on presenting the petition from the freeholders and in habitants of the county of Warwick, observed, that the prayer of the petition was not only against the property tax, but also for the reduction of the proposed military establishment, and for the abolition of sinecure places and pensions. As he had not been able to attend in his place during the discussion of the army estimates on the motion for going into the committee, he wished to take the present opportunity of stating to the House, in a very few words, his sentiments as to the amount of the proposed establishment. He thought it larger than the country could afford to maintain, because in our present situation we could afford nothing that was not absolutely necessary. As to the property tax, his sentiments concurred entirely with those of the petitioners. The opinion throughout the country was, that it could not be continued during peace without a breach of faith. Without entering minutely into this question, he could only say, that if he were in the situation of his majesty's ministers, he would certainly not press any measure which the country universally understood they had promised not to adopt. It was a tax levied at best upon an assumed income, but in the present times it was a tax upon absolute loss. Chearfully as it had been paid in war, the public had a right now to be relieved from it.

on presenting a petition from the freeholders and inhabitants, of Ashburton, against the property tax, took occasion to repeat some of his observations on the distresses of the agricultural interest, attributing them chiefly to the enormous weight of taxation. He remarked, that one of the pretexts of ministers for continuing the property tax, was, the necessity of supporting that pretty sort of thing called the sinking fund. The petitioners, he said, characterized the tax as odious and inquisitorial, and applicable only to a period of war.

presented a petition from the portreeves and other inhabitants of Ashburton, setting forth;

"That the petitioners having, within the last ten days, by themselves and many other of the inhabitants of the said town and borough, petitioned the House, in consequence of a public meeting convened by the portreeves for that purpose, for some relief to be afforded to the agricultural interest of the country at large, from the heavy and burthensome taxes they now pay, and particularly from payment of the tenant's property tax, cannot but express their concern that they should be under the necessity of again stating their sentiments on the same subject; but they are compelled to do so, in consequence of another petition, which they understand is intended to be sent to the House, in terms which they do not approve of, and signed by some of the persons whose names are subscribed to the said former petition; the petitionerslament, in common with their neighbours and the country at large, that there should be occasion to continue the payment of taxes after the restoration of peace, which fall so heavy on the public; but they are well aware, that upon the conclusion of so long and arduous a contest, the expenses necessary to be discharged must require a heavy taxation; they trust, however, that parliament, in its wisdom, will adopt the most effectual and speedy means possible, to reduce the public expenses, and also to lessen the payment of sinecures, pensions, and other burthens of the state; and that the property tax on the tenant, the tax on laboured horses, and some other payments which bear principally on agriculture and on the lower and middling classes of people; and under these circumstances, the petitioners consider that the remainder of the property tax at 5l. per cent, if not clothed with such strong and inquisitorial powers, may be kept on foot for two years, and that the money so to be raised will be obtained with less public grievance than in any other way."

said, that the petition evidently prayed against the inquisitorial power, which was a great object of those who opposed the tax altogether.

observed, that this was the first petition he had heard of, that approved of the property tax, under any modification, and he suggested, that as the good people of Andover had no objection to the tax, it might not be improper to bring in a bill, for the purpose of excepting them if the tax were to be abolished. The willingness with which these petitioners offered themselves for taxation, reminded him of the anecdote which was related of king James 1st, who once asked the opinion of two of his bishops, on the propriety of his levying money by his own authority. One of them, the bishop of Lincoln, replied, that no one could dispute the authority of his majesty, for "he was the breath of their nostrils." Turning to the other, the bishop of Norwich, the king said, "What does your lordship think?" To which he answered, "Your majesty certainly may take the money of my bro- ther of Lincoln." Mr. Brougham said, he thought that the same might now with as good reason be said to the petitioners from Andover [Hear, hear!].

wished to submit a motion to the House, to which he apprehended there would be no objection. It was for "copies of all correspondence which had taken place between the treasury and the auditor of the barrack department, touching the arrears of that department."

said, he believed, from recollection, that the correspondence was extremely voluminous. If the hon. and learned gentleman would point out the particular part of the correspondence to which he wished to refer, there would be every disposition to meet his wishes.

said, he merely wished to refer to that part which respected the default of Alexander Davison, and general Delancey.

said, the whole of this correspondence was very long. The hon. and learned gentleman could, perhaps, suggest some particular point, to which he was desirous of recurring.

never having seen the correspondence in question, was at a loss to point out the date of that part of the correspondence which had relation to the transaction which he was anxious to bring under the consideration of the House. He would, however, state the circumstance which gave rise to his motion. About a year and a half back, he believed it was, he understood that Mr. Alexander Davison was declared by the auditor of the barrack department to be a defaulter, to the amount of ninety or a hundred thousand pounds, since which no payment had been made, nor had any security been taken, either by issuing an extent or otherwise, to ensure to the public this sum. What he wished to ascertain was, whether any steps had since been taken to recover this balance, and what means had been adopted to prevent the issuing of an extent which was the usual course on such occasions?

said, he could, he believed, in a few words, explain this transaction. It was true that the auditor-general did report to the treasury that a balance was due by Alexander Davison, to the amount stated, being a balance of his account with general Delancy. Mr. Davison had, however, disputed this claim, and the subject was now undergoing an investigation in the court of exchequer. In the mean time, the treasury had felt it their duty to secure the public, be the result of this inquiry what it might, and they were about to issue an extent against Mr. Davison, when he came forward and offered ample security on real property, to abide the event. This was accepted, but the extent was still kept hanging over him.

said, that if this explanation turned out to be consistent with the real circumstances of the case, nothing could be more satisfactory. He was anxious, however, that the House should be satisfied on the subject, and as the best mode of coming at that part of the correspondence which was necessary to decide the question, he thought he might, as had been done on former occasions, be permitted to see the correspondence, in order that he might select what he wanted.

said, there was no objection whatever to this, and the hon. and learned gentleman might see the correspondence any day he chose to call at the treasury.

Mr. Brougham then withdrew bis motion.

appeared at the bar with the Report of the Army Estimates. On the question, that the said report be brought up,

said, he wished to take that opportunity of offering a few remarks upon the question embraced by this report. He considered that at the present crisis of the country, no subject was of more importance than its military policy, or called for more dispassionate and minute deliberation. It appeared to him that throughout the late momentous war in which we had been engaged, his majesty's ministers had deserved the confidence of the country, and therefore it was that he viewed with more regret the course which they were now taking. It was but justice to remark, that as far as our external interests were concerned, in the arrangements resulting from the recent peace, nothing could be more satisfactory, or be better calculated to obtain perfect security. It was to be lamented, however, that in turning our eyes to our internal situation, the same sources of pleasure were not to be found. Without, all was prosperity; within, nothing but distress and misery. In such a situation of things at home, it was the duty of every member of that House not to give a vote in favour of any measure which went to impose upon the country an unnecessary expense. If ever there was a period when this precaution was more necessary than another, it was the present. The House was on all occasions the guardians of the people, and it was now peculiarly the guardians of their distresses. It behoved them to scrutinise every item of expense which was suggested, with the utmost jealousy, and not to suffer a farthing to be drawn from the country which was to be avoided. With these feelings he should proceed to view the question before the House. He did not pretend to know what might be an adequate force for the protection of our colonies. He was aware that those colonies had been increased, and that the state of Ireland, too, required the employment of a large force. Be this as it might, he thought, in a state of peace, and considering the distresses of the country, we ought to go as much as possible, in the arrangement of our military establishment, upon the principle adopted in 1792. Judging by this principle, he could not imagine that it was necessary to vote so large a number of men for the service of England as 25,000. In 1792, the number of men voted for England was but 17,000. This he thought was quite adequate to the purposes of the country, and ought to form the basis of our present arrangements. We were told that our garrisons were increased in many parts of the country, and that an additional number of men, of consequence, was necessary. Admitting all this, however, he was at a loss to account for the enormous extent of one particular species of force—he alluded to that of cavalry. From the estimates before the House, he was led to conclude, that the cavalry was to comprise no less a number than 14,300. He confessed he was struck with the extraordinary extent of this force, inasmuch as he could not immediately discover its utility in a time of peace. The defence of our colonies, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, did not require cavalry. The cavalry of India and France was distinct from this estimate; so that it appeared that this immense body was to be applicable to Ireland and England alone. How it could be necessary for those countries was be- yond his comprehension. He did not presume to say what was the necessary number of cavalry for Ireland; but the proportion to 25,000 men, he apprehended, did not exceed from three to four thousand. Eleven thousand, therefore, was left for England alone. In 1792, the whole amount of the cavalry embodied did not exceed three thousand odd, which made an enormous difference of force and expense. He therefore could not see why so many cavalry were necessary. We had now 6,500 more than at any former period, and this only for the purpose of preventing smuggling. He entreated the House to consider whether the number proposed was absolutely necessary; if it was not, it became the duty of every member to vote against it.

conceived, that the maintaining so large a body of cavalry, as had been stated by the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, would have the most pernicious effect upon the morals of the people of this country. He particularly objected to the employment of this species of force in the protection of the revenue; because he believed the men more capable of being bribed than any others—added to which, they would obtain such irregular habits as would necessarily prove destructive to that discipline which it was desirable, on all occasions, to maintain in the British army. Indeed he thought them little better than a species of guerrillas. Another point of view in which the maintaining so large a body of cavalry was objectionable was, the increase which would necessarily take place in the poorrates. It was true that their residence in our villages might promote the recruiting of young dragoons, but the morals of the people would be the sacrifice. At the moment of the return of peace it was important that our military establishment should be reduced to the lowest possible standard; and conceiving, as he did, that attention had not been paid to the suggestions, that had been thrown out on this head, he should vote against the resolution of the committee being adopted by the House. Another point to which he wished to call the attention of the House, was the yeomanry cavalry. Though, under some circumstances, such a force might be necessary, he did not think it was called for at present. In time of peace such a body was, in a moral point of view, very objectionable. He had been told by farmers, whose sons had entered the yeoman ca- valry, that they were ruined in consequence. He had also known men, who were very good farmers, before they attached themselves to such corps, but who soon forgot the agricultural knowledge they had previously acquired. The hon, gentleman then adverted to the increase of the household troops, and expressed his opinion, that they ought to be reduced. The foot-guards had also been greatly extended. It would be a very great benefit to the country if their establishment was also confined within more narrow bounds. The noble lord opposite had stated, that they were more available now than formerly. That might be very true. But if the service of other troops, equally good, could be procured at a more moderate expense, it would be better, in the present state of the country, to employ them. They ought now to study the useful instead of the ornamental. As to the pensions, he quite agreed with an hon. gentleman, that though the expense was very heavy, it was incurred in supporting persons who were every way deserving of it. The local militia appeared to him to be altogether unnecessary. The military college, though he approved of the establishment, might, he thought, be supported at a less expense. The retired chaplains cost the country a very large sum; but, if a military church were to be built, and he understood such a work was in contemplation, those persons might be employed in it. In conclusion, the hon. member expressed his determination, however painful it was to him, to vote against the estimates, as they now stood.

intreated the House to look at the present state of the country, and, having examined it minutely, to say, whether it was such as would justify the keeping on foot a single soldier more than absolute necessity called for. Those who took such a view of our internal concerns, must be convinced, that the country was in a state which called for the strictest economy, even in the most trifling things. That this establishment was only to be continued for a short time, was an argument that did not weigh with him. He felt a strong constitutional jealousy on the subject of a standing army. It was a principle which their fathers always cherished, and he hoped their sons would not shrink from maintaining it. He did not say that this great establishment would threaten any danger to the country, to-day or tomorrow; but he would impress on the House the necessity of watching, with vigilant care, the introduction of any system, that might, in the end, be detrimental to that constitution which was so dear and so sacred to them. It was said, the establishment would last only for a short time. They, however, had no time to lose. Instant economy was called for, And, if they did not proceed immediately upon a course of retrenchment, the tradesmen and farmers, throughout the country, would inevitably be ruined. In Ireland, it appeared, a large force was to be employed. He saw no reason for it. If the taxes were reduced, there would be no necessity for a standing army there. A conciliatory system might allay that ferment in the public mind, which dragooning never could. But, if the House and his majesty's ministers made light of the sufferings and distresses of the Irish people, perhaps a much greater army would be called for, than that which was now determined on. An observation had been made, which, coming from the hon. member for Buckingham (Mr. Fremantle) who had himself held a high office, struck him very forcibly. That hon. gentleman had said, that millions (he did not know whether he mentioned many millions) could be saved to the country, by a revision of the office-establishments. In the present burthened and oppressed situation of the country, such a measure would be attended with incalculable benefit. But he gave little credit to the professions of economy, of which he had heard so much from the other side, and seen so little. How could he credit them, when ministers, with the word 'economy' in their mouths, came down to the House, and asked them for a military establishment of 161,000 men, in a time of profound peace? They told the House, that if they made every retrenchment in their power, the saving to the country would "only" be 600,000l. "Only" six hundred thousand pounds! That was not the language in which he would speak of such a sum. That was not the language in which, at any time, but particularly at the present moment, it ought to be spoken of. Dreading so large an establishment as dangerous, in a constitutional point of view, and knowing that the nation was not able to support the expense, he must object to it. In doing this, he felt that he was discharging a sacred duty both to his constituents and to the country.

said, there never was an occasion on which the members of that House were more imperatively called on to examine the estimates laid before them, than they were at present. The conclusions, however, to which he had come, after an attentive consideration of the subject, were very different from those that the hon. gentleman who spoke last had arrived at. Unquestionably, they had a most important question to consider. On the one hand, they had to take care that no burthen was placed on the people, beyond what was absolutely necessary; but the hon. gentleman must allow, that they also had a duty to perform towards themselves and the country, and that they ought not to shrink from imposing a burthen, if it were evidently called for. They ought not to give way to any thing, in the shape of remonstrance or complaint, which they did not conceive to be well-founded. The Prince Regent's ministers called for the number of troops which appeared, in their judgment, necessary for the service of the empire. Their judgment undoubtedly might be erroneous; and, if it were so—if a less establishment would answer the purpose—no man could attempt to argue that it ought not to be preferred to the larger one. This subject had been discussed on two distinct lines of objection; and he thought the course taken, in debating the question on going into the committee, was, in the view entertained of the question by gentlemen opposite, perfectly correct and parliamentary. If he had, like them, considered the whole system improper, he would have proceeded in the same way, and called on ministers to go back to the Crown, and to introduce the estimates in a new shape. But he took a view of the question he was not ashamed to say, totally different. He could see nothing in the conduct of the present government, from which it could be inferred, that they would unnecessarily or improperly demand a large military force, that might have an operation inimical to the free constitution of England. If he felt any such apprehension, he would have taken the course adopted by gentlemen opposite. He now came to consider whether the army proposed was unnecessary, or disproportioned to our means of supporting it. In the first place, it was proper to look to the colonies. The government of the country were bound to afford protection to those colonies, whether conquered by force of arms, or ceded to us by treaties; and the question was, whether that protection could be given, in a manner less burthensome to the country, than that which ministers had proposed.—As to one branch of the service, there appeared in that House to be very little difference of opinion. He alluded to the force destined for Ireland. The right hon. secretary for Ireland had shown in his able speech on the state of that country, that far other remedies than a military force were necessary to render the people tranquil and peaceable. But still every person who looked to the history of Ireland, must see, that, in the course of the next two years, it was absolutely necessary to employ a large military body there.—With respect to the colonies, if government intended they should remain with us, they must be adequately protected. Gentlemen had observed, that, at the present moment, there was no fear of their being invaded; and, that even if they were attacked, the inhabitants might defend themselves. Such an argument he thought most disgraceful. Having taken certain colonies under their care, it would be shameful if they neglected to provide for their defence. With respect to the reduction proposed by his hon. friend (Mr. Bankes), he could not call to his mind any data on which they could be founded. He could not see on what safe parliamentary grounds his hon. friend had come to the conclusions he stated to the House. He could understand the line of argument taken by gentlemen opposite, who applied themselves to the danger to be apprehended from keeping up a large military force. Though he did not agree with them in opinion, he understood their argument perfectly. He was satisfied, in his own mind, notwithstanding what had fallen from his hon. friend, that the safety of the colonies demanded the force stated in the estimates, and, therefore, he should support the pro-position.—He now came to inquire, whether the army intended to be stationed in England was more than the necessity of the ease called for. He thought, considering the various duties which were to be performed, that the force specified was not too great. As to the cavalry, about which so much had been said, not more than 7000 would remain in England. Great objection was made to the employment of those troops. in the suppression of smuggling, because, it was said, that their morals and discipline would be destroyed. This observation would, how- ever, have more weight, if the practice were a new one. Ever since smuggling had existed, the light horse of this country had been employed in its prevention; and he was sure recent events had proved, that their discipline had not suffered in consequence. The hon. gentleman who spoke last had alluded to the possibility of making great savings. Now, he did not like these general assertions, especially when they came on second-hand authority. Such statements, though they could effect little in that House, might produce considerable mischief out of doors. He did not mean to say, that even savings, or small sums, should be treated with levity; but it was wrong to adopt a loose, general statement, and to throw it out as worthy of attention, when, in fact, it rested on no solid foundation. This brought him back to the point from which he had started, which was, that whether millions, or hundreds of thousands, or even thousands, could be saved, that House ought to make the necessary reduction. But it was the duty of individuals, who best knew that those savings could not be made, to state their opinion fairly, and not to shrink from that opinion, however unpopular it might be. It was necessary to maintain our colonial possessions, although it obliged government to impose burthens on the people. The system of the country had been to procure colonial possessions; and from those possessions prosperity and riches had flowed upon the country. The question, then, was, not whether protection should be afforded them—but whether it could be given at a cheap rate. Those who thought it could, ought certainly to oppose the plan laid before the House; but those who, like himself, believed it was impossible to protect them at a more moderate expense, would feel that they were acting conscientiously and wisely in voting for it. Looking to the old colonies, it did appear to him, that, from the situation in which the black population of St. Domingo were now placed, and from the increasing energies of the American people, it was necessary that they should be secured as much as possible. The evil which would arise, if any one colony were left too weakly defended, would be greater, not merely to that colony, but to the country at large, than the keeping up of an overpowering military establishment, immense as he admitted the danger to be, from such a force. The mixing up this question with the property tax (an attempt which had failed in producing the effect desired), appeared to him to be highly improper. It was clearly shown that no practicable reduction could be made in the military establishment, that would render it unnecessary to call for that tax. It would, therefore, have been a more statesman-like mode of argument, to have divided the two questions. He could neither agree in the views of the hon. gentleman who wished the whole system to be new-modelled, nor yet could he concur in the plan of his hon. friend (Mr. Bankes), who wished, by various reductions, to save two or three millions. Those only who wished the plan laid before the House by ministers to be totally abandoned, could mix up the two questions with any propriety. The individuals who demanded a few reductions, could not, although they had done so, mingle the consideration of the two points, with the smallest show of reason; because they must have known, even when they called for those reductions, that, if they were granted, still the property tax would be necessary.

said, the only consideration which could induce him to vote for the employment of so large a force as 25,000 men in Ireland, was, that this was merely a temporary measure, intended to repress temporary atrocities, with which it was only possible to wrestle with a force of that kind. He could not but deprecate in the strongest terms that unwillingness which was manifested to inquire into the condition of Ireland, with a view to afford a remedy for the evils from which that country suffered—a country which must either prove a source of strength or a source of weakness to the empire, according to the policy which might be adopted towards it. He was convinced that nothing short of a clear and determined examination of all the grievances which had affected Ireland—not from the misconduct of the government of this or that day, but from the misconduct of all the governments of Ireland—would do for the people of that country. Ireland was now reaping the fruits of British injustice. He claimed, therefore, as an act of justice to Ireland—as an act of justice to the United Empire—that they would examine with the utmost attention, that they would strictly scrutinize the mischiefs of the system of government which, to the disgrace of this country, had so long afflicted Ireland. The population of that country was too large to be trodden down; and if parliament would not look into their grievances, they would soon know to their cost what it was to exasperate a whole nation. He had said so much, on this occasion because he painfully felt how much it was the system of that House to postpone Irish affairs to the very latest period of the session, when so many members, either from business or from pleasure, or any pretext on which they could possibly get away, absented themselves from their duty in parliament. If the noble lord opposite (Castlereagh) had ventured to descend from his high imperial intercourse to examine a little into the condition of his own suffering country, and not merely left it to come out in a consideration of the military estimates whether any attention would be paid to Ireland, it would not have lowered that noble lord, perhaps, in the estimation of those whose opinion was of most value [Hear, hear!]. But if that noble lord chose to withdraw himself from the consideration of the condition of his own country, it was the duty of the House in every sense, to adopt a different line of conduct, for there was a resolution on their Journals, that at an early period of the present session, the system of the two exchequers of England and Ireland was to be taken into consideration. But it was still endeavoured to conquer by the same system of delay which had been so long adopted. His majesty's ministers might consider Ireland in their estimates as contributing to the expenses of the empire: but the House must be told that Ireland could not take upon her the charges which she had hitherto borne, from the state of absolute ruin into which she was plunged [Hear!]. Above three fourths of the population of that country were dependent on agriculture. It was for the House to consider how soon they would restore that system which had given employment and subsistence to that people—and if not, how long they could keep them down by such a force as 25,000 men? If they did not afford the proper remedy, they would soon have a suffering peasantry and an impoverished and beggared gentry, who would feel, what he never thought they would have occasion to feel, that the intercourse with this country had been a curse to them. But, independently of the just claims of the Irish population on the attention of the House, the interest of England was here deeply affected; for did not the impoverishment of Ireland produce the impoverishment of England? The Custom-house accounts would teach them, that the importation of all articles of mere necessity in the daily habits of life into Ireland had greatly decreased—the peasant wore a coat in rags, because he could not afford to buy another. He would implore the House, again and again, not to consider this as a cursory subject—a subject which they could examine at their convenience and leisure,—but to afford, without delay, a constitutional remedy to a suffering people; and if they brought soldiers into the country to repress the crimes and atrocities which at present prevailed in Ireland, that they would also inquire into and put a stop to those grievances by which the crimes and atrocities were occasioned—[Hear, hear!]

jun. begged leave to disclaim any wish on the part of his majesty's government to keep down Ireland with an armed force. He might say that his majesty's government were as much convinced as the hon. baronet of the truth of the sentiments which he had just delivered; and he appealed to the speech of his right hon. friend, the secretary for Ireland on a late occasion, for a confirmation of what he had asserted. With respect to the question more immediately before them, there were two ways in which it might be considered; first, what was the extent of forces which our finances enabled us to keep up; and, secondly, what was the amount of force which the defence of our empire required. If it was true that we were at the end of our finances, then this was no longer a political but a financial system—then he would say, reduce the extent of the empire which your finances will not allow you to retain; because it was the greatest of all follies to wish to keep possession of an empire which we could not afford to protect. But he was convinced that the country had resources, and though its distress was unquestionable, the cause of that distress was temporary. It did not follow, because he sympathised with the distress, that he should conclude our resources were exhausted. We had now conceded 8 millions of taxation, and if this relief was not adequate to the general expectation, it was, after the close of so arduous a contest, as much as the im-mediate circumstances of the country admitted. At the end of the American war it had also been loudly proclaimed, that the national means were exhausted: an hon. gentleman had even said, that the country was exhausted. What had then been the conduct of Mr. Pitt? He felt, in 1783, that he ought to look to something beyond the prevailing wishes of the people; that he had their general security to provide for, and that a time would come when, emerging from their error, they would trace back to his measures the causes of their prosperity or their decline. The good effects of these magnanimous counsels were afterwards realized in the progressive strength of the empire, and in the accumulation of those vast resources which had enabled Great Britain to effect all her subsequent achievements. He might have been then told, as the present ministers now were, about military despotism, and the uselessness of colonies; but in the face of all these difficulties he ventured to propose new taxes. Parliament had the wisdom to impose them. Their beneficial results were known. Why, then, should not the same system be at present adopted? It was agreed on all sides that a considerable increase in the establishment, in comparison with that of 1792, was necessary; but why should the House be entirely bound by the establishment of that period? It was the situation of the empire, and of Europe, that ought to form the object of their consideration. It had never been the policy of a British statesman to look with indifference at the state of Europe. It was said that it was our policy to entangle ourselves too deeply with European politics; but he would ask when it had been less so? Was it under William 3d, or under queen Anne? The question was not now, whether the country should be raised to the highest pitch of glory and of power, but whether, having obtained that point it would be wise to abandon it. Experience had shown us the possibility of maintaining our ascendancy in Europe without equalling the numerical strength of her armies. But it was necessary to consider what was the state of Europe when Mr. Pitt proposed the establishment of 1792. Never had the arts and sciences, and the civil power been more predominant than between the close of the American war and that period. There were then not 500,000 men in arms on the continent, and now there were upwards of 1,400,000. France, which had always been the chief object of our alarm, was then in such a situation, that Mr. Burke had said that when he looked at the map of Europe, he found that France no longer existed. It was at such a period that Mr. Pitt had proposed his establishment; but how different was now the nature of things! It was asked, was this the result of our exertions and our sacrifices? Had we not attained our object? The fact was, we had gained every thing, but we had not yet secured it. The skill and wisdom that had led to the acquirement, must now be employed in fixing and securing the enjoyment of the blessing. There yet remained for us a victory over the elements of discord in Europe—over the principles of Jacobinism, from which so many mischiefs had originated—over the military spirit which had so long disturbed the world, and which was not yet extirpated. They had to diffuse throughout Europe a sense of security and adequate protection among the civil part of the population, to enable them to feel their proper weight in the state, and lower down the military to a due subserviency to the civil authority. A constitutional objection had been stated to an increase of our establishments beyond that of former periods. If that increase of our establishments, which our extended empire now demanded, were incompatible with our constitution, he should have no hesitation in at once saying, rather reduce your empire than invade your constitution. But was it true that the constitution which was fit for a small state was unfit for a mighty empire? Whoever looked at our constitution must acknowledge that one of its most striking features was the facility with which it adapted itself to all the exigencies of a nation, to every new and unforeseen combination of circumstances in the progress of a great, a growing, and extended empire. The constitution of some countries, like that of Sparta, for instance, had been found, by experience, suitable only to the community for which it was originally framed. Our own possessed the faculty of developing every variety of resource, and every principle of action—of causing the democratic interest to keep pace with the prerogatives of the Crown. The resources which it developed were always sufficient to meet the difficulty of the occasion. If the royal authority, for instance, was increased, that increase had been accompanied by a corresponding ac- cession to the democratical part of the constitution. If the demands of the empire required the maintenance of a great military force, the constitution itself afforded a power to keep that force in check. The general diffusion of information, the rapidly increasing weight of public opinion, the increasing opulence and strength of the country—these were the resources with which our constitution supplied us, and enabled us to avert the dangers which threatened an extensive empire. These were the correctives of power with which we were supplied by our constitution. If it was said, that we had tripled our armies, he would say that the checks of those armies were also at the same time more than tripled; and that all those checks, all those resources which we derived from the diffusion of knowledge and the increase of wealth, constituted as it were a source of vitality which would always be found adequate to our protection, and never allow us to be reduced to the alternative of consulting our safety at the expense of the integrity of a mighty empire [Hear, hear!]. But it had been said the constitutions of the states of former times were overturned by standing armies, by armies drawn from the bosom of the countries which they enslaved. He must, however, take the liberty of saying, that the precedents had been brought forward in too indefinitive a manner to afford any conclusion to be drawn from them. Without a reference to the constitution of the country and to the constitution of the army itself by which it had been subjugated, to the number of the population compared with the number of the army, it was impossible to draw any satisfactory inference with regard to any other country—these were data, without which it would be found impossible to solve the problem, how far the military energies of a people might with safety be developed in a period of peace—these were data without which they must leave the problem as it was. Those who argued from the history of the states in question, were apt to overlook a most material circumstance, that a great part of their population was not applicable to any struggle between the civil and military authority, was locked up in domestic slavery. He would take a state of a population of 300,000, with an army of 30,000, the state of Athens, for instance, or any other similarly circumstanced—could it be conceived that the whole of that population acted as a check on the army? Why, that population was more than half composed of slaves, who were a source of weakness rather than of strength, in any such struggles as those alluded to. But the example of that state was not applicable here, it was not applicable to this country where the whole weight of the civil population could be brought into operation against the military. It was not merely on the superior information which we possessed, the rapid circulation of that information, on which we had to rely for a defence against our armies, the constitution of those armies was perpetually under the superintendence and control of parliament. The balance between the military and civil power was held by parliament. We had a security in the information and liberal sentiments of the army, who entered into all political discussions as well as other individuals. We had a security in the general intelligence of our armies, which descended even to our soldier; who by a most unexampled union carried with him the hopes and wishes which belonged to the citizen of a free state, with the most perfect habits of obedience. To this intelligence of his rights, was in a great measure to be attributed the superiority of the British soldier, and to speak in the language of a great poet,

"The scorn of death in freedom's sacred cause,

"And freeborn thoughts, that league with freedom's laws."

It was this national character which conquered on all occasions. This it was that had made the scene of Waterloo so interesting, when we regarded it not only as the triumph of British valour, but as the triumph of the British constitution. He should sit down after making one more observation. Alarm had been expressed at the military spirit diffused through the nation. What, he would ask, had occasioned that military spirit? It was the tremendous war just closed. It was the exigencies of Europe. It was that great danger with which the world was threatened from the preponderancy of the military principle, and which nothing but a military spirit could subdue. But when that duty had been performed, and danger was apprehended from the excess of that military spirit, how was it to be put down? Was it by violent measures—was it by wounding the feelings of the army—was it by throwing ridicule on those who had worked the safety of Europe? He re- gretted that even the foibles of that class of men had ever been attacked. He thought those foibles deserved some indulgence, when it was considered with how many good qualities they were united. When it was considered that we were now sitting quietly at our ease at the expense of their blood; that the safety of the country had been secured by them, he thought it was a little ungracious that on the very first opportunity which presented itself after that security had been achieved, we should turn round and attempt to throw ridicule on them. He confessed he felt for that class of men—but they were proof against such taunts; and it might be said of them, as it was said of an ancient hero, that he was protected from injury by the glory of the triumphs which he had achieved. Still, however, he thought the magnitude of their services ought to render them sacred from unnecessary attack, and to teach Englishmen to look back to them with gratitude [Hear, hear!].

said, he had never heard of those attacks which had been mentioned on the noble class of men in question. He wished to know at what period, and from what quarter of the House, those taunts had been thrown out, of which he professed himself ignorant. He would expressly maintain, that neither this year, nor so long as he had had a seat in that House, had any such taunts been thrown out in his hearing. This was a subject of too serious a nature to be allowed to pass without farther explanation [Hear, hear!]

said, he alluded to the ridicule thrown on the foibles of the army.

What foibles? was immediately asked by a number of members.

said, the perpetual ridicule of their dress [Hear! from the opposition].

did not believe that there was a gentleman in that House who believed that the ridicule was not justly and properly directed against the dress by which that noble class of men had been disfigured; [Hear, hear!] and on which, God knew, that noble class of men was not intended to be attacked. He would ask any gentleman, if he believed that the fooleries and fopperies of some regiments of dragoons were the wish of their officers? The officers of some regiments which he could point out, had not been yearly, but quarterly obliged to equip themselves anew. The ridiculous trappings which meritorious officers had been obliged to appear in, had never been brought forward with the view of ridiculing the officers, but those who exposed them to appear in such a disguise—the real authors of the foibles. It had been said that the British constitution was adequate to all emergencies, and they had heard much of the free thoughts of the army. He had not, however, he confessed so very high an opinion of the political science of our soldiers. He questioned whether the private of a marching regiment knew exactly the privileges which he enjoyed under the British constitution—how far he was bound to obey his officers. If an officer were to direct him to march into that House, and turn out the members by the point of his bayonet, he questioned whether he would say to the officer there your authority stops. This might be, but he did not wish to see the experiment made [a laugh]. He had always understood, that the great principle of military government was, that the soldier should ask no questions, nor look to any guide but the commands of his superior. With reference to our colonial possessions, it was said, that it became our duty to protect those who were transferred to our power. It certainly did, but not to an extent incompatible with the interests of our population at home. The defence of the colonies should rest on our maritime strength, and if it was necessary to maintain in addition an unusual establishment of force for their protection, it would then be a question, whether the advantages we derived from their possession were equal to the expense of maintaining them. The hon. member then took a review of the past state of the country, for the purpose of showing that those establishments were not deemed necessary in much more pressing moments than could now be anticipated. The benefits of a reduction of our force to the lowest possible amount were to be found not only in the immediate saving, but in the capacity which the country thus acquired, of making the efforts which any new war might render necessary. From the economy practised after the peace of Versailles the country was enabled to bear the great expenditure which the late war had occasioned. With a view to this reduction he thought it would have been advisable to instruct the committee to divide the amount of force voted into the numbers necessary for England, Ireland, or foreign service. To look for instance at the recent increase of the household cavalry. In the year 1792, just after the period of the then peace, the number of household cavalry was 785. In the year 1801 it was 1,101; last year it was 1,504; and, in the present, 1,744; so that an increase of no less than 240 had taken place since last year. Now he wished to know why a greater amount was required for a peace establishment at this time than at any former one? It was no argument that because these troops had been useful in time of war at Waterloo, that they should be continued in time of peace. It could not be said, that they were required for the peace of the metropolis, for that was sufficiently secured when their number was only 785. Was it meant that the remainder should be employed in turn with the other regiments, to prevent smuggling? Nothing could be more ridiculous than to employ these great horses to trot up and down the Sussex cliffs after smugglers. A proper guard of honour for the court should be retained, and the rest be replaced by less expensive troops. Another very extraordinary preparation for peace was the increase of every cavalry regiment, by 128 men. With regard to the ridicule of the dress of the army, which he had before alluded to, he would add, that it was not confined to that House; for a general officer had actually memorialed against its introduction into his regiment. The concluding prayer in that memorial was, that the new helmet should not be inflicted upon his regiment.—Adverting to the force appointed for the protection of our colonies, he could not conceive why the island of Jamaica required an establishment of 400 men. If a garrison was necessary, there could be no reason why the colony should not maintain it, without any assistance from the finances of the mother country, as it did from 1792 to 1803. A good deal had been said about the political condition of St. Domingo, and the danger that might be apprehended from that quarter; but looking at the confined resources of that island, and its entire want of a naval power, he could not think that danger either imminent, or, if so, capable of being averted by the establishment in question. A garrison of 4000 men could not afford that protection, in case of an attempted invasion, which we could find in our maritime strength. Another item of our foreign establishments seemed to him still more unnecessary, and, though not extensive, betraying an inattention to that economy which the circumstances of the country called upon ministers to practise—he meant the 1,200 men appointed as a guard to the great person confined at St. Helena. The other great powers considered him their prisoner as well as ours, but we were to have the honour and expense of being his keepers. The allies, he thought, should contribute to pay a guard, seeing that they considered their own interests equally concerned in his detention with ours. The noble lord (Castlereagh) had given as a reason why, even in the greatest practicable reduction of our establishments a great expenditure would still be necessary, that a great dead weight was created upon the funds of the country by the effects of his late right hon. friend (Mr. Windham's) plan. The amount of pensions created by it was certainly considerable, but if they were improperly bestowed, the noble lord was himself responsible for the result, as he, and the administration to which he belonged, came into office only a year after the passing of this act, and might have easily carried its repeal. It could not have been repealed as far as regarded those men that entered the army under its provisions, but it might have closed with regard to all future enlistments. For himself, he certainly did not lament that this plan had not been repealed, notwithstanding the expense it had occasioned; since it had overcome the reluctance to enter into the military service which had formerly existed. There were many objections to the proposed establishments in a constitutional point of view, but the objections of a financial nature were not less valid. The smallest saving should be attended to. The noble lord had mentioned 600,000l. as all the deduction that would accrue from disbanding twenty thousand men. This estimate he thought far too low, but, assuming it as all that could be anticipated, it was still a saving of great importance in our present difficulties. It would enable us to pay the interest of the loan which might be raised instead of the property tax, and even establish a sinking fund to pay off the capital. It was the imperative duty of the House, however small the possible reduction was, to effect it, and follow it up by the strictest regard to economy in all the public departments.

rose to make an observation on the military force necessary for the protection of our West India colo- nies. Referring to what had fallen from an hon. member, on a former evening, concerning the sufficiency of a floating force for their defence, he said, he thought, that such a force was by no means adequate, and could not always be applicable. He himself had been on that station for eight years, and was well acquainted with the state of the islands; but he would not undertake to defend them with the force in question. He had lately conversed on the subject with a gallant officer who had conquered some of those possessions, and having asked his opinion, he received for answer, that if a floating force was employed, there could be no saving, for there must be such a force for every particular colony. Where could these floating garrisons go to in the hurricane season? The hon. gentleman who thought the West India islands could be defended by 1,500 men, could have had but little information respecting those possessions. Barbadoes alone would require that number.

in answer to the observations of a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Grant) who had spoken with so much eloquence, contended, that our constitution could not be considered as exempt from danger during the existence of a standing army. However great were the energies which the nation had developed, however extended were our foreign possessions, and whatever mass of influence the civil power derived from the possession of wealth and the diffusion of knowledge, would our constitution be in less danger because we had added to our dominions islands in the Mediterranean, and in the East and West Indies? The noble lord opposite in defending the necessity of the proposed enormous establishment, had said, that we were now in an intermediate state between peace and war, and contended that the same thing occurred after the peace of 1783, when there was likewise an intermediate state. The noble lord did not seem well versed in history, or much acquainted with the precedent to which he referred. The establishment in 1783 after the American war was exceedingly low, when contrasted with the estimates on the table, and very inconsiderably reduced, in any period of the peace, below the estimates for the first year. In 1784 the whole establishments, including guards and garrisons, Gibraltar, &c. amounted only to 29,730 men. Of this number the vote for Great Britain was only 17,483, Two years afterwards, in 1786, when the temper of peace might be supposed confirmed, and the intermediate state of the noble lord at an end, the difference was only 200 men. Here the noble lord, charging the noble secretary of state for foreign affairs with an ignorance of history, stated the peace establishments in the first and second years of the various periods of peace, from that of Utrecht downwards, as derived from documents produced upon his own motion. In 1711, our establishment during the war amounted to 201,000; in 1714 it was reduced to 21,000. Thus nine-tenths of the army was at once reduced. In 1713, the force reduced was 70,000 men. It was true they were chiefly foreign troops, but they were paid by England, and commanded by English officers. The next treaty of peace, after a great war, was that of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, the force was then reduced in one year from 49,939 to 18,857. On the peace of 1763 the reduction was still greater, for the force which had been voted in that year was 56,360, that voted in the next year was 17,532. Thus, whatever was the opinion of the pre-sent day, it never had before been thought necessary to have any intermediate establishments; for all these reductions which he had quoted were not only rapid, but had brought at once our force down to that level at which it had been kept during all the time of peace. There was, he said, no inconsistency in demanding a reduction of our establishments, without approving of the treaties. He had not arraigned the treaties because he dreaded immediate war, but because when war, at a future distant time might break out, they gave us no sufficient security against the power of France. The noble lord must either think his treaties secure or insecure. If they were secure, our military establishments should be reduced much lower; if insecure, they should have been raised much higher. The honourable admiral who had said that he could not undertake to defend the West Indies with a floating force, might have been correct in his opinion, but the question was not as to the force necessary to defend those islands in war, but what was the smallest possible force which could be left there in time of peace. Had we not embassadors at the courts of Paris and Madrid who would advertise the preparation of armaments in the harbours of Brest or Cadiz? Adverting to the establishment for the Mauritius, he thought it extravagantly high. The garrison which was to be left in Mauritius was three thousand men. While that island was in the hands of the house of Bourbon, an engineer had reported to the French government that 2000 men were quite enough to defend it; and the abbé Raynal, in commenting upon the amount of this force, had said, it became only necessary for the purpose of preventing the effect of a sudden attack from the naval force of England. Why were we to keep up 3000 men to defend the strongest island in the world against France, who had no fleet, and with whom we were at peace. In the history of the island by Grant viscount de Vaux, it would be seen that there was a hill behind the town in that island, which 400 men might defend for a considerable time: this was a security against sudden attack. This detail might seem unimportant, but it showed the extravagant disposition in which the whole estimates were formed, and which was more and more apparent in proportion as they were closely examined. The noble lord said, he agreed with every opinion in the speech of an hon. gentleman (Mr. Bankes) on a former night. It was a speech for which he felt grateful, and which had never yet been answered, because it could not be answered. The noble lord (Castlereagh), had said, that the utmost saving in the establishment would not perhaps exceed 2 or 300,000l., but the hon. member for Corfe castle had clearly shown that two millions might be saved. It was said of a man attacked by an epilepsy, that when the fit terminated, he finished a sentence which he had commenced before the attack—and he begged leave to say, that the noble lord seemed the other night only to finish some remarks which he had commenced in 1807. He referred to the noble lord's animadversions, which he might as well have spared, upon a distinguished individual now no more (Mr. Windham), and in which animadversions the noble lord thought proper to charge that great man with saddling the country with what he called a night-mare. But these animadversions were not creditable either to the noble lord's judgment or liberality. For of what did this nightmare consist? why, of a provision for the comfort of those gallant men who had bled to establish the safety and exalt the glory of the country. For this provision the army were indebted to the wisdom and justice of Mr. Windham, against whose plan the noble lord never ceased to cavil, because it produced an expense of about 4 or 500,000l. a year. Yet, to this expense for such a purpose, the noble lord perpetually objected, because he, truly, was so tenacious of economy—he who talked of millions for other objects with such levity, complained of the appropriation of 400,000l. or 500,000l. to improve the pay and pensions of our soldiery—to provide those valiant warriors with something like the means of subsistence in the evening of their lives. Such, indeed, was the noble lord's hostility to this arrangement, that death itself could not save the author of it from his censure. As to the remarks of his hon. friend on the floor, upon the singularly novel dress of the soldiery, it was quite a perversion to say that those remarks were meant in any degree to detract from the merit of the heroes of Salamanca, Vittoria, or Waterloo. No; these remarks applied only to the authors of such foppery, which was known to be so disgusting in the army itself, that he was credibly informed none were so forward to reprobate it as our principal military officers. He had heard indeed, and he believed the statement to be true, that the distinguished commander of Waterloo would not allow those fopperies to appear in the field. How, then, could it be deemed disrespectful to the army to ridicule such fooleries? The ridicule was indeed only applicable to those who had such foppish articles put on the heads and backs of our soldiery. With respect to the statement, that if our army were disbanded, the poorrates were likely to be more burthened, the hon. gentleman who made that statement had not, he apprehended, any very accurate knowledge of the country. For his own part, he could say, from his own experience as a magistrate, that he never found disbanded soldiers apt to become any burthen upon the parochial rates, nor had he ever heard so from any other magistrate. But if the hon. gentleman's apprehensions were well founded, what would that avail in favour of his argument? For what did it signify in what way the money was taken from the pockets of the people, whether in poor-rates or other taxes. The former would, in his view, be the preferable mode of providing for the men alluded to; for they were, according to the measure under consideration to be maintained as a standing army, not only in a manner more injurious to our finances, but upon a principle seriously dangerous to our constitution. When he spoke of danger to the constitution, he did not mean in the sense which an hon. gentleman thought proper to ridicule. He did not apprehend what that hon. gentleman supposed was the fear of those who deprecated the danger, namely, that regiments would be brought into Palace-yard to overawe the proceedings of that House, but that danger of another kind would be the result; he meant the danger of patronage—he meant that danger which, although not so direct or immediate as the hon. gentleman imagined was the apprehension of those who opposed this measure, was still as likely, by slow degrees, to undermine the stability of our constitution. The noble lord said he should vote against the motion because he thought it unconstitutional, and that it was impossible the country could bear the establishment.

in explanation, stated, that without a military force to garrison our colonies, a fleet could never afford them any adequate protection and this he felt it his duty to urge, as the opinion of a naval officer.

thought that government was the best judge what degree of force ought to be maintained for the supply of our foreign garrisons. As to the foot-guards, they possessed a greater esprit de corps than any other part of the army, and should not therefore be sent out on that service. There was no occasion, however, for keeping up so large a force in Great Britain; it might be reduced full one-half without any danger whatever to the country, and there was no reason why the household troops, which were to be stationed at Windsor and London, should be increased. In times like these, it was necessary that the utmost economy should be adopted; the people had a right to demand it, and ministers should not disappoint their just and anxious expectations. He had expressed his opinion on this subject on a former night, and from the ill success his motion had then experienced, he should not again divide the House on any further proposition. Consistently with the vote he had then given, he could not however consent to receive the report of the committee.

said, that he felt himself called upon by the strongest sense of duty to oppose the measure before the House, not only upon financial, constitutional, and moral, but even upon military grounds. For the character of the army he declared the most grateful and ardent regard. He felt, indeed, the warmest attachment and admiration for that meritorious body, which had raised the country to the highest elevation, while it had served as the instrument of Providence for the deliverance of the world from the greatest danger by which it was ever menaced. But with all this feeling, he could not forbear to express that jealousy of a standing army, which our most distinguished constitutional writers had never ceased to inculcate. In expressing this jealousy, however, he meant not to offend, nor could he apprehend, that any offence would be felt by any part of our gallant warriors—so little, indeed, did he feel such an apprehension, that even in the presence of the distinguished hero, who had so long led our army to victory, he would not hesitate to express that jealousy. He acknowledged and admired the services rendered to our army by the illustrious commander in chief, and had, therefore, a high respect for that personage, but he believed his royal highness was too much of an Englishman to be offended by his jealousy of a standing army. With regard to the opinion of his right hon. friend (Mr. Grant), as to the means which existed for preserving our constitution, he concurred with that opinion to a great extent. He felt that our constitution derived considerable security from the diffusion of knowledge—from the influence of opinion and wealth—and from the general conviction of its own intrinsic merit. But then it was to be recollected, that the influence of the Crown had been most materially increased of late years, and that such influence was likely to derive great additional power from the existence of a standing army. He was not one of those who ever objected to the due reward and encouragement of a military spirit. He highly approved of the recent institution of an order of knighthood, and only lamented that the distinctions which that order conferred were not duly extended to the navy. He never, indeed, saw one of the badge of this order, that it did not seem to excite his gratitude by the natural association of some glorious achievement. Of the institution of the Military College also, he fully approved, because this seminary was calculated to furnish good officers, which, he understood from military men, it had usually been found most difficult to provide. In this seminary, indeed, he was assured that the best system of education prevailed. But still what a source of patronage did this institution afford? Yet the existence of such an institution considerably reduced the necessity for a standing army, because it would always serve to afford good officers, and privates could be had without material difficulty, whenever an army should be required. But he objected to the standing army at present proposed, from a consideration of its amount, and from a natural apprehension that as the army had perpetually been increased at the conclusion of every war in which the country had been engaged for the last century, that increase was still likely to go on, until we should become quite a military nation, and against any measure of this tendency he strongly protested. He also objected to this measure, because, he was one of those who thought that this country was always too ready to go to war, and the existence of a large standing army was but too likely to encourage that disposition. We had most successfully terminated the late war, and he was peculiarly grateful for the adjustment which had since been made, and especially for a certain part of that adjustment. But still he felt that this adjustment was calculated to excite serious apprehensions. For there was reason to fear, that the consequence of this adjustment would be to implicate this country rather too much in the affairs of all Europe. Such policy he deprecated, as much as he did some years ago the project for guaranteeing the territories of the grand seignor, as if the interest of England could be materially affected by the reduction of the Turkish dominions. Now, as to his moral objections to the measure before the House, he could not help expressing the gravest apprehension of the injury which the morals of the country were likely to receive from the prevalence of military habits. This was a consideration of magnitude, to which he trusted the House would duly attend. Again, he objected to this measure as unnecessary, especially if the power of the navy were adequately consulted. The navy was, if he might so express himself, his first love. it was, indeed, the branch of our service upon which it was peculiarly the disposition, the habit, and the interest of England mainly to depend; for the navy formed the best bulwark of our defence, while it had no tendency to endanger our constitution—[Hear, hear!]. Then as to his financial objections to this measure, it was exceptionable from the amount of expense which it was calculated to entail upon the country, and however great our military force, the security which the empire would derive from its existence would little avail, if the pressure which it imposed upon the resources of the people served to damp their spirit, or alienate their attachment. The resources of the country were not in a state to endure any additional burthens. Some diminution of the burthens which already bore upon it must, indeed, be removed, or its distress must become intolerable. Under such circumstances he could not accede to any measure calculated to aggravate those burthens, and especially to a measure so exceptionable as that under consideration.

said, he was glad the discussions upon the proposed establishments had gone to so great a length, not only because they would satisfy the country that that House was diligent in the discharge of its duty, but also because they had produced the effect of removing many of the objections which were urged at the commencement. Most of the hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House (be believed, indeed, he might say all), were now agreed, that 25,000 men were necessary for Ireland, at least under the present circumstances; and, with respect to our West Indian colonies, he apprehended there did not exist much difference of opinion, except as to the mode of securing them. It had been suggested by some, that it would be better to provide for their safety by stationing ships in those seas, but even on the principle of economy, he did not think it would be found advisable to pursue that course. Supposing the 3,000 men were deducted from the force now intended to be used in the West Indies, and that their place were supplied by two sail of the line, the latter would incur a charge of 130,000l., which would be more expensive than the proposed number of troops, while, at the same time, it would be impossible that such a naval force could be equally adequate to the defence of those colonies. Nor was it merely as a question of finance that the military would be preferable to the maritime establishment. Looking at the arrangement with respect to the health of men in that climate, it would be found deserving the approbation of the House; for it should be remembered, that though by the system now adopted under the direction of the medical board, many of the evils attendant upon a long service on that station were obviated on board our ships, yet it was impossible to counteract them all. But the troops, when in garrison, were relieved from many unhealthy duties, from exposure to the sun, &c, by the co-operation of the black regiments, the latter being composed of men inured to the climate. It was desirable also, in the contemplation of a renewal of hostilities, that we should maintain a sufficient force there for the protection of our possessions. One or two ships of the line could not defend all the different islands: at the most they could be available only to a very limited degree; and supposing any of them to be captured, they could not be regained without great sacrifices. The same might be said of some other of our possessions, especially of Malta and the island of Corfu. With respect to Malta, every one knew how great an effort was required to reduce that strong position, and Corfu was surrendered by treaty. A noble lord, in speaking of the Mauritius, had stated, that the enemy did not maintain there a larger force than 2,000 men; the fact however was, that 3,500 had actually surrendered; and as to the military strength of that island, he did not think that the Abbé Raynal, to whom the noble lord so confidently referred, would be regarded as any great authority upon such points by that House. He was warranted in saying, therefore, with regard to our colonial possessions, that no one had yet succeeded in showing that any reduction of magnitude could be made in the amount of force to be employed for their protection.—He should next touch upon the home force; and he must observe, that he did not think sufficient attention had been paid to what his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) had advanced upon that subject on a former evening. His noble friend then showed what great deductions must be made from the gross amount estimated for the home station. Even assuming that the 3000 men which were to be kept up for reliefs were added to the 25,000, making in all 28,000, it would be found that the real disposable force did not amount to any thing like the number. It was admitted, that in order to provide sufficient reliefs for the troops stationed in foreign garrisons, it would be necessary to appropriate at least 7000 men. He wished the House to be aware that there were, at the present moment, serving abroad, above thirty regiments, some of which had been ten, and others even twenty years on those distant stations. That circumstance, however, arose entirely from the nature of the war in which we had been engaged, and which required us to strain every nerve of military exertion for its prosecution. The moment a regiment was fit to go abroad, instead of being able to send it out for the relief of those who had been so long serving in colonial garrisons, it was immediate dispatched to that station where the fate of Europe was to be decided; but as that necessity no longer existed, it was most desirable that those regiments should now be permitted to return home. If, then, the 7000 men, which he had mentioned, were taken from the 28,000, there would remain only 21,000, strictly applicable to the home service, and of those, seven thousand were to be cavalry. A further reduction also was created by the force necessary for the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, which amounted to about 2,500, whose services were most important on those stations, with respect to the revenue. That, then, would reduce the 21,000 to 18,500 for Great Britain, including both cavalry and infantry, and if the 7000 cavalry were deducted, there would remain only 11,500 infantry. Nor were those the only deductions, for they ought also to take into the calculation the non-effectives, the ordinary casualties, which must occur more or less in all establishments, and the usual proportion of sick who were not capable of undertaking active duty. But supposing the whole effective force to be 11,000 for home duty, could that be considered as too large? According to a return which he had that day laid upon the table of the House, it appeared, that at the present moment no less than 18,000 were actually employed in that very duty; and let the hon. gentlemen make what deductions they chose in the different stations where that duty was to be performed, he did not think they would be able to prove that 11,000 men were more than was necessary.—It had been urged that Ireland would be a source of assistance for reliefs, and in some respects that was true, because they might send out to Ireland weaker corps (though competent to perform all the military duties in Ireland) than could be sent out to foreign stations. But he was far from thinking that Ireland could afford any assistance to the extent which some hon. gentlemen seemed to anticipate. While on that branch of the subject, he wished to apologise for an error into which he had fallen on a former evening, in stating, that it was the intention of government to recall that part of the guards now serving in France. He had since been enabled to make more minute inquiries, and he could now inform the House, that the guards at present under the duke of Wellington would remain in France as long as the army remained there; and that, consequently, would reduce the guards at home to somewhere about 8000 men. It was not to be assumed, however, that they were to be kept stationary in the metropolis. They would certainly be considered equally as liable to be employed upon duty in any part of this country, or of Ireland, as the other troops of the line; and he differed therefore from those who stated that they would not be as available for service as the other troops. As to the composition of the guards, about which so much had been said, whoever had paid any attention to the events which had occurred in the peninsula, or to those which had taken place last year, must surely do them the justice to admit, that not only in what regarded complete efficiency in the field, but in all that related to internal organization, and to general regimental arrangements, it was impossible for any corps to exceed them. It should be remembered, also, that the household troops formed a sort of nucleus for any army which it might be necessary to raise at the commencement of a war, and that by always keeping three or four thousand effective men ready to send off upon any great emergency, the most important and beneficial consequences might ensue to the country. It was difficult to compare the amount of charge incurred by those troops with that which was required for troops of the line, because they were upon the old establishment of the army, and paid according to their rate, and not according to their effective number. But though the charge was somewhat higher than that of the line, he did not think the household troops were, to any considerable degree more expensive. Some little excess there undoubtedly was, though not to such an extent as deserved much consideration. With regard to the cavalry, it was a mistake to suppose that they had been augmented during the war, they were now lower than they were in 1814. During last year, indeed, they had been augmented for the purpose of going abroad, but even that augmentation fell considerably short of the previous reductions. With respect to what had passed in the House concerning the equipment of those troops, their jackets, their lace, their helmets, and their theatrical appearance, he should not feel it necessary to say much upon that point. He would only ask the hon. gentlemen who were so fond of indulging in their merriment upon the subject, whether they did not think, that at the battle of Waterloo they found the helmets a little more serviceable against the attacks of the French cuirassiers, than their cocked hats would have been? The real utility of the changes which had been introduced was admitted by all who were most competent to form an accurate judgment. In reply to an observation which had been made, he should state that the force he was then alluding to would not be confined merely to the service of the metropolis, neither would they be sent to scour the Downs of Sussex, in order to prevent smuggling; but there were other duties for which the life guards were as well adapted as any other kind of cavalry. With respect to the difference of expense between them and the other description of cavalry, it was extremely trifling. Taking the household troops at 1700, the estimated expense would be about 112,000l. and an equal number of dragoons would be about 85,000l., so that there would be only a saving of 27,000l. Supposing, however, that those troops were to be reduced one half, as had been proposed, then the saving would not exceed 13,000l. per annum. He did not mean that such a sum as that, or even a smaller one, ought not to be saved, but he really did not consider the economical advantages so great that they should counterbalance those which would be derived from keeping up that description of force.—With respect to the constitutional point of this question, he could not but observe that the hon. gentlemen opposite had varied their ground of attack, so as to suit their own arguments. At one moment they talked of the constitutional jealousy with which parliament and the country ought to regard a standing army; but when they were attacked upon that ground and driven from it, then they turned round and exclaimed, "No, we do not object to it merely as a military force, but as giving a large patronage to ministers, and increasing the influence of the crown."The hon. member who spoke last, had even talked of his preference of a naval to a military force, as if he had forgotten, that on that view of the subject, patronage and influence might not be as successfully and as extensively exerted as in the army. He was gratified, however, to observe, that there seemed to be a cessation of those charges which had been so liberally indulged in it at the beginning of the discussion. There was no mention now of a deliberate intention on the part of ministers to subvert the constitution of the country. Those taunts were freely uttered at the outset, but they were not now repeated. He was glad of it, for indeed he did not believe that such a charge would be countenanced either by that House or by the country. For himself, he could not entertain such a suspicion of any statesman of the present day: and he spoke not only of those with whom he acted, but of the strongest of his political opponents. At the same time, he was far from wishing to treat lightly or inconsiderately the evils attendant upon a standing army. The history of those countries where standing armies had been allowed to usurp an ascendancy over the civil authorities, was a volume pregnant with instruction to every one. They might look at France, for example, and derive a lesson of eternal importance. But when they talked of the 12,000 prætorian bands, who, in ancient Home, were potent enough to dispose of that empire according to their will and pleasure, it should be remembered, that that was the result of a number of predisposing causes which had no existence in England. Before the civil constitution of any country could be overturned by a standing army, the people of that country must be lamentably degenerate; they must be debased and enervated by all the worst excesses of an arbitrary and despotic government; their martial spirit must be extinguished; they must be brought to a state of political degradation, he might almost say, of political emasculation, such as few countries experience which have once known the blessings of liberty. And when they were reduced to that condition, it mattered but little by how many or how few soldiers their final ruin was accomplished. They were already fitted to bear the yoke, which their debasement prepared for their necks. He trusted, that whatever differences they might entertain about abstract questions of foreign or domestic policy, it would at least be allowed, by all parties, that we enjoyed the practical blessings of freedom in a greater degree than had ever been done by any other country, and he would presume to say, in a greater degree than even this country had ever enjoyed at any former period. He was not a little surprised, indeed, to hear the reign of queen Elizabeth referred to by the hon. gentle men opposite, as a period from which we were to deduce our constitutional practices; to hear the whigs talk of those times with exultation when no standing armies existed. In his opinion, when a sovereign exercised such power as to send members of that House to prison, and advise them not to meddle with state affairs, it was of little consequence whether they had a standing army or not. With regard to the present case, he was quite satisfied that there was even in the very constitution of our army a sufficient protection for the constitution, and a sufficient check to prevent its being abased as a body. A large proportion of the officers, who commanded in it were identified by their property, their connexions, and general interests, with the civil prosperity of the state; and he was sure, that if it were possible for one half of the army to decide against the constitution, the other half would stand up for it. In point of fact, however, when they looked merely at the number of the troops proposed to be employed, with the nature of the service for which they were required, it was ridiculous to suppose that they carried with them any thing that could be considered as really dangerous to the constitution [Hear, hear!].

expressed his strong conviction, that the amount of the military force proposed to be kept up was not only unconstitutional, but unnecessary. If ever there was a period when it was unnecessary, this, he said, was that period. Since standing armies, that great curse of modern society, had been introduced, when was there a moment but the present when that of France might be said not to exist? As a member of the British parliament, he felt it his duty to protest against the measure.

animadverted on the proposed establishment of 25,000 men for Ireland. The people of that country, he said, neither were, nor had reason to be, satisfied with such a measure in the midst of profound external peace. If the state of Ireland was such as to require that unprecedented force, why had not a formal message from the Prince Regent set forth its necessity? Why was the House left to take it for granted, from the mere statement of the right hon. secretary for Ireland, that such an amount of force was absolutely necessary? Would not the Irish people ask, how their condition came to be such as to require 25,000 men in profound peace? Well he remembered the time when Ireland was able to defend itself, even when the fleets of France and Spain rode masters of the channel. In 1782, the whole establishment of Ireland was only 8000 men, and the greater part of them were fighting in America. Would they not ask us to restore to them the constitution of 1782? Adverting to the statements in the speech of the right hon, secretary, he would ask, what were the objects to be attained by keeping up so large an army in that part of the empire? Were tithes to be levied, were rents to be collected, by a military force? He would assert, that the southern countries of Ireland, Kilkenny, Kildare, and Wicklow, were now as tranquil as they had been for years past. The whole formed part of a great plan to render this a military country. Hence it was, that the black regiments in the West Indies, and even the Greek regiment in the Ionian islands, were to be disbanded, that these possessions might become pretences and depots for British troops. If, however, we affected to rival the armies of continental powers, we must sacrifice our commercial and naval greatness, and become a mere auxiliary in the wars of continental despots.

explained the nature of the quotations which he had made from the Abbé Raynal, the civil part of which had been mistaken for the political.

could not suffer the speech of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down to pass without notice. He could not but complain of some of the topics that he had introduced, and the view that he had taken of the question before the House as it concerned Ireland, and the military establishment necessary to be maintained. He was persuaded that the hon. gentleman would not have made the statements which he had done, had he heard the speech of his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Peel). That speech still remained unanswered—and it was some satisfaction to him and to those who with him took the same views which his right hon. friend had done, that in the opinions that had been expressed that night, the hon. gentleman stood alone; he was as yet the only member who had said that the force proposed for Ireland was greater than was necessary for the public safety. Even those who would vote with the hon. gentleman that night, evaded giving that opinion. The hon. member represented his right hon. friend as having said, that the extent of that force was rendered necessary in Ireland by three causes; but he had so stated them, that it would appear as if his right hon. friend had contended, that those causes separately were productive of that necessity. It was on the combination of those causes, and on other circumstances, aggravated by their continuance for years, that his right hon. friend had founded his argument. Neither did he state, as has been imputed to him by the hon. gentleman, that the only way to remedy the evils existing in Ireland was, by maintaining in that island a large military establishment. Who had ever said (as the hon. gentleman had apostrophised), "that a military force was a remedy for political evils?" He would take leave however to tell him, that it might be a protection against political danger. In fact his right hon. friend had admitted and asserted, that there were many measures calculated to diminish the evils by which Ireland was afflicted, and to the distant but ultimate operation of some of them, he had sanguinely looked. He (Mr. F.) and many of those near him would go farther than his right hon. friend; but to whatever extent they might go, there was no one, except perhaps the hon. gentleman, who would contend, that those or any measures could be put into such operation at once, or that they could be expected to produce immediately such an effect, as to render the pressure of a large military force no longer expedient.

The hon. gentleman's statement of what had fallen from his right hon. friend had been in other respects equally erroneous; he asserted, that parliament had been called upon by him for a great extension of the military establishment in Ireland. Now, what his right hon. friend had said was, that the state of Ireland was such, as to require, not an extension of the existing force, but that a greater reduction than that of 17,000 men should be prevented. If it were an extension of force to reduce it to 25,000 effectives, the hon. gentleman was authorized in what he had said. If he judged from the hon. member's manner, he was uninformed of the nature or of the amount of the force in Ireland and now employed there. Did the hon. gentleman know what that force now consisted of? Or was he not equally mistaken in his historical account of the armies of former times? What was the representation that we had heard from him of the military force existing in the reign of king William? He had asserted that, "at that glorious era, "the whole standing army was disbanded: "there was then some spirit of freedom in the breasts of Englishmen;" but the House would recollect, that that was the identical period at which a standing army first existed, at least at which it was first recognized by parliament. So far was the army from being disbanded at that time, it was then first voted by the House of Commons, and 10,000 troops were maintained in England, besides guards and garrisons—besides a force abroad, and a force in Ireland [Hear!]. In the very reign preceding, a legal objection was taken to a charge laid against an individual, who was accused of conspiring to attack the King's guards, because it was said, that the having guards was unconstitutional, and that the law knew not what the King's guards were. He was not surprized, however, at the hon. gentleman's inaccuracy in quoting what took place in England at that period, when he heard him asserting that Louis the 14th, "in the plenitude of his power," and the "romantic" king of Sweden, drew their swords at this time for the restoration of the exiled monarch of England. Charles the 12th undoubtedly commenced his martial achievements at an early age, but he apprehended that he could hardly have unsheathed his sword at the time the hon. gentleman stated [Hear, hear! and a laugh]. Twenty years had elapsed after that period before the intrigues of Sweden and France commenced (he alluded to the negociation of the baron de Goertz), and it was to accomplish the dethronement of the House of Hanover, and not of king William, that Alberoni prepared the projects which the hon. gentleman had anti-dated in this night's debate! [Hear, hear!]. But, take the time when he would, did he mean to contend, that at any one of those periods which he had illustrated, England was without a regular force, or Ireland either? He should not have adverted to historical errors such as these, had they not have been brought forward in such a triumphant tone, in contravention, too, of the statements of his right hon. friend, and had been received with such plausive assent by some of those around the hon. member [Hear!]. He had further declared, that a greater force was demanded for Ireland now than had ever been required before. Adverting to a former period of her history, he, had said, that the whole force then existing in that country was composed of volunteers exclusively, and that there were no regular troops. This was another mistake. Of those days which saw her volunteer force arrayed, his country had a right to be proud; nor was the glory the less because it was bloodless. At the same time, although the whole of the regular troops were not retained, though Ireland trusted principally to her own patriotism for defence, and though the parliament of that country freely consented to every sacrifice that England required, yet a certain amount of regular force was still kept, and it did so happen that the only attempt at the invasion of Ireland during that war, was repelled by a part of that regular force. This, however, was not worth dwelling on.

Reverting to the declaration made by the hon. gentleman, that at no time antecedent to the present, was such a force kept up in Ireland as that now proposed, he would refer him to periods of the late war, when there was no danger of invasion, and little danger of any extraordinary disturbance of the public peace in that country, and yet when a much larger military establishment was maintained. He would refer him to 1806 and 1807, when those persons with whom the hon. gentleman was in the habit of acting, composed his majesty's government; and in doing so, he was not influenced by any motive of paltry or personal recrimination, but merely by feeling that the government of that time would be considered by the hon. gentleman as good authority, if by others they were not. In the years 1806 and 1807, when there was no danger of foreign invasion, and little danger of domestic disturbance, the regular troops in Ireland amounted to 30,000 men, besides the militia, volunteers, and a powerful yeomanry force. ("That was in time of war," from the Opposition benches.) True, that was in time of war. But those who reminded him that it was so, would hardly say that the force so placed in Ireland was entirely for military purposes, to be applied in operations against a foreign enemy, unless they could show (which he was persuaded they could not) that there was danger of invasion, or that the peace of the country was likely to be disturbed. The force at present contended to be necessary, was not the force which was considered necessary during the war.

He had before observed, that the hon. gentleman had referred to three points in the speech pronounced by his right hon. friend on a preceding night. He would advert shortly to these points; he had said shortly, for to dwell long upon them would be to do great injustice to an exposition of the state of Ireland, which had not been forgotten by any one who had heard it, and to which he begged to repeat, that no one either who had heard it had attempted a reply. His right hon. friend had ascribed the present state of Ireland to a combination of causes.—The non-residence of the landed proprietors, the incompetency of the magistracy [Hear, hear! from the opposition side]. Let not gentlemen suppose he meant to admit a general incompetency of that class of men in Ireland; but it was notorious, that there were many incompetent in ability,—that there were large districts where they were deficient in number; that in many places, above all in times of trouble and of danger, persons had been appointed—necessarily appointed—of a class from which they would not otherwise have been voluntarily chosen. He felt, perhaps, that to follow this branch of the subject would involve him and the House in too wide a field; but it was evident, that in a country where the popular mind had been so corrupted, and where so few years since an armed rebellion had raised its head,—in a country so circumstanced with respect to its resident gentry, and its magistracy, something more than ordinary means were necessary for insuring the public safety, and guarding, what would be not less interesting to those who heard him, the lives and properties of the well disposed and the loyal.

There was another point, upon which what had been said by his right hon. friend had been utterly distorted; he meant with regard to the practice of illicit distillation, that bane of the country and of the people, but of which the hon. gentleman seemed to think so lightly; and well he might—for of its causes and of its effect, and of the means which had been used to extinguish it, he seemed equally careless and misinformed. It was true, that they had been forced, particularly in the north of Ireland, to employ military detachments to suppress it. When it was recollected to what violation of the laws it led, the House would not be surprised or sorry to hear that recourse had been had to the strongest means. The hon. gentleman had declared, that in his part of Ireland illicit distillation did not prevail: it certainly did not to any extent in the county which he represented, nor in the county of Kilkenny. It would therefore not be necessary to employ the troops on that service in those counties, though he could tell the hon. gentleman that, of which he seemed also unapprized, in the county of Kilkenny where he resided, though not believed very lately, there were other calls for the services of those troops. At the same time, as to illicit distillation, he could have wished that the hon. gentleman had attended to the representations of other members who were acquainted with other parts of Ireland. Many of them also from the south, who with a liberality and a manliness, which he thought it his duty warmly to acknowledge, had declared their readiness to support the strongest measures to put down a practice so fatal wherever it prevailed. He was sorry the hon. gentleman had not heard the sentiments of the right hon. baronet near him (sir John Newport), because he knew the weight they would have with him. Still more, he wished he had heard the speech, in which he had immediately followed his right hon. friend in. the debate of a former night, for he would have heard from that right hon. baronet his most unequivocal testimony to the accuracy of the statements which his right hon. friend had made, and he would have heard him say further, the military force demanded for Ireland was not greater than the necessity required.

To return, however, for a single moment, to the subject of illicit distillation; he could inform the House, that it had so extended, that the act imposing penalties on the vicinage had been revived and enforced. It was now in force in more than two-thirds of the counties in Ireland, and he confessed that there was no justification for such a law, but the impossibility of suppressing it by any other means. The hon. gentleman had treated the whole subject with very unsuitable levity. Could he affect to consider it merely as a question of revenue? or did any man believe that to prevent the use of "unsanctified" spirits was the sole motive which had induced the legislature to endeavour to guard by such severities against the prevalence of a mischief than which nothing could be more destructive to the community [Hear!].

It had been asserted by the hon. gentleman, that the disturbances in Ireland were confined to a few districts. He hoped certainly that the recent execution of those laws with which the government was invested, had produced a salutary effect; but the spirit of combination had not subsided, the spirit of outrage was still abroad, and it was at this time that it was proposed to strip the country of the whole of its regular force. The hon. gentleman had told the House, "that some melancholy events had occurred, and that one of those melancholy events had been the murder of a magistrate." It had indeed. It was on the return of that unfortunate gentleman from discharging his duty as a magistrate at Clonmel,—it was the punishment of his conduct as an active and intrepid assertor of the laws—it was perpetrated in the open day, and marked by circumstances of combination amongst the lower orders of the people which it was painful for him to dwell on. But it was in one of those counties where the hon. gentleman believed no military force was necessary. At the special commission which followed the death of that most active and respectable man, whose loss was no less to be deplored by the public, than by the private friends who loved him [Hear, hear!]. Fourteen persons were capitally convicted—in a county in which the hon. gentleman had contended that no military force was necessary—among them were some who were leaders of the violence by which the district had been disgraced. Probably the hon. gentleman did not know of what crime those men were convicted—they were convicted of having been forward in an attack made by about 200 persons upon one of his majesty's barracks, upon a house, he meant to say, which had been taken as a barrack for the occupation of the king's troops in a disturbed part of the country [Hear, hear!]. It was therefore marked for destruction—they did destroy it—and fourteen of them were convicted and suffered for the crime. He would appeal to those who knew those facts (there were several present who knew them personally),—he would call on one particularly whom he had in his eye, (who was now sitting near the hon. gentleman)—he would call on him to state whether that county was in a situation in which it would be advisable, in which it would be safe, to attend to the hon. gentleman's recommendations, and to dispense with the presence of a regular military force [Hear!]. In another and a neighbouring county also, serious affrays had taken place and several lives had been lost.

Were these not sufficient facts to justify—not an extension of the military force in Ireland, but a proposition not to reduce it under that amount which the security and tranquillity of that country required? At that late period of the night he would keep clear of all those general topics of policy on which the hon. gentleman had so amply dilated; and would confine himself to a few observations on the declaration made by some hon. members, that if the state of Ireland was such as it had been represented to be, it was a matter of grave charge against his majesty's government that it had not sooner been brought under the consideration of parliament. It had even been insinuated that his right hon. friend had kept the knowledge of this state in reserve, until it became necessary to bring it forward in order to induce parliament to vote the force required. But did not the House bear in mind that in the session before last, and in the last sessions, the situation of Ireland had been distinctly represented to them by his majesty's government, for the express purpose of procuring the re-enactment of the most severe laws ever known in the British realms? In that application for coercive measures, his majesty's government had been supported not only by the majority of the House, but by the hon. gentlemen opposite, who, with a liberality and manliness that did them great credit, had admitted that less could not be asked with a view to secure the tranquillity of Ireland.

If, therefore, a motion should be made in any quarter for an inquiry into the state of Ireland, at least he trusted, that no one would allege that this was the first occasion on which the grounds on which the vote was justified were submitted to parliament, or that the House was unprepared for the statement which his right non. friend had made [Hear, hear!].—He could not in this stage offer any thing further; he perceived the House was exhausted, and he was exhausted also [Hear, hear!].

trusted, that if the disturbances ceased in Ireland, which there was reason to hope would be the case, a considerable reduction would be made in the establishment.

supported the necessity of a large military force in Ireland. 4,000 regular troops were not found to be too many to preserve tranquillity in the county of Limerick; 25,000 therefore could not, he thought, be considered as more than sufficient for the whole island.

The report was then brought up and read. On the question, that the resolution be read a second time, Mr. Wynn moved, as an amendment, to leave out all the words after the word "that," for the purpose of substituting the words "the resolution be re-committed." On this amendment the House divided:

The Resolution was then read a second time and agreed to.