, in moving for leave to bring in a bill to ascertain and establish uniformity of weights and measures, made a short statement of the objects of the proposed measure. About two years ago, a committee had been appointed to examine the standard weights and measures kept in the exchequer. It was found that those weights and measures were very disproportionate, and inaccurate; a circumstance which materially added to the great inconvenience felt by the public, in consequence of the different weights and measures used in different parts of the country, and opened a wide door to the practice of frauds on the subject. Many attempts had formerly been made to rectify this evil, but without effect. The bill proposed that the standard weights and measures in the exchequer should be regulated. The measures in the exchequer were very inaccurate. The bushel, which ought to contain 2152 cubic, inches, contained only 2124. The gallon, the quart, and the pint measures were also far from being proportioned to one another. Dismissing the mode of regulating by capacity, it was proposed to regulate by weight, and the pound avoirdupois was chosen for this purpose, instead of the pound troy, as being in more general use. It was proposed, that the pint measure should contain 20 ounces of water, and consequently the bushel 80lbs. It was also proposed to abolish the present distinctions of ale and wine, and other distinctions of measure, with the exception of that of coals. Some exceptions also would be proposed, which related to the drugs of apothecaries. Although it would be necessary, should parliament adopt the measure, that a sufficient time should be allowed to elapse before its operation, to prevent inconvenience, yet it should be considered, that the recent investigation of the subject, had very much distressed the makers of weights and measures, some of whom, in consequence of the uncertainty that prevailed on the subject, had not received a single order for the last twelve months. In the committee on the bill, any alterations that might be suggested, would undergo the most advantageous discussion. He hoped that the bill would be allowed to be read a first and second time, and committed for the purpose of filling up the blanks, as until that was done it would be quite unintelligible. The hon. baronet concluded by moving, "That leave be given to bring in a bill for ascertaining and establishing uniformity of weights and measures."

complimented the hon. baronet on the ability and patience with which he had prosecuted the inquiry that led to this measure.

Leave was given, and sir G. Clerk subsequently brought in the bill, which was read a first time.

, on presenting the petition from Arundel, observed, that the petitioners understood that a pledge had been given for the discontinuance of this oppressive tax, as soon as the war should be terminated. It was hardly necessary for him to say, how far his opinion coincided with that of his constituents. But he wished to take this, the earliest opportunity of correcting himself, in a statement which he had made, relative to the persecution of the Protestants in the south of France. He had yesterday stated that the number of houses destroyed in the department of the Grade was two thousand. This was quite a mistake. What he ought to have stated was, that nearly that number of individuals, of the protestant persuasion, had been robbed by the populace, under the pretence of levying contributions. The number of houses destroyed was only 240. There was another error on this subject, which was not his. He had been represented as having said, that the number of women who had been treated with indignity was 150: whereas he had only said, that 30 women had been abused, and of these that eight had died in consequence. He concluded by moving, that the petition be read.

wished to take that oppor- tunity of stating his reasons for opposing the property tax. Although he approved of the amount of the proposed military establishment, he by no means wished the expense of that extensive establishment to be defrayed by the continuance of a tax of so unequal and oppressive a nature. Until the present military fervor subsided upon the continent, he felt how necessary it was for us to keep up a large army. His opinion on this subject was not so much grounded upon an apprehension of a reaction in France, as from the immense preponderance of a great continental power, whose dominions extended from the Sea of Aesop to the Gulp of Bithynia, and which, not even contented with such a prodigious extent of territory, had added thereto almost the whole of Poland. He agreed with an eloquent writer, who said that Europe might one day owe the preservation of its liberties to the military power of France and the naval superiority of Great Britain; and on this principle he was not one of those who wished to see France curtailed of its due proportion of power on the continent. Yet, however necessary it might be for this country to support, for some time longer, a great military force, there was no plea thereby afforded to justify the continuance of the property tax. He referred to the words of the noble lord who had been prime minister of this country at the time of the peace of Amiens, on the occasion of his taking off the property tax on the conclusion of that peace, as showing the opinion of that noble person to be, that the continuance of this tax during peace was illegal. He would be glad to know the opinion of that noble lord now. One great objection to this tax, independently of every other consideration, was this that it bore so unequally on the poorer classes of society. The hon. gentleman concluded by animadverting on the sarcastic expressions of a hon. baronet (sir R. Heron), as to the country being "covered with glory." He saw very plainly the disposition which dictated this expression; but he would tell the hon. baronet that he believed there were very few in the country of those who had labored most under the burthen of taxation during the war, who would not cheerfully bear much greater privations rather than see this country run the danger of becoming the province of some continental power.

said, that as he should probably not have another opportunity, he would take the present occasion of entering his humble but solemn protest against the continuance of the pro: party tax. It appeared to him to be totally inconsistent with any principles of policy or good faith, to render that which was a temporary and a war measure, a peace and a permanent one. He was aware that the chancellor of the exchequer had declared his intention of proposing it for two years only; but this proposition for a certain time had, in several instances, been already made, and the result had always been the disappointment of the hopes of those who were hostile to the tax; so it would, no doubt be, in the present case. As to the question of public credit, he was persuaded, and had been assured by individuals conversant with the money market, that a small loan would be much less injurious to public credit, than the perpetuation of this odious measure; the inequality of which, in subjecting the capitalist only to the same burthen as the man who derived the same income from the labor of his head or his hands, from six in the morning until six at night, he forcibly exposed.

begged the indulgence of the House, while he explained the reasons which induced him, having voted for the property tax in the last session, to vote in opposition to it in the present. In the last session, he felt that a large sum was necessary to carry on the war, and he was convinced that that sum could not be raised so advantageously as by the property tax. But now he was convinced, that the money which it was intended to him raised by the property tax, ought not to be raised at all: and that the enormous military establishment of the country ought to be diminished by an amount equal to that which the property-tax was estimated to produce. Reductions ought to be made in the civil list also; and if any money should subsequently be required, the best way would be to raise it by loan.

General Wemyss having presented a petition against the property tax from the tenants and owners of lands in Fifeshire,

congratulated the House and the country on the commencement of petitions from a distant part of the empire against this oppressive measure. As he came from that part of the island whence the petition just presented by the hon. general proceeded, he would under- take to say, that though it was among the first it would be by no means among the last of the petitions that would be sent from that quarter, if a sufficient time was allowed for that purpose. It was evident that these petitioners had not heard the ingenious observations of the right hon. gentleman last night, by which he endeavored to convince the House that the faith of parliament was not pledged against the renewal of the tax. The petitioners, it seemed, had not waited for the right hon. gentleman's explanation, but no doubt when they heard that in the act of last session, the three words "and no longer" had been omitted, they would be perfectly satisfied that the faith of parliament would not be violated by a continuation of the tax! It certainly was a very clever and dignified way which the right hon. gentleman had discovered for getting out of a difficulty from which he found it necessary to escape. Whether, when the petitioners heard of it, they would change their opinion, he would not say. At present they were certainly under the impression—a mistaken impression according to the right hon. gentleman—that parliament were pledged not to continue the tax. When he left Scotland many similar applications to that House were in preparation, and when the slowness of the Scotch people to petition parliament was considered, that circumstance ought to be deemed a strong proof of the impression that existed throughout the empire on this important subject.

, on presenting the petition from Monmouth, said, that the petitioners complained of the attempt to continue the property tax as a violation of faith. The tax having been levied as a war tax they insisted that it ought to cease with the cause of its imposition. The petitioners also complained of the large expenditure of the country, and of the number of unmerited pensions that had been granted; they said "unmerited," because they by no means grudged those pensions which had been merited by public services. They also complained of those enormous sinecures which still existed, notwithstanding the recommendation in the speech from the throne to measures of economy, and they could not but consider that the forbearance from all measures calculated to carry that recommendation into effect was little short of adding insult to injury. The petitioners likewise complained of the sums expended in mo- numents, and other showy useless buildings representing that in the present unparalleled state of the country all such expenses ought cautiously to be avoided. He had great satisfaction in presenting this petition; and he trusted that the effect of this and the innumerable other representations of a similar nature, which had been made, and which were about to be made, to parliament, would be to arrest his majesty's government in that course, which, if pursued, must lead to the consummation of the ruin of the country.

presented the petition from Coventry complaining of the weight of taxes in general, and of the inquisitorial nature of the property tax in particular. The hon. member began by stating his claims to attention, if on no other grounds, at least as the representative of a great city, whose interests were immediately involved in the consideration of this subject. Last year he had voted against granting money, in order to restore the Bourbons, and on the same principle, he would continue to vote against the present enormous proposed expenditure, the object of which was to support a great military establishment to maintain that family on their throne. The petition which he had the honour to present, represented sufferings in a strong point of view, and yet he would venture to assert that it did not depict the one-fourth of what the people really endured. He would mention one fact that came within his own knowledge, and which told more than any language, however exaggerated, could convey. In the House of Industry, which was supported by public expense, for the maintenance of the distressed, and of those who had no other asylum, premiums were regularly offered to gain admission, and advertisements put publicly forth to farm the industry of the poor. He requested that attention would be paid to the statements in the petition, as during the fifteen years in which he had the honour to be a member of that House, he was sorry to observe that petitions in general were paid as little attention to, as though they were no more than so much blank paper. The hon. member adverted to the cunning with which an attempt was made to pledge the parliament to a continuance of the property tax—at first they were induced to approve of the peace and the treaties, by which it had been concluded; it was now said, that they were in consequence bound to vote a large supply, in order to support a large military establishment founded on the terms of these treaties, the proceedings of ministers on this occasion was, he said, contrary to every rational principle of conduct amongst private individuals on similar occasions. It was usual, amongst those who had any wisdom, to regulate their establishments according to their certain income, and not to depend on precarious revenue for the support of establishments extravagant beyond their means.

supported the petition of his constituents. He remarked that had the tax been imposed on real or funded property it would not have excited such general opposition as it did at present, from its affecting precarious and uncertain income. The generally distressed state of the commercial interests in the country rendered the pressure of such a tax much more severe than usual. He had known several houses in Coventry which had paid from four to five hundred pounds a week in wages to workmen, now unable to pay more than forty or fifty pounds, and such a state of distress required, he thought, the removal of so oppressive a tax. He objected tab the tax on many grounds, and on none more than the facility it afforded to favoring one person more than another. The commissioners constantly favored their friends, and many suffered considerable injury by developing their private concerns to persons with whom they had been in habits of business. The tax was also an injury to public morals, by the inducement it held out to perjury, and giving false returns of property. With regard to the distress mentioned in the petition, he, from certain information could corroborate the statement, by declaring that greater distress never existed at Coventry than at the present moment, and he firmly believed that no party feeling was mingled with the statement of grievances, but that it proceeded from the general sense of the people. After all that had been brought forward already on this subject, he would not detain their time longer.

expressed his surprise that no notice had been taken by the hon. gentlemen on the opposite side, of what had been stated so ably on this subject in the course of the evening. For his part, he would not take upon himself to determine, whether ministers were ignorant of the distresses of the country, when they talked of its prosperity in the speech delivered at the opening of the session. As he had always given the Chancellor of the Exchequer credit for at least candor, he would allow him the benefit of it on that occasion. But whatever excuse there might some time ago have been for ignorance, there was no plea for it at present, when there were every day accumulating proofs of the misery which prevailed throughout the country. He was sorry to observe that retrenchment, of which so much had been promised, was so little practiced, but he hoped that the House would do its duty by compelling ministers, if they did not voluntarily enter on the subject. He concluded by advising the chancellor of the exchequer to give up the question of the income tax, or he would find himself engaged in a cause to which he would not be able to ensure success.

Sir T. Acland presented a petition from the inhabitants of the south and west division of the hundred of Black Torrington, which, on being read by the clerk, appeared to pray for relief under agricultural distresses against the property tax, and the duties on malt, leather, salt, and iron.

considered the last petition which had been presented as the most sensible that had come under his observation, inasmuch as it pointed out the cause of public distress, and at the same time suggested those measures, the adoption of which was likely to afford relief. It did not, like many others which had been laid on the table, petition generally against the property tax, but, adverting to the difficulties which the agricultural interests had to encounter, at once referred to schedule B. as the great cause of those difficulties. It was evident, that the great burthen felt by the farmers was attributable to this schedule, and to afford them any prospect of relief, that must be abandoned in limine. It was in vain, however, to expect any radical advantage from this modification of the tax, unless those persons, who possessed exchequer bills, or property in the funds, were brought under its operation. The great evil of which the country had to complain, under the effect of the tax in its present form, was, that those persons who had no property were as liable, if not more liable, to its operation, than those who were large capitalists; but to contend that there should be no property tax at all was, in his mind, an absolute absurdity. Independent of this tax, there was, in his mind, another essential cause of public distress, and that was the insolvent act; the direct tendency and effect of which had been to dissolve that confidence between man and man, upon the existence of which the credit of the country had heretofore depended. For himself he had only to say, that he should be ready to support the property tax upon fair principles, as applicable to real property.

had no doubt the chancellor of the exchequer congratulated himself with no small delight at having at last found a champion for the property tax.—The hon. and learned gentleman who had just sat down having been the first to stand up in that House and advocate its continuance under any modification. From what had last fallen from that hon. and learned gentleman, however, it would appear that he was not likely to prove so useful a champion as might at first have been anticipated. He had, in fact, admitted that the tax was oppressive in a variety of ways, and could only be rendered tolerable by material, and what; no doubt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would consider very objectionable modifications. It was the duty of the House, however, when the tax did come before them, not to consider by what means it could be rendered less oppressive than at present, but at once to resist its introduction in any form. The hon. and learned gentleman had talked of exchequer bills and the funds not coming under the operation of this tax. Now he (Mr. Baring) had never heard a doubt that the tax was applicable to this description of property as well as to any other. The fact was that each individual of each separate class who was called on to pay this tax, whether the tenant under schedule B., the landlord under any other letter, or the tradesman, all had their objections to the measure, and the result of the whole was, that the tax was oppressive, inquisitorial, and directly at variance with those blessings which the constitution of the country in its pure form was calculated to bestow.

coincided in all that had been said by the petitioners who had addressed the House upon the oppressive operation of the property tax. He maintained that the farmers had for some years been compelled to pay a tax upon profits, when the fact was, that they had been sustaining most heavy losses; some with whom he was acquainted, and who two or three years since were worth 1000l., 2000l., or 3000l., were now bankrupts, and were yet com- pelled to pay an impost that professed to be laid only upon their gains. It was assumed in flue collection of the tax that the profit of the farmer was equal to three-fourths of the rent he paid to his landlord: this average was at all times uncertain and fallacious; but of late the losses of the tenants, in some cases, had been double or treble the amount of the rent. Under these circumstances, he was astonished that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should persevere in forcing so unjust and impolitic a measure upon an unwilling and overburdened people. It was said, that the whole machinery of the tax was complete; it might be so, but even though it should be reduced to five per cent. He doubted whether it would produce half the stun calculated upon by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The rigor with which the exactions were made was another ground of complaint; and the small amount of the arrears was to be attributed to the extraordinary powers given to the commissioners. He trusted that the chancery lord of the exchequer would obey the voice of the country, which loudly called for the removal of this odious imposition.

also hoped that his majesty's ministers would listen to the complaints of the house and of the nation. He said, he mixed much with commercial men, and though he was not furnished with their signatures, he was authorized by them to state how grievously they were oppressed by the property tax, and to resist its continuance, excepting as a measure of the last necessity. The long period during which they had submitted to this burthen for the prosecution of the war, had showed how objectionable it was in its effects; and even those who at first had not disapproved of its principle were soon convinced, by experience, of their error, and were now most strenuous in opposing the renewal. Few now doubted that this tax was founded in injustice; for how could it be just when it was so unequal, compelling a man to pay, upon precarious and fluctuating property, in the same proportion as he who possessed the unalterable fee simple of an estate? and whatever modifications might be introduced, it was impossible that it could ever be carried fairly and equitably into effect. He begged to be allowed to canvass what had fallen. Len from the chancellor of the exchequer upon the question, whether the property tax of five per cent. Were preferable to a loan annually raised. He did not deny that loans were objectionable, but they were much less so than what was now proposed in their stead; for the first was obtained from the superfluity of those who had too much, while the last was extorted out of the hard earnings of the poor and the industrious. As a mere question of finance, it was undoubtedly in the end much the same whether six millions were raised in the one way or in the other; but to the subjects of the country it made a most important difference at the present time, when those upon whom a property tax would bear with the heaviest burthen were, from recent sacrifices, the least able to bear it. He did not believe that the bankers were indisposed to render that assistance to government which, on many former occasions, had been obtained from them; but the diminution in the value of property might, perhaps, have made them less competent to afford it; a loan would make demands upon monies men, while a property tax at once depressed the spirits and drained the pockets of the community. He entreated government to advert to the unprecedented burdens the people had of late years cheerfully submitted to—burdens even beyond their powers, looking forward to the time that had now arrived, when peace should warrant retrenchments, and enable them to recover their exhausted strength. What, then, must be the grief and disappointment of every individual, who now discovered that war was not the only period of excessive taxation, but that even during peace they were called upon to resign the little comforts that they had hoped to enjoy? What must be their feelings when they should find, that, in defiance of every promise and every pledge, the property tax was to be continued? The burthen, it would be said, was reduced one half: but that was a small relief. It was not with regard to money alone that the tax was obnoxious, but to the manner in which it was levied. It did away the trial by jury, ever since the institution of which the country had grown up in prosperity and happiness, and for that reason alone, were there no other, he would raise his hand against it. Even were it only one, instead of ten per cent. Though it would be less onerous with respect to money, it would be more onerous than the country should bear, by the innovation that it would introduce into the constitution. When our neighbour's house was on fire, we had a right to pull it down, in order to save our own; but when the fire was over the right also ceased. It was the same with the property tax, borne through necessity during the war, but which could not be justly revived when the contest was closed. He hoped the right hon. gentleman would attend to the voice of the House and of the country, and withdraw a measure, which, if pressed and carried, would prove one of the most detrimental to which the nation had ever been subjected.

was not aware upon what. Principle Ireland was to be exempted from the operation of this tax, if it should be imposed. In his view it was most impolitic to renew it in either country, from the demoralizing effect it had upon the people, who were compelled to resort to a system of misrepresentation; and upon the commissioners, who were encouraged in a practice of extortion. In his opinion, all means of retrenchment ought first to be tried, and, before monuments were pro-. Posed to be erected to our armies, it ought to be considered whether the property tax would not be a monument of our distresses. Although he objected to the continuance of this offensive measure, he should not think_ it necessary to vote against the army estimates, because he believed that other means of raising them might be found, and he felt that in France an army of observation ought to be maintained. We had already witnessed the consequences of the restoration of one sovereign, in the wanton tyranny exercised by Ferdinand; and it was possible that our army in France might be the means of preserving liberty and tranquility in that country. When peace was once firmly attained, he should consider a force of such magnitude unnecessary to be maintained.

conceived, from the discussion of these two nights, from the petitions which were already presented, and from those of which notice was given, and which would be laid on the table of the House, if proper time were allowed, that he might presume an almost unanimous opposition to the income tax, both in parliament and in the country. There was no one who professed his desire to support it but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and even he was now silent. But though an almost unanimous opposition to the proposition of government might be calculated upon, there seemed to be shades of difference, with regard to the tax itself, among those who united in the general object of petitioning against its renewal; and the government would endeavor, by going into a committee, and by listening to the suggestions of different individuals in their several recommendations, to carry their own measure into execution, by presuming upon the division of hostile force, which slight differences of opinion would allow them to infer. He would therefore implore all those who opposed the proposed renewal not to allow the right hon. gentleman to bring in his bill. If they did, the general object would be lost, while the attention of the House would be turned to minute and unimportant distinctions. Different classes of petitioners out of doors confined their objections to particular provisions of the tax which more immediately affected them; and those who supported their prayers in the House entertained slight differences of opinion with regard to the effects of different modifications. The class of farmers felt the oppression of that part of the tax included in schedule B: another prayed for relief from schedule D; and the proprietors of land complained of schedule A, which applied particularly to them. It was very natural for the different classes which this odious and inquisitorial impost oppressed, to direct the view of the legislature to those hardships which they in their respective cases experienced, and to bestow less of their attention upon those, which were borne by others. It was enough for each if they stated their own grievances; but the House should not behave in this respect like the country. If every member, attending only to his own view of the question, contended for its adoption, and withheld his assistance from those who agreed with him in the same general view, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would obtain his committee, and defeat them all. By attending to the objection of one individual, by listening to the suggestion of another, by showing the inconsistency between the propositions of his opponents, and by dividing their forces, he would gain an effectual ascendancy over them all, and, in the midst of contradictory schemes and plans, would carry that which he had previously resolved upon. While the parliament was divided, there would be the most perfect unity of action among the friends of the right hon. gentleman. If one hon. gentleman only pressed his proposition with regard to the relief of the agricultural interest; if another, who stated forcibly the sufferings of the commercial and manufacturing portions of the com- mutiny, only endeavored to lighten the pressure upon them; if a modification satisfied one gentleman, and a slight change in the mode of collection another; short, if they formed no union for the purpose of a total abolition, there might be a danger that the efforts of all, being thus so divided, would be rendered ineffectual. He entertained, indeed, the firm assurance, that ministers would be compelled to relinquish their projects; that they would be unable to carry their measures against the sense of the country, so loudly, so firmly, and so universally expressed. But still there was a necessity for a continuance of their opposition. The people should not relax in their exertions; they should continue to meet and lay their prayer before their representatives that their voice, expressed in a constitutional manner, might act upon ministers so as to induce them to abandon the alarming measures they had in contemplation. He was the more anxious in pressing this necessity, as he understood that arts had been employed to allay the general activity of the country, and to prevent them from petitioning, in order that the act might pass without that universal protest which would certainly be made to a measure so obnoxious, if no deception were practiced. He had heard that the friends of government were spreading reports, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had changed his mind with regard to the property tax, and that he had abandoned the proposal of renewing it, in order that the measure might be carried more quietly through the House, when petitions would be of no avail.—The hon. and learned gentleman repeated his conviction, that the tax would be abandoned, and that a premature belief of such abandonment, leading to a neglect of the proper and constitutional means of compelling it, was the only danger to be dreaded. Whenever there was any appearance of relaxation on the part of the people, the right hon. gentleman opposite would make his own use of it, and employ it as an argument for proceeding in his proposed measures. It was very remarkable; that, during discussion after discussion, while so many petitions were presented, while so many representations were laid before the House by gentlemen on both sides, and so many calls were made upon the friends of the right hon. gentleman to defend themselves and him, not one rose up to state his opinion in favor of the tax in question. Even an hon. baronet, the member for Devonshire (sir Thomas Acland) who had presented so many petitions against it, and who seemed so willing to support the ministers in imposing it, had stated no reason for his predilection. Mr. Brougham said, he could only account for this extraordinary silence, on the supposition, that the gentlemen who approved of the renewal of this tax, felt themselves so much at variance in their sentiments with the expressed sense of the country, that they were ashamed to avow themselves. The national wish had been so unequivocally expressed, that they were afraid to raise their voice against it. He hoped the gentlemen on the opposite side would be induced to forego their silence that night—that they would take some sort of notice of what had fallen from those near him, and offer some defence of the measures they meant to support.

thought it his duty to state to the House, that in the course of last autumn he had traveled from one end of Scotland to the other, that among all classes of the people of that country, he had found the income tax held in execration, and that they declared their firm reliance on the faith of parliament, that this tax would not be continued. These sentiments were not confined to the owners and occupiers of land, but were also expressed by persons engaged in trade and manufactures. This he thought it right to state, as from the shortness of the time which had elapsed since the continuance of the tax had been announced, it was impossible that many petitions could have yet arrived from Scotland. But if a sufficient time was allowed, he was convinced there was but a very small proportion of the inhabitants of that country who would not petition against the tax.

regretted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have been absent during the speech of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down; but he hoped that some of his friends would communicate to him the information conveyed by that hon. gentleman to the House. There was no one who knew that hon. gentleman who would not respect his account, and place the greatest reliance on it. When that hon. gentleman declared that there was not one place in Scotland which would not petition against the income tax, he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not persist in his intention of hurrying it through the House in such an indecent manner, before the people of Scotland could have an opportunity of so petitioning. But he would say to the people of Scotland, still petition and have your petitions rejected. He was anxious that all the United Kingdom should follow the same course, and that petitions should be presented from those places whose voice had not yet been heard by parliament, even though they should be unavailing so accomplish the objects for which they were drawn up. The people of Great Britain would thus come to know the character of their government, in opposing the interests, contemning the opinions, and resisting the wishes of a whole nation.

observed, that the reason why petitions had not arrived from Scotland was want of time. A petition had that night been laid on the table from the county of Fife, and one had likewise been presented from Montrose. More might be daily expected, if the door was not shut against them by the precipitate proceedings of the right hon. gentleman opposite. Not only the people of Scotland, but of the north of England, had yet been prevented from expressing their wishes to the legislature from want of time, and were now hastening to do so. The noble lord said, he had received a letter that morning, informing him that a petition was preparing at Leeds, and that a meeting was advertised at Litchfield for the same object. Would the chancellor of the exchequer press the measures he had in contemplation upon parliament on the day he had announced, when he was aware that the first vote passed in the committee of ways and means would render petitions from so many quarters ineffectual and nugatory? Formerly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not been so precipitate. Before he proposed the renewal of the property tax, he consulted with some agents at Liverpool, who were to sound the minds of the respectable merchants there, and attempt to reconcile them to his measures. The success of that canvass was not such as he expected, and did not encourage a second attempt of the same kind. The people there could not be prevailed upon, by any inducement he could offer, to express their cordial acquiescence in his plans, and thought it better to get quit of the burthen of the property tax, than to curry favour with the chancellor of the exchequer.

presented a petition from Nottingham, against the property tax. The petitioners also, he said, expressed their fears, that the vast standing army proposed to him kept up would prove dangerous to the liberties of the country. A great number of these petitioners were engaged in trade and manufactures; and he would say, that they were not among the persons described in the speech from the throne, as carrying on a flourishing commerce. He had only to add, that if any body of men in this country had been consistent friends of liberty, it was these petitioners; and that he coincided with them in the apprehensions which they entertained respecting it at the present moment.

rose to express his surprise that none of the hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House had yet spoken in favor of the measure that government was pursuing. At an early period of the session the House was congratulated on the flourishing condition of the country, in its commerce, trade, and agriculture. The assertion, that we enjoyed so much prosperity, still remained uncontradicted by those who made it; but it did not remain so by the nation itself. The farmers and manufacturers had told pretty intelligibly what was their condition, and it was found to be the reverse of wealth and prosperity. The flourishing condition of our trade, as declared by our exports, had been somewhat moderated by the explanation of his hon. friend (Mr. Baring), who showed that there might be exportation without gain to the merchant, and that the amount of exports had arisen from the previous interruption of intercourse with America. When the estimates were talked of, it was said that there was no connation between them and the property tax; and the chancellor of the exchequer had insinuated, that if this tax was not agreed to, he must propose some other not less obnoxious. Was this proper language to hold to the country—"If you do not like the property tax, I will contrive some other that you may not like better." He had tried the experiment last year, and succeeded wonderfully; for there never was a system of taxation so odious and partial as that which he proposed to substitute for the property tax.

, though he hoped the people of this country would not relax in their exertions, and though he was of opinion, that the whole would depend on their exertions, could not but congratulate them on the subdued tone of the opposite side of the House—he might go further, and even say, their absolute silence—and he thought be might venture to say, the measure would never be brought before the House. Still, however, the country ought not to relax in their exertions. After the petitions which they had heard from all descriptions of persons, he thought it impossible that ministers should persist in bringing forward the measure. But there was another reason against it which ought to operate with ministers. He was persuaded that if they persisted in the tax, they would not derive that revenue from it which they expected. And here he would mention an anecdote of rather a ludicrous description which he conceived to be not out of place on the present occasion. He believed the circumstance which he was going to state had actually taken place. A return was said to have been made to an assessor in the county of Cork, in Ireland, in this way—"take notice, I have cut the throats of all my horses—I have shot all my dogs—I have burned all my carriages—I have shut up all my windows—I have dismissed all my servants, except my wife, and therefore I conceive that I cannot be liable to any assessment whatever." By persisting in this tax ministers would reduce many persons in the country to such a state of distress as effectually to set all tax-gatherers at defiance.

declared, that he for one was rather friendly than otherwise to the property tax—[Hear, hear! and a laugh]—and he believed if it should be abandoned, the chancellor of the exchequer would have to propose worse taxes, not from any inclination, but because he could not help it, as he had no other means within his power. He knew he was hold-, in a very unpopular language. He believed that though the county to which he belonged was hostile to the tax, yet his constituents, who were a pretty numerous body, were not hostile to it. In the tom of Northampton, which contained 300 freeholders, there were only 28 who had petitioned against the tax.

admired very much the noble lord's courage. He had in the most manly and dignified manner put himself forward for his friends, at a time when no one of his friends durst say any thing for themselves. But still the noble lord was no very warm admirer of the tax; he expressed himself only rather friendly to it than otherwise. But this faint approval, he hoped, would not weigh with the House against the wishes of the country at large, though some of the noble lord's constituents should also be friendly to the measure. But would they send a petition to the House, praying that they might enjoy that tax rather than be subjected to some others out of that box of ills which the chancellor of the exchequer was to open on the country?

The petitions were all ordered to lie on the table.

rose to call the attention of the House to the novel and extraordinary return made by the board of taxes to an order of parliament. It was painful for him to make the observations which he was now called upon to do. Whatever respect he entertained for the commissioners of that board; however high in particular was his opinion of the respectable character of Mr. Lowndes, who was at the head of it, he could not help saying that they had committed a great indiscretion in their return. Whether a motion was made from one side of the House or the other; whether it was supported by a smaller or a greater proportion of the members; with whatever gentleman it originated; when it was carried, the order consequent upon it became the act of the House, and was to be obeyed as such. The previous proceedings, the sentiments of members who were for or against, were not to be taken into consideration by those whose conduct it was issued to direct. The board in this case had no right to make any retrospect—their duty was to obey the order made them, and to make a return according to the terms of it. The order, it would be recollected, was for a return of all the persons assessed to the income tax in London, the amount of the assessment, and the appeals against it, with the decision upon them. The answer returned to this order began by instructing the House how they should denominate the tax in question. It stated that the commissioners knew of no income tax but one rose under an act that had expired in 1802. Did the House require the schooling of the board of taxes? Did it not know that the act alluded to had expired at the time specified? The board, however, proceeded to state, that they presumed that when the House mentioned the income tax, it meant a tax levied upon property, professions, profits, trade, &c. Was not this, even upon their own showing, a tax upon income? Was not a tax upon the profits of trade a tax upon income? Was not a tax upon the revenue, derived from offices, a tax upon income—unless it could be said of offices what Lord Arden had said of his sinecure, "that it was his freehold?" But he would refrain from any further discussion of the principles of the board, and would have pardoned their rather indecorous criticism of the order of House, had the return been made. This was not, however, the case. They had made no return, and gave as a reason for their conduct, that they did not find the accounts in their office, and had no connation with them farther than was necessary for carrying into execution the provisions of the act. He could not too highly praise one part of their return, where they alluded to the oath that restrained them from making disclosures, and he wished that oath had been every where held equally obligatory. He contended that if they did not find the accounts ordered in their office, they ought to have made inquiry after them at the proper offices. If there had been any necessity for those returns, with the design of increasing the tax, he had no doubt that they would have been forthcoming. The cause, however, of the failure of the order in procuring the necessary return lay with the treasury, who ought to have directed it to the proper officer. He had brought the subject before the House that an explanation might be given of what could be considered in no other light than as disrespect to the authority of parliament.

said, that the order of the House had not been sent to the treasury, but directly to the board of taxes; so that he had known nothing of the return before it had been made to the House. From the known merit of the officer to whom the order had been sent, he was convinced that no disrespect could have been intended to the House; but immediately on having seen the defective returns, he had given directions that a proper return should be made out by the officers who had the information in their power. At the same time he should remark, that the order had not been accurately worded. It required an account of the number of persons assessed, which was impracticable, as persons were assessed sometimes in two places, and partnerships were assessed as one person. He should therefore move, "That there be laid before this House, an account of the number of assessments, in the city of London, granted by the acts of 46 Geo. 3, c. 65, and of 55 Geo. 3, c. 53; and of the number of surcharges upon the returns to such assessments for the year ending the 5th of April 1815, and for the three quarters ending the 5th of January 1816, distinguishing the number of appeals against such surcharges, and the number of cases in which such surcharges have been confirmed, or wholly or partly reversed, respectively, so far as the same can be made up."

said, that as a board of commissioners had presumed to enter into an altercation with the House, he should insist on the words "to the income tax" being inserted in the order, lest these commissioners should suppose that the House acquiesced in their criticism, and acknowledged the lesson well bestowed. Though this was of very little consequence in the order, it was of much importance as to the merits of the question. He should not, however, have insisted on this alteration, but for the altercation with these tax commissioners.

said, that he had no objection to the words proposed; it would be best', however to refer to the acts by which the contribution was granted. He also observed, that it would be well in these cases if the orders of the House on the subject of taxes were sent first to the treasury, whence they might be directed to the proper officers.

observed, that there was a standing order of the House by which all such orders were to be sent by the serjeant to the treasury. But from the order having fallen into the hands of some new messenger, or some other accident, it had happened otherwise in the present instance.

The motion as amended was agreed to.

wished to know whether there had been any excess on the civil list during the last year, because by law a return of the excess, if such there had been, should have been made to parliament on or before the 28th of February.

said, that there had been some excess in the expenditure of the civil list, and that the accounts were making out and would soon be laid before the House, after which it would be his duty to bring in a bill to regulate the civil list expenditure.

said, that the conduct of the minister in this case was such that it was difficult to imagine any thing more insulting to parliament. In the last session a bill had been brought in requiring that the excess of the civil list in every year should be laid before the House on the 28th of February following, on the ground that the accounts being laid before the House late in the session, there was no time left to debate on them. The hon. member who brought in that bill (Mr. Bankes) must feel that his act had been entirely defeated, for now on the 28th of February, the chancellor of the exchequer being asked whether there had been any arrear, gave for answer, that the accounts of the excess were making out, and would soon be presented. The fact was, there had been an arrear which it was not convenient, at an early period of the session, to present to parliament.

said, that though there had been an excess on the civil list expenditure as regulated by act of parliament, there had not been an excess above the estimate presented last year.

said, the estimate was no authority; he had objected to every item of it, as the most impudent proposition that had ever been made to parliament, and on the consideration of the House voting the sum required last session, that estimate was withdrawn. As to the excess, in whatever department it had occurred, he hoped the persons who had incurred the additional expense, would be left to pay it. The kindness of the House in paying the last debt on the civil list had not been received with common decency; for at the end of the session the speech from the Crown had not even thanked the Commons for the 530,000l. advanced to pay the Prince Regent's debt, as if it were so much a matter of course, that whatever extravagance the Prince was to run into, the House was to pay, without even receiving thanks in return.

wished to know what was the amount of this excess, or, if he might use the word, this extravagance of the persons in question had been?

could not take on himself from memory to give the exact amount, but it did not exceed the estimates of last year. The excess of the expenditure in the civil list had been inevitable, and had been sanctioned by parliament.

suggested the impropriety of discussing, in the absence of the noble lord (Castlereagh), estimates which must entirely rest on statements which he had given; unless, therefore, gentlemen came to vote, and not to hear, they could not go into that question to-night. He had no wish to impede the public business, and the object of retarding the discussion of the property tax had already been effected. He had not many doubts on the subject they were about to discuss; but if he had any, they might be removed by the statements of the noble lord; it was only, therefore, on the score of common propriety that he should move that the debate be resumed to-morrow.

stated, that though he had left lord Castlereagh exceedingly unwell, yet his lordship had expressed a most anxious wish to give, if possible, any statement that could be desired, and that, unwell as he was, he would, if it were considered necessary, attend in the course of the evening.

felt that the House was placed in an awkward situation. If the House persevered in moving an adjournment, the noble lord would be called down, however unwell; if they proceeded without him, they would debate at a great inconvenience; for the attendance of the minister was in the highest degree material, as the army estimates involved the consideration of all our foreign relations. It was very usual to postpone debates when ministers were ill; and though it might not be proper to delay the discussion for any length of time, yet, when so much might be gained by a pause of eight and forty hours, he must wish for an adjournment.

reminded the House of the motion that stood for to-morrow, and, after the statements that had been already received, did not think the attendance of the noble lord so absolutely necessary.

said, that his hon. friend, the member for Essex, had no objection to postpone his motion which stood for to-morrow, and he thought it indecent to proceed in the absence of the noble lord.

opposed any delay, and thought it inconsistent with the dignity of the House to defer a discussion on account of the absence of a single member.

thought the House competent to discuss the question in the absence of the noble secretary, and was astonished that they could not proceed after all they had heard on the subject.

observed, that the same difficulty would recur to-morrow should the noble lord continue indisposed.

said, that if the noble lord could not attend to-morrow, the business ought not to be further delayed.

thought it better to proceed, as the noble lord's attendance could not be ensured to-morrow, and recommended his hon. friend to withdraw his motion.

said, he would withdraw his motion, not because he had altered his opinion as to the necessity of the noble lord's presence, but because business pressed, and he did not wish to bring the noble lord down with inconvenience to himself.

hoped that nothing that had passed would be thought for a moment to impose any necessity of attending on the part of the noble lord.

The debate on the Army Estimates was then resumed.

then rose, and entered into a detail of the state of Ireland, which he contended, justified the amount of armed force which it was proposed to keep up in that country. Atrocious outrages were, he said, daily committed, and to withdraw the military force would be fatal to the loyal part of the population. The state of that country, and the feelings of the population, was proved by the manner in which the news of the return of Buonaparté had been received. The effect was electric, and showed that the hopes of the disaffected were cherished by the expectation of succor from France. That a peace with that country, however, was not sufficient to suppress the spirit of revolt, was proved by the fact that many of the most violent infractions of the law had taken place since the battle of Waterloo, and the occupation of Paris. It had been said, there was no plot or conspiracy in Ireland because no such plot had appeared on the trials at the late commissions. The want of evidence of such a plot, did not prove that it did not exist. The leaders of a plot would not entrust the knowledge of the plot to the rabble, but they would endeavor to promote a lawless spirit in the people which would be available to promote their designs. The Ribbon societies had been instituted with this view. The state of Ireland had by some been attributed to the rejection of the Catholic claims. This might be true; but obedience to the laws must be maintained, and it was necessary to protect individuals from the fury of the ill-disposed part of the population. He should therefore vote in support of so much of the estimates as referred to Ireland.

said it was with considerable reluctance that he offered himself to the House, but he felt it necessary for him to explain the apparent disagreement of the vote which he should give that night with the opinion which he had delivered as to the treaties of peace in the course of a former discussion. His dissent from the vote on that occasion, and his agreement with the vote on the present occasion, were dictated by the same view of our engagements and our policy. He could not approve of the treaties, because he thought the peace which had been concluded was insecure, and because that peace was insecure he should vote for the large proposed establishments. He therefore thought those gentlemen on that side of the House inconsistent who thought the peace was insecure, but refused to maintain that force which alone could support it. He acknowledged that the danger from standing armies to our constitution was not inconsiderable; not that he apprehended the violence of an army which bore the proportion of one to five hundred to our population, but that he saw with pain the prevalence of a military spirit. Yet notwithstanding this internal danger, after a view of our actual situation with relation to the continent, he should not oppose, for the present year, the proposed military establishment.—There had, he thought, been two errors in the consideration of the peace establishment, the one, in supposing that it was a permanent peace establish- ment; the other, that it was an establishment for a permanent peace. As to the first error, it had been correctly stated, that this was an intermediate establishment. It was too much the habit of this country to conclude that what we wished must be accomplished, and that when the cause in which the danger originated had ceased, the danger must have ceased also. But we saw that the waves continued to roll when the storm was no more, and that this swell was more terrible than the tempest itself. We had many dangers to apprehend from two causes,—the hostility of governments to their subjects, and of subjects to their governments. This hostility threatened a renewal of the war, and a great obstacle to the renewal of war had been removed. The small principalities and small republics, with the worst possible governments, combined the greatest quantity of practical happiness. He spoke from personal observation, that in the territories of many of those states, there was the greatest desire to return to their former governments. These governments had been supported by opinion—they had no armed force—no taxes to maintain an armed force. They were strictly paternal; that was to say, without any security for personal liberty, the subjects actually enjoyed much liberty. These states were now no more; in Italy, the French, who were said to have done harm wherever they went, did much good. They gave the Italians public spirit, they gave them education, they gave them courage, and they gave them a desire of liberty, a confidence in themselves, and a wish for a general united government. These considerations had all been overlooked by the congress at Vienna—they had left Italy divided, discontented, and insecure—they had united by force Genoa to Sardinia, and Lucas for the first time ceased to have a separate existence. They had joined Rages to Venice, Venice to Lombardy, and subjected the whole to a government which all Italians held in the utmost abhorrence and contempt. The hon. gentleman observed that similar danger was to be apprehended from the state of Germany. But the most alarming source of danger was to be found in the position of Russia, whether we looked to the extent or the character of her population. That character was in no degree changed, however the amount of the population had increased, or the frontiers of the empire had been extended, since the time when Lord Chatham had described Russia as moving eccentrically in an orbit of her own, and as governed by a power in which assassination stood in place of the functions of Lords and Commons. With her left washed by the Baltic, her right by the Black Sea, and her back resting on the confines of the world, she wielded the elements of nature as means of defence, and poured forth an inexhaustible population when necessary to foreign or distant war. With such views, then, and such means, it behooved this country, as well as other states, to guard against any deluge of that Northern upon the South of Europe. But there was another and a serious danger against which it was wise on our part to provide, namely, the general demoralization of Europe, which demoralization had been, by the way, produced, in a great measure, by the conduct of our great allies. For with them originated the partition of Poland, and until that original sin was wiped away, it was vain to calculate upon the restoration of morality in Europe. This atrocious partition, and all the circumstances connected with it, was one of the main causes which served to pollute the progress, and aggravate the horrors of the French revolution. But the evil effect of this prevalent immorality upon the continent was that when we talked of morality the continental people laughed at us, and coveted only our money. Under all these circumstances he felt that the proposed peace establishment was necessary, at least, until we should be fully assured of the pacific disposition of the continental powers. For should a war suddenly take place what must be the fate of the Netherlands, which could not be defended without our aid? That state in which we naturally felt such an interest, would in that event, be liable to an immediate incursion from France; and what was not to be apprehended from the vengeance of the exasperated people of that country, if the force of this empire was not prepared for its protection? He remembered to have heard it said, that this country was so preeminent in power that it might from the security of its elevation look down with indifference upon the combatants below; but he trusted that a degree of benevolence would be always found to belong to Great Britain, that would dispose it to interfere for the purpose of restoring peace and doing justice. With this view, in order to maintain our ascendancy, and ensure our safety, it was wise to hold our- selves in a state of due preparation. There was some good sense in ancient mythology, in which the goddess of wisdom always appeared in amour; and it would be wise in this country, if it desired to preserve treaties, to be armed with the means of securing the observance of them.

said:—Mr. Speaker; I am anxious to offer a few observations to the House on the present question; and am the more pleased at having caught your eye at the present time, as I am desirous of calling the attention of the House back to the real matter in debate, from which different gentlemen last night, in some degree, digressed, and with which the speech of the hon. gentleman who spoke last, eloquent as that speech was, and forcible and important as many of his observations were, had very little to do.

Before, however, I apply myself directly to the question, I cannot refrain from noticing the speech made last night by the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Peel). That speech, delivered in a most prepossessing manner, and being, from the nature of the matter to which it peculiarly referred, of a most interesting description, has naturally excited particular attention. Melancholy, indeed, is the description which it gives us of Ireland, and loudly and imperiously does it call upon us to pay to it our most early and serious attention. To that part of the estimates which refers to Ireland, I, for one, after this account so given to us, this woeful picture so pathetically drawn by the right hon. gentleman, shall not object; except that I think the House would not do its duty if it voted the number of men required, 25,000 men, for the whole year. I think they should be voted, but only for five or six months, in order that this House may in the mean time inquire, may investigate the causes of this calamitous situation, explore the remedies, and endeavor to apply them; and in the hopes that, before the expiration of the period, we may have been able to render so large a force in Ireland unnecessary. But, if we deplore the state of that country now unfolded to us, what shall we say of a government who, seeing that it has been for near twenty years falling from bad to worse, under the line of policy that has been adopted; seeing that no evil was removed, but that every source and cause of its distress was yearly and monthly gaining strength and increasing; who seeing all this, have notwithstanding never, thought of adopting or trying some different line, but have pertinacious persevered in the same pernicious and ruinous course of proceeding? What shall we say of a government who, under these circumstances, did not deign to mention even the name of Ireland in the speech from the throne at the opening of the session? What shall we say of a government who, now that the House has been six weeks assembled, have in this debate, for the first time, undertaken this melancholy task; and who have now done so, not in a manly manner for the purpose of redressing its grievances, but with a side-wind, in a bye question as it were, for the purpose of effecting a particular object, the obtaining a vote on the army estimates?

Sir, another right hon. gentleman, who spoke last night (Mr. Robinson), very eloquently charged those who, like myself, think that these estimates should be sent back unexamined, and should not be submitted to the committee; he charged us, I say, with a strange inconsistency of conduct. "What!" said he, "you admit this is a question of degree. Nobody contends that there should be no standing army at all; it therefore is purely and simply a question of degree. Now, how or where can that degree be settled but in a committee? And yet you object to go into that committee." Now, Sir, this appears to me to be one of those arguments, which, by proving too much, proves nothing at all. I do admit that it is a question of degree; but then my answer to him is this—that the demand you make on me is so enormous, that I will not entertain it at all; I will not canvass it, but reject it altogether. I will put a case to the right hon. gentleman—Suppose these army estimates raised the establishment not to 150,000 men as it does, but to 500,000, would he himself then argue that they ought to be entertained at all? Still it would be a question of degree; yet I do not think there is one man of the House who would think of going into a committee on them. I admit that I have put an extreme case—the way to try a principle is to put an extreme case; and though the estimates before us are not so excessive, they are in my mind sufficiently so for them to be treated in the very same manner. But then the right hon. gentleman used another argument; not only, he said, that this was a question of degree, but that we, if we objected to the size of the estimate, must prove that it was excessive. I say quite the contrary: I say the onus probandi is on the gentlemen on the other side—they must prove that the troops demanded are necessary, not we that they are not; and for this plain reason amongst others, that it is quite impossible that we should be able to do so. The ministers who are officially acquainted with the state of the country, the dangers that may be threatening it from without, and the probability or improbability of its repose being disturbed either within or. From without, are able and ought to be willing to prove the necessity of a force, wherever such necessity exists, and should not call for it, if it does not. But how by any possibility can we, who know of the state of affairs only just so much as the gentlemen opposite, or the newspapers inform us; how are we to take upon us to decide—how can we attempt to prove, that the necessity alleged or supposed does not exist? Nor let it be said, that we should not object to the force, if we are unable to disprove the necessity of it. The constitutional rule no doubt is,—the right hon. gentleman will hardly dispute that—the rule is, that a standing army is not to be endured. The modern practice has relaxed the rule, and I am not going to quarrel with that practice; but still the rule exists, and is to be dispensed with only on the proof of necessity; and that proof of necessity the gentlemen on the other side must produce. I maintain; therefore, that primâ facie these estimates are enormous, and that in the absence of all proof of any necessity for them, we ought not for one moment to entertain them.

Sir, in further examining this question, it naturally divides itself (and has accordingly been so divided, by most of the gentlemen who have spoken on it) into two parts—the financial and the constitutional—both important, especially at the present time; important in themselves and in their consequences; but the latter, in my mind, so infinitely outweighing the former, that I shall detain the House only a very few moments on the first part of the question. But I cannot abstain altogether from noticing a very curious argument, produced the other night by a right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Yorke), viz. that, even if we were to disband the whole army at this moment, the necessary expenses entailed upon us by establishments which have been for some years growing up, partly by charitable establishments (of which a word or two by-and-bye), by half-pay, &c. these unavoidable expenses would amount to or exceed, the whole charge of the army during the last peace. Now, Sir, if this argument had been used for the purpose of persuading the House to retrench as much as possible, to lower every expense to as small a scale as by any means could be done, to economize scrupulously, to reduce this establishment, I should have understood it; but when it is urged by a gentleman in support of his extravagant demand, when he tells us that our necessary expenses are so very large, and thence draws an inference that to those we are to add others, which I am sure might, and I think ought to be avoided, this seems to me a most curious argument indeed. Yet the right hon. gentleman was so fond of this argument that he recurred to it some half dozen times in the course of his speech. And in this part of the subject, I should be glad to hear from the chancellor of the exchequer how the enormous expense of this extravagant establishment is to be provided for?—by the income tax? Is he quite so sure, after what has passed here this very evening, that he will be able to carry his favorite property tax? And suppose he does, is he quite sure that it will satisfy the demand? For my part, I believe not—I trust that it will not be passed at all: but if it is, I am quite persuaded that though it may produce much distress, infinite calamity, extreme dissatisfaction and discontent, that it will yield very little money indeed.

I pass over this part of the subject with these few observations, not because it is not deserving the most serious consideration, but because I am unwilling unnecessarily to detain the House, and I wish more particularly to press on their attention the other great consideration, in my opinion infinitely outweighing the former, viz. the serious and imminent danger to the constitution, to the rights and liberties of the people, which the establishment a this great standing army in time of peace presents.

The right hon. gentleman before alluded to (Mr. Yorke), who took so large a part in the discussion at the beginning of the debate, told us, that a standing army could never be dangerous, because they came annually under the review and cognizance of parliament; that as this House annually votes the number of men and the money to pay them, they may abate the nuisance whenever it arises, and get rid of the danger the moment that it threatens. To this argument, I can by no means subscribe. In the first place, having once passed the vote, we have no power in the case for twelve months; and in the second place, putting out of the case, for the present at least, the danger of a more open attack on our privileges, by calling in the soldiers to overawe and directly to influence our divisions (a danger which if this system is persevered in, I am far from thinking impossible or improbable), laying aside for the present any consideration of such open and armed interference, I ask if much is not to be dreaded from the power which will thus be put into the hands of the Crown, to influence secretly the votes of members? We are told that the patronage of the army can have no such effect; I cannot conceive that any gentleman would seriously urge that argument out of the House. Does not all patronage give influence? in the case of individuals as well as of the government? and putting aside the proofs of such influence, which your journals will afford you within very few years last past, I am sure that it must be obvious on the slightest consideration, that the patronage of so large an army must be in the hands of the Crown, a most potent engine to influence the votes and to affect the decisions of this House: so that this power now conceded, it may not be possible ever after to recover it.

Another argument used by the same right hon. gentleman, to my mind equally extraordinary, is this, that this large army cannot be unconstitutional if legally and regularly voted by this House, according to the accustomed forms. This I positively deny: a thing may be quite legal, and yet directly unconstitutional. The Habeas Corpus act may be suspended by law; but will the right hon. gentleman maintain that such suspension is constitutional,—that a man can constitutionally be deprived of the benefits of the provisions of this act? Why, Sir, the contrary of this is so notoriously the case, that I protest am quite astonished to hear the right hon. gentleman gravely uses such an argument. Does he not know, or has he forgotten, that there is a declaration of lord Coke's precisely against him, that that great lawyer has declared that the rights and liberties of Englishmen are so secured, that the provisions of Magna Charta are so sacred, that an act of parliament passed in contravention of them, is not binding? Nor is this a mere brutum fulmen: it is a doctrine, which has been acted on. Sir, many years ago there existed some able financiers, as able as the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, by name Epson and Dudley; these men did most unconstitutionally extort money from the people; they had acts of parliament too, but this did not screen them: they were impeached for their misdeeds, and suffered the penalty for their misdeeds. As little weight therefore as I gave to the former argument of the right hon. gentleman, just as little do I allow, and I trust will the House allow, to this.

But the character of the officers of the army is our warrant that no danger can arise from them. I am as willing as the right hon. gentleman himself, or as any man in the House or out of it, to estimate highly the character and principles of the officers of the army. I admire their great and glorious deeds of arms, and to judge from the different consequences which the right bon, gentleman and I would draw from them, admire them more and esteem them much higher than he; for I say that they have placed us in that state of security, have so raised our own military character, and have so far surpassed the exploits not only of our enemies, but of all other nations, that we have no reason so keep up this great military preparation; that we may repose on our laurels, and trust to our fame for our security. I know no other advantage attending great military reputation than this, that it is a mean of defence, and a security from attack. This advantage the army has obtained for us by their labors and their blood; and it appears to me no compliment to them to refuse to avail ourselves of it. I am quite willing therefore to trust our defence to their hands in times of war; in future wars as in past, I am sure it will be complete in their hands. Not so, however, the keeping of our liberties,—I do not mean to say that any one of the officers of our army, or any body of them, would wish to subvert the liberties of the country, or has any intention of doing so; but I do say, that they must be entirely in other custody and under other protection. An officer is not a free agent, he is a man under control and authority; discipline necessarily requires that. Besides the habits of military subordination, the esprit de corps which they necessarily imbibe, every part of the life of a military man is inconsistent with feelings of liberty. And I ask the House whether we do not daily see before our eyes proofs that a military spirit is very prevalent amongst us; the affectation of a military dress is an evident sign of this, and of the desire to make the military an exclusive order of men, separated and apart from the rest of the community. I do not blame the officers for this; is very natural for young men proud of their exploits to indulge the feelings of satisfaction which the praises and admiration of the world have excited, and if they were left to themselves, I should not anticipate much mischief from it. In a few years they would lose these military notions, would return to the habits of civil life; but I fear they will not be left to themselves. There is a desire, I repeat it, and there is a wish and intention to keep up this military spirit, these military feelings. An exclusive military order is a strong proof and a most powerful engine for this purpose: and is not this engine set to work? Another mode is this new Military Club, an institution of which I cannot speak with too much reprobation, where military men alone are admitted, and where of course the general topics of conversation must be of a military nature. I know, indeed, that an attempt has been made to include the navy in this institution; but although I have very different feelings on such subjects with respect to the officers of the navy and the army, not on account of their private characters, but on account of the nature of their services, this, be it remembered, was only an afterthought, when the institution began to excite attention, and after all does not by any means do away the objections I feel. But to return to this affectation of military dress: is it confined to the younger officers,—is there not a general officer of very high rank both in the army and in the state, (the marquis of Anglesey) who always travels about attended by a hussar? Do we not see officers riding about the streets of London attended not by a groom in livery, but by a dragoon in regimentals? I know perfectly well that an officer in quarters or on duty is attended by an orderly soldier, on foot or on horseback as the case may be; but it is quite new to me to see (as I have done twice within these two days) an officer not on duty, for he was in plain clothes, riding about followed by a dragoon.

Mr. Speaker, I dwell the more on this subject, because I am ready to confess that I have long felt great apprehensions of the military spirit which exists in certain quarters, and which the nature of the times in which we live has given a force and extent to, which I think truly alarming in a constitutional point of view. I do believe, in my conscience I firmly believe, that there does exist, and that there is firmly rooted, an intention and design of establishing a military government in this country. I have long entertained the apprehension, and it has been confirmed to me by a variety of circumstances, some perhaps in themselves trivial, and if they had stood alone, not to be dwelt upon, but which taken together are sufficient to alarm every man attached to the constitution, and to arouse the jealousy of every friend of liberty. With the leave of the House I will mention some of these matters.

Sir, in the course of last night's debate, an hon. friend of mine (Mr. Wynn), in a speech which, from the confusion unfortunately existing in the House, I heard but imperfectly, and which was imperfectly heard by the House, stated some of these circumstances, and as I cannot help thinking them of importance, I will beg leave to repeat them. Every body who hears me has witnessed the number of troops that are on duty every time there is a levee at Carlton-house. On every such occasion those who have the honour of paying their respects to the Prince, have to drive down from the top of St. James's-street in the midst of horse-guards. The whole quarter of the town is filled with troops; the cross streets are closed by them; no one can go about his private concerns into those streets; the King's highway is stopped; those who live there cannot approach their own houses in carriages at least, and that part of the town is for the time, entirely under martial law. Now this is quite new within my memory; I have myself been to levees and drawing-rooms at St. James's without seeing a soldier, except in the court-yard of the Palace; half a dozen constables, and a few marshal men, were all that were necessary to keep order, and for ought I ever saw they did so very effectually. Again, when the Prince comes down to the House of Lords at the opening and close of the session, all the streets leading to this House are quite blocked up by dragoons,—Parliament-street is absolutely lined with them,—all access to Westminster bridge is stopped,—no carriage is allowed, to pass, and even the carriages of mem- bers are stopped,—nay, on foot you are not left at liberty to choose in what part of the street you shall walk, but if you take a course contrary to the military order, you are most unceremoniously turned back. This was never so in the King's. Time. When his majesty came to his parliament, he used to come in his state coach, attended by a certain number of horse-guards, who preceded and followed the carriage; but except these attendants, no more soldiers appeared on that day than on ordinary occasions; there was then no lining of the streets, no officers trotting at the side of the carriage. His majesty was pleased to show himself to his people, and did not think it necessary to keep them at a distance from him, by this sort of military display. What the object or meaning of all this is, I am at a loss to guess, unless it is to assume the forms of a military government. I know no danger to be guarded against. I see nothing in it but an offensive violation of our old constitutional habits and notions.

Nor is it only on these occasions of pa-, ride and state that the military have thus been called on to act. I have been informed, for I was not in town, and had not the mortification of seeing it, that two years ago, when the foreign sovereigns were here, on the occasion of a ball given by White's club, and another by the marquis of Hertford, a regiment of dragoons were stationed about the town to regulate the carriages and to keep the peace. A pretty use truly to make of dragoons! We are not to object to these military establishments out of delicacy for the army to which we are so much indebted; but I, for one, out of regard to the army, in consideration of their past deeds, in consideration of their future discipline, do object to their being put to such uses, to such ridiculous and degrading uses. But I may be told that it is very convenient. I have often been told this, when I have mentioned these things in conversation. I know it is very convenient, and this convenience has induced persons to submit without murmuring, to these dangerous innovations. But I know, too, that for many purposes, for all purposes of police, an arbitrary government is extremely convenient. Sir, some years ago I passed some time in Russia; these matters were managed there very conveniently indeed. If you went to a ball, every thing was well regulated—no whipping and flogging—no carriages broken. First came the carriages with six horses, then those with four, then those with two: all was as regular as a mounting;—nothing could be more convenient, but nothing more inconsistent with a free government. An arbitrary government has its advantages, and a government of law its inconveniences. But I, for one, prefer a free constitution with all its inconveniences. It is the constitution of this country, and I will not tamely give it up.

Other instances may be produced (and every man who walks the streets may convince himself of their existence) of the increase of military guards and sentries all over the town. There is scarce an exhibition opened, but immediately a couple of sentries are posted at the door. The British Museum, the Picture Gallery in Pall-Mall. What on earth have soldiers to do there? What danger is apprehended? What are these sentries to guard against? For my part, I verily believe that this is done for the mere and simple purpose of accustoming the eye of Englishmen to the sight of soldiers intruding into and superintending all our concerns. What need is there of soldiers at Somerset House? Within this year or two, for the first time, we have sentinels posted there. But there is no use in multiplying these instances.

There is another circumstance in itself perhaps a very trivial one, and which it may be thought offensive to mention: if it is, I can only say, I mean no offence. But I will mention it, for to me it is particularly disgusting. It is this, that on all occasions of dress or show the Regent always appears in a military dress—at the levees at Carlton-house his royal highness always is dressed in a military uniform; and on every other occasion, when dressed clothes (as it is called) are worn. Formerly, when the King used to come to his parliament, he came in a plain dressed coat of the usual fashion, and wearing his crown; but the Regent is always advised on such occasions to appear in a field-marshal's uniform, and with an immense cocked hat upon his head.

All these circumstances, Mr. Speaker, though each by itself may be trivial and unimportant, yet all of them taken together, form, I think, a strong mass of evidence on this subject. They prove, I think incontestably, that we are gradually adopting military habits and military ideas, anti that we are imperceptibly lending ourselves and submitting to military modes of proceeding, military appearances, and military forms of government. And I presume I need hardly point out how totally inconsistent these are with any thing like civil freedom.

But if I feel any jealousy or alarm for our liberties from the circumstances which I have taken the liberty to detail to the House, there are, I think, some others which are calculated to increase my fears in no small degree. There is in these estimates provision made for certain charitable institutions, to which the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Yorke) alluded the other night with great commendation. In that commendation I cannot join. These institutions I must extremely reprobate, as totally inconsistent with all our old received notions of constitutional liberty. The first I shall mention is the Military Asylum at Chelsea for the education of the. Children of soldiers; this was, I doubt not, in the first instance, established upon grounds of charity merely; but what-. ever the motive, I am not the less hostile to such an institution; for we have here a large number of children educated as a class totally distinct and separate from the rest of their fellow subjects; brought up from their earliest infancy to the peculiar modes and habits of a military life,—doing every thing with military rule and precision, and in military form,—called together by beat of drum, to their school, and to their meals,—and in no degree joining in the pursuits or amusements of civil life. Another institution of the same description is the Military College, for which also provision is made in these estimates; and this institution I view, I confess, with still greater jealousy, as applying to persons of a higher order in society, than the asylum just mentioned. What would our ancestors some fifty or sixty years ago have said at the idea of the establishment, in this country, of a large college, for the purpose of giving an education purely and simply military to a numerous body of young gentlemen? Here, too, as in the last case, every thing is done in a military style; the habits acquired are altogether military; the education may be excellent in that way (I have heard,-indeed, that it is not), but it is a military education, calculated to render those who are the objects of it a distinct and separate class, unaccustomed to and unfit for the usual life of an English gentleman,—with no civil pursuits,—no knowledge of or veneration for our civil institutions. Does the House think, for instance, that a young gentleman educated in the college could be well qualified to undertake the office of a justice of the peace? Or that his administration of the laws could be very mild or gentle? Sir, I say that this is a most dangerous institution. In time of war, indeed, there might be some pretence for it. It might be said, that having to contend in arms with regularly bred soldiers, who from their infancy had been trained to military life, and drilled in military maneuvers, it was necessary to supply ourselves with a similar arm to withstand them. I think that this is no good ground. But what shall we say in time of peace? Do we want these military gentlemen now? Or are we to train them up from this time forward to the great danger and damage of our liberty, because we may some time hereafter be glad of their assistance?

Sir, I will not detain the House by quoting or referring to books on this subject. It would be in vain that I should quote Blackstone, or De Lolme, or Montesquieu, on the dangers arising to civil liberty at all times from a separate and distinct order of military men in a state. I say, I need not quote these opinions, because I am met in limine by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Yorke), who tells me, that "the times are changed. These doctrines may have been very good formerly, but the times are changed, and they do not apply to us now. It was true, in former days, that the constitution abhorred a standing army in time of peace; but the times are changed, and you must now have 150,000 men." Sir, I say, too, the times are changed—woefully changed—and still more changed will they soon be, if this goes on. Sir, I say if this goes on, the times are changed, and the British constitution is gone. Indeed, I should have expected, from the manly character of the right hon. gentleman, that he would have spoken boldly out on the occasion,—that he would not have sheltered himself under the plea of legality, or under the pretence of a change of the times. Why did he not tell us at once that the constitution was unfit for these times; that we must change our habits, and give up our ideas of liberty, and submit to a military government? We should then have known where we were. Sir, I repeat it, the times are changed, or we should not so long have borne these things. But we may yet retrace our steps, we may repair the injuries committed; but if we do not this without delay, this very day, by refusing to entertain these estimates, the constitution is gone indeed.

Sir, we are told, that all this numerous body of troops is necessary in consequence of the increased size and number of the establishments in the country, of the dock-yards and depots. And here I cannot omit to notice by the way, that when the hon. gentlemen opposite really have some good ground for justifying the demands they make upon us, as in the case of the Irish establishment, they refuse no explanation, and withhold no details; but with respect to England we can get nothing but general expressions,—no particulars are given: they talk of our increased establishments, our dock yards, and depots;—now as to the dock-yards; the three great arsenals of Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth, as far as they relate to the navy, I do not believe that they have been increased at all in size; and if the increase of stores accumulated in them is meant, why then what has been said, or what can be said in answer to the argument used by my hon. and learned friend (Mr. Brougham) the other night in ridicule of the idea, that an increase of stores required an increased number of men to guard and protect them? Then as to the depots. Now, Sir, I object to the word depot; first it is a military term, then it is not an English word, and mainly I object to it because it is used as a cloak, to disguise something that it is not wished to name,—something that might sound very offensive to English ears, at least if English ears were constituted as they used to be; for what in truth is meant by this word depot? and how would an English House of Commons some few years ago have started with astonishment and dismay, if they had been told, that they must vote an army of 150,000 men in time of peace, and that 25,000 were wanted for England and Scotland, in order to guard the arsenals and fortresses erected in different parts of the kingdom. Fortresses! Military fortresses in England!! But, says the noble lord (Palmerton), they are numerous, and been raised at an immense cost, and would you now let them go to ruin? I know, Sir, that they are numerous; there is an arsenal and immense fortifications at Woolwich: more at Chatham: more at Dover: there is no end to the towers, and castles, and ditches, and breastworks, that are to be seen; and I know full well too, that all these things have cost millions upon millions of money; but all this is no reason with me for spending still more to keep them up,—on the contrary, I should be much better pleased to see them molder into dust; for thus to spend money to preserve them, merely because so much has already been spent in the erection, which is the noble lord's argument, is, to use a familiar expression, only throwing good money after bad.

There is, however, another argument which has been much insisted on, particularly by a right hon. gentleman, on the first night of the debate (Mr. Yorke), and which seems to have had weight with some gentlemen, but which appears to me to be founded partly on a fallacy, and partly on a mistake. "Our wealth," says the right hon. gentleman, "is much increased; our population is augmented; our territories are more extensive;—in short, the increased prosperity of the country requires this increase of military establishment." In the first place, I would observe on this argument, that it is most extraordinary that our increased prosperity should require that which would be required by a state of things precisely the reverse; that the prosperity of England, and the distresses of Ireland should super induce the same consequence an increased army of 25,000 in each country is extraordinary indeed. In the next. Place, I should answer, that if we are in a state of prosperity, we have attained to that state without ever at any former period of our history keeping up such an establishment, and that the happy result of our former policy is a strange reason for altering it. But to examine this argument more particularly; the right hon. gentleman says, our wealth is increased. Till the right honourable gentleman went on to the end of the sentence, and talked of our prosperity, I really suspected that instead of wealth, he meant to state poverty. The petitions with which your table is crowded, prove that that term would have been much more applicable, and then indeed there might have been some force in the argument,—for I can understand that a poor distressed, discontented people may require a large force to keep them in order; but why the increase of wealth and prosperity should make such a force necessary, unless they are to guard us and our wealth from thieves and robbers, I am at a loss to divine. As to the extent of our empire; I do not know that a great ex- tent of empire is a good per se: I am myself very much inclined to think the very reverse, and that it is, abstractedly considered, no subject of congratulation to this country at least: but we have always been reconciled to it by an assurance that it would increase our security. If, however, in this we have been deceived, as it now appears we have, and this extent of territory, instead of adding to our security, only super induces the necessity of a great increase of force, let us by all means get rid of it at once, and ease ourselves from the burthen. But lastly comes the favorite part of this argument, the increased population. If, as the hon. gentleman who spoke last seems to imagine, it is quite necessary that the army should bear a certain proportion to the population; if this were the case, then undoubtedly as the population increased, so must the soldiery. But I see no reason for such proportion,—on the contrary, the larger the population, and the more able to defend itself (for be it observed the right hon. gentleman brings in aid of this argument the extent of military knowledge diffused into volunteers, and militia, &c. &c.) the more able, I say, the population is to defend itself, the less does it want an army to defend it. On this subject, I really should be glad if gentlemen would be a little more explicit, and tell us openly whether they require this army to defend the people against their enemies, or whether they require it as against the people themselves. If the former, the argument is ridiculous; if the latter, unconstitutional. That, however, the latter is really their meaning, I have little doubt; and I am the more convinced of it from what passed in this House a few years ago. A short time before the death of Mr. Perceval, a discussion arose in this House on the subject of erecting barracks at Liverpool and Bristol, which was objected to on the ground of expense;—the answer given by Mr. Perceval on that occasion was, that "the towns had of late years very much increased in size and population, and that barracks would be necessary to keep the people in order!" To keep the people in order! gracious heavens! What are we come to!! Sir, I protested against that doctrine then—I protest against it now; solemnly, sincerely I protest against it, as contrary to the constitution, as novel and dangerous, as subversive of our liberties, and I protest against the present attempt to give effect to that doctrine, by maintaining a large standing army in the country in time of peace.

"But you are inconsistent," says to us the hon. Gentleman who spoke last; "you think the peace insecure, and yet you object to these establishments."—His Majesty's ministers and their friends are, according to the hon. gentleman, equally inconsistent, for they ask for these establishments, though they profess to think us in a state of perfect security. I agree with the hon. gentleman, that his Majesty's ministers are quite inconsistent; but I do not agree with him, that he himself is the only consistent man in the House, because I see no inconsistency in myself and in my friends around me;—we say, the peace is insecure, not likely to be lasting; we therefore say, expect and he prepared for another war, and for that purpose husband your resources—economize every shilling you can—call not on the people for any exertion further than the obvious necessity of the case requires. Show them, in short, that when you can spare them you will—that you do not harass them and tax them for the purposes of show or parade—to satisfy your vanity or whim—and then be assured, that in the time of danger, when you make your call, your call will be again answered as it has heretofore been, and you will command the purse and the utmost exertions of a brave and affectionate people. But if you harass them by exertions when they are unnecessary, and waste their strength on projects of foolish display, when their utmost efforts are wanted, you will have nothing but an unwilling and listless obedience. Sir, the hon. gentleman thinks that we shall be again plunged in a war in the course of a twelvemonth. He has taken up the cudgels for his Majesty's ministers on this occasion, and I heartily wish them joy of their champion. For how does he defend them; why, he tells you that all the treaties they have entered into are so hollow—all their arrangements so inadequate to the circumstances of the different nations of Europe—all their views so absurd and mistaken, that within twelve months we shall probably be again engaged in war. I admit that he did not say this in as many words—but that was the jet of his argument; for he maintained, that this large establishment was necessary for a year;—"but," says he, "if every thing continues quiet during that year, I shall then think a reduction may take place." I say then, I wish the ministers joy of their champion. For my part, I sincerely regret that the noble secretary of state is absent on this occasion. I lament the cause, and I also lament the effect; for I should like to have heard him give some answer to these strange statements, so ably and eloquently put by the hon. gentleman, Indeed I wonder that the hon. gentleman himself did not desire his presence; and I confess, I am not a little surprised that the hon. gentleman, after having expressly interfered to prevent the House from waiting for the noble lord's presence, should get up and let off such a shot at him, as I protest I should be unwilling to fire against any gentleman in his absence, though I were not at all connected with him. I do not agree, nor do I believe any gentleman around me, I think probably none in the House agree with the hon. gentleman, that the peace will not endure a year. But even if that were my opinion, I, for one, would still object to these estimates. For the satisfaction of the people, groaning as they do—for the satisfaction of the spirit of the constitution—I would relieve them from the burthen were it only for a few months—and I am sure I should be amply repaid by their readiness to answer any future calls which may be made upon them.

Sir, I have detained the House I fear too long, indeed, I am quite ashamed to observe how long I have detained them on this subject,—but the apprehensions which I have attempted to describe and explain the grounds of to the House, have long pressed upon me;—they are now reduced to a melancholy certainty. These estimates are in my mind the proof, the certain proof that my fears are neither visionary nor premature. There does exist a determination, a settled, deep-rooted determination to substitute a military despotism for, our free constitution, under which and by which we have so long prospered.—I lament this determination, but I cannot doubt it—I still more lament that any set of ministers can have been found of lend not only the weight of their characters, whatever that may be, but also the weight of their official situation to such projects, by presenting to the House such estimates as these. But still more sorely shall I lament and grieve, if the House adds to all this, so much of its sanction as to entertain them and suffer them to go to a committee. I entreat the House to be careful what they do—to well weigh the consequences—to look to the result as they shall answer for it to their country and posterity.

Sir, I need not add that I shall vote against the proposition to refer these estimates to the committee of supply.

rose to explain. He said he should always deliver his opinions in parliament with perfect freedom, and with perfect indifference as to who the person might be who he considered in fault. He must deny, however, that he said the country was on the eve of a war. He only alluded to the actual state of Europe, which he considered to be so insecure, that it was necessary, in his judgment, to arm the hands of ministers with a power that might enable them to negotiate with effect. He made no pointed charge against the ministers. It was not in their power wholly to prevent what had recurred in Europe, though he certainly thought they might have done more than they did, while at the same time be willingly admitted they had, done much to ameliorate its condition in many respects.

said, he hoped the House would permit him to occupy some part of its attention, while he took a general view of the arguments which had been advanced on the other side of the House; and first of all, he could not help adverting to a prophecy with respect to the present discussion, which his noble friend had ventured upon on a former evening. His noble friend, in agreeing to the adjournment, had said, he was sure that the more the question was examined and sifted, the more it would redound to the discomfiture of those who opposed it; and he would ask of the right hon. gentleman opposite, and those who followed in his train, whether that prophecy had not been fulfilled? [Here some noise prevailing, the Speaker called to order at the bar.]

rose, not, he said, to enforce order on the floor of the House, or below the bar, but to demand that something like order should be introduced into the language used by the ministerial side [Hear, hear!]. They had heard on a former night from the noble lord who was now absent, a recommendation to introduce better discipline into their ranks, and now they were told that they were in the train of a right hon. gentleman. One thing, however, was certain, that whether they were in a train or not, at least they received no pay [Loud cries of Hear, hear!].

resumed, that if this meant to imply that men did not act from opinion because they were in office, he utterly despised the accusation; and he would repeat, that all but those in the train of the right hon. gentleman would agree, that the investigation the question had received had opened men's minds to its propriety.

the assertion is unfounded, that any gentlemen on this side of the House act in any man's train. Let the right hon. gentleman name those who do?

. After having made the assertion, it is imperative upon the hon. gentleman to do so.

thought that no man had a right to call his hon. friend to order for the expressions he had used, and still less to ascribe to him, because he held Office in administration, motives less honourable than those which actuated other gentlemen.

denied that he had imputed motives to any one, He simply stated a fact which could not be denied. He did not say that the hoc. Gentlemen opposite were actuated by motives less honourable than any other members of that House, but he stated an undeniable position, that their situations were more lucrative.

replied, that as the hon. and learned gentleman had abandoned his allusion, he should most willingly accept the explanation in the sense in which it was offered. He certainly understood him to mean, that those who were in office were in the pay of the minister, and therefore forced to give up the unbiased and independent exercise of their judgments, For himself he could only say, that he despised any such allusion.

begged leave to say, that he abandoned nothing, and that he had given no explanation.

said, he was compelled to make the observation, that many persons in that House thought the hon. and learned gentleman assumed a tone and manner which were most improper. He took upon himself to school every one in what he conceived to be their duty. [Hear, hear!]

said, he did not know whether any disorderly language had been made use of before, and he had no doubt if it had, that it was through inadvertency; but he was sure that when the hon. mem- ber talked about another hon. member schooling that House, such language was disorderly, and he presumed he could not be aware of the force of the expression.

replied, that he should be sorry to use any expression which might imply disrespect for the talents of the hon. and taught gentleman, which he duly appreciated. He must say, however, that the word "school" was the only one which, in his opinion, correctly expressed his meaning. The hon. and learned gentleman complained of the expression as applied to the other side of the House, in describing them as being in the train of another; but surely that language was not worse than what was employed in characterizing their opponents as the minions of government.

rose to order. He was not aware that any such expression had been used.

said, he would take upon himself to say that he had heard that expression in the course of the debate on the preceding evening, though he was not sure whether he was in order in referring to what passed on a former occasion. As a proof, however, of the conduct of the hon. and learned gentleman, he would only allude to the manner in which he thought proper to give a lesson to the honourable member for Devonshire, with respect to the mode of presenting even a petition.

said, the proceedings of the hon. gentlemen opposite, if their object was to create delay, were well calculated to accomplish that object. All he meant to insinuate by saying that they were in the train of another, was nothing more than what the House perfectly understood on both sides. They linked themselves together, elected a sort of leader, and followed that leader [Cries of No, no, from the opposition benches]. With regard to the question before the House, he wished chiefly to speak to it in consequence of the strange exaggerations and misrepresentations persisted in with astonishing pertinacity, and which made it necessary to recall the real facts to the recollection of the House. The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham) had from first to last called the military establishment 150,000 men, and the expense of all the establishments together, 30 millions. This had been repeated by other gentlemen, though over and over again contradicted, and though it had been proved to the plainest comprehension, that the men were no more than 99,000, and the expense about 20 millions. It was to investigate this that the House was really called upon. But another hon. gentleman (Mr. J. P. Grant) had said, he would not even listen; and thus a Whig who was perpetually calling for investigation, would not investigate when the thing was offered. Yet the hon. gentleman might have received a lesson upon this rashness, from his own friends, particularly the member for Waterford (sir J. Newport) who owned that the 25,000 for Ireland were absolutely necessary. This, then, immediately brought them into details, which honourable members affected to despise, and proved that the principle was right, and the question was only one of degree. There were three grounds of objection—the constitutional, the political, and the economical. He would address himself to them all. As to the first, it was remarkable, that the standing army was the child of the Revolution and of the Whigs. It had existed for a hundred years, and all the prophecies that it would. Enslave us had failed. It was still more remarkable, that the only army in England that had really destroyed the constitution was the army of liberty, under Cromwell; while the army of despotism under James 2nd had refused to side with him when invited. Jealousy had been recommended; and he, too, was for jealousy; but not so chimerically as the noble lord, who would have us destroy all our fortifications, from the fear of the bugbear of his own imagination, and expose us without defence. History taught us serious things by examples. Let us beware of that of De Witt, a great patriot; he braved the designs of the House of Orange; he threw down the defences of the country, which was ruined by France, according to sir W. Temple, on this very account. The noble lord said there was a design to convert this into a military government.

spoke to order. He denied that he had made such an assertion; he did indeed say, that the effect of the present system was the establishment of a military feeling—he had said nothing as to the designs of those who were parties to it—he merely spoke as to the effect.

continued. The jit of the noble lord's assertion was to that purport. Of this gratuitous assertion he would only say, that he did not believe it; and it was impossible for him to meet it in any other way than by a negative as strong as the assertion itself. After a war of twenty-five years duration, nothing was more natural than that the officers should retain many of their military habits, and should not at once return to the class of citizens. He therefore saw nothing alarming or improper in officers wishing to keep up their old associations, and exercising the same right as tradesmen and professional men did every day, in forming societies where they might meet together, and talk over their former exploits. But gentlemen feared the army in France; and to, remedy this, proposed it should be composed of foreigners. What! to prevent Britons from being enslaved a British army to be disbanded, and foreign mercenaries taken in their place! The wonder was, that the noble lord in his fears did not move to address the Crown to part with its patrimonial dominions; for the Hanoverians were good troops, and not much farther off than the duke of Wellington's army. It had been said that the navies of the world were annihilated, and therefore we needed no army. But a hon. friend of his (Sir George Warrender), in moving the vote of seamen, had stated the navies of the world at two hundred ships of the line. He adverted to the necessity of protecting the forts and arsenals of the kingdom, which would be more cheaply protected by the military than by the civil power. Besides, the naval arsenal at Chatham had been much enlarged; it was altogether a little kingdom within itself. The works had cost a million of money. Were they to be abandoned to dilapidation in peace? Was Woolwich, he would ask, where there was a depôt of arms and military stores for 200,000 men, to be protected by a few watchmen? As to the political objections, it was pertinacious said, that all thick establishments were to keep an illegitimate monarch on the throne of France. Waving his right as successor to Louis 16th, was he not formerly elected in 1814, and did a few months usurpation force him to a new election. If so, Charles 2d, was not a legitimate king when restored. For after various forms of government, during thirteen years exile, he returned and took possession, merely, by writing to the parliament, that he would do so. It had been said we were at war for a wicked alliance: but the only alliance he knew of, was that for the peace of Europe, and essentially of England against France. Was this wicked? As to economy, to be sure the most economical plan was what had been recommended. "Away with all your colonies and defences, and then you have no need of an army." But he could not deal gravely with such a proposal. Upon the whole, the more the subject had been sifted, the more the wisdom of the measure had been proved, and the objections refuted; and therefore he voted for the proposition.

began with complimenting lord Folkestone on his eloquent, manly, and truly constitutional speech, which, he hoped, would have that weight to which it was so justly entitled. He wished, however, to say a few words on, the financial system of the right hon. chancellor of the exchequer. When the Prince Regent's speech was read from the chair, he had heard words of a most extraordinary nature, and which could have been introduced merely for the sake of deceiving the country. His royal highness was made to say, that the trade and commerce of the united kingdom were in a most flourishing situation; but he appealed to every man within those walls—and there were many of the first importance in the city of London—whether this statement was correct. There never had been a period, with the single exception of the year 1810, in which greater commercial distress had prevailed in every part of the country. An account had been laid oaf the table of the amount of exports of last year ending in October, contrasting it that of 1814. It appeared that there was an excess, but the inference which the right hon. gentleman drew from it was most false. He would refer him to the year 1810: a year of the greatest commercial enterprise, but at the same time one of the utmost disaster. The right, hon. gentleman ought not to have put such language into the mouth of the Prince Regent. Mr. Smith said, he had stated two years ago, that there was a delusion in., the House with respect to our finances; and he was now convinced that unless: government kept up the whole of the war. Taxes, we had no revenue to apply to our. Peace establishment. If there were not an income tax, not merely at five per cent. but at ten per cent. We had not the means of supporting, the establishment now proposed. Suppose a man having 5000l. perannum, spending 10,000l. were to take the advice of his friends, would they say to him—"Go to Jews and money-lenders, and raise money to meet your difficulties." No, his best friends would say—"reduce your expenditure." He might answer—"Yes, I know that expedient will answer, but then I shall sink in the estimation of those around me." But would they not wisely reply—"No, you will not fall; you will rise in the estimation of the worthy; for economy will ever be found the true road to independence." These observations were not only true as they regarded an individual, but as they related to a nation.

rose and said:—I have attempted more than once to catch your eye at earlier stages of this debate, before the question and the House were so nearly exhausted, in order to protest against measure which, however intended, I do in my conscience believe to be the first step to the establishment of military despotism on the ruins of the British constitution. I felt great eagerness to have entered that protest at a moment when, with a regret and mortification aggravated by respect, I heard this dreadful novelty defended on principles still more dreadful by a right hon. gentleman who bears the name of Yorke, and in whose veins the blood of Somers flows—[Mr. C. Yorke rose to order. He complained of any member naming another. The Speaker observed that he understood the hon. and taught gentleman to speak historically; not with an intention to name any member.]—certainly, sir, I did. I meant to name the right hon. gentleman's ancestors, not himself; and I am sorry that he should not consider the mention of their name as a gratification and an honour.

I am relieved from the necessity of stating much of what I had intended to urge by the excellent and admirable speech of the noble lord (Folkestone); a speech as much distinguished by old English spirit and old English principles as any ever delivered within these walls. I shall leave ministers to defend themselves against an ingenious advocate (Mr. Law), who founds their claims on their faults, and is desirous of arming them with a great military force as a safeguard against the danger which they themselves have created by unwise negotiations and insecure alliances. He fears our allies more than our late enemies. It seems as if he had intended to illustrate his argument by an example, in his own speech, of the formidable danger of hostile support.

I rejoice that my view of the subject does not now lead me into adverse discussion with the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Peel), whose eloquence has thrown so dreadful a light on the condition of Ireland. I honour the sincerity as touch as I admire the talent which he has displayed. But he has said that of Ireland which cannot with truth be said of any great province of the most absolute monarchy in Europe. He has told us, that it is incapable of being ruled, I do not say by free but by civil and legal government. He justifies that part of the establishment on the principle that Ireland can be held only by military force. Even the state in which she is, a state of immorality and atrocity, a state without security for life or property, a state of disturbed and barbarous submission, without respect for law or preference for government, would be made far worse (for it seems worse can exist in Ireland), if any attempt were made to rule that great and ancient member of the empire otherwise than by an army. Admitting the premises, the conclusion certainly follows. I do not now controvert the premises. A time must soon come for a solemn inquiry into the extent, the causes, and the remedy of these tremendous evils. Till that time comes, it is certainly premature to make observations likely to excite discussion. But I cannot forbear from saying, that I consider the remains of the laws of proscription and persecution against the Irish people as the source of all the evil. To that evil principle all the second causes enumerated by the right hon. gentleman may be clearly traced. The popery laws originally deprived Ireland of a Catholic gentry: they deprived the people of natural leaders, whose authority might guide and check them. The persecution which destroyed the original gentry necessarily reduced the people to the manners and passions of a populace. The Protestant gentry were a small and hostile body, which rather exasperated the hostility of the nation than supplied the place of a native proprietary body. Hence the evil so much complained of—the want of competent magistrates in Ireland. That great evil may indeed be in part caused, or rather aggravated by errors and faults of administration. But the source of the evil is more remote. It is the great principle and peculiar excellence of our system of justices of peace, that these magistrates are generally persons who are the natural objects of the respect of the people, who only add a legal stamp to their personal influence, and may be with some truth said to lend as much authority to the law as they receive from it.

The penal code destroyed a similar body in Ireland, or perhaps rather prevented its formation. The remnant of that bloody code, which still subsists in the form of disabilities, prevents the revival of such a gentry as are qualified to be magistrates. It deters Catholics from being land-owners, and it keeps up civil war between protestant proprietors and that Catholic people who would naturally be subject to their influence as well as secured by their protection. No wonder that there should be absentees from a country where the law teaches the proprietor to dread his tenants as his enemies. It is no wonder that all the habits of intoxication, contraband distillation, and lawless ferocity should be found among a people who feel none of those sentiments towards law which the example and ascendant of their superiors would have silently inspired if that law had not sowed discord between them, and whose only teachers in morality and religion, were only yesterday persecuted, and are still despised where they are not dreaded by their Protestant masters. Till this foul stain is effaced, there can be no beginning of good in Ireland. Our laws must cease to be distinguished by the disgraceful peculiarity of disabling men to serve their country because they serve God according to their conscience. In this exclusion we are now almost alone among great states. The military monarchies have in general carried toleration as far as policy or indifference would stretch it. Indeed, absolute governments do not willingly subject themselves to rules in the selection of servants, and are apt to evade or disdain such restrictions when they exist. Holland, in the new constitution and I believe in fact, adheres to her ancient toleration, in contempt of the detestable remonstrances of the Flemish bishops. France, in her constitution at least, proclaims the equal admissibility of men of all religions to the trusts and honours of the state. England is not quite solitary in the proscriptive system. England and Spain (I join the names with sorrow and shame) observe the same policy. They are the only great states who form an exception to the liberality of the civilized world. England and Spain are the only remaining seats of intolerance!

It has been said that the revolution gave us standing armies. I cannot pass over in silence so grievous a calumny on the revolu- tion: it is a great historical error. The revolution found standing armies kept up without the sanction of parliament, and in defiance of law;—the revolution found the king claiming and exercising the power of keeping up as large an army as he could find means (abroad or at home) to pay;—the revolution branded the usurpation, and expelled the usurping king;—the revolution bent the neck of military power under the yoke of law, and rendered armies the creatures of parliament ado and destroyed by its breath:—it permitted, indeed, the annual vote of an army with an annual grant of money for its support; and an annual mutiny bill for its government rendering that army every year a new establishment to be proposed on particular grounds, and adopted only on the same principle as if each year were the first of its proposition. The revolution tolerated such annual standing armies, or rather did not attempt to limit the power of parliament to provide for the public safety by such an expedient as often and as much as it became necessary. But it was on such principles, and under this triple control, as well as for this limited term that the revolution allowed an army. The principle of the revolution on this subject, I conceive to be, that an army without the consent of parliament is destructive of liberty, and that an army with the consent of parliament is dangerous to liberty, though policy may compel us to suffer it, and though these multiplied securities may abate its mischievous tendency. The revolution, then, did not establish an army, but reduced it under the power of the constitution. Cromwell first maintained a large army in this kingdom in time of peace; and that army raised, in support of liberty, the best composed and the most moral that perhaps ever took up arms, as soon as they had subdued their opponents, afforded the strongest demonstration of the unchangeable hostility of all armies, even the best, to freedom, and indeed, to civil authority. They trampled on all law; they compelled a remnant of this House to become the instrument of their generals; and when their services were no longer needed, they expelled even that remnant with outrage, and drove your predecessor, sir, from the chair which you now fill. Charles 2d disbanded that army because they were the enemies of his title; but he soon collected another as his allies against the rights of his people. He faithfully copied the usurper in all the means of main- taining his legitimate authority, with no other difference than that if Cromwell's, army destroyed the liberty; it maintained the glory of England, while Charles, the slave of foreign powers, obtained no victories but over his people. He clandestinely augmented this illegal army. James thought himself strong enough to avow it. The glorious revolution destroyed the army and the king.

It is among the most alarming singularities of the estimate now before the House that it exhibits an attempt to undo the revolution, and to release the army from one of the checks then established on it, the most powerful of all, and the only one peculiar to the House of Commons. As to the 34,000 men now stationed in France, forming the second head of this estimate, we are informed in a note, that "it is not proposed to submit to the House of Commons any vote on account of their charges," they being payable by France. So that the House of Commons is to resign for five years all pecuniary control over an army of 34,000 British soldiers. This fearful novelty is proposed as a mere trifle or a matter of course in a marginal note, composed, I presume, by some clerk at the war-office. And what is as singular as any part of this astonishing proposition, a descendant of those great men who made and maintained the revolution ventures in the House to justify this partial counter-revolution, this restoration of an army independent of parliament, this abdication of one of the greatest powers bestowed (I speak practically) on this House by that glorious and auspicious revolution. "It is enough," says the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Yorke), "that parliament sanctions the army in France by an address approving the measure."

It is thus that he values the securities, for liberty gained by his ancestors. He is quite content to establish an army for five years, to surrender the pecuniary control,—the exclusive privilege of the House of Commons,—the annual duration which distinguishes the army from that before the revolution, and renders it constantly dependent on this, House;—and he is ready to take in return some appearance of a parliamentary sanction to be collected by an ingenious commentator from the general words of a congratulatory address! But on this point I need say no more, it is in the hands of my, hon. and learned friend (Mr. C. W. Wynne), who will do all that can be expected from hereditary lave and knowledge of the British constitution, I mention it now chiefly as a circumstance which characterizes the spirit and intention of this estimate, and the disregard of its supporters as well as framers for all that has hitherto been deemed most sacred among Englishmen.

I agree with those who say that it is a question of amount. The state of the world requires a regular army; all discus. Scions respecting it must turn upon its extent. But it is not merely a question of amount in relation to the supposed necessities of military defence; it is a question of amount also in relation to the safety of the constitution;—threatened by the influence from the disposal of military offices,—threatened still more by the wide diffusion of a military spirit, and the permanent adoption of military habits by a great part of the people,—threatened also (we must never for a moment be so unmindful of the lessons of history as to, forget) by the employment of open force, to overthrow a constitution after it has been undermined by influence, and when a nation of soldiers are long enough accustomed to turn their eyes from laws and lawgivers to those who are the more natural objects of the attachment and fealty of armies.

What, then, is the amount of this proposed army? Waving for the present the army in France and in India, we are called upon to vote a hundred thousand men. This is nearly as large a proportion of our population as the most military governments of Europe have attempted to keep under arms in peace. The army of France appears from authentic accounts in the last years of the old monarchy to have amounted to a hundred and sixty thousand men, out of a population of twenty-eight millions. This was one out of a hundred and seventy-five. Making: the largest allowance for our late progress in population, it would be impossible to, calculate the people of the two British, islands at more than seventeen million. And a half, of which a hundred thousand, men is the hundred and seventy-fifth part. This was never thought too small an army for France with her prodigious line of frontier, with a complicated system of alliance and influence throughout. Europe to maintain,—then, perhaps, only the third or fourth military power in the world, but with the feeling that she had been and might soon again become the first. The decay of her military renown, the decline of her political ascendant, as far as either existed, has never been imputed to the numbers of the army. Her policy might be blamed,—her actual means were never thought inadequate. With that army she was always considered as capable of supporting the station which she occupied or even of recovering that from which she had fallen as a military power. The peace establishment of Joseph 2nd, in 1785, was two hundred and thirty thousand men, or something more than the hundred and thirtieth part of the population of his dominions. The peace establishment now intended in Russia is, I have reason to think, less compared to its population than that proposed to us. I do not make this comparison with any view to the comparative facilities of supporting an army in different countries. The greatest number of men can be maintained in idleness where the labor of those who work is most productive. The aid which science and genius have given to English labor through machinery renders it impossible to compare this country in that important respect to any other. But I press this for quite a different purpose. An army equal to that of France before the revolution, equal to that of Russia at present, nearly equal to that of Austria in the time of her greatest power, has every mark of a resolution that England is to be a military state. Where do military states exist, unless they are Russia, France, and Austria? If we, the first naval power in the world, with not a foot of frontier to defend, are permanently to have under arms a proportion of our population as great, or nearly as great as Russia, France, and Austria, it is evident that considering our situation we aspire to be more military than they are. What would have been said at any former period of our history, if it had been predicted that a minister would have been bold enough to propose a peace establishment for this country, which would render it equal or superior in land forces to the most military governments of Europe? It would surely have required no argument to prove, that the amount of a standing army must be fatal to this constitution when it was such as to indicate military pretension in a free and insular state, superior or even nearly equal to those of despotic continental monarchies.

This is one mode of comparison applicable to the amount of these estimates. Another is with the establishments of this country in former times. But to render this last comparison just, it is necessary to introduce it by one preliminary observation: all former establishments have been chiefly calculated on the danger of attack from France; with some view to colonial or commercial differences with Spain and Holland. At the present moment 30,000 British troops in France are a sufficient security against French attack: that army covers Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies against all possible hostility from that power. There is no navy in the world but our own: Holland has not the will if she had the power to molest us: Spain holds her slender and precarious hope of recovering her colonies on suffer, acne from us: a cannon fired by one British ship of war for ever delivers the new world from her power. All the objects for which we used to keep up a standing army are gone. The time is come when, according to the maxims of our former policy, we might disband our troops, or at least considers our force in France as standing in the stead of the army. To compare this estimate fairly with the establishments of former times, we must either deduct from farmer establishments all that part of them which was designed to secure this country and her colonies against France, Spain, and Holland, or we must again add to our present estimate the 30,000 men maintained in France who now secure us against the hostility of that country, to say nothing of a large addition required to represent the former navies of that great state and her dependant ally—Spain.

Take for an example the establishment proposed by Mr. Fox in 1784, which the right hon. gentleman has chosen to select:—let it be called 46,000 men, for Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies. But as I now lay aside the army in India, I must also deduct the force then in India from that establishment; it will be reduced to 36,000 men: the present is nearly three times greater. But what deduction would have been made from that establishment, if there had been a British army posted in the strongest fortresses of France? If a sloop of war could not leave Brest without the permission of England. Either making the deduction or the addition which the nature of the case required, it is obvious that the present establishment surpasses that of 1784 in the proportion of more than four to one.

Without this consideration, the compa- rison, or rather the contrast between the establishment made by Mr. Pitt in 1792, and that now recommended by his pretended followers, would be just neither to his character nor to theirs. It is quite obvious that he very reasonably reduced his establishment in 1792 because the Revolution had for the moment reduced France. Would he have thrown out of his view that France is now conquered, disarmed, garrisoned by an English army?

I will not go through the whole detail of colonial garrisons with which the ministers labor to bewilder the judgment of the House. It proceeds on a principle which inverts the order of reasonable deliberation. With me the great questions are, what can the people pay? What army will be safe for public liberty? When the amount is determined on these principles, we must afterwards adapt them as best we can to the necessary defence of our various possessions. But the first question on the other side is what the proper garrison of Cape Coast castle is? What ought to be the number of the Royal African corps? What is the desirable garrison for this colony or that fortress? when they have made out a tremendous total out of such details, they consider every consideration of the national resources as vain, and every argument founded on constitutional danger as foolish declamation. Now even if I could believe such statements to be exaggerated, neither by the zeal of colonists nor by the interest of those who profit by supply, nor by the precautions of military men; if waving all consideration of the state of the enemy, of the means of naval defence by which our colonies exist, of the military resources which have often before been found in the people of these colonies themselves; of the strength which the old possessions and the recent acquisitions do give or ought to give to each other;—if waving all these. Considerations, which are in truth the greater part of the question, I were to give implicit credit to every detailed statement taken by itself, and consequently had no means of attacking the total amount through a calculation of particulars, I should still try it by the standard of the means of the people, and the safety of the constitution. Believing it to be utterly inconsistent with both these objects, I should vote for the motion of my noble friend, and require ministers to come to the House with estimates of which the total amount should be so mo- derate as to entitle them to particular examination.

The few words which I shall say on particular objects shall therefore be merely as an exemplification of general argument. No colonial case seems to be so confidently relied on as Upper Canada: such is the happy result of our war with the United States. At the end of that war we are to have an increased defence for Canada: it has increased the danger of our American possessions. That admission is implied in the whole argument used on this subject in the debate.

Two reasons are assigned for the necessity of this defence: the first has at least the merit of being original and unexpected. Canada is, it seems, more exposed, because it is more cleared and cultivated: it was formerly guarded by forests and deserts: the farmers who cut down the forests have acted as pioneers to open roads for the invader. The natural answer to this ingenious paradox is that every field opened to an invader also nourishes men ready to oppose him, and that if cultivation has removed some obstacles to his progress; it has risen up a brave and hardy race of men able to defend the country which they cultivate. But this is at variance with the general argument which runs through the whole case for the present estimate. An increase of people either at home or abroad is not an increase of strength, but an increase of weakness: the garrison of Upper Canada must be augmented because the population is doubled or trebled. What! are we to consider our subjects as our enemies, and an army as the means of containing popular discontent and ensuring passive obedience? I wave all the tremendous consequences to public liberty of thus extending and perpetuating in every part of the empire the wretched principles of admits, nitration, which seem for a moment excused by necessity in Ireland. But what is to be the result to our finances and resources if this system be applied to our colonies? Their population will increase with their prosperity. Must the growth of their prosperity impoverish and exhaust the mother country? Must we become poor in proportion as our colonies become rich? Must the progress of their population dry up the sources of ours? There is one recent acquisition, which, if it be wisely governed, has almost indefinite capacities of improvement. It is not easy to set bounds to the possible advances of the Cape of Good Hope: there is no colony which unites more sources of prosperity. Are such colonies, then, by the rapidity of their progress, to be rendered a growing burthen, and at last a sure destruction to Great Britain? Canada is a possession which either must be held by the attachment of the inhabitants, or never can be worth holding. There cannot be a more shallow policy than that of teaching the Canadians to lean on England for defence. It is the necessary tendency of such a system to weaken their reliance on their own efforts, and to extinguish those feelings of national pride, or, if you will, of national hostility, which are kept alive in borderers by fear and contention, and which protects effectually that part of a country which is most exposed to attack. Under such a system, that provincial patriotism will go out which must be the only effectual defense of Canada. Nothing can more plainly show how widely we have wandered from the policy of our ancestors than these new principles of colonial defence. By the peace of 1763 we added Canada and the Floridas to the British dominions; yet the military establishment of 1764, was less than that of 1749: new dominions were then regarded as accessions to strength, not as sources of weakness.

We are told that this establishment is an experiment for a year, adapted to the uncertain condition of Europe, scarcely recovered from war, and far from general tranquility. But how does this general reasoning apply to any part of the details of this establishment? Is not every part of the military establishment, except the army in France, proposed on grounds which are either permanent, or likely to be progressive? Is the national character of Ireland to be changed in a session? Is America to become a less formidable neighbor to our continental or insular colonies? Is the progress of cultivation and population in Canada to stop or to go backward? Are the slaves in the West Indies not at length under a better system to multiply? Will the works of Malta and Gibraltar require fewer men? Is the population of Great Britain to be thinned and tamed till it become manageable with fewer soldiers? Every thing is permanent in their arguments—nothing is temporary but their professions.

They have, indeed, betrayed their secret in another part of their argument. They justify their system by arraigning the whole military policy of our forefathers. Mr. Pitt, they tell us, repented the smallness of his establishment. They would have us believe that he ascribed to that limited establishment same part of the French success in the first years of the war. I believe, from the highest authority, that Mr. Pitt never did feel such regret. But if I had no authority for my opinion, I should have adhered to it till compelled by the clearest proof to relinquish it, from respect for the understanding of a great man. Could he have believed that any increase of our peace establishments in 1792, which could have entered into a sound mind, would have any effect on the events which followed? Were not the military powers of the continent, whose establishments were on the utmost stretch, discomfited? When the whole people of France rose in 1793, stimulated by irresistible enthusiasm, what obstacle could have been opposed to their progress, by a few thousand more soldiers? Or if the British army of 1792 had doubled, no man in his senses can believe that the event would have been different. The addition of twenty or of thirty thousand men to the force of Europe could have varied very little the probabilities of success. As well might a Neapolitan peasant lament that he had not added a foot or two to his fence to turn aside the broadest and most furious torrent of lava that ever flowed from Vesuvius.

I cannot bring myself, by voting for the new system of large peace establishments, to stigmatize all the wise men who administered the affairs of this kingdom since the revolution, who, according to the new creed, brought on their country bloodshed and defeat, and protracted war, which a larger army in peace would have prevented. Experience seems to me to teach quite a contrary lesson. If you look back on history, you find the smallest peace establishments followed by glorious wars, and the largest by inglorious wars. In 1699 the army was reduced by act of parliament^* to 7000 men. The policy of this reduction might be blamed. Its motives might be suspected. It might be considered as ungenerous and harsh towards our great deliverer. But its effects on the succeeding war could not be called very mischievous. The war broke out in three years. In two years more the battle of Blenheim justified the peace establishment. About the middle of the next long peace, we had the largest peace establishment before the truce of Amiens. In 1735 we had about 26,000 men. This peace was followed by the war of the Austrian succession, the least fortunate of any before the American war. Without undue reliance on these coincidences, it is enough for me that the whole history of our establishments destroys the pretended connation between the magnitude of a peace establishment and the success of the subsequent war. In 1755 an army of 18,000 men preceded the glories of Lord Chatham's war administration. In 1774 a like army of 18,000 men preceded the calamities of the American war.

^* 10 W. & M. 3, c. 1.

The connexion is indeed belied by the history of all free states in civilized periods. It is inconsistent with the nature of liberty, and the belief of it is founded only on those most vulgar prejudices which confound strong government with uncontrolled power. In despotic countries it may be necessary to maintain great armies as seminaries of warlike spirit. The mind, which in such wretched countries has no noble object to employ its powers, almost necessarily sinks into languor and lethargy when it is not roused to the destructive phenyl of war. The show of war during peace may be necessary to preserve the chief skill of the barbarian, and to keep up the only exalted feeling of the slave. The savage soon throws off habits of order, and the slave is ever prone to relapse into the natural cowardice of his debased condition. But in this mightiest of free communities, where no human faculty is suffered to lie dormant, and where habitual order and co-operation give effect to the intense and incessant exertion of power; the struggles of honourable ambition, the fair contests of political party, the enterprises of ingenious industry, the pursuits of elegant art, the fearless exercise of reason, upon the most venerable opinions, and upon the acts of the highest authorities, the race of many for wealth, and of a few for power or fame, are abundantly sufficient to cultivate those powers, and to inspire those energies which, at the approach of war, submit to discipline, and quickly assume the forms of military science and genius. A free nation like ours, full of activity and boldness, and yet full of order, has all the elements and habits of an army, prepared by the happy frame of its society. We re- quire no military establishments to nurse our martial spirit. It is our distinction that we have ever proved ourselves in time of need a nation of warriors, and that we never have been a people of soldiers. It is no refinement to say, that the national courage and intellect have acted with the more vigor on the approach of hostility, because we are not teased and worried into petty activity, because a proud and serious people have not been degraded in their own eyes by acting their awkward part in holiday parade. Where arms are the national occupation, the intervals of peace are times of idleness, during which a part at least of the people must fit them Selves for the general business, by exercising the talents and qualities which it requires. But where the pursuits of peace require the highest activity and the nature of the government calls forth the highest spirit, the whole people must always possess the materials and principles of a military character. Freemen are brave because they rely on themselves; Liberty is our national point of honour. The pride of liberty is the spring of our national courage. The independent spirit, the high feeling of personal dignity, and the consequent sensibility to national honour, the true sources of that velour for which this nation has been renowned for ages, have been in a great measure created and preserved by their being accustomed to trust to themselves for defense against invasion from abroad or tyranny at home. If they lean on an army for safety they will soon look to it with awe, and thus gradually lose those sentiments of self-respect and self-dependence, that pride of liberty which are the peculiar and the most solid defences of this country.

Small peace establishments, old English liberty, a people fearlessly discussing all principles and measures of government, a House of Commons jealous of the power of the sword, tenacious of the power of the purse, have given to these islands happiness and greatness: they have given us Churchills and Wellesley, Blenheims and Waterloos—what higher names or more splendid trophies has the new system in store?

said, that he would not trouble the House at any great length, but he wished to be allowed to make a few observations. His wish was to recall the attention of gentlemen to the real question before them, which was simply, whether the army estimates should be re- ferred to the committee of supply. The whole force of the argument on the other side of the House, and all the splendid abilities which had been displayed on the present occasion, had been directed to the establishment of this position,—that it was not desirable to refer the army estimates to the committee of supply, because they carried on the face of them an indication, that his majesty's ministers recommended a system, which, if it did not produce an immediate military despotism, had a tendency to a state of things of which a military despotism must be the final result. The hon. gentleman opposite contended that because the proposed measures appeared to them to be in their nature unconstitutional, they ought not to be submitted for a moment to the committee for investigation. This was their main objection to the motion. The principal argument which they had urged was, that every one who understood the constitution of England, knew that it was contrary to law to keep up a standing army in time of peace, without the consent of parliament. That was true. But all who knew what had taken place in parliament for the last hundred years must admit that to a certain degree, a standing army in peace had always been considered necessary for the preservation, not only of the country but of the constitution. There was not a hon. member who had spoken in the course of the debate, who had gone so far as to deny that some standing army was necessary for the security of Great Britain and, our colonies. If it was admitted on all hands that some standing army was necessary, the constitutional question was at an end, and the only question that remained was a question of degree. If it was admitted, that there must be some degree of force, then there must be some estimates; and he begged leave to say that, according to all parliamentary usage, it was impossible to determine what number of forces ought to be maintained unless the estimates were submitted to the committee of supply, and there deliberately investigated, point by point. His noble friend had laid before parliament an estimate of the force which in his opinion, ought to be maintained. In so doing, he had done only his duty. Would it have been manly or honest, had his noble friend submitted to the House an estimate which in his own conscience he thought insufficient? The only proper course for his noble friend to adopt was that, which he had adopted, namely, to propose to parliament the force that he thought was required by the occasion, and of course to leave to parliament the decision upon the items of which the estimate was composed. The gentlemen opposite contended that on the face of the estimates there appeared an extent of force, the establishment of which would be dangerous to the constitution. His majesty's government contended that if the discussion of those estimates were allowed to take place, they were ready to show that every part of them was necessary. This was the difference. It could be decided only by facts; and how could facts be ascertained unless the House went into the committee. He should not have been surprised at the violent opposition to the motion had ministers called on the House at the present moment to vote the estimates. But that was not the question. No sum was proposed; but, his noble friend having laid on the table of the House the estimates which he had thought necessary for the public service, the House was asked to refer them to the committee of supply, in order that that committee might thoroughly investigate them, and determine whether they would agree to any, or all, or which. What common sense was there therefore in attempting to put a stop in limine to this proceeding? Was there any impartial man who had listened to the three nights of debate on this subject, and who did not perceive that the hon. gentleman opposite, in arguing against the examination of the estimates by the committee had shown decided reasons for such an examination? Hardly two of those hon. gentlemen had agreed as to the amount of force which was desirable. There was a wide field of difference among them. For instance, one hon. baronet whom he saw in his place, and who was as conversant with the affairs of the sister kingdom as any man could be (Sir John Newport), concurred with his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Peel) that 25,000 troops would not be too many for Ireland. Another hon. gentleman, however, expressed great doubts as to the propriety of voting a force for Ireland until it should be determined by a committee above stairs whether any soldiers were necessary there at all.—[An expression of dissent from the opposition bench]—No! He was glad to hear that he had misunderstood the hon. gentleman, and that all parties thought 25,000 men were necessary for the security of Ireland. Another hon. gentleman who had spoken very ably last night, had admitted that the estimate for Canada and Nova Scotia was not at all too large for the necessity of the case—an estimate, let it be observed, by the way, in which there had been a great increase since the last peace. Other hon. gentlemen declared that it was better to give those colonies up than maintain them at the proposed expense. Here was a considerable difference of opinion. He put it to the candor of the hon. gentlemen, what could be a fairer proceeding on the part of his majesty's government than to refer the estimates to the committee of supply, where they would be sifted and investigated; where his noble friend would have the opportunity of explaining the nature of every article of which they were composed, and where gentlemen of both sides of the House would have the means of canvassing the subject freely, and without limitation? The House was not called upon to vote the estimates blindly; but they were challenged—they were implored—to examine them with the utmost scrupulosity. With respect to all that had been said on the subject of economy, he, for one, was satisfied in his own mind, that a pledge more sincere was never given than the pledge on that subject, and that in every department of the state, it would be redeemed to the utmost extent compatible with the safety of the country. His majesty's government contended that in the estimates before the House the utmost attention to economy had been shown. If the hon. gentlemen opposite doubted this, let them go into the committee, and if they could prove that there was a single item which might, be reduced without endangering the public security, to that reduction he would most cheerfully consent. He was satisfied, however, that the closest examination would convince those who thought any force necessary, that the proposed force was not too large in any of its parts. He might be mistaken in this conviction; but, he repeated, the only way to ascertain the fact would be to go into the committee of supply, in which the hon. gentlemen opposite might question and cross-question ministers; and what was more, might obtain answers to their questions; an occurrence which he was sure would highly gratify them. A noble lord, in an able speech (to many of the constitutional points of which he readily assented, although he could not admit the soundness of all the doctrine inferred from them), had argued that before his majesty's government called on the House to vote these estimates, they ought to prove the necessity of them. Very true. But how could that be done so well as in the committee of supply? It was impossible that the matter could be so thoroughly examined in a debate, in which no man had a right to speak more than once, as in the committee of supply, where every man had a right, and where indeed it was the duty of every man to speak as often as doubts occurred to his mind which required solution. The noble lord had chosen to assert, that his majesty's ministers had been anxious to come forward and explain the necessity of the estimates which regarded Ireland, because they knew that their explanations would be satisfactory to the House: but that they had cautiously abstained from explaining the necessity of the estimates which regarded England, because they knew that their explanations would not be satisfactory to the House; and thee, recollecting himself a little, the noble lord proceeded to remark, that more was wanted for England on account of the depots (on the foreign name of which a joke had been attempted), the batteries, the works, and the dock-yards. "Get rid of all these," said the noble lord, "and you will not want so much money." This was a very intelligible principle; but would the House approve of its application? Let that among the other questions be referred to the committee of supply. Let his majesty's ministers have a poor, unity of stating the value and use of these depots, batteries, works, and dock-yards, and then let the committee determine whether or not they ought to be maintained.—He would not trespass longer on the attention of the House. He had thought it his duty to recall them to the consideration of the actual question. It was a regular and parliamentary proposition to refer the estimates to the committee of supply. By so doing, the House would not be precluded from cutting down any article that might appear to admit of retrenchment: on the contrary, ample opportunity would be afforded of investigating every thing with the utmost minuteness. The whole debate had, in his opinion, branched out into matter—he would not say irregular, but irrelevant; but he was convinced, that let the honourable gentlemen opposite take what course they might, they would never suc- ceed in persuading the House to adopt their very extraordinary proposition—not to inquire into this important subject.

, late as the hour was, felt the question to be of such vital importance, that he should not do his duty, if he were not to take his stand by the noble lord under the gallery, in every point of whose constitutional speech he completely concurred. Indeed as the motion had been opposed with the most splendid ability, so he would, on the other hand, say, that since he had had a seat in that House, be had never seen a proposition by government supported with less talent. The right hon. gentleman, who had just sat down, had triumphantly repeated an argument which had already been answered. He had asserted that it was a great absurdity to oppose the proposition, since no man contended that some standing army was not necessary. But this triumphant argument, the hon. baronet contended was erroneous; since nothing was more common than the mode now adopted. If a man wished to purchase an estate, and on asking the price, a most enormous one was mentioned to him, he would refuse to listen to the demand, and would indignantly say, "make me another proposition altogether." That was what the House ought now to say to those ministers who had proposed the establishment of a standing army, at which no former ministers would have dared to hint. They ought to say, "we will not enter into the detail. We care not what case you are prepared to make out. You have made a proposition inconsistent with the liberties of the country, and we will not enter into the consideration of it." It had formerly been said by a hon. Member of those House—."Perish our commerce, but let our constitution live!" With much more reason might it now be exclaimed—"Perish our military establishments, let our constitution live [Hear, hear!] At the period of the Revolution, even the few thousand troops then maintained for the necessary garrisons of the kingdom, had been looked at by parliament with a jealous eye, and it had been predicted that it would be the root of that tree which had now arrived at its full growth, and overshadowed the constitution of the land. With respect to the comparison that had been made by a hon. gentleman, between the restoration of Charles 2nd, and that of Louis 18th, the hon. baronet contended that they were dissimilar cases. Charles had been invited to return. He had not, like Louis, been forced upon the people, and maintained on his throne by foreign bayonets. The invitation of Charles was thought by the statesmen of that day the best way to secure the liberties of the people, but Charles, like Louis, and like all other restored sovereigns, soon forgot the pledges which he had given. The case of Cromwell had also been much misrepresented by a hon. gentleman. Cromwell, finding that the great landed interest of the country was with the Stuarts, and that he could not govern by parliament, and not wishing to go either to the gallows or to St. Helena, determined to govern by the sword alone, and the whole army with which he governed England, Scotland, and Ireland, consisted of only 25,000 men. And yet they were now told that no jealousy ought to be excited by the establishment of an army of thrice that number. Few tyrannies indeed that had been maintained in the world required any thing like such a force. The praetorian bands at Rome amounted only to 12,000 men the janissaries at Constantinople did not exceed 12,000: the despotism of Buonaparté, at a time when his domination extended over almost the whole of Europe, rested mainly and almost solely on the 40,000 troops whom he called the imperial guard. When, therefore, it was proposed to maintain nearly 100,000 men in arms in this country, was jealousy of such a proposition a chimera—a folly? It was not indeed merely of 100,000, but of 150,000 men, that we ought to be apprehensive. He alluded to that greatest of dangers, the patronage arising from the existence of such a force; for he perfectly agreed in opinion with Bolingbroke, that there was more to be apprehended for the constitution from a hundred mercenaries within those walls, than from 100,000 armed men without them. When gentlemen denied the existence of this patronage and its consequent effect, if it was out of the House every one would laugh in their faces; if in the House, the rules of parliament, which required that it should be considered pure and unbiased, would demand silence, although no one could really maintain the truth of the denial without being thought either an egregious fool or a contemptible hypocrite. Even with reference to the very head of our military establishment, it could never be forgotten that the commander in chief (whatever his subsequent conduct might have been) had been obliged to resign in consequence of an abuse of the patronage which he possessed. And what pretence was there for this accumulation of force? An hon. gentleman on the floor had asserted that ministers had so mismanaged the recent treaties, that another bugbear—the power of Russia—had taken place of the bugbear of which we had got rid—Buonaparté. For his own part, whatever Might be his opinion of the treaties, he did not apprehend any danger of that description. He did not think Europe would so soon be again plunged in war. There existed neither power, nor interests, nor objects to produce that effect. On this account he wished that we should revert to our old insular policy. Instead of that "imposing situation," as it was called, which we were impoverishing ourselves to maintain, he wished the country to be restored to that really proud station which it occupied when it was the country of a free people. To say that we could not venture in peace to reduce our establishments, was as absurd as it would have been in a great poet to declare that his hero dare never take off his amour when he came from the field, lest he should expose his weakness. Where was the enemy whom we dreaded? Was it France? Never was she so crippled. The cruel imposition on her of a government which she detested had palsied all her energies. Was it the French army? Unless those who fell at Waterloo could return from the infernal regions, and Buonaparté could procure wings to enable him to fly to their head, little was to be apprehended on that score. The real danger of this country was in her financial situation. The national debt was the enemy, to the reduction of which we ought to apply our utmost efforts [Hear, hear!] This could only be done by retrenchment in every part of our establishments. "What!" said a hon. gentleman, "would you have the British grenadiers become scavengers and dustmen again!" The hon. baronet knew of no useful employment in society, however humble, which, if accompanied with industry and integrity, was fit to fall under the contempt of the greatest man in it. And in his opinion, work infinitely more dirty than that of scavengers and dustmen was done with hands as apparently clean and delicate as those of the noble lord who generally graced the opposite bench [Hear, hear!] And let it be considered how small a part of the sum proposed to be voted would go to these men. It would go to a different establishment, and to different people. It was to prevent it from being thus employed, and not to prevent the soldier from receiving the reward which he had bravely earned, that he objected to the proposition before the House. When ministers talked of the inexpediency of overlooking one set of men, they should recollect another set, which they had entirely overlooked. He meant the junior officers of the navy, the midshipmen, &c. men of good education, and who after ten or a dozen years hard service were turned adrift without any provision, to become scavengers and dustmen he supposed. With all his anxiety for economy, he should have no objection to make some provision for such persons. What he meant by economy, was economy well understood. Not merely a saving of expense; but a saving of that expense which would not be detrimental to the best interests of the country. The picture painted by the right hon. gentleman opposite of the state of Ireland, was such as to involve a strong censure on his majesty's ministers for having abstained from any notice of that country in the speech from the throne. It deserved to be asked, why that country which at the end of the American war, when it had no army, and when it apprehended invasion, rose as one man in its own defence, was now, after a lapse of so many years, in such a state that it required 25,000 troops to keep it quiet? He believed there was not another nation in the civilized world in so deplorable a situation as Ireland had been described to be by the right hon. gentleman. Yet all this had been passed in silence; and the House would never have heard of it had it not been brought forward as an inducement to consent to the increase of our military establishments. The hon. baronet here ridiculed the right hon. gentleman's assertion, that the greater part of this evil in Ireland was attributable to illicit distillation; and contended that if it were so, the best thing that could be done was to take off the duties. But this was a subject well deserving of a separate, and not of an incidental, consideration by parliament. The establishment to be maintained in England was enormous. As to increase of population, he thought that argument applied the other way, though it had been said that the army could not prudently be kept, even on the proposed footing, without having its outposts in France, where, by-the-bye, they were to be employed in keeping down the people of France. A greater population should require less military force. It was rather on the militia, on the volunteers, and on the affection of the people, that government should depend to maintain the constitution, and to defend the country against the attacks of foreign enemies. Then the great number of our colonies was urged as a reason for a great force. If there was no apprehension of insurrection in the colonies, he could see no reason for this. On what other ground would danger be apprehended? Never, since England was England had there been so little pretence, at home or abroad, for an increased military peace establishment. A few ships of war sailing about our colonies would, in his opinion, be an ample security. If it were otherwise, it would be better to abandon them than incur an expense by their possession ruinous to ourselves. If once parliament consented to the proposed establishment, it would be rendered perpetual. In old times, when the martial spirit of the country was as high as at present, though unmixed with any fopperies, there was no such thing as a standing army. When the Spanish ambassador expressed his astonishment to queen Elizabeth at seeing her going among her subjects without any guards, she pointed at the people, and said to him—"These are the guards of the crown of England." [Hear, hear!] He trusted the House would reject the motion. He trusted they would say to his majesty's government—."This proposition which you have made to us is so monstrous, that we will not listen to it. Model something fit for the parliament of England to consider, and then we will enter into the details of the subject, and determine what modifications ought to take place; but we at once reject the plan which you offer, as the adoption of it would put the seal to the destruction of the liberties of the country." [Hear, hear!]

observed, that whatever eloquence could enforce, knowledge of history could illustrate, or English feeling could impress, had already been so powerfully stated to the House, that he should confine himself to the humbler task of endeavoring to bring the practical question home to the understandings of that great and important part of parliament—the landed interest of England. He had suggested a call of the House, because, if ever there was a question that concerned the great landed interest, it was the present. Now they had a full attendance, and to that great body he particularly desired to address a few words, without going deeply into the subject. He hoped to show a primâ facie case against this large establishment, which it behooved ministers to answer. He could not do so, if he did not briefly notice the state of our finances first. He could show the absolute necessity of real economy. We had for nearly twenty-five years contended for the overthrow of the military domination of France, and had at last met with success that exceeded the hopes of the most sanguine. We had destroyed that power with which it was said no other nation was safe. Might he, or might he not, then, congratulate the House on this great event? If there was now no danger, the army was too large; if there was impending danger, the army appeared too small. He must assume that Europe was now safe, and England in security. He would say, that the revenue had been declining for the last six months, and our surplus was so small, that our finances could scarcely be in a worse way. The amount of the revenue, as stated by the chancellor of the exchequer for the year ending the 5th January 1815, was 65 millions, while the amount of the year ending 5th of January 1816, was 66 millions. But he would take the revenue up to the year ending in the July quarter last year, which was 66 millions, whereas the revenue of the preceding year up to the same date was 67,403,000l. Now, here was a palpable falling of one million in the revenue. He did not believe that the present taxes could remain at the same rate, for the war expenditure contributed in a degree to revenue; but now, when even that source had failed, and when every mode of supply was cut off by the accumulated distresses of the country, he was persuaded that it would be impossible to levy taxes to the same amount. Admitting, however, that 10 millions could be raised by the means proposed, all that remained was the property tax, and that would not be equal to the return of last year; for it must be remembered, that last year's return was in fact the return of the year preceding; and though the chancellor of the exchequer had stated, that the amount for the 5th of January 1816 exceeded, by more than a million, the amount returned for the 5th of January 1815, yet he could prove incontrovertibly, that the amount of the year ending in July 1815 was less, by a million, than the amount of the year ending in July 1814. He would venture to assert, that the utmost the property tax would produce next year, would not exceed eleven millions. The right hon. gentleman had taken the half of that tax, which, added to the former ten millions, would make up fifteen and a half millions, while the right hon. gentleman had calculated on twenty. The right hon. gentleman knew, as well as himself, that Ireland, instead of contributing three millions, must throw herself upon us for support; and thus so much more would be added to our exigencies. We had been told that this demand for 20 millions of money would not be a permanent demand; but it was admitted, after deducting the 30,000 men stationed in France, that there was to be a permanent establishment of 111,000 men. Now, in order to compare this establishment with that of 1791, we must deduct for the new colonies 23,000 men, which would leave 85,000; 25,000 for Ireland, which would leave 60,000; in short, the result of the papers on the table showed that there would be an exceeding of 27,000 in this peace establishment over that of 1791. Now, was not this a primâ facie case that would establish a sufficient ground for alarm? And ought we not to pray his royal highness the Prince Regent to order that other and far different estimates be produced? The secretary at war, in the luminous statement which he had made of the disposition of the forces, had divided the subject into four branches—England, Ireland, the old, and the new colonies. After what had fallen from members, whose authority he could not doubt, he might admit that so much was necessary for Ireland; but not for a year—that would be the way to remove Ireland from the attention and remembrance of the House. He thought such a force should be granted only for the exigency of the present moment. As for England, he was utterly unable to conceive the grounds on which the force should be so much increased. If the population was greater, had it proportionally degenerated in spirit? On the head of the new colonies, he was still less able to comprehend why we were called upon for an army to support islands, at the very moment when, we had reduced our navy, which was the more obvious defence for such possessions. But this convinced him the more, that our navy was reduced for the sole purpose of applying more money to the army. He deprecated this neglect of our peculiar constitutional force, and would ask whether the navy, by any conduct during the late war, had justified the apparent imputation that we deemed them unable or unwilling to defend us? If there was danger, a fair proportion had not been maintained between army and navy. If there was no danger, why did we keep up an army? With regard to the old colonies, the secretary at war had probably relied on the opinions of military men; and if we went into a committee, the utmost we could do, would be to sift the secretary at war. But the House in such matters ought itself to take the depositions of military men, and had they done so at a former period, Weltered had never been attacked. The opinion of military then ought to be asked by the House itself. Among other statements, the noble lord had mentioned one thousand men stationed at the Cape, for the purpose of resisting what he termed the natives; for it would have sounded too ridiculous to have said in plain words the Hottentots. The noble lord had very probably made due inquiry at the Horse-guards; but inquiry at the Horse-guards was very different from a formal examination before that House. In the former case, it was almost impossible that they, whose opinions were requested, should not gravitate towards the centre of influence. But we had been told we were to provide against future contingencies; we were to be prepared. He must observe that the present were no preparations. This was not a rehearsal, but a performance; we were cursed with all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of war. This was no provision against future evils, but present exhaustion and ruin; and if ever war did come, there must be a stop to the payment of the interest of national debt—we must defraud our creditors, we must sink in bankruptcy. He did not wish to prevent a proper establishment, but the question was what should be deemed such? The secretary at war had said that only 600,000l. would be saved, if 25,000 men were to be struck off the list; for his part, he could not comprehend this statement; but if we could save only six pounds, we were bound in duty to exert every effort for doing so. Ministers themselves had stated that every possible saving should be made. Ministers loudly proclaimed the necessity of economy and their desire to adopt plans for carrying it into execution; but all the savings we had yet heard of were to be created by an increase of salaries. Could any set of men, then, be viewed with more distrust and jealousy than such an administration? Could the country gentlemen of England, who had been assembled here by the call of the House, place any reliance upon them, or concur in their measures, when the most prominent points of their policy had been a bribery of the tax-gatherer, and a pampering of the army? He wished the noble lord was in his place, that he might remind him of what passed on a former occasion, when he proposed the measure that had procured so full an attendance in the House. The noble lord then tauntingly told him, that the country would not be interested ill what was said or done on the side of the House on which he gene-, rally sat. This prophecy had not been fulfilled. The country had been roused, and was bestirring itself from one end of it to the other; and he was convinced that many of the country members had come up charged with the sentiments entertained by the districts to which they belonged. The inconsistency of ministers had been apparent. They could not expect confidence in their statements while they themselves contradicted them; nor could they rationally anticipate that the gentlemen who composed that House would vote for such extravagant estimates while no real danger could be pointed out, and while it was considered that ministers themselves wished, before they thought of their establishments, to lull us to the most profound repose. There was nothing now but black spots in the horizon (for ministers were still determined to look into the clouds), and upon the simple declaration of the existence of such spots we were required to encumber ourselves with taxes, and to incur the danger of losing our liberties. He concluded by imploring the members of the House, who had been sent up by their constituents to attend to their interests and the interests of the empire, to weigh well what they were required to do before they lent themselves to the support of ministers; to consider what account they could render to their own minds, their friends, to the people of Great Britain, and to the world, if they adopted the course proposed, and contributed so powerfully to overthrow the liberties and the constitution of their country.

observed, that the speech of the right hon. gentleman would unquestionably have convinced him, if he had not been con, evinced before, that nothing could more effectually tend to weaken the cause of the gentlemen opposite, than the unusual length to which this discussion had been drawn. Finding that by fair argument they could not successfully resist the motion—feeling that they could not resist the evidence laid before them, they had endeavored to divert the House from the regular course of proceeding, and had at. Tempted to make their stand on the ingenious devices which had occurred to them for that purpose, and on a few striking facts which seemed to hear out several assertions till explanation was afforded? To some of the observations which had been made by those who had taken part in this debate, he thought it necessary to offer a few words in reply, but in doing this, he could not expect to throw any new light on a subject which had already undergone such ample consideration. The argument of the right hon. gentleman had been founded entirely on the fallacy, that by the vote of this night the House would pronounce an opinion on the estimates which were before them. He wished it to be distinctly understood, that they would do no such thing. It was not on the propriety of the estimates themselves, that they were now called upon to decide, but simply on the propriety of sending them to the committee. The right hon. gentleman in the first part of his speech had taken up the constitutional doctrines of the hon. baronet who had preceded him. These, if acted upon, to the extent proposed, would leave the House but little to do; for according to the hon. baronet, it was unconstitutional to keep up any standing army at all. From this position, however, the right hon. gentleman had afterwards seemed to depart, and his argument had then rested on two points; first, the assumed security of the country; secondly, the desperate state of our finances. In the first part of his argument, he most cordially agreed, so far as it went to declare that the country had gained as perfect a state of security, as depended on the triumph of arms, and the success of negotiation; but while he concurred in this, he could not agree with the right hon. gentleman that we had gained that state of security which would authorize us to repose on the laurels we had so hardly earned, and to neglect those saving precautions, without which the most powerful and the most inoffensive nations, must, from the ordinary course of human transactions, be open to danger. He was happy to say this country had reached a pitch of glory and elevation among the nations of the earth, which had never been surpassed; but if we were now hastily to disarm, and thus leave ourselves dependent on the mercy and forbearance of other powers, the policy of the government might justly be arraigned. This was what no country could do with safety, under any circumstances. If we searched into history, we should find that the most inoffensive nations had not always been most respected. What, for instance, had been the fate of Switzerland? Separated for so many centuries, as well by her natural situation as by the policy she had adopted, from contention with the nations by which she was surrounded, her independence had at last fallen before the ambition of her neighbors. Agreeing, therefore, with the right hon. gentleman, that we had gained security as far as successful war and negotiation were concerned, he still differed from him in his conclusion, that for this reason we might dispense with those precautionary measures which ministers had taken upon themselves to declare were necessary. The right hon. gentleman, in examining the state of our finances, had taken a narrow view of the question. He had stated the produce of one branch of the revenue up to Jan. 5, 1816, to have fallen short by about a million of the produce of the preceding year. This was perfectly true, but the total produce of the revenue had not been thus deficient. Here the right hon. gentleman proceeded to repeat the explanatory statement formerly made, with respect to the produce of the customs of the last year. He also combated the assertions which had been made by the right hon. gentleman, with respect to the general state of our finances, which upon the whole he contended wore a satisfactory aspect. On the present occasion it was not necessary for him to enter at large into the state of the revenue; for whether it could be proved to be a million more or a million less, would not affect the question now under the consideration of the House, and determine whether or not an unnecessary million had been called for. This question could only be properly investigated in the committee of supply. If the House should be disposed to act upon the constitutional doctrines, as they were called, of the hon. baronet, and the noble lord (Folkestone), they would bring into little compass the great work of retrenchment; for, according to them, any thing like a standing army was inconsistent with the principles of the constitution. In the event of the House being disposed to take this course of proceeding, they would make short work of the business by disbanding at once the whole army. This done, a considerable saving might certainly be effected. But he wished the amount of the estimates actually before the House to be considered. They went to create a charge of something less than 9,000,000l., and he desired that they might see not only how much our expenditure would be reduced by recurring to the seta abolishment of 1791, but he wished them to know what would be the extent of the saving which might be looked for if the army was disbanded altogether. In the case of its being reduced to the standard of the army of 1791, the expense of maintaining a force of 47,000 men, would be at the present rate of the pay, and at the present prices of the provisions and other articles necessary for an army, about 6,100,000l. The difference, therefore, between the expense of the force intended to be proposed to the committee of supply, and of that of 1791, would be 2,300,000l. This would be the amount of the saving produced. But he would go a step farther; he would suppose the army of 1791 to be also put down. This would give a further retrenchment of 2,000,000l.; and thus a saving in the whole of 4,300,000l. would be accomplished. There would still remain, if we continued to act on the principle which he thought not less wise than just, that of providing for the veteran in consideration of his past services, and if we maintained our establishments for giving the officers their half-pay, the sum of 4,600,000l. to be borne by the nation even after the suggestion of the hon. baronet had been adopted, and the country had been laid open to the inroads of an enemy. The right hon. gentleman next proceeded to defend the policy of the arrangements made for the defence of our colonies. They had now been told that these were hardly worth preserving at the expense which would grow out of the establishments to be kept up for that purpose. This doctrine was new. It had long been the policy of the English government to acquire and to hold these possessions, and if we should now abandon them as not worth the sum they would be likely to cost us, the country could not abandon that portion of debt which had been incurred by the efforts made to attain them. At so late an hour he was unwilling to detain the House a moment longer than was absolutely necessary, on a question which had been so fully discussed. He, however, thought it right to bring forward the authority of a gallant officer on the question of the force which it would be desirable to keep up for the defence of our colonies. The authority to which he referred was that of an officer now no more, and it would not be the less attended to by the House, because the individual who drew up the paper which he should quote, could not now be interested in the impression which it might create. The opinion, of which he spoke, was that of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. In the year 1797 the government of that day applied to him for an estimate of the forces which would then be necessary to defend the West India islands, which it was expected would be left in our possession in the event of the negotiations which were at that time in progress terminating in peace. The opinion of Sir Ralph was that to secure the islands of Trinidad, St. Lucie, Dominica, &c. a force of 7500 men (including a detachment of artillery) would not be more than sufficient. On referring to the present estimates it would be found, that a force of 5000 men only had been set apart for that service, being but two-thirds of the amount of the army which had been thought necessary by sir Ralph Abercrombie.—He would not go over the statement made on a former evening by his noble friend (lord Palmerton), any further than was unavoidable, while expressing his conviction that the present establishment was not on an extravagant scale. Ministers were perfectly aware that were every colony made to contain a sufficient number of men for all the purposes of defence, this would occasion a charge which neither the colonies nor this country could easily bear. They had therefore taken up the plan of fixing upon certain important points of defence in which garrisons were to be stationed, while, for the rest, no greater force was left than was considered necessary for their internal military arrangements. Acting on this plan in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, had been pitched upon for the purpose he had mentioned, and at the first of these stations a smaller force would be found than had been given to it in 1791. He proceeded to unfold the arrangements of a similar nature which had been made in America, at Barbados, and the islands of Ceylon and the Mauritius. The House, from these explanations, would feel that no reduction could take place on the charges which appeared on the estimates in the present year at least. In the next year this might be practicable, but before it certainly could not. The right hon. gentleman who spoke last had followed the hon. baronet in stating, that the midshipmen of the navy, when discharged, had had no provision made for them. He was not astonished that the hon. baronet, who had lately so seldom attended the debates in that House, should make such an assertion, but he was surprised that the right hon. gentleman should have also fallen into this error, which had been so often exploded. Now, the fact was the whole body of midshipmen who had served their time in the navy, had either been promoted to lieutenancies, or had been retained as supernumeraries on board their respective ships. Those who had not served their time, had certainly not been thus provided far, but these for the most part, it would occur to the House, were not so far advanced in life, but they might yet turn their attention to other professions. They might engage in the mercantile service of the country, or they might qualify themselves for civil situations. The right hon. gentleman had compared the reduction which had taken place in the navy, with that which had been carried into effect in the army, and had commented on the great disproportion between them. The chancellor of the exchequer proceeded to show, from statements of the force kept up at the two periods, that the reduction of the navy, as compared with that of the army, was not materially greater in proportion than that which had taken place in 1791. He was sorry to have detained the House so long on a question which had been so fully discussed before, and now in conclusion begged again to remind them that they were not called upon to decide on the propriety of the estimates themselves; they were called upon merely to give an opinion on the propriety of referring them to a committee of supply.

shortly addressed the House on the subject of Malta, and contended, that if justice was done by granting the constitution and laws for which the Maltese had stipulated, on their voluntary surrender of that island to the British crown, there would be no necessity for a British military force there. The population of that island was fully adequate to its defence now as well as in former times. The French had not conquered that island: nor could the fortifications be taken or reduced, unless by famine: But instead of granting that government and those just laws which we had stipulated to give, it seemed to be the determination of ministers to rule there and every where else by military force. The whole House knew, and he (lord Cochrane) was present at the blockade, that the fortresses of Malta were reconquered from France. By the Maltese and not by this country; and it was obvious, that those who could regain their own independence were equal, under the protection of the British navy, to maintain it. He would observe, too, that it was the duty of government to conciliate the Maltese by appointing them to the responsible or lucrative situations in their own island, instead of sending out shoals of ministerial creatures to feed upon and plunder them. He would mention one instance, that of the secretary of the noble lord opposite (lord Castlereagh), who lived at home and derived the enormous revenue of 7000l. sterling a year as vendee master. Harbor masters, quarantine masters, and other places were similarly filled and executed. And, indeed, such was every where the system. The Ionian Islands, too, must have large garrisons, though the people had nothing to tempt them to revolt or withdraw from our protection; unless our government was worse than that of the Turks, from which they had been rescued by the French, or that of the French from which we professed to have delivered them. Our whole conduct, however, had been such in the Mediterranean, that perhaps ministers did not, on the whole, form an erroneous estimate on this head. He would ask, what was the necessity of such an enormous force in the West Indies? If it was intended for protection against an invading force, whence was that force to come? What was the use of our ministers abroad and our consuls in foreign ports, if we were every where to be on a war establishment during peace? Could it be believed, that the West India islands could be sub- jugated by fleets and armies without our having any intimation of hostile preparations? If these troops were intended for internal compensatory government, the abuses which rendered such precautions necessary should be redressed. The cessation of the African slave trade had been held up as tending to diminish the amount of human suffering; but he contended that by that measure, unattended by the emancipation of the men of color and blacks bred and educated in our islands, the sum of misery was increased; in as much as the enlightened mind suffers more than the savage in a state of bondage. If the intention was defence and not oppression, the purpose would be fully answered by one effective force stationed on a healthy part of a windward island, where it would be more efficient than if scattered in unwholesome stations. The army in France appeared to be more injurious to the cause of that government than useful, except for the purpose of oppressing the people, and establishing despotism against their will. He verily believed that the latter was the object, united to the scheme the ministers seemed to entertain of a military government at home. It was obvious, that as a naval and not a military power, this country had rose to wealth and greatness; if we abandoned that line of policy, we must inevitably sink to the level of a second or third rate state. A respectable squadron, well manned, would have more influence on the conduct of continental affairs, than all the troops this country could for any length of time supply or maintain. He would venture to predict, that if we persevered in supporting the despotism we had established on the continent, our resources would fail before the object was accomplished. Let grievances be redressed at home and unprotected abroad, and there would cease to be any necessity for an enormous standing army in France, in Ireland, or any other quarter.

thought a very strong case had been put by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Tierney) on the government, which was entitled to attention, though he certainly was desirous that the House should go into the committee. He felt himself obliged, and he believed the country was also obliged to his majesty's ministers for those exertions which they had made; but he must tell them that the time for economy was come. He re, gritted that the excess of the civil list ex- penditure should fall upon the people, and contended that there ought in these times to be no increase of salaries. There was not, however, any government in which be had more confidence than he had in the present, and he was sure they had nothing to do for the satisfaction of the country but to pursue a system of economy.

wished to ask the chancellor of the exchequer, whether it was true, that within a short period the salaries of six collectors of the taxes in Scotland and thirty-six in England had been increased?

intimated his intention of answering that question to-morrow.

, although he felt the exorbitance of the estimates, yet thought they ought to be considered in the committee.

The question was now loudly called for, and the House divided:—

It was agreed, that the House should go into the committee on Friday; after which the House adjourned at half-past, four o'clock on Thursday morning.