presented a Petition from several inhabitants of Birmingham, setting forth,

"That the Petitioners observing, with feelings of deep concern, the increasing number of prosecutions arising from and out of the forgery of Bank of England notes, are of opinion that a due regard to public morals, as well as public credit and security, requires that the utmost endeavours should be made to diminish the evil; that it appears to the petitioners that some of the principal causes of the frequent commission of these crimes are to be found in the slight and insufficient manner in which the plates are engraved, in the paucity of words used in the notes, in the want of variety in the character employed; in the small quantity of manuscript, and in the uniform badness of the hand writing, all which contribute to the facility with which these notes are now imitated by the inferior class of engravers, and make it so difficult for the community at large to distinguish between a forged and a genuine Bank note; that the petitioners conceive that the art of writing on copper plate is now carried to such perfection in this country, that this alone, if applied by the best artists of that class to the execution of the Bank of England notes, would render their imitation exceedingly difficult if not impossible, even without the introduction of an expensive and complicated vignette: and that this improved style of copper-plate writing, when combined with an increased quantity and a more artificial arrangement of the words, both engraved and written, in each note, would remove in a great degree the temptation to crime by increasing the difficulty of its commission, and would thus prevent those numerous trials and frequent executions which shock the feelings of the humane and disgrace the character of the country; that, in the opinion of the petitioners, an additional and important obstacle to the success of those who now make a trade of forging and uttering Bank of England notes would be interposed by the simple expedient of affixing the king's stamp to each note; and the petitioners submit, that this of itself, without any alteration in the present mode or amount of the composition for the duty paid by the Bank, would afford to the public a familiar and easy mode of detecting forgeries; the petitioners, therefore, humbly pray the House to take this matter into their serious consideration, with a view of ascertaining whether, by these or by some other means, the forgery of Bank of England notes may not be prevented, or at least rendered more difficult."

On the motion, that the petition do lie on the table,

said, he thought the case stated by the petitioners deserved the most serious consideration of the House.

gave notice, that if the motion about to be brought forward by his right hon. friend should not succeed, it was the intention of his hon. and learned friend (sir J. Mackintosh) to move, some day next week, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the forgery of Bank of England notes.

stated, that half the Bank of England notes circulated in the three northern counties turned out to be forgeries. Therefore, those counties were the more alarmed by the apprehended attempt to force the circulation of Bank of England notes in preference to country Bank notes: for the latter were scarcely ever forged, because they were liable to be so readily detected; but the forgery of Bank of England notes was so frequent, that the grand jurors of the counties alluded to were quite shocked at the number of the bills of indictment preferred for felony. He hoped that this subject would meet with the serious attention of the House.

said, that no one could reflect without horror upon the multiplication of forgeries to which the present system gave birth. He was assured, that no less than thirty forgeries of Bank of England notes were detected every week at the several country banks. The Bank of England suffered no loss by these forgeries, but the poor and ignorant, into whose hands the forged notes fell, suffered most severely. Surely, then, some means should be adopted to put an end to the evil. The Bank might easily, he thought, contrive to call in all its old notes, and issue notes upon a new plan, and thus forgery would be checked, at least for a time. But was it not possible to devise some plate which could not be imitated? Every description of ingenuity should be employed upon such a subject. It was the peculiar duty of the Bank of England to do so. There were last year not less than 140 capital forgeries detected. To what sanguinary persecutions, then, must such a system give birth? The Bank directors might coolly in their parlour give orders for a prosecution, but they ought to know and feel that every such order was tantamount to an order for the death of a fellow-creature, and that the multiplication of these melancholy deaths was owing, in a great measure, to the bungling clumsy manner in which their notes were at present constructed.

said, that he had two years ago endeavoured to draw the attention of the House to the subject, and he congratulated both the house and the country upon the impression which now so generally prevailed, as to justify the hope of some remedy for the evil complained of.

seeing sir James Mackintosh enter the House, asked the hon. and learned gentleman whether he meant to bring forward any motion upon this subject?

answered in the affirmative, and said, that should the motion which his right hon. friend was about to bring forward this evening unfortunately fail, he would, in the course of the evening, give notice, for the next open day, of the motion alluded to by the hon. gentleman.

said, that Bank of England notes formed the principal circulating medium at Liverpool, and that the state in which the notes of low value generally were, afforded facilities for forgery. Many of these notes were, indeed, so old and worn out from being long in circulation, that it was dangerous to fold them. In London notes were seldom found in such a state, because they could be easily exchanged at the Bank; and if some means were adopted for facilitating the exchange of notes in the country, he thought that something might be done to impede the operation of forgery; but much more efficacious measures must be adopted to prevent the great evils of forgery, if the nation was to go on with its present circulating medium.

The Petition was ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.

said, he rose in pursuance of the notice which he had given several weeks ago, to call the attention of the House to one of the most important subjects that had for a long period been brought under its consideration. He was afraid that he should be obliged to trespass on the patience of the House for a considerable length of time, but he could only assure it that to the best of his judgment he would avoid doing so for a single moment unnecessarily. He had no more to observe except that the nature of the subject, the time which its discussion would engage, and his own imperfect qualifications for the task which he had undertaken would require all the indulgence and kindness of the House to enable him to bring that subject fairly under its review.

The importance of the subject on which he was addressing the House must be at once felt when he stated that the purpose of his motion was, to ascertain the real state of the currency; to make it known what the people of this country and the people of foreign countries who were connected with them, were trusting to as the means of carrying on their respective dealings. The mere statement of this object was sufficient to exhibit its magnitude; and that magnitude was not diminished by the total abstinence from all consideration of this subject which had hither to marked the present session. Many persons, indeed, were much perplexed by the interesting question—whether the country was at present in a state of prosperity or adversity? He should limit himself to the statement of the actual circumstances. What seemed undeniable was, that we had a funded debt (to speak in round numbers) of 800,000,000l.; and in this third year of peace, an unfunded debt of 40,000,000l. The total amount of our debt therefore was 840,000,000l.; which, as he apprehended, was rather an appalling consideration. But we were not, it was said, without some comfort in this unpromising state of affairs: we had a sinking fund of 14,000,000l., and that brought us round to the side of prosperity. But then, again, it occurred, that it was necessary to borrow the whole of this 14,000,000l. or amount of the sinking fund, which recollection replaced us in a situation of adversity. But to set off this, we had the chancellor of the exchequer exulting at the advantageous terms on which he could obtain the loan, and that he (Mr. Tierney) presumed must pass to the credit of the prosperous side of our affairs.

Thus much as to the actual state of our circumstances. The next question which presented itself was—Ought this prosperity, if prosperity it was, to be bottomed on a paper currency not convertible into specie? Every man who heard him would, he had no doubt, say in answer "God forbid!" He believed that none even of the warmest admirers of the present system, not to refer to those who had hitherto supported the restriction on the ground of some special emergency, would venture to maintain that it ought. Were such a measure distinctly proposed, every man would declare his aversion to it. How happened it then that, in the third year of peace, the same measure of restriction on cash payments, which could alone be justified by the extraordinary pressure of a most extraordinary war, was to be renewed? How happened it then, that the pledge given by parliament two years ago of the return to cash payments on the 5th of July next was about to be rescinded?

These considerations led him to the immediate object of discussion, namely, ought the restriction to be renewed in the manner proposed by the right hon. gentleman, the chancellor of the exchequer? The House must surely think that some extraordinary grounds ought to be laid for such a proposition, when it was recollected that on passing the bill two years ago all the grounds on which the original necessity for restricting the Bank from payments in cash was founded were abandoned. Now with regard to the new necessity, therefore, what was the showing of the chancellor of the exchequer? It was, that certain British merchants had evinced a disposition to embark in foreign loans, and that a great number of British travellers were indulging their curiosity abroad. Indeed he believed he might throw the travellers out of the question, for he had the authority of the right hon. gentleman for stating, that they had all returned—at least in the proportion of 78 to 99—for out of 99,000l. who had left England, 78,000l. had according to the right hon. gentleman's own statement, come back.—It was material here to recollect, that when the original measure for restricting the payments of the Bank was submitted to parliament, a minister at least as powerful as the right hon. gentleman who stood as high in the public confidence, and was certainly not inferior to him as a financier—the late Mr. Pitt—did feel it due to parliament, not only to inform the House of the grounds on which the necessity for the order in council that had been issued rested, but referred the consideration of those grounds to a committee above stairs. He did not think it enough, like the right hon. gentleman opposite, to come down to the House and to say at once, "I believe the restriction to be expedient, and therefore you ought to do the same." It was material also to revert to the actual state of public affairs when the measure was introduced by Mr. Pitt, and to contrast it with the state of things at present. In the year 1797, the Bank of England made a representation to government, that great drains were making on them, and the act suspending cash payments was expressly founded on the report of a committee stating, that those drains were occasioned by the exaggerated alarms, and unfounded panic, arising from political circumstances that at that period existed in the country. We were now, in the year 1818, at profound peace with all the world; with no alarm, no wish to hoard in any part of the community, no threat of invasion, no foreign subsidies, no army abroad on whose exertions (as used to be said) depended the fate of the civilised world. But for all these the chancellor of the exchequer's simple assertion was to be the substitute. Against drains, panic, war, invasion, subsidies, the spirit of hoarding and the hopes of the civilised world, the House had the belief of the right hon. gentleman, and nothing else. Now he objected against the right hon. gentleman's testimony; for he was an interested witness;—interested he would say, because the whole of his financial arrangements, their support and permanence, were built on the continuance of the principle of restriction. He did not mean to impute any improper motives to the right hon. gentleman, but, with every reliance on his honourable intentions, it was impossible, with this consciousness on his mind, that he could be free from bias in forming his opinion on the question under consideration. The fact was, that the right hon. gentleman had pledged himself, by his recent plan of finance, or conversion of stock, or loan, or by whatever name it might inaccurately be called (for there was no word in the English language descriptive of so complicated a transaction) to the continuance of the Bank restriction. No man could believe that the subscription would have succeeded but from the confidence entertained by those who engaged in it, that such was the minister's intention. The right hon. gentleman therefore was bound to continue the restriction; for otherwise he must break faith with men who confided in his projects and speculations. He had a direct interest in the passing of the Restriction bill, for otherwise it would be thought that he had deceived those who had embarked their money on that security.

But, had the House of Commons entered into no pledge? What did it, two years ago, tell the holders of Bank of England notes, who, on the faith of that pledge, might, during those two years, have entered into various securities and undertakings? It assured them that on the 5th of July 1818, they should be paid in cash. It gave them that assurance in the solemn form of a legislative enactment. Even as late as the month of June last year, the right hon. gentleman himself assured parliament that the arrangement on the part of the public with the Bank would be carried into effect, and that the notes of the Bank would be paid in cash. All this was now, however, to be done away,—and by whom? By the House of Commons! The House was called upon, after these solemn declarations and enactments, to break faith with the public creditor—for it was nothing less. Would not the House at least previously inquire whether it was not possible to fulfil the engagement without detriment to the public interests?—He had said before that he objected to the chancellor of the exchequer's testimony on this subject, because it was impossible that he could be a disinterested witness. His accusation against the right hon. gentleman went further—he had now to accuse, him not alone of not dealing fairly, but of dealing unfairly by the House. He (Mr. Tierney) was speaking to a body of gentlemen, who, perhaps, had never read the provisions of the bill which two years ago passed the House, and the object of which was to delay the resumption of cash payments for two years. What were the grounds on which that bill was founded? The delay it granted was founded, not on any supposed danger in our internal or external, relations, but on the expediency of giving time to the Bank of England to make such arrangements as might in their discretion seem necessary to guard against any possible inconvenience in recommencing their cash payments. These words were inserted in the preamble, for the precise purpose of showing that there was no obstacle in the circumstances of the country to the resumption, and that without the possibility of further delay, on the 5th of July, 1818, those cash payments would be resumed. What would the House think when he assured it, that the very preamble of that bill passed two years ago, was also the preamble of the bill before the House?—There they had it, word for word, comma for comma, stop for stop. Nothing could be more amusing, if on a subject so serious, stage effect were desirable, than to call on the clerk to read them both. Neither the foreign loans nor the british travelers, which were the grounds on which the right hon. gentleman founded the necessity of the present bill were mentioned in its preamble, but the old ground was taken, although the Bank directors stated that they were perfectly ready and willing to pay immediately in money. In what a situation would the House be placed if it passed such a bill! It was about to vote that which stated that the Bank was not ready to pay, while the Directors were declaring that they were perfectly ready! It really would be almost an insult on the decent and solemn forms of legislation, to suffer the bill to become a law in its present shape, and on its present pretences. If the negotiation of foreign loans was the true ground for continuing the system on which we were now acting, why was it not so stated in the preamble? For his own part, he believed it to be an unfounded and exaggerated apprehension; but still it had the appearance of a reason, and ought to be inserted in the preamble of the bill.

But he should wish to know whether or not the Bank directors had been consulted on the proposed measure as expressed in the present bill? If they had been consulted, and if they had sanctioned it, then had they sanctioned that which was directly at variance with their own declarations. If they had not been consulted, why should not the House examine them as to the fact of their being prepared to pay or not? It was desirable to learn if they had ever made any representations to government on the subject of the foreign loans. As he perceived no sign of assent on the part of the right hon. gentleman, he concluded they had not. Let the House look, then, at the situation in which it was placed. In 1797 the Bank directors represented to Mr. Pitt that the drains upon them were such as to threaten the safety of the House, as it was called. A dread of similar effects had led to the continuance of the restriction down to the year 1816. A postponement of the return to cash payments was then determined upon, on grounds wholly distinct from the former; and the right hon. gentleman, so late as the last session, had declared his confident belief that cash payments would be resumed at the Bank on the 5th of July of the present year. In this statement all the Bank directors in the House concurred, at least if he might judge by their countenances—the only means by which the House could form an opinion of their meaning; for a more taciturn set of gentlemen were not often to be met with. The complacency of manner with which they listened to the right hon. gentleman's declaration, proved either that they were of the same opinion, or that they were laughing in their sleeves at the monstrous nonsense he was talking. If they agreed in the right hon. gentleman's assurance, that cash payments were to be resumed, they could have had no apprehension from the effects of foreign loans. The right hon. gentleman must be assured that the French loan never would have been taken by an hon. friend of his (Mr. Baring), if it had been stated to him that government regarded it as a transaction that might prove prejudicial to the interests of the country. The right hon. gentleman he well knew, had been consulted by his hon friend on the subject, and from his being a Bank director also, the whole Bank must have known of his engagement in that loan. The House must therefore see that it was driven to inquire into these facts before it came to a decision on the important principle of restriction.

He must again ask were the Bank directors serious in their acquiescence last year in the assurances of the right hon. gentleman, or were they, which God knows he sometimes thought, laughing at the right hon. gentleman? If the latter, that was an abundantly sufficient reason for not trusting to the right hon. gentleman's belief on a question of this nature. If the House, however, consulted its own character and the mere decorum of its proceedings, it would not pass the measure with its present preamble. Indeed, he did not doubt that some hon. director would that night abjure the whole proposition on which the proposed enactment was founded, and aver that the Bank stood in no need of further preparation. The House was therefore called upon to legislate on a matter of the utmost difficulty and importance, on the speech of the right hon. gentleman—on a breath that passed away. Not a single syllable of the grounds stated by the right hon. gentleman was to be found in the proposed enactment. The bill abjured those grounds.

If he were to stop here, he should think he had made out a sufficient case for inquiry; but it might, perhaps not unreasonably be expected of him that he should suggest what he would propose for in- quiry if the Committee were to be appointed. This brought him to the consideration of the foreign loans. It was the opinion of the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer, that the disposition of certain merchants to engage in loans to foreign powers, had raised the price of gold, and that that rise in the price of gold was the object of just alarm; and to guard against the evil consequences of such a state of things, the right hon. gentleman had proposed to continue the restriction for one year more. Before, however, the House could admit the conclusion that those loans and the high price of gold were a sufficient justification of the proposed measure, there were several points which it was incumbent on every hon. member who desired to vote from conviction, rather than from a disposition to compliment the right hon. gentleman, to have clearly ascertained by an examination of persons competent to afford the necessary information; he meant such persons as were formerly examined on the original restriction bill, and subsequently on the bullion inquiry. He should first advert to the stress that was laid upon the high price of gold. And here he would give gentlemen the gratification of assuring them that he would abstain from all abstruse propositions; first, from the consciousness of his own inability; and, secondly, from a conviction that the last place in which such questions could be discussed with advantage was a popular assembly. His wish, nevertheless, was, to state intelligibly, if he could, what the points were which ought to be referred to a committee. And first, he would ask the House, if it was satisfied that all which had emanated from the Bullion Committee, should be set aside? Was it convinced that the price of gold had nothing to do with the quantity of paper in circulation? He trusted that he gave no offence in any quarter, when he alluded to the Bullion Committee. Though many might charge the Bullion Committee with too extensive a reliance on one principle, and with not attending to all the circumstances that influenced the price of gold, he believed there was no intelligent man who did not believe that an excessive issue of paper must have a certain operation on it. In order, therefore, to Clear away every thing that obstructed a fair consideration of the subject, it would be first necessary to inquire what was the probable amount of the increase in the price of gold that was attributable to the issues of paper. Having disposed of that first point, it should be considered, whether other circumstances affected that price. The Bank, it was generally believed, was at present in possession of a greater quantity of bullion than it had ever had in its vaults at any former period, and to which it was presumed the Directorst rusted, when they professed their readiness to pay in coin. Now, if you took from the market, an article in demand, as well from your own purchases as from other circumstances, must not the amount subtracted, and by the measure of restriction precluded from circulation, most materially increase the price of that article? The issue of bank paper and the amount of gold in the possession of the Bank must each, to a certain extent, operate on the price of gold. There was a third course productive of a similar effect, arising from the difference between the present silver and gold currency. He begged to be understood as not dogmatizing. He spoke as an ignorant man earnestly desirous of information; and it required no other quality than modesty to induce others to participate in the same desire. The proportion of value between the two currencies before the last coinage was as 15 and a fraction to 14 and a fraction. The difference now amounted to 5l. 18s. per cent; a difference which must enhance the price of gold; for until silver reached the price of 5s. 6d. per ounce, it could not be exported as equivalent to the gold. It was, therefore, a question entitled to consideration, to ascertain what effect all these three causes produced on the price of gold. If the excess of the bullion price of gold was, as he believed, four shillings in the ounce above the Mint prince, must not a large proportion of that excess be attributable to the other causes which he had mentioned, and not to foreign loans? If so, it was a circumstance that required the most grave and mature consideration of the House. And with respect to the foreign loans, he would ask the right hon. gentleman whether six months ago, at the moment he spoke with such certainty of the Bank resuming its payments, he did not know that those loans were in contemplation? There was not a particle of difference between the loan then negotiated, and the loans which were expected to be negotiated. The right hon. gentleman seemed to take fright at the term loan, but whether they were loans, or remittances to purchase in the French funds, government must have been aware of them as they had the sanction of the noble lord opposite; and to whom he (Mr. Tierney) was individually obliged, having recovered as a claimant money which he had never expected to receive. But if this disposition to invest money in foreign stock alarmed the right hon. gentleman, the chancellor of the exchequer, was it not of his own creation? He had exerted himself successfully in raising the funds in this country, and consequently in lowering the interest of money. Was it not then very natural that the capitalists should take the advantage of the rise in the price, and transfer their capital where they could obtain a higher rate of interest? But if these questions were to depend on the negotiation of foreign loans, where were the apprehensions respecting them to end? It was true, the restriction was proposed only for one year. But what security had the House, that when the bill was about to expire the same alleged necessity might not again present itself? In this country, when there was a loan, the money was borrowed first, and the interest was provided for by parliament; but in France the case was directly the reverse. Instead of stating what amount of capital they required, the French government announced the amount of rentes or annuities they had to dispose of. They were at liberty to postpone or put off the arrangement until they thought they could obtain the most advantageous terms. When, therefore, they heard of a large loan for France, it was not to be presumed that the money was wanting immediately. At present every thing seemed to go on flourishingly in France. The stocks were up; which, as there was no paper currency, was a fair measure of prosperity. While we were talking here of prosperity, and had nothing but paper, the stocks fell; whereas in France, while they were talking only of adversity, and had no paper, the stocks rose. It was most probable that the French minister would wait until the funds had increased in price before he brought the annuities to be negotiated for to sale. The transaction might not happen for nine months. We should at that time be precisely in the very situation in which we were now supposed by the right hon. gentleman, the chancellor of the exchequer to be placed, and on which he founded the necessity of the renewed restriction. If so, was the House again to have the right hon. gentleman's bill, and for the third time his preamble? He could not help thinking, that if the government of France were to require a delay of a few months for the payment of the amount of the indemnifications, public and private, under admitted securities, that the allied powers would most likely, and in his opinion most wisely, abstain from pressing the demands immediately. If such an arrangement should take place, the same apprehensions would again be urged against the resumption of cash payments; so that it was impossible to say when the restriction might be got off. The right hon. gentleman had calculated the loan that France wanted at 10,000,000l. sterling. Taking the amount of indemnifications to foreign governments and individuals at 20,000,000l. sterling (valuing the French stock at 68), the total amount of money wanted by France was 30,000,000l. Now, to what extent was it to be supposed that this country would contribute towards such a loan. He had no hesitation in saying, and he put it to the candour of the right hon. gentleman, that in the present confidence which was entertained with respect to the French finances, a very large sum would go from other countries. It was obvious, indeed, that this would be done by great capitalists, in order to obtain the present high rate of interest in the French funds.

Among other descriptions of information that he was desirous of acquiring on this subject, he wished to know whether or not he was to understand (as it had been stated in some of the public journals to have been declared by the duke de Richelieu), that the claims of individuals on the French government, whether those individuals chose it or not, might be liquidated by their receiving stock in the French funds. For instance, a Prussian, or any other foreigner, having a claim on the French government for any sum, might be told that be should be paid not in money, but in stock; a proceeding which might be so conducted as to be wholly unobjectionable. Thus, if such an individual had a claim on the French government for a hundred pounds, the manner in which that claim was to be liquidated, might be to take the value of the French stock, the five per cents, say at 68, and to give him as much of that stock as if sold would produce his hundred pounds. In that case there would be no transmission of money, which would counteract the necessity of a loan. The chancellor of the exchequer seemed to smile at his ignorance, but he should like to hear the right hon. gentleman explain how it could be otherwise than so. This was at any rate a question deserving serious consideration, and ought to be referred to them who were competent to investigate it. Another question, and a very important one, connected with the French loan, was, whether after the proportion that was to be furnished from this country was properly estimated, it was to go all together in gold or not. Was no part of it to go in goods? Part of it would, no doubt, go in the way in which it would be most convenient for the remitter to send it. To say that the whole of it must be remitted in gold, and that therefore the price of gold must be proportionably raised, would be just as absurd as to say that a contract made to supply a foreign army with bread must raise the price of flour in England, when it was known, that such floor might be procured by remittances on the spot where it was to be used, or that cottons might be shipped for the purpose of purchasing it. But if the loan to France was actually to be paid in gold, he was at a loss to conceive why the means of so remitting it, should not be afforded by the resumption of cash payments on the part of the Bank of England. No mercantile man would deny that such a proceeding must, by improving the exchange, be productive of great commercial benefits. It was not to be supposed that the gold thus sent out would not return. Unless there was something in the air of this country repulsive of that metal, if gold went out gold would come back. This was therefore an additional ground for the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England. Let the Bank of England send out large quantities of gold from their coffers. That would alter the rate of exchange. The Bank would have no difficulty in purchasing gold to replenish their coffers, though certainly at some loss. But the question for the House to determine was, which was best—that Great Britain should lose the character for good faith which she had hitherto maintained, or that the Bank should be compelled to disgorge a part of the enormous profits which it had made from the country at large? Was it more desirable that the public credit should be preserved, or that the Bank, having accumulated millions upon millions, without having contributed in the smallest degree to the national expenditure, should be enabled to persevere in that system? At any rate this was another fit subject for inquiry. It ought to be ascertained whether, in the opinion of those who were best informed on the subject, gold might not with advantage be sent abroad—whether that would not alter the rate of exchange in our favour—whether that gold would not in all probability return—whether it might not be repurchased by the Bank—and whether all this machinery would not continue in motion without danger or inconvenience, there being no danger that during peace it would be stopped or impeded by any recurrence of that disposition to hoard gold, which naturally existed during the war? And as to the loss which the Bank would suffer by the transaction, it was a loss to which in common honesty they were bound to submit. Supposing that the Bank had ten millions of gold in their coffers; if it were all to go, and if they were to repurchase it at a sacrifice probably of five per cent, that would be on the whole a loss of half a million. And what of that? The Bank had made twenty-one millions by the country; and was the country now to be told that its whole commercial system was to remain in an injurious and unnatural state, because the Bank would not relinquish the smallest portion of their profits? These were subjects which required consideration. There was no man who could deny that they demanded consideration. Let any man in that House ask his neighbour on the same bench, what his opinion was with respect to them. No two individuals would be found entirely to agree upon them. And yet the House was called upon to jump the difficulty, and to pass the bill, allowing the restriction on cash payments by the Bank to continue another year, on the simple statement by the chancellor of the exchequer, that such a measure was expedient, and without any previous investigation.

On these grounds he maintained, that, with respect to this part of the case, he had made out a good ground for inquiry; for sure he was that there was not an honourable member who heard him, that could get up and say that he had completely made up his mind on the subject.—The result of such an investigation as that which he recommended, would be, either that the Bank was capable of resuming its cash payments, or that it was not so. In the former case, a great good would be achieved for the country; in the latter, the House would get an insight into the real state of our trade, finances, and circulation, which would abundantly reward them for their labours, and which must ultimately be highly conducive to the public benefit. In saying that the Report of the Committee of Inquiry might be that the Bank ought immediately to resume their cash payments, he by no means meant to say that such would be their report. Still less would any honourable member who voted for the appointment of such a committee be pledged to that proceeding. All that he would do by such a vote, would be to give the means of ascertaining how the facts stood. The chancellor of the exchequer said, the Bank ought to be restricted from paying in cash for twelve months. A committee of inquiry might be of opinion that the cash payments might be resumed in a shorter period. But whatever might be the result of their investigation, in some way or other the question would be set at rest.

With a view to persuade the House of the expediency of inquiry, he would urge the little probability, if they agreed without any inquiry to pass the right hon. gentleman's bill, that the Bank would ever resume cash payments. If the restriction were not at once rendered permanent, it would at least be continued from year to year. The House might depend upon it that this was not the last year in which it would be required. If the House now acquiesced in it as a matter of course, as a matter of course it would be proposed again. This was evident from the progress of the restriction acts. He would not trespass on the patience of the House by entering minutely into the history of that progress, but he would simply advert to the answer made two years ago by the right hon. gentleman, to an honourable and learned and valuable friend of his (Mr. Horner), whose loss the country had the greatest reason to deplore. When his hon. and learned friend recommended the reduction of the period of the Restriction bill from two years to one year, the reply of the right hon. gentleman was, "No; let us make it two years, for that will look as if we were in earnest in our determination to put an end to the restriction in that time; whereas, if we make it only one year, people will say there is nothing in it." That was the distinct answer given by the chancellor of the exchequer to his hon. and learned friend. He begged gentlemen now to recollect, that at the end of the two years they were called upon, notwithstanding this observation of the right hon. gentleman's, to prolong the restriction for one year more. Under such circumstances there was no man of common discernment, who could doubt that if such a measure were adopted with out inquiry there would be an end to all probability that the Bank would ever pay in gold again. For what was to be expected in the next year that could make any material difference in our financial condition? There was every reason to believe that a loan must be resorted to in the next year as in this. What reason was there of any other kind to warrant the supposition, that there would not exist in the mind of the right hon. gentleman and on the part of the Bank, the same disposition next year to renew the restriction as was manifested at the present moment—It was a common reproach against the legislation of this country, that nothing was ever settled until the last instant. Here was the House on the 1st of May, discussing the expediency of the resumption of cash payments, which the existing act said, if it took place at all, must take place on the 5th of July. He was quite aware it would by some be contended, that the intervening period might be too short to afford the Bank a sufficient opportunity for providing for the resumption. But this he contended—that if parliament thought fit to enlarge the term, they ought to do it in such a way as to show the Bank that they were in earnest in their determination to enforce the return to cash payments at the expiration of that enlarged term. Hitherto the Bank had judged rightly with respect to the intentions of the House—they had judged that they were never in earnest on the subject. If the House should now agree to the continuance of the restriction as a matter of course, the Bank would treat as lightly as heretofore the provision that their payments in cash should be resumed at a certain period. It was most desirable, therefore, and would be productive of infinite good, were the House by previous inquiry to mark that they were in earnest, even were they to extend the restriction for twelve months longer.

He was perfectly aware that there were persons in the country who were alarmed at the prospect of the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England. Those persons apprehended all sorts of horrors from that circumstance—that nobody would receive his rents, that the funds would be reduced to Zero, and that there would be a general bankruptcy. Suppositions of this kind were artfully circulated by some, and two greedily swallowed by others. The uncertainty that existed on this subject was a source of great encouragement to all speculators and gamblers. One of the principal evils of the present system was that there was nothing secure and solid in it. No man knew what was to come next. He was convinced that the fluctuation of the funds during the last eight or nine months arose chiefly from the uncertainty whether or not the Bank restriction would be continued. It would be much better to say at once that the restriction should be permanent, than to go on year after year extending it; because, whenever it was extended for a year, after the first six months of that year a variety of rumours got abroad as to the probability or improbability of the resumption's being insisted on at the end of the year, and numerous opportunities were thus afforded for gambling and speculating. Among the chief speculators he must say, although he by no means wished to say it offensively, he could not help ranking the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer. The speculation of the right hon. gentleman was—whether or not he could keep the existing circulating medium of the country up to that point to which it had attained by the continuance of the restriction on the payment of cash by the Bank of England. For that the right hon. gentleman lived; he dreamt of nothing else; for on so keeping up the circulation depended the whole of his financial arrangements. In order to form anything like a correct opinion on this part of the subject, it would be necessary to inquire into the issues of Bank paper. This Bank paper, not being convertible into cash, the only criterion by which the excess of the issue could be distinctly and accurately ascertained was lost. He believed, however, that all who heard him would agree that there had been an excessive issue—except indeed the Bank directors. Those gentlemen would no doubt say, that they did not believe so; they had a criterion of their own, which was, that as long as they issued money on good bills, that was, as long as they exchanged notes not con- vertible into cash for good bills, or for exchequer bills, all was right. They had, in fact, a most confused notion of what a good currency was. They contended, that there was no fear of their acting improperly, since, in former times, their conduct had been correct.

The fact was, however, that a check was provided in the nature of the thing, against a very excessive issue, by the return of the notes on the hands of the Bank whenever they became too abundant. No thanks were due to the Bank for this limitation arising out of circumstances which they could not control. They said that the country had experienced no difficulties or inconveniences from an excess of paper. No; be cause it could not. The Bank themselves cured the evil without being aware that they did so. They were in the condition of Molière's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who who had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it. It was a fact, however, that since April in last year, the Bank had increased their issues of paper in an extraordinary manner. Being called upon to prepare for the resumption of cash payments, they showed their experience and discretion by immediately increasing the number of their notes in circulation! By the returns on the table of the House it appeared that during the half-year ending on the 5th of January last, the Bank paper in circulation, as compared with the amount in circulation during the half year ending on the 5th of January 1817, had increased no less than two millions and a half; and that in the face of the lessening demand of the country—in the face of the enlarged issues of the country bankers—in the face of their own diminished discounts, diminished from their charging a higher discount than any private banker in London! Was there a man who could fairly say that the Bank ought not to be called upon to account for this extraordinary conduct?

Of the proper state of the circulation of the country, the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer happily had a criterion. If he could show that that right hon. gentleman had directly violated his own criterion, he should think himself entitled to call on the House to pause before they proceeded in the course recommended to them. The criterion of the right hon. gentleman was to be found in a resolution on the Journals of the House, which he had moved in answer to reso- lution proposed by his late hon. and learned friend to whom he had already alluded. The words were these: "The amount of currency necessary for carrying on the transactions of the country must bear a proportion to the extent of its trade and its public revenue and expenditure.^*" The object of the right hon. gentleman at the time he moved that resolution was, to show that the amount of Bank of England notes in circulation in 1811, was not disproportionate to the amount in circulation in 1797, in answer to the allegation of his hon. and learned friend that the issue was excessive. The right hon. gentleman summed up the exports and imports, the revenue, and that which was technically called the budget, and said that to meet that amount such and such was the issue of Bank notes in 1797. He did the same with reference to the year 1811, and he thence inferred from the enormous increase of trade, revenue, and expenditure, that so far from that issue being excessive, it fell short of the amount required. For his own part, he did not think much of the right hon. gentleman's argument at the time; still it was the right hon. gentleman's criterion of the proper amount of Bank paper in circulation; and it became the criterion of the House, for the House adopted the resolution moved by the right hon. gentleman, and in which that criterion was comprehended.

On the principle of that criterion, to see how matters stood at present, he (Mr. Tierney) had made out, from the documents on the table, a statement of the difference in the various points to which the right hon. gentleman's criterion referred, between the years 1816 and 1817. By that statement it appeared, that in 1816 the imports and exports added together, amounted to eighty-one millions and odd: in 1817 they amounted to eighty-seven millions and odd, being an increase of 5,747,000l. In 1816, the revenue amounted to fifty-seven millions and odd;—in 1817, to forty-seven millions and odd. In 1816 the budget was twenty-five millions and odd; in 1817 it was twenty-two millions and odd. Thus it appeared, that in 1816, the revenue and budget together, amounted to eighty-two millions and odd; in 1817 only to sixty- nine millions and odd. Consequently if the diminution in 1817 of the revenue and budget were deducted from the excess of exports and imports, it would be found that in 1817 the sum to be met by the circulation was less than in 1816 by 7,200,000l. What was the state of the issue of Bank notes at both those periods? In 1816, the average amount in circulation was 26,500,000l.; in 1817 28,200,000l. So that, although there was a diminished demand of above seven millions, there was an increased supply of near two millions! But was that all? By no means. In the right hon. gentleman's estimate, founded on his own criterion, he had omitted to notice the paper issued by the country banks. How stood the question with respect to them? In 1816, the quantity of country bank paper in circulation was less than it had been for many years, and no man could doubt that last year it was greater than it had been for many years. It was impossible to speak accurately as to the extent of the increase from 1816 to 1817. He was sure that he estimated it very moderately when he took it at a third of the whole amount. The average quantity of country bank paper in circulation was twenty-one millions. The increase of a third, therefore, would be seven millions, which seven millions would be to be added to the increase in the amount of Bank of England notes. The result of the whole was, that although in 1817 the demand for circulation (according to the right hon. gentleman's own criterion, and the criterion adopted by parliament) was 7,269,000l. less than in 1816, above 9,000,000l. more of paper was in circulation! Was there any man of common sense and common honesty who would say, after this, that inquiry was unnecessary? This question naturally arose—what became of all this money? There was only one way in which it could be absorbed, namely, by raising the price of every thing. Could any man doubt that the rise in the price of stocks had been occasioned by this circumstance

^* See Vol. 20, p. 73.

Adverting to the bill which the right hon. gentleman had introduced into the House respecting the country bank paper, and which had been characterised as a grand financial measure, he observed, that it had excited a just alarm in the mind of every man in the kingdom. The effect of it, had it been adopted, would have been to drive a great many of the country bankers out of their business. For his part, he believed the country bank paper, generally speaking, to be a sound and useful currency. Nothing could be more objectionable than the purpose of the bill to which he alluded, namely to prevent a man from using his own credit in his own way. A security was required which there existed no right to require. Parliament had a right to prohibit the bankers from issuing one and two pound notes, if it was thought that their circulation was detrimental to the general interest; but parliament had no right to exact any security for the payment of such notes. Those who supported the measure had adverted to the number of failures that had taken place among country banks, and had said that two hundred out of seven hundred of those banks had given way. So far, however, from there having been any increase in the number of failures in the last year, the reverse was the fact. In 1816, it was true that a considerable number of the country bankers had failed, but it was a mistake to suppose that those failures were followed by a total loss to those who held the paper of the banks in question. Great misapprehension also prevailed on this subject in consequence of a number of the licences to country bankers having been withdrawn. An unfair influence was deduced from that circumstance. The way in which those licences were granted was this—it was the usage for an established bank in any large provincial town, for the convenience of their customers, and for the better circulation of their paper, to send clerks occasionally to the inferior market towns in their vicinity, for whom it was necessary to procure licences. A diminution of business had induced many of their establishments to diminish the number of subordinate persons thus employed, and of course to relinquish their licences. He knew one banking establishment in the country by whom twelve licences had been obtained for the purpose he had described, but who relinquished five of them. From this statement it was evident, that no inference such as that which had been drawn from the diminution in the number of licences was well founded. The whole number of country bankers who had failed since 1814 amounted only to sixty. Was that much coming out of such a war as we had for so many years been engaged in? He doubted extremely if the London bankers who had failed within the same period had not failed for a sum at least as large as that in which all the country bankers who had failed were deficient.

There were two objects which the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer appeared to have in view in the bill which he had introduced relative to the country banks. The one was, the recognition of the continuance of one and two pound notes, whether the Bank of England resumed their cash payments or not; the other was to pave the way for the issue of government paper. On the first point he (Mr. Tierney) could give no opinion. It was a matter fit for inquiry. No man could know how it stood until it had been thoroughly investigated. But the assumption of the right hon. gentleman set at defiance all investigation. He confidently declared that the metallic currency of the country could not be sufficiently kept up without the assistance of these one and two pound notes. In the teeth of all the former experience of this country—in the teeth of all the present usage of the other countries of Europe, the right hon. gentleman ventured to make this declaration. He (Mr. Tierney) was at a loss to know why England could not keep up a metallic currency without these small notes, when he saw France keep up a metallic currency without any notes at all. At the same time he did not say that the right hon. gentleman might not be correct in his opinion; but he did say that it was a subject which ought to be inquired into; and that the right hon. gentleman was not authorized, without investigation, to assume a principle that was contrary to all precedent and experience.

With respect to the other object which he believed the right hon. gentleman had in view by his bill, namely, to pave the way for the issue of government paper, he would ask the House what would be government paper, if the country banknotes issued under the proposed regulations of the bill were not so? The proposition of the right hon. gentleman was, that no country banker should issue notes of the value of one and two pounds until he had deposited double their value in the hands of the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, and that his notes should have a government stamp on them as a certificate of their validity. Would any body, under such circumstances, trouble himself to inquire whether a note was from the Chester, or the Exeter, or the Doncaster bank? No; he would see that the government stamp was on it, and that would satisfy him. It was impossible not to feel that this was for the purpose of preparing the way for the issue of government paper; and he was persuaded that in a few years the House would find this to be the case. It was natural enough for government to say "as we can circulate the paper of other people, why not circulate our own; why can we not do this as well as the Bank of England?" The right hon. gentleman shook his head; but then the right hon. gentleman had two ways of shaking his head—one was when he thought he could silence an opponent by shaking it, the other when he despaired of being able to carry a favourite measure. Whether the scheme to which he had alluded was actually in the contemplation of government he knew not, but he thought it highly probable.

There was another thing to be considered. Any person, for thirty pounds, might take out the licence which, according to the bill proposed by the right hon. gentleman, and under the regulations of that bill would authorize him to issue one and two pound notes. No man could by anticipation say what might be the consequence of such an inundation of country paper as this would permit. Again he put it to the House—were not these matters which demanded the most serious consideration? It was true that the right hon. gentleman had postponed his bill for a year but it was also true that he had avowed he had it in contemplation then to proceed with it. It behoved the House therefore to pronounce an opinion on the measure, but it was impossible they could form an opinion without a previous and deliberate investigation.

There remained little for him to say except on the subject of the mischiefs which some persons apprehended from the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England. To a certain extent he was willing to admit that those apprehensions might perhaps be well founded. He did not believe however that any violent shock would occur. He by no means supposed that the Bank would try to secure the continuance of the restriction by making the resumption of cash payments as difficult and as dangerous as possible; and he was convinced that if the Bank sincerely applied themselves gradually and gently to prepare for that resumption, although undoubtedly a great diminution must take place in the existing circulation, yet it would not be productive of any of those fatal consequences which it was the fashion with some persons to apprehend from it. But, if there were no other grounds for going into an inquiry, the expediency of trying if a committee of that House could not chalk out some course by which the Bank of England might resume their payments in cash without endangering the tranquillity and welfare of the community, would be one amply sufficient. Indeed, were he asked how such a committee as that for the appointment of which he was about to move could best employ itself, he would say, in endeavouring to devise the means by which the cash payments by the Bank might be gradually brought about, and a limit put to the issue of paper, so as to facilitate those objects without risking any serious shock. This he believed might be done; but he also believed that it could be done only by a committee composed of intelligent individuals, who would calmly and dispassionately enter into the investigation of the subject, and collect all possible information upon it from those who were the most competent to the task of affording such information. On a former occasion the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer had asked what complaint there could be against the rise in the price of stocks, as that in the end would enable government to compel the holders of five per cents to accept of three and a half. His objection to this was, that it was unfair towards the holders of five per cents that they should thus be paid off, not as the consequence of increased national prosperity, but because the market at the Stock Exchange had been raised by artificial means. The right hon. gentleman smiled; but he was glad to see that the right hon. gentleman was the only man in the House who smiled; for he repeated, that he held this to be a most unfair proceeding. Let the House consider how unequally and unfairly the artificial elevation of the funds operated. In the course of seven or eight months, the funds had been raised to twenty or thirty per cent. Who were the gainers by this rise? The great capitalists. Those who had the command of money. Into their pockets went all the profits of this temporary and accidental occurrence. But what was the condition of others? For instance, in what a situation were trustees holding the money of minors? They saw the high price of stocks passing them without being able to avail themselves of it; and when those for whom they acted came of age, some ten years hence, the bubble would then have burst, and they would have the mortification to reflect on what they might have acquired under other circumstances. A great deal had been said of the facility which the rise in the funds gave to country gentlemen to borrow money at a moderate interest, for the improvement of their estates, and for the construction of roads, bridges, canals, and other public works. All this might be very good. But a day would come on which this money must be repaid. In his opinion, the facility so much boasted of, was calculated to entangle and embarrass those who availed themselves of it. It afforded an advantage to artful and designing, over innocent and unsuspecting men. The consequences would be highly mischievous to all who had real property to lose, as well as to the merchant who had hitherto acted on the broad basis of fair dealing. The old system of English policy ought not to be abandoned unless in a case of extreme and indispensable necessity. Let the House remember that the restriction on the cash payments had from time to time been imposed on the ground of necessity alone; and let them prove the sincerity of their motive in agreeing to it on those occasions by now entering into an accurate investigation of the subject, and refusing to continue the restriction unless a clear and undeniable case of necessity could be made out. If they voted as the chancellor of the exchequer wished them to vote, there would be an end, and there ought to be an end, to the character of the country. It was that which was at stake. All principle would be set at nought by such an acquiescence, which would merely show the disposition of the House to bow to ministers, and to accede to any proposition without inquiry, however pregnant with unfair and dishonourable consequences. Every country in Europe, but England, was turning its whole attention to the state of its finances; and glad to avail itself of the return of peace, was adopting plans (whether they were wise or not was not then the question) to repair the evils which war had occasioned. England was the only country in the world that, after three years of peace, made no attempt of that kind; and the legislature of which, was about, on the mere assertion of the right hon. gentleman, that it was expedient to do so, to postpone the evil day for another year! If the House would vote that, they would vote any thing. If they would vote that, there was an end to all security for property of whatever kind. Every man would be exposed to the loss of his all; and however small that all might be, still to the individual deprived of it, the injury was as severe as if his means were most ample. The honour of the country would be sacrificed. It would be distinctly proclaimed to the world, that he who had dealings with England, dealt with a debtor of whom no man could say, that he discharged his debts honestly. At least, it was material to the character and honour of the country, that the question should be set at rest in some way or other. If the House was partial to the present system, let it say so. If gamblers and speculators were to enjoy its favour, let it again pass the Restriction bill, and again give those gentlemen the opportunity of exercising their vocation. But let it not believe that while it continued such a system it could recover the respect of the world, or set the financial affairs of the country to rights.

There was another consideration which it might not be useless to press on the attention of the House. Such was the restless and unsettled state of man, that it was the duty of parliament in peace to provide for the return of war. Every year the country necessarily advanced more nearly to a state of war; and if war found it with a debt undiminished, and with cash payments not resumed. from that day there would be an end to the British empire. Nay more. By pursuing the present system war would be provoked. Other nations would be provoked to attack us.—Why should England be the only; country afraid to face its difficulties? The continental nations had not allowed any apprehension to prevent them from probing their affairs, and they were beginning to feel the advantages of such a proceeding. The noble lord opposite was, on a former occasion, very profuse in his high-flown statements of the situation of this country as compared with any other in Europe. England, the noble lord said, was the land flowing with milk and honey, where every man could sit down under his own vine; and France was overpowered and humbled. But now France—degraded France—had faced her difficulties, she had braved the storm, and her government had brought forward a budget calculated to relieve her by degrees, from the condition into which she had been plunged by circumstances; while the British chancellor of the exchequer constructed his miserable piece of machinery to enable him to borrow three millions, and asked that House to abstain from compelling the resumption of cash payments by the Bank, because the drain of money in consequence of a foreign loan would render such a measure embarrassing! And why was this avidity shown in England to subscribe to a foreign loan? Was it not a proof of a great and an increasing confidence in foreign credit? Whence could this confidence arise? Did it not proceed from seeing that France was under a wiser government than this country—a government that dared to sift its finances, to show at once its necessities and the resources which time would bring to their supply—a government that had sufficient manliness to transact every thing above board, to call things by their proper names, and to allow that two and two made four. The House was then debating a proposition which the House of Commons of twenty-four years ago would have laughed at any one who should have predicted would ever be under the consideration of parliament. Never would it at that period have been believed that the day would come when a chancellor of the exchequer, not very remarkable for his financial authority, would induce the House of Commons to continue the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England, by telling it that the merchants of the country were sending their money abroad to lend to foreign states, and that therefore all the principles on which Great Britain had, until that period, maintained her credit, must be abandoned, and an attempt made to support that credit on a paper not convertible into cash.

It only remained for him to state to the House what were the points to which, in his opinion, the committee that he proposed to institute ought to direct their attention. He would not have them meddle with the internal affairs of the Bank of England. Had he intended that he should have moved for the appointment of a secret committee. But he wished that they should examine whether any public inconvenience was likely to result from the resumption of cash payments by the Bank. He wished that they should report what would be the most convenient and expedient time which that resumption could take place, and to suggest the most wholesome means for securing its taking place at that period. He was desirous that they should also enter into the subject of the danger or inconvenience that might be incurred by the remittance of gold abroad; as also into the causes operating on the price of gold. It would be likewise advisable that they should inquire what was the probable amount of the gold remitted to the continent in consequence of foreign loans; as well as what might be the effect of the Bank sending out gold and repurchasing it; as also of the probable amount of the loss that would be occasioned to them by the operation. A great part of the Austrian loan was remitted in goods, under the direction of Mr. Bowyer. All these subjects must be fully investigated before the House could come to any decision that would be satisfactory either to him or to the country. At present every man had his own particular theory. There were, no doubt, individuals who believed that it was desirable to defer for another year any inquiry into the subject of our finances, and any change in their regulation. For those who sincerely entertained that opinion, however much he differed from them, he felt respect. But the mass of the people of this country were of opposite sentiments. They wished from their hearts that the whole system should undergo a thorough investigation, and be restored to its original and healthy state. What he proposed would lead, not to a sudden, but to a sound conclusion. All he asked the House was, before it decided on the proposition comprehended in the right hon. gentleman's bill, to take every adequate means of ascertaining from the opinions of intelligent and well-informed men, whether the adoption of that proposition would be conducive to the public good.

He could not conclude without thanking the House with Unaffected sincerity for the candid attention with which it had listened to the observations which he had thought it his duty to submit to it. He would now move,

"That a Select Committee be appointed to take into consideration the State of the Circulating Medium, to examine whether there be any and what necessity for the further continuance of an act passed in the 56th year of the reign of his present majesty, restraining the Bank of England from payments in Cash; and to inquire whether any and what Restrictions on the issue of Promissory Notes by licensed bankers be fit to be adopted; and to report the same, together with their observations thereupon, to the House."

rose, to state the reasons winch induced him to dissent from the right hon. gentleman, and in doing so he should occupy as little of the time of the House as was consistent with the subject. He was glad to find that the right hon. gentleman had put his case on broad and general principles, rather than on arithmetical calculations, applicable to precise and defined circumstances. He could not see any necessity for the appointment of such a committee as that proposed by the right hon. gentleman, by the inquiries of which, the House should be guided with respect to the propriety of continuing the Restriction act for another year. He felt great satisfaction, that since he had last spoken on this subject, what he had then stated as probable to occur had occurred, and he should now address the House, and call upon them to form a judgment as to the propriety of continuing the Bank Restriction, not on conjecture, but on what had actually taken place.

The right hon. gentleman had stated the grounds on which he proposed the appointment of a committee, and next the nature of the inquiry into which he proposed that they should enter. The first of the subjects into which the committee were to inquire was, the nature of the effects which foreign loans were calculated to produce in this country oh the price of gold. They were then to deduct from the effects produced by such foreign loans on the pride of gold in this country a variety of circumstances. They were to deduct the effect produced on the price of gold by the withdrawing by the Bank from the market of that quantity which they had amassed, in order to prepare for the resumption of cash payments. They were also to deduct the effect which the excess of the issue of Bank paper had produced. He should leave it to the consideration of the House, whether these were subjects on which they could be expected to arrive at such a degree of certainty of conclusion as to justify making them the subject of the in inquires of a Committee. The result of the inquiries of a committee on such subjects would indeed be most unsatisfactory. When the variety of causes which might be said to contribute to produce the high price of gold was considered, it was evident to him that the result of the inquiry would be only to leave the subject in greater doubt and uncertainty than before. In illustration of that opinion he need only refer to the inquiry by the bullion committee, which, however ingenious and laborious, had led to no practical result.

The right hon. gentleman had assumed as a fact that there was an excessive issue of Bank paper, and he assumed this on the fact of there having been an increased issue of paper during the last half year. The right hon. gentleman had taken as a criterion the proportion which the Bank notes bore to each other at different times. He had assumed, that, because the Bank notes issued up to a certain period had amounted to a certain sum, which he conceived to be equal to the aggregate of the trade and revenue of the country, and because the notes issued within the last half year had exceeded that sum, there was necessarily an excess of Bank notes now in circulation. But the data on which the right hon. gentleman founded his calculations were necessarily imperfect and unsatisfactory. The right hon. gentleman had left out of his aggregate one of the most important of all trades, namely, our internal trade. It appeared that our foreign trade had considerably increased last year. There had been an increase of six millions in the aggregate of our exports and imports. But our internal trade had increased in a much greater proportion. Every man at all acquainted with the internal state of this country must know that its internal trade had never been so greatly distressed as it was in 1816, and that it revived in a most wonderful manner in 1817. One criterion for determining the increase of our internal trade had been pointed out by the right hon. gentleman himself. The issues of country notes had increased in a very great proportion last year. But why had they increased? Because a reviving trade called for increased issues. But another cause might have augmented the issues, and that was the purchase of gold by the Bank. The right hon. gentleman had stated, and stated truly, that the Bank possessed a very large treasure, and that they had been amassing that very large treasure during the last twenty years. As this was a subject not open to investigation, the amount of that treasure could not be ascertained by the House, although there was no doubt of the fact. But how, he would ask, could the Bank amass treasure but by the issue of their own notes? The advances of the Bank to government had also been assigned as a cause of the increase of Bank paper. But the House had the satisfaction of knowing from accounts on the table, that the advances of the Bank to government had not caused any such increase; and they had also the authority of a Director of the Bank, that the purchases of government paper by the Bank had not increased. He apprehended, therefore, that that part of the right hon. gentleman's statement in which he assumed that the over issues of paper by the Bank of England had contributed to the high price of gold, fell to the ground.

Another circumstance had been stated as having contributed to the high price of gold, namely, the difference between the price of silver at the Mint compared with gold; and he thought in this there was some plausibility. The difference of value of the new silver coinage compared with the old was about 6 per cent. But the new silver coinage which had replaced the old, if it was 6 per cent below the old, as the old had issued from the Mint, was, from the state into which the other had fallen, at least 20 or 25 per cent better than it. The other cause, namely, the quantity of gold taken out of the market by the Bank, he should not then enter into. But if these circumstances had contributed to raise the price of gold, in how much greater a degree must the operation of foreign loans have contributed to produce this effect. In 1814, the amount of Bank issues was 23,600,000l.; and the price of gold was then 5l. 10s. per ounce. In 1815, the amount was 26,300,000l.; being nearly three millions beyond the amount of 1814; but the price of gold had fallen to 4l. 6s. 6d. per ounce, being nearly 1l. 4s. an ounce less than it was when the issues were three millions higher. The House must therefore see the difficulties into which the consideration of these theoretical questions would involve them. When there were obvious circumstances to account for the increased price of gold, parliament ought to found their measures on what was known rather than on what was uncertain.

The right hon. gentleman had said, that foreign loans were negociated in this country last year, that foreign loans were negociated in this country this year, and that foreign loans might be negociated in this country next year; and therefore, that if they were to be governed by such circumstances, they might never want a cause for the continuance of the Bank restriction. If the ordinary transactions of foreign nations were in question, he would admit, that the argument of the right hon. gentleman was perfectly just. But he (the chancellor of the exchequer) had never rested the expediency of the measure on circumstances which arose out of the ordinary transactions of foreign nations. The transactions which justified the present measure, were of no ordinary nature. It was true, that about this time in 1817 a loan of twelve millions was negotiating by the French government. But, in the present year, the French loans were of an unusual magnitude. There had been two loans of 320 millions of francs each, and there would be a third of 380 millions of francs, making together a sum equal to about 45 millions in our currency of stock. The provision for the loans was 16 millions of francs of rentes, and a credit was opened depending on a certain contingency of 24 millions of rentes, making together a sum of 1020 millions of francs of capital, equal, as he had said, to about 45 millions of our money of stock; and making the loan amount to about 30 millions, not of stock, but of actual money. They were to add another remarkable circumstance, that a Prussian loan was actually negotiating in this capital of five millions, which would necessarily have the effect of draining the country of much of its specie. What proportion of the French loan would be remitted from this country, or what part might have already been remitted, could not be ascertained. These were circumstances reporting which he had no precise data. But a committee could obtain no more information on the subject than he possessed; for there was no precise information on the subject to be obtained, In considering, however, the effect which these loans would produce on the price of gold, it was not necessary to determine the proportion of this great sum which would be from this country. It was enough to know that much the greatest part of it must be obtained in this country. When they found the Directors of the Bank of England coming to a solemn resolution which was laid before Mr. Pitt, that another Austrian loan would be fatal to the Bank, and when they considered that that loan was expected to be only three millions, or at most four millions and a half, he would ask whether there could be any prudence or safety, when loans to so much larger an amount were to be raised, in removing the restriction? In consequence of this representation, Mr. Pitt promised that no Austrian loan should take place.

observed, across the table, that those opinions of the Bank Directors were taken up in a moment of alarm.

said, that the circumstances of the time were such as to justify the alarm. But even if a loan to so small an amount would not have produced the effects which the Directors anticipated, the circumstance became very different when there was a loan to the enormous amount of 30 millions sterling. The right hon. gentleman was sufficiently fond of producing the authority of Mr. Pitt, when his object was to condemn the measures of his majesty's present government. But be certainly wished the House to remember, that the right hon. gentleman approved of none of those measures to which when it suited his own purpose he could refer; and he (the chancellor of the exchequer) would appeal to the House, whether Mr. Pitt would have desired to see the affairs of the country in the hands of those who, according to the best of their judgment, endeavoured to follow his measures, or in the hands of those who constantly vilified them?

With respect to the present restriction bill, he wished to state the plain truth without disguise. The truth was, that the whole preamble originated in a mistake. The preamble was inadvertently copied from the last act, it not having been observed that there was any thing extraordinary in it, or which did not apply as well to the present bill as to the former bills of the same description. When the bill came into the committee, he should submit proposition by which the objectionable part or the preamble would be done away with. He was ready to admit that, whatever blame that degree of negligence deserved, it ought to fall on himself. The preamble as it was at present drawn, conveyed an unjust reflection on the Directors of the Bank of England. It stated, that it was necessary to continue the restriction in order to enable the Bank to make preparations for the re- sumption of cash payments. This was not true; for as to preparations by the Bank for the resumption of cash payments nothing had been left undone. In referring to the conduct of Mr. Pitt, the right hon. gentleman had said, that Mr. Pitt in 1797 had referred the subject to the consideration of a Committee. That was true, and nothing less could then have been expected by the House from Mr. Pitt. On a subject so new, so unforeseen, so alarming, so little understood as to its causes and its consequences, Mr. Pitt acted perfectly right in proposing a committee of inquiry. But what would a committee now have to inquire into? Undoubtedly the right hon. gentleman had pointed out some topics for inquiry on which a committee might sit long enough; for it was impossible that they could ever come to a satisfactory conclusion with respect to them. But, after all, such an inquiry could not be necessary to enable the House to decide a question which principally turned on simple and obvious facts, of which the House was as completely in possession as the committee could be. The right hon. gentleman had stilted, that the committee would have to consider, not the internal situation of the Bank, but whether any internal in convenience would be produced by the resumption of cash payments. But he (the chancellor of the exchequer) thought a committee ought to take the counter-part of this proposition, and ask, what internal inconvenience could result from the continuation of the restrictions for another year? As to determining the proper time for resuming cash payments, the House, after the report of the committee, might not be a bit the wiser on the subject. The House Could not judge whether some farther circumstances might not, by possibility, arise, which would render it impossible to resume cash payments at any given time; and a committee could only form a judgment on the present state of things, and could not possibly form a judgment on what might hereafter arise.

He had been charged by the right hon. gentleman with not being serious in his intention of resuming cash-payments, because he had not taken longer than a year as the period prescribed by the bill for that purpose. He had certainly proposed as short a period as possible. He had considered, that in that period only we had to apprehend any great danger from foreign financial operations, and that those operations would nearly be closed in less than a twelvemonth. The operations to which he alluded, were of a nature not to be repeated. Whether France would obtain a similar loan next year, he would leave to the judgment of any man acquainted with those matters. Was it not reasonable to suppose, that the great efforts made by the French government this year, had proceeded from their anxiety to remove what they considered a great evil—the presence of a foreign army in France? In what respect their credit might or might not be improved by the removal of that army, it was not for him to judge. But the French government professed, that they had no occasion for loans, but what arose out Of the circumstance of foreign demands and the maintenance of a foreign army, and that the ordinary revenue of the country would be sufficient for the ordinary expenditure. He therefore believed, that France would not again require a similar loan. This was only conjecture, but it was a conjecture founded on the best information which circumstances could afford.

The right hon. gentleman had bestowed a good deal of attention in his speech on a subject not strictly before the House, and into the consideration of which, he did not mean to enter—he meant the bill for regulating the issues of country banks, which was not to be proceeded with this session. But the right hon. gentleman had laid down some propositions so different from what he (the chancellor of the exchequer) considered true, legal, and constitutional principles, that he could not help noticing them. The right hon. gentleman had said, that it was not legal or constitutional to exact security from bankers for the notes they might issue. [Here Mr. Tierney intimated across the table, that he had said it was bad policy]. If the right hon. gentleman retracted his words, he ought to do so explicitly; but, he had unquestionably called in question the right of demanding security from bankers, for the notes which they might have in circulation. It appeared to him, that the legislature had not only a general right to regulate all the transactions of the country but, that it had a peculiar right to call for security from those who issued a currency to represent the metallic currency of the country—a power, in effect, no less than that of coining, which had always been held to belong particularly to the sovereign. If any man, at his sole discretion, were to be allowed to coin money without being restrained by the legislature, he should like to know in what state the country would soon be? Any man, it was said, with a banker's licence might issue notes on the security of stock. But the House ought to recollect, that in the present case, without any security, any man might issue as many notes as he pleased, provided he could put them into circulation. The undoubted principle of his measure was to place under proper limitation, what, when so limited, must be a great good to the country; but what without such limitation, was undoubtedly a great evil; for no evil could be greater than that of an insecure currency; and he had proposed to limit the circulation of one and two pound notes, at least, without a security, in order that the poor might not suffer by their circulation. A second principle on which he deemed the measure advisable was, that the issue of paper on government security, was preferable to any issue on private security; for all the notes issued on the security of government, might always be received without risk or inconvenience, as the fluctuations in the price of stocks could not affect the holders of the notes.

The right hon. gentleman had adverted to a subject on which he (the chancellor of the exchequer), had already stated his sentiments to the House. He had asked him, whether he had not really once entertained the idea of issuing stock debentures? He would repeat what he had formerly said, that he had never entertained such an idea for a moment. The proposition had been made to him, but he declared it wholly inexpedient. Whether under any circumstances, stock debentures might or might not be advisable, was a question into which it was not then necessary to enter. He had thought such a measure wholly inexpedient at present, because the amount of floating government paper was already as much as it was desirable to have at the present moment. The right hon. gentleman had imputed blame to government for the rise in the funds; he had talked of the shifts to which the said government had had course for raising the funds, and he had asked, who had been the gainers by the rise. Undoubtedly the great capitalists had been great gainers, but how many small capitalists had also been benefited by the rise in the funds? He firmly believed, that the general improvement in industry, the diffusion of speculation and trade, the revival of the prosperity of the country, the increase of capital employed in commerce, and the consequent increase of confidence, all arose from the rise of the funds. Some individuals might have felt inconvenience from the rise, but thousands had derived from it the greatest advantage.

There was one subject on which he hoped he might be allowed to say a single word—he meant the advances made by the Bank to government. The right hon. gentleman had maintained, that one of the great causes of the present high price of gold was, the advances made by the Bank to government. He had the satisfaction to state to the House, that provision was made for reducing the advances of the Bank to any amount that might be deemed necessary—to a greater extent indeed than even the Bank had thought fit to require. By the diminution of 16 millions in the amount of exchequer bills, that part of the advances of the Bank which arose from the purchase of exchequer bills would be reduced. So much, therefore, was withdrawn from the unfunded debt; and this diminution would have the farther effect of counteracting that possibility of an excessive issue of paper which the right hon. gentleman had supposed; although he (the chancellor of the exchequer) did not conceive that the right hon. gentleman's supposition had any foundation whatever. The right hon. gentleman had enumerated the advantages possessed by other countries from having a metallic currency, and he had affirmed, that the character of this country was at stake on the subject. How far the character of the country had suffered from its paper currency, he would leave those gentlemen who were acquainted with the continent to determine. Had any of them found that the character of this country had decreased there? The constant increase of paper circulation in England had been known for many years. Was it not by the aid of this paper currency, that we had been able to subsidize all Europe, that we had marched triumphant armies over the continent, that we had stood so high at the congress of Vienna, and that we had been enabled to conclude a peace the most honourable to this country of any that we had ever obtained? And now, after three years of peace, there was no country in Europe of which the finances had improved so much—there was no other country in which any thing had yet been done towards redeeming any part of its debt. In this country fifty millions of capital of the funded debt had been paid since the peace. It was true, that this was partly counteracted by the addition which had been made to the unfunded debt; but he had the satisfaction to state, that at the close of the present year we should be on the whole from 17 to 18 millions less in debt than when the peace was concluded. While our finances had improved, considerable taxes had been taken off. He had not heard that in any other country in Europe there had been any diminution of taxes; at least, in no other country had they been reduced to such an extent. France certainly had not yet had an opportunity, in consequence of the burthens to which she had been subjected. In America indeed the taxes had been reduced. But we ought to consider, that while 17 millions of taxes had been taken off in this country, the internal taxes which had been taken off in America amounted only to 8 millions of dollars, or about two millions sterling. He was far from being jealous of the prosperity of America. The interests of the two countries were so intimately connected, that nothing but the most ill judging policy could again separate them. It was but justice to the American government to say, that by the measures it had taken it had given a strong pledge of its sincere desire for peace as could possibly be given. By repealing all internal taxes, and placing the whole of the revenue on their customs, which depended entirely on the continuance of peace, the American government had given such a pledge of a pacific disposition as must be highly satisfactory to every man who wished well to either that country or this.

The grounds on which he proposed to continue the Bank restriction for another year were simply these—the extraordinary situation of foreign countries, and the extraordinary relations of this country towards them, which were such that no man of experience on the subject could deem it prudent or safe to resume payments in specie at the present moment. The experiment had been partially tried last October, and what was the consequence? The sudden disappearance of two millions and a half of gold cur- rency. He admitted, that by an unlimited issue of gold currency we might ultimately restore the exchanges in our favour. But he should like to know what might be the amount of the issue of gold and silver coin which would be necessary to turn the scale in our favour when there was a loan of 30 millions negotiating by France, of which the greatest proportion would be remitted from this country. On the one side then, there were evils of a most formidable nature to be apprehended. But what inconvenience could be feared on the other side from remaining one year longer in a state of things under which the country had prospered for so many years past? He wished, however, to guard against the idea, that he thought such a state of things ought to be continued longer than was necessary. Though the country had as yet experienced no danger or inconvenience from it, it could not be permanently adhered to with safety to the interests of the country which might be materially injured by any sudden alarm. On the one side, then, there were great dangers and certain inconveniences; on the other, no inconveniences and fanciful apprehensions; and on those grounds he should oppose the right hon. gentleman's motion for the appointment of a committee.

thought it most extraordinary that, on such a highly important and most complicated question, resistance should be offered to inquiry. Of the two grounds on which the restrictions had been originally imposed, not one was now alleged to exist; but a very extraordinary reason was assigned instead of them. The House were told that the restrictions must be continued, on account of the foreign loans. This was the first time that such a ground had ever been alleged for such a measure. This was placing a question of vital importance to the country in dependence on circumstances not under the control of the country. Whether we were in prosperity or in distress, whether capital were abundant or scarce, foreign loans might thus call upon us to restrain the Bank of England from redeeming its pledge, and keeping faith with the public. He doubted whether foreign loans could ever drain the country of its bullion, it would be found more profitable to export other commodities, to complete the loan. This was the case in the Austrian loan. But at least it was proper to inquire whether the foreign loans made it in expedient now to resume cash payments. The Bank might perhaps be unprepared to pay. He thought it would in that case be proper to continue the restrictions till the Bank could recall its issues: but it was necessary to inquire whether the case was so. As to the withdrawn bill, he had to observe that it was not the mere security that a banker possessed stock which could establish his commercial credit. It was his character, his skill in business, and his attention to the circumstances of his situation, it was principally these things that people regarded in a country banker. Gold and silver were made our standards of value for other commodities, on the ground that they were less variable than other things that could be used for a currency. But it was evident that the price of stock which the country bankers were to deposit as a security for their issues varied from day to day, and therefore ought not to be adopted as a standard. As he therefore doubted the prudence of the chancellor of the Exchequer in proposing this system, he thought sufficient grounds were laid for inquiry by a committee. One of the first principles of the banking business was, that the banker should have the complete disposal of his capital; but according to the plan of the chancellor of the exchequer, a great part of the capital of every country banker was to be taken from him, and locked up in other hands. Unless the notes, which it was proposed to issue were made payable at the banker's counter, they would necessarily bear a discount in the remote parts of the country. The banker to avoid this, would be obliged to keep money in hand to meet these demands, and thus to shut up a double portion of his capital. People would not receive his notes, unless they were assured that they would be paid upon presenting them for payment. They would not submit to any thing like the circuitous mode of sending them to London to be paid for there. Besides, the plan proposed would give an unfair advantage to the holders of small notes, over those who held notes to a greater amount. When a banker stopped payment an unfair advantage would be given, according to this new plan, to one set of his creditors, to the complete ruin of the others. The confidence of those who transacted business with country bankers, would be thus of necessity diminished. These objections and others had met the right hon. gentleman (the chancellor of the exchequer); and therefore he had expressed him self dissatisfied with his scheme, and had for the present abandoned it; but as it was not finally given up, and as no sufficient reasons had been assigned for its temporary surrender, a committee ought to be appointed inquire into those dangers to public credit which it was it was intended to obviate or prevent. The right hon. gentleman was uncertain and wavering himself in his plans and views, and he had said, that there must be great doubts and difficulties on this subject. On every great commercial question these doubts and difficulties must occur, but they formed the motives for inquiry, not the objections to it. For these reasons, and because the restriction was to be renewed on grounds never before alleged for such a measure, on grounds which, if they existed, must be most detrimental to the country, he should support the motion for a committee.

saw no reason for continuing the Bank restriction, from any injurious effect which might be apprehended from the negotiation of foreign loans on the state of the exchanges. The right hon. gentleman (the chancellor of the exchequer) had supposed that the remittances for these loans would be made in cash. This did not appear to him (sir H. Parnell) likely to be the case. The remittances, according to the general course of commerce, would be made in exports; and therefore would rather be favourable than otherwise to the state of our exchanges. The evidence obtained in 1797, with regard to the effect of the loan to the emperor of Germany, bore him out in the statement. That loan was for six millions, Of which sum only 1,200,000l. was expected in cash, the remainder was sent in manufactures, the exports of which had risen that year from two to eight millions. When the corn bill was before the House, he remembered that it was made an argument against that law, that it would diminish the exports of manufactures; but now the imports of corn were alleged as reasons for the exportation of specie. As a proof, however, that remittances from one country to another could be performed without bullion, he should mention the case of the Irish Absentee landlords, to whom two or three millions were yearly remitted, thought there had been for a long time no metallic currency in that country. It was by an export of produce that the remittances were managed. Wherever there were any facts which bore on the question, they proved the futility of the opinion that the negotiation of foreign loans would necessarily drain the country of bullion. The right hon. gentleman had quoted the opinion of the Bank directors in 1797, as authority for his present conclusions; but it ought to be recollected, that the Bank was then mistaken in his own case, and had proceeded on principles which were afterwards admitted to be unfounded. The evidence then taken went to show, that their feelings were those of alarm and apprehension, which ought not to govern the general interests of the country at large. The reasons for the resumption of cash-payments by the Bank were now strong. For the first time since 1797, that measure could be adopted without danger or inconvenience. If the opportunity for enforcing it were now neglected another equally favourable from the state of the exchanges might not soon occur. Another great reason against any farther delay was, that by the continuance of the restriction, the Bank of England would be induced to join with the country banks in increasing their issues of paper, which would raise the price of gold, and render a return to cash-payments more difficult than before. To the hazard of raising the price of gold, and consequently of all other commodities, thus endangering a convulsion similar to what we had lately experienced, we should again expose ourselves. The project of issuing small notes on government securities, by the country banks, did not appear to him to be any preparation for a return to a sound state of currency. These small notes would displace our coin, and would thus prolong the evil, instead of having a tendency to produce a remedy. The great source of the evils which we experienced or apprehended arose from the conduct of government. So long as government continued to make loans in times of peace, so long as we delayed the adoption of those economical measures which would bring the expenditure of the country within its income, so long would the Bank be unable to return to cash payments. The excess of our expenditure over our revenue was, therefore, the great object to be attended to; and immediate means ought to be adopted to reduce the one to a level with the other. He trusted a more rigid inquiry on that subject would be instituted than had yet taken place: till that was done we should never be able to get out of the difficulties that surrounded us, with regard both to our currency, and to other matters.

, jun. thought there was some ground of complaint against the right hon. gentleman for the way in which he had entered upon this discussion. The principal cause for this complaint was, that he had involved the one principal and practical question with several others in themselves complex and speculative, from which it might easily have been separated. Among other subjects, the state of our currency had been largely dwelt upon by the right hon. gentleman, but it did not seem to be concerned with the point at issue. The simple question for the House to consider was, whether the present was a proper time for the resumption of cash payments. With this question the right hon. gentleman had involved other considerations of an abstract nature. On the principal question, the right hon. gentleman said, that in postponing the resumption of cash payments, parliament broke faith. He was, indeed, astonished to hear this from the right hon. gentleman—When was the pledge given? What sort of pledge could that be which parliament could give as to its future conduct without reference to future circumstances? To this much indeed parliament had committed itself, namely, to its desire and wish that cash payments should be resumed as speedily as possible. It pledged itself to take every method of forwarding the desirable result of payments in cash according to contingent circumstances. Beyond this there was no pledge. There were two circumstances which might disappoint the expectations of the Bank resuming its cash payments at a certain time. Either the Bank itself might be involved in such difficulties as would prevent it from doing so, or there might be circumstances arising out of the state of the country, and its relations with foreign powers, which would render it inexpedient to do so, although in a full state of preparation. As to the first of these causes, so far as the Bank itself was concerned, it was now ready to resume its payments in specie; and therefore so far as parliament was pledged in this behalf, to this extent was it redeemed. As to the other cause—the situation of the country, it must be clear that it was impossible for parliament to pledge itself to any future line of conduct which was not to be subject to the control of future events. But as to this cause, the right hon. gentleman said, that to admit of its operation, in the present case, it was necessary to make out a close parallel between the circumstances of the country now and in 1797, when the restriction began. He must deny that any such parallel was necessary. For it must surely be allowed, that persons who had even opposed the first restriction would admit that a restriction might, under certain circumstances, be expedient, or perhaps absolutely necessary. The right hon. gentleman had referred to the report of the Bullion Committee, and had taken occasion to say, that the report of that committee was not very popular. As to this, he could only say, that so far as his opinion went, there was much in that report to be approved of and even admired, although there were many parts Of it which he certainly thought founded on erroneous principles; and that nothing could be more erroneous and blind than those parts of it which sought to deduce practical results from mere abstract principles. What was the present situation of the country? Was it not in fact that now, and for the last twenty years, we had been without a metallic currency? The question then Was, whether or not we were now able to return to a metallic currency; and if able, whether the circumstances of the country made it expedient, not for the interests of the Bank, which were of little consequence on such a question, but for the interests of the public at large? We had now for twenty years been going on with a currency of no intrinsic value; and might it not be inexpedient to make a rapid transition to a metallic currency? In his opinion, (and he seriously urged the consideration of this point on the other friends of a sound currency) nothing was more likely to defeat the very object of those who wished to return to a metallic currency, than that the transition should be effected by force, and in the face of unfavourable circumstances. He would put it to those who might be disposed at all hazards, and under any circumstances, to resume cash payments, to say what would be the consequence, if such a forced resumption were to raise a cry in the country for a renewal of the restriction? It certainly was not in the power of parliament to command those circumstances which were favourable to the resumption; but yet it was in the power of parliament to choose the proper time; and surely it was not in sense and wisdom to choose that time when the effects of the transition would be most strongly felt. Be the transition made when the price of bullion was low, and the exchange in our favour, still it must be done at a time when the country was otherwise prepared for it. The right hon. gentleman had admitted that a time of resumption would be a time of pressure; but he (Mr. Grant) was surprised at the confidence of the right hon. gentleman in the exertions of the Bank on such an occasion. The right hon. gentleman, who solely attributed to the Bank the desire of profiting by excessive issues to the destruction of the country, seemed nevertheless confident that immediately the restriction was put an end to, they would lose all regard to themselves in their exertions in favour of the country. He (Mr. G.) had no doubt that the Bank would exert themselves for the public, but it was at confidence in such a quarter that he was surprised. He agreed that the remittances which were to be made to foreign parts, would be made not entirely in specie—but admitting this, was it to be supposed that they would not influence the exchanges?—Although the sums were sent abroad in goods, the merchandize to that amount would produce no commercial returns, and the imports would, therefore, exceed in value such of the exports as were available to the purposes of commerce. The value of the exports being thus virtually diminished, who could doubt but that the exchanges would be effected. There were two causes which must always operate to diminish the issues from the Bank a panic in the country, or a foreign remittance. Now, unquestionably the effect of resuming cash payments would be to diminish the issues of the Bank. Was it therefore a time for the House to choose that the resumption should take place when either of the two other causes was operating? He thought it would hardly be questioned that a foreign remittance (the cause which now operated) produced some effect on the Exchange. For, admitting that a part of the remittance would be made goods, still goods could not be instantly remitted. The right hon. gentleman had referred to the Austrian loan of 1797, to show that this result could not take place; but the reference was unlucky. The amount of that loan was no more than about 4,000,000l. yet it materially affected the exchange. The committee, whose inquiries were at that time directed to the subject, examined witnesses on this part of it. Mr. Boyd was the person to whom the management of the remittance of the loan had been entrusted, and in his evidence he distinctly stated the difficulty which he had felt in managing so as to prevent it from producing a violent effect upon the exchange, and the various means which he had adopted for the purpose. Yet notwithstanding all the precautions which his experience and ingenuity had Suggested, the effect produced in the exchange with Hamburgh was such, that in a few months (from February to August) it sunk from 36 to 31l. The object of the right hon. gentleman was, to have a committee appointed, to get at the state of the Bank issues, for the purpose of regulating the exchanges; but parliament could judge of these without any inquiry by a committee, as it had all the facts before it without such an inquiry. A committee could only give its conjectures and opinions and judgment upon the various parts of the question, and all these the House could as well form for itself. He agreed that the liability to pay in cash was a beneficial restraint on the issues of paper; he agreed that excessive issues were mischievous, but whether at any one time those issues were excessive, it was difficult for any man to make out to his own satisfaction, and impossible to establish to the conviction of others. The effect of political and commercial circumstances it was difficult to ascertain. Of late there had been an advance of prices, and it was on that account immediately asserted, that it had been caused by an increase of issues. But how was it ascertained that increased issues had raised prices, and that higher prices had not increased issues. In 1810 it was proved the increase of the commerce of the country had caused an increase of circulation. A midst all these doubts, the result was this;—There were great principles which it was necessary to adhere to, except in cases of exigency, but having departed from them, it was not proper rashly to return to them at an unfavourable time, and thus put to hazard the public prosperity. The right hon. gentleman said that the difference between a sound and an unsound state of the currency was this—that in a sound state of the currency, no- thing was left to the discretion of the Bank; whereas in an unsound state of the currency, every thing was left to the discretion of the Bank. Though there was some truth in this, yet it was quite evident that what was true in it was pushed to such an extreme that the proposition became a false one; for it was well known that in either of the two cases which he had mentioned—in a case of domestic alarm, or of a large foreign remittance, the Bank had it in its power to produce the greatest mischief He was confirmed in his opinions on this subject by referring to the Report of the Bullion Committee—a committee of which be could not speak without respect, veneration, and regret—respect for those distinguished persons who had been members of it, and who were still in the House—veneration and regret for those members of it, and who were now lost. That committee, he could never help thinking, did not make sufficient allowance for the various perturbing causes which succeeded one another so rapidly through out Europe. But if that committee, so highly gifted, had not been able to come to any satisfactory conclusion, what was to be expected from a committee to be now appointed? It was, indeed, in vain to expect any accurate conclusion on so complex a subject through the medium of a committee. The former committee sufficiently proved this. It had attempted to fix the measure of the operation of war on exchanges—it limited the effects, ordinary and extraordinary, to seven per cent. Beyond that it left a void expanse—an immane barathrum—which it indeed attempted to fill up with depreciated Bank notes. It had at tempted to define what was indefinable— the operation of great moral and political causes operating in various ways on all the complicated system of money and exchanges. In short, no good could be obtained from the appointment of a committee which could not be obtained by a decision of the House. In talking of exchange, the right hon. gentleman seemed not to have reasoned in the most natural order on the causes which affected rate of our exchange. These causes he stated to be the coinage— the issues of the Bank—and lastly, remittances to foreign countries. If the right hon. gentleman was right in what he said as to the Mint and the low price of gold, he must show that in no case when gold was under-rated, could the Bank continue its cash payments. This, however, was completely refuted by the fact which his right hon. friend had stated with reference to what had happened at the time of the Silver act. It would not do to say it was any defect in the coinage which occasioned that unfavourable state of things which now made it inexpedient to resume cash payments, because the whole principle of the coinage was settled two years ago. But the House was told that silver was extravagantly under-rated. The fact was, that by the operation of the last Coinage act, silver had been depreciated six per cent, whereas now it was overrated seven per cent. It was impossible that any arrangements in the Mint could keep pace with extrinsic causes that operated so suddenly and so strongly on the coinage. As to the great demand for gold, he thought it might be, perhaps, very truly accounted for, by supposing that throughout Europe the same change with respect to the precious metals was now going on which had taken place in this country about the beginning of the last century, and that gold was gaining the ascendancy as the standard metal. He had already disposed of that part of the argument which related to the remittances. That of the issues of the Bank was a subject more intricate, and requiring so much delicacy in the discussion of it, that it could not safely or advantageously be entrusted to a committee. His main objection to the motion was, that it mixed an abstruse and general subject with a plain practical question of expedience. For these reasons he would vote against it; the more especially as to go into a committee would produce a great agitation in the country, the evils of which would not be counterbalanced by any trifling benefit—and no other could be expected—of which such an inquiry might by possibility be productive.

said, that he felt some difficulty in proceeding, to notice the speeches of the chancellor of the exchequer, and of his hon. friend who had just sat down. The chancellor of the exchequer opposed the motion for two reasons. First, because of certain principle and facts upon which he was satisfied in his own mind, and which he had represented as being universally admitted; and secondly, because of other facts upon which he was not satisfied, and which he thought there existed no necessity of investigating. His honourable friend had applied himself in the early part of his speech to a course of reasoning which was applicable to another subject, the restriction of cash payments. There was nothing in the speech of his right hon. friend which called for such a discussion, wholly irrelevant to the question before the House. The question was not whether the House should now refuse the continuation of the restrictions on cash-payments; his right hon. friend himself did not oppose this by the motion he had made, but he had said, and rightly said, that two years' time having been given the Bank to prepare for cash-payments, if those payments were now refused, a new era was established, a new principle was set up, and gentlemen opposite were as much bound to show why the Bank should be excused from payment now as they were in 1797. His right hon. friend had not contended that cash-payments should be resumed, but maintained that it was a subject of too much importance to be determined by the opinion of any individual, however high in situation or in talents, and requiring the labour of a committee to investigate it as became its magnitude. He could not agree with his hon. friend that because the subject was difficult, because it involved the most extensive and the most minute considerations, there was therefore no ground for going into a committee: those were the very grounds for appointing a committee. It was not enough for an hon. gentleman, be he who he might, to say, "I entertain such principles, I state to you such facts, I agree with the bullion committee in this, I differ from the bullion committee in that, my authority and opinions ought to have great weight with the House, I am quite sure the House is not so fit as I am to enter into an inquiry on the subject." No doubt his hon. friend had satisfied himself; no doubt he had studied the question.

He (Mr. J. P. Grant) had taken some pains himself; though he could not at present go the length of saying, that he had come to any decisive opinion; but he knew enough to convince him of this—that they ought not to be satisfied with the mete assertion of the chancellor of the exchequer, when they had a choice between that and the prosecution of inquiry by a certain number of their own members. He could not admit that what the chancellor of the exchequer had said, either as to facts or principles, was decisive of the question. He did not believe that foreign loans, affected the state of the cur- rency at all. If the honourable gentleman would show that any one foreign loan had ever done so, he would give up the argument at once. But the evidence of the bullion committee, the evidence of Mr. Pitt himself, were all strong to show that foreign loans had no such effect whatsoever. If this was to be the principle on which the restrictions were to be renewed, he presumed the preamble of a bill for that purpose must say, "That whereas the kingdom of France had negotiated a great loan in this country, and whereas that loan would unavoidably drain the country of specie, therefore the Bank was to be excused from paying its engagements in cash." When that preamble should appear at the head of a bill, he should be ready to show that it was not grounded on any one true principle or fact. If he succeeded in convincing the House that a foreign loan could have no such effect, then perhaps they would admit that there existed ground for farther inquiry. He would admit that at present the Bank could not, in point of fact, resume cash-payments, and that was the very reason why he desired inquiry; because, if any of the principles, or any of the facts, given out as the cause of this inability, were in reality the principles or facts which prevented the Bank from resuming cash-payments, there was not One of those principles or facts that was not within the control of the House. If the obstacle to a resumption of payments was the negotiation of a foreign loan, that might be remedied by the interposition of parliament; if it was attributable to the state of the coinage, parliament could equally remedy that. He begged now to call the attention of the House to the evidence of Mr. Boyd, given in 1797, with regard to the operation of the Austrian loan. With respect to the remonstrance made by the Bank in 1797, on the subject of another loan, he should observe, first, that that loan never actually took place; secondly, that Mr. Pitt said the Bank were entirely wrong in their conceptions about the effect of that loan; thirdly, that the loan which did take place 1795, had no such effect as that which was apprehended, or as that to which the Bank declared that its stoppage of payment was owing. Mr. Boyd, who was agent for the Austrian loan, stated in his evidence, that it could have no effect upon the priced of bullion, as none of it was remitted in specie. He was also agent in 1795, and stated, that the remittances were then made, as almost all remittances were made, by bills of exchange. Some part, however, was transmitted in foreign bullion, namely, the sum of 1,092,000l.; this was principally silver bullion, Spanish dollars; 1,043,000l. were silver; so that the Whole amount of the gold sent out was no more than 150,000 of French louis d'ors; the greater part of these were purchased by the Bank, so that, if any ill consequences ensued, the Bank was itself a party to them. The loan of 1796 was transacted almost entirely by bills. If gentlemen looked to the rate of exchange at Hamburgh at that time, it would be found, that during all the time from which a pretence had been drawn to justify a stoppage, the rate of exchange was such, that gold was exported at a loss, and imported at a profit; and yet we were now told, that the stoppage in 1797 Was owing to the loss upon exchanges. Whatever he might be in other respects, Mr. Boyd was a good judge of matters of fact, and could speak accurately as to the way in which remittances were made. This remarkable passage occurred in his evidence: "A remittance of 4,600,000l. he considered a difficult operation: it was necessary to vary the modes, and make use of all expedients. He could not carry it on by bills on Hamburgh alone, but by bills on Cadiz, On Madrid, On Vienna, on Venice, on Genoa, on Leghorn, on Lisbon, and on other places; and it was impossible to give a preference to any mode, but it was necessary that he should apply himself to all; by these means he made the exchanges favourable; if he had Stuck to bullion exclusively, the price would have been so high here, and so low at Hamburgh, that it must have been exported at a loss." Gentleman might wrap this matter up, as Locke said, in mystical expressions; but if they considered it plainly, they would see that, as between one country and another, gold and silver were not different from tea and coffee, or any other commodity. In this view of the subject there was no difficulty, and as well might it be said, that because we had troops to support abroad, the price of beef and bread must rise in England, as that the negotiation of a loan would make gold scarce here. We should not send out beef and bread, but cottons and manufactures to provide for our troops. The chancellor of exchequer had said that 30,000,000l. had been sent out of the country, but would he say it had been sent gold? When remittances were made to Germany, the amount of our exports was four times as great as at any other time. After all these facts, could it be said that a foreign loan afforded any reason for the farther suspension of cash-payments? On these subjects they were bound to consider what fell from the chancellor of the exchequer as entitled to some weight; but had such principles fallen from any other person, he should not have ventured to have troubled the House with an exposition of their absurdity: what he had been now advancing was within the sphere of every one's knowledge, and there was not a decently educated young man at his leaving college, that was not as well acquainted with the principles he had just stated, as the most profound calculator. If, in addition to the proof he had given, that the stoppage of the Bank in 1797 was not owing to the existence of foreign loans, he should show that it was owing to advances made to government, the House was bound to inquire into the subject, and before they resorted to the desperate measures proposed by the chancellor of the exchequer, to find out the real cause of the evil in order that they might adopt an adequate remedy. He would not fatigue the House by examining the correspondence which had passed between the Directors of the Bank of England and Mr. Pitt, when those difficulties first began, but he would refer them to that correspondence in which they would find repeated remonstrances on the part of the Bank, entreaties that the government would pay up their advances. He did not think that Mr. Pitt, if he were living, would feel highly flattered by a comparison with those who professed to act upon his principles, who one day proposed a plan to the surprise and alarm of the whole country, and the next day gave it up; who finding the nation in a state of embarrassment, could suggest no remedy for its and relief; and who, when the period came round for renewing the restriction of cash-payments, refused a committee to inquire whether such a measure was necessary. It wag Mr. Pitt's opinion that the Bank was straitened by too large an issue of paper, and that the only remedy was, to withdraw some of it from circulation. This had also been the opinion of Mr. Giles; and that if the Bank had adopted that measure two months before the stoppage, it had been safe. As to the alternation in the standard of value, that had been sug- gested by his hon. friend, and the surmise that gold was becoming the standard all over the continent, he could not answer it, because he did not understand it. Where there was but one standard of value, by one metal only being constituted a legal tender other metals might be measured by that; but where there were two measures of value subsisting at once, one would drive the other out. Under the present circumstances of the country, it was as impossible for the Bank to supply the deficiency of gold, as it would be for them to fill a reservoir that leaked as fast as liquor was poured into it; for while gold bore a premium of 8 per cent it would be quite vain to attempt to keep it in the country. On this subject the book of the late lord Liverpool contained a fund of valuable information. The whole subject was of the last importance, and demanded serious inquiry, to ascertain whether now or at what future time it would be expedient for the Bank to resume cash-payments; for, from the specimens of financial perspicuity and decision lately evinced by the chancellor of the exchequer, he did not feel himself very ready to pin his faith upon the right hon. gentleman's, assertions.

felt it necessary, after the extraordinary and novel doctrines, avowed by the right hon. mover, and by the hon. gentleman who spoke last, to trespass on the attention of the House. In some points he even differed from the chancellor of the exchequer, and they also required explanation. The motion was, that they should institute a committee to inquire into the state of the currency. His right hon. friend had adverted in the course of his speech to the discussions and publications which had taken place during the inquiry adopted by the bullion committee, and he seemed to be of opinion that it required an effort of courage to refer to their report. He had ventured, however, in defiance of all ridicule, to re-peruse that report this morning, and he had no hesitation in describing it as a perspicuous statement of facts, and well connected inferences which had never been answered. It had been prepared by a gentleman whose enlarged mind was well calculated to investigate any subject with precision, but which had been applied to this question with peculiar success. He could not conclude this brief observation of that distinguished individual, with out expressing his regret that he was not then present to assist their deliberations with the force of his reasoning, and the accuracy of his judgment. The question now was this—whether to the present circumstances it was fit to apply the principles on which that report was founded. He had that night come down to the House, in the full conviction that no dissent could have been expressed to the principle that an increase of a paper currency tended to its own depreciation; and must have the effect of increasing the prices of all commodities, including of course, gold and silver, and bills of exchange; for the real definition of a bill of exchange was, "an assignment to one country of so much of the bullion of another, as was represented by that bill." The reverse had, however, been asserted. He here read some extracts from a pamphlet lately published, intituled, "On the approaching Crisis," which he said was written by at warm and able opponent of the bullion report, and who seemed of late to have altered his opinion. It was true that the state of the country was now widely different: we were no longer at war, and it was consequently unnecessary to keep in the Bank a supply of specie; and he admitted, that the only ground on which a renewed suspension of cash payments could be justified Was, that the contraction of the paper circulation, which would be its result, would produce a general and a weighty pressure. Such a contraction would immediately force the exchanges above par, and induce remittances of specie from abroad. This had been the case in 1816, when the failure of one-fourth of the country banks, and the diminution of the paper of the rest to one half, had of itself made an alteration in the exchanges. A paper circulation had always a tendency to increase itself, because it was the interest of those by whom it was issued; and the main difficulty of returning to cash-payments arose from this very circumstance—the system was now of more than 20 years standing, and the issue had almost annually augmented. The proper time for resuming cash payments was, when the exchanges were either at or above par; and if the Bank had been prepared with gold, and the act had not prohibited it, he should have been glad to have seen a gold currency restored last year, and he was convinced that the demand would not have been great, as no man would have doubted the solidity of the Bank, not would the wish have been generate to have changed a convenient for an inconvenient circulation. He doubted even whether more gold specie would then have been required for the purpose than had lately been uselessly issued. The state of affairs was, however, widely different at the present period. Unfortunately the exchanges were now so much against us, as to alter the whole complexion of the case; and he would ask the House if they were prepared to compel the resumption of cash payments at the moment when the government of France were about to negotiate a loan of thirty millions sterling and when the government of Prussia had just concluded one in this country, of which a very large proportion had been transmitted in specie, and when all foreign loans, more or less, were obtained from the capital of Great Britain. It had been asked, what difference existed between a loan to a foreign government, and the effects of the usual desire displayed by many persons of seeking a larger interest for their money in foreign countries? To his mind there was a great difference, because it appeared from experience, and from the very necessity of contracting the loans in this country, that the foreign governments had not succeeded in inducing persons in this country to transfer their capital into the foreign funds, and that without this supply of British capital those governments were wholly incapable of performing any great financial operation. It had been stated, that Mr. Boyd had given in evidence before the committee, that he had transmitted but a very inconsiderable part of the Austrian loan in specie; and it was thence argued that a foreign loan was not calculated to produce any great effect upon the price of bullion. But of the actual amount transmitted in money in any one loan, it would be difficult to speak with accuracy. It was not correct that loans were generally transmitted in merchandize The fact was, they were more usually transmitted in bills of exchange—which he was ready to admit might have been purchased by merchandize—but should the results of this commercial operation leave against the country a balance, it must be eventually paid in gold and silver. In 1797 there had been a considerable failure of country banks; it was, in fact, a period of panic, and a consequent drain took place upon specie yet left in the coffers of the Bank; but the exchanges were much in favour of this country; upon Hamburgh it was as high as 36, and a considerable profit was therefore afforded on the importation of bullion. But the failure of the country banks, the panic, and the drain had led to the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England; and he had therefore been astonished to hear the hon. gentleman assert, that the suspension of cash payments arose in 1797 from the excessive advances by the Bank to the minister of the day. The distress which occurred at that period had been attributed by Mr. Henry Thornton a man of great practical knowledge, as well as of deep insight into the principles of finance, in his evidence before the lords committees, to the great diminution of the paper issues of the Bank; and even Mr. Giles, whose authority had been so triumphantly stated on the opposite side, had given his opinion, that were it not for the restriction the Bank would still farther contract the circulation. With respect to the immediate resumption of cash payments, the measure seemed to him incompatible with the existing state of affairs, nor did he think that the House could in any degree interfere with the internal regulations of the Bank for determining on the best means for attaining that object. He feared that in any attempt they could make, they were placed very much in the hands of the Bank of England.—He meant that the House could do nothing more than declare the time for resuming cash payments, but must leave the means with the Bank itself. It was impossible to dispute it, and he defied all the ingenuity of the other side to propose any satisfactory regulations as to the mode in which cash-payments were to be resumed—that must be left wholly to the Directors of the Bank of England; their character, however, would be at stake before the world, and they would, no doubt be anxious to be relieved as soon as possible from the inconvenient and pressing inquiries now, day after day, made into their affairs. He would not go into any numerical calculation as to the amount of the issues of the Bank, because he did not consider that amount any criterion of excess, which was in fact only to be looked for in the convertibility of paper into cash at the pleasure of the holder. For the general principle of currency was this—that the quantity of metallic money should be as small as possible, and the quantity of convertible paper as large as possible. Great mistakes had got abroad on the subject, and he could not agree in the praise bestowed upon a pamphlet quoted by his right hon. friend (the chancellor of the exchequer)—he alluded to that of Mr. Weston—for the very title of it supposed an absurdity. It was called "Letters on the Means of increasing the Circulation of the Country;" now no circulation could be sound and safe unless it was precisely such as would have existed if the currency was all metallic. He thought that all the advances made by the Bank to the government ought to be repaid before the resumption of cash payments. These advances must, in the first place, limit the means of the Bank to procure gold. The facility of acquiring gold must depend upon the rate of exchanges. These should be carefully watched by the Bank, and the amount of their issues ought to be cautiously and gradually reduced to a state similar to the circulation in other countries. With respect to what had fallen from the hon. gentleman, in regard to the difference between the gold and silver currency, he had forgotten that silver was no longer a standard of value, and that a person carrying silver to the Mint could no longer procure coin for it at the rate inserted in the Mint minute. This made an important distinction in the present instance, from the state of affairs in the reign of Charles 2nd, when a slight alteration in the relative values of the gold and silver coinage, caused the disappearance and restoration of either, as they happened alternately or respectively to be affected. The government now retained the power of regulating the exact amount of the silver coinage of the country, and, of preventing it from exceeding whatever was considered necessary for the mere purposes of exchange. The right hon. gentleman then adverted to the effect produced upon this country, and indeed, upon all the continent of Europe, by the facility enjoyed by Great Britain of extending her paper circulation. It was like the effect that had been found to arise from the discovery of the mines of America, for by increasing the circulating medium over the world to the amount of forty millions, it proportionably facilitated the means of barter, and gave a stimulus to industry. In proportion, however, as the Bank of England had found it necessary to purchase gold on the continent to meet its engagements with the public here, the circulating medium of the continent was diminished; and as the conti- nental states did not enjoy the credit possessed by this country, and were thereby debarred from increasing their paper currency, the result was discernible in the great confusion and deterioration of property that had taken place on the continent during the two last years. Indeed he had no hesitation in saying that much of the distress which had prevailed upon the continent, was fairly attributable to the purchase of bullion by the Bank of England. He then remarked on the great stimulus the increase of the circulating medium had given to the arts and industry of this country, but while the general appearance of the country was improved, and its prosperity promoted it was much to be lamented that the comforts and rewards of the labourers had been much reduced. The population of the country had increased in proportion to the rapidity with which the circulating medium had advanced; but though there was an increased demand for labour, its wages were diminished. This he showed by reference to the prices of corn for the last century. He stated, to show the improvement of the country, that from the year 1658 to 1754, there had not been one bill of enclosure, and this country imported corn. There were, from 1754 to 1796, during which time there had been a rapid increase of the circulating medium by imports from the mines of America, bills of enclosure to the number of 3,500, and this country became an exporting country. He concurred with the right hon. mover in thinking, that though some difficulty might attend the resumption of cash payments, yet it was idle to talk of its producing any serious convulsion in the country. He believed that nothing had tended more to create alarm in the country, than the clamour which was raised on the subject of the resumption of cash payments by the Bank. It was notorious, that in Scotland, even previous to the restriction upon cash payments at the Bank of England, the principal currency was in paper, and that there was very little gold currency in that country. Such, indeed, was the happy system of the chartered banks of Scotland, that even in the years 1793 and 1796, no inconvenience was felt in that country from want of metallic currency, when the pressure was so sensibly distressing in England. Nevertheless he felt, as he always had done, that it was the duty of the Bank, as soon as possible, to resume those pay- ments—and he was convinced, that, by a gradual, temperate, and cautious conduct, the resumption might take place without risking any material alteration in the affairs of the empire. This, however, could only be done by a proper reference to the circumstances of the country—and taking care that the amount of the circulation tended to place our course of exchange on a par with that of other countries. The present was not that season. To withdraw the restriction now, would soon force the country into its paper circulation with renewed and probably incurable evil.

congratulated the House on the opinions which they had heard delivered by the hon. members who preceded him in the debate; all of which proved the necessity of the investigation. The question before the House was, whether there should be an inquiry instituted by the House entering into a committee, in order to remove the restriction from the Bank, and by what means it could be removed. Two years had elapsed since he had explained to the House the reasons which should influence the Bank to resume its payments in cash, while the course of exchange was in its favour. The hon. member who spoke last, had, at that time, said that the Bank required time to prepare for resuming its payments. Two years were allowed, and what, resulted? The hon. gentleman this evening urged, that the time was gone by; he acknowledged the utility, the necessity, of the resumption of cash payments, and wished for its adoption; but he fixed no period. It was to take place at an undecided, floating moment. The Bank, it was stated, was eager, for the resumption, but he (lord F.) thought otherwise, for the Bank derived too much profit from the continuance of the restriction, to wish its removal. Where was this to end? Suppose another year were allowed, what would be the event? A committee must finally be established in order to inquire into the means of resuming cash payments, and why not at this period? The House would please to consider, the committee, which was the present object of debate, was to decide on facts and not on principles. He called on every gentleman who had thought on the situation in which the want of cash payments for twenty-one years had place him, to reflect seriously before he should embark in this melancholy career, to whom he en- trusted his future welfare. There was a decided difference of opinion amongst those individuals who spoke from the treasury benches; for the House would recollect, that the right hon. gentleman who spoke last, had absolutely laboured to overturn the whole of the reasoning made use of by the right hon. gentleman who first spoke from the opposite side; and it was not a little remarkable, that one Of the leading members of the cabinet had offered no opinion whatever on the subject. He thought it monstrous that the Bank should, without any inquiry, be allowed to raise or depreciate at their pleasure the property of every individual in the kingdom; nay, that the Bank should think this so much a matter of course, that not one gentleman connected with it thought it worth while to say a word in explanation.

could not let the question go to a vote, and especially after the manner in which he had just been called upon by the noble lord, without asserting that the Bank directors had done all that was in their power towards resumption of cash payments. The unforeseen circumstance of a bad harvest, and the loans raised for foreign powers had impeded the measure. The Bank had evinced its sincerity by twice advertising an issue of cash for its notes up to a given period, but the gold was no sooner issued than it disappeared. With a view to prepare for that resumption they reduced their issues from thirty to twenty-six millions, but from the circumstances of the country they afterwards felt it necessary to advance their issues, in order to supply the circulation. He trusted these impediments were only temporary; and as other countries were relieved in pecuniary affairs they would become our customers. As to the loans alluded to by the right hon. mover, he meant those to Russia, France, and Prussia, the fact was, that to Russia and Prussia those loans were made in English manufactures, so that they served to give employment to our own manufacturers, and to provide a market for their produce; and France would, in the liquidation of debt, and the payment of its contingent, return to this country a part, at least, of what it raised through our subjects. To the other drains was to be added the expenditure of Englishmen on continent, which was estimated at not less than 6,000,000l. Under all these circumstances, as a member of parlia- ment, he could not but admit this was not a favourable time to establish again a metallic currency. He lamented that these impediments had arisen to the completion of the measure which the House and the country looked for with so much anxiety. As a Bank director he lamented it still more, as he had learnt by experience that the cessation of the restriction could alone put the Bank in a state of complete independence. The House would feel that it must be irksome to himself, and other hon. members, situated as he was, to be daily subjected to harsh reflections, and to a language which he thought no circumstances could vindicate; and more especially when they had only acted in the faithful discharge of a duty entrusted to them. There had been last year no less than 20 accounts from the Bank called for, and this session already 17, and he believed notice given of others. These accounts there would be no pretence to require when the Bank was placed under different circumstances. Another proof of its disposition to pay in cash was, the calling in a large part of its advances to the public, for the payment of which provision had been made by parliament. By this it would be enabled to reduce its issue of notes; but he must apprize the House that this was a matter of the greatest delicacy, and it was impossible till the time to determine how far this measure should be carried. The present times were very different from 1797. Nothing the Directors could do, the House may be assured, would be wanting on their part. He could assure the House, and for a period of 17 years he could speak from personal knowledge, it was the anxious wish of the Directors to perform their duty towards the public, as well as towards the proprietary. He was, indeed, perfectly ready to take his full share of the responsibility which attached to the system so long pursued. With regard to the motion, he must say, that to appoint such a committee as the motion referred to, would only operate to produce embarrassment and injurious impressions, and therefore he should vote against it.

contended, that a committee of the House would prove ultimately the means to which the country must refer the important question of the Bank restriction, and wished to know why it should not at present be adopted. The point at issue was with the Bank, which had, during the time of the restriction, collected a vast quantity of the precious metals, which, by a future restriction, it would be enabled to send into the market, a proceeding which could not fail of being productive of advantage to itself. It was useless to call upon the Bank two years ago to make preparations to resume cash payments, if, at the expiration of that period, the restrictions were to be renewed, and the gold collected to effect those payments was to be disposed of for other purposes, so that the Bank would find itself as unprepared as ever, whenever a fresh call might be made for a return to a metallic circulation.

observed, that as the question was one of importance, he could not give a silent vote upon it. He would, however, avoid going at length into the subject. He was surprised to hear the Bank restriction advocated on the ground of foreign exchanges, and the demand for gold on the continent. Last year, the right hon. gentleman congratulated the House on a virtual resumption of cash payments, as he designated the partial sums of specie advanced by the Bank. It appeared, at present, as if the right hon. gentleman was anxious to avail himself of any pretext for continuing the restriction. With respect to the observation, that the price of gold was against such a measure, he could inform the House, that, for the last year, no change had taken place at Paris. The uniform price of that metal, since January, 1817, was 346 francs the hectorgramme. He regretted that the hon. gentleman who had spoken last from the treasury beach would not give the House the benefit of his vote as well as of his opinion in favour of the appointment of a committee; for in favour of that appointment all the hon. gentleman's arguments directly tended. Adverting to what had fallen from the hon. Bank director, he denied that in any remarks which on former occasions he had thought it his duty to make on the proceedings of the Bank, he had treated that corporation with any undue asperity.

said, that at that late hour of the night he would rather direct his observations to the motion immediately before the House, than enter into a wider field. He contended that no inquiry had ever been proposed to the House, which carried on its face less plausibility than the present. The motion had three objects, first, to inquire about a proposition respecting country banks, Which his right hon. friend had withdrawn; secondly to investigate the state of our currency; and thirdly, to consider of the means of controlling the issue of Bank of England notes. Any inquiry as to the two first objects appeared to him quite unnecessary, as the House had already sufficient information upon the subject; and as to the third, he must protest against any attempt on the part of that House to interfere with the management of the concerns of the Bank; for that management should be left solely in the hands of the Bank itself. The Bank might, if it thought proper, have resumed cash payments in 1816, by simply serving a notice upon the Speaker, but the Directors distrusted the continuance of the rate of exchange, which was then favourable, and that distrust was soon after justified. But had the Bank resumed payments in cash, the consequence might easily be judged of from the result of the partial resumption which had since taken place; for what was become of the quantity of sovereigns which were but lately issued from the Bank? Why they were melted down and sent out of the country for profit, and such must be the case while the rate of exchange was against us. When the loans contracted by foreign powers should begin to operate, the Bank would have to purchase gold at an extravagant price abroad, and after coining it here, would see it melted and carried back again to the continent. Upon what ground then could any reasoning man justify the sudden resumption of cash payments, while such resumption must obviously lead to the most mischievous consequences. He felt it his duty, therefore, to oppose the right hon. gentleman's motion.

replied in a speech of unusual brilliancy and force. He said, that the noble lord who spoke last had undertaken to simplify the object of his motion, and because the inquiry embraced various points, had endeavoured to simplify it by arguing that there ought to be no inquiry at all. The difference between, him and the noble lord was this—that the one desired to know what he was about, and the other looked upon this as an antiquated notion. The noble lord thought it would embarrass the public mind and create alarm, if the proposed inquiry was instituted; whilst he (Mr. T.) was of opinion, that the country never could be alarmed at seeing its representatives in- quire before they acted. He regretted the absence of a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning), who had given to the chancellor of the exchequer, at the time of the bullion committee's discussions—discussions which he had been reproached for not renewing that night—so severe a lecture upon the doctrines he then maintained. Had any body foretold at that time to him, that an hon. member, so severely lashed for his erroneous opinions on matters of finance, would soon after become chancellor of the exchequer, he should have thought the prophet out of his wits. But had it been added, that the lecturer, and a party to the lecture (Mr. Huskisson), would also sit by this chancellor of the exchequer, and support him on an occasion like the present, it must have exceeded all human credulity. The right hon. gentleman, indeed, seemed, after much deliberation, to have made up his mind, that the best way after all was to speak the truth, and the first confession was, that stock debentures were not worth a farthing. With regard to the preamble, indeed, the right hon. gentleman asserted, that he had had nothing to do with it, and that it was entirely a mistake. The person employed to draw it up had probably applied for some reason to prefix to such a measure, and the right hon. gentleman not having one at hand, desired him to find the best he could; the consequence of which was, that he took the preamble assigned to the last. As to the Directors of the Bank, he could not concur in the opinion that they were anxious to resume cash payments. Those gentlemen professed in private company, as well as sometimes in that House, their desire for the resumption of cash payments. They were, no doubt, individually very fair, amiable gentlemen, but as a body, he must say that he thought them most dangerous, and that they never would resume cash payments if they were not urged to do so, by finding that House in earnest to produce the measure. He, therefore, exhorted the House to show its earnestness upon this occasion. If it did not do so, he feared that the consequences would be dreadful—that a terrible revulsion would take place. This was probably the last struggle to guard against that melancholy event, and let each man, who felt for the situation of the country, have the satisfaction of thinking that, what-ever might be the result, he had done his duty [Loud cheers].

The House then divided: