opposed this bill, the object of which, he said, was, to enforce additional tolls on boats navigating the canal in question, on the ground that no parliamentary reason had been assigned in the preamble, for its introduction. If the persons who undertook to form this canal could not obtain all the profits which they anticipated when they first entered upon the speculation, he thought that was no reason for levying a new burthen on the public, to reimburse them for their own imprudence. If parliament agreed to such a principle, there would be an end to all economy in such undertakings, and the strongest inducements would be afforded foolish and ill-founded speculations. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving, that the bill should be read a second time this day six months.

also spoke against the bill. It was, he said, an attempt to impose a tax upon the buyers of one of the necessaries of life, the coals conveyed by the canal.

spoke in favor of the bill. He observed that this canal had been formed at an expense of 1,,200,000l. and that the old shareholders of 40l. each, received but 15s. per annum for their profit. He trusted, that in looking at the utility of such a work, the House would not consider it unreasonable to allow these gentlemen the means of reimbursing themselves for the capital which they had sunk.

observed that the objection of the hon. Gentleman who spoke first had not been satisfactorily answered. There certainly was no parliamentary ground laid in the preamble of the bill. The public would derive no advantage from an increase of the tonnage duty. If the precedent were once established, every canal company in Ireland would have a right to come to parliament for compensation, for he would venture to say there was not a canal in that country which paid one shilling profit on the concern.

supported the amendment.

was also against the bill, and accused the company of a breach of faith towards the Bristol dock company.

opposed the bill. Its principal object, he said, was, to acquire a coal monopoly.

spoke in favor of the bill, and submitted, that unless the House encouraged such speculations as these, there would be an end of all public improvements.

was hostile to the bill.

The House then divided. For the postponement, 81; Noes, 19. The bill was consequently lost.

moved, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that be will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, the substance of every patent, commission, sign manual, or other instrument, under which any place in the West Indian or other colonies is held by persons not resident therein, with the names of the holder and his deputy, the salary and average profits of the place and the date of the appointment."—Ordered.

wished to inquire of the chancellor of the exchequer, whether any augmentation had been made to the salaries of the commissioners of excise and customs in London, since the 1st of January, 1815?

replied, that he must pursue the same course as on a former evening. If the noble lord wished for the information he could move for it.

then moved, "That there be laid before this House, an account of all augmentations which have been made in the salaries of the boards of customs and excise since the 1st day of January 1815, with the dates of such augmentations."

said, before the question was put, he wished to make some inquiry respecting the patronage exercised by those boards in appointing to certain offices connected with them.

replied, that the hon. and learned gentleman could move for the information be required [a laugh].

, Then it is to be understood by the House, that the chancel- lor of the exchequer will answer no questions upon financial subjects which relate to the taking of money out of the pockets of the people.

The motion of the noble lord was agreed to.

then moved, "That there be laid before this House, an account of the number of officers belonging to the revenue cutters and of the authorities under which they are appointed: also, a copy of any treasury minutes or correspondence between the treasury and the revenue boards relating to the said cutters since the 1st of January, 1815."—Ordered.

said, he had a question to ask, and he should like to try whether the right hon. gentleman would be more indulgent to him than be had been towards others. He wished to know, whether it was in the contemplation of government to grant any augmentation of salaries to the officers of the navy board?

replied, that there would be no difficulty in giving the information required by the hon. baronet: but he could not take upon himself to do so, without giving offence to those gentlemen to whom he had refused similar information.

then moved, "That there be laid before this House, an account of all the augmentations which have been made in the salaries of officers in the navy board department since the 1st of January 1815, with the dates of the same."

would fain suggest to his majesty's government, whether, although they might refuse to answer all questions of a difficult or an intricate nature, there was not some information which they might give, without infringing any of those maxims of state prudence by which they were guided. Was it necessary, he would ask, that gentlemen, when they came down to require explanation on particular subjects, should be nation to the necessity of discussing the propriety of asking information, before they could expect to receive it—and that too upon topics intimately connected with the expenses of the country? Could not his majesty's ministers, in order to prevent all this inconvenience, come down prepared with an account of all the retrenchments and reductions which they were making in the expenses of the public from day to day? Could they not furnish to the House a statement of the offices which they were, no doubt, actively reducing on the one hand, and of the salaries they were reducing on the other? And if they were augmenting the salaries of the public officers, instead of diminishing them, which now seemed to. Be their only real pursuit, could they not at once boldly declare the extent to which they were violating that pledge of economy, which they had put into the mouth of the Prince Regent, on the first day of the session?

said, if the hon. and learned gentleman would be so good as to wait, the information which he required would be laid before parliament in a very short time, under the provisions of an act expressly provided for that purpose, and which imposed a duty upon his majesty's government to inform parliament, annually, of all augmentations and diminutions which had taken place in the public departments. He could not himself see under what view of expediency, those questions were so frequently put. It was a very novel mode of procedure, and one which he was of opinion could be productive of no public utility whatever. The information, too, which the hon. and learned gentleman had requested, was not a little singular; for not content with confining his question to the augmentations which had taken place, he had gone still further, and required to know what were the augmentations contemplated by his majesty's government. In his motion, however, he had acted with more caution, and had restricted him to the augmentations alone, without requiring a detail of the contemplative views of ministers. It was satisfactory to find that what was done was done in a business-like manner, and that gentlemen came down with all their questions reduced into writing. The subjects would, thus come forward in a regular way, and the information required would be given in an official shape, which would prevent all those mistakes that might be expected from answers given without due consideration. Upon the whole, however, he thought the system of putting those species of questions was incompatible with the ancient usages of parliament, and to those practices which had been so long and so properly observed. He was satisfied they only tended to embarrass, and not to facilitate public business.

said, that the very objection which the noble lord had made to the terms of his hon. friend's question, was the foundation upon which that question was to be justified. The noble lord had deprecated his asking what was in the contemplation of his majesty's government? Why, this was the very point at issue; it was upon the answer to this question every thing turned; for if the House was to wait until the return alluded to by the noble lord was made, the augmentations meant to be condemned would have taken place, the new officers would be appointed, and when called on to resign their situations, they would instantly exclaim with lord Arden, "It is my vested interest, my freehold estate!" To prevent this, and for that purpose alone, the question of his hon. friend was framed.

observed, that the hon. and learned gentleman must know, that a mere increase of salary to a public officer, was not a vested interest, notwithstanding the affectation of activity on the part of the hon. and learned gentleman, no possible benefit could arise from the course he was pursuing.

reprobated the very unusual tone which the noble lord had assumed—a tone which the House were unaccustomed to hear from any hon. member, let his situation be what it might. He was convinced, that there was no gentleman in that House, let him be an oppose or a supporter of administration, but must feel that on such an occasion, when the public were ground down by distress, and when the necessity and the determination to economies had been proclaimed from the throne, the noble lord had assumed a tone which that House ought not to tolerate, and which was quite inconsistent with the character of a minister. On a recent night, when the wretched state to which the grievous imposition of taxes had reduced the country, was represented to the House, the noble lord insulted not the House, but the people. It was impossible for him to forget the expression used by the noble lord on that occasion. In speaking of the popular conduct, he termed it "an ignorant impatience for the relaxation of taxation." On another grave occasion, when the noble lord opening the debate, had his choice of topics, one of the subjects which he chose was the sensibility of the people to questions in which their pecuniary interests were concerned, and he talked of them as apprehensive of being "toughed on the score of money." This night, when an hon. gentleman was performing one of the most important duties of a member of parliament—a duty which he trusted would never be abandoned—and was urging the noble lord to state what evidence, at the expiration of three weeks from the period at which the Crown pledged itself to economy, appeared to show that that pledge had been redeemed, he received the question with the tone which must have been condemned by all who heard it. And then the noble lord made an observation, which he presumed was considered satisfactory—namely, that if a question were not answered by his majesty's ministers, it might be reduced to writing in the shape of a motion. Now, it was manifest that all questions could not be with effect reduced to writing in the shape of a motion. When a return could be made of something actually done, a motion would go to the office to which it was directed with effect; but where no such return could be made where the question related as to that which it was intended to do, and not to that which was actually done, to ministers alone could it be put with the expectation of a satisfactory reply. As to the usage of inquiring into what it was in the contemplation of his majesty's government to do, the noble lord must surely have supposed that the House had forgotten all the instances of such questions which had occurred. For his own part, as long as, he retained his seat in that House, whenever he suspected that it was intended to increase the burdens of the people, he would inquire into the reality, of such intension. It was the privilege of a member of parliament to do so;—"and in exercising that privilege," added Mr. Horner, "I am sure, Sir, I shall not be stopped by you." The House and the country must perfectly understand the reason which induced the noble lord to refuse to answer to the questions which had been put to him. He would have answered them, had he felt that his replies would have been satisfactory to parliament and to the nation. Nothing could be more insufficient than the statement of the noble lord, that it was provided by act of parliament, that at a late period of the session—the middle of the session at least—the 25th of March, a return should be made to the House of any diminution or augmentation of official salaries which had taken place in the preceding year. Was this to satisfy the House on the pre- sent pressing occasion, during a session in which money affairs must become one of the most important duties of parliament a duty paramount indeed to every other? The House had been told from the throne, that it was the intention of his majesty's government to use every means of diminishing the public expenditure. From day to day, however, parliament witnessed the increase of the salaries of public officers, during a period of peace, and when the low prices of every article of necessary consumption rendered such augmentation less than ever necessary. He would distinctly state the course which he should feel it his duty to pursue on this subject; and he would do so by an instance. If he were to hear that the treasury had already increased the salaries of the officers of the tax board, he would make a motion for a return stating the fact. But if, on the other hand, he were to hear that the salaries of the officers of the tax-board having already been increased, the commissioners of stamps were applying for a similar augmentation, and that it was in contemplation to give it them, he would not hesitate to take the liberty of asking the right hon. gentleman opposite what were the intentions of his majesty's government on the subject.

again rose; but in consequence of a loud cry of "Spoke! spoke!" his lordship sat down.

said, that he had hoped the hon. gentlemen opposite would have endeavored to redeem their character, by allowing his noble friend, who had shown his readiness on the occasion, to reply to the hon. and learned gentleman. After the language which had been used by that hon. and learned gentleman, he was persuaded he would be the last man to prevent his noble friend from being heard. If ever there had been an occasion on which the strict usage of the House might with propriety be departed from, it was surely the present, in which his noble friend had been accused of using language taunting and disrespectful towards Lon, members. In making this charge, the hon. and learned gentleman, contrary to all the orders and precedents of the House, had alluded, not alone to an argument used in a former debate, but to the express terms in which that argument had been couched. In the course of his speech the hon. and learned gentleman, notwithstanding the accuracy of his mind, had drawn an inference unautho- rized by the circumstances of the case, when he insinuated, that because the questions which had been put to his majesty's government were unanswered, that therefore his majesty's government were employed, not merely in augmenting the salaries of public officers, but in contemplating the further augmentation of others. It was curious enough, however, to observe, that the hon. gentlemen opposite were not disappointed at receiving no replies to their questions. On the contrary, they seemed to expect this; for they were all prepared with written motions as substitutes.

observed, that the inconvenience of the course which had been adopted by ministers was now apparent. His hon. and learned friend's experience of parliament had been comparatively short. He (Mr. Tierney) had had the misfortune of having sat in that House since the year 1789—he called it a misfortune, because it proved that he was so many years older than his hon. and learned friend [A laugh!]. During the whole of that period, he had never heard any minister, from Mr. Pitt in the plenitude of his power, downwards, hesitate to state whether government had taken such steps as those respecting which his majesty's present ministers had been so properly questioned. The House would see the consequence of a strict adherence to parliamentary usage. Both parties got heated. The right hon. gentleman who spoke last talked of his hon. and learned friend, and those who acted with him, redeeming their character. They had lost no character. His hon. and learned friend was perfectly right in calling the noble lord to order, when he attempted to speak twice. He had a right to say to the noble lord, "If you will not answer our questions, then you shall not speak twice on the same motion. If you enforce the strict usage of parliament, we will enforce the strict usage of parliament too." His hon. And learned friend had said that the noble lord's refusal to proceed must arise from some motives which he did not choose to communicate. He (Mr. Tierney) believed so too; and he believed them to be very wrong motives. With respect to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was afraid that tat right hon. gentleman had been in bad company lately; or, he was persuaded that he would not have conducted him as he had done on this occasion. He was anxious to impress on the House the inconvenience attendant on the refusal to answer questions, by making a motion. This would occupy some of the time of the House, for as he was not bound to write the motion himself, he would desire the clerk to take it down.—Mr. Tierney proceeded slowly to dictate to the clerk at the table, pausing every three or four words, in a way which excited the general risibility of the House.:—"That there be laid before the House — an account — showing — how much sooner — than the 25th of March — it is practicable — to make the returns —."

Here the Speaker interposing, observed, that there was already a motion before the House.

. "Oh! then, Sir, the clerk can scratch out what he has written, and begin afresh as soon as the motion before the House shall be disposed of." [A laugh!].

contended, that it was fair to conclude, from the conduct of his majesty's ministers, that it was in their contemplation to make the augmentation of salaries which had been alluded to.

, to prove that a motion would not always produce the information required, stated the circumstances of a motion for an address to the Prince Regent, made on the 20th of April last, and renewed in May, which had not been complied with, although the information it required might have been produced in a single day.

The motion was acceded to.

then proceeded to make his motion, the object of which was to ascertain whether or not it was practicable to lay before the House, at an earlier period than the 25th of March, the account of the increase or diminution that had taken place in the salaries of public officers. He would have put this plain question to the right hon. gentleman, had it been practicable to obtain an answer from him; and if that were practicable, he had no doubt that the answer would have been in the usual terms, namely, that such a return could be made in part, but not altogether. As it was, however, he had no resource but to apply to the clerk. Mr. Tierney then dictated to the clerk the following motion:—"That there be laid before the House an account, showing, according to the best judgment of the officers in the different public departments, how much sooner than the 25th of March a return stating, according to the directions of an act of parliament, what increase or diminution of salaries has taken place, can be returned to this House, distinguishing each of the offices."—The motion was agreed to.

. I have another motion to make; and as it would be irregular for me to write it myself, I must again apply to the clerk [A laugh].

observed, that for the sake of the convenience of the House, it was usual for hon. members to write down their own motions, unless they labored under some infirmity which prevented them from doing SO; in which case they received the assistance of the clerk.

. The infirmity of the hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House is, that they are dumb [A laugh]. Sir, I move, "That there be laid before this House, a return showing the number of men borne and mustered in the different garrisons abroad, from the year 1786 to the year 1791 inclusive, made up to the 25th of December, distinguishing each year and the different garrisons."—Agreed to.

said, that notwithstanding what had occurred that evening, he would take the liberty of asking the noble lord a question, the circumstances attendant on which were so different from those belonging to any other which had been proposed, that he was not without hope that the noble lord would favor him with a reply. He could assure the right hon. gentleman, the late chancellor of the exchequer for Ireland, that he so little anticipated a refusal from the noble lord, that he was not one of those who were prepared for the alternative, by have in a motion ready written. The affair was simply this: it had been strongly rumored that the British ambassador—he could not say at the court of Lisbon, for court there was none—but the British ambassador at Lisbon had been recalled, and that a successor had been appointed. What he wished to ask the noble lord was, whether, if such a recall had taken place, the individual appointed was to enjoy the same emoluments as the late ambassador?

replied, that the mission of the late ambassador to Portugal had terminated a considerable time ago; as soon, indeed, as it was ascertained that the prince regent of that country did not mean to return to his European dominions. With respect to the latter part of the hon. baronet's inquiry, all he had to say was that no appointment of an individual had taken place, either as ambassador or as minister of legation.

, adverting to a statement made in the House at a late hour last night, relative to a monument erected at Rome to the late cardinal York, wished to know whether or not such a monument had been erected; and, if it had, by whom it had been ordered, and who was to defray the expense of it?

replied, that he had no difficulty in answering the questions of the right hon. gentleman. The fact was as the right hon. gentleman supposed. The individual alluded to, the last branch of the unfortunate family from which he descended had long been an object of his majesty's bounty. Stripped and plundered by the French, cardinal York had not been considered as forfeiting his claim to his Majesty's generosity by his belonging to a family which the ancestors of his majesty had so justly and properly succeeded on the throne of these realms. This generosity on the part of the king created an indelible gratitude on the mind of the unfortunate cardinal; and by his will he directed some interesting family documents, together with the collar of the garter which he possessed, should be sent to the Prince Regent as a memorial of his respect. This had accordingly been done, the executor of the cardinal, accompanied these bequests with a request that his royal highness would assist him in the erection of a monument to the deceased cardinal. Under all the circumstances of the case his royal highness, in that spirit of liberality which did honour to him, acquiesced in that request, and in consequence paid to the cardinal's executor the sum required to assist him in the erection of the monument.

said, that every man must entertain a high sense of the gracious bounty which had been shown by his Majesty towards the late cardinal. The way in which the subsequent transaction had been described by the noble lord, evinced it to be a transaction very different from what the distinct erection of a monument by his royal highness the Prince Regent to a branch of the House of Stuart would have been. If it had not been so he should have felt it his duty to institute a parliamentary inquiry into the subject.

wished to know whether the expense of the monument, like that of the allowance, had proceeded from the royal privy purse?

replied, that the expense had been paid out of the surplus of the contribution by the French government, for the removal from Paris to Rome of the statues which belonged to that city.

rose and observed, that he had always considered it to be a fundamental principle of the policy of this country, to view France in the light of a great maritime and commercial nation. Such was the principle adopted by the greatest English statesmen—a principle which, it appeared to him, had been lost sight of, in concluding the treaties which were now the subject of discussion. In examining the treaties which had been laid on their table, however great their luster might appear, however high our military reputation might seem to stand, he hoped, if the House, on the perusal of them, saw that any of their stipulations affected the constitutional liberties of the country, or her maritime interests, that they would not be prevented, by the dangerous illusion of military glory, from marking their sense of such stipulations. That France was formerly viewed in the light he had mentioned, would be clearly perceived by a recurrence to our history. So strongly was that feeling impressed on the minds of ministers at other periods, that, on every maritime war with France, this country had always raised against her a continental enemy, in order to distract her attention—to compel her to keep up a great army, and thus neglect her commercial interests; by which means a better opportunity was given to us to effect the ruin of her maritime affairs. The Netherlands were always considered necessary to the success of such projects; and he regretted, that, in the present instance, the interests of the Netherlands had been neglected, and, with them, our commercial interests. They had been called on to admire the annexation of Belgium to Holland, as a master-piece of policy. But, so far from being pleased with that annexation, it appeared to him to be pregnant with danger—since, by that means, the Netherlands were deprived of their great barrier against the power of France. If the military establishment of the Netherlands amounted, in time of war, to 100,000 men, in time of peace it would not exceed 50,000; and, if eighteen fortresses were to be garrisoned by that state, it was clear that they would require the whole of these troops, not leaving a single regiment to take the field, if necessity required it. The consequence must be that, should the Netherlands be invaded, Great Britain must defend them. Austria would not lend her forces for that purpose; neither was it to be supposed that Prussia would grant her assistance. Under ordinary circumstances, the Prussian cabinet would be disposed to adopt a very different line of policy. At the present moment, when a sense of danger had united the various potentates of the continent, Prussia might interpose to prevent the subjugation of the Netherlands by France. But, when that sense of danger ceased to exist, she would probably pursue a contrary course. When the House recollected the transactions between Prussia and France, with respect to Hanover—when they recollected that Hanover had been given up to Prussia—he thought they must perceive, that they might look in vain for the assistance of Prussia, should such a state of things arise as he had alluded to. The House was called upon to believe, that, by the occupation of certain fortresses, all danger was removed from the Netherlands. Now, in considering the usefulness of fortresses, three points were to be examined. First, the distance of those fortresses from the line of an enemy's operation. Second, the extent of their garrisons. And, third, what proportion they bore to the force which the enemy had in the field. When the army of an enemy amounted to 25,000 men, and the force of a garrison was 4 or 5,000, a fortress thus guarded might produce some effect on the general success of the war. But when armies were swelled to 150,000 men, then such fortresses lost their importance. The frontiers of the Netherlands were provided with 18 fortresses, but they could not stand against so immense a force. When armies were so prodigiously increased, only great fortresses, containing armies rather than garrisons, could successfully oppose their career. It was evident that our connection with the kingdom of the Netherlands was necessary to our commercial relations with the continent. Now, the kingdom of the Netherlands could not defend itself. That, therefore, must be done, which was done—we must have two peaces establishments, one for the Netherlands, and one for this country. Taking this view of the ill effects which the junction of Belgium with Holland must inevitably produce, he regretted that the allies had not imposed, as they could have imposed on France, certain territorial cessions which would have effectually secured the peace and tranquility of Europe. Many errors were observable in the proceedings of Congress; but the battle of Waterloo made us arbiters in our own cause, and we should, by the treaty of Paris, have rectified the faults which had preceded it. A general league had been made amongst the great powers of Europe to prevent France from indulging in ambitious views, and that intention should have been carried into complete effect. They were told, that the dismemberment of France would have been impossible—that the allies were all opposed to it. He believed that no such idea was ever entertained. The cession of the Netherlands, it was said, would have been useless. So it undoubtedly would, if it were not coupled with other cessions. It was asked, "If you proceeded on this principle of cession where would you stop? You would find it difficult to point out the particular cession at which it would be proper to pause." The hon. gentleman could not see this difficulty. He, for one, would be perfectly content, if Alsace had been given to Austria—to the south of Germany, the line of the river Rhine—to Prussia, the territory immediately in front of that which she at present possessed—and to the Netherlands, the department due Nerd. Such a disposition of territory would have secured the permanent tranquility of Europe. It was asserted, that, by the treaty of Paris, this country procured full indemnity for the past, and perfect security for the future. Now, what indemnity had they received for twenty years of war—for burthensome and oppressive taxation—for an impaired constitution? They were to get a paltry pecuniary recompense—not so much as the income tax, at five per cent. would produce. This was the indemnity they received. But other states received indemnities of a different description. With respect to the security for the future, there was no part of the treaty which appeared to him more objectionable. A foreign force of 150,000 men was to be kept up in France. This measure must necessarily lacerate the feelings of the French, and fill their minds with hatred against those powers that inflicted so great a disgrace on them. When Austria, Russia, and Prussia were obliged to withdraw their forces, either to guard the new dominions which had been ceded to them, or to embark in any project of ambition, then would the French nation rise in arms, terrible to the rest of Europe. Irritated by the injuries and insults they had received, they would rise and demand satisfaction from those who had pressed them down. Who, then, would lie most open to their attacks? this country—which would be called on to defend the Nethreads—a state that might almost be considered its own property. Louis 14th, when convinced that his designs upon Spain would succeed, had emphatically said, "the Pyrenees are removed;" and the ministers of this country, speaking of our connation with the Netherlands, might now observe—"the sea which once divided us from that state has ceased to exist." He recollected a military officer, when speaking on this subject, denominated the kingdom of the Netherlands and Hanover the great military depoôt of this country. Holland, he observed, was the citadel, and the Netherlands and Hanover the out-works. With respect to the constitution which had been given to France, he was unwilling to make many remarks on it. The House was told that, if the cessions he had spoken of were demanded, they would not have been granted—it would have been an insult to Louis 18th which he would not have borne. Now, he could not believe that Louis 18th would have refused what Louis 14th had offered to concede. Was it to be supposed that Louis 18th, placed on the throne by the allies—supported by them—reigning by their sufferance—would refuse to give up (all Europe, as was called, being at the gates of Paris) the provinces which had been spoken of? he believed the fact was that the allies were afraid to push their demands, lest there should be a re-action amongst the French people, which might overturn the government that had been imposed on them. But, in his opinion, the insults which had been heaped on them, had driven them to a state of despair and madness, which no cession that might have been demanded could have rendered worse. There was a mental alienation amongst the people of that country, which could not have been made greater by any measure which the allied powers might have conceived it necessary to enforce. Was it to be imagined, after France had been stripped of all the territories which a long course of successful warfare had possessed her of, that the feelings and sympathies of her population would have been suddenly aroused, if the cession of a small portion of her territory were demanded? especially, when a hostile force of 1,500,000 men was arrayed upon her soil. He firmly believed that a feeling of delicacy towards the reigning family was the reason which induced the allies not to make the demand. The ascendancy which a great northern potentate (the emperor of Russia) had gained over the mind of a neighboring sovereign (the emperor of Austria), threw still farther light on this circumstance. One of the most important difficulties to be surmounted at the congress of Vienna was the effect of the influence to which he had alluded. And it was not a little extraordinary, if some influence had not been exerted, that those cessions, on which the whole public mind of Prussia and of Austria were fixed, had not been demanded. Had they been made, Austria and Prussia would have been the efficient guardians of the greatness of Germany, by their imposing situation on the eastern frontier of France. With respect to the doctrine of legitimacy he would say little. The legitimacy of a sovereign, resting on the laws and constitution of a country, he did not conceive objectionable; but there was a great difference between that, and the legitimacy of a prince who was forced on a people. He hailed the first as knitting the people together in a bond of union—as tending to expand the best feelings of the human heart; but the second he looked upon with abhorrence, as the greatest misfortune that could be visited on the human race—as tending to excite, in the breasts of princes, more bad passions than those to the influence of which their situation exposed them—as giving impunity to ambition—as favoring designs against their country—as leading to immoral excesses—as encouraging every thing which a good government would control, and which a bad government was never without. [Hear, hear!] Believing that it was intended to support this species of legitimacy in its fullest extent—believing that to this object the interests of Europe had been sacrificed—and totally disapproving of the policy which prevented the allies from demanding those cessions that would have formed a great barrier power between the Netherlands and France, in consequence of which our maritime and commercial interests were exposed to danger—he could not, give his assent to the proposed address.

adverted to the inconsistency in the arguments of those who, while they recommended that the Netherlands should have been raised into a great military power, reprobated the expense of the proposed peace establishment. Those who recommended that Alsace and Lorraine should have been wrung from the vitals of France, seemed to forget how long she had struggled for those provinces, what importance in her system of policy she attached to them, and how dearly she clung to them as the native soil of most of her great men. Dismemberment would have united Frenchmen of all ranks against us, while, between the provinces severed and the states to which they would be united, there would be neither resemblance of language, sympathy of feeling, nor community of interest. He rejoiced that while crimes had not been left unpunished, the moderation of the allies would afford a more useful lesson to the French than the degradation of conquest; we had fought, not against a man, but against a system; we had overthrown that system, and to prevent its revival, we had erected another in its place. Had we not so proceeded, we might have defeated one Buonaparté, but others would immediately have risen to have renewed the contest. He entertained no apprehensions that our troops in France would adopt the manners and habits of the French; because it was not usual for the victors to imitate the vanquished, and they would, besides, be taught, by the experience of those over whom they triumphed, that it was no less the business of a soldier to keep within the limit of his province, than to act up to the full extent of his duty. Upon the whole, he with confidence looked forward to the re-establishment of social order in France, and consequently to the permanency of the peace we had obtained.

, not concurring in the address, nor in the unqualified praise lavished upon ministers, could not consent to give a silent vote, more especially after the personal allusion made by the noble lord last night to what had fallen from him on the first night of the session. The subject of discussion was one of greater importance than had perhaps occurred within living memory, more particularly that part of it which regarded the interposition of Great Britain in the settlement of a government for France. The noble lord had put this interference upon two grounds: first he had argued the abstract point, whether, under any circumstances, it was competent for one nation to intermeddle in the internal government' of another; and, secondly, whether, under the peculiar circumstances, Great Britain had a right to interfere to impose a government upon the French nation? Sir Samuel said, it did not appear to him that it was at all necessary to meet the first question, though the noble lord had widely enlarged upon it, and upon other topics connected with it—whether one government was called upon at any time to assist another against revolted subjects—and whether it would be justifiable for us to interpose for the protection of a class of individuals persecuted for religious tenets? Such matters were wholly beside the real subject of dispute, included in the second branch of the division of the noble lord, which he had supported by reference to the triple alliance in 1717, and to the quadruple alliance in the year following. The House, however, would not fail to, recollect, that all the interference we had required from foreign states was the obtaining of a guarantee for the succession at that time established. The noble lord did not fail to remind the House, that this interposition of foreign powers was obtained by the Whigs of that day, and, imagining most mistakenly that it was a case in point, had taunted the Whigs of the present day with a total dereliction, of the principles they had formerly supported. The noble lord, however, for the sake, perhaps, of the strain of irony in which he had indulged, had forgotten the principal facts of the case he had referred to. Certainly if it were true that modern Whigs had degenerated from their tenets, the same charge could not be brought against the noble lord and the modern tories, who now revived with ancient pertinacity the long exploded doctrines of passive obedience and indefeasible right. This was one of those short lived triumphs with the love of which the noble lord had last night charged his opponents. Looking back to the repeated declarations of the allies, but more especially of the British government, the question was, whether, after those declarations in the face of Europe, this country, with any regard to consistency, could put in her claim to restore the dynasty of Bourbon, in opposition to the known and expressed wishes of nearly the whole French nation? To those who had not witnessed the acts of the British cabinet, and had only referred to its professions, it would seem strange that at this day such a discussion should be necessary. During the whole course of the war, ministers had asserted (with what sincerity was now obvious), that they did not fight to replace a particular family on a throne from whence it had been driven. When the contrary was charged in parliament, the noble lord had frequently declared in his place that it was a libel and a calumny. No longer since than the beginning of the last year, after the return of Buonaparté from Elba, and the issue of a proclamation by the duke of Wellington, in which he professed that the object of renewed hostilities was, to restore the house of Bourbon, the lamented member for Bedford (never more to be lamented than at the present moment) in his place had demanded of the noble lord if that proclamation had the sanction of ministers? The usual reply was given—that to state that the object of this country was to restore the Bourbons was a calumny upon this government, which adhered with fidelity to the professions they had all along given, that their design only was to remove the: individual who had placed himself at the head of the French nation, and whose authority was inconsistent with the safety of the rest of Europe. The declaration of the Prince Regent, on ratifying the treaty of the 25th of March, was exactly to the same effect; in which his Royal Highness stated that that "treaty was not to be considered as binding his Britannic majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government". [Lord Castlereagh, across the table, requested that sir Samuel would read the passage immediately succeeding.] Sir Samuel said, he apprehended that one part of the declaration could not contradict the other. It went on to state, "that however solicitous the Prince Regent must be to see his most christian majesty restored, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this declaration, on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his most Christian majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British government has invariably regulated its conduct." Did the noble lord mean to assert, that the latter part of the declaration was designedly framed to render nugatory what had proceeded? For, even supposing the noble lord were correct, that the passage just read bore his construction, he must contend, that the British government had been guilty of a species of duplicity in asserting that their only purpose was to remove Buonaparté, when, in truth, their secret and resolved design was, to compel the French nation to submit to the family of Bourbon. This was followed by the letter of Lord Clan arty of the 6th of May, to which he had referred on the first day of the session. Buonaparté, on his arrival in Paris, had written a letter to the Prince Regent, offering to observe the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, which letter was transmitted to lord Clancarty at Vienna, to be by him laid before the sovereigns. The result of the deliberation was communicated by his lordship, and the objects there disclosed were consonant with the declarations that had been previously made. "After reading this paper" said lord Clancarty, "the general opinion appeared to be, that no answer should be returned, and no notice whatever taken of the proposal: but one opinion has appeared to direct the councils of the several sovereigns: they adhere and from the commencement, have never ceased to adhere, to their declaration of the 13th of March, with respect to the actual ruler of France. They are in a state of hostility with him and his adherents, not from choice, but from necessity, because past experience has shown, that no faith has been kept by him, and that no reliance can be placed on the professions of one who has hitherto no longer regarded the most solemn compacts, than as it may have suited his own convenience to observe them." His lordship afterwards went on to state—"They are at war, then, for the purpose of obtaining some security for their own independence, and for the recon quest of that peace and permanent tranquility for which the world has so long panted. They are not even at war for the greater or less proportion of security which France can afford them of future tranquility; but because France, under its present chief, is unable to afford them any security whatever. In this war, they do not desire to interfere with any legitimate right of the French people; they have no design to oppose the claim of that nation to choose their own form of government, or intention to trench, in any respect, upon their independence as a great and free people." Then followed the passage which the noble lord had charged him with omitting: "They no otherwise seek to influence the proceedings of the French, in the choice of this or any other dynasty or form of government, than may be essential to the safety and permanent tranquility of the rest of Europe; such reasonable security being afforded by France in this respect, as other states have a legitimate right to claim in their own defence." Sir Samuel said, he was not so well acquainted as the noble lord (whose abilities in that way were acknowledged) with the mysteries of diplomatic language; but it seemed to him, that in ordinary acceptation the words would not bear any double sense, in order to favor the argument of the noble lord: the whole letter was a disclaimer of war for the restoration of the Bourbons, while it was professed to be undertaken against Buonaparté, on the ground that his character was such as to prevent all reliance upon his good faith. The right of the French people to choose their own governor and government was admitted. How the noble lord would reconcile these contradictions between profession and practice, was as mysterious as the language of Lord Clan arty, if it could be made to hear the double construction. It was not to be denied, that the effect of these declarations in France had been to lull the people into a supposed security, and to prevent that resistance which might have been made even after the battle of Waterloo. The assemblies in Paris had deemed it useless to make any exertions for their independence, which they believed, was not intended to be invaded, and many were as anxious as the allies to remove Buonaparté from the throne. The noble lord was, doubtless, aware of the effect these soothing professions would have in putting an end to hostilities that otherwise would have been carried on, though with what success it was not necessary to determine. The forcible re- storation of Louis 18th, soon succeeded; for the king followed in the rear of the allied armies, which possessed themselves of Paris, and prevented all possibility of a free choice on the part of the nation. It was a mockery to talk of a voluntary election under such circumstances of compulsion; and those who had fondly relied on the promises of the allies, not yet victorious, were disappointed in their expectations after the capital had submitted. Those who had voted in the parliament of Great Britain for the renewal of hostilities, had no less reason to complain of the insincerity of the declarations of government, who talked of free choice while they enforced an unwilling people, by at gross breach of faith, to receive a king, whom, if permitted, they would have refused to accept. He begged the House to reflect, before it concurred in the address, that the time might come when Russia, Prussia, and France, would be confederated against England; when an English king was to be forced upon the people who had expelled him. The example that we had set might then be followed by our enemies; and as we now maintained, that French revolutionary politics were inconsistent with the safety of Europe, it might then be asserted, that the principles of English constitutional liberty were inconsistent with the security of other states; that the liberty of the press, which in England alone, of all the nations in the world, was enjoyed, threatened danger to the thrones of neighboring princes. Even at this day, the freedom with which the press of this country arraigned sovereigns for their follies or their crimes, pointing at them the finger of public contempt and scorn, had excited much dislike upon the Continent, and had made our newspapers the objects of jealousy and prohibition; they were accused of breaking in upon the sanctity of sovereigns, and of making no distinction between the peasant and the prince in their daring accusations. Who was able to determine how long the other sovereigns might permit this system to exist, or how long a period would elapse before they combined against England to crush this fearless independence, Surely there was nothing absurd in thus prospect, when even the noble lord had spoken of the dangers resulting from the promulgation of the principles of modern Whiggism; and having taken a lesson in the well-disciplined school of the continent, reprobated even the freedom with which debates were conducted in the British parliament? If the noble lord could be induced so severely to reprobate this liberty of speech and of the press, who could say how soon his efforts might not be aided from quarters with which he had been recently so much connected? Our army too, it would be recollected, on its return from France, would be well prepared to second his efforts, and to extinguish our liberties, under pretence that they were deviating into license.—With regard to the securities obtained for a lasting peace, he could not avoid saying that they were such as were rather calculated to defeat than to ensure the object, since the consequence would be to ensure the resentment of a whole nation. When the noble lord spoke of the popularity of England in France, and of the general approbation of the measures of our cabinet, it would have been well if he had adduced some evidence of his assertions. What the noble lord had said upon the subject of contributions was equally unsupported; and it would be difficult to prove that the English was the only nation that felt taxation, and that the French would disregard it even when enforced by a military power, more especially when it was recollected, that a question on the taxes of the country had been one principal cause of the expulsion of Louis on the return of Buonaparté. The people in France must necessarily feel when they were called upon to pay taxes for the support of foreign soldiers, that they owed those taxes to the restoration of the king, and that this restoration was effected by the English nation. With regard also to the stripping the Louver, independent of the injustice of that transaction, to him it appeared, that no difference of opinion could exist as to its implicit. It was impossible that such an act should not inflict a sense of disgrace upon the people of that country, and excite in their minds a spirit of resentment against those who despoiled them of a collection that was so much an object of their national pride. As some surprise seemed to be testified, on the other side, at the mention of the word injustice, he was desirous of explaining himself, by stating, that he was at least far from satisfied with the justice of that proceeding. It was said that these monuments of art were the fruits of unjust war; but were they not also the subject of various treaties, by which they were formally conceded to France? When he heard so much said of the fine moral lesson which we had by this means taught to that country, he could not avoid recollecting some circumstances with regard to one of the principal actors in this spoliation. He alluded to Austria, and to her seizure of the Corinthian horses. Austria gave back to Venice her horses, but did not give back to her her republic and her independence. It was remarkable, too, that these horses were conceded by the same treaty (that of Campo Formic) by which Venice was transferred to the dominion of the House of Austria. Without going, however, any further into the merits of this question, he should give his vote for the amendment, upon a firm belief, that the peace was utterly insecure, and that it would last only till France should have acquired strength for resistance, when her hostility would burst out more rancorous and fatal than ever. He was aware that his opinions did not concur with those of a large majority of the House; but they were his honest persuasion, and he deemed it his duty to express it.

said, it was not from any ambition he had to measure himself with the hon. and learned gentleman, that he persevered in presenting himself, against the wish of another hon. member, but because, throughout a speech whose topics he considered of the greatest moment, he could find nothing with which he did not disagree, and which he thought the mere common sense of the most ordinary person could confute. The hon. and learned member had accused ministers of duplicity, in acting contrary to their professions to France; he proved it solely by referring to lord Chancery's dispatch, which itself contained its own answer on the point, by actually making a reserve for the very situation that had occurred, namely, the compatibility of the restoration of Louis 18th with the interests of France. The hon. and learned gentleman had said that ministers had not followed the steps of their predecessors. That was a great mistake—they had trod precisely in the path of Mr. Pitt and in a manner gloriously to themselves, to the country, and particularly to his noble friend. In proof of this he referred to the communication to the Russian ambassador, in 1805, ^* which displayed the master hand of Mr. Pitt, and in which all that was or could be done for Europe against France, was clearly traced. Ministers had founded themselves upon this, in the declaration from Frankfort, afterwards at Chaumont; then at Paris, in 1814 at Vienna, on Buonaparté's usurpation; and finally, in these transactions which the hon. and learned member so much blamed. The hon. and learned member seemed to him to argue fallaciously, from one end of his speech to the other. It was a fallacy to say, that because it was not the professed object to reinstate Louis 18th, it was therefore binding upon us not to reinstate him. He returned to his own, and his own received him, but, according to the hoi. And learned gentleman, we were almost bound to prevent his being received. According to him the duke of Wellington having conquered Paris, the king having entered his capital, the duke was bound to expel him again, and say to the people, "I have beaten the tyrant, here is your king, but you must not have him—no, you must proceed to elect him again." Would any man alive believe this, or receive the hon. and learned gentleman's proposition? He was glad to find the first general position of his noble friend had not been resisted; namely, the right of nations to interfere with the internal government of other countries, if dangerous to their own. The silence of the hon. and learned member showed that he could not upset this position, for with his principles he would if he could. But lest there should be any mistake, he now challenged the hon. and learned gentleman to deny it. By his continued silence he yielded. Well then, said Mr. Ward, he has at least abandoned one of the favorite maxims of his great roaster, Mr. Fox, who, in 1793, moved a broad resolution to the contrary, in respect to this very France. Mr. Burke, however, (quite as great a name) completely refuted him, and proved, that if a great nuisance prevailed in any country, the vicinage had a right to abate it. Gentlemen talked of Poland, to show, from the acquiescence of ministers, that they were not sincere as to the right. The truth was, they or that side of the House detested the atro cities in Poland as much as any self-constitute Whig; but they did not interfere because they were too far off to have any power. Poland was, in their respect, a country in the moon. Another great fallacy of the hon. and learned gentleman was that he called the precautionary army an ally of Louis against his people. We say it is an ally of Louis against Jacobinism, but for his people, he believed a very great majority panted for the restoration, to put down the military tyranny. The hon. and learned member, however feared the example. May not, says he other powers combine against our freedom if they choose? Yes! And I trust freemen can resist all their combinations; but are we to refuse putting down Jacobinism when we can, from the fear, that at some other time an attempt may be made put down freedom? He had questioned the justice of restoring the pictures, man of them having been yielded by treat. But by what treaty? Such a one as it armistice of Toileting, where the Pope with 500 men, was hunted down, for no cause at all, by the plunderers of France. Did a treaty make it less a robbery? If with a pistol at his breast, a man his force to sign a bond, is it the more binder because it his signed? The conduct his noble friend, in this part of his missy was, perhaps, he should say, what did most honour to his principles, his talents and his great knowledge of the true interests of states. The French soldiery did, indeed, want a great moral lesson, and they had got it more by this than by any victory that had been obtained over them. He (Mr. W.) had met with people France, who denied that we had ever beaten them by sea, or that De Grasse had been taken by Rodney. Much had been said as to the little to be drawn from the character of a king. Did that appear in Buonaparté, with whose character alone we had waged a twelve years' war? Why then, should not a peaceful characid operate? Did it not operate for twenty years upon Walpole and Floury? A young member (Mr. Law,) had hazarded definitions which Mr. Ward owned he did, not understand: in particular his notion of a legitimate sovereign, whom, he said, he would love when personally the choice the people. Did he mean, that every sovereign must be elected? Or that if he happened to be unpopular, although obeyed the laws, he was therefore not legitimate? Mr. Ward said, he had an more enlarged notion of loyalty: he loved the present king for the virtues of his excellent life, but he was loyal to him also as king, and must be so whether virtuous or not, for the sake of keeping together the bonds of society. He had observed one fallacy to prevail through all the arguments and statements on the other side. It was, that a foreign army was supported in France by the king as against the people. That army was employed, not against the people, but against the spirit of military Jacobinism in that country; it was employed to guard the people against future usurpers, and a recurrence of those evils from which they had been delivered. A great deal had been said in the course of the debate, on the subject of our departure in this treaty from the ancient policy of Europe with regard to the Netherlands. He was disposed, however, to rejoice in the change, and to hail any new experiment, when he remembered, that the result of the former policy had uniformly been, both when that country belonged to Spain, and when it belonged to Austria, that in every war it fell a prey to the arms of France. It was easy to say that Belgium ought to be defended by some great military power, but it was not equally practicable. The difficulty was in the distance of the great protecting powers, and in their means of drawing on their resources. The protection of the Netherlands, by the existing system of alliances, was never brought to their own door. The hon. gentleman concluded by contrasting the confederation of Germany with the late confederation of the Rhine, and by expressing his opinion, that we had every reasonable ground for presuming a long continuance of general tranquility. At all events he trusted we had a fair prospect for at least four or five years. He apprehended that the political sagacity of gentlemen opposite would hardly extend further.

^* See Vol. 31, p. 178.

observed, that his indisposition would be a pledge to the house that it was not his intention to detain them long. He was, nevertheless, desirous to take an opportunity of stating his opinion on two or three points, to which he should strictly confine himself, and by which his vote on the present question would be governed. He must confess that he had never offered himself to the attention of the House on any occasion with feelings of more sorrow—sorrow, at finding himself obliged to differ with friends for whom he cherished the most sincere affection and respect. The two parts into which he wished to divide his observations were, first, the policy which, under the circumstances of the times, he conceived ought to have been observed; and, in the next place, how far the engagements entered into have been conformable to that policy. To advert, first, to the doctrine, that the war was personal against the late ruler of France, and that declarations to this effect had been made by the allied powers; he must remark, that these declarations were out of the question, that they had never been acted on, and that they were terminated by the issue of arms at Waterloo. He believed, likewise, that the representations of imposing a government on the French nation had been very much exaggerated. His own views, indeed, had always looked to some settled order of things founded on civil principles, and to a revival of some civil institutions in which they might appear embodied. He had considered likewise that the restoration of Louis 18 was the first step in this necessary process. In his person he saw the rightful successor to the throne of France, the legitimate heir of Louis 17th, who was the lineal and legitimate heir of Louis 16th, who, in his opinion, had been unjustly deposed. He held no such principle as that of indefeasible succession or divine right; he knew none who adhered to a doctrine at once so absurd and profane; or if there were a few insane enthusiasts who did so, their insanity ought not to prejudice opinions that were better founded. Amongst what he considered those well founded opinions was, that there were, amongst the institutions molded by time upon the frame and genius of society, such things as hereditary, prescriptive monarchy, and hereditary prescriptive nobility, not of divine right, but of human institution. He believed that kings had duties to perform, and that subjects had duties also; that obedience was due in return for protection, and, if due, that it became a binding moral obligation. Cases of imperative necessity, such as would justify a resumption of power, might occur, as exceptions occurred in every other case of moral duty, but not on views of speculative or contingent advantage, or from a notion that the people, at their own will and pleasure, had a right to choose and change, without regard to the safety of themselves or their neighbors. Such a doctrine as this appeared to him to be upon a par, in point of absurdity, with that of a divine and indefeasible title. He had never seen any such case in the history of the French revolution. Our own, on the other hand was a fair example of this imperative necessity. Our revolution was against a king who sought to destroy the liberties of his country; their's was against a king who had voluntarily convoked the national assemblies, and who had consented to a system which might have mellowed and ripened into a regular plan of liberty. It was impossible for him to attempt any distribution of public opinion in France; but he was persuaded that all rational men, and the pacific classes of society, as was well known indeed in the north and in the west, were zealously attached to their ancient monarchy, and to the person of their present sovereign. He was disposed on this subject to hazard another opinion, that the character of the chamber of deputies, it mattered not to him however chosen, was a strong proof of the prevalence of a loyal spirit in France. The constituents of that assembly had, however, included a larger number of electors than had ever before voted; nor could he doubt that the disposition of such a body must be a fair representation of the disposition that animated a large proportion of the nation. He must add that he, for one, had never expected that we should suddenly return to a state of perfect repose and safety after so long a struggle. The nobility and property of France, as well as its monarchy, had been destroyed, a revolted army had been just disbanded; and amidst these elements of danger, some apprehension must remain. After so long and furious a tempest, the swell must not be expected to subside in a moment. It was not in the nature of things that entire confidence and security should be created in an instant with regard to a nation for many years torn by faction, in which religion and virtue had been studiously eradicated, and in which an army existed, hot with the spoils of Europe, and inured to revolutionary movements. But he now came to the consideration of the two courses which presented themselves, and the first of which was the question of dismemberment. He regretted much to differ on this point from one whose general talents, long experience, and statesmanlike and enlarged views, had always commanded his respect. But with regard to a reduction of territory, his own feeling was, that it was extremely difficult how to decide upon its execution, and that if France should return to a state of moral order, it was unnecessary. If experience should prove that she was irreclaimable, then he should be prepared to go a great deal further. He did not however think her strength at present very formidable, and it was at all times desirable that France should not be too much reduced; she was a most essential member of the European system, and might one day prove one of its most powerful guardians. The ascendancy she had lately acquired, attributable in some degree to errors of conduct in the commencement of the war against her, was chiefly to be ascribed to that distempered energy, imparted by the revolutionary spirit, which bounded over the Alps and the Rhine, and gave a wonderful consistency and steadiness to her operations. But, previous to this period, the acquisitions of France had not been extensive. Under Louis 15th she obtained Lorraine, and under Louis 16th greatly improved her naval and commercial resources. It had been said, that she then made use of those means to aim a deadly blow at our existence; but we might more properly be said to have inflicted it on ourselves by the injustice and implicit of the contest in which we had engaged. If Lorraine and Alsace were to be taken front France, it was clear that the French would be against such an arrangement. If those countries were to be added to Austria, what would Prussia, what would Bavaria say? We should only throw ourselves into all the intricacies of a question of adjustment of territory. Besides, France was a rich and fertile country; it was tempting bait for the cupidity of sovereigns; if we once broke ground on such a field for avarice, where should we stop? Would Austria, would the other powers exercise any moderation? No! France would soon become what Poland is. It had been alleged, indeed, that these very countries were unjust acquisitions of France, and added to her territory by fraud or violence. But if we were to go into the origin of every acquisition, and ravel into the iniquities of preceding ages, there would be no end to our dissentions.—With respect to the arrangements. That had been entered into, he felt the. Force of all the objections that had been; urged; he was sure we ought to feel a wholesome jealousy of the proposed establishment; and he should regret if the nerves of the House of Commons were not exquisitely sensible on this point. But with all the disadvantages that attached to the arrangements proposed, he acquiesced in them, because they afforded the best chance of maintaining the alliance that had been entered into; they were the best protection against future dangers, and had given England a greater weight among the combined powers. He felt that the gen- tlemen who sat behind, and who differed from him in opinion, would here oppose a triumphant argument in arraigning him as the supporter of a standing army; but this argument, however specious, was not sound; it was not logical: the case was in effect the same as if a civil magistrate were to post infantry in defence of the peace. What! it would be said, a civil magistrate restore peace by the intervention of armed men? Yes! when necessity called for such interference; and that was the whole case before us. The danger opposed to us was a combination of military force, and could only be met by a military force in return. Admitting the general danger of a large peace establishment, yet the army proposed for the defence of the frontier of France was a necessary evil, and, as against Buonaparté, we must have kept up a much larger military, with the addition of an enormous naval establishment. From the difference between the French and English currency, (a difference which we must make up to our soldiery) it would amount to the same thing as if the establishment were larger by 6,000 men than in reality it is; but even this must be cheerfully submitted to, if the measure of keeping the forces in France were, as he contended it was, a necessary measure. In 1802 he had gone further; but, whatever might be the case then, and however necessary an army might be in France, he could not see any ground for such an establishment as had been proposed in other quarters. In 1802 Buonaparté had Holland, Spain, and Italy, at his feet: but now France had no navy; Holland, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Turkey, no navy. What had we then to fear? He could not but think that as to colonies and garrisons, our establishment ought to be low. We had been told much of the station we ought to occupy in Europe; but it was insanity, if we wished to become a continental power. Two propositions were entertained on this subject;—one, that because ours was an island, we should have no intercourse with other nations; so far from this, he hoped we should always consider ourselves identified with the rest of the world; but he deprecated the idea of our becoming a continental power, and thought that, by husbanding our resources alone, we could ever shoot forth to vigor again. He thought that a great source of error in the present treaties was the indemnity to be contributed by France; he did not deny the practice, but the po- licy of the measure. Nothing was so difficult to France as the arrangement of her finances, and we might have saved all the money to be contributed, by one year's diminution of our peace establishment. On the part of France, the payment of this contribution would risk all the tranquillity for which we had contended. He could not therefore vote for the address proposed by the noble lord, and he did not think himself of sufficient importance to move an amendment; but he was anxious nevertheless to give his sentiments to the House, and had for that reason only taken up their attention so long.

said, that the great objects which had always been held forth as the grounds for the continuance of the war, had but been ill answered by the treaties which were on the table. Our security, which it now seemed was to consist in the maintenance of a large military force, was worse than no security at all. What, then, was our indemnity? The cession of four fortresses on the part of France, and the payment of a sum of money, large indeed, and the exaction of which must be oppressive to France. But the whole of this sum was but equal to one half of our yearly taxes; and the sum which England was to receive would be but one-twelfth of our charges in this halcyon year of returning peace; and in return for this indemnity, we had to keep up 30,000 men on the frontiers of France at our own expense, together with a peace establishment in all parts of the world, to an extent before unheard of. It had been the great object of British parliaments, on the return of peace, to reduce immediately our armies. After the peace of Ryswick, our peace establishment was reduced to 7,000 men; and in 1738, when Sir Robert Walpole, then minister, proposed an establishment of 18,000 men, on the ground of internal disaffection and danger of rebellion, Mr. Shipper successfully opposed the establishment of so large a force, and the army was reduced to 12,000 men. But now, besides 25,000 men in this country, with additional troops in Jersey, Guernsey, &c. and 25,000 in Ireland, in France there was an army of 30,000, not paid by the legislature of this country. It might be said, the sum received from France would be carried over to the exchequer, and then re-issued in consequence of a vote of the House; but they had heard no declaration of this kind, and in the long oration of the noble lord there had been nothing said of any attempt to reconcile this proceeding with our constitution. It had been said, that a new disorder required a new remedy, but when this remedy affected our constitution we should take care the remedy was not worse than the disease. The metaphor, too, was now out of date, for it might be said the patient had recovered. He deprecated the fashionable doctrine that this country was to take rank, as it was called, among the military powers of Europe. Commerce and our constitution had been the real sources of our prosperity, and had enabled us to make exertions beyond those of any military powers. The House therefore, should beware lest in grasping at a shadow of strength they lost the substance.

defended the treaties, wishing it to be understood that, though he approved of the principle of keeping up a force on the frontier of France, as to the other parts of our establishment he reserved the right of discussion at some future time. He should not argue that point at present. It had been said, that this treaty would not afford a permanent security to the country. But what treaty had afforded such security? There never was a more reasonable prospect of peace than at present. As to the idea of stripping France of provinces which she had held for many reigns, and which had been confirmed to her by repeated treaties, such a measure would have rendered a permanent force on the frontier of France necessary, and that threefold of the present establishment. France stripped of all that could be taken from her would remain a most powerful country, and would burn to revenge the insults thus offered to her. The present monarch of France, too, would not have deigned to accept a crown thus plundered of its jewels, and the people would not have endured a king so debased. This brought him to the question, whether it was desirable for us that the family of the Bourbons should be restored? Now, though France was torn asunder by many parties, there was none which united a greater proportion of the people than that in favor of the Bourbons. As that family had, therefore, a claim on the throne, could it be said, that it was not one with which a peace was likely to be most permanent? He thought it could not, and this we knew, that that family would not venture again to raise that army which had disturbed and endangered Europe. As to the arrangements respecting the Belgian frontier, the House had good authority, that they were sufficient for the end in view; and if, though not the best which might have been made, they were the best which could have been made with the general consent of the alliance; the parliament and the country should be satisfied with them. This country could not command the alliance, and it was better to have a strong alliance even with a weak frontier, than a strong frontier and no alliance. It was a misfortune that this country had been so much involved in continental politics; but this was rather to be lamented as a consequence of the late war, than objected to as a consequence of the treaty. There were various inconveniences and a thousand objections to every treaty, and this was perhaps not free from them, the great result could not have been accomplished without the alliance in which we were joined: and we should be content to pay some price for the attainment of that great object. He was particularly satisfied with what had been done as to the works of art. As to the pretence that they had been ceded to France by treaties, this plea might have some weight as towards Austria; but as to Florence and the weaker powers, it was a mockery.

, after apologising for troubling the House at so late an hour, and entering on a discussion entirely; above his powers, stated, that nothing would have induced him to do so but an anxiety to have his opinions on the subject of the treaties clearly understood; and though those opinions must, on many material points, differ from the opinions of some who had preceded him, yet there was one point on which, though it might seem already hackneyed, he wished a moment to touch: for, whatever his opinions might be as to the principle of the war, and the negotiations by which it had been terminated, he was not slower than any other man to exult at the splendid success of our efforts in arms. Our gallant servants had performed their duty with heroism unexampled; they had not only given us a leader of unrivalled eminence, but had placed the character of the British army above all comparison. It had, since the battle of Waterloo, been admitted even by the confession of an enemy, that the infantry of England had no equal. He did look on this as a great acquisition of glory, a great acquisition of strength; and his prayer was, that the military strength thus acquired might be properly made use of. The proper use of that strength was, first, to reserve it for the defence of our country; and next, in foreign interposition, when that interposition should be clearly and absolutely necessary to our welfare: but we were to remember that it would be employed unnecessarily in continental quarrels, or in projects of unjustifiable ambition. It was obvious, that they had mixed up the whole of their transactions with French politics; and though it was impossible for the House not to entertain some feelings on that subject, yet they ought to interfere with it as little as possible. By an unnecessary interposition, they would be unavoidably led to involve themselves in the factions and views of their neighbors, and be drawn out of the circle of their own affairs, which were quite enough for them, without considering whether this or that form of government was most beneficial to the people. His main objections, however, to the treaties were, that they did not provide that security which the country had a right to expect; and it demanded the most serious consideration, that in prosecuting the war to an end, his majesty's ministers had at last disclosed that important project which they had so anxiously disavowed at first; namely the determination of forcing the Bourbon family on the throne of France, contrary to the faith of the crown, contrary to the pledge which had been given to parliament, and in direct violation of the solemn engagement and promise to the nation of France at large. On former occasions the noble lord had expressly avowed, that the professed object of the war was of a very different nature. The idea of forcing any particular person on the French had been repeatedly disclaimed, on the principle that it was carrying their measures further than the justice of the case allowed: but now, forsooth, it was openly, and without a blush, acknowledged, that however the national honour had been violated, it had always been considered that such a result of the contest would be satisfactory. It was now too late, indeed, to say, that they had not resolved to interfere with the internal government of France: but they excused themselves by saying that they might interpose on a necessary occasion.

It must, indeed, be within the recollection of the House, that when it was put to the noble lord, whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the object of the war, he distinctly and repeatedly disclaimed it. It was notorious that, upon this under- standing, several gentlemen in that House voted for the war. Yet it was now evident, from the treaties upon the table, that the restoration of the Bourbons and their maintenance upon the throne of France was really and truly the object of the war. Why, then, was not this object openly and manfully avowed at the outset? With what view was it disguised? Why, obviously for the purpose of obtaining votes in that House, and practicing delusion upon England, upon France, and upon Europe. The effect of this delusion and duplicity upon France was, as he understood from the best authority, to dispose the well-informed and the reflecting part of France, who belonged to no faction—who were as hostile to Buonaparté as they were indifferent to the Bourbons—to look to the allied armies as deliverers, as about to afford the French nation an opportunity of choosing a government agreeable to its own wishes and interests. The effect was indeed such as to neutralize a great and respectable proportion of the French, who, instead of supporting Buonaparté, rather endeavored to keep down the spirit of the people, and induce them to confide in the declarations of the allies. Many Frenchmen believed those declarations, confirmed as they so often were by the solemn pledges of the ministers of England. But the believers were dupes. For himself, as well as for several of his friends, he could state that he never was duped by these declarations, or by the pledges of the noble lord, because he always thought that to be the sole object of the war, which events had demonstrated. But he would ask some gentlemen in that House who thought differently, who grounded their votes upon an entire credit in the professions of the noble lord, how they now felt? He would appeal to the whole House, to parliament, and the country, what ought to be the feeling oaf proud and honest nation tenacious obits character for good faith, upon comparing the pledges of its government at the commencement of the war with the conduct of that government at its conclusion. Was there to be no faith, then, in these solemn promises? Could it be a satisfactory feeling to any honest member, who possessed the generous spirit of an Englishman, to know that the engagements of ministers with the French nation had not been kept? His majesty's government had declared manfully, boldly, and plainly, what their purposes were; but it was one of the most melancholy features of the times, that the bonds of political faith were not as strong as they used to be. Whatever doubt might exist in some minds as to the import of the declaration on which the war was commenced, there could be no possible misunderstanding as to the object of the treaties. It was no longer to get rid of the dangerous ambition of Buonaparté; it was not to prevent the military power of France from encroaching on neighboring states. No! It was to maintain the family of the Bourbons on the throne, whatever might be the feelings of the people towards them.—If it were pretended, as he understood had been somewhere said, that the conduct of the French army in invading the Netherlands released the allies from their pledges not to force a government upon France, he would ask the noble lord and his colleagues, whether they, who always alleged that the French people were hostile to Buonaparté, and that he was supported only by the army, could consistently maintain that the conduct of that army could release the allies from their solemn pledges the people not to force any particular government upon them? But yet this government was imposed upon France, and it appeared that with a view to maintain it, certain precautionary measures, as the noble lord termed them, were adopted. Among those measures a large pecuniary contribution was levied, and this contribution the noble lord called, rather singularly, a main feature of the tranquillizing policy to be acted upon towards France. This was really a most extraordinary view perhaps peculiar to the mind of the noble lord. For it was the first time he had heard that to subject any people to a large pecuniary contribution was a good mode of producing their tranquility. Certainly the noble lord could not have learned that doctrine in England, where a large pecuniary contribution was not very apt to produce popular tranquility. Indeed, he rather apprehended that an opposite feeling would arise in this country, if that contribution were enforced by a foreign army. Why, then, should the noble lord calculate upon a different result in France? But upon this point it seemed that, according to the doctrine of some gentlemen, the contribution raised in France, instead of falling into the pockets of the people, and being placed under the control of parliament, was to become the property of the Privy Purse, to be applied, perhaps, to enable the pope to carry home some works of art from Paris, or to erect a statue to Henry 9 (Cardinal York). He wished, however, that this novel doctrine might now be repelled, as inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this country. But as a further precautionary measure to keep the Bourbons upon the throne, it appeared that 150,000 men, composed of different nations, were placed in France. So it was calculated, that the presence of this foreign force, under the command of a general who was the native of a country always the rival of France, was likely by degrees to reconcile the French people to the government which that force had imposed upon them. But what could be the character of the minds which entertained such a calculation? Would not every rational being rather conclude that the presence of such a force must serve to form a perpetual fester in the breast of France, instead of contributing to the tranquility and contentment of that country? But according to the express opinion of some gentlemen, that which was most galling and offensive to the French, formed an argument to justify the expectation of order and repose. Those only, however, who entertained such a singular notion could, he believed, concur in the views of the allies in placing an armed force in France? And what estimate must those gentlemen have formed of the character of the French people—distinguished as, that people always were for national pride and military spirit? How, he would ask was that proceeding likely to operate upon them, which was calculated to rouse the most sluggish nation upon earth? How were the French people to feel towards a sovereign twice forced upon them by an army of foreign bayonets? For when that army was on the first instance withdrawn, that sovereign was soon compelled to quit the country; and he would put it to the candor of any man, if the French people were friendly to that sovereign, why should it be necessary to maintain him on the throne by the assistance of a foreign army? The dilemma was obvinous—either the Free were friendly to the king, or they were not. If the former, the foreign army was unnecessary to the maintenance of the king; but if unfriendly, the presence of this army was calculated to augment their dislike. For what could be more galling to a Frenchman than to suppose his king guilty of that which was the greatest treason any sovereign could commit, namely, that of inviting the assistance of a foreign force? While the French were our active enemies in war, we must rejoice in their defeat; but now that they were completely fallen, must not every considerate man feel for a people so circumstanced? Was there, besides, no danger to be apprehended from the result of a national movement against the army by which the French were so grievously oppressed? The great power of the allies would no doubt defeat such a movement; and could any man doubt that the effect of such defeat would be the dismemberment and partition of France? What, then, would be the consequences? It would perhaps be said, that no danger whatever was to be apprehended from the ambition of any of the allies—that none of them were capable of meditating any wrong. But the noble lord had written much against the plans of aggrandizement entertained by Prussia. His letter to count Harden berg, on this subject, was in the recollection of the House, as was the treaty which he concluded in January 1815, with France and Austria, to guard against the danger of these plans. And here he must observe in passing, that while the noble lord himself declaimed against the views of Prussia, he was quite in a rage, if any observation whatever against any of our foreign allies happened to proceed from the opposition side of the House.—But to return to France. If that country should be dismembered—if it should cease to be a substantial power in Europe, by the division of its territory among the despots of the North, what then would be the state of this country? In such an event what must be the amount of our establishments, both naval and military, in order to guard against the dangers naturally to be apprehended from the occupation of France, by those formidable powers? Now, as to another point. It was stated by the noble lord, that he was pressed by several reflecting persons in France to secure the guarantee of the allies to the maintenance of the constitutional charter. But to this the noble lord refused to accede, while an unreserved guarantee was granted to maintain the king upon the throne. No stipulation was made to support the constitution, which by-the-bye, had since been repeatedly violated. While every arrangement was made that appeared to the allies necessary to provide for the maintenance of, the king, nothing was done to preserve the privileges of the people. The allies, in their eagerness to support the former, overlooked the conciliation of the latter; although that conciliation would have been the best policy. But such policy was not within the consideration of despots.—Here the hon. and learned gentleman said he felt it necessary to make a few remarks upon the assertion of the noble lord that the whigs of the present day forgot or departed from the doctrines of those whom the noble lord called their progenitors. But this assertion was grossly erroneous, as would appear upon a review of the address moved by Mr. Fox in 1793. For in this address that great man did not propose to protest against our interference in the affairs of any foreign state as a general principle, but against such interference under existing circumstances. The effort, therefore, to fix any imputation upon those whom the noble lord denominated the modern Whigs, by contrasting their conduct with that of the old Whigs, was totally ineffectual. The noble lord's cry of victory was quite groundless—was indeed clumsy. But it was strange that the noble lord should quote precedents from those whom he never before affected to admire. It happened, however, that in the entire noble lord's reference to the conduct of the Whigs, and he betrayed a total want of historical accuracy. This want of accuracy was indeed particularly evident in the noble lord's reference to the quadruple and triple alliances, for neither furnished any precedent in favor of the noble lord's cause. On the contrary, it was notorious, that in the former the Whigs obtained a guarantee from the allies that they should not interfere with the right of this country to choose its own government, which choice was made decidedly against the doctrine of legitimacy and the divine right of kings. For this country on that occasion dismissed King James with his hereditary rights, and selected William, with a view to establish a government congenial to the constitution and assent of the people. Then, again, as to the triple alliance, the object of that confederacy formed by the Whigs, was to withstand the principle of legitimacy, by preventing the house of Bourbon from becoming possessed of the throne of Spain. How, then, could either of those alliances be said to furnish any precedent in favor of the conduct of the noble lord and the allies, in forcing a government upon France according to the doctrine of legitimacy? But there was a precedent on the occasion of the triple alliance, which the noble lord might have quoted in support of his views. For Louis 14th, at that time sought to force a government upon Spain, according to the principle of legitimacy; and the noble lord, in overlooking this circumstance, showed that he was quite as ill versed in Tory as he was in Whig precedents. The noble lord should, therefore, before he ventured to quote again, study history with more attention.—But with respect to the principle of legitimacy, the hon., and learned gentleman said, he fully concurred in what the House had heard so eloquently urged in an early stage of the debate by an hon. member (Mr. Law) upon that subject, namely, that hereditary right was not essential to the maintenance of monarchy.—It was, in fact, but subsidiary to that object, as our own history demonstrated. For the maintenance of this principle was subordinate to the preservation of the constitution and laws of any country, and meant not that the direct lineal descendant should be preferred, but that some such member of the family of the monarch should be selected as might be best disposed and best calculated to maintain the laws and liberties of the country. This was the true, sound doctrine sanctioned by the wise example of England. But the sole object of the late war and of the treaties which followed it manifestly was, to place a monarch upon the throne of France, without any regard to the laws, the liberties, or the wishes of the people. The restoration of that monarch was, no doubt, thought a most desirable object, with a view to re-establish the peace of Europe, by some great statesmen, both in that and the other House, of Parliament, who maintained that this object ought to have been avowed at the outset as the great end of the war. But this object was disguised by the noble lord from the consideration of the House, although it was now evident that it was really the chief end of the war. The noble lord no doubt also wished to put down all the principles of the revolution, which he might conceive a very desirable end, and it was consistent with his views, that every thing that could be accomplished should be done for sovereigns and nothing for the people. That such was the intention was pretty evident from what had taken place within the last two years. A great statesman had often observed, that of all revolutions a restoration was the greatest, and that of all innovators an arbitrary mo- narch was the most dangerous. This, indeed, was fully evinced in what had taken place in Wurttemberg, in Prussia, and in certain states upon the Rhine, where nothing whatever of right was restored to the people, while the authority of sovereigns, whether crowned since or before the revolution, was established and confirmed. The total disregard, indeed, of popular rights was manifested in various parts of the recent arrangements, but it was sufficient to refer to the instances of Venice and Genoa. But the most odious part of the late arrangements, which appeared from a treaty on the table was, the league of arbitrary sovereigns to meet annually for the purpose of considering their interests; for what rational man could doubt what such sovereigns would, in the long run, consider their interests, how they would decide upon every indication of popular feeling, or upon any movement in favor of popular principles? The noble lord even, who was the advocate of every act of those sovereigns—who was ready to take up the gauntlet in that House for every one of them, could not be much at a loss to decide upon their probable views, if he would only take the trouble of looking with but common attention to history. Let him look, for instance, to the conduct of Austria towards Hungary and the Low Countries; let him look at the conduct of three of those sovereigns with respect to Poland. Hence it might be concluded how these sovereigns were likely to decide for their own interests, and against the privileges of the people. But it appeared from the noble lord's own statement how those sovereigns felt with regard to popular privileges, from the jealousy which they expressed respecting the freedom of debate in that House. He should like to know whether these sovereigns expressed that jealousy in the noble lord's presence, and whether they obtained his acquiescence [a laugh, and hear, hear!]. It would, indeed, be surprising if the noble lord, who had himself acquired so much distinction as a parliamentary orator, especially in favor of popular privileges, and who was said to have made such long speeches to these sovereigns themselves, no doubt in the same strain, could silently listen to such an expression of jealousy with regard to the freedom of the British parliament. Yet the noble lord had observed, that these arbitrary monarchs were, truly, indisposed to follow up some arrangements which they had in contempla- tion for the establishment of popular privileges, in consequence of some speeches in that House. What a compliment did the noble lord thus record in favor of the virtue and firmness of these sovereigns. So, they were dissuaded from doing that which they themselves thought proper, in consequence of parliamentary speeches in England! They declined to do right, because some of them might have been censured for doing wrong—because, for instance, such an able senator as the late Mr. Whitbread—because that great man, who had perhaps, more of the good man in his composition, than any great man that ever existed, felt it his duty to expose and reprobate some act of oppression, or injustice. He trusted, however, that such a feeling of duty would ever be found to prevail in that House. But, seriously, could it believed, that the sovereigns alluded to, could have been prevented from making arrangements in favour of popular liberty, by any thing that happened to fall from an obscure minority in that House seconded as their disposition must have been by the noble lord himself, at the head of his immense majorities. The opinions of these military despots, on this as well as upon other subjects, he entirely disregarded. No prospect could be entertained that any thing would be done by them for the rights of mankind. His hopes of improvement were derived from a different quarter. They were not directed to innovation, but to a beneficial change effected through the medium of constitutional organs, and the wholesome operation of public opinion. Even though there was reason to believe that the sovereigns appointed their meetings with no preconcerted designs against the liberties of the world; even although they formed no deliberate conspiracy against the rights of their subjects; still he could not but view the close association that would appear to be established between such great military powers, without great jealousy. The great object of our late struggle was avowed to be the destruction of the military principle in Europe, which was incompatible with the liberties, the happiness, and the social tranquility of mankind. By unparalleled efforts, by persevering and heroic sacrifices, we had extinguished the great military despotism which agitated and conquered and oppressed the nations of the continent; but was the situation of Europe much improved, if the present system was to be carried into complete effect, and the late arrangements were henceforward to be universally adhered to? We had, indeed, annihilated the most extensive, the universally felt military despotism; but there were now three or four to spring up and to occupy its place. Their union, for purposes connected with their own support and extension, might be nearly as dangerous as the one from which we congratulated ourselves on being delivered. These military sovereigns were to meet and consult for their common security or mutual interests, and nothing could be done, or permitted to exist in Europe, without their consent. The hon. and learned gentleman then went into an examination of the securities established in the treaties. He wished to meet the question of security fairly and impartially; but he could not help inquiring at first, what were the evils against which security and guarantee were required? What were we to guard against? We were at the end of five and twenty years of convulsion, revolution, and war. In that period the institutions of society, the political arrangements, and the relative condition of the different orders in the civil state, had undergone great changes. A new spirit was created, and had operated powerfully in bringing about the present circumstances. There might be different views entertained, and there were certainly very different opinions delivered on our present situation. Some thought that the revolutionary spirit, which produced such atrocities in its first display and subsequent operations, still existed in France in all its malignity, and that its existence in any degree was inconsistent with national tranquility or civil order. This opinion had been declared by many members in the House, and was entertained by a great party out of it; but he thought that it was entertained upon false and narrow views. There were other persons who took views entirely opposite, but equally distant from reason and sound policy. They would not be satisfied, if France did not at once carry into practice all those ideas of political freedom that they entertained: they would not be contented with less than seeing France in possession of all those institutions, and that free constitution that this country enjoyed, without taking into consideration the difference that existed between the state and the ideas of the two nations. It was needless to say, that he disapproved of both these extremes. Whether the re- volution in France was good of bad, whether it had contributed to promote the liberties and rights of the nation or not, it could not be denied, that there had arisen out of it a state of things which could not be altered, a spirit which could not be entirely extinguished. If the restoration of the Bourbons proceeded upon the supposition that every thing was to be restored to its former condition, and that every new interest was to be destroyed, the project could not be realized; and those who entertained it were not aware of the obstacles they would have to encounter in attempting its execution. Every thing was changed in the revolution—property had been transferred to new hands—the people had acquired new ideas—the privileged orders had been abolished, or their claims reduced—political institutions were altered, and a new distribution of political power had established a spirit of inquiry, and a disposition to discuss the conduct of rulers was every where diffused. It was difficult to calculate the power of these changes. We might guard against the effects of them, but we could not bring things back to their former situation. Happily this was not necessary for our security, as it certainly was not practicable in its execution. The real security which was required from France, after the destruction of that military monarchy which oppressed the greatest part of the Continent of Europe, combined the integrity of that kingdom with the establishment of a government agreeably to the wishes, and deserving of the confidence of the people. The hon. and learned gentleman said, he would decline entering upon a discussion of the other kinds of security required against France. The question of territorial cession had been discussed at great length, and he would merely state, that in his opinion any attempt to dismember France, instead of being likely to afford any security for the continuance of peace, would be the certain source of inquietude and danger. He would not enter upon the propriety of demanding a barrier on the side of the Netherlands, as that seemed to be of the same nature with territorial cessions; but he would say that he would place no reliance on any guarantee founded on the basis of reduction or dismemberment. There was no chance of the stability of peace, if guarantees were sought for in measures that must be galling and irritating to the French people: there was no chance of continued tranquillity but in conciliatory arrangements; there was no chance of reconciling them to Europe, but by allowing them to establish the government they liked. We could never rationally entertain confidence in the pacific dispositions of people, on whom we forced a government by conquest, which we maintained by arms. The sentiments of the people could not manifest themselves while a powerful army occupied a part of their territory, and might be called in to repress them. There had been a good deal said by a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Elliot) concerning the chamber of deputies; but he could not agree with him in supposing that that body could be considered as an organ for the expression of popular feeling and opinion. How was the chamber elected? It was elected by the influence of the royal power—it was filled by that execrable person Fouché; a name connected with the greatest atrocities of his country. That immaculate statesman, during the short period that he served his sovereign, had performed for him the office of selecting the deputies.—The hon. and learned gentleman, adverting to the French revolution, contended, that though it exhibited many scenes of cruelty, atrocity, and horror, and though its principles had been often dishonoured by the profligacy of those who held them, or professed to carry them into execution, yet it arose at first from a love of liberty, and had been attended by consequences of the most important kind. Any man who had examined the state of France before the revolution and after it would perceive the good effects that it had produced. The great body of the people, whose interests were the most important, was raised by it in education, in character, in property, and in independence. No revolution since the Protestant reformation appeared as important as that of France. The people of France might, therefore, expect, that some attention would be paid to their wishes, and that all the advantages for which they had suffered would not be extorted from them. They might expect that they should be allowed a free constitution; and would it be honourable for us to obstruct them in that object? The first men in this country had anticipated great good from the revolution. The hon. and learned gentleman, after having delivered his opinion on our foreign policy, said he would refrain at that late hour from any discussion on our military establishments to support it.

junr. said, he should not feel it necessary to trespass long upon the indulgence of the House at that late hour, in what he had to offer; but at the same time he was anxious to submit a few observations in reply to what had fallen from his hon. and learned friend. He perfectly agreed with his hon. and learned friend in the eulogy which he had pronounced upon the conduct of our heroes at Waterloo; and he was glad to find that he was not understood, as some other gentlemen had been, to draw a conclusion from such victories, that we ought to have adopted measures of greater severity against France. His hon. and learned friend at least, had not made it a charge against the government that we had not pushed our rights of conquest far enough, or that we had turned a war of just and necessary defence into a war of revenge. On the contrary, we had crowned the greatest and most unparalleled military exertions by a signal display of moderation and magnanimity. If it were not so late he should be induced to call the attention of the House to the general situation in which this country now stood with respect to her commercial and maritime interests. In his opinion, there never was a treaty which did more honour to this country, or which had more consolidated the British power in every part of the world, than the treaty which was now submitted to parliament for its sanction and approbation. It was but fair, however, that he should not omit to advert to the actual position in which that treaty had left us. Whatever was wanting in other treaties concluded at former periods was consummated in this. Besides securing to us all our possessions in the West Indies, the importance of which, no one, he apprehended, would be disposed to undervalue, it also secured that impregnable barrier in the East Indies, which was so necessary for the safety and prosperity of our empire there. Nor should it be forgotten, that by the conditions of that treaty we were confirmed in our possessions in the Mediterranean, all of which were peculiarly valuable to a great commercial country like this. He wondered, indeed, that in the great variety of arguments which had been employed in discussing the different provisions of the treaty, none of them had had any reference to those important features of it.

It would not be necessary to recall to the recollection of the House the very dif- ferent sort of treaties to which, on former occasions, the sanction of parliament had been required, or how narrowly we escaped, at a later period, from concluding a peace which would have left all Europe at the mercy of France. It was strange, indeed, that those gentlemen, who then saw nothing to alarm them as to the security of Europe, should now make the discovery, that this treaty contained no stipulations, no arrangements, at all calculated to guarantee that security. Surely, at the time to which he alluded, France was more dangerous than she was now, not only from her military system, but from possessing a larger territorial extent. Why, then, was the alarm now sounded for the first time, as if the dangers which threatened the repose and liberties of Europe, were only to be most apprehended when they were in reality least in existence? Many imputations had been cast upon the good faith of this country, and upon that point, he could not, perhaps, do better than leave it in the hands of those who had already defended it. He should only beg leave to say, that he entirely differed in opinion from his hon. and learned friend, who thought that the restoration of the Bourbons was forced upon an unwilling people. For his own part, he required no stronger proof of the contrary, than that, when Buonaparté had all the resources of France at his disposal, and was at the head of a numerous and effective army, he lost his empire by the events of a single day. That single fact spoke volumes to. His mind, as it incontestably proved, that the great mass of the population of France was not cordially disposed to co-operate in promoting his views of usurpation and ambition. In fact, the discovery that the good faith of England had suffered came somewhat too late to obtain much credence. In the course of the last year it had been equally insisted upon, but the grounds upon which the assertion rested, did not bear out the sensation. It was then said that the violation of good faith on the part of England, united with the conduct of the congress of Vienna, were such, that if any occasion should, arise to call for the general confederacy of Europe in support of her liberties and independence, it would be found impossible again to rally them for one common object. Now, the fallacy of that prediction had been abundantly proved, the experiment had been made a second time; the call had been repeated; it was answered with the same enthusiasm, and it had led to the same glorious successes.

His hon. and learned friend had asked, towards the conclusion of his speech, what was the nature of the dangers against which it had been thought necessary to demand and obtain securities. It seemed to him a great fallacy on the part of his hon. and learned friend and other honourable gentlemen, to take a special part of the treaty, and without any allusion to the circumstances of the case, without at all referring to the great and momentous exigencies of the crisis, to argue only upon the general scope and nature of the stipulations. In every treaty of peace they were bound to consider, not only the terms upon which it was negotiated but the nature of the circumstances under which it was concluded, and the character of the existing dangers which were to be guarded against. More particularly was it necessary to pursue that course with respect to the treaty then under discussion; for without so doing, it would be impossible to form a just and enlarged view of the question; or to come to a satisfactory conclusion upon it. That fallacy pervaded many of the remarks which had been made upon the conditions of the securities required, and he thought it necessary to advert to it. His hon. and learned friend, however, having asked what the dangers were, and not having gone on to investigate those dangers, he would tell him what he conceived to be their character and tendency. In his opinion (and that opinion was not lightly formed), there still existed in France an anti-social spirit, originating in the revolution, which was incompatible with the existence of well regulated society in Europe. His hon. and learned friend had coolly told them, that the spirit of the revolution was extinct, and the spirit of Jacobinism was gone. He differed from that opinion, and every man who looked at the present condition of France with unprejudiced eyes must differ from it. He was as ready to admit as his hon. and learned friend could be, that they must not judge France according to the various factions that had at different times prevailed; but those dangerous spirits which still survived, combined with that military feeling which, though curbed by reverses, no one could suppose to be obliterated, rendered it an imperative duty upon the allies to provide adequate securities for the future repose of Europe. It had been justly observed, that every revolution left the seeds of another revolution, in those habits of misrule and disorder which it generated. If that maxim was true of a single revolution, what must it be when applied to such a series of revolutions as France had undergone; a series which though they passed rapidly over the stage, had left deep and lasting traces of their progress? In that, then, consisted the danger which was to be guarded against by the precautionary measures of the allies: and no one he apprehended would deny that the danger was either real or imminent.

He should now proceed to offer a few considerations upon the case of interference. As to the general principle of interference he believed there was but little difference of opinion entertained on either side of the House; but his hon. and learned friend had descended into particulars, and amused himself and the House with what he considered to be the misconceptions of his noble friend (Lord Castlereagh) upon the subject of the quadruple and triple alliance. He need not remind his hon. and learned friend of the partition treaty. That treaty was founded upon the direct recognition of the right to interfere when the security of Europe required it. And who were the parties that acceded to that treaty? The states of Holland were one, a power at that time not indisposed to advocate the cause of liberty, or incapable of comprehending its character and claims. Above all, our own great and glorious deliverer, William the 3rd, was a party to the measure. But his hon. and learned friend maintained, that the object of the present treaty was merely and exclusively to support the Bourbon family on the throne. Assuredly, a great object with the allies being to obtain security for Europe, by an arrangement, which might at the same time accomplish the welfare of France it could not be doubted that the maintenance of the Bourbons on the throne, was one of the most obvious means of producing those results. With respect to the benefits which France had derived from the revolution, he was as willing as any one could be to admit the existence of those benefits to a certain degree; but while he did so admit them, he must also add, that the surest way of giving full operation to. Them, consistent with the security of Europe, would be to make their collateral consequences as beneficial as their direct ones had been fatal and disastrous. That, however, could be done only by repressing whatever of anarchical, anti-social, and revolutionary principles yet remained; and until that was effectually done, he could not venture to say that the spirit of Jacobinism was extinct. What had been the effect of the revolution, not only upon Europe, but upon a great proportion of France itself? A general love of order, and a general feeling of abhorrence at opposing upon slight and speculative grounds, any existing constitutional government; and he could not applaud the wisdom of allowing those feelings and propensities to be overlaid and smothered by the mass of revolutionary spirit which still existed in France. The danger of such a catastrophe was immediate and formidable; and how was the danger to be obviated? He had heard in that House; and knew that similar arguments prevailed elsewhere, that we had exasperated France, that we had poured insults upon her, and plunged her into a state of deep humiliation. It was, indeed partly true that such was the fact. From the circumstances of the case, it was impossible that Europe could interfere so as to overawe the dangerous and alarming dispositions of the French people, without offending them, without inflicting some mortification, or without wounding their national feelings. For that inevitable evil the allies ought to have been prepared. The great object with them was, not to avoid giving offence, for that was utterly impossible; but to mitigate, as far as they could, the exasperation of France. Did it follow, however, that because the allies must necessarily wound the feelings of the French people that therefore they were to give up all idea of obtaining the requisite securities? He contended that the allies having that particular object in view, it was most desirable to obtain, for its accomplishment, that lapse of time which would soften down the feelings of the nation, and contribute to remove those sentiments of irritation which might otherwise impose its operation, and prevent the an from rallying round the throne of the restored monarch. The rule which the allies had to prescribe to themselves was not to avoid giving mortifications (for how could they be prevented?), but to abstain from all wanton or gratuitous insults, and that course they rigidly pursued. Some insults, indeed, it was not easy to escape from inflicting, and among these, in the estimation of the French, the battle of Waterloo itself would no doubt be included. Let it not however be supposed that any wanton or unnecessary exercise of the power which victory had conferred, was indulged in. If they saw it necessary to exact certain sacrifices from France, they limited those sacrifices to the necessity of them; if they felt themselves compelled to demand certain limitations, they did not push their demands beyond the strict line of what their safety required. That was their policy, and so long as they acted upon that plain and direct line, though they might exasperate France, they were sure to have the approbation of all wise and honest men out of France, and even in France itself when the effervescence of momentary irritation had subsided, because there was something in honest principles which was always certain to extort the ultimate approbation of all men.

With respect to the securities which were demanded, it was not his intention to enter into any minute examination of the character of those which came under a pecuniary compensation. But he had heard it stated that the pecuniary indemnities were those which, of all others were most calculated to afflict her, and that even territorial cessions would have been less galling. They had been told, in a tone of much exaggeration, that every time the meanest peasant paid his taxes, he would be reminded of the degradation into which his country had fallen, leaving it altogether out of the question, that their tributes would be blended in the general taxation of the state, and would not bear the distinct and specific form of a contribution towards their victors. But surely there was no comparison between territorial cession and pecuniary indemnification, with respect to the influence which either might be supposed to have upon the feelings of the nation. At the expiration of five years, the pecuniary indemnification would be paid off, and leave no trace behind, but territorial cessions would be permanent; they would leave a memory behind them of the subjugation of France, which would never be effaced. He was surprised also to hear it argued that the army of occupation would be more galling to the feelings of the French people than territorial cessions. If, indeed it was so terrible to France to have her frontier fortresses occupied by foreign troops, far a short and limited space of time, how much more terrible must it be to see those fortresses permanently surrendered. But it was added, if territorial cessions have been made, then the armies of the allies might have been withdrawn from France. He would, however, ask the House whether, in the case of those fortresses being surrendered to Holland, the allies would have been justified in disbanding their armies; whether it would have been safe to leave the Netherlands a prey to the overwhelming superiority, and to the ambition of France? That certainly would not have been the way to reduce our standing armies, or to reduce the military spirit upon the continent. The hon. gentleman in his zeal to prove that the Bourbons must have been forced upon a reluctant people said that it was impossible for France to reflect upon their restoration without connecting it with invasion and the presence of foreign armies. He apprehended, however, that the return and second downfall of Buonasparté had materially altered the case; and that the meanest peasant in France was now able to draw a just inference upon the subject. In the peace which was signed in 1814 no harsh stipulations, no exactions were made, and they must therefore feel that whatever of moderation, magnanimity, and forbearance they experienced from the allies in that year, they owed to the virtues and to the presence of Louis 18th; while whatever of misfortune and degradation awaited them in the following year they owed to Buonaparté. Buonaparté, the man who had raised the military glory of France to an unexampled height, entered the lists against us with every possible advantage, at the head of one of the finest armies, in point of number, bravery, discipline, and appointment, that had ever been assembled in that country. That army, however, suffered the consummation of military disaster. It sustained a defeat the most memorable in the annals of European warfare. The hon. and learned gentleman asked who the author of their disgrace was. Who was the author of it? Did not all France know that so far from the Bourbons having been the cause of it, had they never existed Buonaparté would not have been able to save Paris from the presence of the allied armies, determined as all Europe was, with an intensity of feeling never before experienced, never to allow military despotism again to tyrannize over it. He differed therefore most materially from the hon. and learned gentleman on this point; being fully persuaded that whatever might have been the former opinions of the people of France, they had been taught by circumstances, accurately to distinguish between the real and the alleged author of the calamities which they suffered. In the prosecution of his argument the hon. and learned gentleman had alluded to that part of the treaty by which the allied powers pledged themselves to maintain the constitution of France, and Louis 18th on the throne of that kingdom. However the passage might be expressed, the meaning unequivocally was, that the allied powers were resolved to maintain an orderly government in France. Not only was this passage perfectly consistent with the other parts of the arrangements which had been made, but it was essential to them. There were many parts of the hon. and learned gentleman's speech, to which at an earlier hour he would have trespassed on the House by an endeavor to reply.

There were some topics, however, on which he begged their indulgence while he said a few words. The hon. and learned gentleman had observed a great deal on the relation in which Holland and France had been left. The security of Holland was in her situation. The treaty had been severely censured by some, because it annexed the Austrian Netherlands to Holland; and the house had heard from the noble lord opposite, an appeal on the subject to the established principles of European policy. The House, however, was not to decide the present question by the principles on which the great statesmen of former times acted with respect to it. Those persons were not at liberty on the subject. They were bound by treaty to give the Netherlands to Austria. They gave it thus in order to indemnify the emperor of Germany for the surrender of his pretensions to the throne of Spain. The consequence had, in fact, been most injurious. Was it not true that the Austrian Netherlands had been the great cause of Holland and England having been drawn into every great continental quarrel which had occurred? When the Netherlands were called the Spanish barrier, Louis the 14th perpetually invaded Holland. In later times not a single war had occurred in which that barrier had not been found insufficient for the protection of Holland. In the war of 1733, the only continental war in which this country had not been engaged, we were prevented from engaging in it by having previously stipulated for the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands. When the hon. gentlemen talked of no security being derived to Holland from bringing Prussia down to the left bank of the Rhine, they seemed not to have well considered the subject. It was of the utmost advantage to Holland that a great power like Prussia should be so placed in relation to her. It was essential that there should be a great power on the left bank of the Rhine, to protect Holland. In one of the wars of Louis 14th, that monarch, by negotiation and interest, previous to an intended attack on Holland, gained over the principal little powers on the Rhine. The only one which refused to unite with him was the elector of Brandenburg, who well knew, that the subjugation of Holland must necessarily lead to the destruction of Dutch Cloves, on the left bank of the Rhine.

With respect to the question of the balance of power, he owned that he had been a little surprised to hear—first, that France had been left in too powerful a state, and, at the same time, that it was the policy of Russia that France should be left in the state in which she was left. This was surely inconsistent with the opinion, that Russia was a just subject of the jealousy of Europe. The fact was, that the security of Europe was to be sought not in one power, but in the combination of powers—not in Holland alone, or Prussia alone, or Austria alone, or France alone; but in the combined force of all these states; in the enlightened feeling which impressed the necessity of maintaining it; and, above all, he was sure he might say in that House without fear of contradiction, in the influence and guardianship of this country. Our great object, as we were not obliged to engage in the minor disputes of the Continent, would be to preserve, by our occasional interposition, the general balance and independence. This was the policy which at various times we had pursued with success. There were three particular cases of British interference with the continental powers, to which he would recall the attention of the House. The first was, when we checked the domination of Spain on our own shores and seas. The second was, when we assisted to defeat the attempt of Louis the 14th, to subjugate Europe; the third, a hundred years afterwards, when we had again defeated efforts of France to triumph over the Continent. The glorious war which we had thus waged, we followed up by a peace concluded, not on narrow and exclusive and local considerations, but with reference to the most extensive and common interests. He trusted that it would be maintained in the same spirit of moderation and magnanimity; and that we should continue to be actuated by the same cautious vigilance with respect to the general affairs of Europe. For to Speak of relinquishing the influence we had obtained in Europe, and at the same time, of preserving our commercial preeminence, appeared to him to be one of the most extravagant of all possible propositions; firmly convinced as be was that we could never separate our prosperity from our political influence.

said, he had no objection to be designated one of the modern Whigs who had been alluded to by the noble lord; but all he wished was, that a definition of the practice of modern Whigs should not be given, which had no relation either to their (pinions or their practice. The noble lord might call his adversaries Whigs, but it was too much to designate them as fools, for, according to the statement given of their opinions, they could be called nothing else. The part of this treaty which particularly struck him with a horror and detestation of its consequences was, that we were compelled to keep up an army of 50,000 men in France; but although he had read through the treaties, he could not see that we were bound to furnish a contingent of British armed troops; and if we were not bound, why, he wished to know, was it the choice of ministers to make the contingent consist only of British troops? Why should they not consist partly of continental troops? Why was it necessary to keep up nearly 100,000 men in the United Kingdom and its colonies, and, at the same time, 30,000 men in France, which, he observed, was termed the advanced guard of the British army? Was this an example to the other great powers of Europe to lessen their military establishments? He defied the noble lord to state an instance, where the fall of any empire was not first caused by a standing army. These were, it was said, idle fears; but were they not supported by history? Germany lost her liberty by her standing army. Spain shared the same fate; for when Charles 5th, formed the project, in the plenitude of his power, of destroying the liberties of that country, whom did he employ to execute his designs? Spanish arms and Spanish ministers. At that time it was inquired of the Spanish minister, what power and authority had been given by Charles to adopt such measures? The minister pointing to the military force collected, immediately said, that these I were the powers and authority which the king had given him. The same was done by Louis 14th, by his own French troops; and in England what did the army do in the reign of Charles 1st? It turned the parliament out of doors, and took upon itself the government of the nation. Under these circumstances, was it not most dangerous, he would ask, to keep up a standing army as enormous as that now intended to be supported? The noble lord had told us, that part of the contribution already received had been applied to the erection of a monument for Cardinal York. By what authority or advice was that money sent by the Prince Regent? It was rather extraordinary to send it for erecting a monument to the last of that family who had been expelled by parliament. If the noble lord wanted an inscription for the monument, he would propose to him the preamble of the bill of rights. In this application of the public money he saw neither generosity nor magnanimity; for what good had any of that family ever done to England? It was merely a studied compliment to what was now-a-days called the principle of legitimacy. He felt assured that there was a project to establish the military system in this country on a footing incompatible with its liberties, and ultimately dangerous to the government itself. The right hon. gentleman concluded an animated speech, of which, from the lateness of the hour at which it was delivered, we can give barely by expressing his hearty assent to the amendment, which had been proposed by his noble friend.

began his reply by stating, that at that late hour he would not attempt to follow all the arguments of the hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House. Indeed, he was so much indebted to some of those who had taken his view of the question, that he felt he might safely rest his defence on their speeches, and more especially on the unanswerable argument of his hon. friend near him, who had exhibited so much solid ability, so much just reasoning, almost approaching to demonstration. The principal motive, therefore, that induced him to trouble the House was, to explain amen of the arrangements which had been he subject of discussion, in order that the House might be able to come to a sates story determination upon them. In the first place, he would say a few words respecting an omission which had been imputed to him, namely, that in the present treaties, the ancient treaties, regularly reviewed for so many years, were not to be Mind. This had formerly been the practice, because each peace carried forward vita it the arrangements among the states if Europe which had been previously node, and without the recital of which, therefore, the treaty concluding the peace could have been imperfect. The first departure from this usage was in the realty of Amiens; and it took place on the obvious principle, that those ancient treaties were wholly inapplicable to the modern case, and that any introduction of them would have created a system not of order but of disorder. Those treaties had peen fully considered at the congress of Vienna; but it was found that, in consequence of the French revolution, so great A change had taken place in Europe, and more particularly in the German empire, the old constitution of which had been completely dissolved, that it was in vain to think of referring to the ancient treaties in the new arrangements. All the statesmen assembled at that congress agreed, that, under such circumstances, to revive those old treaties would be to plunge the Negotiation into inextricable difficulties. But with reference to all practical purposes, this omission was altogether unimportant. The danger of which the hon. gentleman talked as threatened in the event of the union of the crowns of France and Spain was really at the present day quite visionary. The law of Europe had too long considered those monarchies as incapable of junction, to warrant any serious apprehension from the possibility of their falling into each other and besides, as between this country and Spain, the treaty of Utrecht, by which the possibility of such an occurrence was provided against, remained in full force. This arrangement had also been confirmed by the treaty of Seville in 1729.

He was anxious also to diminish by explanation a great misconception, much of which had been ably removed by his hon. friend, namely, that the frontier of the Netherlands was, with reference to France, in a state of dangerous weakness. The defence of that frontier would at least not be inadequate during the next five years. The question therefore was how would it he left after the expiration of that period? The hon. and learned gentleman opposite spoke of the fortresses as incapable of defending the frontier. In 1814, the hon. and learned gentleman's apprehensions were of a different nature—he then feared, not that the frontier would be too weak, but that the government of the country would not be such as he wished it to be. Hoped that that fear had ceased; for although the hon. gentlemen on the opposite side were disposed to maintain, that most governments retrograded in the cause of liberty, it was impossible that they could say so of the king of the Netherlands. Let the House consider the position which Prussia occupied in that quarter. Prussia came down directly on the frontier of France. There could be no better pledge of the determination of the king of Prussia, than that he pressed furs the possession, and obtained it, of Sartre Louis, that he had provided for the defence of Luxembourg, and that he was about to refortify Trees. When a most efficient military power thus took a position on the frontiers of France, strengthened by three fortresses, it was not to be expected that it would permit the Netherlands to be conquered, as that conquest must expose it to a more facile attack. In fact, Prussia was deeply interested in the conservation of the Low Countries, and would, of course, take good care that France should not turn her flank, and penetrate between the sea and Luxembourg. It was a perfect solecism in military affairs, that Prussia could remain tranquil with France in possession of the Netherlands. Prussia must fight for the Netherlands as for the frontier of her own territories. He did not hesitate to say, that to that defence Prussia appeared perfectly competent. He did not mean that she was equal to meet revolutionary France, if France should unhappily again exert that unnatural strength which had formerly rendered her the scourge of Europe; but he contended that Prussia, possessing a population of five millions of souls, if supported by Great Britain, would be fully able to check any aggressions that France, in her regulated state, might be inclined to attempt. Not only was that part of the frontier strong against France, but the territory open to Landau was so strongly fortified, that if the revolutionary tide did not again flow, it would be perfectly able to resist all ordinary attacks.

The hon. and learned gentleman dealt much in assumption. Where facts did not exist, it was convenient enough to assume them. On these assumptions the hon. and learned gentleman had built up the statement that the allied powers had imposed the government of the Bourbons on France by force of arms, and had thrown over the necks of an unwilling people an odious yoke, from which they would endeavor to disengage themselves on the first opportunity. All this, the noble lord said, he most pointedly denied. Although the British government and its allies always reserved to themselves the right of using all justifiable means which were calculated to insure success in the object which, in coincidence with all Europe, they had in view, namely, the settling of France, they never committed any act in favor of the Bourbons unwarrantable in itself. They felt too well what was due from them to the French nation, and even to the Bourbons themselves; whose cause would have been injured, and not served, by any such step. It would have been impossible for the allied powers to have devised any thing more injurious to Louis 18th, than an endeavor by force to produce that manifestation of feeling towards his majesty, which he (lord Castlereagh) was, from the very first, convinced his subjects cherished, and would gladly show, whenever the military impediments to the expression of their at, attachment should be removed. The allies had done nothing to deserve the enmity of France. He was not aware that they had dune more than this—they had driven before them that rebellious army which had betrayed the interests of their king and country, to place a usurper on his throne. He did not know that the allies had been guilty of any offence, but that of defeating that army, and driving it from Paris; and he knew of no violence having been done to the feelings of the French people by restoring their legitimate sovereign. He did not know what sentiments some portion of them might entertain with respect to Louis 18th, but this he knew, having witnessed his second return to the capital, that wherever he made his appearance, he had been received with transport by the populace. The noble lord said, he had never witnessed a greater display of popular affection than had been called forth by the presence of the king. On his return in 1814, he had been greeted with one general expression of joy, but the demonstrations of satisfaction were still greater in the last year, and he had on no occasion seen enthusiastic kindness more generally elicited from a people in honour of their sovereign than on that. The conduct of the allies with respect to Louis had been perfectly consistent. There was, however, necessarily a difference between the course which they had to pursue, when he was obliged to fly his kingdom, and that which was prescribed to them when he was enabled to resume the administration of the government of France. The relations between the allied powers and him of course changed, when, instead of being compelled to reside out of his dominions, he was again established in the exercise of his functions. The difference to which be alluded, arose from the course which the sovereigns had in the first instance thought the interests of their own subjects, as well as those of Europe, generally made it their duty to pursue. They had not thought it right on entering on the new war, to make the restoration of Louis a sine quâ non of peace. But though they had not, in the first instance, felt themselves called upon to declare that they would prosecute the war till he was re-seated on his throne, when be was in a situation to resume his authority, it was not for them to oppose his doing so, and by thus virtually displacing him, risk again disturbing the peace of Europe.

The precedents which he (lord Castlereagh) had brought forward last night, had been objected to by the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Horner), on the ground that the circumstances connected with them were not exactly similar to those under which the present treaty had been concluded. That there were differences which ingenuity might detect, he did not deny, but this did not make against the comparison which. He had thought might fairly be made. He should be glad to know what two precedents in the history of the world could be found in every respect precisely the same. Though he admitted that some variations might be pointed out in the circumstances, the principle in both instances was identical, and this was enough for his purpose, and nothing had pleased him so much as to find, from the statement of the hon. and learned gentleman, that the whigs of the present day bore so strong a semblance to the whigs of former times. The sentiments of the gentlemen opposite had been, perhaps, more distinctly expressed on the question, how far one country might be justified in taking upon itself to interfere with the internal affairs of another, than they would have been, had he not laid before them the precedents in question, and therefore he did not feel at all disposed to regret that he had been induced to bring them forward. What precedent could be more distinctly in point than that which proved that in former times, to establish the authority of the king of this country on a secure basis, it was necessary to guard against his being left merely dependent on the support which might be afforded to him by the people of these realms? It had been thought no disparagement to British liberty on that occasion to enter into a treaty with the States General, in which it was stipulated, that, should it become necessary, a certain number of infantry and cavalry should be sent over to England, to support the king against the people, if ever they should be so infatuated as to resist the exercise of his lawful authority. Now he would ask if the present government of France was not as lawful and as legitimate as that could be in whose support this treaty had been concluded. Was it not more reasonable that Louis should desire assistance from the interference of a foreign state, than it was that an English monarch should be thus supported who had not that revolutionary spirit to contend with, which at present unfortunately threatened the authority of the king of France. The justice of the interference of one country in the internal affairs of another, was thus established as far as it could be established by precedent, when it was proved, that even under a Whig administration a treaty had been concluded, by which a British monarch was made dependant on a foreign state for support against the attempts of his own subjects.

He now wished to offer a few words on the subject of the imputations which had been cast on the present national assemblies of France. It was said that a design had been formed for restoring the national domains to those to whom they formerly belonged. He should much lament the adoption of a measure which would tend so greatly to disturb the tranquility of France. If the national assemblies should be se unfortunate as to retrace the steps of the revolutionary legislators of that country, by disturbing the present proprietors in their possessions, he would agree with the hon. and taught gentleman, that acting thus they would prove themselves the bitterest enemies, not only of their own sovereign, but of the general tranquility of Europe. Such a measure he was confident would be in direct opposition to the feelings of the great mass of the French people, and whatever had been said of the manner in which the members of those assemblies were elected, he believed they brought with them a considerable share of the popular feeling into their deliberations. The influence of the government in France had not that effect on the elections, which it had been supposed they had by many persons in this country. He had never heard that the members returned under their influence exceeded a tenth of the whole number, and he had often heard it maintained, that they did not amount to a twentieth. The members of the present chamber were three times as numerous as they were under the late system, and they had a much greater number of constituents, not fewer than 50,000 persons having voted on the elections. These persons were distinguished as those who paid most to the revenue of the country; they were therefore likely to be among the most enlightened portion of the French people. By the elective franchise being placed in such hands, a very tolerable representation of the country was obtained. From the manner in which this assembly had been brought together, and from the feelings by which it appeared to be animated, a strong, if not a conclusive proof might be drawn, of the decidedly favorable impression which had been made on the minds of the French generally, with respect to the character of the king. This was so clearly demonstrated by various circumstances, that he thought the only feeling which existed in France against Louis 18th, was that of the military interest; he meant those who looked for advancement to the creation of an army, to promotion, and to the rewards of exertion in war.

With respect to the scope of the hon. and learned gentleman's argument, which represented the force to be kept up in France as dangerous to our internal situation at home, he should offer a few words. He apprehended the House would be disposed to agree with him, that if we did not keep in existence the means of repelling any new effort that might be made on the part of France, it was possible our neglect in this instance might cause that country, and indeed Europe, to be again deluged with blood. The hon. and learned gentleman, however, seemed against precaution altogether; he would not suffer money to be taken from France—lie would not keep up a military force there—and he doubted if he could bring himself to touch the frontiers. He therefore seemed to desire that we should go back to the peace of 1811; and in this he had separated himself from all his political friends.

He should now notice what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman who had spoken last. That right hon. gentleman, turning aside from the dangers which menaced our interests in other countries, had particularly dwelt on the jeopardy in which our liberty at home would be placed by the maintenance of that army which had served us so well abroad. The noble lord said, he did not see the danger himself, and he did not believe the country would easily be brought to recognize it. He could easily conceive the right hon. gentleman might feel it to be his duty to advocate the wise principles acted upon by our ancestors, but that he himself could seriously believe our liberties would be endangered by the circumstance of an English army being kept up in France for a specific service, and for a limited time, he could hardly think possible. It was a romance too extravagant for imagination. He (Lord Castlereagh) admitted it would have been possible for our contingent of the force to be maintained in France to have been composed of foreign troops; but he knew not why any feelings of irritation should be excited by an English force being preferred for this duty. He had every reason to believe that the feelings of the French people were most favorable to this arrangement; that they would rather British troops should come in contact with them than those of any other nation. The arrangement would not be expensive to this country, and he did not hesitate to state it to be most decidedly his opinion, that we could not do better than to guard against too hastily breaking down that force which it had cost the country such stupendous efforts to build up, before we were certain we could go on securely without it. If a precautionary system was thought necessary to secure the peace of Europe, he could see no reason why those admirable soldiers, who had deserved so well of their country, should not be kept together (if this could be done without expense to England) for its support. Those who had conquered at Waterloo he had thought might well be maintained in France, at her expense, till the state of the world should be such that we might safely ground our arms, till the danger of re-action was gone by, and the peace of Europe was securely established.

did not wish to take any unfair advantage of the noble lord, by rising after he had made his reply. He should not have done this had he not endeavored but in vain to speak before. He wished, as the conduct of the Whigs of former times had been brought under the consideration of the House, to submit to them a comparative statement of the course which had been pursued by former Tories. [The hon. member was here interrupted by cries of question, and the impatience of the House to divide became extreme.] He had wished, he said, to state what in former times had been the conduct of the Tories, conceiving this to be the last opportunity he should have of doing so, on the present question; but having been informed that his object might be affected when the report of the address was taken into consideration, he was far from wishing, at that late hour, to trespass longer on the patience of the House.

The House then divided:

The original address was then put, and agreed to.

The House adjourned at four o'clock on Wednesday morning.