted to the pledge of economy given from the throne at the opening of the session, and subsequently echoed from every department of the administration. He trusted that it would not prove mere empty sound, and thought that the present was a favourable opportunity for redeeming that pledge, and for showing a disposition to inquire into every possible mode of saving the public money. He said it was singular that the chancellor of the exchequer had so strenuously reprobated all coercion upon this subjeet, when he must be aware that not one step had been gained, since the first agitation of this question, but by compulsion with the bank of England. He contended upon principle, in opposition to the noble lord, that the public ought to participate in the profits arising from the restriction upon cash payments, as the only mode of compelling the bank to resume payments in specie, by lessening the advantages they derived from withholding it. He had apprehended that the directors would have been the first to move for a committee of inquiry, to show that their conduct was unimpeachable; they might then have come out of the investigation like their own gold, more pure from the furnace to which it had been exposed. It was the duty of the House, by adopting the motion, to show that it lost no opportunity of affording relief from the burthens of taxation.

said a few words strongly against the motion. He stated that, including all the responsibility and expenses, the bank only charged the public, for the expense of managing the funds eight-pence in the 100l.

, in reply, contended that the public balances of late in the hands of the bank, were at least double what they were in the year 1808, or at any former period, thus contradicting the assertion of the noble secretary of state.

The House then divided:

acquiesced in the proposition for a call of the House, but rather preferred Friday week.

deemed it essentially necessary, upon the present extraordinary state of public affairs, to have a call of the House, especially with a view to the due consideration of the proposed military establishment, and the renewal of the pro- perty tax. But that call would be quite a mockery, if time were not afforded for the attendance of members from Ireland for instance, whence, through the uncertainty of winds, he himself found it impossible to make his way to this country so soon as his wish and his duty prompted. It was, besides, material to postpone the discussion of the subjects to which he had referred until the call was enforced, for it would be perfectly absurd to enforce that call after those subjects should have been decided.

proposed to fix the call for Monday se'nnight, which would afford time enough to collect a full attendance from every quarter, excepting perhaps the extremities of the United Kingdom, and that exception might, he said, not inconsistently be admitted.

hoped that the call would be enforced to the utmost practicable extent, as a full attendance was peculiarly desirable upon the discussion of the army estimates, and the renewal of the property tax.

assured the House that he was quite as anxious for a full attendance as the right hon. gentleman could possibly be.

The call was fixed for Monday se'nnight.