, in postponing his motion on this subject, wished to offer his reasons for so doing, He did not withdraw the motion because the subject was not one of the most pressing emergency, but having been prevented from time to time, by the press of other business from bringing it before the House, he found that if he were now to take the first open day, he should be doing the cause no service, as the attendance at this late period was likely to be so thin. He should, therefore, better discharge his duty to the House, and the subject, by giving a general notice of-his intention to bring it forward at an earlier period next session.

observed, that as there might be a long debate on the Habeas Corpus suspension bill, he should rather prefer moving his intended Resolutions on a future day; Tuesday, for instance. They were necessary in order to show the difference of his views from those of the chancellor of the exchequer. He should, therefore, simply move his resolutions with the view of adjourning the debate till Tuesday. He then moved the following Resolutions:

rose, for the purpose of calling the attention of the House to a petition which he held in his hands, involving in it considerations of the highest importance. The petitioner said, he had experienced great sufferings and privations, owing to the error, to say the least of it, of the judge before whom he had lately been tried. It was from Mr. Thomas Wooler, the author of the publication called the "Black Dwarf," at present in confinement in the King's-bench, The petition stated the number of hardships which Mr. Wooler had undergone. In the first place he was taken up and committed to prison on an ex-officio information filed by the attorney-general, and he thus underwent a considerable punishment before he was brought to trial. He was committed under an act brought in by sir Vicary Gibbs, though when brought in, it was never intended that it should be applied in the way in which it had been applied. But as such injustice had taken place under it, it was his duty to propose, and perhaps the House would think proper to do so, the repeal of that act, which had so improperly been applied to objects for which it was not originally intended. The petitioner stated that two ex-officio informations had been filed against him. When he was brought to trial, it was impossible for him to know on which of the informations he was first to be tried; of Course he could not be so well prepared with his defence, as, under other circumstances, he might have been. On that information which was last filed, he was first brought to trial. So much irregularity had taken place on the part of the judge, in taking the verdict that he had put the individual tried in a very extraordinary predicament. In the first place, which was certainly rather a hasty mode of proceeding, the judge received the verdict before the jurymen were all in court. He (sir F. Burdett) happened to be in court at the time, and to be sitting on the same bench with the judge, and he could see only the foreman of the jury. But it was impossible not to see that there was some difficulty with respect to the delivering of the verdict. The foreman, in answer to a question from judge Abbot, whether the verdict was guilty or not said, "The verdict was guilty; but some of us wished to say so and so." The verdict, however, was recorded. But a very short time elapsed, when it was whispered in court that the jury were not agreed as to the verdict. The verdict was hastily taken; and if one could suspect a judge of a wish to entrap a jury into a verdict, he would behave exactly as judge Abbot had done: There were such circumstances attending the delivery of the verdict that it was impossible for any person not to be aware that there was a difference of opinion among the jurors. And under all circumstances but under those circumstances more particularly, it was incumbent on a judge to have had all the jurymen before him, and to have put the question to them, are you agreed as to your verdict? But the thing was not done in that way, and the verdict of guilty was recorded. When the circumstance of a difference of opinion among the jurors was first stated to the court, the judge ought to have inquired if the jurors were or were not separated?—and if not separated, they ought to have been sent back to consider the verdict. It appeared that three of the jurymen were not agreed as to the verdict—that special reasons were given by them, on the condition that if these reasons were not received they did not agree to the verdict. Of this they made affidavit; but the affidavits were not received. And why were they not received? After a great deal of argument had been used, and many precedents had been quoted of the affidavits of jurymen in other times, having been received, it was decided that they could not be received after a rule for a new trial had been granted. Mr. Justice Holroyd, than whom a more conscientious and independent judge never sat on the bench, stated that the affidavits could not be received after such a rule. In this case, Mr. Wooler had no opportunity of urging reasons why the rule should not be granted. But the court made the rule in the first instance, and then made the rule a reason why he was deprived of that to which, according to every principle of justice and equity, he was entitled. It was very hard on Mr. Wooler that the affidavits of the jurymen could not be received, because the court had made a rule, at the request of Mr. attorney-general, against the making of which rule he had no means of arguing. But the circumstances stated in these affidavits were heard by the bystanders in court. One of the jurymen expressed his disagreement with the verdict loud enough to be heard in court. Mr. justice Abbot however found that he had got himself into considerable difficulty in this case. He had received a verdict on which sentence could not be passed and at the same time Mr. Wooler was under confinement till he should be delivered in due course of law; and he could not be delivered till sentence was passed against him; and the verdict at the same time was so vitiated, that no court could venture to pass sentence on him, It was somewhat singular that in an early part of our history the same number of three jurymen disagreed as to a verdict, when the judge proceeding to pass sentence on it, he had the misfortune to get hanged. This was to be found stated in the Mirror of Justices. But in this case the matter was carried still farther than was done by justice Camhden—he put in other three jurors, and the cause was tried over again. But what was now doing in this case? Twelve jurors were put on. These twelve men only who first sat on Wooler could try his cause. They were his only legal tribunal; and yet the court now ruled that not three fresh men, but twelve fresh men should be taken. Now, this was a violation of the first principle of common law, that a man could not be twice in danger for the same offence. There was another instance in the same invaluable book, of a judge who was so unfortunate as to get hanged, because he passed sentence in a case where the jury were doubt-full: for, as the Mirror says, where there is any doubt there ought always to be an acquittal. You cannot, says Mr. Wooler, grant a rule for a new trial, because if the verdict is recorded, no new trial can take place, though the verdict was of such a nature that it set the court at defiance. But Mr. Wooler had the indulgence of the court forced on him, though in his opinion, the word indulgence in a court of law ought never to be used, for a court could only grant what was agreeable to justice. However, the court by way of indulgence endeavoured to impress on Mr. Wooler how much injury he did himself, by allowing a verdict to remain recorded against him. Mr. Wooler, however, was not to be shaken. Let the verdict be what it would, he was resolved not to accept the advice of those who are said to be of counsel for the prisoner. Mr. Wooler would not accept of the indulgence of the court. The court, however like squire Western, who, when he locked his daughter up, said "I will break her heart but I will make her happy," were resolved notwithstanding his protesting against the indulgence, that he should have a new trial. Suppose he were brought out to undergo again a new trial before a new jury, all his defence was already known—he had laid himself completely open to the prosecutor, who might take an unfair advantage of it, and avail himself of circumstances which he had formerly overlooked or neglected. Mr. Wooler was not, therefore, standing in the same situation in which he was when he was first brought before the 12 men who were sworn upon his trial. Under these circumstances were he Mr. Wooler, he would positively refuse to submit to a new trial, and leave the judges to act as they thought proper. He conceived, that standing on the verdict of condemnation he stood equally clear of them. It would become the imperious duty of the House to take into consideration the situation in which the petitioner was placed, owing, to say the least of it, to the overhasty proceeding in the judge.

said, he never was more astonished in his life than at the statement he had just heard, because, with respect to a great many of the facts in the petition, they were altogether without foundation; he spoke of the part more particularly which alluded to himself, if he was meant in what was said respecting the communication with the attorney-general. He undertook to state, that unless his memory of past transactions was gone, he never had had any personal communication with Mr. Wooler, or any agent on his behalf; nor did he ever see him, till he appeaved in court. But if such a communication had been made to him, he would have told Mr. Wooler, that the same proceeding must be observed in his case which was observed in all others. All the communication he had with him was giving him notice that his trial would come on of course after the Easter term, that as he had pleaded, he might not say he was kept in custody till the sittings after Trinity term. It was stated, that the second trial was pressed on him. But the fact was, that so far from being unwilling, when he (the attorney-general) was looking over some papers, and pausing in the proceeding, Wooler's attorney desired to have his warrant, as a sufficient number of special jurymen was not present to pray a tales. So far was it from being true that he had forced on the second trial! Indeed, in his speech to the jury, Mr. Wooler made a sort of triumph that he (the attorney-general) had paused so long before proceeding with the second trial. Now, what passed at the trial. Behind the place where the judge sat, a place was partitioned oft', through which the jury passed when their came back with their verdict. While the second trial was going on, the jury came by that passage into court. The foreman came and two or three others, and the rest were behind them when their names were called over, they either all answered themselves, or twelve voices answered to the names. This he would say, and he would defy any person to contradict it. When the officer of the court asked, guilty or not guilty? The foreman answered guilty; but stated at the same time, that he had a paper in his hands. He undertook, on his solemn honour, to say that he never had had the slightest communication with any juryman who sat on the jury—he knew not even the faces of any of them—he knew nothing of that paper—he knew only that the foreman was a Mr. Powell, a respectable merchant in the city. When the officer asked, guilty or not guilty, the foreman looking at the paper which he held in his hands, answered guilty; but three of the jury wish to give reasons. The answer of the judge was, I shall receive any thing which comes unanimously from the jury; but I cannot receive particular reasons from particular jurymen. What is your verdict? The answer was— My lord, we find the defendant guilty. If those behind him were not all in court they must have heard what the verdict was from the symptoms which were manifested in court on hearing the verdict. When the question was asked, is that your verdict the answer returned was, yes—on which it was recorded. Three quarters of an hour passed, and after the greater part of the jury were gone, after the defendant's solicitor had been out of court, and after conferring with one of the jury-then, and not before, it was stated that the jury were not unanimous in their verdict. It had been laid down by all the authorities, that when a verdict had once been recorded, it could not be altered or retracted; the judge therefore said that nothing could be done there, meaning that application must be made to the court out of which the record had issued. It appeared to him (the attorney-general) most marvellous, if the jury had not agreed in their verdict, that those who dissented should not have stepped their fellows. They knew that some verdict had been given, and that it was not an acquital, as nine of the jury were in favour of a verdect of guilty absolutely. On the first day of term the learned judge, who knew that the whole of the jury were not within his view at the time, and that possibly all of them did not hear what had passed, felt it his duty to state the circumstances in court. He (the attorney-general) suggested, that the facts should be made out I in some manner by the affidavits of the by-slanders. The court then said, that if there was a doubt whether all the jury were within the view of the court, a new trial would be granted on the application of the party, on which he, in the character of the advocate of the crown, anxious that not the least injustice should be done, begged a new trial. The attorney of Mr. Wooler objected to this, and wished either a verdict for an acquittal, or a trial by the same jury. Could he reasonably demand a verdict of acquittal, when nine men were for returning an absolute verdict of guilty, and three merely for adding their reasons? If the verdict had taken its course, and it had appeared that the court could not pass judgment on it, the course would have been to award a venire de novo, which is a new trial by another jury. When any mistake occurred, lord Coke, and all others agreed that such a new trial must be granted. Yet Mr. Wooler complained that he was used with hardship, because he had been treated according to every principle of law, and objected to that which was awarded him ex debito justitœ. He therefore contended that the complaints of the petition were unfounded, that some of the statements to which he referred were untrue, and that it could only have been intended to bring the administration of justice into contempt.

asked the learned gentleman, whether the names of the jurors were called over? whether the clerk had asked them if they had agreed in their verdict? whether their foreman should speak for them? and whether they consented?

said, that the questions were asked such as the right hon. gentleman had stated them; but he could not say whether all the jury repiled that their foreman should speak for them.—such was not usual. It was rather customary for the clerk to say the words, "Does your foremen speak for you?" and the silence of the jury implies their assent. In this case, the judge asked the jury, "Are you agreed in your verdict?" "yes, my lord," was the reply of the foreman, "but—" "I cannot receive the reasons of a pant of the jury," said the judge, "what is your verdict?—"Guilty, my lord," was again the reply.

was of opinion, from the information he had just received, that the proceedings in question were perfectly regular. He wished to know on what grounds the new trial had been granted?

answered, that the court was not satisfied that the verdict was returned in such a way that it could form the foundation of judgment.

wished to know whether the foreman, after saying "yes," had not added—"but."

said, that the word "but" was not used that he recollected.

never heard the word, "but," on that occasion.

was perfectly satisfied with the explanation of his two learned friends. If credit was to be given to the attorney-general, and, from long knowledge of him, he had every reason to believe his statement, the assertion of Wooler, that he was obliged, after having been exhausted, to enter upon the other trial, was incorrect, as the immediate succession of the second trial was of his own seeking.

said, he was certainly going on with the other trial, but Mr. Wooler's attorney seeing him pausing, and believing that he was not ready to go en, sent him a note demanding a warrant for proceeding immediately.

said, he understood the attorney-general quite well. Though the solicitor wrote the note, Wooler took credit with the jury for greater readiness to proceed than the prosecutors showed. This was quite irreconcileable with the charge in the petition, that he was hurried on while exhausted with the other trial. Such a contradiction affected the credit of the whole petition. He wished so dishonourable a contradiction could be explained. He could not but greatly lament one omission which had confessedly taken place on the trial.— Before he alluded to this omission, he thought it right to disclaim the slightest wish of casting an imputation upon Mr. Justice Abbott, or to insinuate that there sat on the bench in this country any judge of a time-serving character, or who, in the discharge of his duty, looked for any other reward than the approbation of his own conscience. The omission to which he alluded was, that the learned judge should not, at the instant of the appearance of a disagreement among the jury, have taken the very obvious step of suggesting that then was their time fully to consider the nature of their verdict, and of seeing at the instant, what struck him not a great many hours afterwards, when he made the candid and ingenious statement to his brother judges, that there was a possibility of all the jury not being within hearing when the foreman addressed the Court.—He was also at a loss to account for the two very unusual questions put by the judge when the verdict was given, namely, "Gentlemen, are you agreed?" and repeating the question—and then asking them, "Is this your verdict?"—From these very questions, he was compelled to infer that the learned judge had at the time some doubts of the regularity of the proceeding. There could be nothing of greater importance in a country like this, than that the utmost light should be thrown upon all judicial proceedings, particularly those which were in some degree connected with the state.

said, the reason why Mr. Justice Abbot reported the case to the other judges was, that a gentleman had stated in court, three quarters of an hour after the verdict had been recorded, that all the jurors had not concurred.

would say nothing further on the subject but for an expression used by the attorney-general as to his motives in bringing in the petition. He had alleged that his intention was to bring the administration of justice into contempt. He knew that the attorney-general had the power of filing informations ex-officio for whatever he conceived to be a libel, but he did not know that he was entitled ex-officio to utter libels against members of that House for their parliamentary conduct. He had presented this petition from an anxiety, that what was administered as justice should really be justice.— It was stated by the attorney-general that the new trial was for the benefit of Mr. Wooler. He could see no advantage that Mr. Wooler was to derive from it; but it was evidently for the benefit of the judge, who had brought himself into at least an awkward predicament. Mr. Justice Holroyd had said, that it was impossible to proceed upon that verdict; therefore, the new trial was not for the benefit of Mr. Wooler. It had been stated too, that Mr. Wooler was told that he could be discharged upon his own recognizance: he knew not how far this was true, but it was true it made the argument still stronger.

replied, that not wishing Mr. Wooler to suffer a prolonged imprisonment, in consequence of any mistake in the delivery of the verdict, he had directed that the offer of liberation on his personal recognizance should be made to him.

said, that the offer was a handsome one, and he wondered it was not accepted.

as one of those who had voted for the first suspension of the Habeas Corpus as a measure of urgent but temporary necessity, wished to know whether those persons who had now been under arrest for four months, and whose imprisonment it was, by the present measure, proposed to prolong, had been during that period kept in solitary confinement. He was the more anxious on this point, having learnt from a gentleman confined in that manner for fifteen months in the Temple at Paris, during the government of the Directory, that he considered that the human intellect could not sustain itself under such circumstances for any great length of time, without material derangement; and he was afraid that system was, most unhappily, gaining ground in this country—Mr. Gurney said, that since the last debate, he had seen persons eminently well qualified, and who had taken the greatest pains to inform themselves as to the state of Birmingham, which had been mentioned in the last Report as one of those towns to which the spirit of disaffection and consequent organization into societies had spread; and they declared, on the minutest inquisition, that the accusation was totally unfounded. Birmingham was obviously just the place where the greatest distress must necessarily exist— an immense population got together on the two staple manufactures of arms, and of toys—peace rendering the one useless, and poverty the other unsaleable; and yet there there had been nothing but the most exemplary patience and good conduct under almost unexampled sufferings.—Seditious meetings, and incitations to disturbance, the bill passed this session had rendered highly penal already; and when this measure was recommended to preserve the tranquillity of the country, it ought to be considered how it could so operate. There was certainly a small body of political fanatics of great and most mischievous activity, and there were notoriously districts in great distress, where a great disposition consequently existed to acts of tumult and outrage; but against these, all that the present measure would do, would be to take the power away from the ordinary jurisdictions, and out of the hands of the local magistracy, where all the sound part of the population would, for their own sakes, be aiding, and where that power would be effectual, to lodge it in those of a secretary of state, where the natural and honest prejudice of Englishmen against acts of mere authority would lead the mass of the community in every instance to impede its exercise, and where it in consequence would be found utterly useless and unavailing. All this had been pretty clearly proved during the late trials; and Mr. Gurney said, he could not but extremely lament with a view to the impression made in the country generally, that the executive government had so lost the confidence of the people, by the communications of the highest authorities of the state with such men as Castle and Oliver; and, above all, by the unfortunate circumstance of Mr. Reynolds appearing first as a grand juror and then as appointed to an ostensible situation abroad—as to render these transactions subjects of more alarm than a thousand combinations of starving mechanics.

objected to the measure altogether, but seeing that it was likely to obtain the sanction of the House, he would propose a clause to render its duration as short as the assumed necessity justified. By the present provisions of the bill it was to continue till six weeks after the assembling of parliament. This, it was evident, made its duration very indefinite, for it depended on the pleasure of ministers, at what time, after a prorogation or a dissolution, they would call parliament together. There was a rumour abroad, that a dissolution would take place after the termination of the present session, and consequently with the suspension act in existence. If this was the case, it was difficult to say when this oppressive measure would cease. He would not propose that any pledge should be required as to the time of assembling the House; but he would move, that the duration of the bill should be limited to the 1st of December, and thus make it necessary for the Crown to call parliament together, if ministers saw proper to prolong its date. Last year the difficulties of the country were allowed to be great, yet parliament was postponed by repeated prorogations till late in the winter. If ministers so exercised their discretion, this act might be continued as long as ministers chose to exercise the powers it conferred. If at any time it was more necessary than another that its duration should be limited, it was the present, when great general distress prevailed, and it was proved that agents employed by government had endeavoured to seduce the suffering people to the only acts that could justify an extraordinary exercise of power. It had been said, that our constitution could bend to circumstances, and he would allow that the present administration had found or made it flexible and accommodating enough. He would Dot, however, agree to this description of it. Frangas non flectes was the motto best suited to the British constitution, and the sturdy oak not the pliant willow its appropriate emblem. He concluded with moving, "that it be an instruction to the committee, to limit the duration of the bill till the 1st of December next."

said, that the motion was altogether unnecessary, because it was competent to the committee, without the proposed instruction, to fix the duration of the bill at any period it thought proper. Such an instruction was called for, only where it was deemed proper to introduce in the committee some matter not strictly relevant. But, waving the point of form, he must object to the motion upon principle; for if the state of the country should be such at the period stated in the motion, as to require the further continuance of the act, he did not know that to call gentlemen to attend parliament, from the several districts in which their local influence and personal authority might be so usefully exercised, would not be a greater evil than the cessation of the act itself. As to the rumour of an intended dissolution at the close of the session, he could not think it probable that any of his majesty's ministers would have made such a declaration as the right hon. baronet had stated, for such a declaration would imply an interference with the prerogative of the Crown. But this had nothing to do with the question before the House. It would be obviously inconvenient to assemble parliament before Christmas, and especially so for the Irish members; and yet such a proceeding might be necessary if the motion of the right hon. baronet were adopted. The provision of the supplies, and the re-enactment of the mutiny bill, would of course render it necessary for parliament to reassemble at such time as to render the right hon. baronet's apprehensions groundless, with regard to the indefinite duration of the bill. But yet he (lord C.) proposed to fix in the committee a definite period for the duration of the bill, not so early, however, as the right hon. baronet desired.

said, that the rumour of an intended dissolution depended on the authority of a noble peer high in administration, who had declared that such a measure was in contemplation, to more than one noble peer of his (sir J. N's.) acquaintance.

could not answer for what was said by any individual, but he was not aware of any such intention.

said, that if Providence blessed us with a plentiful harvest, of which there was now every prospect, that distress which was the instrument of disaffection, would be taken out of the hands of the enemies of the public tranquillity, and the suspension act might expire on the 1st of December. Every member who supported that act allowed that it was an evil, and that it should not be continued one hour longer than it was justified by the necessity of the case. If, therefore, the difficulties of the country at the period mentioned should be so mitigated or removed as to render it unnecessary, it should then expire; but if dangers to justify its continuance should exist, much as he valued the exertions of members in their country residences, he thought this House would then be the proper sphere of their duties.

thought any such instruction to the committee unnecessary. The amendment was negatived. The House then went into the committee. Sir W. Burroughs moved two clauses; the one limiting the provisions of the bill to the counties of Lancaster, Derby, Leicester, Nottingham, and York, together with the towns of Birmingham, and Stockport; the other providing that no committal should take place under the bill, except the warrant, was signed by six privy councillors, two of whom should be the lord chancellor and the secretary of state. Both amendments were rejected.

was in favour of appointing a determinate day for the meeting of parliament.

objected to the limitation of the bill to a fixed period rather than to six weeks after the meeting of parliament; but if any fixed period was thought necessary, he would, to avoid the necessity of calling parliament together at too early a period, propose, that the duration should extend to the 1st of March.

asked, whether the noble lord intended that the persons now under arrest should continue for nine months longer in solitary confinement.

said, that every reasonable indulgence, consistent with safe custody would be allowed to the persons in confinement.

had supported the former measure, but as parliament was about to rise, he thought the duration of the bill ought to be limited, and that the 1st of December, or some definite times should be fixed.

objected to the extension of the bill to Scotland, and moved the omission of the clause by which that country was included in its operation.

wished to know whether, in fact, this bill would really extend to Scotland or not. He knew that, according to some legal opinions, the amendment made in the former bill, had taken Scotland out of the operation of the act [No answer was given].

expressed his surprise that no answer had been given to the question of the noble lord: for if it really was the case that the bill could have no operation in Scotland, then it was not passed for the purpose of suppressing any dangerous practices in that country, but for some unexplained object of ministers. He believed that since the former bill passed, not one individual in Scotland had been committed under it. The question was not whether the Habeas Corpus had or had not been properly suspended in the early part of the session, but whether they should now pass a bill, purporting to deprive Scotland of the benefits of the act against wrongous imprisonment, though that measure was not called for by the state of the country, and when it was not certain that the bill could operate.

said, it was evidently the intention that the measure should extend to Scotland. He saw no reason to suppose that it could not be executed in Scotland.

wished to know for what purpose the second committee of secrecy had been appointed? Was it for mere form, or was it to lay a parliamentary ground for this measure? If the latter, he could say, that the report did not touch Scotland, and he would assert farther, that not a tittle of evidence relative to Scotland had been submitted to the committee. When, therefore, the report was silent respecting Scotland, was it to be endured that the liberties of the whole Scottish nation were to be taken away on the mere recommendation of ministers? What availed the good conduct of the people, their unshaken allegiance, their loyalty or their attachment to the constitution, if this could be done at the mere will of an administration? If the committee, under these circumstances, extended the bill to Scotland, the vote would be the most violent and unjust decision ever made by that House.

said, it would render the measure altogether illusory, if any privileged place was left, to which the authors of these hostile machinations might retire.

rose as a Scotsman to protest against the injustice of extending the measure to his country. He defied the noble lord to instance even a solitary case of disaffection. With respect to the apprehension that the right hon. member expressed as to emigration he believed there was little fear that Londoners would fly to Scotland.

observed, that all the disorders which had occurred in the disturbed districts mentioned in the report proceeded solely from the spirit of Luddism, against which the present bill was perfectly inoperative. Before the former bill passed, there had been a great many clubs in those districts, which were of an open, public nature; but after the bill passed, the people, instead of meeting publicly as before, assembled secretly in barns and Methodist meeting-houses, and in that way the late disorders were hatched up. He would ask whether Mr. Oliver, and such men as he, ought not to be regarded as the chief instruments in these movements Nothing could be more culpable than that abominable system by which spies and informers were let loose among, an ignorant people, to work on their passions and provoke them to acts of violence-He should not object to a law for punishing more severely the crime of frame-breaking, or any bill for strengthening the magisterial authority in the disturbed districts; but he must protest against the present bill.

expressed his surprise that ministers had not given any reply to his question. His question was, net whether it was a point of policy that this law should extend to Scotland, but whether in point of fact, Scotland was not taken out of the operation of the act by the way in which the clause was drawn up? If that was the case, it was of the utmost importance that the House should know whether they were legislating for Scotland or not.

said, that Scotland was included in the act, but admitted that no person had been taken up, and that no evidence was laid before the second committee relative to the existence of treasonable practices or disaffection in Scotland.