moved the second reading of the above Bill. His lordship observed, that many objections were made to the measure, and, he believed, petitions were preparing against it; but, as those objections related principally to the raising of tolls, and some other matters of regulation, he conceived they could be removed in the committee. He should, therefore, move the second reading of the Bill, which, if delayed, would occasion much inconvenience to a number of persons who were now attending in town.

did not mean to oppose the motion, as the noble lord seemed to suppose that the objections would be disposed of in the committee. He wished, however, to observe, that petitions would shortly be presented against it from Liverpool, and from several other places.

The bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be committed.

on presenting a petition from the county of Northampton against the property tax and the peace establishment, said, that although not passed unanimously, it was carried by a very large majority.

stated that the minority was respectable, and that he could not support that part of the petition which related to the property tax.

presented a petition from Bristol, signed by above 4,000 inhabitants, but felt it his painful duty to declare that the sentiments contained in the petition did not accord with his own.

presented a petition from the corporation of Bristol against the property tax, and declared that in his opinion the continuance of the property tax was a most judicious measure for the purpose of winding up the expenses of the war.

presented a petition from Liverpool against the property tax. He said that no difference of opinion existed in the town with regard to the prayer of the petition. He fully coincided in those sentiments; the House was pledged to the discontinuance of the tax during peace, and he should oppose it as long as he had a seat in that House.

wished to state a fact which came within his own knowledge. All the signatures were procured in a few hours, on the supposition that the petition could not be presented after to day. Many parts of the country, he said, were laboring under the same mistake, imagining that this was a new tax, and that the standing orders would prevent the reception of any petitions on the subject of the income tax after to day. He was convinced this was a manœuvre to prevent the voice of the country being heard.

also stated that such an opinion existed in his county.

took this opportunity of giving notice, that he meant to propose the income tax in the committee of ways and means on Wednesday, and hoped those members who had notices on the book would give way to him.

said, that so far from that he would rather add another notice than remove the one now existing, in order to prevent the right hon. gentleman from running a race with the country. Such precipitation was most indecent. He declared he would oppose the measure in every stage, and keep it as long before the House as he could. He knew the anxiety of the country on this account to be very great. He wished hon. gentlemen would attend more to their constituents than to private meetings at the minister's house, thereby endeavouring to stifle their voice.

said a meeting had been called in his county; his constituents were anxious to have an opportunity of expressing their sentiments, and he therefore required delay.

said, that it was the intention of Beverly to petition if they were given time.

said, he had received intelligence from his constituents stating that they had delayed a requisition until the motion of the hon. member of Essex had been disposed of. If the income tax was thus hurried on, their object must necessarily be defeated.

stated that a similar occurrence would take place in Rutlandshire.

stated the same fact with regard to the counties of Denbigh and Montgomery.

observed, that Berkshire was very desirous of meeting, and that a requisition had been sent for the purpose. He trusted the chancellor of the exchequer would abandon his intention of being so precipitate.

declared he had so long ago announced his intention respecting the property tax, that a full opportunity had been given of petitioning against it; and that he was persuaded the sense of the country at large was not adverse to its being continued for the period and under the modifications which he had proposed; he should therefore bring forward the discussion on Friday next.

said, that the right hon. gentleman seemed to take it for granted that the estimates he intended to propose would be agreed to by the House; but he trusted gentlemen would remember, that if they were not carried, the property tax would not be wanted.

observed, that he should proceed in the usual course of beginning with the estimates first, and proceeding to the ways and means afterwards.

was in favour of delay. His constituents intended to petition, but had hitherto been prevented by the indisposition of the mayor, who was incapable of attending public business.

expressed his surprise that the right hon. gentleman would not accommodate himself to the wishes of the country. Did he conceive that the opposition to this tax was artificial or fictitious, or that it was excited by a party spirit?

said, his majesty's ministers wished to prevent the voice of the people from being heard, which he considered most unfair.

said, he held in his hand a petition which was unanimously agreed to at a very numerous meeting of the inhabitants of Westminster, and signed by a certain number of them. The petitioners complained, that it was the declared intention of ministers to propose the continuance of the income tax, in violation of their most solemn pledges to the contrary. Against this tax they protested as an intolerable grievance, and also against the maintenance of a large military establishment, which in their judgment, as well as his own, was utterly incompatible with the liberties of the country.

presented a petition against the income tax from the inhabitants of the ward of Broad Street, who, Le said, had supported his Majesty's government for the last twenty-five years, but were now unanimous in their opposition to this proposed tax.

presented a petition from the city of Norwich to the same effect, which, he said, expressed the sentiments of the great body of the inhabitants of all ranks.

presented four petitions from the land-owners and occupiers in the Isle of Ely and from other parts of Cambridge shire setting forth the distresses under which they labored, and praying against the continuance of the war taxes generally, and particularly against a standing army in the time of peace.

presented several petitions against the income tax from Don caster, North Allerton, North and South Cave, and the parish of Cottingham, all in the county of York.

said, he held in his hand not less than twenty-six petitions, the object of which he should endeavour to state generally. The first he should notice was one signed by 700 occupiers and owners of land in North Devon, complaining of the distresses under which their agriculture labored, of the heavy burthens imposed upon the farmer by county rates, poor-rates, and tithes, and particularly by the property-tax, which they estimated at seventeen and a half per cent. on the land. They stated, that many of them, in order to meet these payments had been under the necessity of selling their young cattle to great disadvantage, and some of them were now in confinement for debt, from inability to pay. This petition also complained of the severity of the salt tax. Another petition which he held in his hand was from the yeomanry of the district of Tiverton, once an opulent body of men, complaining of the property tax, and setting forth the great increase of poor-rates, in consequence of the distresses of the agricultural laborers. The petitioners stated their wish, that if the income tax was still deemed necessary, it should undergo some modification, and that, if possible, the same should be the case with the assessed taxes. The hon. baronet proceeded to observe, that from the best attention he had been able to give the petitions, some of them were for the unqualified removal of the income tax; others for some modification of it should it still be deemed necessary.

The first petition presented by the hon. baronet was then brought up and read by the clerk, who was proceeding merely to read the titles of others, when

interposed, observing, that he thought all of them should be read. All they knew at present from them was, that, to use the words of the noble lord opposite, there was a great degree of ignorant impatience for relief from taxation [a laugh, and cries of hear, hear]; but it was proper that the petitioners should be heard for themselves,

This was assented to, and the whole of the 26 petitions were read. When the clerk had got nearly half through them;

rose, and put it to the right hon. gentleman opposite, whether it was necessary that the time of the House should be occupied at such length, particularly when, as far as respected any information which the House might derive from hearing so many petitions of nearly the same tenor, it was quite useless?

replied, that he had wished them to be read for the express purpose of calling the attention of the House to them. It was the least thing the House could do to listen to the prayers of the people; but if gentlemen chose to pay no attention at all to the reading of the petitions he could not help it.

When the petitions had been read,

observed, that possibly the hon. members opposite might now know something of the contents of the petitions, for their better information he would state that twenty out of the twenty-six were against the property-tax, the rest complaining generally of distress and heavy taxation.

, in reply to the right hon. gentleman's remark, felt himself called upon to state, that all the petitions were put into his hands that afternoon, and that notwithstanding the shortness of the time, he had read them over as carefully as he could. The impression on his mind was, that they did not generally pray for the unqualified repeal of the income tax, in the fair sense of the word; otherwise why did many of them call for its modification? The right hon. gentleman would allow that a considerable noise prevailed in the House during the time of their being read, which might have prevented him from accurately hearing their purport; but if the right hon. gentleman took the trouble to read them over as he (Sir T. A.) had done, he would find that they were not generally against the income tax,—probably not above half of them.

would not pretend to put the accuracy of his ears in competition with the accuracy of the hon. baronet's eyes, the hon. baronet having stated that he had read the petitions, and therefore ought to know something of their contents: but he nevertheless maintained the accuracy of his original statement, that twenty out of the twenty-six petitions contained prayers against the property tax; in some of them that prayer was mixed up with other matters, but twenty contained such prayer, or he had lost his hearing.

again rose and persevered in speaking, although there were cries of "spoke, spoke!"

stated that there was no question before the House.

added, that the hon. baronet could not be allowed to persevere, as there really was no question before the House; but as there was a dispute about the meaning of these petitions, perhaps the better way would be to read them over again (a laugh).

could not but express his astonishment at the way in which petitions on this most important question had been brought before the House, especially where one member happened to have a considerable number to present. This was the first time that he had seen twenty or six and twenty petitions introduced, as they had been that night, and on a question of such importance that was agitating the country from one end to the other. To him such a manner was extremely unsatisfactory. If any member chose to adopt such course towards his constituents, that was his business; but he should be sorry to see the day arrive when the petitions of the people of England were to be regularly received in such way. If petitions by the score and hundred were to be smuggled into the House in such manner, what probability was there of their having a fair chance of effecting their object? According to such system, when one or two petitions were presented, they must be read; but when they poured in by twenties and hundreds, a proof of how much more importance they were, then they were to be smuggled into the House without being read at all. According to such practice, neither the House, the public, nor the petitioners, would know what became of the petitions. There was another practice of modern date, of which he must also complain, namely, that of only printing in their votes the names and prayers of such petitions as were presented, instead of, the leading features of each petition. In future he hoped this practice would be amended, and particularly that all members would refrain from presenting petitions in the mass; he trusted that they would separately notice and present them.

presented a petition from Taunton, against the property-tax. At the same time he expressed the hope that members, who might have petitions to present, would impartially notice their contents, and not give to such contents the colorings of their own impressions.

supposed that the latter remark was leveled against his hon. friend, upon whose petitions so much had been already said. He must observe, and the House would probably entertain the same opinion, that the assertion, that the hon. baronet had given to his petitions the coloring of his own feelings, was altogether unjustified by the contents of the petitions themselves, which, when read, were found completely to bear out the remarks made on offering them to the House. He had listened during the reading of the petitions with the greatest attention, and would maintain that a statement more correct in all particulars had never been given in the House than that which had fallen from the hon. baronet.

censured the mode in which the hon. baronet had endeavoured to dismiss twenty-six petitions of such importance; certain it was, that if the hon. baronet had felt upon the subject of the property-tax as strongly as those who made him their organ, his conduct would have been very different. It was singular also that the petition which the hon. baronet had been most anxious should be read, said little or nothing upon the theme of the abolition of the property-tax, which had filled nearly all the others.

, although not unprepared to agree with what had fallen from a noble lord, as to the propriety of printing the petitions more fully in their votes, could not but remark that he had very recently observed the practice pursued by an hon. baronet in presenting twenty-six petitions, pursued a short time since by one of their oldest members, who had many petitions to present, he presenting the whole of them at the same time.

said, that he had been induced to remark on the way in which the petitions had been presented by the hon. baronet, in consequence of observing the decided attempt of his Majesty's ministers to bring forward the subject to which those petitions referred, before the sentiments of the country at large could be expressed upon it. Under such circumstances, it was natural to view with jea- lousy any attempt to slur over the business before them.

said, that the chancellor of the exchequer having informed the House that on Friday next, in a committee of ways and means, he should bring forward the subject of the property-tax, he should to-morrow move for a call of the House on that day, and on every day during the discussion of that great question.

The petitions were ordered to lie on table.

Mr. Goulburn presented to the House, pursuant to their orders, an account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the island of St. Lucia, with the salaries and emoluments of the same; and also of all offices in the said colony filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.—An account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the island of Tobago, with the salaries and emoluments of the same; and also of all offices in the said colony filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.—An account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the colony of Demerara and Essequibo, with the salaries and emoluments of the same; and also of all offices in the said colony filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.—An account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the colony of Berbice, with the salaries and emoluments of the same; and also of all offices in the said colony filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.—An account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the Isle of France, with the salaries and emoluments of the same; and also of all offices in the said colony filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.—An account of all offices, civil and military, under the Crown, in the island of Malta, with the salaries and emoluments of the same.—An account of all offices in the islands of Malta and Gozo filled by appointment from any authority other than the Crown.

said, that he came down to the House with the intention of opposing the motion; but if he had not previously made up his mind, the petitions that day laid upon the table, would have rendered it an imperious duty on his part to give a decided opposition to any proceeding which should warrant even the consideration of the enormous estimates of which the House had already heard too much. Those petitions proved beyond contradiction, that the people were with haste congregating in all parts of the country, in order to compel ministers to listen to their sighs under their afflictions, and to their groans under the burthens that were laid upon them; burthens heavier than in any previous time of peace; heavier even than in many former wars in which we had been engaged. Ministers, on the contrary, were endeavouring to shut their ears against the cries of the people, and were running a most unbecoming race, in order to impose the grievous weight before the nation could have time to express its resolution not to sustain it. The bare proposal that a standing army of 150,000 men should be supported, must alarm every friend to his country and its constitution; not that he was impressed with any fear so ridiculous, as that a standing army unaided could ever effectuate what had been accomplished in some of the states of the continent; but the greatest danger was to be found in the influence of the Crown, which, by daily increase, threatened to erase even the vestiges that departing liberty had left behind her. How much that influence would be augmented by a great standing army, required no illustration. A time might arrive, and that not far distant, when the House of Commons, for its own security, as well as for the security of the Crown, would find it necessary to keep up an immense regular force; when that event occurred, the people must bid farewell to that freedom which they had so long and so anxiously preserved. Among the many reasons that had been urged for the enormous peace establishment, the most absurd appeared to him to be the assertion, that it was necessary for our own security, in order to avoid the speedy renewal of hostilities. The House could not fail to recollect that, for the last twelve years, ministers had been soothing the impatient country by stating, that the war was continued to prevent the necessity of an armed peace, and yet now they ventured to tell the people, that, after all their sacrifices, they had gained nothing; for still an armed peace was all that had been acquired. Thus then the case stood—we had undertaken a war to procure peace and a diminution of taxation, and we had concluded a war only to perpetuate the burthens for which war had been the only excuse. At the peace of Amiens it would not be forgotten that the power of France was infinitely more dangerous than at present. Switzerland bowed to her yoke, and Italy acknowledged her sovereignty; yet the chancellor of the exchequer of that day, when the danger was more imminent, had proposed a much more economical establishment, as fully adequate for our protection. The noble lord on the opposite side might endeavour to show that we were now in equal peril from our neighbours; but, supposing the assertion true, what did it prove, but that, under his administration, all the valuable lives destroyed, and all the immense treasures lavished in the continuance of the war, had been wasted? Honour might have been gained by our armies, but shame had been brought upon the House, and calamity upon the country. From the close of the American war to the opening of that of the French revolution, the peace establishment of this nation had been too much extended, and the admitted consequence had been, that our resources having been exhausted, a sanguinary contest was prolonged by the deficiency of means to bring it to an early termination; and while adverting to the instruction history would afford, he could not avoid noticing a speech of his present majesty, soon after he ascended the throne, at the termination of a war, in which he said that his first and most ardent wish, the attainment of peace, had been accomplished; his second, the alleviation of the burthens of his subjects, yet remained to be fulfilled; but still it was necessary to maintain a respectable navy, the true bulwark of the island. The language of the minister in our own day was far different; it held out, indeed, a vain promise of retrenchment, while Great Britain was converted from a naval into a military nation, and, instead of continuing a mighty island, she was to be changed into a petty continental state. The history of the country showed, that the invariable object on the arrival of peace was, to reduce the military establishment as low as possible. Even at the peace of Ryswick, when it was said that the Bourbons meditated an attack upon the independence of England, that the succession was to be disturbed, and that she was again to be placed at the mercy of the House of Stuart; even then, the parliament would not agree to the proposal of a standing army, holding it to be of paramount importance to reduce it as low as possible, and to trust the defence of our liberties to the operation of the constitution, rather than to confide it to those who had an interest in its overthrow. This brought him to the question of the propriety of maintaining in France a British force to repress revolutionary movements. Whether even that were a fit object, might be a matter of doubt; but who could avoid perceiving to what a purpose this army might be applied? It might happen that evil counsellors should persuade a king of France to trample on his subjects, and British soldiers might be engaged as the instruments of detested tyranny. Already in Spain the prediction had been nearly verified. Sir William Blackstone had held, that the army only existed for the protection of the people; and after having been employed successfully in France in quelling the rising energies of a great people, our soldiers on their return would be well qualified to act the same disgusting scenes in England—perhaps an improvement upon the emissaries of Fouché under the régime of Buonaparté. With regard to the mode in which they were to be supported, no friend of his country could fail to wish that they should be paid under the control of parliament, and that the money now intended to be devoted to them might be placed in the British treasury. To the 25,000 destined for Ireland, he objected with equal firmness; if they were indeed required, his regret would be augmented, and here was a real danger to be apprehended; for nothing could be more objectionable than the mixing up of soldiery with the private and civil affairs of a country; the constitutional authorities were thus superseded, and slavery engrafted on the very stock of the nation. For these reasons, he should strenuously resist the estimates about to be proposed; and, should he have the good fortune to succeed, he would afterwards propose an address to the crown, praying that more economical propositions should be made to the House, that the people might find that parliament was not deaf to their loud complaints, and that if measures of late years pursued had prevented complete retrenchment, yet that at least an anxiety prevailed to alleviate their burthens.

expressed his anxiety to embrace every opportunity of mitigating—he would not say of resisting—the estimates proposed by his majesty's government. In spite of the strong feeling which he entertained of his inadequacy to address the House, he was sustained by his stronger sense of the duty imposed on every honourable member to exercise, and to declare sincerely and independently his own judgment on this, which of all the important questions which had been agitated in parliament during the three short years that he had had the honour of a seat there, appeared to him to be of infinitely the greatest magnitude. Whenever the proposition of a large standing army had been made in that House, it had been resisted on a principle wholly unconnected with any party feeling—it had been resisted by a body of men acting independently of any administration—he meant the country gentlemen of England; who had invariably united in their hostility to a measure of that nature. As for his own motives on this particular occasion, be could solemnly assure the House, that he was wholly uninfluenced by any personal feeling towards any individual whatever. In comparison with such a question as that before them, he cared not who was in or who was out of power; but he called on the country at large to think and to act for themselves—to look at the extent of the means they possessed, and at the extent of the danger to be apprehended, and to decide on the establishment that was advisable with reference to both those considerations. Without desiring the House to go far back to precedents, without referring them to the sterner periods of British history, he thought it might do no harm to remind them of one instance of the inflexible manner in which parliament formerly discharged its duty on this subject. He alluded to their conduct towards king William—that sovereign who had been the seal and the confirmation of our liberties—from whom nevertheless the parliament of his time tore those Dutch guards who had been his companions in all his victories [Hear, hear!]. But without going so far back for examples of the conduct of the country gentlemen in parliament, he would refer to a period of between 30 and 40 years ago, when Mr. Pitt, with all his eloquence, with the force of his government, and with a case incomparably stronger than that of the present time, attempted to press the expediency of expending 400,000l. of the public money in fortifications. What was the event? It was not Mr. Fox or his party by whom the proposition was effectually resisted. It was by the country gentlemen of England, headed by Mr. Bastard, then member for Devonshire. The numbers on the division respecting it being equal, Mr. Cornwall, the Speaker, gave that casting vote which secured the country from the danger with which it had been threatened.^* The same spirit of liberty, the same love for their country and for its constitution would, he trusted, animate the country gentlemen of the present day. In his opinion the estimates proposed by his majesty's government were founded on a perfectly false view of our means, and of our danger. What were our means? the interest of the national debt was 40 millions; from this we could not relieve ourselves. It was proposed to vote a peace establishment of nearly 21 millions. To pay these conjoint sums the annual peace taxes must exceed 60 millions. If the income tax had any one good quality, it was, that it afforded the opportunity of estimating the national property. Deducting from the returns all that was derived, as by the professional man, from the mere employment of time, or as by the farmer from mere personal labor, it would appear that the revenue actually proceeding from the land and stock of the country, did not exceed 130 or at most 140 millions. When it thus appeared, that even in time of peace the country was called upon by the state for half its revenue, that there was danger of its soon arriving at the end of its re- sources, let the House consider what must happen should we unfortunately be plunged into another war. Last year the right honourable the chancellor of the exchequer, as an apology for touching that sacred deposit the sinking fund, had declared that taxation had found its limits. It appeared, then, that the expense of our peace establishment was nearly equal to that which under any circumstances the country could defray. How was this situation of things compatible with that high tone which it behaved the country to maintain, and which could only be maintained by that economy in peace which would afford us the means of waging war with success? [Hear, hear!] These considerations pressed the more nearly, when the House looked at the mass of petitions on their table. He verily believed that the distresses of the people at the present moment were of a magnitude not sufficiently appreciated [Hear, hear!] And in what consisted the danger which required this immense peace establishment? We were, as far as the assurances of ministers went, confirmed in our alliances, and being thus bound cordially together, there was less danger of this union being dissevered from jealousy than there was of any alliance ever made in Europe, of which England formed a part. Where, then, was the need of this establishment? As the army of France was destroyed, there was surely no military danger to be apprehended on her account. If we kept up men at Cambray and Condé it was perfectly needless to keep them at Colchester and Chelmsford; in short, if our army was to be kept in France, we did not want it here. The same might be said respecting a large naval establishment; it was not required. Neither France nor Spain had any navies at all. As to our troops for foreign stations, they appeared large beyond all possible necessity. There was to be 11,000 men for Gibraltar; but there was no reason why a higher number of men were wanted for the Mediterranean now than was necessary in 1791, when the establishment was between 4000 and 5000 men. In the Ionian islands there were to be 3,500. He would call upon the House to consider the nature, terms, and principles of that acquisition, in order to see what gronnds there were for any danger arising in those islands. It could not be from Russia, or from Austria; for it was by the concurrence of those two powers that we took possession of them. It was surely not to protect ourselves against the inhabitants; for they conceived that our coming was from a disposition to deliver them from the thraldom under which they had previously labored. He must therefore think that 12 or 1500 men would be a number fully adequate for those possessions. The same might be said of Batavia and Ceylon, and even of India itself, where, if we were anxious to find an enemy, we had to seek him on the frontiers of Napaul or Thibet. He therefore thought that all our foreign establishments were too large; and he was sure the House would think that 14,000 men for the West Indies was out of all proportion. In 1791 the establishment for those colonies was not more than 2000, and surely they were even more safe now than at that period, or than they ever were while the chain of the French colonies remained unbroken. About 4000 men would, in his opinion, be amply sufficient for them. Another important subject was Canada, which, he believed, as far as frontier went, was stronger rather than weaker than it was before; for the possession of Upper Canada materially strengthened Quebec. There was a force of Canadian militia, so excellently disciplined, that full, reliance might be placed on it, as to its assistance in case of danger. Respecting Ireland, it was a melancholy subject; his idea was, that there should be a specific inquiry into the real state of that country, for we only know that there is a great degree of local disturbance about tithes; but there was no symptom of rebellion against the government. There could therefore be nothing to occasion the continual employment there of 25,000 men, except to assist the police, and their aid was not grounded on any positive or actual necessity. In referring to the unhappy state of Ireland, it was impossible to refrain from lamenting the course which England had heretofore pursued, and was still pursuing towards her. Every application had been resorted to, to suppress the consequences of the evil, but none to remove its cause. He would not indeed, in referring to this painful topic, call on them to repeal at once the whole of their accumulated system, but he trusted that a sufficient inducement appeared on the face of the question, to impress in the proper quarter the necessity of resorting, as soon as it was possible, to the diffusion of a better system in that country. As to England, the military establishment was also extraordinary, and the motive for its existence worse. We were now to depart from the old system of collecting our revenue, and to employ a military force against smugglers. The cutters heretofore employed by the customs and excise departments were to be suppressed, and the navy vessels to be employed in their place. He was old-fashioned enough to object to this sort of arrangement on a variety of grounds—he preferred the King's forces to be in an auxiliary state to the customs, and not their principal; besides, the alteration would lead to the bribery and debauchery of the soldiers—a change most fatal to their character and discipline, and yet one necessarily arising out of the new habit into which they would be thrown. But even if a case of danger could be made out, he thought we had lost sight of maintaining the best species of force. The militia furnished the most eligible defence for the country, and, with an auxiliary force of twelve or fourteen thousand regulars, it would be quite sufficient for all the duties which the army would have to perform. This, he conceived, was a much better mode of viewing the subject than that which his majesty's ministers had adopted. He could not understand why they proposed so large an establishment, and least of all, why they intended to keep so large a proportion of the local militia embodied. He should have thought it better to have cut off that branch of our expenditure which the present situation of the country rendered quite unnecessary.

^* See New Parliamentary History, vol. 25, p. 1096.

said, he conceived it would have been better, more regular, and convenient, to take up the debate on the whole estimates when they were in a committee. He was glad to find, however, that an opportunity had at last been offered to go into the subject in some way or other. The hon. gentleman who had just sat down had expressed his sentiments in a most liberal, manly, and proper manner; and he was not without hopes, knowing the excellence of his understanding, and the uprightness of his mind, that, before the debate was concluded, his opinions would be considerably shaken. He would leave it to gentlemen more conversant with the subject to enter into the various details of the establishment now proposed; he apprehended it was not the question, whether we were to have a regular standing army or not, but whether the estab- lishment was greater than ought to be voted for the present year? The enormous extent and wealth of the British empire rendered it indispensably necessary that we should have some standing army, if we meant to preserve the blessings that had been handed down to us by our ancestors. Such had been the practice of the country ever since the Revolution, at which time a standing army was first established, and had continued to the present time. He therefore apprehended that there could be no possible objection to the practice. Nobody would be more ready than himself to admit, that a legal and constitutional jealousy ought to be exercised on this subject, as far as related to a standing army being under the control of the crown; but the amount of the jealousy ought not to go beyond the proportion of the amount of the army. Nobody was more anxious than himself that the standing army should be under the civil government, and especially subject to the control of parliament. The ancient jealousy against a standing army it ought to be recollected, was against suet a force being maintained in these realms and not so much from disapprobation of that which might be kept up in our foreign possessions. This was expressed in the bill of rights, as it was in the mutiny bill founded on the bill of rights. He approved of the practice which had been introduced in modern times of bringing them army kept up in our foreign possession under the control of parliament, as we as that maintained within these realms. The increase of men which the present peace establishment required, was small compared with the increased greatness of the country. When it was considers how much it had increased in every way—in population, in wealth—[Hear, hear!] He wished to know if those who cried "Hear!" were of opinion there was no wealth in the country. He would not interrupt his argument to go into that question now, but he saw an hon. gentleman opposite, who knew what wealth was, an he did not expect to hear from him the there was any scarcity of real wealth in the country. One objection which had been made to the force it was pre posed to keep up was that it would be dangerous to the liberties of the country. Now when the state of the militia we looked at, and when all the circumstance of the country were fairly taken into cot sideration, he would put it to the common sense of the House, and of the nation, if it were not a mere chimera to talk of jealousy of the army, because it was to be eight or nine thousand men stronger than it had been 26 years ago, on a former peace establishment. With respect to the evils which had been heretofore expect reined in this country from a standing army, it would be necessary to say a few words. The only instance to be found in our history in which the Crown had attempted to make use of a standing army against the rights of the people, was that furnished by James 2d. He endeavoured to use the standing army to the subversion of constitutional liberty; but with what success? The result was this—the army immediately went to the right about, and declared for the constitution and the people;—it hurled the king from his throne, and compelled his ministers to fly the country. If such was formerly the conduct of a British army, what was there in the conduct of the army of the present day, or in the character of its officers, that ought to make us suspicious that our liberties are at all in danger from them? [Here it was said, on the opposite side of the House, that it had not been intended to cast any reflection on those who at present composed our army.] It was said no reflection was meant on the present army—why, then, the reasoning they had heard was not applicable to the situation of the country at the present day. It could only be brought to bear on the abstract question; it could not affect a temporary arrangement; and the force to be kept up for the present year, he contended was not to be regarded as the permanent peace establishment. The times were changed—the doctrines might have been good formerly, but did not apply now.—He should now proceed to consider the expense which the arrangement in question would throw upon the country. Was it meant to be asserted that the army caused the increased charge of the present, over all former peace establishments? He would maintain, that if the whole army were disbanded to-morrow, the officers turned adrift, and the English grenadiers made scavengers and dustmen of, the necessary expenses entailed upon us, by establishments which have been for some years going on, partly by charitable institutions, by half-pay, &c. would exceed the whole charge of the army during the last peace. Was the situation of the country like what it was when Mr. Fox brought forward his peace establishment? He wished the House to look at the half-pay, the allowances, the gratuities, and the charitable institutions connected with the army, which had nothing to do with its present effective strength, and it would be seen from the estimates, that these created a charge of nearly two millions, which would have covered the total expense of the army in 1791. The pay of the soldiery had been doubled since that period, and the number of men necessary to do the garrison duty, to guard our military establishments and dock yards, and to protect the subject, must exceed that which was necessary on any former day. On the face of the present estimates, a variety of items would be found, which were not formerly included in similar documents. These charges were then paid, he did not know how, but they were not thus brought forward. He would say, under the circumstances he had described, no rational man could be of opinion, that the force which had formerly been kept up would now be sufficient. He would defy the gentlemen opposite, even in their present situations, to frame any thing like a satisfactory plan for carrying on the public service with a force like that which had been maintained in 1791; and if they were to come over to the ministerial side of the House, be was sure they would at once see that it was impossible. The history of the country proved our former peace establishments to have been insufficient. He thought to these it owed, if not some of its wars (which, however, he believed it did), certainly many of the difficulties with which we had had to contend, and many of the reverses and disappointments which had been experienced. At the commencement of the war with France we were positively in danger from our peace establishment, not having been calculated on a scale suitable to the defence of the country. In the year 1744, when the war broke out between this country and France, (though as we were then at war with Spain we might be considered to have been partly prepared for it), a French fleet of twenty sail of the line entered the Channel, and cast anchor at Dungeness. At that time, 42,000 men under marshal Saxes were ready to be transported to our shores, and we had, from the best information he had been able to obtain, but 18,000 men in arms to oppose them. In 1779, when we were engaged in the American war, we were in imminent danger when hostilities recommenced between this country and France. A few years ago, when all Europe was under the control of Buonaparté, who could have foreseen that the allies of England would so soon have been in possession of Paris? From this he wished it to be considered, that we ought to rest content with being prepared for that which it was probable would occur; it was necessary that our defensive preparations should be commensurate with the great interests we had at stake, thereby leaving nothing to hazard. He was anxious that the force kept up should not be larger than was really necessary. That which it was now proposed to maintain was, however, not the peace establishment; it was the force which peculiar circumstances made it necessary to maintain in the first year after the termination of the war.—The right hon. gentleman then proceeded to show that many of the charges to be met in the present year were of a temporary nature. He defended the policy of keeping up an army in France, and said that parliament had sanctioned the measure by an Address. He contended, that the difference between the expense of the present arrangement, and that of the peace establishment proposed by Mr. Fox in 1784, arose partly out of the different character of the two wars. In the American war England lost thirteen colonies, the island of Minorca, the Floridas, and other territories; in the last we had obtained Malta, Demurer, Trinidad, the Cape, and many other possessions. The smallness of the former peace establishment was caused by the losses which the country had sustained; and the largeness of the army called for in the present year partly arose from the advantages we had gained. Gentlemen said, that we were not in a situation to pay such an army as was necessary for the defence of our possessions; but what was the amount of Mr. Fox's establishment? For the navy 4,500,000l. were voted; for the army, 4,080,000l.; for the ordnance, 120,000l. These several items, with others, included under the head of miscellaneous services, made a total of about 12,000,000l.; and new takes, to the amount of 900,000l. were imposed on the country. It was now proposed, however, instead of raising new taxes, to reduce the present, so that eight million of taxes would be taken off. And then, with respect to the number of forces—Mr. Fox's estimate for Great Britain was 17,500, for Ireland 15,500, for the plantations 12,000, the East Indies 6,000; making a total of 51,000 men. From the enormous augmentation of our possessions, our present establishment was not too great; and the fair consideration of Mr. Fox's establishment was, that 59 or 60,000 men ought to be added to it. All things now were more than doubled, and we should not only take an amount of force equal to our temporary demands, but also consider the present rates of expense. He believed it would be found, that if there were to be such a peace establishment as Mr. Fox proposed thirty years ago, it would rather exceed what was submitted to the House.—He would then refer to a variety of articles which did not relate to the maintenance of the army, but had grown out of the circumstances of the war, and which the country must pay, whether it kept up any army or not. The estimate for the out-pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham hospitals amounted to 855,000l., widows pensions 93,000l., military asylum 39,000l., military college 33,000l., retired chaplains, &c. 17,000l.; which, with various other items, made a total of 3,229,000l. independent of the army. Numbers knew not what peace was but by history. No doubt he wished to see this military spirit diminished; but would it be safe, under all circumstances, for us greatly to reduce our military establishment? There were various reasons to make us pause on such a proposition, when we considered the military disposition of Europe, and looked fairly at North and South America. Undoubtedly there were still black spots in the political horizon, which rendered it necessary that we should keep up the proposed military force.

rose, to express his astonishment and indignation at the sentiments contained in the speech of the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, at the language in which those sentiments had been uttered, at the cool, calm tone in which he had laid down principles unknown to the purity of our fathers, and repugnant to the spirit of the constitution. The right hon. gentleman, indeed, had professed to speak only for himself—to deliver only his individual opinions—to make no one but himself answerable for what he said; but be nevertheless must consider the right hon. gentleman's speech as a ministerial exposition of principles; not only from the part of the House from which the right hon. gentleman had spoken, but more especially from the sentiments with which it was fraught, from the documents with which it was furnished, and from the ostentatious sort of official tone and display with which it had been delivered. He would appeal to all those who had been present at the discussions in the House during the session, whether it had not all along been the plan of the noble lord opposite, and his colleagues, to sit from day to day in their places, to hear questions asked by himself and his hon. friends, without giving any answer—to hear the debate carried on without taking any due share in it. But now, the right hon. gentleman was set forward, and with a sort of remembrance of his official habits, and resumption of official duties, comes before the House with a kind of military budget, and gave what could be looked upon in no other light than as the government statement upon this important occasion. The House was, therefore, now to consider this statement of government principles upon which that system for the maintenance of an immense military force was to be supported. He should not follow it at length into detail, as the matter was not yet in a shape to be entered upon so particularly, and he could not consent to go into a Committee on the papers on the table, which were formed on principles dangerous to the constitution. It was of inferior consideration whether the constitution was to be destroyed by an amount of cavalry, infantry, and ordnance, of 139,000 or 149,000 men. His objections went to the whole system of an enormous force in time of peace, and to the principles on which it was defended. All Europe, the right hon. gentlemen said, was much changed, and had become far more military than in 1784 and 1792. We were now told that we must put off our peaceful habits, and conform ourselves to the practice and principles of the despotic governments of Europe. This was the principle which, on the first opportunity during the session had been inculcated by the noble lord opposite. We were to change not only our establishments but our tone—we were to put on a military tone. The words of the government had been in harmony with their acts;—they had not only shown their disposition in our establishments, in the extension and creation of military orders, but in institutions not the less dangerous because they were not under the control of parliament, nor of a less insidious tendency, because they bore the innocent name of clubs [Hear, hear!]. On this head he concurred in the opinion of an illustrious naval commander (Earl St. Vincent) as to the nature of these institutions, who had not only refused his assistance in promoting their formation, but had expressed his abhorrence of them as being un-English and hostile to the spirit of our free constitution. The right hon. gentleman had said, that the treatment which was recommended towards the army was ungrateful—that it was laudandus, ornandus, and tollendus. He (Mr. Brougham) joined in the praises which had been bestowed on the army—not from empty wonder and groundless admiration, but because they had done real service to the country, and he did not therefore wish that they should be perverted to our destruction. He would join to praise their triumphs, and raise altars or pillars to record them—but he would also disband them, that they might not be as fatal to England as they had been to Buonaparté. It had been said, that we had long kept up a great army in safety. An army in time of war could not be constitutionally mischievous; it was abroad and in activity, for ends beneficial to the country: but bring it home, let it be in this island at the direction of the executive; even if it should be under the command of officers as pure and incorruptible as it was possible to conceive, still they were men—men in a state of subordination and allegiance, not to parliament, but to another power, and might be employed by that power either against the parliament or the people. The right hon. gentleman had asked whether it could be supposed that the gentlemen of England, the officers of that army would turn their arms against their country? If such an appeal had been made in former times, with what scorn and indignation would it have been treated? [Hear, hear!] Could the right hon. gentleman who was so well versed in constitutional knowledge, and whose family had borne so distinguished a part in the constitutional history of this country, advance such a doctrine? Let him imagine that in former times it had been said that the army was under the command of lord Cadogan and lord Peterborough, the very pillars of the constitution, and that therefore it could not be turned against the people:—Would it not have been then said, that as long as sol- diers were subordinate to the Crown the parliament was bound not to maintain one man more than were absolutely necessary to the safety of the country. The right hon. gentleman had quoted the preamble of the bill of rights to show that if parliament passed a law for the maintenance of an army in the time of peace, the measure would not be illegal. This was true enough; but did it prove that an army was necessary in time of peace, or that it was not altogether contrary to the spirit of the bill of rights, and of all the enactments and rules for the maintenance of our military force, that any men should be maintained who were not absolutely necessary to our safety, because during peace that force must be at home, and could not act but in a manner hostile to our constitution? The peace establishment of Mr. Fox had been cited by the right hon. gentleman, not because he had any wish to follow the precepts or principles of that great man, but as a species of argumentum ad hominem, in which reasons of the right hon. gentleman's stamp much delighted. Mr. Fox in 1784, had proposed to the House a peace establishment of 50,000 men, under the circumstances of the country at that time; that is to say, just one third of the present establishment. How then, were the remaining 90,000 men accounted for? It was said there had been a great increase in our population. On this principle, every increase of our population was supposed to be an increase of our weakness, and an additional source of disturbance. And we were to decide by the rule of three, that if with 8 millions of people we required 50,000 soldiers, with 15 millions we required nearly twice as many! But the fact was, that in 1784, the country was much more disturbed than at present; and could any man for a moment attempt to say, that as to external danger there was any comparison between that time and this? In 1784 we had concluded a war of which it was hard to say whether it had failed most in Europe or America, and at that epoch so pregnant with danger, lord North and Mr. Fox had proposed an establishment of 50,000 men; but in the present halcyon days of peace, three times that number was demanded. Of that year the whole expense was 7,821,000l.; and of 1787, which, as to tranquillity, was nearer on a level with the present, it was 4,891,000l. instead of 20 or 21 millions.—It was worthy of notice in how ingenious a manner the ministers had contrived to fritter away questions of the greatest national importance. Instead of general debates as to the policy of the country, which they always deprecated, they took at once some one "feature," as it was called, of that policy. On Monday last the treaties were debated, and that debate having passed by, all that was then decided was held to be gospel—the House was estopped from calling it in question, and the 30,000 men to be maintained in France were held to be absolutely decreed. This night the military establishment was the "feature," and on some future night it will be the property tax. "I," said Mr. Brougham, "will not disjoin one feature from another; they are all in harmony—they have all the same expression—they are parts of the same face—they all look one way—all look against the constitution, and form neither more nor less than the visage of a military monarchy." [Hear, hear!] This division of our policy into features, he continued to say, had many incidental advantages; they were that night told of a black spot in the horizon—not a word of this in the debate on the treaties! If in that debate a man had suggested that there was a spot even as big as a man's hand, he would have been denounced as nothing less than a false and malignant prophet; all was then bright and beaming with gay prospects of everlasting peace. But now, on the question of military establishments, forth came the volunteer minister with his war-office speech, declaring that nothing but black spots were to be seen, which would soon gather into clouds, and discharge their vengeance on our heads. Now, as to the 30,000 men in France; though he and his friends had objected to them on grounds of foreign policy, they were not constitutionally so dangerous as the troops which were to remain at home, although he was convinced that these troops would not be entirely paid by the French government, and would be provided for in part in the army extraordinaries. Neither was the force in the colonies, though it involved such an alarming extent of influence, dangerous in that double degree to the constitution, as the force in this country and Ireland. This colonial force had been increased in a manner quite inexcusable. For the West Indies and Canada 23,000 men were robe kept up—a number far beyond the establishment of any former period. Whence arose the additional danger? Was France more formidable than in 1781? Was our uncontested maritime superiority of no avail to the safety of our colonies? Or did they require three times as many men to defend them as at a period when we had suffered defeats by land and drawn battles at sea? The more the calculation was followed up, the less would the proposes of this unexampled establishment gain by the scrutiny; and they would gladly resort to general arguments and the visions of remote danger drawn from the military spirit of Europe. If we might apprehend danger from this spirit at some future time, a plain man would ask, why we should not wait a few years, and save ourselves and our resources till the danger manifested itself. It was evident that the results of the last victory had been such, in the dismemberment of France, that though that country had the wish to revenge itself, and though we could not trust either its monarch or his family, the state of Europe and the aggrandisement of our own military character left us less to fear from our natural enemy (as France had been called), than at any time since the revolution of 1688, or even long before that epoch. And this was the moment when it proposed to establish a perpetual military force which had never been contemplated when all Europe was leagued against us, not even at times when war was actually raging! It was a fact as to which the right hon. gentleman might satisfy himself by figures, to which he loved so well to refer, that in the seven years war, when we defeated France in all quarters of the globe, our military force was not half that which was now proposed as a peace establishment. [Hear, hear!] But they were told it was a chimera to suppose that an army could be dangerous to the constitution; that an army was the most innocent and harmless of all establishments. Without inquiring into all the ways in which an army might be injurious to the constitution, was it not enough to prove the danger, that it bore with it an immense system of influence, which was not the less injurious to the interests of the people, or less fatal to the constitution, because it was not in the hands of a responsible minister who might be questioned day by day in that House (though questions of late had not been answered), but in the hands of a person intimately connected both by interest and blood, with a power which was neither Lords nor Commons, nor Cabinet, but the Crown itself? [Hear, hear!] Was there no danger to be apprehended from the traffic which might possibly take place between the Crown and powerful individuals, who in return for commissions might engage their families to serve the monarch politically, and themselves to serve him military? [Hear, hear!] But to warrant this tremendous danger to our liberties and constitution, the plea was, that there had been a change in the country; that our arsenals, depôts, and dock-yards were larger; and that unless we would lay open these establishments, and allow the rabble to break in and steal, we must increase our military force. Now, was it that these arsenals contained more stores than formerly—that the quantity of hemp, and anchors, and masts had so increased, that by a view of these very portable and alluring stores the people would be beyond all measure enamored, and would not, without military interference, be restrained from the indulgence of their larcenous propensities? And was it from the great quantity of old iron, that we were to have an army of 150,000 men? He could scarcely believe that he had heard it. Was it that the buildings were larger, and that it would be more easy to break into a great house than a small one? In time of war, he granted, or in the event of insurrection of his majesty's loving subjects, of whose universal happiness they had heard in the speech from the throne (though they had that night received twenty-six petitions from a small district), if it was said there was a danger of insurrection, and that the garrison of Plymouth had been increased in extent, additional force might be necessary. But against midnight depredators, or the chimera of popular insurrection, a smaller force would be sufficient. And he hoped the right hon. gentleman who spoke last would not suffer himself to be led astray by any abstract view of nocturnal depredations, or the portability of sheet anchors, but would follow his natural good sense, and those practical notions of the nature of man, which he had recommended to those who made reflections on courts and courtiers.—Mr. Brougham said, that he had, perhaps, wasted more time than they deserved on the propositions which had that night been advanced, but the unwarrantable principles, and the cool talk of the right, hon. gentleman, as to the bugbear of a standing army which had frightened the opposition side of the House, had provoked him to enter his protest against those principles, and endeavour to recall to the House the feelings of better times. He hoped the House would not be led away by illusory details and items, which might be multiplied at pleasure, from the view of the sudden and groundless extension which was meditated of the influence of the Crown, against which the efforts of the House and the people should be directed. He had not said one word about the property tax, because that was a question perfectly separate from the question of the increase of the army. If the House agreed to maintain establishments which were inconsistent with the liberty of the country—if they consented to change the whole form of the constitution which was founded on the predominance of the civil power, great as the question which then remained undoubtedly was—namely, whether the people should be ground in their property, after having been stripped of their rights; yet, compared with the constitutional question, it was trifling and subordinate. The House, once for all, should make a stand against the ruin of the constitution. And he would in treat and implore the noble lord and his colleagues, that they would not be led away by their majorities. The people, who had sometimes supported them in measures of which they had since bitterly repented, were resolved, now the war was at an end, and the plea of necessity—the plea so often used when right was opposed to might—could not be advanced, to be deprived of their rights no longer. He implored the noble lord and his colleagues that they would not bring the matter to a closer issue. A voice was raised in the country which, if government persevered in measures of such unparalleled magnitude and expense, would be heard from all quarters, he trusted, in terms humble and respectful to parliament; but of a character so decided, that he hoped even the cool courage of the noble lord would not dare to resist. If there were any able and honest counsellors of the Crown, he knew the advice which they ought humbly to offer. He would presume to suggest the sort of language which such a minister would use to the throne. He would say to his royal master, that this was not a country in which the constitutional system and habits were to be encroached upon by the prejudices, tastes, or views of a military monarch; that the present royal family reigned in this country in consequence of the expulsion of a former reigning family, who endeavoured to govern contrary to the laws; that this country was England, and not Germany. He would say, that whatever prince would indulge himself in costly military gewgaws, in whiskered hussars, and the parade of foreign uniforms, who would make a plaything of an army to amuse himself and his family with, at the expense of the constitution of the country, he must not seek for this in England. [Hear, hear!] This honest counselor, if such there be, would seek to allay the military mania which prevailed, and if it had reached England, and was to be found in a certain quarter, would use his efforts to root it out, as a malady fatal to the liberties and true glory of the country.

began by observing, that the hon. and learned gentleman had made an accusation against him, which he certainly could not retort upon that hon. gentleman himself, namely; that he very seldom troubled the House with his observations. With respect to the general and declamatory manner in which the question had been argued, leaving wholly out of view the real point of discussion, he should not be tempted by the example which had been set, to imitate it, but should rather feel it his duty to abstain from all reasoning upon the constitutional and political character of a standing army in a time of peace, and to confine his remarks to the nature and extent of the proposed estimates. He adopted that course, not because he conceived the arguments of the hon. gentlemen opposite unanswerable, but because the present moment was not the fit and appropriate occasion for going into them. The aggregate amount of military force which it was intended to keep up (exclusively of the Indian army and the army of occupation in France, neither of which armies was chargeable to this country), was 99,000 men, and that force might very fairly be divided under four different heads, according to its application, namely, Great Britain, Ireland, our old colonies, and our new colonies. By our new colonies he wished to be understood as meaning those which we had conquered since the years 1791 and 1792. For the service of Great Britain there was to be an establishment of 25,000 men: for Ireland, a like number; for our old colonies, 23,800; for our new colonies, 22,200; and 3000 for relief to be afforded, from time to time, to our colonial garrisons. With respect to the force intended to be kept up for the service of Ireland, he should not trouble the House with any details upon it, because he was sure his right hon. friend, the secretary for Ireland, was much better qualified to enter into all the necessary explanations when that part of the subject came regularly before the House. At the same time, however, he could not help observing, that the governments of the two countries were bound together by the closest reciprocal interests; that whatever compromised the safety of the one compromised also the safety of the other; and that it became the duty of both to take care, when magistrates were acting, at the peril of their lives and fortunes, in the discharge of their functions, that they were adequately protected. It could not be denied that the state of that country was such as made it impossible to apply the same general principles of policy or of constitutional practice, with respect to the military force to be maintained there, as might be applied in other cases. If the legislature expected the laws to be obeyed, it became its duty to protect the persons and property of those upon whom devolved the execution of those laws.

In adverting to the other quotas of the public service, he should beg leave to take the colonial question first, and to commence with our old colonies, Gibraltar, our North American possessions, Jamaica, and the old Leeward Islands. The whole amount of force employed on those several stations in 1791 was 16,780; and that which it was now proposed to employ would be 23,800, being an increase of about 7000 men. With regard to what had fallen from an hon. gentleman who spoke early in the debate (Mr. Frankland Lewis), respecting the strength of the garrison of Gibraltar in 1791, he apprehended he was under some mistake upon that point, for, from the inquiries which he had made upon the subject, he believed it would be found that a larger force than 4000 men had been usually kept up there. It was not intended, however, to have a garrison exceeding that number at present; and when it was considered how greatly the works and defences of that fortress were augmented, and how much, in consequence, the military duties of the place were increased, he did not think that 4000 men could fairly be considered as a disproportionate number. With respect to our North American possessions, including the Bahamas, the force main- tained in them in 1791 was 5600, and that now proposed to be maintained was 9500, being an increase of only 3900. There were many circumstances, both in the internal and external condition of our North American possessions, which required that increase. It was required, as a defence for our increasing population, and not to be employed against that population. He would remind the House also, that the province of Upper Canada had been almost entirely peopled and settled since the period referred to as the point of comparison by which we were to judge of the present necessity for so large a peace establishment. The rapid accumulation of capital, the augmentation of buildings, and the extended cultivation of that province were, all of them, sufficient grounds for requiring a larger military force. In point of fact, the axe and the spade of the settlers had acted as pioneers in aiding the hostile approaches of our external enemy. He was far from meaning to insinuate (and he anxiously entreated that no such interpretation should be put upon his words), that any fears existed as to the permanency of that amity and good understanding which now so happily subsisted between this country and the United States of America; he hoped, and indeed he believed, that both countries had discovered that peace was productive of reciprocal benefits to them; that both had much which they might lose by war, and much which they might gain by peace. But still, as a measure of political prudence, it was always wise to calculate upon the possibility of aggression and hostilities; and he would venture to lay it down as a general principle, that there were no better means for securing the continuance of peace and tranquillity to any country, than to have it known that any possessions in the neighborhood of a foreign state were in a condition to repel attack. He was firmly persuaded, that among nations, weakness would never be a foundation for security. He trusted, therefore, the House would agree with him in opinion, than an increase of our military establishment in that quarter to the extent of about 4000 men, was not greater than the safety and protection of those possessions required; especially when it was remembered, that the navigation between the two countries was frequently interrupted for a considerable length of time, and that many months might elapse before reinforcements could arrive, in the event of any sudden incursion of an enemy. To insist upon the value and importance of our Canadian possessions, must, he apprehended, be perfectly superfluous. The tonnage alone, from those possessions, amounted to nearly one-fourth of the whole tonnage from our American territories, while their resources for the supply of naval stores, timber, &c. were such as rendered us in some degree, independent of the nations of the Baltic for those articles. He considered the Canadas, indeed, as the most important and the most valuable of all the possessions belonging to this country.

He should next advert to the island of Jamaica. In 1791 the force stationed there amounted to about 1800 or 2000 men; now, it was proposed to be as high as 4000. And with respect to that augmentation of force, the same arguments which he had used to justify the increased force for our North American possessions would be equally applicable here. The cultivation and increase of the military and naval character of the United States, was a just and legitimate ground for enlarging our own means of defence; for if, by any misfortune, which he should most sincerely lament, we were to be suddenly involved in a war with that government, could it be doubted, that their first efforts would be directed against our North American colonies and our West Indian islands. With regard to Jamaica, however, he was willing to refer, as a criterion by which to judge of the military force necessary for its protection, to the opinions entertained by the inhabitants of that island themselves, which would be found to sanction not only the extent contemplated by the government, but even a much larger one. In point of expense, indeed, it would be easy to prove that it was ultimately much cheaper to maintain a garrison of 4000 men than one of 2000. In the old Leeward islands the force kept up in 1791 was 4,221, and it was now proposed to have 5,500 being an increase of between twelve and thirteen hundred men, including the garrison of Bermuda. And here again he would observe, that the same general arguments were applicable to that branch of the establishments which he had already used in reference to the other colonial augmentations, with one difference however, that at Antigua there was a very considerable naval arsenal which required an additional force for its defence. He was aware that the abolition of the slave trade, by which the importation of fresh slaves was prohibited, and the condition of those actually on those islands was much improved, would, in the course of time, diminish the necessity of a large force being employed with a view to protect the inhabitants from their tumultuary attacks: but at present the condition of those islands was not such as would warrant any diminution of the military strength: and he was sure the House would feel, that even in reference to the welfare of the slaves themselves, it was a more humane and benevolent course, to maintain such a force as would overawe any attempt at rebellion, rather than to expose them to the temptation of risking one, the ultimate consequences of which must always be so fatal and disastrous to the blacks. It appeared, then, upon a general comparison of the force kept up in our colonial garrisons in 1791, with that which it was now proposed to keep up, that there was an aggregate increase at present of no more than about 7000 men; and surely if the House concurred with him in the views which he had taken of our actual situation, they would not regard that increase as disproportionate or excessive.

With respect to our new colonies, they could not have the same point of comparison to direct their judgment; but though they did not possess such a criterion, they had another, and one which, under all the circumstances, would not be considered as inadequate or fallacious; he alluded to the amount of force which the enemy had in those garrisons at the time they surrendered to this country—[Hear, hear! from the opposition benches] He could easily anticipate the sort of objection to that reference, which was implied in the cheers of the hon. gentlemen; he was aware it would be urged that those garrisons were then defended for a time of war, and not for a time of peace; but if he could show that what his majesty's government now proposed to keep up, was much below the amount of force maintained by the enemy, he should then be justified in assuming the latter as a fair ground of comparison, by which to judge of the former. The colonies to which he alluded were those of Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, the settlements on the coast of Africa, Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo, Malta, and the Ionian islands. It was difficult to state the precise amount of force which the enemy at various periods kept up in those colonies, because the only documents to which he could refer related to the amount which actually capitulated: whereas it was highly probable that a considerable number was lost by sickness, by other casualties, and during the engagements which pre ceded their surrender. With the exception, however, of those deductions, he was enabled to state to the House, that the aggregate number of troops which capitulated and marched out from those garrisons, amounted to between 29 and 30,000 men, while the force which it was now intended to maintain in them, did not exceed 22,000. It was to be remembered also, that those 30,000 were all of them effective troops, and that the 22,000 were to be taken only as the estimated establishment. If, also, to that 30,000 they added, at a moderate computation, 3000 as the number of those who perished from sickness, war, and other causes, it would make the whole force maintained by the enemy, for the defence of those colonies, between thirty-two and thirty-three thousand—a force very considerable indeed, but yet, as the event proved, not sufficiently considerable to save them from falling into our hands. When, therefore, it appeared that our proposed amount of force would not be more than two-thirds of that which the enemy thought it necessary to keep up, he did not apprehend that the House would consider that number as too high.

He should now proceed to enter upon a few details connected with those garrisons. In the Island of Ceylon it was intended to have 3000 troops; but it should be observed that there were two principal stations in that island, Trimble and Colembo, situated on opposite sides of the coast, and between which the communication was so difficult at particular seasons of the year, that each station might be regarded, in a manner, as a separate and independent post. In the Mauritius there were also to be 3000 troops maintained, and an equal number at the Cape. With respect to the former, it was a recent acquisition, and the population of it was entirely French; a circumstance by no means to be overlooked, for when, in the course of last year, intelligence arrived there of the enterprise of Buonaparté and his usurpation of the sovereignty in France, the conduct of the people proved that they still entertained feelings and views calculated to endanger the security of our possession, if a sufficient force were not maintained to overawe and check them. The Mauritius, however, was a most important naval station, and one which it would be most impolitic to lose. The same, indeed, might be said of all our new colonies, and that constituted a circumstance which remarkably discriminated them from our old ones. The latter had been solicited either by individuals, or by the Crown, mostly with a view to commercial speculations, and to enlarge the sphere of our commercial enterprises; but the former were either conquered in the first instance, or retained afterwards, as military positions, and calculated to afford protection to our commercial frontier. Their value and importance, therefore, were not to be estimated merely by the criterion of pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the degree Of efficient protection which they afforded to our trade in every part of the world. With respect to the coast of Africa, the principal object of our settlements there was to establish commercial relations with the various tribes bordering on the coast, and through those relations gradually to diffuse the blessings of knowledge and civilization. In the new Leeward islands, including six different stations—Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demarara, Berbice, and Essequibo—4000 men were to be maintained: and when they considered the number, the nature, and the character of those islands, that amount of force would not, he was sure, be regarded as too great. In Malta and the Ionian islands there were to be 7000 troops: 4000 for Malta, and 3000 for the Ionian islands. With regard to Malta, he need not expatiate on its value or importance: every one who heard him must be acquainted with both the one and the other, and every one must also recollect, how great and prominent a feature it formed in our diplomatic discussions with France, previously to the rupture of the peace of Amiens. Perhaps, however, it would be urged by the hon. gentlemen opposite, that it was so strong, both in its natural and artificial defences, that it required scarcely any other protection; but he would beg leave to remind those hon. gentlemen, that walls and ditches were no very formidable or secure defences, unless they had soldiers behind them. He could not, in fact, persuade himself that 4000 troops would be thought too much for the protection of so valuable a possession. With respect to the 3000 men who were to be stationed in the Ionian islands, he would, perhaps be fully justified in affirming, that the force, both there and at the Mauritius, were in the nature of an experiment, till it could be ascertained, from the disposition manifested by the inhabitants, what degree of military strength it would be necessary permanently to maintain. If any grounds should arise here after to authorize a reduction, he could only say, that there existed every disposition on the part of his majesty's government to avail themselves of such an opportunity. It should not be forgotten, however, that of those islands, the island of Corfu was a very important one, the defence of which ought not to be entrusted to too small and inadequate a force.

It appeared, therefore, that the whole amount of force required to garrison our new colonies, was about 22,000; or, if the proportion required for St. Helena and the coast of Africa were struck off, about 21,000. To that number were to be added the 3000 to be kept up for the purpose of affording relief to those garrisons. The propriety and necessity of that arrangement, would not, he apprehended, be disputed. It certainly could not be desired that our officers and men who were sent to garrison those colonies should be placed in a condition of perpetual banishment: they ought to be permitted to look forward, after a certain time of service, to the cheering prospect of returning to their native country. As, however, by the recent regulations introduced into the army, we could not now draft the men from one regiment to another, it became obvious that there must always be a certain amount of force maintained as a sort of fund of reserve, and occupied in passing to and fro. Calculating that the force employed in the colonial garrisons would not be kept abroad for more than ten years, which was as long a period as could reasonably and fairly be contemplated, there then ought to be annually sent out from this country one tenth of the whole amount of force employed upon our colonial stations; and to supply that proportion, it would require from six to seven thousand men to be annually sent out as reliefs. But, as the position of the army of occupation in France might be justly considered as adding to the security of our colonial possessions, only 3000 men were to be taken for reliefs.

He now came to consider the last quota of the 99,000 men which were to be maintained; namely, the 25,000 which were wanted for the home station. That amount exceeded what was kept up in 1791, by about 7000 men; but when he reflected upon the enormous increase of our colonial possessions, and the amount consequently required for foreign service, he could not regard an increase of 7000 as exceeding the fair proportion of what that increase might be expected to be. The House should recollect, that in proportion as our colonial force was inevitably augmented, in the same necessary proportion must be the increase of our depôt at home, from which the former was to be supplied. They were also to look to the possibility, though, he hoped, not to the probability, of our army in France being called into action. That there was a possibility of such an event taking place, was obvious, from the very nature of the engagements under which that army remained in France; for if there were no such possibility, why was the army stationed there at all? In such a case, therefore, reinforcements to a considerable extent might be required, and would it be wise or prudent, or even economical, to reduce our army at home so low, as to be unable, upon the emergency of the moment, to afford those reinforcements? The hon. and learned gentleman who spoke last, said it was perfectly ridiculous to suppose that any increase of our naval arsenals and magazines should require an increase of military force to protect them in time of peace; that a magazine of a mile long need not be more extensively guarded than one of only a furlong but that sort of argument, if indeed it might be called an argument, carried its own refutation along with it; for if the object were only such as the hon. and learned gentleman himself supposed, namely, to secure a magazine from the depredations of a midnight robber, still it was obvious, that the more you increased the line of that building, the more men you would require to watch it in different parts. But the House would commit a gross blunder, if they limited their views only to the supposition of the hon. and learned gentleman. It should be remembered, that a great many different works for the defence of the country had been constructed, and after having incurred the expense of erecting those works, would it be a very economical plan to suffer them to go into a state of dilapidation and decay, in order to be put to the same expense again whenever another occasion should arise to render them necessary? The force now proposed to be kept up within the realm was not more than would be found requisite to guard against such improvident dilapidations.

With regard to the difference in the amount of expenditure between the present period and that of 1791, there were circumstances connected with our foreign and domestic policy which at once accounted for that difference, and justified it. He presumed no one would venture to say that our new colonies were not worth keeping, and if they were worth keeping, then they must be garrisoned. If the hon. gentlemen opposite were prepared to affirm the contrary of that proposition, let them do so distinctly and explicitly; let them lay their finger upon this or that colony and say, here is one which is of no value to this country; or here is another which requires more expense to retain it than it is worth. Let them follow up that doctrine by an address to the Crown, and if the Crown should concur in the wisdom and policy of their suggestion, it would then be for the government to say to such colonies, so proscribed, you must either provide for your own expenditure, or you must transfer your allegiance to some other potentate, who has more power and more wealth than Great Britain to defend and support you. But, until that direct course was taken, and until parliament had so pronounced itself with respect to our new colonies, he apprehended it was incumbent upon his majesty's ministers, in the solemn and conscientious discharge of their duties, to prepare such establishments of military force, as they thought necessary for the defence of those possessions. If they did not do that, or if, from any base and mean desire to court popularity, they were to put those valuable colonies in hazard, and if any disastrous consequences were to ensue from their neglect, they would incur an awful responsibility, and he would venture to say, that the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, would not be the last person in that House to pour down upon ministers the torrent of his invective and accusation [Hear, hear!].

The plain question, then, for the House to consider was, whether they would reduce all the military establishments of the country below their just level, and whether, if they did so, the savings would bear any comparison to the injury that might be done? For after all, even if the plans of retrenchment so loudly called for were adopted, the diminution of expenditure would not be so great as the country and that House seemed to imagine. Would, it therefore, be a wise or expedient course, under those circumstances, to abdicate the high rank we now maintained in Europe, to take our station among secondary powers, and confine ourselves entirely to our own island? He would again repeat, that the question was not whether they should carry into effect such diminutions of the military establishments of the country as would save the people from the income tax, for he contended that no possible reductions in those establishments could accomplish that end; but whether they should compel the Crown to abandon all our colonial possessions, the fertile sources of our commercial wealth, and whether we should descend from that high and elevated station which it had cost us so much labor, so much blood, and so much treasure to attain Hear, hear!]? He wished also to remind the House of a circumstance which was constantly overlooked, though it ought to be always borne in mind. The present estimates were not to be regarded as the estimates for a permanent peace establishment. They were, in fact, no such thing. They referred to a sort of intermediate state between peace and war. Of the 9,800,000l. which were to be voted for those establishments, one million was exclusively appropriated to expenses which would be incurred this year, and not the next: it was to be applied to those land forces which would be reduced in the course of the year, to the embodied militia, and including also the charge for foreign corps, the whole of which was to be reduced. Some of those were already reduced, and others were in progress of reduction. The House, therefore, even upon the face of the estimates then before them, might calculate upon the diminution of one entire million after the lapse of the present year.

There was another consideration also, which had been very properly urged by his right hon. friend. Even if every officer and man composing that part of the British army, which it was intended to keep up, were annihilated to-morrow morning there would still remain a charge of upwards of two millions, which had no connexion whatever with the proposed establishments, but which would be absorbed in the half-pay, in the gratuities to the army in the funds necessary for the support of various charitable institutions of a military character. These two millions, however, were likewise included in the general estimates for the army for the current year; but if they were deducted together with the one million which, as he had already stated, would cease to be a charge upon the public after the present year, the aggregate amount would be reduced under six millions. It was to be considered also, when comparing this peace establishment of six millions with the peace establishment of 1791, that since that period a very great increase of pay to every department of the army had, taken place. The pay of the soldier had been doubled, that being now one shilling a day, which used to be sixpence. The pay of the officers also had been raised, though not exactly in the same proportion; and a variety of regimental allowances had been granted. All those different augmentations had been submitted to parliament, and had received its deliberate sanction; and he must say, that as far as it had fallen to his share to propose those augmentations, he had always found the liberality and benevolence of parliament disposed to outstrip the measure of allowance which the government thought it prudent or necessary to propose. When, therefore, all those circumstances were taken into consideration, and all those deductions were made which distinguished the present period from that of 1791, he was convinced that the proposed peace establishment was one which could not justly be regarded as stretching beyond what the interest of the country imperiously demanded. He would not trespass longer on the attention of the House, but should reserve himself for any further explanations which might be necessary, when they went into the committee.

said, that as every gentleman must be satisfied it would be impossible to bring the important debate then before the House to a close that night, he should move the adjournment of it.

was anxious that an extensive and minute scrutiny should be applied to the estimates, as the fullest discussion and examination would, he was convinced, only tend to establish the wisdom and just application of the policy on which they were framed. Ministers were desirous of nothing so much as an investigation, which he confidently anticipated, would redound to their credit.

The motion for adjourning the debate to the next day was then agreed to.