presented, by order of the Prince Regent, the following Papers, relating to the residence of Napoleon Buonaparté at St. Helena, viz:—

1. Estimate of the probable Annual Expense of the Island of St. Helena, during the period of its continuing to be the Residence of Napoleon Buonaparté and his Suite.

2. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Croker to Mr. Goulburn, dated Admiralty Office, 11th of April 1816.

For the probable Expense of the Naval Force employed at St. Helena, vide the annexed Letter from Mr. Croker to Mr. Goulburn.

(2.)—Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Croker to Mr. Goulburn, dated Admiralty Office, 11th of April 1816.

Admiralty Office 11th April 1816

Sir;—In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, communicating lord Bathurst's desire that a statement should be transmitted to his office, showing the amount of expense per annum, in the naval departments, on account of the additional ships of war employed at St. Helena during the residence of Buonaparté in the island, as distinguished from former periods; I am commanded by my lords commissioners of the admiralty to acquaint you, that as it is not possible to state the precise disposition which the admiral commanding on the Cape of Good Hope station may make of the squadron under his orders, it cannot be exactly calculated how much of the whole expense is attributable to the service of St. Helena; but an estimate of the expense on this latter account may be thus formed: the whole expense of the squadron on the station is 131,275l. 9s. per annum;—the expense of that part which would, if there were no St. Helena squadron, be restored to the Indian station, and employed in performing the ordinary duties of the Cape of Good Hope station, including the Mauritius, &c. is 76,712l. 13s. 1d., which being deducted from the first sum, leaves 54,562l. 15s. 11d. as the expense of the St. Helena squadron, contradistinguishing it from the whole force of the station; but it is possible that the admiral may find that the service can be carried on with a less amount of force, in which event a further deduction will be made from the above stated expense. I am, &c.

(Signed) J. W. CROKER.

gave notice, that, if the subject should not be taken up by some other person, it was his intention, before the close of the session, to call the attention of the House to the act of the 48th of the King, with the view of effecting a reduction in the charges of the bank of England for the management of the public debt. There was also another subject to which the attention of the House ought to be called, the application of unclaimed dividends due to public creditors. On this subject he would not give any notice, because the House had been given to understand from the chancellor of the exchequer that he would bring forward some measure on the subject; but if the right hon. gentleman should not bring forward any measure, it was his intention also to call the attention of the House to these unclaimed dividends.

stated that on Friday next he would name an early day for bringing this subject before the House.

and said: — Mr. Speaker; Though I apprehend it is not likely the motions I am about to make will meet with opposition from any quarter of the House, the subject involves matter of too much importance to pass without some explanation as to the ulterior views with which I call for the information; on these grounds, I beg the attention of the House for a very short time. The grievances arising out of the tithe system are felt and complained of in every quarter of the empire. Scarce one of the numerous petitions that have been presented, in consequence of our agricultural distresses, but place tithes as one of the most prominent grievances under which they labour. Many petitions have been received by the House directed solely to this purpose. The nation expects, and our duty requires, this matter should be brought under our consideration. Difficult and complex as the subject may be, it will not be found insurmountable when resolutely and fairly encountered. The interests of agriculture are most materially injured, and, what will not weigh less with the House, the cause of religion, and the respectability of the clergy, are lessened in consequence. Litigation is multiplied to an alarming degree. Every thing conspires to call on us candidly and dispassionately to investigate the subject, to relieve the country, and, at the same time, to do strict justice to the tithe-holder. The object of my motions is, to restore to juries their indisputable rights, and to show the extent of litigation. I leave it to abler hands to bring forward a plan for the abolition of tithes. The comfort and prosperity of Great Britain require the measure.—The tranquillity of Ireland can never be secured without it., Great as the object is in this country, it is comparatively nothing with its importance to Ireland. The object of my first motion is to show to the House the origin of the power assumed by the court of exchequer, in deciding on facts without the intervention of a jury. The trial by jury is the great and fundamental bulwark of the constitution; and I cannot withhold an expression of my astonishment, that such an innovation on Magna Charta could have been so long tolerated. It seems as if the evil had grown up so gradually, that it had deeply rooted itself before the country was aware of it. The evil is now of a nature so alarming, that I apprehend there are few of the members of this House who are not aware of its extent. In applying to the exchequer, claims are set up that the parties would be ashamed to prosecute in the face of the country; the odium attending the exposure of such claims would preserve the peace of the parishes, and the character of the parties. I beg most distinctly to disclaim, in the remotest degree, casting any imputation on the learned judges presiding in the exchequer. If the public feels their mode of proceeding tends to advantage the tithe-holder and to extend the system, I attribute it to the principles and practice of the court. The decisions of 150 years have so fettered their judgments as to render it difficult, if not almost impossible, for them to recur to a better practice without the aid of the legislature. I beg the House to believe I have not slightly taken up this question; I have the sanction of one of the learned judges of the court of exchequer, whose information as a sound lawyer, whose integrity and respectability, was never surpassed by any one who ever sat on the bench. The opinion of such a person must have its influence with the House, and weigh materially in favour of my proposition. The House will anticipate I allude to sir George Wood. I will very shortly explain what was the practice in suing for tithes, and how that has been deviated from in late times. In the reign of Elizabeth, and antecedent to it, suits for the recovery of tithes were instituted in the ecclesiastical courts; wherever a plea of modus, exemption, or composition, was alleged, the court of King's-bench, on application, stayed the proceedings, and directed the question to be tried by a jury—this produced a disagreement between the courts, and an appeal was made, and a solemn hearing took place before all the judges of the realm, who determined agreeably to the common law of the land, that the subject was entitled to have all matters of fact decided by a jury. From this decision the ecclesiastical court appealed to the king in council. So important was the question then considered, that James 1st, on hearing the cause himself, and after three days solemn argument, defended on one side by the archbishops and doctors, and on the other by some of the judges, decided, with the approbation of his council, that the common law of the realm should be abided by; a decision worthy of a monarch who regards the happiness of his people and the maintenance of their just rights as a sacred duty of his office. This decision seems to have been acquiesced in for above fifty years, when, to avoid the intervention of a jury, the recovery of tithes was sought for in a court of equity. The first cause in which the exchequer decided on the fact was, in 1687, by chief baron Ward; from that period the practice of the court has been, under certain circumstances, to pronounce what, according to them, appeared a rank modus. Nor is this the only hardship defendants in tithe causes have had reason to complain of; because, in cases of composition, the court of exchequer requires the production of the deed, deeming no usage, however continued, sufficient to supply the existence of such an instrument. Nay, it has occurred, that in cases of inclosure sanctioned by chancery, where land has been given in exchange for tithes, and because the parties to whom the waste would have belonged, can not now, by reason of change of property, be made out, the clergyman holds the lands and exacts the tithes also. Such monstrous incongruities call imperiously for relief. On appeals to the House of Lords, the general practice is to reverse judgments when moduses are set up which have not had the decision of a jury. The other motions are for returns of the number of causes heard in the last seven years, and also the number of those now pending. I do not believe I hazard any thing, by anticipating the number to exceed one hundred. Mr. Speaker, the mania of extending tithes must be checked, or that respectability and esteem so necessary to be possessed by the clergy, so essential to the due discharge of the sacred functions, will be lost. Sir, I am afraid it has occurred too often, that the tithe gatherer has of late entered the garden of the poor cottager, and demanded the tithe of his half dozen gooseberry bushes, and perhaps a solitary apple tree. I dare not trust myself on this subject, lest I should be led by my feelings to other expressions, though applicable to a few, not certainly to the clergy at large. We see that great efforts have sprung from small beginnings. Had the existing spirit of setting up claims for tithes existed when the court of exchequer first commenced its proceedings, the evil had long since been remedied. What, Sir, shall we say to the claims set up for the tithe of pine apples and hot houses? Why might not the tithe owner as well extend his claims to the tenth of the goods of any manufactory? One as well as the other spring from the soil, or is the production of the atmosphere. Could a jury of the country, consisting of Englishmen, so have construed the intention of the grantors of tithes? Can these be considered as the fruits of the earth? Mr. Speaker, I shall no longer detain, the House; it is high time to prevent if nothing else can be adopted, the undue extension of tithes. If we value the respectability of the clergy, or the peace of the country, the evil must be remedied. This communication will lead, I hope, to the total extinction of tithes, ultimately for the benefit of all—as far as I mean to go, I hope, may be accomplished even in the present session.—Mr. Curwen then moved, " That there be laid before this House, 1. A copy of the first decision made by the court of exchequer, in which the court pronounced on the fact of moduses, compositions, or exemption, without referring the same to a jury to be tried. 2. A return of the number of tithe causes heard or decided in the courts of exchequer and chancery in the last seven years, together with the names of the parties and parishes and places involved in such suits. 3. A return of the number of tithe causes now pending in the court of exchequer, instituted by the clergy as well as lay impropriators, tithe-owners, distinguishing by whom and when commenced

said that if any inference could be drawn from the present motion affecting the rights of the clergy to tithes which, he contended, were as perfectly established by law, as the right of any individual to any other species of property in the country, he should oppose it; but as he believed that the hon. gentleman's object was solely information, he could have no objection to the production of the papers.

The motion was then agreed to.

presented a petition. signed by a number of inhabitants of Kilbarchan and its vicinity, praying for a reform in the representation.

did not rise to object to the present petition's lying on the table, but to communicate some information respecting a petition lately presented to the House from a populous town in the county which he had the honour to represent. The petition to which he alluded was the one said to be signed by 10,000 people belonging to Huddersfield and the neighbourhood. He had been informed by several most respectable inhabitants of that town, that the petition had originated in no public meeting. He did not mean to say that such a petition ought not on that account to be attended to; but considerable weight was generally attached by the House to petitions from meetings legally convened. In the winter of 1812, and spring of 1813, that part of the country was in a state of great distress, from which it was now relieved. At that time the venerable patriarch of reform, major Cartwright, happened to pay a visit to the town of Huddersfield, which was the central seat of the disturbance; for he could not call it disaffection. This was in the commencement of 1813, after a special commission had been held at York for the trial of the offenders. At that time, when a great degree of ill blood prevailed in that populous county, were signatures collected for the petition alluded to. From 1813 to 1816, where it had been lurking he knew not, but it was singular enough that it should have been now brought out of its lurking-place by the venerable patriarch or the hon. baronet, and presented to the House.

said, he had similar information on the subject of the petition from Huddersfield, and had received a paper from 23 or 24 reputable gentlemen' disavowing it. His lordship then read part of the paper, stating circumstances, similar to those mentioned by lord Milton. Major Cartwright, it stated, entered Huddersfield on the day that the dead bodies, of the persons executed, after the sentence at York, were brought into the town by their friends; and that he brought with him bundles of inflammatory petitions. He collected about a dozen persons at a public house: some gentlemen requested him to explain his objects, which he declined; and all that met him disavowed their objects, except one. His friends deserted him, but he went before a magistrate the next morning, and produced his petition; he directed others to get signatures to it, but no persons of character encouraged it — only persons in low life. Since then, the numbers might have been secretly increased to 10,000. His lordship only stated what his information had afforded him; but as there was no public meeting, nor any public notice, the numbers must have been clandestinely obtained.

said, that his hon. friend the member for Morpeth, had examined the signatures, and stated that at the head of them was one of the most respectable persons of the town, but that he was not acquainted with any of the rest.

could not help being astonished at the inconsistency of gentlemen on-the subject of petitions. When he had lately presented a petition from the county of Wilts, adopted at a meeting legally convened, though the petition was signed by the high sheriff, and was in every respect the petition of the county of Wilts, yet it did not receive that attention to which it was entitled, and in a few days afterwards the member for Wiltshire presented a counter petition, which was very differently received. The gentleman by whom the present petition had been proposed, was so well known both in and out of the House as an honest man, that he could not be suspected of improper motives, and so far was he from approving of the riotous proceedings in the county, at the time alluded to, that in his addresses he had urged, that if the people had any grievances to complain of, it was not by riotous proceedings that they would be likely to get them redressed, and had recommended the mode of petitioning. The petition was signed by 10,800 persons, but who those persons were he had not the means of stating.

The petition was ordered to lie on the table.

said, he had a petition to present from an individual, who complained of great hardships, and which was important, because it concerned the administration of public justice. The petition was that of an unprotected female against the lord president of the court of session in Scotland, complaining of an exercise of power on his part, which could not be authorized by the Scotch, or any other system of law. This lady had been deprived of the guardianship of her children, which had been left her by her husband, and had been subjected to other illegal proceedings. The case was of great importance, and he should not suffer it long to remain on the table, without an ulterior motion.

asked, what was the prayer of the petition?

that the petitioner prayed that the House would put her children under the guardianship of the court of chancery of England, and that they would take steps to punish the right hon. Charles Hope, president of the court of session, for various acts of malversation, in the administration of justice, and especially the contravention of a statute of William and Mary.

seconded the motion, that he might have an opportunity, when the petition had been read, of refuting the calumnies it contained.

said, the House ought to be cautious how they lent themselves to a course which would mislead the subject. If it was supposed that the House could interfere in the administration of the course of justice, that course would become disturbed and confused. If there was no charge in the petition of the great law officer in question having committed malversation or oppression in the exercise of his high office, and if such charges were not borne out by a statement of facts in the petition, the House ought not to interfere. If, however, it were allowed to be read, be begged he might not be understood as giving his support to it.

contended, that its complaining of great injustice and oppression on the part of a high law officer, was a sufficient reason for its being attended to.

suggested the propriety of having the prayer of the petition again stated.

said, that the prayer was for the interposition of the House to bring back her children to the protection of the chancellor of England, where she had placed them, and to bring to justice the president of the court of session for malversation.

conceived, that the petition on the first prayer was altogether inadmissible, as it would countenance a direct appeal from a court of justice in Scotland to the House of Commons which had no jurisdiction.

apprehended that, in strictness, the hon. baronet had failed in one part of his duty, which was, to state the facts on which the charge of malversation was founded. This he had omitted to do.

said, that the facts were so numerous, that it was better to have the petition read by the clerk. One fact was, the taking from the lady the guardianship of her own children, contrary to the law of Scotland—another was, unjustly stopping her jointure-another was, contempt of the statute of William and Mary. There were many others with which he had not burthened his memory.

said, that those facts were all matter of appeal rather than accusation. Contempt of the statute of William and Mary was no proof of malversation, but was a good ground of appeal, not to the House of Commons, but to the proper Court. He was one of the last members in that House, who would throw any impediments in the way of petitioning, but he thought if the present were received, it would establish a dangerous precedent, and open a door to petitions from suitors, who would prefer the summary mode of praying the interposition of that House, rather than the more proper, but unfortunately much more expensive one, of appealing to the higher tribunals.

said, that many attempts had been made in that House by disappointed suitors to accuse the judges, but such attempts had been constantly repelled. It was for the House to consider whether there were any circumstances in the present case that could justify them in making it an exception to the general usage. Had the hon. baronet any allegations of direct injustice to make, which could enable the House to receive the petition?

stated, that the president of the court was accused of having intimidated several gentlemen of the law, and prevented them from assisting this lady by their advice and assistance. She also declared that she had been unjustly imprisoned by the president, for refusing to give up her children to his authority.

suggested the propriety of permitting the clerk to read the petition.

expressed his confidence that the president of the court of session would readily undergo any scrutiny into either his public or private character.

The Petition was then brought up, and read. It was from Belinda, widow of the late col. George Colebrooke, who died in 1809, and left her guardian of the children, with a jointure of 1,200l. a year; also 500l. a year to bring up the children, and 500l., to be paid to herself. She had since remarried in Scotland in January 1811, to John Taaffe, esq. The estates were worth about 8,000l. a year of which 5,000l. were in Scotland. The petition made the children wards in chancery. Her second marriage proved very unhappy. The removal of her children had been sued for, and the court appointed a curator. The petition was long, and entered into a variety of details, stating that the judge had said that he had private means of knowing she was an infamous woman, that the children's morals might be corrupted, and the sooner their affections were alienated from her the better; and that the judge used persuasion and intimidation to prevent her from getting assistance. She also complained of imprisonment, and that the sentence was privately made up, which she could prove at the bar. The object of her imprisonment was to extort her submission, rather than which she would have died in prison.

On the motion of sir F. Burdett, that the petition do lie on the table,

stated, that, among the numerous cases in behalf of the subject which his hon. friend had been induced to bring before parliament, there never was one introduced by him with less consideration to the matter at issue, or with less attention to what was due to the parties concerned, than the present which he had made himself the medium of conveying to parliament. The noble lord then adverted to the allegations of the petition. In contradiction to that which stated her sentence of imprisonment to have been caused by her refsual to enter into security, he begged to state, that that sentence was pronounced against her, not to compel her to a separation from her children, but for a contempt of court. To show the feelings of this lady to tear her children by persuasion and stratagem, from their present guardianship, he stated, that when they had been permitted to visit her, on a representation of her being on a deathbed, an attempt had actually been made to entrap and remove them from their present control. If there was any thing in the case which entitled the party to appeal from a judicial process, let her resort to the House of Lords, where she might, if her case were good, obtain redress, instead of appealing to that House, where it was impossible, from the nature of its constitution, that she could obtain any redress.

was anxious to say a few words on this petition, as he knew something of the parties, though from mere rumour. All that he had ever heard went to confirm the statement of the noble lord, that the petitioner was in custody for a contempt of the court of session, which exercised the same jurisdiction in such circumstances as the court of chancery in England. The president of the court of session was no more answerable in these cases than the judge of any other court. If the petitioner considered herself aggrieved, the court of appeal was at all times open to her, and the House was not bound to interfere. There was no imputation of corruption on the part of the learned judge; the petition merely stated, that he had acted contrary to law; and this was an allegation which must be decided by a court of appeal. There was nothing, undoubtedly, of greater importance to the liberty of the people, than that that House should be open to petitions; but it was no light matter to hold up to public reprobation the conduct of an officer of justice, against whom, if he had discharged his trust unfaithfully, it was the duty of that House to institute proceedings, and to take care that he should not be guilty of malversation again. It was equally their duty, however, to shut their doors against loose and frivolous charges, and to protect the characters of those who were intrusted with the administration of the laws of the country. For these reasons, he should certainly object to the present petition.

could not suffer this matter to pass without a few observations, but rejoiced that the noble lord was so fortunate as to be before him. He wished to occupy the attention of the House for a short time, on account, of his very near connexion with the lord president of the court of session. He believed there was no person who ever presided over a court of justice that had discharged his duties with more honour and integrity, or with greater advantage and satisfaction to the country. With respect to the merits of this petition, he had been informed that a process was now pending against the lord president, for using abusive and unwarrantable language to the petitioner; and if this was really the fact, she was not entitled to apply to that House pendente lite. If she considered herself aggrieved, the proper court of appeal was open to her. He almost lamented that the House had suffered this petition to be brought up and read; but having done so, he should take the liberty of moving that it be rejected

expressed his opinion that there was no ground whatever for entertaining the petition.

felt himself bound, as the petition had been read, to state the impression on his mind of the conduct of the learned judge. That eminent person had a very difficult task to perform; and he had no doubt whatever, from what he had heard of this case, that his lordship had not only discharged his duty according to law, but had manifested a degree of affectionate consideration and zeal towards the mother of the children that could not be surpassed. He was the more anxious to deliver his sentiments on this occasion, as the learned judge had lately presented a report to that House, which was not very consistent with his dignity or with the respect which the House had a right to demand. He might thereafter think it it his duty to offer some animadversions on that subject, and it was principally for this reason that he considered himself bound to do justice to the learned judge in the case which was then before them.

said, he had no doubt whatever, from all he had heard on this subject, that the lord president was not only perfectly blameless, but had acted with that propriety and correctness which the laws of the country and the circumstances of the case required.

conceived it right to inform the House, that printed papers relative to the case of the petitioner had been forced upon him by the post almost every day. From the publicity which attended the proceedings in that House he did hope, that if the discussions of that night should reach the persons to whom he alluded, they would understand that the repetition of this practice would not be suffered to pass without some animadversion.

replied at considerable length. He apprehended that the conduct of a judge who imprisoned a person on the grounds stated in this petition ought not to pass without the serious inquiry of that House. It was the duty of the House, and not of a court of appeal, to determine whether he had not exceeded his powers. With regard to the character of the parties, he was unable to form a decisive judgment; but, from the facts disclosed in the petition, he entertained rather a favourable opinion of the lady. She had been left by her husband the guardian of his children; so that, at least, she could produce his testimony of her good conduct. She had afterwards made them wards of the court of chancery in England; and what could she do with more propriety? He knew not what credit should be given to rumours, but he had heard that these young ladies had been extremely well educated by their mother; and the will of the husband expressly declared, that no second marriage of the wife should deprive her of the guardianship of the children. It had been argued, however, that the court of session had a right to interfere; but the real question was, whether the petition contained allegations which brought the matter under the cognizance of the House? He apprehended it was a great and serious charge against any judge whatever, that he had decided a question upon mere private information. There could be no doubt, that if this lady was chargeable with that misconduct which some gentlemen seemed to think, it was not brought publicly before the judge in order to induce him to act as he had done. The learned judge, however, had taken upon himself to restrain this unfortunate and unprotected female from any intercourse with one of her children, when, by the law of the land, he had arrived at an age to appoint his own guardian.

It had been argued that, if she considered herself aggrieved by this conduct, she might appeal to the House of Lords; but he believed, she was not in a condition to institute such a proceeding, as she had already been put to the expense of 5,000l., in defending and maintaining her rights. He would not deny, indeed, that, if she complained of misjudgment only, the court of appeal was the proper tribunal to which she ought to resort; but she complained of the general oppressive conduct of the learned judge. Under these circumstances, he thought that this petition ought to lie on the table: and if the House should approve of that motion, he should consider it his duty to take some farther tice of it on a future day.

The motion, that the petition do lie on the table, was negatived without a division: After which lord Binning's motion, that the petition be rejected, was carried without a division.

in rising to make the motion of which he had given notice, respecting the Liberty of the Press, claimed the indulgence of the House for the statement which he should have to make, on account of the magnitude of the subject. The importance of the privileges connected with a free press were so well known, that he should not say one word respecting them; his object was to prove, that the laws by which that liberty was secured, were capable of amendment. In showing the necessity of an alteration in the law, it was not enough to make it appear that there was an absurdity in the letter of the law, without going a step further, and showing that practical inconvenience did result, had resulted, or was likely to result from it; because nothing would be less wise than to attempt to legislate for the purpose of removing an apparent inconsistency merely. It was necessary for him to guard against another error into which some persons had fallen, as to the improvement of the law, which was the supposition that all that was necessary was, to revert to the jurisprudence of former times, or what were called by these persons the purer times of our constitution. He mentioned this argument because it was urged by persons of great respectability arid profound knowledge; but it was an unfortunate prejudice, as it tended to throw discredit on their attempts aud formed an answer to their plans of improvement. For his own part, he thought that, with one or two exceptions, our constitution was never in a better state than now, except in one or two instances, in which it was best to try to remove its blemishes. Another error which had arisen from the nature of the press was a supposition that its liberty could be secured by a law, defining libel, similar to that by which constructive treasons had been abolished—how to define treason was perhaps an easy task, and though possibly the law of Edward 3rd had drawn too narrow a line by confining treason to the levying war against the king or conspiring against his life, it was a prodigious improvement, compared with the law by which so many multifarious offences were visited by the terrible punishment attached to that crime. But in an attempt to define libel, if it were said that a libel was an attack on the character of the sovereign, it remained to be explained what was an attack on character. The truth was, that it was best left to common sense to decide what was an attack on character, and consequently a libel.

Having said thus much to clear the way, he should proceed to remark, that as the law now stood, the chief evil felt by persons accused of offences of this nature was this, that if prosecuted for libel it was of no manner of consequence to the trial of their cause—it was a weight that entered not at all into the scale, whether the matter of the alleged libel was consistent with truth, or totally false. This was the first grievance and in calling the attention of the House to this, he must remind them, that he did not rashly require legislation on the subject; to say that he had considered it himself for many years, was saying little; but he certainly did approach the subject with a sense of great anxiety, because he was aware of the multiplied considerations which it involved. It should be his business to state every difficulty that had occurred to him and others within his knowledge, and he should be content to stand or fall by his success in producing an adequate remedy. The House would clearly see wherein lay the great evil to which a party accused was subject. He would suppose that a statement, not one item of which was overcharged, containing reflections on government, or on an individual, was published, and that the author was prosecuted by government, or the individual. Let the statement be ever so true, he was willing to admit that the prosecution should be criminal, but he contended that the question whether the matter was true or false, ought to be taken into consideration by the jury. To say that the measures of government were bad, and that the ministers who proposed them ought to be impeached, or that A. B., a given individual, is guilty of felony, though never so true, might frequently be highly criminal; because there were cases in which nothing but malice could have originated such charges, and other circumstances, besides the allegations being true or not true, might account for the publication, and from them a malicious motive might be inferred. Nevertheless no one could deny, first, that the crime would be greater if the allegations were false; and that would go to be considered at least in the amount of punishment: but, secondly, though on trial truth was no absolute justification, yet it ought to enter into the consideration of the cause, because in many cases it would be decisive for or against the defendant. He should first put the case of a private libel, because it was more likely that malice should enter into the composition of this, it being difficult to conceive a person guilty of intentional malice on subjects of public concern. He would suppose it had been published that A. B. was guilty of felony: it did not follow, because he might have been guilty, that the publisher was not also guilty of a libel; but the truth or falsehood ought to go before the jury, that they might sift whether the motives of the publisher were innocent or not. There was no case in which the falsehood of the charge would not be decisive against him, though there might be many in which it would not be decisive for him. If I say that A. B. is guilty of felony, and it turns out to be false, I am a libeller; though it does not follow that the truth being so would always exculpate me. But then, is the truth always to be excluded? Unless those who take a different view of the question are prepared to say, that in no possible case can the truth or falsehood of the facts be material as to the malice or purity of motives, then they must agree with his conclusion, that the court should have the truth of the facts before them, not as conclusive for or against the defendant, but as going to show the purity or malice of his motives. As the criminal law stood at present, the truth cannot be stated, and it was no mistake to say that the law had always stood so. But this was the only circumstance so excluded: every other circumstance which went to elucidate motives was freely allowed to be produced.

In order to show the inconsistencies to which this system led, he should refer to a few of them, for the sake of gentlemen, who were not quite so conversant with the subject. If a party was prosecuted for a libel, it was competent for the defendant to show on what occasion he was induced to publish it; and if it was in answer to any former attack, he has a right to bring this forward in evidence. But let the House observe to what this led: if I libel a party, it is no justification that he libelled me before; but I ought to have prosecuted him for his libel, instead of adding offence to offence. But although the courts say that this is no justification, yet they allow it to be given in evidence, in order to cast a better light on the conduct of the defendant; the malice or purity of his motives being the point to which their attention is really directed. Another instance was this; all circumstances attending the manner of publication were allowed to be given in evidence, not as any justification, but because they tended to show the motives of the publisher. The third instance he should adduce was one which frequently occurred, and particularly in a late case; it was where libels were published in the form of a report of speeches, or the proceedings of a court. If a member of that House published his speech, or a private person an account of what passed in a court, and that publication contained a libel, it would be no justification that the speech had been spoken, or the matter had passed in court. He was aware that the court of Common-pleas had gone farther in the case of Curry and Walter: but it had been said in the King's-bench, in a recent case (that of Mr. Creevey) that if the matter were tried over again, the report of what actually passed would not be a justification. Now, how did this bear on the question? We had come to decided cases, and the courts said it was no justification to prove that you were only the reporter, but they allowed it to be given in evidence, and to go to the jury, because they were sifting only the purity or malice of motives: they inquire, " did he invent and defame, or did he only give a defamatory speech, which might be spoken, but not published, with a view to dissemination?" As they considered the solution of this question to throw a light on the subject, they allowed it to be given in evidence, though not to be adduced as a justification. The last instance he should bring forward would be that of high treason. It was well known to several members, that in the case of lord Russell (a less indulgent case he could not mention, for he had a right by statute to denominate it a murder), the evidence of Dr. Tillotson was admitted to prove that his lordship's habits of life were moral: even against the imputation of high treason was this evidence allowed, to show the improbability of such guilt being compatible with opposite habits of life. In the case of Mr. Home Tooke also, who was tried for high treason in the year 1794, a book which he wrote in 1782, was permitted to be put in as evidence of his loyalty. He alluded to his celebrated Letter addressed to Mr. Dunning, upon the subject of parliamentary reform, and luckily for Mr. Tooke, there happened to be in that letter, together with many constitutional doctrines, some very satisfactory proofs of his loyalty. Upon that ground the book was tendered as evidence, and upon that ground it was received. It was not, of course, considered as a justification, but it went to prove the probability or improbability of a man using the question of parliamentary reform in 1794? as a cloak to cover purposes of high treason, who, in 1782, had written upon the same subject with much loyalty.

These were the instances he had thought fit to produce, and he might produce numberless others to show, that although it was not allowed to give truth in evidence, yet all other circumstances were admitted which tended to show the motives of the party. The question then was, what was there in the nature of truth that it should not be taken into the account? Why should that only be omitted which in many cases was conclusive-in all was of weight;—conclusive where the charges—were false, and of weight where they were true. It was needless for him to attempt to convince the House of the materiality of truth in all cases; there could scarcely be any one circumstance so material; but it was quite enough to show that this might be material; or rather he should call on those who negatived the position to show that it was immaterial in the bulk of cases If they could show that this was wholly beside the question—wholly immaterial—then he would retire at once. He had mentioned the hardship it was to a defendant to be put on his trial with his right arm (if he might use the expression) thus tied up, and he should not insist much on the fact that the present system limited the freedom of discussion on public matters of every description: this would be admited by all; but they would rely, in answer, on the probable mischiefs which would ensue from letting in the truth, which, they would allege, would amount to a greater inconvenience than the present restrictions on political discussion. But there was no one point in which the present question was more material than that which related to libels on private character. When he referred to the evil arising from the restriction of political discussion, and compared it with the mischief to which the character of every one was now subject, much as he regretted the former, he should, if obliged to confine redress to one of the evils, prefer remedying the latter. With regard to this, the best that could be said was, that the press was, like the air, " a chartered libertine," and that we must be content to suffer a little in private character for the sake of preserving that liberty; but he had said enough to show that this liberty degenerated, in many instances, into absolute licentiousness; and he considered that licentiousness to arise from this cause, that there was no public person to watch over the property or character of individuals. By the inveterate practice of our law, wrong suffered by a private person could only be redressed by that person himself. When a man's character was attacked, be the pain and injury he suffered ever so great,—be the person who made the attack the most malicious of men, and his motives the most iniquitous,—it was a thousand to one he escaped with impunity. He should be asked, did the law afford no redress? Why did not the injured individual come forward? He would tell the House what was the remedy offered in theory, and what was its result in practice. The reasons why the injured individual did not come forward were these: there were two ways pointed out for redress—by action and by indictment. Suppose the remedy by action was preferred, the accuser was, indeed, defied to prove the truth; but the injured person went into court for a verdict, and then, after running the gauntlet of having all his affairs exposed to the impertinence or pruriency of public animadversion—after submitting to a speech from the defendant's counsel ten times worse than the original libel—after all the expense of a trial, and the risk of being turned round on a point of law, he appeals to a jury for damages to estimate the value of his character; and those who knew how juries were composed (and he meant not to say any thing disrespectful of them) would probably agree with him, that, for the worst injury done to a private individual's character, they would be very apt to give most inadequate damages. Thus a plaintiff would go out of court, with an ingenious speech from his counsel, with another from the counsel employed on the opposite side (rather than bear which he would perhaps have endured ten such libels as that of which he complained), and damages to the amount of 40l. or 50l. He knew it would be said, that higher damages were sometimes given; and a case had lately occurred, that of Webster versus Baldwin, in which 2,000l. damages were awarded. But here he could not avoid observing, that juries frequently assessed damages on extrinsic circumstances, that should have been entirely left out of their consideration. They were sometimes rather guided in their determination by the greatness of the names that garnished the record, than by the nature and extent of the injury stated in the declaration. He had seen thousands awarded, where the parties filled elevated situations in society, while those of less exalted rank, although the injury was much greater, did not recover hundreds. The proceeding, by action, seemed to him, in the present state of the law, to be liable to great objections. Those objections were felt by individuals, and, therefore, they did not choose to adopt such a mode. The emolument which the slanderer accumulated by the propagation of his calumny, constituted the fund out of which the person aggrieved was to be remunerated in damages. The libeller broke open the recesses of an individual's private life—he held them up as a source of profit, to public observation—he absolutely coined the character of his victim—and out of what he had gained in this base manner, the person accused was paid, perhaps, 100l. or 150l. Safety could only be found in a criminal prosecution; and he should never advise an individual to institute an action for libel, if it were not for the one material point, which formed a principal subject of their present consideration. If he went into court, to prosecute a person who had slandered him, he did not defy the defendant to prove the truth of his charge. On the contrary, by taking such a course, he seemed to admit the truth of the accusation; and, in fact, the public were always ready to suppose a charge to be true, when the person aggrieved instituted a criminal prosecution against the accuser. On such occasions, it was observed, that the plaintiff would not have had recourse to this mode, but for the purpose of preventing the defendant from proving the truth of what he had alleged. This was practically the reason why men did not like to prosecute for libel. But if the defendant were allowed the power, in cases of civil prosecutions for libel, to prove the fact, not as a ground of justification, but as a matter worthy of being considered by the jury, all the objections against this course of proceeding would be done away. Every man would then have a powerful weapon to punish his traducer, and a sufficient shield to protect his character from the imputation of having selected this particular mode, in order to prevent his opponent from establishing the truth of what he had asserted. By making this alteration, additional facility would be given to freedom of discussion, and additional security would be afforded to the rights of private character. For all offences against the state there was an effectual remedy. No person could libel the government with impunity, because it was not liable to those feelings which actuated private individuals. The only character which was not thouroughly protected, and for which retributive justice was not provided, in case of libellous attacks, was that which was likely to suffer more from such attacks, than could be inflicted by the most licentious observations made by the press on the government.

Before he proceeded to state the remedies he meant to propose, he should call the attention of the House to the inconsistencies in principle, by which truth was excluded in some cases, and admitted in others. In 1735, when lord Hardwicke presided in the court of King's-bench, the right of pleading the truth in justification, was denied. Since that time, however, it was allowed, that the truth, in all cases of action for libel, might be pleaded as matter of justification. Why, he would ask, should it not also be allowed where a criminal prosecution was resorted to? Because, it was said, in the latter case there was no private feeling or motive, as there was in the former. This principle, however, was not at all borne out by the practice. A private individual might apply to the court for a criminal information, in case of libel, and, in that proceeding, he was called on to state the truth, in an affidavit. This did not take place at the trial, but on the discussion that arose when the rule was moved for. On such an occasion, the plantiff must swear that the libel was false—although he was not prosecuting for damages, nor for a private injury. He was prosecuting for the public in the king's name. He was only prosecuting as a witness. Why, therefore, had he a right to be more rectus in curiâ here, than if he brought his case before the grand jury? He here asked for an extraordinary intervention of the court, who would not grant it without a positive affidavit that the libel was false; but, if he went before the grand jury, and they found a bill, no opportunity was given on the trial, of hearing evidence as to the truth or falsehood of the libel: it was quite sufficient to prove it. Now, with respect to the application for a criminal information, it was what the public had a right to, if that was the speediest and most proper way of putting an end to a business of this kind. But the conduct pursued by the court showed that such application was, in fact, a private matter, although the proceeding was of a criminal nature; for the plaintiff was called on to waive his right of a private action, and must waive it before the application was made: which was a course quite inconsistent with the idea of a prosecution for a public wrong. It appeared to him, however, that the proving the libel to be true, was not a sufficient justification; for which reason it followed, that neither, in a private action for damages, nor in a public criminal prosecution, should the truth be taken as a justification—but, in each case, it ought to go to the jury for their consideration. Much injury might be done to the feelings of a man, by dragging his affairs before the public, and giving a true statement of them. The truth, in such a case, might add to the greatness of the injury. Yet in a civil action, if the truth were proved it was a sufficient answer to the plaintiff. Many cases might be imagined, and such cases often occurred, where, according to the common adage, " The greater the truth, the greater the libel." If, therefore, a change were made at all in the law on this point, it ought to be, that neither in a civil action, nor in a criminal prosecution, for a public or a private libel, the truth should be received as entirely justifying the defendant, but it should be suffered to go to the jury as matter for their consideration. In civil actions it would guide them in assessing the amount of damages; in criminal proceedings it would enable them to judge whether the defendant acted from malicious motives, or from feelings of a public nature. He could also imagine cases in which public libels might be true, and yet their truth might be injuriously stated. For example it might be true to state that previsions were dear, but if that statement were made to a multitude, in an inflammatory and exaggerated manner, it would be a libel. In the same manner, to address troops upon the subject of their pay in such a way as tended to excite disaffection or mutiny, would be libellous, even though the matter stated were true, and harmless if stated in a different manner. So, in a case which had been tried, where a regiment embarking for foreign service, were told that the ship in which they were to go was leaky, the offence was punished. Now it might have been true (in that particular case, however, it was not) that the ship was in that condition, and yet the exigencies of the state at a particular period of the war might have rendered such a thing inevitable, and the mentioning it in an exaggerated manner would be an offence. In the same way, reports spread with regard to invasion, the succession to the Crown, and other state affairs, though perfectly true, yet the law held to be punishable under certain circumstances. It was, therefore, no part of his plan, either in civil or criminal cases, to make the truth, even when proved, a defence of libel, but merely that it should be taken into the account—that it should be given as evidence—that it should go to the jury, and come within the scope of their inquiry, when they assessed what they might think fit and adequate damages

To the great changes in the present state of the law, to which the carrying into effect of those views and principles which he entertained would lead, he was aware, that there might be great and important objections. He did not, however, despair of being able to offer a satisfactory answer to them all, The first lie was prepared to meet was, that in a prosecution for libel, proceeding on its tendency to disturb the peace, and not on its injurious effect on character, the truth or falsehood of the matter alleged was or no consequence, and should not be brought into view. The answer to this, he thought, was easy, and would be completely satisfactory, or even irresistible. This allegation of a breach of the peace was merely a fiction of the law, merely a reason for giving the court jurisdiction, merely a creature of judicial refinement, similar to that of a father recovering damages for the seduction of his daughter. The action in this latter case was not brought ostensibly to punish the seducer, or to obtain compensation for the injury his family had sustained, but proceeded on the ground that he had been deprived of the benefit of her services, and was entitled to damages for the loss. The tarnished honour of his family—his own wounded feelings—the degradation and disgrace of his child were all left out of the view of the law, and the father considering his daughter as his servant, of whose service she was deprived, came forward under the authority of law merely with a claim of compensation for those services. Who was there, however, in practice, that ever looked upon the matter in this light, and how ridiculous would it be in cases of seduction to allot damages on the only principle that a legal fiction allowed? In case of libel the legal fiction proceeded on the idea that character was nothing, and that the tendency to a breach of the peace, was every tiling; but why adhere to such a fallacy? Why not admit that character was of some value, that it was property which deserved protection, and that the robbery of our goods and chattels would infer the punishment of death? The robbery of our good name, which was dearer to us than any other species of possession, deserved a certain degree of punishment, although the act had no tendency to create tumult or a Breach of the peace. But if any thing could prove the futility of this objection, it was the second answer that he would return to it. If the tendency to a breach of the peace was the only ground of proceeding in cases of libel, how came it that this tendency to a crime was punished with more severity than the offense itself? When a riot was excited, when violence ensued—in short, when the peace was broken, the punishment was often of small importance, while the penalties of libel were frequently very severe. In some cases, three or six months imprisonment were awarded for a breach of the peace, while a year, or two years, with a heavy fine, were adjudged to the publication of libel. Here the tendency to crime was punished more heavily than the crime itself. Did not an absurd inference like this show the fallacy of the premises from which it was legitimately drawn, and consequently that a breach of the peace was not the true ground of proceeding in cases of libel? He might exemplify the absurdity of this principle, and show how different the practice was from the fiction of law, by appealing to the case of duelling. Suppose that, instead of publishing defamatory matter calculated to break the peace, a party challenged another to fight a duel; suppose they went out, suppose even death ensued, or that one of them hilled his antagonist, then would no punishment follow this outrage unless these were some unfairness in the transaction. This was the practice of the law, and this was the spirit of its present administration. The law, however, could not contemplate this unfairness; it merely considered the act, and should pronounce judgment accordingly. It decreed no punishment here for an actual breach of the peace; but in the case of libel it punished the tendency to it. Consummation of crime was privileged with impunity, while the steps to it were punished with severity. He did not complain of the practice of the courts in their leniency to acts such as he had mentioned—he merely brought the instance forward to show the absurdity of grounding the actual justification of the law of libel on a pretended allegation of a tendency to break the peace.

There was another objection to the receiving of evidence, with the intention of establishing the truth in cases of libel, of greater importance than that to which he had replied. It might be said, that if proof were to be received, the object of the slanderer might sometimes be accomplished, as he had only to publish his libel, and force the prosecutor into court on an issue with regard to his character. To this objection it might be considered a sufficient answer, that the defendant would be obliged not only to establish the truth of his assertions, but to remove the charge of malice. He would not only have to justify his statements by showing their conformity to truth, but his motives, by demonstrating their consistency with right intention. The second answer to this objection was, that it would be the prosecutor's own fault if he permitted the attention of the jury to be diverted from the original charge against the defendant to a question regarding his own character. What was the effect of the present practice in cases of libel? When the plaintiff chose to proceed by action, the truth, and the truth alone, was put in issue. When he proceeded by criminal prosecution, the truth of the libellous statements was not regularly put in issue, but the prosecutor's character suffered more than if they were regularly examined. Did it not almost always happen that insinuations were liberally dealt out—that hints were made—that the jury, the court, and the public, by means of the defendant's counsel, were let into all the facts they could desire? The legal assistants of the defendant were in the habit of lamenting that the hands of their client were tied up, otherwise he would have established his charge; and that the prosecutor chose to proceed by indictment, where he was sure the truth could not be listened to, rather than by an action of damages, where it certainly would have been turned against him. The hon. and learned gentleman here appealed to the attorney-general, and described the able and adroit manner in which he, if he were counsel for a defendant in a criminal prosecution for a libel, would use the privilege of the bar to aggravate or confirm the original allegations. All the facts would be brought by a side-wind before the jury, and would make an impression the more unfavourable in proportion as they were undefined in their nature, and eked out with surmises, suspicions, hints, and insinuations, the mists of which a rigorous examination would scatter. There could, therefore, be no hardship to the prosecutor in the change of the law which he proposed. But it might be said that the officers of the Crown, by collusion with the defendant, might prosecute in the name of a third party, or nominal prosecutor, for the purpose of enabling themselves to defame the character of the latter, and to fix a stigma upon it by false testimony in the trial of an issue with regard to its correctness or purity. This danger he thought completely chimerical. No attorney-general would be so base as to join in such a plot, or, if he did, his right to grant ex-offficio information should be taken from him. There was another answer if an objection so absurd deserved one. Neither the jury nor the court would permit a conspiracy of this kind to succeed. His last answer was, that the offended party might choose whether, in the face of the facts with which he was acquainted, he could with safety proceed against the defendant or not. With regard to any injury he could do his character by allowing it to be brought to trial before a jury, he did not hesitate to say that the injury was greater as the law at present stood.

On these grounds he thought the measure he proposed might be defended, and many practical advantages pointed out as resulting, from its adoption, to the freedom of the press—to its proper regulation—to the security of private virtue and public character. He would therefore state the sum of the changes he contemplated in the law of libel. The first of them went to abolish the distinction between written and overt libel, and oral or spoken slander. It was well known that words which were not actionable when spoken, only became so when put on paper or published. Here the hon. and learned gentleman stated several cases, and particularly a decision pronounced by lord Mansfield upon a case argued before the twelve judges. The next change he proposed to embody in the measure which he was about to move for leave to introduce was, to allow the cognizance or the non-cognizance of the defendant, under whose ostensible authority the libel issued, to be put in evidence on his trial. Suppose, as had lately happened, that the person prosecuted was absent, or in prison, or beyond seas, when his servants or agents published the libel for which he was indicted, it appeared preposterously unjust that he who knew nothing of its contents, and whose interest it might materially injure, should be additionally punished for that of which he was entirely ignorant, and which he had no means of suppressing. Much caution might be necessary in receiving pleas of ignorance: but the duty of examining them might fairly be left to the jury—last of all, he would allow evidence of the truth of alleged libel to be laid before the jury, with the view of modifying or guiding their decision, as he had formerly explained. He meant to make a provision, that the defendant should give notice to the prosecutor that, when put on trial, he intended to, offer proof to establish his statements.

The hon. and learned gentleman now came to the jurisdiction of the courts, and the form of proceeding in these cases. First, he should apply himself to the privilege of ex-officio informations, in case of libel, and next to the custom of trying such causes before special juries. He was sure they would not now hear the propriety of continuing the ex-officio system defended on the ground so frequently advanced in former times, namely, the necessity of proceeding with as much dispatch as possible, on those cases which the attorney general prosecuted:—because, in point of fact, very little time was saved by this mode of proceeding. The grand jury sat six times in the course of the year, in every county, except Middlesex, and there they were assembled oftener; and, therefore, every necessary dispatch would be insured by going before them. Why should not a minister of state, if libelled, take the regular course of preferring his bill before the grand jury ? Why should there be one law for him and another for his fellow subjects ? The fact was, that, in most cases, the government did not choose to go before the grand jury, because the latter were disposed to throw out their bills. They saw, therefore, that it was a more sure, though not a more speedy way, to put a man on his trial, by means of an ex-officio information, than by taking the sense of twelve good and awful men, on their oaths. Now, there could be but one reason for the grand jury being inclined to throw out bills preferred by government. It was not because they were corrupt; but because they took into their consideration this fact, that the truth could not be given in evidence on the part of the defendant, and, therefore, they were cautious of putting him on his trial, under such a disadvantage. If evidence of the truth were allowed, their scruples would be removed, and they would be as ready to find bills for public, as for private libels. He objected to the existence of this ex-officio authority, by which the attorney-general might put a man to the expense of 100l. or 150l., without bringing him to trial. He might keep an ex-officio information hanging over the head of an individual, during his life. He had only to file the information, which he might try immediately—defer to the next year—or never bring to an issue. On one occasion, nine years ago, twenty-five informations were filed, not one of which was yet brought to trial.

And here he felt it necessary to point out the manner in which the literary supporters of ministers were treated, and which would prove how liable this ex-officio power was to abuse. During the period in which his hon. and learned friend (sir A. Piggott) held the office of attorney-general, he filed but one information, that was for an atrocious libel, which charged the then administration with providing vessels that were not sea-worthy, for the transport of troops on the point of being sent abroad. If ever there was a case which demanded prosecution, even supposing the statement to be true, this was that case; but so far-was the statement from being true, that it was a direct and unqualified falsehood, and hence his hon. and learned friend was the more imperiously called upon to proceed with the prosecution. At this period, however, the administration to which his hon. and learned friend was attached went out of office, and he was of course succeeded by another attorney-general. What was the conduct of this new officer? Did he proceed with the prosecution of a man who had thus sent forth to the world one of the most foul and malignant slanders that could possibly be published, with a view to excite mutiny and disaffection, at a moment when all the energies of the British force were about to be called into action. He would answer no; and why? because this offender was stated to have given up his author, and the apology received for this conduct was, that he had only published the libel. It was a fact, that from that day forth the author had never been found, and yet the proceedings had been stopped altogether. Here was an instance which proved that the power might be abused, and hence he contended, that it ought not to be allowed to exist any longer. He was willing to admit that his hon. and learned friend, who now held the office of attorney-general, had but in one instance during his public duties, exercised this power, and in that instance he believed he was influenced by the information of others—he alluded to the case of the King v. Sutton. This very circumstance afforded him an additional ground in support of his proposition; for as there were now no libels of such a nature as called for the interference of government—as every thing was quiet and unruffled, he thought this a fit opportunity for revising this most important chapter of the law. The right of replying on the part of the Crown appeared to him to be another abuse, which might with propriety be altered, as a remnant of barbarous jurisprudence.

With respect to the third point in the measure he should propose to introduce, he conceived it sufficient to state, that in all cases of libel prosecuted by information ex-officio the Crown never went to trial without a special jury. All other crimes and misdemeanors, felony, and even the highest crime known to the law, high treason, were always tried before a common jury. He saw no reason for giving to the Crown, in the instance of libel, a right of selection which it did not possess in any other case. It appeared to him, therefore, that the only argument which could be urged on the other side was one founded on the aversion to innovate at all on the legal institutions of the country. Excellent, however, as the system was, the lapse of time had introduced blemishes which it would be more beneficial to its interests to convert into beauties, than to regard as parts of its perfection. Upon all these grounds, after apologizing for the length of time which he had occupied the attention of the House, the hon. and learned gentleman begged leave to move, " That leave be given to bring in a bill for securing and extending the Liberty of the Press."

seconded the motion.

said, that he had listened with all the attention which was due to the importance of the subject, and to his hon. and learned friend's manner of treating it. He had no inclination to resist the introduction of any measure professing such an object, however strongly he might feel it his duty, when it should be before the House, to oppose in all their parts the alterations recommended by his hon. and learned friend. He felt it a duty he owed to the established system of legal administration to protest against changes of such a nature and extent, without any proof that they were called for either by necessity or convenience. With regard to the justification by truth, he should reserve himself for a future occasion on that branch of the discussion; and content himself for the present with reminding his hon. and learned friend, that no official information ever issued from the attorney-general's office in cases of private prosecution. Upon the general subject of these informations he was happy to observe, that his hon. and learned friend had distinguished himself from those who, in reference to this question, maintained that the present times were worse than the times of our ancestors. The attorney-general said, he considered that the power of filing these informations was a power extremely useful, if not essential to the safety of the state in troublesome times. It ought to be lodged somewhere, and whether where it was now placed, or in the Hands of some other officer of the Crown, made but little difference in the present question. It was observable, too, that it was a power, of which the instances were admitted to be few in which it had been abused. It was not the business of the attorney-general to hunt out libels; the suggestions came from a variety of quarters; and if he had instituted but one prosecution, it was not from the absence of numerous applications. Though he had filled the office but a short time, he had assisted at the consultation of his predecessors for thirty years, and from them he had learned that it was more advisable to avoid than to multiply prosecutions. The single case of the King against Sutton, where he had proceeded by information, was one of a most flagrant nature—an attempt to inflame an insurgent populace to a continuance of their disorders. It was in cases of this kind, and when it might not be so prudent to leave the peace of a district to the decision of grand juries surrounded by a tumultuary multitude, that the proceeding by information seemed peculiarly expedient. He could easily conceive that it might be proper to commence two dozen of prosecutions on an emergency, and be satisfied with one conviction, after the restoration of tranquillity had made it desirable to bury all past offences in oblivion. Adverting then, to the last topic of his hon. and learned friend's speech—the employment of special juries on trials of libel prosecuted by the Crown—it ought not to be forgotten that the subject had, both in civil and criminal cases, the option of a special jury. This appeared to have been allowed because it was thought hard that in a complicated case, or one which rested on a construction of motives, the defendant should be denied the privilege of having his case submitted to intelligent as well as upright men. Nothing could be more unfounded than the jealousy of special juries, nor more absurd than the calumny that they were packed. A common jury was selected from the constable's return. When a special jury was to be struck, the sheriff, or his deputy, attended the master of the crown-office, with an agent for each party. The book was then opened and forty-eight selected, from whom each party struck twelve, so that it was impossible for any man to say which twelve out of the remaining twenty-four would form the jury on the trial. With these explanations he should not oppose the present motion, but content himself with observing, that the proposed measure appeared to him to be a dangerous interference in the existing system of administering this branch of the criminal law.

to be allowed to take this opportunity of entering his protest against the alterations in the law proposed by his hon. and learned friend, whose motion was before the House. As to the proposal of allowing the truth of a libel to be given in evidence, he thought it would prove destructive of social comfort. It would allow a man, who had committed a wrong, by publishing what he had no right to publish, if called to account for this, to put his accuser on his defence. There was no man who might have been guilty of any imprudence in the course of his life, of which he might have well repented—who might have by his future conduct retrieved his character—and who might be enjoying happiness in the bosom of his family, who might not have his deservedly re-established character destroyed, and his fortune ruined by any malicious person in a pamphlet or newspaper, bringing up this circumstance forgotten and repented of. When such a libeller was brought to trial, he had only to prove the truth of the libel, according to the proposed alteration, and then he would come off victorious. And this libeller might, day after day, or year after year, repeat the publication of the libel, and when called to account, get off by proving the truth of it. Would not such a case show the impolicy, the injustice, of such an alteration in the law? As to the power of the attorney-general to file a criminal information for libel, it was a power indispensable to the due discharge of his duties, and which had not been proved to have been in any case abused. With respect to special juries, if there was any one case in which, more than in any other, it was desirable to refer to them, that case was a case of libel. Much better was it that it should be judged by a jury of enlightened men, than by one composed of the lower and more ignorant orders of society. Unless he was extraordinarily mistaken, the more the House considered this subject, the less likely it was that they would adopt the bill moved for by his hon. and learned friend, to the introduction of which, however, it was not his intention to object.

admitted that the question was one of much importance, and embraced a wide field of discussion. Among other subjects in a manner connected with it, was one not hitherto adverted to, namely, the way in which the characters of most respectable individuals who, being absent, or not belonging to the House, had no opportunity of defending themselves, were attacked by hon. members. The mode of attack was in some cases both unfair and unmanly. A case of this sort had occurred within his recollection, where the character of an absent individual had been assailed in a manner which threatened not only his property, but his life: by the speech of an hon. gentleman, the person to whom he alluded had been exposed to the blind resentment of a misguided mob [Hear! from Mr. Brougham]. The member who had made the injurious observations afterwards refused either to retract or explain them. Under such circumstances, no means of redress were left to the suffering party but to appeal to a tribunal of the last resort; and when the member was invited to it, his answer was, that he would meet the person whose resentment he had provoked, with the Speaker for his second, and the Sergeant at arms for his bottle-holder [Hear, hear!]. If some remedy for this grievance could be inserted in the bill of the hon. and learned gentleman, a point of some importance would be gained.

begged to be permitted to say a few words in consequence of the most unprecedented and unprovoked attack which he conceived had just been made upon him; an attack which had as little to do with the subject of debate as the remarks of the hon. gentleman, which could have no possible concern with the measure under consideration. He well recollected the circumstance to which reference had been made, though it would have been much better if the hon. gentleman had been contented with plain terms, instead of resorting to a metaphor couched in language so refined and delicate, that the House would willingly dispense with, its repetition. With regard to the fact, it was necessary to remind the House of, some circumstances unconnected with the question before it [Cries of question]. He had a right to be heard in reply to the charge of the hon. gentleman, who had not been interrupted while making one of the most irrelevant and disorderly speeches ever heard within the walls of parliament. In the course of an inquiry four years ago, in a committee of the whole House, a witness had been called to the bar and examined, upon whose testimony he (Mr. B.) had made such remarks as appeared necessary: in doing so he had consulted no man—least of all the witness himself, and still less than least of all—if such a degree of comparison could be allowed—the hon. gentleman who had now chosen to interpose. The opinion which he had delivered was strong and pointed against the conduct of the witness; that opinion he was now ready to repeat, if necessary: and he was not to be deterred, either by the conduct of the hon. gentleman's friend out of doors, or by the still less regular proceeding of the hon. gentleman within doors. He had spoken at that time sitting as a judge upon the conduct of the witness; but soon afterwards he received a letter from that witness, inclosing a copy of his (Mr. Brougham's) speech, printed in one of the newspapers, and requesting him to state if it were accurately reported. In declining to give an answer to such a demand, he was persuaded he had only acted as every other member would have done; for he was yet to learn, that the privileges of parliament were so completely at an end, that, after having retired from the business of the session, and after having discharged important public duties, a member of the House of Commons was to be compelled to become a corrector, forsooth, of the newspaper reports of debates. Where was the boasted freedom of discussion, if members were bound to answer such interrogatories? As the desire, however, was conveyed in civil terms, the refusal to comply with it was also civil, but short. Near the close of the session he had, however, received a letter from the same witness, very different from the former, containing the most foul and unfounded aspersions upon the character of a member of parliament, and making as deep an inroad into the invaluable rights of members as could be found on the journals at any period when the privileges of parliament were at the lowest ebb. This letter repeated the former demand, accompanied by a threat, and the reply to it was a repeated refusal, with the addition of a piece of advice for the government of the writer of the threat; recommending him to take care how he proceeded further in the line of conduct he was pursuing, since if he persisted he might find it somewhat inconvenient to himself. He heard no further upon the subject until three weeks afterwards, when he was two hundred miles from London, on professional business: the witness took that opportunity of publishing the correspondence, but, though strongly advised by his friends to bring the gentleman to the bar of the House, he had not thought it right to proceed to that extremity: he now regretted his forbearance, partly on account of circumstances that had since happened, and partly on account of the most judicious conduct of the hon. gentleman, who on this night stood forward as the friend of the witness. He had been induced not to call the witness to the bar by several circumstances, and mainly by one which the publisher of the letters had duly considered, namely, that the session was within three or four days of its termination, and the imprisonment which the House could inflict would, therefore, only be of very short duration. The hon. gentleman had thrown out a hint which was easily understood—that, instead of resorting to the House, he (Mr. B.) ought to have given another kind of answer to the invitation sent [Mr. Marryat shook his head]. It was vain for the hon. gentleman to shake his head: not a man in the House could mistake what was meant; and, should he select his elegant phraseology from all quarters of the town, it would be impossible for the hon. member to convince the House that he intended to convey any other meaning. If ever he was prevailed upon to give such a reply as that alluded to, it would be after considering well his own and the feelings of the individual who supposed himself injured; but there was one species of person who never should possess the smallest influence over his conduct in this respect, because the least worthy of such an answer—a man who took upon himself the part of an interferer for the sake of renewing and promoting personal altercation [Loud cheers].

denied that he had said that the hon. gentleman ought to have given the personal satisfaction required; but after it had been publicly and un foundedly asserted in the House, that an iudividual, who employed in his manufactories 2,000 workmen, had stated that bread and water was food good enough for the lower classes, it would have been but fair for the member who had made that assertion to explain or retract it. This was all he had intended to state; and looking at the sort of license which some gentlemen allowed themselves, he must say that the true line to be observed in debate, where the characters of individuals were involved, was " ne quid falsi dicere audeat, ne quid veri non audeat."

added, that he was not the only person who had misunderstood the hon. member who had unjustly accused him of refusing to give any explanation as to the correctness or incorrectness of his speech.

spoke to order, and said that such discussions being unconnected with the question before the House, were much better discontinued.

The question upon the original motion being put,

said, that he should reserve his remarks upon the objections urged to his proposition until a future stage when the bill should be before the House. With regard to what had just transpired, he wished to subjoin, that he had on a former occasion given an explanation of the charge he had made against the witness whose cause was advocated by the honourable member; he had then stated, that a part of the speech, as reported in the newspapers, was correct, while another part was erroneous.

Leave was then given to bring in the bill.

moved the order of the day for taking into further consideration the report of the committee on the Bank Restriction bill.

said, he felt it his duty to oppose the measure in its present form, and contended that a clause was required to compel the directors of the Bank to make preparations to resume cash payments at the end of two years. By their silence they had admitted that they would do nothing in consequence of the mere suggestion in the preamble; and be was convinced that the desirable object of a gold currency would not be attained. What he particularly wished to remind the House of was, that by this restrictive measure the House was making the directors of the Bank of England its masters, and that the country was perfectly at their discretion, if parliament suffered them to have the power of refusing to give specie for their own paper. The public, he maintained, could be considered as neither more nor less than enslaved by the Bank, if such a power was allowed. It was but about ten days ago that he had observed in the London Gazette a notice that the Bank would, he believed in October, call in the 5s. 6d. bank tokens, and that new tokens would be issued, paying, however, not less than eight at a time. Such was the notice of the directors, but what did it amount to? —a direct order and command that any person receiving money at the Bank should be obliged to take at least eight of these tokens. He begged the House to consider what an extensive power was thus granted to the Bank; for if at one period the directors were allowed to issue not less than eight at a time, it would soon amount to 80, 800, 8,000, or what number they should choose to name. He did not rest these opinions merely upon himself; they were also those of many hon. gentlemen better acquainted with the subject than himself; and he considered that he should be wanting in his duty both to the House and to the country, if he did not move by way of amendment, That the report of the bill be taken into further consideration this day six months.

thought that the House had had ample and abundant proof of the profligacy of the measure about to be adopted by parliament; and conceived that it would be a dereliction of his duty if he did not strenuously resist a system which, in every light, appeared to him most unjustifiable and indecent; and applying, as he did, his observations to the system, he did not hesitate to say, that that system upon which the Bank conducted themselves to the public, was that of a usurious money-lender, who had been lucky enough to get into his clutches one who cared not how or in what manner his life or his fortune were spent or squandered away. As long as he had the honour of a seat in the House, and God gave him health, he would enter his protest against a measure which he should always consider as one which took the money out of the pockets of those who could but ill afford it, and enriched those who had already amassed too great a wealth by usurious means.

wished to make a few observations on what had fallen from the noble lord before the question was put. It had been said that the Bank would be bound to comply with any measure parliament might judge most proper to adopt. He could not deny but that the directors were compelled so to comply, but the court would not be called upon to state what particular construction the Bank might put upon any precise expression which might have been used; this, again, was construed into a reluctance to give proper information, and a design to conceal some hidden secret; but, however anxious the directors might be, under different circumstances, to give this information to the House, it must be confessed that the manner in which it was sought did not give much encouragement to those by whom it was possessed to divulge it. He was perfectly ready to admit, as an individual, that at the end of the two years the Bank ought to be considered as in some measure bound to restore cash payments; but the noble lord had asserted that there was no notoriety which proved the necessity of this restrictive measure. It seemed to have been quite forgotten by his noble friend, that during the last war there was no possibility of any mass of gold being collected into the country, on account of the state of exchanges, and that until the change which had taken place little more than a month, the gold had been daily going out of the country. It was impossible that that gold could be brought back, although the exchange had taken a favourable turn, either in a day or a month; but a much longer period was requisite; and it was the opinion of all those who were the most conversant in this question, that two years was not too long a time to allow, before the Bank could safely return to cash payments. If the amendment of the noble lord were agreed to, what would be the consequence? Nothing less than the complete stagnation of trade. The taxes could not be received, and the great wheel, on which the prosperity of the country depended, would be completely checked and clogged up. This reasoning followed naturally from the very arguments of the noble lord, when he asserted, that any reduction in the circulation of the Bank of England notes would be attended with the greatest calamities to the country. Would not a reduction in the circulation, then, so much to be dreaded, be the very consequence of the motion of the noble lord, if agreed to? He felt perfectly confident that no hon. member would vote for the restriction on account of any interest the Bank of England could have in the question; and he could assure the House that the very first moment that it might be thought fit and proper to return to cash payments, the Bank would be most ready to comply with the order of parliament.

opposed the amendment. He conceived that it would be an impossibility for the Bank to return now to cash payments without involving the country in new troubles and difficulties.

The question was then put on the amendment, and negatived without a division.

that as it appeared from the observations of his hon. friend (Mr. Baring), that the bill was understood to imply merely, that the Bank should resume payments in cash at the end of two years, he thought it proper to propose a clause, providing that the directors of the Bank should take measures immediately, in order that cash payments might be resumed, at as early a period after the passing of that act, as appeared to them to be expedient.

of the Exchequer remarked, that the motion of the hon. and learned gentleman was similar to that which he had made before, and that on the present occasion he had urged no additional arguments in its favour. Besides, it was merely declaratory of the preamble of the bill, and was therefore unnecessary.

The House divided on the clause, when there appeared,

The report was then agreed to.