, in presenting the petition from the inhabitants of Chatham against the property tax, observed, that he fully agreed with the petitioners, that the tax should be given up in time of peace. In those arduous times, when the necessities of the country called for the tax, the people had cheerfully born its pressure, but those times were passed, and he conceived that the representatives of the people should no longer consent to its continuance. The circumstances under which the tax was first brought forward, and those under which it was now proposed, were materially different. On the first occasion, the distress of the country was so great that it was almost impossible to raise money by loan, at present no such difficulty existed. On the whole, the tax at this time appeared to him unjust and impolitic, and he would therefore take every opportunity of opposing it.

having presented a petition from the farmers and other occupiers of land in Mid-Lothian, against the property tax,

bore testimony to the great respectability of the persons by whom the petition was signed; and insisted on the attention to which their prayer was entitled by the House, from the circumstance of their having borne the heavy pressure of all the war taxes with so much cheerfulness.

did not mean to deny the respectability of the petitioners, but at that same time, he thought it right to express his dissent from their prayer. He did not know under the present circumstances of the country, a more just or fair way of raising those supplies which the public service now called for, than the property tax.

, in presenting the petition from the inhabitants of Durham, against the property tax, observed, that the petitioners were of that class of persons, who had been called clamorous against the tax. They were at present in a most economical mood, and evinced what a noble lord had described to be, an ignorant impatience of taxation. They prayed strongly against the proposed peace establishment, and for the reduction of the public expenses, but above all they implored the abolition of the property tax.

, on presenting the Aylesbury petition against the property tax, said:—Sir, I hold in my hand a petition from the town of Aylesbury, and in presenting it, I feel a satisfaction (not enjoyed by some few gentlemen who have presented petitions on this subject), the satisfaction, I mean, of concurring most fully and warmly in every sentiment expressed, and every prayer, contained in the petition of my constituents. Sir, they petition against the principle of the income tax, as unjust, inquisitorial, and unconstitutional. They pray against its revival, under any modifications, because they conceive such revival would be a forfeiture of the pledged faith of parliament. They petition against the enormous military establishment proposed to be kept up in time of peace, because they conceive such an establishment to be the real cause of these intolerable and undiminished burthens on the people of England. They conceive besides that a large standing army in time of peace is a body highly dangerous, highly unconstitutional, and highly offensive to the very spirit and essence of our free government, as established by our ancestors, the fathers of the British constitution. Sir, they lay before this House the distresses of the people, and they complain that these times of general pressure are met, on the part of government, only by increased profusion in every branch of the public service. It is but fair to these petitioners to say, that the greater number of those whose names are affixed are well known to me. They are respectable and loyal men,—men who have cheerfully and manfully met every sacrifice which belonged to the stormy times in which they lived—men whose public spirit would never slumber while their country was in difficulty or in danger. But they do now feel, and feel strongly, that they are taxed to the uttermost farthing, not to enable their country to resist with effect a formidable and an inveterate public enemy, but to encourage and support a military taste, and out of that, perhaps, a military system, in peace, most dangerous to public liberty.—Sir, these petitioners are of a class of men generally who suffer the most severely from the operation of this tax. They are not merchants. They are not, manufacturers. They are in general grazers and dairy farmers, who hold in their hands highly valuable old grass lands, at a very high rent, and who are obliged to stock those pastures with a very expensive sort of stock. Sirs they complain to me that they can neither make their rents, nor stock their farms. They are consuming their capital in the means of life. They complain to me that there is one kind of property for which they are assessed highly, a property which in fact is in many cases merely ideal. A property which in many cases does not exist, but for which they are taxed as if it did exist, and for their benefit, I mean rent. They instruct me that, as between the landlord and the tenant, 17½ per cent. is paid upon a rent which the latter cannot pay and the former cannot collect. Sir, this state of things cannot, and will not last. The Yeomanry of England will and must resist this odious and profligate system, by every legal means within their power. They will not doom their children to want and beggary, themselves perhaps to bankruptcy and a goal, in order to build thatched cottages for the Prince Regent, or to crowd his parades with tawdry uniforms in time of peace. An English uniform was once, (and lately too) respectable wherever it was seen. It was to the English soldier, all over the world, whithersoever he went, at once the record of his own valour, and the symbol of his country's greatness. But far different will now be the recollection with which that uniform will be seen, in peace, on the parade at Brighton or the Horse-guards, from the recollection of the glorious days of the Peninsular and Waterloo.—But one word more, Sir, on the subject of this petition, before I move for leave to bring it up. It lay but three days for sig- natures, during which time upwards of two hundred names were affixed. Had it been suffered to lay three days longer, I believe I can pledge myself that considerably above twice that number of signanatures would, in addition, have been obtained. But the petitioners saw, or fancied they saw, an intention manifested by ministers to hurry on this measure at a rate which made them apprehensive that perhaps one day of delay might leave them without the opportunity of humbly entreating the legislature to pause before it sanctioned a tax, in their opinion, so oppressive, injurious, and so little consonant with the spirit and tenor of the English constitution.

, in presenting the petition from the land owners of Rutland, observed, that it was not the petition of the county, but that the petitioners were respectable farmers, grazers, and tradesmen—classes of men who had seldom busied themselves with politics; but who now petitioned because they were anxious for that redress which parliament, as the representative and organ of the people, ought to be desirous to afford. The numerous petitions that had been received left no doubt as to what should be done. It was his own opinion that the great increase of paper money had been a great cause of the evil. The bullion committee suggested that the bank, should narrow its accommodations. Grain afterwards fell, and the farmer was depressed. The country banks refused notes any longer on the security of farm stock. Hence arose almost the non-appearance of what had constituted a great part of the circulating medium. He did not mean to say that the bullion committee were wrong: he was not sufficiently acquainted with the subject, but he thought that the great issue of paper had tended to raise the price of corn. It was notorious that for fifteen years the paper circulation had been out of all proportion to that of the metallic currency. This occasioned a disadvantage to us in foreign exchanges. The foreign policy we had so long pursued was dangerous. If we interfered so much in the affairs of continental nations, the uttermost farthing would soon be extracted from the people of this country. Whatever ministers might be advised to do, there was but one positive ground of proceeding for a remedy. The greater the extent of our present reductions, the more certainty there would be of our burthens being lighter in future. Neither the security nor the dignity of the country required these enormous establishments in time of peace. It might be going too far to attribute to the chancellor of the exchequer, or the rest of the ministers, a design to overturn the constitution by taxation and military establishments; but really, when there was no shadow of reason for such extravagance, it was quite natural that a considerable degree of suspicion should be excited. The petition stated facts respecting the weight of taxes and the low price of corn, and the alarm at a war establishment during peace. At the lowest rate of making out a peace establishment, it would amount, in the year after this, to 21 millions. The high duty on malt amounted very nearly to a prohibition. The petition also called the attention of the House to sinecures and pensions given to those whose services had not merited them, which ought to be abolished. He had another observation to make. Since he had the honour of a seat in that House, he had never heard such extraordinary declarations as he had last night heard from a noble lord not now present. They went the length of destroying the whole right and practice of petitioning. The noble lord found fault with members for entertaining the petitions of the people. Never had he heard before such improper and unconstitutional doctrine from any minister. Why, even the petition of a condemned criminal was attended to. He was surprised at such monstrous propositions from the noble lord. Were members to be called factious and seditious, because they entertained and supported the people's petitions? That House might as well be converted into a chamber, in which members might wait till they heard the propositions and opinions of gentlemen on the other side, then give their consent to them, and retire to their homes. As long as he should haw a seat in parliament, whenever he received petitions from the people against any measure of administration, from whatever quarter, he should stand up for the right of discussing them in that house. If factious motives were to be ascribed to members for acting so, he would say farewell to the free constitution of Great Britain.

observed, that the petition which had just been presented was not a county petition, and he should state to the House how it had been signed, to show how easily a petition might be procured, when one or two active gentlemen set themselves to work for that purpose. There had been no requisition made to the high sheriff to call a meeting. Some seven or eight persons had agreed to the petition, and went about for the purpose of procuring the signatures which were now to it. A counter-meeting had not been called for the purpose, because it was known that several of the great landed proprietors were not averse to the tax, conceiving, as they did, that it was called for by the necessity of present circumstances.

objected strongly to the property tax in the present distressed state of every class of the community. He contrasted the circumstances of the country at the time of its first introduction, with those of the present day, and contended, that the most oppressive way by which the sum demanded could be raised, was the property tax. He would ask the chancellor of the exchequer, if he thought the country now able to bear a tax of six millions, did he not think that it could better bear the interest of that sum? Why, then, should he press the tax, knowing, as he must, that the general distress was so great? He thought that the best way would be to raise the money by loan, which would release the public from so very heavy a burthen, until they were better able to bear it.

, in answer to the speech of the last speaker but one, observed, that the petition which the hon. baronet had presented was not a county petition. The hon. baronet had himself so stated at the commencement of his speech, but it was not the less entitled to the notice of the House on that account. The hon. gentleman had said, that a meeting of the county had not been called, for fear of the large proprietors who were thought favourable to the tax. If such were the motives of the petitioners they acted right. If, as probably was the case, the large landed proprietors were inclined to support the measure of ministers, and better able to bear such support by paying the tax, the small proprietors had a right to meet among themselves and petition against it, when they found it would press so heavily on them.

said, that though the petition which his hon. colleague had presented, was not from all the inha- bitants of Rutland, yet it was from a very respectable portion of them. It was the duty of that House to receive petitions from every class of the community, when, they were respectfully drawn up. But perhaps the objection to this petition arose from its not being very palatable to gentlemen on the other side. As to the tax itself he did not think it so objectionable when properly modified, but he thought under present circumstances it would be extremely difficult to collect it.

objected to the extraordinary language used by the last speaker, who supported the tax, but at the same time said, that it would be difficult to be collected. If such difficulty should exist, it would arise from the inability of the people to pay it, and that inability would be an argument against it. To him the tax did not appear at all necessary, and it was impolitic to press it at the present moment, when the opinion of the people was so strongly against it. He could not sit down without mentioning a circumstance which had come to his knowledge that morning. A requisition had been signed by several respectable persons, for the purpose of convening a meeting at Leicester; this had been addressed to the mayor of that town, who refused to call the meeting. The House would probably not be surprised at this refusal on the part of the mayor, when he informed them that this very mayor was the receiver general of the county.—[Hear, hear!].

, to show the severity of the existing mode of levying the tax, instanced the case of Mr. Taylor, a member, who stated by letter to the commissioners of taxes, his inability to pay the tax at the time desired, requesting suspension of the exchequer process with which he was threatened. By the commissioners he was referred to the chancellor of the exchequer, who, after answering one letter, referred Mr. Taylor back to the commissioners. The commissioners replied, that they did not feel authorized by the act of parliament to grant the relief prayed for. He then applied to the chancellor of the exchequer, who referred him to the commissioners of the taxes. He wrote a second time to the right hon. gentleman from whom no farther answer had been received.

said, that when he was so applied to, he certainly should feel no difficulty in giving an explanation. He did answer the applica- tion of the hon. member alluded to in the first instance, as had been stated. In fact, when the application was made to the commissioners for relief by that hon. member, it did not, under the circumstances of the case, come under the provisions of the act of parliament, or the orders from the treasury. On the second application to him by letter, he certainly did not feel himself bound to return a very particular and distinct answer, because he had found that his first answer had been published in the Morning Chronicle. He had been informed, that the estate in question was placed under peculiar circumstances, and that the loss complained of was not one arising out of the pressure of the times, but from some peculiar management. The commissioners thought the same, upon the information they had received. He was convinced that the commissioners, in this as in all other instances, so far as he was aware, had executed their arduous and painful duty with the utmost carefulness, and he had certainly some feeling for them on these subjects. To explain this transaction, so far as to show that he had not been wanting in attention to the hon. member alluded to, was his chief object in rising. He was now waiting for the pleasure of parliament to be known respecting the tax. But he should observe that an hon. member had taken too narrow a view of the grounds on which the introduction of this tax originally proceeded, in speaking of it as intended to avoid the inconvenience merely of a large loan. Neither Mr. Pitt, nor lord Sidmouth, nor lord Henry Petty (the present lord Landsdowne,) could have proceeded on so narrow a principle. They considered it important to provide a large supply within the year, in preference to the indefinite extension of permanent taxation by the continual accumulation of debt, as had been the case; and thereby to provide effectually for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and for the future relief of the public in peace. These two points had been obtained, and the public had been relieved of from nine or ten to twelve millions. He begged the House, therefore, to consider in what a different situation the affairs of the country were placed from the state they would otherwise have now been in. The burthens would have been fixed on the country for a long period of time, had not vigorous measures been adopted. Before the establishment of the sinking fund, the permanent taxes were for a period without limitation. But, thanks to Mr. Pitt, and to the wisdom and firmness of parliament, that was not now the case. It should be recollected how large a part of our resources was pledged on different accounts, which was certainly a very serious consideration; yet he felt himself far from thinking that our finances were in a hopeless, or a desperate, or an alarming situation. Let the House consider how we had been situated at various periods preceding the war. The burthens laid on the country during the war had been, upon the whole, collected with so much wisdom and success, that now the consolidated fund had a greater surplus than in the year 1790. The augmentation of the funded debt had been so proportionally met by the increase of revenue, that there was now even a larger surplus than had been calculated upon by the committee of 1791. They calculated upon a million in the sinking fund, with a surplus of two millions. We had now a surplus of 2,500,000l. with a sinking fund of 11,000,000l. There was therefore an improvement in the consolidated fund of 10,000,000l. He had been, and might again be told, that his views would all prove fallacious. For his part he professed but an imperfect judgment concerning futurity, though his anticipations of future events had been much more frequently realized than those of gentlemen on the other side. But this much he would undertake to say, that no diminution in the revenue had been experienced up to March. An hon. baronet had dwelt on the distress which he thought arose from the depreciation of the value of currency. He was not at that time disposed to enter into the merits of that question, on which there were various opinions; more particularly as it was not materially connected with the present argument. But if the hon. baronet entertained really the opinions he had professed, he ought to give his support to this measure; for, of all taxes that could be imposed, this tax would have the smallest tendency to depreciate the value of the circulating medium. His object had been principally to give some satisfactory statements respecting what had fallen from some gentlemen; and he had further to observe, that measures had been taken to prevent any penal proceedings.

rose, in order to defend the character of the principal magistrate of Leicester, from the reflections which had that night been made upon his conduct. He had received a letter from that gentleman, explaining his conduct upon the occasion that had been noticed. In the letter, he stated that his objection to comply with the requisition presented to him for a meeting against the property tax, arose from his unwillingness to convene an assembly, which, from the terms of the requisition, applied only to those inhabitants who were against the tax. Such a proceeding he considered but ex-parte, and not a fair, deliberative measure. In this opinion, he had been countenanced by the other magistrates, and accordingly refused to sign the requisition. When, however, it was modified so as to address itself to persons who might be favourable to a continuance of the tax, he then signed the requisition. To have signed it sooner he considered would have been to give an opportunity to those who disliked the tax to express that opinion without opposition. This was the substance of the letter which he had received. He could further add, that a meeting was held yesterday at Leicester, at which a petition had been agreed to against the property tax in any shape, he believed, for he had not yet received the petition. What he had that night troubled the House with, he conceived but justice to a worthy individual who had not an opportunity of defending himself from the attack that was made against him. Before he sat down, he could not refrain from advising gentlemen in that House to be cautious how they made charges against persons in the country merely upon report. If members did wish to indulge in such accusations, they ought at least to consult those who might be qualified to correct exaggerated statements, owing to their local information.

, after a justification of his noble friend who had noticed the conduct of the mayor alluded to, observed, that he could mention an instance of undue interference relative to a petition against the property tax, intended to have been presented from a town of far greater importance than the one just mentioned. The town to which he alluded was nearly the third in the empire—it contained a population of about one hundred thousand, yet it unfortunately was not represented in parliament, and therefore he could not avail himself of that application to members of local information which had been suggested by the hon. gentleman who spoke last. He believed, however, that what he was about to state was perfectly correct. In Manchester a requisition had been signed by one hundred of the most respectable citizens for a meeting to petition against the property tax. To this requisition the magistrates refused to accede, under pretext that a counter requisition was going about for signatures; but if this were really the case, it must have been the strongest argument possible for convening a meeting on the subject.

protested against the system adopted by the hon. and learned gentleman of canvassing the conduct of persons in the country on slight grounds. The character of a worthy individual would have been most seriously injured that evening, had not an hon. member been fortunately possessed of such information as proved the charges unfounded. It would be a caution to the House not to give ear to the unfounded assertions. If the system of running down individuals in this manner, was adopted, it would introduce an idea in the minds of the people, that parliament was not disposed to receive the petitions of the subject with the respect to which they were entitled. He should now advert to what had taken place at an earlier stage of the debate. His right hon. friend the chancellor of the exchequer had last night stated the principle of the modifications which he should propose in the property tax to relieve the people. [Hear, hear! and a laugh on the opposition side.] He really knew of nothing so ill received on the other side of the House, as the proposal of any indulgence to the public. They seemed to view with regret every thing which tended to lighten the tax. He did not consider it important for the winding up of the expenses of the war, that the payments under the property tax should be made during the two years that the impost was to be retained. Three, four, or even five years might be allowed for that purpose, without any inconvenience to the public service, as exchequer bills might be issued to be met by the produce of the tax as it should be collected. Much relief would be extended to the subject in this manner, as well as by some regulation in the issue of exchequer processes. He thought it his duty to apprize the gentlemen opposite of an important fact on which he intended to argue when the discussion on the property tax should commence, that they might look at it and prepare any arguments their ingenuity might suggest to controvert it. The part of the question to which this fact would apply, was that which had been assumed with so much energy by a right hon. gentleman opposite, that to continue the property tax in peace, would be to commit a breach of public faith, even if it were to wind up the expenses of the war. He would show that in attempting to clamour down this tax, that right hon. gentleman had only, deprecated the conduct of his own friends. He had thus volunteered against his political friends, and given him (lord C.) an advantage which he did not seek. He should now proceed to establish the fact, that in passing and augmenting the tax on property as a war tax, the gentlemen opposite had not conceived themselves precluded in good faith from continuing it in time of peace. In the table B, 2nd of the plan of finance, brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer under the administration of lord Grenville, it would be seen that minister proceeded on the supposition that the country might be carried through the war at an expenditure of 32 millions per annum. The calculation was in itself so far wrong, that since that period the expenditure of the country had not been under 52 millions. The loans which would be necessary were to be mortgaged on the war taxes; not on the property tax alone, but on the war taxes generally. They were then estimated at nearly 20 millions, their amount being 19,800,000l. Supposing that system had been adopted, and the yearly expenditure to have been 32 millions, the whole of the war taxes, including the property tax, would have been exhausted and mortgaged in the year 1819;and, as the expenditure had been annually 52 instead of 32 millions, the whole of those taxes would have been mortgaged in 1815. The chancellor of the exchequer of the day had certainly said, that if the war lasted only seven years, the property tax would not be mortgaged; but that was not saying it should not in case the war should last, and in fact it had lasted longer. On the contrary, it must then have been mortgaged with the rest, and by this very plan the noble lord (the present marquis of Lansdowne) recognized that although the act was to expire with the war, yet if the war continued more than seven years, it must share the fate of the other taxes. This should be discussed on a future occasion [Hear, hear, hear! from the opposition]. He wished the House to go to the bottom of it. Had that noble lord's plan been adopted, when in 1819 all the war taxes and the property fax should have been absorbed by mortgage, the country would remain without any resource but the surplus of the consolidated fund. Now, it not only enjoyed the surplus of that fund in an improved state, but it had a revenue of six millions out of those very war taxes that would have been absorbed by the measure. He would argue, that never had a principle been more solemnly recognized than that all war taxes, including the property tax, would be mortgaged, and that there was no parliamentary incapacity to effect that object.

rose in explanation, and took occasion to observe, that the apple of discord which the noble lord had endeavoured to throw amidst the members of opposition, would, he trusted, fail of the effect intended.

confessed he was extremely surprised at the attempt made by the noble lord to prove that the plan of finance of the marquis of Lansdowne in 1806, went to the mortgaging of the property tax, and for a period which might eventually have considerably exceeded the duration of the war: and that from this design of mortgaging the tax, the administration of 1806 clearly showed, that in their judgment it did not necessarily cease with the war. The first thing to be done after an assertion of this kind, was to look at the plan itself; and in it they would find it stated, that there was no case which could reasonably be supposed so unfavourable as would not admit of a relief from the property tax on the very first year of peace. The noble lord had stated, that by this plan, if the war had continued till 1819, a part of the property tax must necessarily have been mortgaged. He did distinctly deny, on the faith of an honest man, that such was the case. In 1819, long annuities to the amount of 239,000l. and other annuities to ales amount, would have fallen in, and these annuities were destined to the discharge of the sums for which the noble lord had maintained the property tax to have been pledged. In the plan of finance it was distinctly said with regard to the property tax, that it was a tax "to a relief from which the country will naturally look on the return of peace." By the act of parliament, embodying into a law the principles of the financial statement which had been previously delivered to every member, the war taxes to be pledged were distinctly stated to be the duties of excise and customs. It having been mentioned, that misrepresentations had gone abroad with respect to the war taxes to be mortgaged, and lest it might be supposed that it was intended to mortgage the property tax, these war taxes were expressly declared to be the duties of excise and customs. He considered it his duty to observe thus much in justice to his friends and himself, to whom it had been imputed as an inconsistency, that they had supported that plan and opposed the present. Whether that plan had been calculated on wise principles or not, it was not for him to say. On this subject the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer was best qualified to speak, from the part which he had in it, and it was to him the House had to look for the defence of the plan. It was enough for him to have shown that in that plan it was distinctly stated, that no case could be so unfavourable as not to admit of a release from the property tax on the first return of peace. It was most unfair, therefore, to impute to those members who, in 1806, had voted for the property tax, an inconsistency, because they would not now support a renewal of the same tax on the return of peace. He would adduce an obvious illustration of the principles which had guided their conduct on both occasions. He himself, for instance, had voted several times for a repeal of the Habeas Corpus act, a measure which was certainly most unconstitutional but still absolutely necessary, under the particular circumstances in which the country was placed. But because he had voted for this measure under such circumstances, was he therefore to vote for a perpetual suspension In like manner, if the king's ministers in 1806 had been induced to continue a tax which was at first unconstitutional, but justified by the magnitude of the war in which the country was engaged, were they to be held bound to support all other ministers who should propose to continue the tax, after the termination of what alone could render it justifiable.

rose amidst loud cries of spoke and chair.

observed, it certainly was the rule of the House, that no person should speak twice on the same question; but it was also the practice of the House, when any personal appeal was made, that the person to whom such appeal was made should be allowed to be heard.

having been allowed to proceed, said, as an appeal had been made directly to him, he should be wanting to his own character, if he did not immediately afford some explanation to the House. He had stated generally, that the continuance of the property tax in a time of peace was a question of discretion, and not one of necessity. In page 17 of the statement of the plan proposed by the marquis of Lansdowne, and delivered to the members of the House, it would appear that a great variety of war taxes from 1814 to 1826 were mortgaged, and that the property tax was necessarily involved in them. Had that arrangement been adopted, and had the war continued so long, the property tax must infallibly have been mortgaged. It was stated in it, that if peace should be concluded even after 14 years of war, the country might have hopes of the property tax being discontinued—That with respect to the property tax, it could not be pledged at all till after 7 years supposing the war to last so long; and after these 7 years, it could be pledged so long as the war continued, and till parliament enabled government to relieve the country from that tax. It was not, therefore, a question of good faith, but of discretion; and it would be doing great injustice to the character of the noble lord who proposed the plan of finance, to suppose that he could have been so wanting in good faith to the country, as to pledge that which he did not conceive be had a right to dispose of.

thought the right hom gentleman had been singularly unfortunate in his explanation. He had attempted to show them, that by the plan of finance some part of the property tax might have been mortgaged in time of war, forgetting, that by the same paper no time was conceived to be so unfavourable as on the supposition of any part of the tax to be so mortgaged in time of war that it could not be redeemed in the very first year of peace. They might as well attempt to reason away the words of an act of parliament as the words of that paper. The noble lord had been pleased to say that he (Mr. Ponsonby) wished a personal triumph on this occasion—that he wished to distinguish himself from his friends on the subject of the property tax. He had never endeavoured at any such distinction; he had said that he never gave his vote for the tax, and that he never should have given his vote for it. His friends might have one opinion and he himself another on this subject, and he could assure the noble lord that nothing was ever less said for the sake of personal triumph. With respect to political character, his own opinion of himself was not much affected by any thing which the noble lord could say of his conduct, and he was also sure that be would never stand so high in the opinion of his friends as when that conduct was condemned by the noble lord. The noble lord had talked of a feature of the present clamour. He always wished to understand what any thing meant before he replied to it. He had, for one, contended that the legislature said to the public in as strong terms as language could convey, that the tax would not be continued more than six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace; and this was the sense of the country respecting the tax, though the noble lord chose to put his own construction on the engagement between parliament and the country. But whether he would ask, was the country to take the meaning of the engagement from the act of parliament itself, or the construction put upon it by the noble lord?

said, the whole of what the chancellor of the exchequer had stated amounted to this, that a plan had been submitted to parliament which would have enabled the country to go on for seven years without additional war taxes, and without touching on the property tax. This was, at all events, something better than the plan of the right hon. gentleman, by which, at the end of four years, had the war continued so long, the country would have been completely at the end of its resources. In every part of the paper before alluded to there not only appeared an extreme reluctance to touch the property tax, but the plan contained in it was one by which in all human probability, that tax never would have been touched. Nobody ever contended that it was not in the power of parliament to mortgage the tax; but what they contended was, that the tax never having been mortgaged, and the country being always led to expect that the tax would expire at the termination of the war, to renew it now during peace would be a complete breach of faith with the public. If the tax had been mortgaged it would have been no breach of faith with the public to have continued it till the redemption of such mortgage, even some time after the termination of the war; but as it was not mortgaged, there could not be the smallest pretence for its continuance in a time of peace. The strongest proof that such was the opinion of the right hon. gentleman himself was, the cunning device to which he had resorted last year, of omitting the words "and no longer"—a device which had that day at a most respectable meeting in the city, been very generally reprobated as unworthy of a minister of this country. This he said without meaning any disrespect to the right hon. gentleman, for whom personally he entertained the greatest respect. With what intention could this have been done, but to weaken in some degree the pledge between parliament and the public? The country was now agitated from one end of it to the other, and conceived this renewal a direct violation of faith. What answer had been returned to this? None whatever—and therefore, he took the charge of faction and clamour to be perfectly senseless, as far as respected the country. With respect to what the noble lord had said, as referring to the conduct of private individuals as he called them, but which private individuals were actually men in important public situations, he hoped when any man thought proper to act as the mayor of Leicester had done, that his conduct would always be brought before the House. When they found a person holding one of the most lucrative government offices frustrating the wishes of the people, and preventing them from having an opportunity of expressing an opinion on a subject in which the country was so deeply interested as the property tax, no terms could be too strong to be made use of in speaking of his conduct; and he believed that his hon. friend (Mr. Babington) had given a more favourable opinion of that person than he deserved. As to the Borough reeve of Manchester, it was evident that his whole object was to make himself acceptable in a certain quarter. The House would see the great difficulties into which they would get by the continuance of this tax. Ministers had endeavoured to signify to the country gentlemen that they might expect any price for their support; and had proposed what was wholly unexampled in the history of the country. He hoped those gentlemen, however, would not swallow the bait, but hold out; for they must be well aware, that after using the influence of one class to oppress another the next thing would be to call in that other class to oppress them in their turn. No measure could be for the interest of any class, but such as were consistent with general justice. The whole of their plan, with all its individual cases and exceptions, and its long credits, would be found a most false and miserable financial measure. This miserable end of the property tax was only to be good for two years, if any reliance whatever could be placed on the promises of ministers. Now it was impossible that the tax could produce five millions each year, in the manner in which it was to be proposed. He was the last man who would wish the House to infringe on the public credit of the country. But when he considered the difficulties in which they were to be involved with all these exceptions; the soreness and irritation which the country could not avoid feeling; and that after all they could only get ten millions out of it, every gentleman would see how preferable it was to give up this ten millions altogether. What burthen would this ten millions of debt create? Nothing at all when put in competition with the distress which the tax would occasion. The noble lord had told them, that it was the interest of the country gentlemen to put up with this measure; as by preventing the government from borrowing it would throw so much more capital into the market. But even supposing this to be the case, the whole vanished by what he afterwards announced of government being to borrow on speculation, so that the guineas would go out of their pockets, and government would also be borrowing the whole of those two years of distress. The right hon. gentleman had told them of the prosperous state of the finances of the country, and that the sinking fund amounted to twelve millions. Now, what would be the result of relieving the country from two years property tax? These ten millions would require a charge of 600,000l. So then all this flame had been kindled throughout the country, merely to save a charge of 600,000l. Had the right hon. gentleman attended the meeting that morning, he would have seen many of his warmest friends expressing themselves in the strongest terms against his proposal. To get rid of all this would only occasion a charge on the sinking fund of 600,000l. And he would ask, would the public credit be affected by this reduction of the sinking fund? It appeared to him surprising that government should persist in this tax contrary to the sense of the country, and that they should select the next two years as the most proper for carrying it into effect, when by a simple charge of 600,000l. the whole would be provided for. The noble lord had held out a seductive bait to the landed interest, but they were not the only sufferers at the present moment. The noble lord was not aware of the distress felt by the commercial world as well as by the agriculturist. During years of such unexampled difficulty as the next two, the discontinuance of this tax would be the greatest relief that could be supposed. The noble lord had called the voice of the nation factious clamour; but unless he succeeded in his artful plan of opposing one class of subjects to another, he would find that it was a clamour to which he must yield, since it expressed the sense of sufferers of all ranks, professions, and employments.

felt it almost useless to add another word to expose the poor equivocation attempted on the other side of the House, which, if established, could not affect him and others who had become members since the year 1807. The object was, to divert the attention of the country from the real question to a point upon which no judgment could be formed but by those who had all the minute details before them. The same artifice had been employed by the noble lord, when he complained that the modifications were received with dissatisfaction by the opponents of the measure: the truth was, that no alterations could render the tax tolerable, and the people demanded that it should be no longer allowed to oppress them. The manner, as well as the conduct of the noble lord, were most disrespectful to the House and to the country: instead of employing himself in alleviating their burthens, he aggravated their pressure, and with a most unbecoming levity seemed almost to ridicule the complaints daily laid upon the table. If the noble lord persevered in this odious imposition, the sources of industry would soon be dried up, and all the future means of raising supplies would fail. The noble lord had reprobated a reference to individuals and to particular cases; but he (Mr. L.) should, notwithstanding, venture to refer to a communication which had been made to him from Worcester upon the subject of the property tax, and with which he had been entrusted in the absence, and during the indisposition, of the members for that city. From this statement, and from his own knowledge, he could assert that the trade of Worcester had so much declined, that the inhabitants were reduced to a condition in many respects most deplorable; and throughout the whole empire he had reason to think that the commercial distresses were at least equal to those of agriculture. A requisition had been sent to the chief authority, and a petition from Worcester in a few days would be laid before the House: any delay that had attended this proceeding arose from an unwise though loyal reliance upon the promises of the sovereign, and upon the assurances of his ministers.

defended himself from the charge of levity or disrespect to the house. He had always been impressed with the serious nature of the question, and had expressly stated the difficulties under which ministers laboured in their endeavours to meet the exigencies of the crisis. If he ever had indulged in any thing like levity, it did not arise from a disposition to treat with indifference the question under consideration, but from a feeling that such was the most effectual means of meeting the reproaches of hon. gentlemen who were opposed to them on the present occasion.

said, that there was no intention to impute to the noble lord a feeling of disrespect to the country, as far as the language which he had used in that House had gone; but what was meant was, that he and his right hon. colleagues did treat the country in a disrespectful manner, in proceeding with this measure, after the sense of the people had been so decidedly declared against it. As to the new argument he had triumphantly introduced, the utmost it proved was, that lord Grenville and the marquis of Lansdowne had once contemplated the mere possibility of mortgaging the property tax, and from such premises it was absurd to draw the conclusion, that the faith of parliament would not now be broken by its continuance under totally different circumstances. One other thing which he wished to advert to was, the statement that had been made by the chancellor of the exchequer, that the commissioners of the property tax acted voluntarily, and were not paid. He agreed that this was the case, under the present bill; but he had authority, from some of those commissioners themselves to state, that if the right hon. gentleman succeeded in renewing the tax, although they had acted for nothing during a period of war, they would not be induced to pursue a similar course in time of peace. The right hon. gentleman therefore would be obliged to have recourse to those paid commissioners, under whose gripe the people of the country had already so severely smarted.

, after much consideration, had brought his mind to the conclusion that the property tax ought not to be continued. Admitting that the country was now in a sort of intermediate state between peace and war, for that reason it appeared to him that the people were the less able to bear a burthen they had sustained until their strength was nearly exhausted. The long duration of war unavoidably introduced many distresses that could not terminate till peace had been long re-established: the immediate consequence of peace was, that a great number of individuals were thrown upon their own scanty resources, and were little able to sustain the weight of taxation. Under these circumstances the people had a strong title to relief, and that relief should be afforded by the discontinuance of the property tax, which ought to be kept as a sort of line of demarcation between peace and war. On the revival of war, he wished it to be understood that it should be revived, and the effect might be to weaken a propensity with which this nation was charged by foreigners—that of being too prone to engage in new hostilities. He was one of those who thought that ministers had a fair claim to the thanks of the country for the happy conclusion of the war, and he hoped that they would prove that they had a still further title to the gratitude of the people of England, by listening to their complaints, and relieving their distresses.

said, in answer to what had fallen from lord Milton, that although that noble lord had been authorized to state, that some acquaintances of his, commissioners of the property tax, would no longer act, if this impost was renewed, yet he knew others who entertained different sentiments, and who did not think it would be impolitic to continue the tax for two years. He admitted, that it was a war tax, but as it was necessary that the war should be wound up, the continuance of this tax he thought more politic than having recourse to a loan,. which might be destructive to the credit of the country.

argued strongly in favour of a loan, contending that it would rather have the effect of raising the funds than of depressing them, and was much to be preferred to the property tax, which would be attended with the additional charge of the issue of exchequer bills. The hon. gentleman would ask the ministers, if it would not be humanity, as well as wise policy—if they were not bound in duty, as well as called upon by respect for the opinion of the people, to grant an immediate relief from a tax so generally felt and execrated, when that could be done by a loan of ten millions, or in some other way that would not endanger the public credit? Such a measure was surely preferable in the present distress of the country, unless in proposing a renewal of the property tax for two years, more was meant than met the ear—unless there was something behind the curtain which was not yet explained. The distress of the country banks, and the difficulty of obtaining money on any reasonable terms, were universal. It had been said that the property tax obliged misers to pay like gentlemen. This argument was rather specious than true, for he knew misers who lent their money on the condition that they should not pay the property tax. It was said the borrower might stop the amount of the tax. Yes, but the lender might also demand immediate re-payment. He would put it to ministers, after all the distresses the country had undergone, whether it was not their duty to relieve the people from this oppressive impost? They never would be able to persuade them that it was not obnoxious and unnecessary. The hon. gentleman then recapitulated a variety of instances which had come under his own knowledge of the distresses in which the agricultural interests were involved. Some time ago, he said, he had applied to the secretary of state to have a poor woman and her two children sent out to Botany Bay to join her husband, who had been transported for a very bad offence. A short time since a letter had been received from these poor people in this country, in which they expressed the utmost gratitude for the change which had taken place in their affairs, and represented that they were much better off than they had ever been in their own country. They now had their cows, and their pigs, and their poultry, and, in fact, possessed comforts which they never could hope to have enjoyed in England. No sooner had the contents of this letter transpired, than he (Mr. Thompson) was assailed from all quarters, by persons who said they understood he was commissioned to send out settlers to Botany Bay. A man who had been a small farmer, and who, from the late causes of depression, had been reduced to the most deplorable distress, was one of those applicants. He stated to him, in making his application, that he had formerly lived in comfort upon the fruits of his industry and the produce of his land, but now he was obliged to beg his bread from door to door; that though, willing to work, he could find no employment, and that even the poor-rates could afford him no supply:and he actually entreated as a boon that he might also be transported, in order to be relieved from the miseries which he suffered. [Hear, hear!] He mentioned this fact, which he did not think irrelevant, to show the distresses of the country, and the necessity for any relief that could be extended to the agricultural interest, by abolishing the property tax, and the tax upon farm horses. The hon. gentleman, (Mr. Baring), he was sure, could point out to the chancellor of the exchequer a better plan of raising the supplies than the property tax, and would not hesitate to become a subscriber to a loan, rather than submit to it. If any particular detail were necessary to show the sufferings arising from taxation, after the numerous petitions on the table, he could state facts which he was sure would produce an impression on every man who heard them. He had, since he came to attend his duty in parliament that day, received a letter, urging him to press upon the consideration of the House, the embarrassment and distress of the farmers, stating that they could not pay their taxes, and declaring that while the debates were going on from night to night about a remedy, they were literally starving. This was language which only the most calamitous and deplorable sufferings could extort or justify.

, in answer to an insinuation which had been thrown out, that the signatures to this petition had been surreptitiously obtained, begged to state, that a week's notice had been given of the meeting at which it was proposed, and the fact of that meeting being about to take place, was notoriously known throughout the county of Rutland. He was, he hoped, incapable of giving his sanction to any petition which had been clandestinely obtained.

said, that the meeting at which the petition was proposed did not consist of more than one hundred persons, of these only sixty had signed it. He was also informed, that many of the persons who had put their names to it were not actuated by a feeling of opposition to the property tax alone, but, in signing it, thought they were praying to be relieved from taxation altogether. He would ask, whether among all the signatures to the petition, there appeared one magistrate, or one great landholder in the whole county of Rutland?

said, he had distinctly stated that this was not the petition of the county of Rutland; but, notwithstanding this, he was satisfied that, if the opinion of this county was fairly taken upon the subject of the property tax, nine-tenths of them would be against the tax.

said, he would vote for the tax under certain modifications. He admitted that several species of property were suffering under extraordinary and unnatural depression; but he likewise was of opinion that others were as unnaturally and disproportionably exalted; and as the same principle could not in fairness be applied to both classes, he would relieve the one by imposing a burthen upon the other; which object would be accomplished, not by an unconditional repeal of the tax, but by certain changes in its provisions. What was the species of property that had been most raised by late events? Certainly the funds, a portion of which would now purchase as much land, or other commodity, as would have required double the quantity three or four years ago. He would, therefore, tax the funds, which could bear the burthen. The farmer and the trader he did not think fair subjects for this impost. A fact had been stated by the chancellor of the exchequer, which showed its unequal pressure as formerly levied. Only 30,000 merchants paid on an income of 1,000l. and only 3,000 on one above that amount. As so few persons of large incomes were assessed under this schedule, the whole weight fell on the middle classes. Therefore not only tenants, but commercial men should be wholly exempted from the tax. As to landlords, it was surely fair to assess them to the amount of rents actually received by them, but of course no farther. Thus modified, the tax was, in his opinion, a very unobjectionable mode of raising money.

said he held a petition from the nobility, gentry, clergy, and freeholders of the county of Essex, praying that the property tax might not be renewed under any modification whatever; the petitioners conceived the faith and honour of parliament was pledged on this subject; they trusted that a rigid attention would be paid to economy, and deprecated the extension of our military establishments in time of peace, as a measure hostile to the constitution.

observed, that, after the long debate which had taken place upon this subject, he felt reluctant to trespass on the attention of the House. He thought, however, that this was a proper opportunity for declaring his sentiments upon this momentous question. After the most mature deliberation, the opinion which he entertained, founded upon the best judgment he was able to exercise, was, that the renewal of this tax would not alone be injurious to the agricultural interests of the country, but the interests of all branches of trade. In setting up an opinion so inconsistent with the opinions of those right hon. gentlemen, whose political principles he had been heretofore so proud to uphold, he felt considerable regret. He could not, however, consistently with the opinions which he had expressed out of doors, adopt a different line of conduct. He felt equal pain at being forced to differ in sentiments on this subject with a right hon. gentleman, to whom he owed every thing that was dear to him in life (Mr. Wellesley Pole), but he was satisfied that that right hon. gentleman, would be the first to condemn him, if had not taken that decided and manly course which the dictates of his own conscience demanded. He was fully inclined to believe that the right hone the chancellor of the exchequer had done every thing in his power to modify the measure, but he was satisfied that there was such a general prejudice against it in the minds of the people, as to render it utterly impossible that it could produce, under any circumstances, the desired effect. It could never be continued in time of peace, without creating much disagreeable feeling in every quarter. As a war tax, however, it was unobjectionable. He trusted in God he had formed an erroneous opinion of the consequences that might result from the carrying of the measure, and he was not without hopes that the right hon. gentleman would not persist in pressing it; but if he did and should ultimately succeed, he should find him standing first and foremost, to use whatever little interest he might possess, to put down the feeling against it which he apprehended would exist. He had attended the meeting, and could assert that the company consisted of those who enjoyed the greatest interest and influence in the county, of which the petition might be considered as the general feeling. Even the lord lieutenant of the county had thought proper to come forward and give his cordial approbation of all the petition contained.

presented a petition against the property tax from the inhabitants of Dundee. The petitioners, he said, had contemplated the artifices of endeavouring to make the measure more palatable by modifications, and warned parliament against being taken in. After the discussions that had taken place that night, and particularly after the able speech of the hon. member for Worcestershire (Mr. Lyttelton), he did not think it necessary to say one word; but, adverting to the conduct of the right hon. gentlemen opposite, he could not refrain from expressing his strong feelings of contempt at the language they held, and the maneuvers they practiced. Instead of defending their measures in a direct and manly manner—instead of answering the arguments of their opponents by arguments of, their own—instead of trying to reconcile the country to their system, by showing its reasonableness—they came forward with a factious and clamorous charge of faction and clamour; they justified themselves, by recriminations on those who condemned them; and, when they were charged with acting wrong, had nothing to offer but a tu quoque to every censure. He would admit, for the sake of argument, that every thing stated against the administration of lord Grenville was true; he would take it for granted, that the assertions of the noble lord on the plan of finance then adopted were as well founded as they were proved by his hon. friend (Mr. Wynn) to be the contrary; still, he would ask, how did those statements apply to the present case? how did they justify the measures now pursued? The country did not look to men, but measures. Let not the ministers expect, that this miserable attempt to draw public attention from what was publicly interesting, by such wretched and contemptible shifts, would succeed. Let them not expect that this device would mislead the country, any more than their, notable trick respecting the words "and no longer." Not an individual would be deceived by them; not a new convert would be gained to their tax; and the nation, whose interests they opposed, would treat them with that contempt which the arts they employed against them deserved.

repeated what, he said at the county meeting in Essex, namely, that while he would attend to the presentation of the petition, he would not pledge himself to any opinion upon the subject of this tax. He did not at that meeting think proper to oppose the sentiments of his constituents; but he could not concur with the hon. member (Mr. Long Wellesley), that the petition conveyed the unanimous sentiment of the county, although the meeting was apparently unanimous. For he knew that now there was a considerable difference of opinion upon the subject in the county. Many men were, and he had no doubt but that many more would be, reconciled to the measure, by the proposed modifications of the tax with respect to agriculture, and he should therefore repeat what he said at the meeting, that upon the adoption of such modification he should feel it his duty to vote for the adoption of the property tax.

expressed his gratitude to the learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham) for at length letting the House into a consideration of the merits of the question. For upon the fair judgment of the House and the country as to those merits, he (lord C.) was willing to abide. But the learned gentleman was mistaken in supposing that he (lord C.) meant to charge lord Grenville and lord Henry Petty with any breach of faith in the course which those noble lords took in 1806. On the contrary, far from blaming those noble lords, he supported the proposition of their administration with respect to the property tax. All he meant to infer from the transaction he had quoted was this, that the noble lords alluded to did not think that it would involve any breach of the faith of parliament to continue the property tax after the conclusion of the war, for such continuance must have been the result of the plan which they brought forward. Therefore he felt himself justified in asserting upon the authority of those noble lords, as well as from a candid view of the question, that no breach of faith could be fairly attributed to the measure to which the petition referrer and yet the allegation of such a break formed the main ground of the clamor excited out of doors against the adoption of this measure.

said, that if the no lord wished to confine the attention of the House and the country to the merits the question alluded to, it was rats extraordinary he should have alluded All to the transactions of lord Grenville and lord Henry Petty, as that allusion could have no other effect than to dive attention from that question. But it Object of the noble lord was obvious; and his colleagues were accused by the country of a meditated breach of faith, and the accusation was echoed in the House. Hence the noble lord thought proper thus to address that side of the House—"You cannot consistently accuse us of a breach of faith upon this classic for you have been guilty of a similar breach of faith yourselves." [No, no! from the ministerial bench]. Then could not conceive what the noble loc Meant by his quotation from the large book he had that night produced; which quotation, however it might avail him against lord Grenville and lord Her Petty, or those who co-operated with them, formed no argument whatever against those who were not at all connect On that occasion with the conduct of these noble lords. But whether these noble lords were guilty of a breach of faith or not, was a point which the public a many members of that House would feel themselves warranted in throwing overboard, in considering the real merits of this question—and a material part of these merits consisted in a charge of attempting to violate the plighted faith of parliament, which charge he was fully prepared to maintain—which charge, indeed, was justly echoed from one end of the country to the other.

denied that he imputted any breach of faith to lord Greenville and his colleagues upon the orcas alluded to. What he meant to say, and was prepared to contend, was, that if the plan of lord Grenville's administration had been acted upon, the whole of the property tax would have been mortgaged and rendered irredeemable for a much longer period than two years after the conclusion of peace. Therefore, if the continuance of this tax after the war in- volved any breach of parliamentary faith, it would not become the gentlemen concerned in the transaction alluded to, to bring that charge on this occasion, however the hon. and learned gentleman might feel himself warranted in pressing such a charge.

maintained, that the breach of faith imputed by the noble lord to the administration of 1806, could only apply upon the assumption that the war would have continued so long if the country had remained under the conduct of that administration.

contended, that if the country had only incurred the amount of expenditure calculated upon by that administration, the whole of the property tax would have been mortgaged by 1819;and that at this hour, if the annual expenditure of the war had not even exceeded 32 millions, half the property tax would have been pledged.

stated, that he had the authority of the noble lord alluded to, to assert that it was not their intention to pledge the property tax in any manner so as to subject the country to its continuance after the conclusion of the war:so far from it, indeed, it was their purpose, rather than touch the property tax, to have recourse to other means of supplying the public exigencies, in case that should become necessary. In the event of such necessity, the administration alluded to would probably have resorted to some of the taxes which had since been imposed.

deprecated the loss of time which these incidental discussions consumed. He concurred in the views of lord Castlereagh, with respect to the operation of the plan brought forward by lord Henry Petty; contending, that even if the annual expenditure of the war had not exceeded the sum of 32 millions, and the amount of that expenditure was known to have been considerably more, no less than 14,600,000l. of the war taxes would have been pledged by this House. Thus such a proportion of the property tax must have been mortgaged, as could not be redeemed without subjecting the country to at least five per cent. of that tax, not merely for two years, but for three or four years after the conclusion of the war. This he maintained to be an obvious deduction from the plan itself, which he had examined this morning. Therefore he conceived that his noble friend was entitled to take the authority of those with whom that plan originated, against that of the hon. and learned gentleman, and those who thought with him.

thought that there could be no fitter time for a member of the House to state his sentiments upon this tax, than when he was discharging his duty to his constituents by presenting a petition against it. But, for his own part, as he had not at this moment that excuse for troubling the House, he would confine himself to a very few words. The gentlemen on his side of the House had on this occasion been accused by the noble lord opposite, of beginning debates upon this tax, of creating delays, and preventing more immediate business from being discussed, when, at the same time he made this accusation, the noble lord produced a large book, containing a most complicated plan of finance, on which his lordship and his colleagues put their own construction, saying, that it was incumbent on their opponents to answer this—to answer that—to look at schedule C, to look at schedule D; and, in short, to discuss all the parts of that complex statement. But he must say for himself, that be would not enter into the particulars of a plan of finance which was now eight years old, as he was eight years older, and could contrive to amuse himself better than by reading it at this time. However, the argument which the noble lord endeavoured to establish, by his reference to the financial plan of 1806, was, that there was a breach of faith then, and therefore a breach of faith was justifiable now. But he denied that there was any breach of faith at that time; and he put himself upon the country for the truth of the denial. There was not then one single petition presented to the House complaining of any breach of faith; but now, petitions came from every part of the kingdom, complaining that if parliament continued this tax they would break faith with the country. What was lord Henry Patty's proposition? "If you (the people) agree to this measure, we will undertake to exonerate you from any new taxes for a certain number of years. Here was a fair proposition which the country might refuse or adopt. There was no clamour about breach of faith, nor any thing like it. Lord Henry Patty's plan was founded on the supposition that the war would be terminated in nine years; and few men, at that period, imagined it would continue more than nine months. But, leaving this entirely out of the question, gentlemen opposite said, "see, under the operation of that plan, the war still going on, how the property tax would be cut up." Gentlemen ought, however, to recollect, that the sinking fund would have been placed in a situation different from that in which it now stood. Now, he would venture to say, without meaning any offence, that there were not three gentlemen in that House, with understood perfectly lord Henry Patty's plan, although so much had been said about it. It was a bargain of which the country clearly approved, for they did not protest against it. But what was the case now? The public, acting under the faith of the minister, expected that a certain measure should be abandoned, as they were taught to hope it would. But then the noble lord turned round and said, "It is right that it should be continued; and, if there be any breach of faith, it is not greater than that committed by those who preceded us in office." This, truly, was a pretty sort of argument, and had a great deal to do with the merits of the case. If he were one of the noble lord's "train" (to use an expression of his own) he should begin to think that he did not keep his ground so firmly as he would wish people to imagine. He should feel considerably alarmed, when he saw his general, instead of fighting in time regular way, begin to throw glass-bottles and stink-pots. Indeed, he did not think the noble lord and the chancellor of the exchequer opposite, looked s) comfortable and happy as they used to do. They did not attempt to defend themselves—they did not suffer their acts to stand or fall on their own merits—but they resorted, as weak people were wont to do, to an abuse of their opponents, and they called on the country to beware of those dangerous persons. Now he wished they would put him and his friends entirely out of the question, as if they were out of the world, and only look to the luminaries that surrounded them. When the proper time came, he and his friends, if regularly accused, would be ready to defend themselves.

said, that the right hon. gentleman had accused his noble friend of unfairly delaying the House by the discussions into which he entered in consequence of the attacks from the opposite side. This was quite anew complaint from that quarter. There were gentlemen in the House who had heard the noble lord, almost by name, attacked most bitterly, only a few nights ago, for not having made any reply to the arguments, or rather the invectives which had been so liberally poured forth from the other side of the House; and now the complaint was, because they had been satisfactorily answered. If the petitions accused government of being about to break faith with the people, and if the right hon. gentleman, perhaps for the tenth time, preferred the same accusation, he was prepared to deny it; the contrary had already been proved. With respect to the plan of finance proposed by lord Henry Petty, the right hon. gentleman said, that there had not been three persons in the House who now understood that plan. The House was certainly obliged to the right hon. gentleman for his assertion, that it did not understand that plan on which a loan had been made, on which the war had been carried on, and the war taxes continued, and by which public cre had been supported. But the right hon. gentleman had gone much farther, when he asserted, that when the plan had been proposed, the war could not have been expected to continue above nine months. This, then, was the sagacious expectation entertained by those who framed this plan, from the expenditure of 32 millions; from that system of wise liberality which the crisis of Prussia made them afford to that power a loan of 80,000l! But he would do them the justice to say that this was not their expectation;'they contemplated the continuance of the war for fourteen years, and they expressly stated, that after the termination of that period, the nation might expect to be relieved of eleven millions of taxes; and the statement was then in these words, "and the public would then be relieved from nearly the whole of the property tax." [Hear, hear!] He now called upon the right hon. gentleman and his friends to support the tax on the same principle on which it had been laid on.

said, that party recrimination had nothing to do with the question. It was of no importance who had broken faith with the public, or who had not. Gentlemen on the opposition side of the House did not deny the right of parliament to pledge the property tax. It was competent to parliament, at any time, and under any circumstances, to pledge it. It had been pledged by Mr. Pitt, and again at the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. But what they maintained was; that it was not now pledged; and, not being pledged or mortgaged, the House had no right to call on the people to pay it, as if a mortgage had taken place.

The several petitions were ordered to lie on the table.

rose and observed, that an hon. gentleman who officiated as chairman to the committees of that House, and to whom a very liberal salary was paid for that duty, had been absent during the last discussion in the committee of ways and means: he now wished to ask whether any of the gentlemen opposite would stand up in their places, and assert, that that hon. member was confined by illness, or whether he might not as well be in Northumberland for any use he had lately been in his office [Hear!]?

No answer being made, the Speaker proceeded to put the question, and upon leaving the chair, Mr. Osborne took his seat as chairman of the committee, amid considerable cries from the opposition benches for Mr. Brogden.

said, that having moved the question of adjournment on a former evening, he thought it his duty now to state to the House his opinion upon the general question then before it. He disapproved of the estimates on account of the number of men proposed to be kept up—on account of the patronage and influence arising to the Crown from that number, and because of the want of economy on the part of government, which they betrayed. He could not concur, however, with an hon. friend of his (Mr. Bankes), who, on a former night stated the amount of force which he thought sufficient to be maintained. He considered the reduction of his hon. friend was carried to too great an extent:and he would venture to state to the committee his own views upon the subject. In the first place, however, he did not understand the language of the honourable gentlemen opposite, when they contended that this was not to be considered as a peace establishment, for if ever a country could be regarded as in a state of peace, this country might surely be so regarded. The first item in the estimates were the household troops, and that item, if com- pared with former peace establishments, would be found to have increased enormously. He would only refer to 1791, when the household troops did not exceed 779 men: now they amounted to 1744, being more than double the number at that period, and they were to be kept up merely for purposes of parade and show. If he were to refer to any other period of a peace establishment, the increase would be found to be in nearly the same ratio. He did not think any sufficient ground could be shown, either on the score of the duty to be performed in the metropolis, or for the maintenance of that due state which ought to accompany royalty, for maintaining so large a number, and therefore he was entitled to presume upon a reduction of one-half as practicable. The next item was the foot guards. In 1791 they amounted to 3765, now they were 7185. He should wish to have some explanation respecting them. He believed that a reduction to the extent of 5000 men might take place in those two items. The dragoons in 1791 consisted of 13 regiments upon the British establishment, or about 3037 men; that he certainly considered as too low; now there were to be 17 regiments, making 12,567 men, and that he thought as much too high as the other was too low. It seemed, however, that they were to be employed in collecting the revenue, and if so, it would be their utter ruin, as he could not conceive any duty more fatal to good discipline. They would not only be distributed into small parties, but they would also be exposed to the temptation of frequent intoxication, a vice which was already but too prevalent in the British army. He should think that half the proposed number would be sufficient, and he should prefer reducing the establishments of the regiments, rather than the regiments themselves. In looking to the infantry of the line, the total kept up in 1791 was 103 regiments, and now they amounted to 157, including the West India regiments, the garrison battalions, the rifle corps, the waggon train, and the staff corps. As a question of patronage alone, he should object to so large a force, and he thought the project was one which deserved the most serious attention of the House, not only on that ground, but because he did not conceive that the performance of any military duties could require the whole of those establishments.

In arguing upon the different stations to which they were to be applied, he should, for the moment, and merely for the moment, concede the point of necessity in respect to the 25,000 men for Ireland. He should also leave out of his consideration the 20,000 required for India, and the 30,000 composing the army of France, which would thus dispose of 75,000 men out of the 150,000. With respect to the army in France, however, he certainly could wish that it were composed chiefly, if not wholly, of foreigners, not only as it would reduce the patronage and influence of the Crown, but also, as he was afraid that the discipline and character of that army would materially suffer, if it remained five years in France, notwithstanding it was under the direction of that extraordinary man, the duke of Wellington, and other eminent officers.

With respect to the 25,000 for Great Britain, he had followed the noble lord through all his statements with the greatest attention, and yet he could not see the necessity for so large a force, merely to guard our arsenals, dock lards, and depots. Why might not the new kingdom of Chatham (to use the expression of an hon. member) be confided to the protection of the artillery? Besides, there were 9,000 marines already voted, and if economy and retrenchment were really the objects of the government, he was sure they would be found as efficient for the protection of those stations as troops of the line. With respect to the garrisons in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian islands, for which 11,000 men were to be provided, he should like to know why we were to keep up a war force in those garrisons during a period of profound peace? As to Gibraltar, it was to be recollected that the Spanish lines were destroyed, and no danger was to be apprehended from the Spanish government, except to its own subjects. That fortress had frequently beed left with only 3000 men during war, and considering the present state of our naval power, he should consider that to be a sufficient number now. Malta was one of the strongest places in the world. It could not be attacked at all without a superior navy, and that circumstance, united with the affection of the inhabitants for our government, certainly diminished the necessity for so large a force there. In the Ionian islands he should consider 1,000 men to be quite enough, for there too we were told, that the inhabitants were most anxious to come under our protec- tion, and besides, there was already a large fortress in the island of Corfu. Upon the whole, he conceived that a total reduction of 3000 men might take place in the force assigned to the Mediterranean, with perfect safety to our possessions there.—With regard to the West Indies, it was true that our possessions there were more numerous than at any former period, but it was also true our security was greatly advanced by the possession of St. Lucie. That was considered, by all professional men with whom he had conversed upon the subject, as a most important military position. He thought that two or three ships of the line, (and he hoped our navy was not entirely to be forgotten), stationed in the West Indies, would preclude the necessity of so large a force. Besides, a quick relief might be afforded from Canada, upon any emergency, and in that view, as well as considering the nature of that frontier at present, he was not disposed to regard the intended force for that settlement as too large. A reduction to the extent of four or five thousand men, might, he thought, be made from the establishment for the West Indies.—With respect to the garrisons for the Cape, the island of Ceylon, and the Mauritius, he thought they were immensely overstated. As to the Cape, it was a matter of doubt with him, whether it might not as well belong to some other power; but at all events, what occasion had we for so large a force there? What had we to fear, or to oppose, except an army of dull and slothful Hottentots, as was justly observed by an hon. member on a former evening? He really could not see the necessity either for a garrison of 3000 men, or for a governor with 20,000l. a year salary. A force of 2000 he should be disposed to consider as sufficient. In Ceylon he was afraid, from peculiar circumstances, the force could not be much reduced; but still it might be a little, and looking at the whole question as a question of money, however little could be saved, that little ought to be saved. He was of opinion, however, that a reduction of 500 men could take place. Of all the garrisons appointed to the different stations, that of the Mauritius was the most surprising. It had been stated, indeed, that the population of the place was disaffected; upon that subject he could say nothing, for he did not even know what the population amounted to, though he had made many inquiries, and consulted many books. But he understood it was one of the most impregnable places in the ocean, and as it was no great distance from our East Indian possessions, or from the Cape, reinforcements might easily be supplied if necessary, He did not see, therefore, why a garrison of two battalions, or about 14, or 1500 men, would not be sufficient for that place. With respect to the floating force which was to be kept up for reliefs, he thought it should be wholly struck out of the establishments for the different stations, because it would be taken out of a fund, which would always exist as a permanent part of the general system. The aggregate amount of his proposed reductions would be 23,000 men, thus reducing the 99,000 to 76,000, and that reduction, estimating the expense at only 50l. per man, though with respect to men on foreign service, that was too low an average, would produce a saving of at least 1,150,000l. exclusively of the army extraordinaries. At all times such a sum would be a great object, but at the present moment it was of infinite importance. The whole country was inflamed upon the question of a property tax or a loan; but by that saving they would have at once the interest of a loan for four or five years.

He should now call the attention of the House to a most extraordinary item. He meant the general and staff officers, who were still to be employed; and he was astonished to find that they amounted to 38 general officers for the different stations in Great Britain and Ireland. Upon what ground such a number was to be kept up, he was utterly at a loss to conceive. In Ireland there were to be 22 general officers, but surely unless they were to be retained for some other purpose, no man would venture to say, they were necessary for the service of Ireland. They ought to be diminished to a considerable extent. The staff at head-quarters, by which, of course, was understood the horse-guards, was also too extensive.—He would next advert to what the noble lord had termed the dead weight, and which the noble lord had attributed to the administration in which he (Mr. Calcraft) acted a subordinate part. This originated in the plan of a right hon. gentleman, of whom he must ever speak with sentiments of the highest esteem and the deepest regret. It seemed that an annual charge of 1,300,000l. was attributed to the excellent plan of Mr. Windham. But from this ought to, be de- ducted the amount of the establishments of Chelsea Hospital and Kilmainham in 1805, before the adoption of that plan, amounting to 500,000l.; so that in this view of the subject only between 8 and 900,000l. of additional expense was created by the plan. This sum, however, ought to be divided between the plan and the expense to which the country must otherwise have been put. He would on the whole allow that the plan had occasioned an increased expense of 500,000l. But among whom was this sum circulating? Among the soldiers who had so bravely fought the battles of the country. It comforted the wounded; it was the relief afforded to the veteran by the state which he had protected. If there was any one circumstance better calculated than another to cherish the military spirit of the country, it was this mode of affording an improved remuneration to those by whom it had been well served. Of his whole life there was not a single occurrence at which he more rejoiced than that he had co-operated with his right hon. friend, Mr. Windham, in the establishment of this plan. But thus it was, large sums were given to civil officers, and nothing was said about them. An increase of 10,000l. a year was given to a lord-lieutenant of Ireland, without notice; but when four-pence, sixpence, or a shilling a day was niggardly dealt out to our brave soldiers, and when parliament had acceded to the proposition, it was made a subject of regret and reproach.

The hon. gentleman then shortly adverted to the other items of the establishment. He maintained that the sum of 122,986l. for volunteer corps might be altogether saved, as under the existing circumstances of the country, no corps ought to be allowed to serve, unless gratuitously. As for the local militia, during the times of threatened invasion and of war, he had highly approved it. At present, however, he thought the expense might be saved. As for the foreign corps, those, he understood, were all going to the right-about. He next proceeded to the Royal Military College, to the principle of which he was by no means unfriendly, although he was so to the extent of the expenditure. This, from 13,000l. a year, had in seven years crept up to 33,819l. Some sum, he would say 20,000l. ought to be specified, within which the expenses of this establishment ought to be kept. The same observations were applicable to the Military Asylum. The next item was the retired chaplains. These gentlemen had no greater objection to good pay than the adjutants general and quarter masters general. The expenditure on this item had rapidly increased. It ought to be limited. To the allowances on the compassionate list it was impossible to suggest any objection.

Having thus rapidly gone through the different items of the establishment (without any attempt at oratory), he trusted that his observations might not be altogether without effect; and that the noble lord would not obstinately adhere to all the items of the estimates, merely because he had introduced them. He contended, that unless the measure had been adopted of opposing the Speaker's leaving the chair, the attention of the House would not have been so completely awakened as it had been to the immense establishments proposed; and he maintained, in opposition to an hon. friend of his, who had censured that proceeding, that had the majority of the House decided against the Speaker leaving the chair in the first instance, the House would not thereby have been placed in any dilemma; for had they sent the estimates back to his majesty's ministers for re-consideration, and had the same estimates been returned to the House, it would have been their obvious course to address the Crown for the dismissal of those ministers.

commended the clear and temperate mode in which the hon. gentleman had made his observations. He would not go into the general subject; but he would say with reference to the home and Irish establishment, that there never was a time in which the presence of a large military force was more necessary to the collection of the revenue—eight millions of revenue could not be more economically collected than by the expenditure of 440,000l. in this manner. Adverting to the Island of Corfu, he contended that the possession of it was essential to the protection of our trade in the Mediterranean, which might otherwise be destroyed with facility. It was evident that Buonaparté knew the value of this place by the large garrison which he maintained in it. With respect to the West India islands, it would be impolitic to rely on any assistance which in the event of attack they might receive from Canada. Each ought to have a force capable Of defending it.!He completely concurred with the hon. gentleman in his observations on the pensions allowed to our brave veterans. They did great honour to the country; and that honour was not a little increased by the private subscriptions with which every newspaper was filled.

complimented the candour with which the objections to the various estimates had been made. He trusted that that candour would be met by a correspondent feeling, and that his majesty's government would not resist any suggestions, except those, a compliance with which might hazard the security of the possessions that ought to be maintained. He would first consider the force required by the colonies, because he conceived, that with reference to that force the establishment at home ought to be fixed. In Canada he admitted that the proposed force could not be decreased. It was good policy to keep on foot such a force there, as should prevent the probable success of an invasion of it from being a temptation to America to commence a new war. As to the West India islands, considering that no power in Europe had a navy but Great Britain, whence could we expect an attack? The consideration was, how much force was required beyond that necessary for the internal police of those islands? On this subject, ordinary military authorities had little weight. The force necessary to take, and the force necessary to keep those islands, were two very different questions. He thought the noble lord had overstated the force necessary for the latter purpose. Independently of the reduction of the establishment, by the approaching restoration of Martinique and Guadeloupe, he thought that the number of troops proposed to be employed in the West India station might be reduced by fifteen hundred men. With regard to the Mauritius and the Cape, he did not think the proposed establishment necessary. First, as to the Cape, it would be recollected, that from its situation it had once, with a regiment of 600 men, withstood the attack of from two to three thousand men, who had been sent against it. It could not, therefore, be supposed to require the large force of 3000 at the present day. The Mauritius certainly was a place of considerable importance, and some persons thought that it was even of more importance than the Cape; but in that place there could be very little danger of external attack. The only thing to be dreaded was from the inhabi- tants, and he thought that they could be kept in sufficient subjection by a force less than that which was now proposed. He should next come to the Mediterranean. The garrisons in its vicinity would, from their situation, be more exposed to attack than any other of our possessions; but I still he did not think, on the whole, they required that great number of men which was now intended. As to Gibraltar, which might be considered in an enemy's country, he did not think that 4000 men would be too much. But this exception could not be extended to the Ionian islands, which in case of attack, might be easily relieved by troops from Malta. He next adverted to the establishments proposed for Ireland; and from the unhappy situation of that country, he did not think it could be considered as too much. The necessity of the force intended for England did not appear to be equally obvious. He could not conceive how this force was to be employed. Nor did he see how the great force of the guards was necessary. They would not be employed on various occasions, like other troops, and therefore he could not approve of a force of them so much exceeding that kept up in 1791. He thought therefore that in this respect a considerable reduction might be made. He admitted that the increase of population required some increase of our military establishment, and he had known instances where the assistance of a military force was necessary to the support of the civil magistrate. On the whole, considering the duty of our troops at home, and the supplies which might be sent from them to our colonies, he thought that some reduction might be made, though he was afraid it could not be very great, yet it would be a saving pro tango. There were some items in the estimates before the House, which he thought might be altogether left out. He alluded to the salaries of adjutant general and deputy adjutant general, quarter-master general and deputy quarter-master general. All these officers held other ranks in the army and received pay for them, and their pay in those situations was an unnecessary expense. He next called the attention of the House to the local militia, and observed that if ever money was uselessly thrown away, it was in this branch of the army. He thought the local militia were of no use whatever to the country, more particularly in a time of peace, except to extend military habits. The yeomanry cavalry he also thought could be dispensed with. They had been at one time of service, and were disposed to be so, but that time was gone by, and their military spirit had long since evaporated. At present he did not think their services worth the money which would be expended to continue them. The Military College and the Military Asylum were items in the estimates, which he conceived might be well omitted. They had been created for a time of war, and were not so necessary in time of peace. There did not now exist that necessity for the military education of young men, for if a war broke out, there were a sufficient number of experienced officers in the country. In the Commissariat and Barrack departments he could not say that the expense was too much, not being perfectly acquainted with the subject, but as it appeared to him it had reference more to a state of war than a time of peace. With regard to the army kept up in France, he could not agree with what had been said, that it would be better to keep up foreign troops than English. If an army were to be kept there, he thought it better that it should be composed of English soldiers; he meant that part of the army which was the quota of England, rather than of any other. English troops had ever shown a more exact attention to discipline, than the troops of any other nation, and therefore in France their presence could better accomplish the object for which they were kept there, than the troops of any other country. Having said this much on the general principle of the estimates, he would wait to hear the termination of the debate. He would listen to what ministers should advance in support of the several establishments. If their arguments were sufficient to convince him, he would vote for them. If not he should it his duty to oppose them, and to move an amendment on some of the items.

observed, that this country was at present in the situation of a man, who wished to reduce a large and expensive establishment, but who, in examining the different items of his expense, thought that each separately did not admit of much reduction. Undoubtedly, on looking to our financial resources, the idea of retrenchment in the different branches of the public service would present itself, and that retrenchment more particularly in the chief branch—the army. This army was conceived to be too numerous, and rather dangerous to the constitution, and there were periods in the history of England, when a less force would have been fatal. A smaller army had once proved fatal to the existence of royalty in this country. That danger, however, could not be apprehended from the present army, constituted as it was, but nevertheless some reduction of it was necessary. With regard to Ireland, he did not mean to say that the force now kept up was not called for by the situation of that country, but regretted that no other means had been resorted to for securing its affections, than holding it in military subjection. As to England, he could not see the necessity of having a much greater force than had been kept up by Mr. Pitt. It was now said that several colonies were to be supplied from the force in England. He would admit this, but the same argument might have been used in the time of Mr. Pitt. We had then colonies to supply from our home force, and though they were not so great as what we now possessed, yet they bore as great a proportion to the army by which they were then to be garrisoned, as our colonies now do to our armies. The hon. member then contended against the policy of employing the regular troops for the suppression of smuggling, as they would thereby be exposed to corruption. For this service, he thought that the yeomanry cavalry would be much more effectual. He also contended against the necessity of such large establishments in our several foreign settlements, which would not be attacked, from the certainty there was of our being able to regain possession of them by means of our navy, and the facility we had of transporting soldiers from one place to another. In the West Indies there was he conceived, no necessity to increase the number of forces. It was not fair to estimate the number to be kept up at present by a comparison with that which was employed in times when our enemies disputed the possession of them with us. Admitting the possibility of an attack upon any of these possessions by our navy, we could hold the invaders in such a state of blockade as would soon oblige them to surrender. He would not much longer occupy the time of the House in the way of detail at that hour of the night. He could not, however, omit to notice the growing rate of our military establishments, at the conclusion of every suc- cessive war in which this country had been latterly engaged; and he felt convinced, that if the present estimates were agreed to, and a new war were to break out, at the conclusion of the peace subsequent to it, a pretext would be held out for a still further augmentation. Most evils arose from consulting merely a supposed temporary convenience; and such he feared would be the event in case the proposed estimates were adopted. If there were no other objection to the proposed military establishments, he conceived that a sufficient one would be found in the circumstance, that it necessarily led them to neglect the navy, to whose exertions the country owed so much in point of fame and safety.

began by assuring the House that, whatever anxiety he might naturally be supposed to feel to express his opinion on the question before the House, be should not presume at that late hour to trouble the committee at any length, but should confine himself simply to some observations upon what had fallen from the hon. gentleman who preceded him in the debate. He observed that the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had in the observations which he had made on the estimates objected to them generally; he had not thought it necessary to pursue them in detail, or minutely to investigate any item of the charge, nor had he considered it incumbent upon him to make any inquiry whether the proportion of force allotted to the several stations was more or less than adequate to the service required. It was sufficient for him, that the total amount of the estimate exceeded, in his opinion, that which the country could reasonably be expected to pay. In soaking, however, his calculation of what the country could afford for the expense of her colonial garrisons, he had omitted many most important considerations. He had, indeed, uniformly kept in view the charge which the garrison brought upon the mother country, but he had never turned his attention to the increased advantage arising from the possession of the colony. The importance of the colonies in a commercial, a military, or even a financial point of view, appeared altogether to have escaped the notice of his hon. friend. These, however, were considerations which Mr. Goulburn said he could not consent to banish from his consideration, for he was convinced that although the possession of them necessarily gave rise to that additional charge which appeared on the face of the army estimates, the advantages which those possessions afforded to the country in reducing the very expenditure which it was the object of the hon. gentleman to diminish, far over played the sacrifice which they required in the first instance. It appeared indeed to him, that throughout the whole course of this debate the importance of our colonial acquisitions had been much undervalued. It had been doubted, whether colonies were in any degree advantageous to the mother country, and there had been some gentlemen who did not hesitate to declare, that the reduction of any one branch of our national expenditure was of greater importance than a whole Archipelago of sugar islands; but he was satisfied that such an opinion would not be entertained by any man who could appreciate the value of an extended field for commercial enterprise, additional markets for our produce and manufactures, and the employment of an annually increasing mercantile marine. These were some of the advantages which we derived from the increase of our colonies, upon which at an earlier hour Mr. Goulburn said he might have been tempted to expatiate; but he should now content himself with showing that the new colonies which we had acquired during the war, and the protection of which required the present increase of our military establishment, not only created no additional expense, but contributed materially (notwithstanding this additional charge on the army estimates) to defray the general expenditure of the empire. It was an important fact, that the conquered colonies alone had, in the year 1814, opened a new market for English manufactures to the amount of above three millions sterling, and had in that year actually furnished to the revenue of this country no less a sum than 1,500,000l. He wished, therefore, that the hon. gentleman would compare this statement with the charge for the proposed establishment in those colonies, and he might then safely appeal to him whether such possessions were not acquisitions to the country, whether they did not discover, even in a pecuniary point of view and for the sake of the clear million of revenue which they paid into the treasury of the country, that degree of military protection which was now demanded.

Mr. Goulburn then proceeded to notice, in the order in which the hon. gentleman had alluded to them, the different colonies, the garrisons of which had been considered liable to objection. With respect to Canada, it was hardly necessary for him to say any thing. It seemed to be the general if not the unanimous opinion of those who had taken part in the debate, that the force stationed there was not unnecessarily great. The present importance of those colonies, compared with their previous insignificance had had their due weight with the House; and if he further adverted to the subject it was only for the purpose of adding one which he considered not an unimportant reason for an increase of the military force in that quarter. It had been stated by his noble friend, that the progress of cultivation in Upper Canada had diminished the difficulties of invasion, and that the plough and the axe of the settler had been the best pioneer of the enemy. The change, however, which had taken place in the American frontier during the same period appeared to have been overlooked. In 1791 Upper Canada was secure, without a garrison, not only because it was itself an impenetrable forest, but because the wild state of the American frontier precluded the approach of any hostile force in that direction. The whole country bordering on the lakes was in 1791 little better than an impervious forest or an impassable morass, and inhabited by tribes of natives who, though they lived within the limits of the American territory were always willing and ready to resist them and presented insuperable obstacles to every hostile preparation. The scene however was now changed. The forests had disappeared—the natives were withdrawn—a numerous American population was spread along the shores of the lakes—and the opening of roads and canals had brought the enemy at once in contact with our frontier.

Adverting next to the West Indies, Mr. Goulburn observed, that there was in our old colonies in that quarter a certain increase of establishment:but the increase was inconsiderable in itself, and rested moreover upon grounds which he believed the hon. gentleman would consider satisfactory. In comparing the present establishment with that kept up in 1791, which had been assumed as the proper model of oar present arrangement, it must be remembered that the whole force then maintained in the West Indies was an European force. The system of employing black troops in those less healthy climates had not then been introduced. The introduction of this system fraught as it was with incalculable benefits, nevertheless carried with it the necessity of increased numerical force. We had it, indeed, now in our power, by employing black troops on the more fatiguing military duties and in the more exposed and unhealthy situations, to preserve the lives of our own soldiers when employed in those climates; and it was a most satisfactory circumstance to observe how, in proportion to the employment of the black troops, the mortality and sickness in the European regiments had diminished. While, however, a change so gratifying to humanity was effected, it must be seen that the employment of so considerable a number of black troops as were adequate to the object in view, made it necessary to increase the total amount of force to be maintained in the West Indies. However absurd or ill-founded might appear those prejudices which prevailed in the West Indies against a force of this nature, the House must to a certain degree, pay regard to those prejudices; nor did he think that any one would be disposed to withhold the proposed addition of a thousand men, which was all that was required to satisfy the alarms of the colonists, at the same time that it secured the health and comfort of the European soldier. Putting humanity out of the question, the employment of this additional number of men was, in a pecuniary point of view, a measure of real economy. If the life of an European soldier was not an object worthy of consideration, at least we should consider that the cost of a soldier and the expense of supplying his place when lost to the service abroad, was neither light nor unimportant, and that the expense now proposed to be incurred would go but a little way in supplying the losses occasioned by the system of 1791.

With respect to the Cape of Good Hope, we had not to guard against a dull and slothful race of Hottentots, as had been stated by an hon. gentleman, but against a rude and warlike people, living on the borders of the colony, and eager at all times to make incursions with a view to plunder and pillage. Against these every precautionary measure had been previously tried, but a military force on the frontier had alone been found effectual. There was, however, another and a stronger rea- son for the maintenance of such a force. To those who had any knowledge of the colony it could not be unknown, that the more remote districts were inhabited by a class of men, the Dutch boors, who having lived without restraint in the time of the Dutch, submitted to it with difficulty under the British government. The cruelty with which they had in many instances treated the unfortunate Hottentots in their service, the murders even that had been committed, called for the interposition of any government that professed itself to be either civilized or just. Sir J. Cradock, the late governor of the Cape, had determined to establish in these distant districts regular courts of justice; but so lawless were the inhabitants, and so little inclined to yield to the tribunals what they considered to be their privileges, that nothing short of a military force in the neighbour hood could ensure the execution of the law. It is only last year, said Mr. Goulburn, that the attempt to apprehend a murderer in that district led to a general insurrection, which was suppressed only by the employment of a military force; and it is under these circumstances for the protection of the industrious colonist against the ravages of a savage enemy, and for the protection of the degraded Hottentots against a no less savage master, that I consider a military force at the Cape to be absolutely required.

The importance of the Mauritius, if not acknowledged by all, may be estimated in some degree by the losses sustained by this country from its being in the possession of the enemy, and the expense incurred in its reduction. The population of that island had always been peculiarly French; much distinguished for its early concurrence in all the violent measures of the French revolution, and for its subsequent attachment to Buonaparté. An evidence of the importance which he attached to this colony, and of their feeling towards him had been recently afforded—It was one of the first acts of his return to France to send an agent to the Mauritius; the result was, an insurrection in his favour. Under these circumstances, could any one object to maintaining for the present the force proposed?

In Ceylon, indeed, reductions might hereafter be practicable, when some means of communication between the widely separated military posts in the island had been completed. It was, with a view to this reduction, the first object of his majesty's government after the conquest of Candy, to effect a road across the island, and when this should be completed an inferior amount of force might be required; but during the present year, when above half the island had but just submitted to his majesty's arms, and when the military posts were so detached and separate as to be capable of affording no assistance to each other, it appeared impossible to dispense with the establishment proposed.—Mr. Goulburn next adverted to the garrison required for colonies in the Mediterranean. With respect to Gibraltar, there was no difference of opinion. Malta, though one of the strongest places, nevertheless from the extension of its works required a considerable garrison: and as to the Ionian islands, the works at Corfu alone, exclusive of the other islands, would fully authorize the number of men allotted for the defence of the whole. The importance of those islands had been fully and ably stated by the right hon. gentleman who spoke before him on that side of the House. The strength of the works when in the hands of the French had been such, that we had never been able to obtain possession of it. They must now, indeed, be for the present year maintained by us; but he trusted, that the period was not very distant at which we should be relieved from the expense of the garrison necessary for their security.

The hon. gentleman who spoke before him, had objected, indeed, generally, to the garrisons recommended for all the colonies, because he considered no garrisons whatever to be necessary, since our naval superiority afforded a certain means of recovering the colony should it accidentally be conquered by an enemy. Against reasoning of this kind, Mr. Goulburn begged to protest, as quite at variance with his idea of the protection which every subject of this empire was entitled to expect in return for his allegiance. Could it he consistent with the hon. gentleman's ideas of protection to leave any class of his majesty's subjects exposed to the ravage and destruction of property, which were the constant and necessary consequences of a hostile invasion? or did he think that they would derive much consolation from the prospect of being again conquered from the enemy by a friendly army, and a second time exposed to those inconveniences which even the conquest by a friendly force cannot but produce?

Mr. Goulburn concluded by observing, that great part of the increased expenditure observable in the present estimates must be considered as arising out of the glory we had won in the war, and the advantages we had gained by the peace. It had been said by gentlemen, that we could but judge of the value of a peace from the diminution of the national expenditure consequent on its conclusion. From those who maintained such an opinion, he must altogether dissent. If the advantage of a peace consist in the acquisition of new territory—of territory situated in different quarters of the globe, important from its immediate position, or from the power which it afforded of checking the operations of future war, an increased military establishment was the necessary and inevitable consequence of the acquisition. But although the military establishment was increased, it was not, as some gentlemen seemed inclined to argue, to the detriment of the navy. From the very extension of our territory, and the increased employment which the trade with them afforded to British shipping and seamen, we had always within our reach the means of commanding a naval force without delay. The increased military force, therefore, was not more effective in securing the colonies in which it was stationed, than in giving us a command of naval means whenever the exigencies of the country might require them.

thought it necessary to make a few observations on what had passed in the present debate, and to state what was the impression which had been left on his mind by the arguments of the gentlemen opposite. He was extremely sensible of the importance of the question, and he begged to state that no false pride on the part of the government would make them object to the economical plans of their opponents if they thought they could have adopted them consistently with prudence. Ministers wished to confine their military establishments within the narrowest possible limits, but the saving which would arise from the reductions which had been suggested, was so paltry, compared with the great sacrifice which was the condition of attaining it, that be was confident in pursuing the course recommended they would not fulfil the wishes of the nation. The government had come to the discussion of this question with the greatest desire to make every pe- cuniary saving that could prudently he attempted, and if they differed from those who opposed them on this point, he was sure it was in consequence of their duty having imposed upon them the task of looking more closely into the subject than the individuals had been compelled to do who had taken part in this debate. It was some satisfaction to ministers to know that those who differed from them with respect to the military establishments proper to be kept up, differed equally from each other. The hon. gentleman opposite had taken for his data what he (lord Castlereagh could never subscribe to, namely that the arrangement of 1792 was that which was perfectly satisfactory, and which it would be wise, under all circumstances and at all times, to recur to. What was the proof of its being applicable to every situation in which the empire could be thrown? Why this; that in almost every instance it was admitted it could not now be acted upon. It could not be acted upon in Ireland; it could not be acted upon in Canada; nor could it be acted upon in our new colonies. It had been thought that 12,000 troops were more than enough for the defence of the possessions last mentioned. He could not understand which way this was assumed; for he could not tell on what principle it was supposed that our newly-acquired territories could be maintained by a smaller force than was judged necessary for our old colonies. It ought to be borne in mind, that in our new possessions we had to maintain some of the strongest military stations in the world, namely, Corfu, Malta, Ceylon, Trinidad, and St. Lucie. His hon. friend had supposed that a saving of 23,000 men might be effected, but in doing this he had assumed that the total force which it was proposed to give the Crown, were to be considered as effectives. The statement which he (lord Castlereagh) had formerly made, that a tenth ought to be deducted from their number for non-effectives, he found on inquiry, was rather under than over the mark. From the ninety-nine thousand men thus to be kept up., ten thousand at least were to be deducted, and when to these were added the number that must every year be in transitu for reliefs, on the principle that the force stationed in the colonies should be relieved once in ten years, it would be found that to the 10,000 non-effectives, 7000 men who must always be on the seas on their passage out or home, ought to be subjoined. These 17,000 men taken from the 99,000, left an effective force of but 82,000 men. Did the hon. gentleman reckon the non-effectives and the reliefs when he made his calculation? If he did not, it would be seen there was after all but a difference of five thousand men between the force his hon. friend proposed to maintain, and that which the government desired should be kept up. He apprehended the hon. gentleman had not reckoned the non-effectives and the reliefs, when he thought an army of seventy-seven thousand men would be sufficient, and had hardly a doubt that the error into which he had fallen was that of founding Isis calculations on the gross amount of the force which was to be maintained, and not on the presumable effectives. It had been thought that a reduction might well be made in the household troops. The duties of this description of force, it was proper to observe, were not now circumscribed as they were by custom in 1792. Latterly he thought a wise arrangement had been carried into effect with respect to them, which left them applicable to foreign service. This had been of great importance to the country, as they had nerved its arm to strike a great blow at a most critical moment, when the requisite force could not have been obtained from any other quarter. This part of the army was always likely to be available on any sudden emergency, as from none of its detachments being abroad in a common way, as was usual with the rest of the army, three, four, or five thousand men could always be gained from the household troops on the spur of the moment. They had been much ridiculed when they were first sent out of the country, and the idea of sending our heavy cavalry to meet the cavalry of France had been laughed at. He had, however, on that occasion preferred the opinion of the Duke of Wellington as to their fitness for service to that of the high military authorities who had not admired this arrangement; and much as their dress had been quizzed at that period (those who had seen the continental armies knew that their dress was not the most extravagant in the world), time had proved that the duke of Wellington was the best judge of their merits. On a variety of occasions they had greatly distinguished themselves, and more than ever at the battle of Waterloo. The cavalry, which had been so much scouted, had overthrown that which had been thought to be the best in Europe, and had on every occasion proved itself to be superior to all that opposed it. The expense of this force might be about one-fourth greater than that of the rest of our cavalry but this he held to be more than compensated by the constant state of efficiency in which it was found.—An hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Calcraft) had suggested some considerations which he thought himself bound to answer. With respect to the home service, he must observe, that there was a considerable part of the duty of the country which could not be done either by the marines or the artillery. He readily admitted the efficiency of these troops, but their estimated establishment would not be sufficient. There were 3,000 of the marines which were always to be considered as afloat:(some of the opposition members observed, that 9,000 were voted)—he was aware of that, but he was now arguing a speculative establishment for next year. Upon the 3,000 thus afloat, all the casualties of the service would fall, and therefore as those casualties would have to be replaced out of the remaining 6,000, it would be impossible to calculate upon more than 1,500 at the highest, as disposable for that duty at home, in guarding our different arsenals, depôts, and dock-yards. Then, with respect to the artillery, of the 2,000 men kept up at home, after the regular duties were performed, what would remain applicable to that other description of duty which it was proposed they should undertake? He would leave it to the judgment and candour of his hon. friend—and he was sure he would feel convinced, that it was impossible to make from either of those branches of the military force of the country any deductions. He was satisfied, that so far from adding to the force maintained in 1792, it would be found, when all the different circumstances were taken into consideration, that the present estimate for the home service did not exceed that of 1792. As to the guards, it was to be remembered that they were not exclusively employed in the home district. They were sent to Chatham; indeed, there was no difficulty in appointing them to any duty to which their numbers were sufficient; and the only difference to be considered was between the expense of the guards and that incurred by the troops of the line. There seemed to be no diversity of opinion between him and the hon. gentleman as to the cavalry; but a considerable one certainly subsisted upon the question of the West Indies, though he was satisfied, that when the hon, gentleman viewed the matter with more deliberation, that diversity would cease. As to Jamaica, the hon. gentleman had totally discarded that colony out of his calculation; but he wished to observe that it was a mistake to suppose that 4,000 men were to be employed exclusively for Jamaica. Out of those 4,000, there were 500 employed for Honduras, and therefore the real force at Jamaica amounted only to 3,500. With respect to the West India service, it should be considered how sudden the casualties were in that climate, and that a fever might consume from 800 to 1,000 men, before any relief could possibly be sent out from this country. But what was the state of the West Indian army now, as compared with that of 1792, setting Jamaica aside? It was proposed by his majesty's government to vote 9,500 men for the garrisoning those colonies, and if 3,000 were deducted from that number, there would remain only 6,500. In 1792, the force in the West Indies amounted to 4,800, so that there would be an increase of only 1,700, applicable to the existing exigencies in that quarter. Was it possible, however, that his hon. friend should consider it a safe line of policy, to garrison the six additional colonies of Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, with only 1,700 men? He was confident that such an idea never entered his mind; and therefore it was evident he could not stand upon his own principle, as he would not venture, under those circumstances, to recommend to government so considerable a reduction. He must beg leave also to deny that the situation of St. Domingo bore only upon Jamaica. He was prepared to contend, that such an independent black empire as was now established in St. Domingo, was calculated to affect the whole hemisphere of the West Indies in its moral and political condition.—With respect to other savings that had been recommended, he must again press upon the consideration of the House, that the present establishments were not proposed by government as permanent ones. They applied only to this present year, and to that state of things which existed in many of the colonies, and which rendered it necessary that such a system of additional precautions should be adopted. The proposed reduction in the home esta- blishments, however, he considered as untenable at present, and that in the West Indies was not only unsafe, but absolutely impracticable. In another year, he was perfectly aware, that many savings might take place, to the extent, perhaps, of 4 or 5,000 men, in our colonial garrisons; nor would that be the greatest possible saving, because Ireland held out a prospect of a still more considerable one. He admitted also, that in the Mauritius, at Ceylon, and in the Mediterranean, there might be reductions in the future estimates submitted to the House. What he contended for was, that the amount of force proposed for the present year was calculated upon the absolute necessities of the country, and that consequently such reductions as had been suggested were impossible. The House, he was sure, would feel that it was not pledged to vote the 99,000 men another year, because they had supported the government in grant,. ing that force now. At the same time, he wished it to be distinctly understood, that he himself was not pledged to any reduction beyond that of 4 or 5,000 men, arguing, as he then did, upon the actual condition of our colonial possessions. It was material also, that the House should recollect, that when they voted 99,000 men, they did not in fact give that force to the government; they only gave to the government the faculty of raising it, which faculty was to be exerted under all those difficulties always attendant upon such measures. He apprehended that distinction had been lost sight of, and that the reductions proposed by some hon. members had a reference to the gross estimate of 99,000 men, and not to the effective force.—He should not detain the House any longer at present, because, although there had been observations made upon some other of the estimates, he thought it better to confine himself now to the larger and more important estimate, reserving, for the subsequent ones, those remarks which might be more appropriately made when they were before the committee. Before he sat down, however, he was anxious to press once, more upon their attention, that in voting for the present establishment, parliament was in no manner pledged to an approval of similar establishments hereafter, unless, indeed, the hon. gentlemen opposite should be disposed to insist upon such a pledge, in the same way as had been attempted upon another question. They would un- questionably be at liberty, in the ensuing year, to reduce the estimates in any mode which might then seem expedient. He had given the utmost attention to the subject, and for the reasons which he had stated, he could not, consistently with his sense of duty, consent to any reduction. He should certainly be most anxious to conform to the feelings of the House and of the country, and if it were only a question of reducing 4 or 5,000 men, he should be disposed to run a small, though not an improvident risk, to accomplish that object. He was satisfied, however, that such a compliance as was required, would be injurious to the most important interests of the country, and therefore he hoped he should not be considered as presumptuously adhering to his own opinion against that of others, in supporting the vote then before the committee.

, amidst loud cries of question, succeeded in effecting a hearing. He said he had but one short observation to make, namely, that in a short time we might probably find to our cost, that we had too few soldiers in India, and too many missionaries.

The House then divided on an amendment proposed by Mr. Stuart Wortley, that from the proposed establishment of 99,000 men, there should be deducted 10,000. The numbers were:

The original Resolution was then agreed to.

At three o'clock on Thursday morning the House adjourned.