begged to call the attention of the House to a violation, as it seemed to him, of the privilege of its members. There was a gentleman confined in the gaol of Lancaster, who had terrified government by attending a reform meeting in 1819, whose letters, from prison, to him (Mr. James) had been broken open; and his letters to that gentleman had experienced a similar treatment; one letter, indeed, had been withheld altogether; and a copy only delivered in its place. Petitions forwarded to be laid before the House had shared the same fate with other communications; and, strange as the decisions of Parliament had been, it would hardly sanction so gross a proceeding. Upon the effect of the practice it could not be necessary to say a word. The most signal injustice—the most atrocious cruelty—might be committed in prisons, under the operation of such a system, and no means of complaint would be open to the sufferer. It might be urged, perhaps, that prisons were visited by magistrates, and that to those magistrates, if necessary, complaints might be addressed; but, let it be remembered that in one gaol at least (Ilchester), cruelty and torture had been inflicted upon prisoners, notwithstanding the visits of such appointed magistrates; and that gentlemen had risen in the House to eulogize the character of the manager of that institution, unconscious of the conduct of the man of whom they were speaking. As far as he had been able to learn, this inquisitorial practice of opening letters had originated in 'the wish of some Lancashire magistrates to pry into the secrets of the advocates of parliamentary reform. Inquiry being made into the legality of the course, those magistrates laid a case before counsel, and obtained an opinion, that the proceeding was lawful: they then, from having merely desired the gaoler to open certain letters, added a formal regulation to the rules of the prison, that all persons confined for peculiar offences should be subject to an unqualified inspection of their correspondence. Now, that such an order was contrary to English law, he had no doubt. The 9th of Anne, commonly called the Post-office act, declared that no person should presume to open a letter unless by warrant from a secretary of state; and in support of that enactment might be quoted the circular of the late secretary for the home department, dated 9th of November, 1814, decidedly stating to gaolers, that such an act was not warranted by law. The proceeding, he contended, was in direct violation of that clause in the Bill of Rights, which said that the law of the land should not be dispensed with, unless by the authority of parliament. He knew that some reliance had been placed upon the act of the 32nd George 2nd; but he could find nothing in that act to justify a magistrate in doing that which was contrary to law. That act referred to persons who were imprisoned for debt. Its preamble set out with recognizing the hardships to which persons so imprisoned were sometimes exposed by the oppression of gaolers, and it enacted that proper rules should be made for the regulation of persons imprisoned; but, though certainly the letter of the act referred to persons imprisoned for debt, yet the spirit of it was humane, and it went to alleviate, not exasperate, the sufferings of any class of prisoners. But before those regulations were made, as well as since, the letters of prisoners were opened in this prison, which showed how little respect there was for the law, by those who thought it for their interest to violate it. This, he believed he was safe in saying, was a practice unknown in any other gaol in the kingdom. It was not practised at Ilchester gaol, even towards Mr. Hunt, whom the attorney general had described as guilty of a crime little short of high treason, but whom he (Mr. James) would always consider as severely persecuted; for he would maintain that he had rendered great services to the cause of humanity, in the recent investigation, to which his exertions had contributed; but even in the case of Mr. Hunt, the magistrates of Somerset had not made a regulation by which his letters were to be subjected to inspection—a regulation which he should ever think most inquisitorial and unjust. Whatever opinions might be held on the subject elsewhere, he would say, that the practice was illegal; and in support of his opinion, he had the authority of a great politician and an able lawyer, whose name he was sure would carry great weight with the House. He alluded to the late sir S. Romilly. That able man, in presenting, in the year 1812, a petition from a prisoner confined in Lincoln gaol, complaining of having his letters opened, had stated, that he knew no statute law which authorized such a practice, and that certainly no such right existed by common law. He had stated as a lawyer; that the magistrates had no such power. They had no right to interfere with the prisoners. They were in the custody of the high sheriff, whose duty it was, not merely to precede the judges of assize, with men bearing white staves, and others sounding trumpets, but to attend to and provide for the comforts of the prisoners in his gaol; for they were in his custody, and not in that of the magistrates. This was the opinion of sir S. Romilly; and, fortified with that opinion, he contended that he was fully borne out in describing the conduct he had alluded to as illegal. But, if it should be contended that the 32nd of George 2nd gave the power in question, the sooner it was repealed the better. As to the question whether this was a breach of privilege, it was at first his intention to have brought the matter before a court of law; and he was satisfied that before an impartial judge, and any twelve honest men, he should have got a verdict; but when he heard from so many excellent authorities, that the matter was a violation of the privileges of the House, be felt that he should not be discharging his duty if he did not bring the subject before it, satisfied that in supporting the privileges of that House he was also maintaining those of the people. The hon. member concluded by moving, "That it is the opinion of this House, that any person breaking open, detaining, or suppressing, any letter or letters addressed by or to Members of this House, is guilty of a direct breach of the privileges of this House."

did not see on what ground the motion for declaring the opening of a letter from a prisoner to a member of parliament a breach of their privileges, could be sustained. A similar question had been started last year, and referred to a committee of privileges, and he had never heard that they felt it incumbent upon them to bring the subject forward. That the practice complained of would, under some circumstances, amount to a breach of moral justice between man and man, no one could deny; but there were limits to the privileges due to letters, and when he found that even the judges of the land, were strongly in favour of the practice complained of, he could not think that there were sufficient grounds for assuming that a breach of privilege had been committed. One of the rules ordered, that the keeper of the gaol should examine all correspondence carried on by prisoners on the Crown side, and not forward any letter which contained improper matter without showing it to the chaplain or one of the visiting magistrates. When the letter was submitted to the proper persons, if the letter came to a prisoner, he was sent for, and the unexceptionable parts were read to him; if the letter was written by a prisoner, he was told what were the exceptionable parts, and had the liberty of rewriting that which was not offensive. This rule was ordered by Mr. Justice Bayley, and he believed was in the hand-writing of that learned judge himself; and the whole of the rules were sanctioned by Mr. Justice Bayley and Mr. Justice Park. Therefore, upon a general view of the question, whether the gaoler was justified in opening the hon. member's letter or not, he firmly believed that he would not have done his duty if he had not examined its contents. Whether the mere fact of the frank of a member of parliament went to alter the operation of the prison rules, was a question which others might be more able to determine; but, for his own part, he certainly did not think it did. How was it possible for members always to know what their franks contained? They might become the means of conveying matter the most improper in its nature, and dangerous in its consequences. Upon the hon. member's own showing, he thought there was nothing in the present case which called for the interference of the House.

observed, that if he understood the hon. mover, his object was, to establish two propositions; first, that the opening of a letter franked by him was illegal; and secondly, that it was a breach of the privileges of the House. If he should be able to disprove both these points, he apprehended there would be an end of the hon. gentleman's case. Before he proceeded with his argument on the first point, he could not but express his surprise at the opinion of a learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham), on a former evening, as to the opening of letters sent by convicts on board the hulks; and he thought that, on a little more mature reflection, the learned gentleman would not himself persist in the opinion then given. It would not be denied, that by far the greater portion of the persons detained on board the hulks were civilly lead, possessed no civil rights, and there fore that the government would be justified, not only in ordering the inspection of heir letters, but in prohibiting all communication with them. However, the Proposition of the hon. member this night was a different question. It went to show that a certain regulation for the better government of the gaol of Lancaster, which had been sanctioned by his (Mr. Peel's) predecessor in office, was in its operation illegal. Now, he would show the contrary. What was the nature of the regulations of Lancaster gaol? Here the right hon. gentleman repeated the statement given by lord Stanley, as to the authorities by which the regulations were sanctioned. The first impression of the House, after hearing such authority as that of two judges of the land sanctioning those regulations, should be, he imagined, a presumption that they at least were not illegal. The hon. member had referred to the 32nd of Geo. 2, but he carefully left out of his view the 31st of Geo 3. By that act it was enacted, that fit and proper regulations should be drawn up for the better government of gaols and other places of confinement, in England and Wales; and it added, that those regulations should be drawn up by the same authorities as those mentioned in the 32nd Geo. 2. And who were those authorities? The magistrates of the counties. It further added, that the regulations to which they might come should have force, when sanctioned by the judges of assize, who were authorized to revise them. This was done in the case of Lancaster gaol. The magistrates drew up and agreed to certain regulations for the better government of the county gaol. These were submitted to the judges, by whom they were examined, and, with some alterations, sanctioned and approved. Would it, after this, be said, that they were illegal? He should be wantonly trespassing on the time of the House, if he dwelt longer on the question of legality. Supposing it, then, admitted to him, that this regulation was a legal one, the next question was, whether the exercise of the rule was, in the case alluded to, a breach of the privilege of parliament. Now, if parliament sanctioned the enactment or the rule, he could not see any thing in the case of a member of parliament which should exempt his letters from being opened, where that was war- ranted by the law of the land. Now, taking it as granted, for the sake of the argument, that the view which he took of the construction of the act was a legal one, upon what did the authority of the regulations rest? Here they had it, that the House of Commons, one branch of the legislature, had declared, by a bill which was passed into a law by the concurrence of the two other branches, that certain regulations for the government of gaols and other places of confinement should be binding, when sanctioned by the authorities there specified, Would it, then, be maintained, that after thus sanctioning such rules, without any reservation as to their own privileges, such exemption now existed? He contended, that where the authority was given, as in this case, he maintained it had been given, it could not be revoked except by another act; and until that act was passed, any regulation under the former would not amount to a breach of privilege. The attention of parliament had formerly been called to the question of privilege, with reference to the letters of members; but, before he proceeded with that, he would make a few remarks on the subject of a letter sent by lord Sidmouth to the gaoler of Gloucester gaol, on the subject of opening letters addressed to prisoners. The letter was written after a complaint made to the Lords on the part of a debtor, and a person accused of a misdemeanor, but not tried, that letters addressed to them had been opened by the gaoler. Lord Sid-mouth, after consulting with the law officers of the Crown, sent the letter in which it was said, that a future regulation would apply to "felons and fines." Now he was satisfied that the word "felons" here was a mistake for the word "debtors." How the mistake occurred, whether in the copying or printing, he could not say; but of this he had no doubt, that "debtors" should have been mentioned and not "felons." He had just said, that the attention of parliament had been formerly called to this subject. In the year 1735, a complaint was made, that letters addressed to members had been opened; and that postage was claimed, but this complaint referred to letters put into the post, and in that case there could be no doubt that it would be a gross breach of privilege. But, was that a case at all in point? was it in any way analogous to regulations made by magistrates to prevent a letter being put into the post? He maintained it was not. The House of Commons never considered that they were exempt from the operation of the law. They resolved on that occasion, that it would be a gross breach of privilege for any agent of the post-office to open a letter of a member of parliament, except by a warrant of a secretary of state. Thus they clearly recognized, that in cases where it might be necessary for a secretary of state to order the opening of a letter, their own privilege was not reserved. He was satisfied that the same feelings would prevail here, and that the House would not claim any privilege which would interfere with the criminal justice of the country. The opinion of Mr. Justice Blackstone was, that the privilege of a member of parliament did not extend to exemption from arrest, in cases of indictment. All the civil rights and exemptions which they had formerly claimed were gone, except that of the freedom of their person in civil cases, and the freedom of their letters. Where the regulations alluded to were authorized by law, there was no presumption of such an unlimited correspondence in any way as could have the effect of revoking these regulations. Whatever right of personal communication a magistrate might have with prisoners, a member of parliament, as such, had none: he had no right to insist upon such communication, but certainly all correspondence should be controlled by the regulations which were necessary for the discipline and proper management of the prison. Under all the circumstances, he saw no ground for the interference of the House, and would therefore conclude by moving the previous question.

said, that if he understood the right hon. gentleman right, he had laid it down as the law of the land, that magistrates, when their regulations were sanctioned by judges, had a right to legislate for gaols, and that they could not only enforce, but aggravate punishments, by placing persons in solitary confinement. Now, the magistrates might make regulations, and the judges assent to them; but such regulations could only relate to the hours of labour and of diet, and such matters. The magistrates might take care that the prisoners had all the advantages consistent with their situation and sentence, but beyond that they had no power at all. He would put it to the House, whether a judge had a right to increase the term of a sentence from one year to five, and solitary imprisonment? The act referred to by the right hon. gentleman was a penitentiary act, and was not applicable to gaols in general. But, if the magistrates had a right to legislate for the discipline of prisons, then there was an end to all the labours of their committees. In the case in question, the letter was addressed not to a felon but a fine; so that the construction of the right hon. gentleman would not apply to it, and consequently the opening of it was an illegal act. On this subject he would refer the House to the report of the committee in 1735. The first resolution of that committee declared that it was the privilege of members, that letters sent by or to them, should pass free of postage. The object of this privilege was evidently not for the purpose of saving two-pence or three-pence, or seven-pence, but because it was essential that members should have a free and unrestrained communication, not only with their constituents, but with the people at large: The next resolution of the committee was, that it was a high breach of the privileges of parliament for any postmaster to open any letter sent from or to a member, unless under a special warrant signed by the secretary of state;—not a general order, such as that which had been given on a recent occasion. One of the principal objects of this privilege was, to facilitate the knowledge, and consequently the redress of grievances. And in what place was the existence of grievance more to be apprehended than in gaols? Who that knew the efforts that had been making during the last eight or ten years to improve the condition of our gaols, and compared their present state with their state before that period, but must feel that grievances without end must have existed in gaols; and therefore that it never could have been intended by the legislature that all complaints proceeding from gaols and addressed to members of parliament should be interrupted and suppressed? The present was a signal case of improper interference, for his hon. friend had written to the gaoler to tell him that the letter was from himself. He was not surprised that the right hon. gentleman had been apprehensive of meeting this motion with a direct negative, and had preferred the previous question; but he was sure that his hon. friend had done good in bringing the subject forward, and that the discussion of it would cause the correction of a great abuse.

said, that though he was fully prepared to admit, that neither the magistrates nor the gaoler had a right to increase the punishment of any individual beyond the degree mentioned in the sentence of the court, still he was prepared to argue that they had a right to make such regulations as they thought proper for the internal government of the prison, liable, however, to the subsequent confirmation or rejection of the judges of the assize. Now, a set of regulations having been agreed to by the magistrates of Lancashire, and subsequently approved of by the judges, it became the duty of the gaoler implicitly to obey them. Indeed, the gaoler would have been guilty of a gross dereliction of his duty, if he had obeyed the hint given him in the letter of the hon. member for Carlisle, and had refrained from opening the letter sent to the prisoner under his custody. In the, case of the Gloucester gaoler, he took upon himself to stop the letters of prisoners, without orders from magistrates. The letter of lord Sidmouth written upon that occasion, was not a circular. It was transcribed by some of the magistrates of Somerset, and afterwards entered upon the journals of Ilchester gaol, where Hunt found it, and supposed it to have been a circular. Would any member say, that he had a right to enter into any gaol in the kingdom, in order to hold communication with those confined in it. Now if hon. members had not a right to communicate personally with all persons confined in gaol, how could they have a right to communicate with them in all cases by letter? As to a breach of privilege, he was quite confident that none had been Committed.

contended, that the absence of all exceptions in the statutes which had been quoted, saving the privileges of members, was a proof that it was not supposed that the general rule, by which those privileges were secured to them, was affected. If this privilege were not-maintained, cases of great severity might exist in prisons, which would never be known to the world. It would be far better to suffer the danger and inconvenience of a solitary instance of an improper use of the privilege, than the much greater danger and inconvenience of preventing acts of oppression from being brought to light. In his opinion, there ought always to be the most free mad unrestrained communication between the people and their representatives, under whatever circumstances the former might be placed.

trusted, that parliament would not allow its privileges to be got rid of by the regulations of any set of magistrates. He was no great stickler for precedent; but he had found one peculiarly applicable to the matter before the House. In the first year of William and Mary, it was resolved by the House, that the breaking open a letter sent by, or directed to, one of its members, was a gross infringement of the privileges of parliament. After such a resolution, there could be no doubt of a breach of privilege having been committed in the present instance. When hon. members read the report of the commissioners on the state of Ilchester gaol, they would discover an additional reason for not allowing the letters of prisoners to be intercepted; for they would see, that there was no longer any great confidence to be placed either in gaolers or in visiting magistrates.

maintained, that neither a breach of privilege nor of the law of the land had been committed. That the law of the land had not been infringed, was clear from the act of queen Anne, on which so much stress had been already laid. That the privileges of the House had not been violated, was also evident from this—that the resolutions to which allusions had been made only referred to the delivery of letters by the post. With regard to the resolution of 1689, the circumstances which had given rise to it ought to be taken into consideration. The House had come to that resolution in consequence of the governor of Hull having seized upon the mail bag, and opened all the letters it contained, among which were some written to and by members of parliament. Now, it ought to be recollected that this event had occurred shortly after the Revolution, at a time of great public alarm and confusion; and that, though the House had come to such a resolution as the hon. member for Southwark had described, it had not inflicted any punishment upon the offender. Indeed, the House was bound to consider, in reference to the present question of privilege, what were the powers of magistrates and gaolers before the acts of George 2nd and George 3rd. Before that time they had the power of adopting all such regulations as appeared to them necessary for the safe custody of their prisoners. The judges could give no connexion or relative of the prisoner an order of admission into the gaol: all that they could do was, to recommend to the gaoler to allow such and such a person admittance; advising him at the same time to take all due care that the prisoner did not escape. They had even the power, cruel and odious as it was, of placing individuals in solitary confinement; and having such power, was it likely that they would not have the power of intercepting their correspondence? Indeed, it appeared to him that nothing might be more necessary than such a power: for by means of it, a prisoner's intention to escape or to give information to his accomplices might be effected; nay, to put an extreme case, poison might be -sent to a prisoner in a letter to enable him to evade the execution of the law; and certainly against such a catastrophe it was the duty of the gaoler, if possible, to provide. He must see evidence of much greater abuse than appeared in the present case, before he could consent to interfere.

begged to make a few observations on what had just fallen from the right hon. gentleman. He confessed he had been anxious to hear what could be said by the right hon. gentleman, well known formerly on his side of the House, and now he trusted to be as well known on the other side of the House, as the strict and vigilant guardian of the privileges of parliament. Since he had heard the right hon. gentleman, however, instead of being weakened, he had been strengthened in his opinion on the subject; as he knew that he had now heard all that could be urged by learning or legal ingenuity. In the first place, he must protest against the doctrine of the right hon. secretary of state, as to that which ought to be considered the test and limitation of the privileges of parliament; namely, that that privilege did not interfere with any act done legally by any established authority; that if, for example, the justices of the session, sanctioned by two of the judges, were empowered by law to make certain regulations for the conduct of gaolers, those regulations were to ride over the privileges of parliament; although there was nothing in the act by which that power was conferred respecting those privileges, except the omission of any clause by which they were saved. Such did not appear to him (Mr. B.) to be a sound construction of the statute. The sound construction was, that nothing in the statute should infringe the privileges of that House. The sound construction of the statute was, that if the two things could stand together—if the regulations could be inforced, and the privileges of parliament maintained, it was well; but if not, that as those privileges were not expressly taken away by the statute, they must be considered as untouched, and not liable to infringement. For to what a monstrous doctrine would the right hon. secretary's argument lead! According to the right hon. secretary, the bench of justices would have nothing to do but to obtain the sanction of two of the judges, and they might establish regulations involving the grossest violations of the privileges of that House. In such a case, the right hon. secretary would exclaim, "Oh, but this is no breach of privilege; for by the act, the magistrates are authorised, with the sanction of two of the judges, to make any orders they please, and the privileges of the House are not saved in the act." Now, the sound doctrine, as he (Mr. B.) contended, was directly the reverse of this. The sound doctrine was, that, unless the privileges were expressly waved by the statute, nothing the magistrates could do should be allowed to infringe them; and, therefore, he should always read any order of the magistrates, with an exception, saving the privileges of parliament, which the statute gave them no right to violate.—Another strange doctrine which had been held was, that the privilege of the House, with respect to letters, went only as far as their delivery from the post office. But it appeared from the resolution of 1735, and from the history of the proceedings of those times, that the complaint did not extend to the post-office alone. He should like to know what was the peculiar nature of the post-office, which could confine the privilege of parliament to all letters which passed through it. If it was a breach of privilege to open member's letters in the post office, why not in other places also? The resolutions must in substance and in spirit mean this—that all communications between members should be free and unrestrained—that the doors of parliament should be opened to all complaints on the part of the people—that the utmost confidence should exist between the House and the country. But this could not be done, if any steps were taken (he cared not whether by a sheriff, a gaoler, a postmaster, or what other public functionary), to interrupt or stop this wholesome and salutary communication. If any thing had been wanting to support this part of the argument, it had been fully supplied by the president of the board of Control (Mr. Wynn). The right hon. gentleman had alluded to the conduct of the governor of Hull, in sending for the bags and opening the letters. Now, in that case, the complaint was made by the deputy post-master, that the said colonel had opened and embezzled the letters of the king's subjects, to the destruction of the trade of the place, and to the injury of several merchants, and amongst others, many members of parliament who lived near the place. Let it be observed, that here was no complaint of breach of privilege on the part of the members alluded to.—Now the first complaint of breach of privilege was brought, not against, but by a post-master, and against a military officer. It would be for the gentlemen opposite to tell the House by what magic it was, that the privilege of parliament was to be preserved in those letters which passed through the post, but that, in the event of their being opened by a gaoler or other person after delivery, such privilege was to be done away with. But they were told by a right hon. member, that this privilege was liable to abuse. To be sure it was; and so was every other privilege; but was that an argument why it should be abolished? Where was there any privilege affording a greater opportunity of abuse than that which protected members from arrest for debt? This privilege had been abused to an extent, that exceeded all comparison with the present question. He himself was acquainted with one case. It was that of a member, not of the present, but a former parliament, who was deeply indebted to many individuals, who (notwithstanding that he possessed ample property to pay his debts) were ruined by the shelter which his privilege afforded him. For when the creditors proceeded against his property, which they thought they could reach, though his person was safe, be made it over to a relation in trust, so that it also was protected; and the creditors were ultimately sent to that prison which ought to have been the destination of him who had made this fraudu- lent conveyance. This was undoubtedly a strong case; but, would any one pretend to argue from this, that the privilege of freedom from arrest ought to be done away with? Surely not. The learned member here referred to another case, in 1727, where the post-master complained that members were in the habit of receiving numerous letters (for the privilege of franking was then almost unlimitted) which did not concern themselves or their families, to the great detriment of his majesty's revenue. But, what was done in consequence? Was this privilege done away with—was it curtailed? No such thing. All that was said by the Crown was, that it was expected members would take the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of the abuse. Gentlemen must not argue from the use to the abuse: they must not do away with the privileges of parliament, because there was a possibility of its being carried to excess. If an abuse was found to exist, let it be pointed out; and if after that the necessary steps were not taken to remedy it, then and not till then was it time for parliament to stop it by a declaration of the House; or if the abuse was found to overbalance the advantage, to abolish the privilege altogether, as they had done other privileges which had been found to have a similar tendency. But there was no fear of the present privilege being carried to excess; there was no fear that it would extend beyond a fair statement of the grievances of the people, or a prayer for the redress of the wrongs under which they laboured. If this was a right to be enjoyed by the community generally, how much more necessary was it that it should be extended to those who were under the strong arm of power? For, after all, law was power; and while men were men, and prisons were prisons, the power vested in those who had the charge of prisoners, was likely to be abused. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the inviolability of all communications from persons so situated should be religiously and sacredly observed. It was for these reasons, notwithstanding the two venerable names which he saw attached to the regulation of the magistrates, that he felt inclined to pause before he pronounced, as perfectly legal, even upon their authority, a document, which went to render the confinement of convicted persons more severe, and their punishment more Acute and galling.

referred to several high authorities, to show, that it was lawful for a gaoler to keep every prisoner (who was committed in execution) in close custody. The person whose case was under discussion had been convicted of a very serious offence, and more than ordinary caution was highly necessary. There was a case within his own knowledge which had come before the grand jury of the county, which showed that the power in question was not given to gaolers without abundant reason. A prisoner had sent a letter to one of his acquaintance; the gaoler suspecting that the communication was of an improper nature, opened the letter, and it was found to contain a statement from the prisoner of false facts, affecting to refresh the memory of his friend, who was to be a witness on his trial; and adding, "mind you stick to this, and don't flinch." This circumstance showed the great danger of subornation of perjury; and of which a member might be made the innocent medium. The rules applicable to the case in question, had not been adopted by the magistrates hastily or unadvisedly; and the gaoler himself had been provoked into an adherence of them by threats. As far as he could judge, the present case did not involve a breach of privilege.

said, that the case divided itself under two heads—the one was a question of law, the other of privilege. If there had been any offence committed against the law, no determination which the House might come to could deprive either the hon. member, or the prisoner who had written the letter in question, of a legal remedy. If a legal offence had been committed, redress might be obtained before the proper tribunal, and in the mean time no possible prejudice would be done to the party injured, by the House not interfering. He put the case as if the regulations of the magistrates, and the use of them on the present case were against law; but the hon. and learned gentleman must forgive him, if he said that he thought the law had not been violated. He thought that, upon the face of the case before them, there was enough to raise at least a very strong presumption that the regulations were sanctioned by law—and here he would say, that the law ought to prevail; and that the privileges of members of that House ought not to be allowed to ride over the law. If he were wrong with respect to his notions of the law, then the party would be entitled to legal redress, and would have their remedy. Now as to the question of privilege, he was by no means prepared to recognise the doctrine, that the privileges of parliament, even though not opposed to law, were to be so largely interpreted as was now contended for. It was not necessary now to raise the question of the privilege of parliament. Were the House, he would ask, prepared to put the law as to the privilege of that Mouse on this broad principle—that all prisoners, whatever might have been their offence, had the right to address letters to all members of parliament? Why was the distinction made with respect to letters sent through the post-office and other letters? Because the post-office knew the hand-writing of members of that House. But gaolers could not be supposed to know the hand-writing of members. The question then came to this—was the House prepared to assert a privilege which would have the effect of rendering it imperative on all gaolers to receive and to transmit unopened all letters which had on the back of them the name of a member of parliament? This was a privilege not necessary for the liberty of the subject. Gentlemen ought to have free intercourse with their constituents; but he knew not on what grounds the House could be called upon to countenance the doctrine, that a member of parliament ought to have the power of secretly corresponding with prisoners. Prisoners, it was true, might have occasion to transmit to members their petitions, in order to be presented to that House; but, if the case of prisoners were a bonâ fide case—if prisoners had nothing to conceal—there could be no grievance in having their letters opened. He saw no reason why members of that House should be invested with the privilege of holding secret communications with all prisoners—charged with all species of crimes—high treason, felony, or misdemeanor. He put the case in that way, because, if the doctrine were to be applied to one case, they would not know where to stop; it might be applied to the greatest criminal, as well as the venal offender. He could not agree in the doctrine as it regarded members collectively or individually, that the privileges of parliament should divert the law with respect to them, which had a universal application with respect to all others. The members of that House surely were not to he regarded as visiting magistrates. It was, indeed, their duty to hear complaints, and to see grievances redressed; and that duty was best discharged through the medium of petition. No one would interrupt that course; but he could not help saying, that he disliked that sort of epistolary intercourse between members of parliament and prisoners which was contended for. He was not saying that in all cases it was justifiable for gaolers to open the letters of members; but he would not decide the question raised by this motion too hastily; and he would therefore vote for the motion of his right hon. friend, because the offence complained of, if offence it was, might be carried before the competent tribunal. It would then be seen, whether these rules, which had been signed by two judges, were legal or: not; but at present be was not disposed to push the right of privilege to the extent sought for by the original motion.

said, that the noble marquis had stated that the question was a question of law, and that the complaint might be brought before the proper tribunal. But the noble marquis had not thought fit to inform his hon. friend of the manner in which be ought to proceed. In opposition to the noble lord, he would contend that the question was not one of law, but of privilege; and all the authorities cited in support of the governor of Lancaster Castle, were cited in disregard of the privileges of parliament—were cited to support the monstrous doctrine that members were to be prevented from receiving the complaints of those who might be suffering under solitary imprisonment. The noble marquis had said, that if the case of a prisoner were a bonâ fide case, there could he no cause for secrecy. Now he (Mr. D.) thought that a bona fide case—a case of great grievance and of real suffering—was precisely a case which ought not to be exposed to the view of gaolers, and which ought to be kept secret, if the complaint were intended to he effectual. Need he call to the consideration of the House the state of that horrible bastile called the Ilchester gaol? When the complaint of Mr. Hunt was brought against the gaoler—when the grievances and sufferings of the prisoners were first stated—the answer was, that he had acted according to law—that the regulations under which he had acted were sanctioned by the judges—and that the gaoler was one of the most humane and most excellent of men; but when an examination of witnesses had taken place, and when the report of the commissioners had been published, it turned out, that the regulations, so far from having been observed by the gaoler, were departed from; and that the conduct of the gaoler justly exposed him to the indignation of the public in general, and peculiarly to the indignation of that House, which he had so grossly deceived. Now he would put it to the sense of the House, whether the abuses of Ilchester gaol would have been ever brought to light, if the gaoler had opened the letters of the prisoners? Was it not monstrous to contend that, a party, who was himself a criminal, should be set up as a judge in his own case, and should be vested with power to prevent the case of the oppressed from ever reaching the individuals that might be inclined to protect him? The noble lord had, however, laid down the doctrine, that the wretched inmates of a gaol should not have the opportunity, without the previous sanction of a gaoler, of communicating with members of that House; that was the doctrine distinctly laid down by the noble lord. Against that doctrine he begged solemnly to protest; as necessarily leading to the greatest abuse. With respect to the learned persons who, it was said, had signed those regulations, he believed that the question of privilege had not been contemplated by those learned persons, as he was sure it never entered into the consideration of the framers of the law under which they acted. The regulations of the act did not refer to the question of privilege. An hon. gentleman had stated opinions taken at the bar; but he would venture to say, that the question of parliamentary privilege had not been brought under the view of the gentlemen who had given legal opinions. The opinion of sir Samuel Romilly had been taken; and he had said that the privileges of parliament could not be taken away by a side wind. An hon. gentleman had instanced a case where a prisoner attempted to carry on a correspondence for the purpose of suborning witnesses. Unquestionably, it was a most criminal act; but, were not those regulations calculated to prevent the communication of truth—were they not calculated to obstruct the opportunity of a fair defence—above all, were they not calculated to prevent the cause of the sufferer: from being made known to the public? A right hon. gentleman had made a distinction between the delivery of letters by the post-office, and other letters; and the noble marquis made the same distinction, because it was assumed that the persons in the post-office knew the hand-writing of members. Now, he would wish to know how letters could come to the hands of a gaoler, until those letters had previously gone through the post-office? The right hon. gentleman had alluded to the case of the governor of Hull; but the principle applied with equal force to the case of the gaoler of Ilchester, as to the governor of Hull. He trusted that the House would feel it to be their bounden duty to assert their privilege on the present occasion. The exercise of that privilege was essential to the situation of a member of parliament. The privilege of parliament was considered precious in the eyes of ministers, when it was wielded to oppress their political opponents; but as soon as that privilege was about to correct the gross abuse of power, then it was no longer thought deserving of their regard. But be did trust that the House, by their vote, would show the country, that they considered that parliamentary privilege had not been given to them to aid and protect ministers in acts of arbitrary power; but to remedy and control such abuses as they might, from time to time, detect in any department of the state.

said, that the hon. mover had admitted, that if he had not been a member he could have no right to complain of the regulations which had formed the subject of debate. The question, then came to this, whether the House were bound to come to a decision on a matter of privilege, which decision would be looked upon as precedent for the future; or whether it would not be more prudent to leave the party to his remedy at law? It should be recollected, that the privilege which the bon, gentleman claimed was not one which was recognised by the former practice of the House; and it would not be difficult to show that, if established, it might, in some cases, operate in a manner highly inconvenient, if not dangerous.

shortly replied. His view of the question was not, he said, at all altered; and he believed, on the authority of sir S. Romilly, that the practice complained of was illegal. The right hon. gentleman had argued that poison might be conveyed to a prisoner in a letter. This was very true; so might a prisoner knock his head against the prison wall, if he were determined to kill himself. He would not hesitate to assert, that if the House should that night decide against him, their decision would be most arbitrary, and at the same time most dangerous to their own privileges. Their vote would have the effect of recognising two distinct legislatures; one composed of both Houses of parliament, with the king at their head, and the other composed of judges, magistrates, and gaolers.

said, that the resolution to which he was about to call the attention of the House, was founded, in its principle, on a transaction which had always formed the subject of panegyric with the writers on the state of England, as one of the greatest proofs of the resources of this country, of extent of its credit, and of the, power which it derived from the combination of private opulence and public faith—he alluded to the reduction of the four per cent annuities by Mr. Pelham in the year 1749. In introducing the measure which he should now have the honour to propose, it would not be irrelevant to bring briefly before the House the circumstances of the transaction in 1749, to which he should appeal as a precedent. In the year 1737, when sir Robert Walpole was chancellor of the exchequer, it was proposed by sir John Barnard, to invest his majesty with power to raise money by loans at a low rate of interest, at which it could then be procured, to pay off that part of the public debt on which a higher interest was paid. This proposal, then made by sir John Barnard, was not at that time acceded to by parliament. In 1749, however, Mr. Pelham, then chancellor of the exchequer, adopted the idea, and proposed to parliament a plan for reducing that part of the national debt which consisted of four per cent. This description of stock amounted then to 57 millions—at that time a very great sum; so great indeed, that considerable doubts were entertained of the practicability of effecting the reduction. Mr. Pelham, however, persevered, and brought forward his plan; which was finally carried into successful operation. The plan was this, a subscription was opened of the holders of the four per cent stock, and the persons subscribing were entitled to receive three and a half per cent for the next seven years, and three per cent after that period. The period fixed for the subscription was three months, and at the end of that time more than 38 out of 57 millions of stock had been subscribed. The more complete success of this first subscription was prevented by a combination of some of the great stockholders, who were, it was said, encouraged by the political opposition of the day. He gentlemen whom he now saw opposite to him, would, he doubted not, form an honourable contrast to the opposition in the time of Mr. Pelham, and would give their full concurrence to a measure so beneficial to the public interest, and so conducive to the immediate relief of the people. Sir John Barnard at that time published a pamphlet on the plan, which produced a great effect, and in conjunction with the firmness of parliament, completed the proposed plan. The time allowed for the first subscription having expired, a further subscription was opened on terms rather less favourable to the holders of the stock: for Mr. Pelham very properly determined that those who, in the first instance, had refused to accede to a plan so beneficial to the public and so just to the holders, should not be allowed afterwards to avail themselves of the advantages offered. Under this second subscription, about 15,600,000l. was subscribed, and there remained about 3,290,000l. stock, which was repaid in money to the holders. The total of the debt was then only 78 millions; so that 57 millions, the sum then reduced, though smaller in absolute amount than the present five per cents formed a much greater proportion of the whole debt of the nation, than that which it was now proposed to reduce. He said this because he was unwilling to assume a greater credit than he deserved, in comparison with the measure of 1749. Indeed very great credit was due to Mr. Pelham, for the vigour with which he carried through his measure, and because he had set a precedent which afforded great facility to the present operation. Having thus described the operation of 1749, he should now state the particulars of the measure which he recommended to the consideration of the House. Every member must know how anxiously they had looked forward to the reduction of the interest of the higher denominations of stock when it could be done consistently with good faith—how earnestly it had been recommended by committees, as well as by various members of the House—and how it had been foreseen as one of the happiest consequences of the dawning of national prosperity. By the operation which he now proposed, the reduction of the 5 per cent stock, a sum of 1,130,000l. of annual charge would be reduced; and when the reduction of the Irish 5 per cents was added, a relief of 1,220,000l. or perhaps 1,230,000l. would be obtained for the public. The stocks, which now bore 5 per cent interest, were of three descriptions. The first and most considerable was termed navy 5 per cent stock, which, at the commencement, was formed by the funding of navy and victualling bills to the amount of 25 millions, and which had since been increased by the funding of exchequer bills, and the loans raised in it, till it now formed a total of 141 millions. The second description was the Irish 5 per cent stock, which was raised for the service of Ireland, but on the credit of England, which was payable at the exchequer of England, and since the union of the treasuries was chargeable on the consolidated fund of the united kingdom. This stock amounted to 1,400,000l.; and as no conditions as to modes of repayment were annexed to it, it would be included in the present payment. Another species of 5 per cent stock, however, existed, which was now of small amount, though originally much larger, which had been created for a loan negotiated in 1797, and generally known by the name of the loyalty loan, to which peculiar conditions as to redemption were annexed. The holders of this stock being entitled to repayment in money within two years after the conclusion of the ensuing peace, the greater part of them called for their money within that time, after the peace of Amiens, and there remained now about one million of that description of stock. That stock was not included in the present operation, because under the terms of their loan, the holders were not liable to be paid off till three years after the paying off of the navy 5 per cents, and when they were so paid off, they were entitled to demand a transfer into 3 per cents on certain terms (that is to say, at the rate of 133 per cent for every 100l. of their stock). On these accounts, the loyalty five per cent would not be included in the present transaction. The remainder of the 5 per cent stocks was about 142 millions and a half. It was proposed that a commutation should be made of the British 5 per cents into a 4 per cent stock, the dividends on which should be payable on the same days on which those in the 5 per cents were now payable, viz. in January and July. The Irish 5 per cents, however, being now payable in April and October, a quarter's dividend would be paid on the stock into which they would be commuted in July next; after which the half-yearly dividends would be payable at the same time as the other parts of the fund. The holders accepting this commutation, would receive in the 4 per cents an addition of 5l. per cent on their capital, which would produce them an interest of 4s. yearly. By the resolution he now proposed, a relief of 1,140,000l. would be obtained, exclusive of the Irish stock. The House would sec, that all that they had a right to enforce on the holders was payment in ready money, and not a com- mutation into any other stock. Such a commutation must be on their part a voluntary transaction; but, by offering fair and somewhat favourable terms to the holders, there was no probability that they would withhold their consent. It was, of course, essential that the holders should have the fullest opportunity of expressing their opinion; but this opportunity would be as fully given by allowing them to express their dissent, as by calling on them to express their assent, when either in the one way or the other sufficient time were given. The present circumstances differed from those of the time in which Mr. Pelham effected the commutation, though in point of principle, and in an observance of public faith, the plans were the same. In the time of Mr. Pelham, the parties who wished for the commutation, were called on to subscribe, and three months were allowed for them to do so. The vast extent of our colonial possessions, and the manner in which proprietors of British stock were scattered over all the world, would make at present the fixed time of three months inconvenient. In some cases it would be not sufficient, in others it would be more than enough. It was certainly desirable that, while sufficient time was allowed to make an option, the time should not be unnecessarily prolonged. To the public such a prolongation would be attended with inconvenience, by making the benefits indefinite; while, to the persons concerned, it was injurious, by encouraging that spirit of jobbing and gambling which often gave a disgraceful character to the transactions of the money market. His proposition was, to limit, in the first place, the time of signifying their intentions, for persons residing within Great Britain, to the 16th of March. To those who lived out of Great Britain, and in Europe, the time allowed, he proposed, should be three months, say, the 1st of June; and to those who lived out of Europe, twelve months from the present time. With respect to the terms on which the commutation was proposed to take place, at the present market price, the four per cents were at 98. The bonus given was 5l. per cent, so that there was nearly 3l. per cent bonus; for 105l. of stock was nearly equal to 103l. of money. But as the dividend on the four per cents was payable a quarter sooner than the dividend on the five per cents, there was a certain deduction from the benefit; but as a set-off, he proposed that a clause should be introduced to provide that the stock should not be redeemable till 1829. In the way of objection to this plan, it was possible that it might be urged that a proportionate, though small addition, was made to the capital of the debt, to the amount of about 7,000,000l. He had been induced to adopt this course for the following reasons:—There were but two other means by which this alternative could be avoided—the creation of a 42 per cent stock. Now this plan, in the first place, would have postponed for a considerable time the advantage to the public from the commutation; for instead of 1,150,000l. a-year, only 700,000l. could, in the first place, be gained. The advantage to the public by the reduction of 4 or 500,000l. a-year was so great, that it seemed to him worth while to incur, for the sake of it, an inconvenience rather technical than real. In the second place, the stock fixed at that per centage must have been made irredeemable for a long period, as otherwise the prospect of another and a speedy reduction would have made holders unwilling to accept that species of stock. The other mode to which he had alluded, of carrying this object into effect was, to grant certain portions of long annuities by way of premium, in addition to so much stock, at a lower interest. The objection to this plan was, that a considerable portion of the fund was held in trust, and that trustees would be unwilling to take securities which would only continue for a limited number of years, and without any capital annexed to them. He would now return to the reasons which had induced him to prefer the mode of taking the option of stockholders by an expression of their dissent, rather than of their assent. In the first place, assuming that the advantages held out to the stockholders by the proposed transfer were so great that comparatively but a small number would wish to remain in the 5 per cents, it was evident that it would be much more convenient to call upon the minority than the majority for the statement of their will. The other mode would, indeed, be attended with great inconvenience, because the 5 per cent stock was divided amongst a large number of, holders. He believed the number of individuals holding that stock exceeded 100,000. Of these persons, 50,000 possessed each lees than 1,000l. stock. The committee would easily imagine the inconvenience that would result from calling on this prodigious number of persons, supposing, as be did, that nearly all of them would consent to the proposed arrangement, individually to signify their approbation of it. He proposed, that the greatest possible convenience should be given to those who dissented. A plan had therefore been concerted that would combine facility and accuracy; a printed form in a few days would be ready for circulation at the Bank, which might be filled up by the party himself, or by a person authorized by power of attorney. Dividends were received either by the actual holders of the stock, or by a person acting under a power of attorney; and the power might be extended to the purpose now in view. He apprehended that it was most equitable that the parties signifying dissent should be paid off in the order of their dissent: their names would be regularly entered in a book at the Bank, in the regular order in which they might be paid on the 5th July. He said the 5th of July, because, although there was no objection on the part of the public to complete the payments on that day, for parliament could direct as it pleased upon the subject, it did not seem at all likely that the number of dissentients would be so great as to render any further instalment necessary. Upon this point he should have further to explain himself, when the period for declaring the option had expired. It would then be requisite for him to submit to the house the mode in which the money for that purpose should be raised; and it might then be determined whether it should or should not be all paid in one clay. On the authority of the 26th Geo. III., c. 31, he affirmed that parliament possessed the power to direct at what period, and in what manner, any payments should be made. That statute expressly referred to the payment of stock at par; and it provided that any stock above par might be paid off at any time and in any manner parliament should determine: it provided further, that stock under par should be purchased in the market for the sinking fund. No difficulty would arise out of the circumstance, that the payments were to be made by the commissioners: any fund parliament might appropriate to the purpose would be paid into the hands of the commissioners for the redemption of the national debt, and applied by them to the object now under consideration. He had now shortly stated the mode adopted by Mr. Pelham: he had also mentioned the mode now intended to be pursued: he had pointed out the difference between the two plans, and had assigned, as he thought, satisfactory reasons for those variations. It now only remained for him to recall the recollection of the committee to the advantages which the public would receive from this transaction: he trusted that it would be deemed in no respect inferior in principle and superior in amount to the operation effected by Mr. Pelham. Under the latter, the public ultimately obtained a relief to the extent of 570,000l., but until the lapse of seven years, it did not exceed 285,000l. In the present instance, the reduction of burthen would be to the extent of 1,150,000l., exclusive of the Irish five per cents, amounting to about 90,000l. The whole would be left open to farther reductions at the end of seven years: the new fund now created might then be paid off. At what time, and under what circumstances, parliament might make s farther reduction of the public burthen by paying off other funds, it was not for him to anticipate. All he could say was; that it mainly depended upon the firmness and resolution of parliament. He ascribed the benefit this day opened to, the House entirely to the firmness parliament had displayed in preserving the public faith inviolate. He took no credit to government, excepting as the organ of the will of parliament, as the agents of the representatives of a free and generous people. The resolution of parliament to support the sinking fund, the stability of public credit, the confidence reposed by the stockholder in the national council that the public faith would be preserved at any hazard, had induced the public to accept terms, from which they might have shrunk with apprehension without this guarantee on the part of the great council of the nation. The operation of this day would sufficiently point out the necessity and the wisdom of adhering to the same steady undeviating course. At the same time, it was in the highest degree satisfactory to ministers to be enabled to give the public the relief which had been held out on a former night in the speech of his noble friend (the marquis of Londonderry.) In the confidence that this great operation would be completed, he (the chancellor of the exchequer) had proposed to the house the re-enact- ment of the annual taxes without the addition of the extra malt-tax: government would now proceed with confidence to give the public, and especially the agriculturists, the benefit of the remission of that duty; knowing that by so doing they broke in upon no principle of public credit, but preserved a full surplus for the sinking fund. Having gone thus far, he, perhaps, should not be wasting the time of the committee if he proceeded to answer a question that might be put to him. He should probably be asked why, under the strong feeling of the importance of an operation of this kind, the opportunity had not been taken in the year 1818, when, for a certain period, the funds were even higher than at present? To that question he was bound to give a distinct answer. It must be obvious that, on the conclusion of peace, ministers had two great objects in view which presented serious obstacles: the one was the restoration of the currency; the other the reduction of a part of the charge of the public debt. Until the currency of the country was reestablished, the stability of public credit could not be depended upon, and the bargain with the stockholder could not be equitable on both sides: no security could have been given as to the effects the change in the currency might produce. In point of fact, this change had produced some important effects. From the high price the funds obtained in 1818, they fell back most rapidly; and consequently, a heavy and inequitable loss would have been thrown upon the public, had any such operation been then contemplated. Until the restoration of cash payments, nothing could be offered to guard against dangers of this kind; but when once that great object had been accomplished; when that important remedy had been applied; it then became ministers to take the earliest opportunity of consulting the public interest by the reduction of the charge on the debt. Never was there a time when that reduction could be more opportune and acceptable. He looked upon this operation as a sequel and consequence of the resolution of the house in 1819, by which it was determined to support a sinking fund of 5,000,000l. It was the first fruit of the resolution of Thursday night last—"That this House sees with satisfaction that by the operation of this surplus, connected with a reduction of the interest on the five per cent. stock, a diminution of taxes may be immediately effected, thereby affording to the people, within the current year, the first advantages of that relief from a part of their present burthens, which was held out to the country in the resolution aforesaid, as one of the beneficial effects to be derived from the application of a surplus of 5,000,000l. The right hon. gentleman then moved his first resolution as follows: "That all and every person and persons, bodies politic and corporate, who now is or are, or hereafter may be, interested in, or entitled unto any part of the national debt, redeemable by law, which now carries an interest after the rate of five pounds per cent per annum, and is usually known by the name of navy five per cents, or by the name of Irish five per cent. annuities payable at the bank of England, and who shall not signify his, her, or their dissent, in the manner hereinafter mentioned, shall, in lieu of every 100l. of such five per cent. annuities, receive and be entitled to, the sum of 105l. in a new stock, to be called the new four pounds per cent annuities, and to carry an interest after the rate of four pounds per cent per annum, and so in proportion for any greater or less amount of such five per cent. annuities; and that the dividends thereof shall be payable half-yearly, at the Bank of England, upon the fifth of January and the fifth of July, in each and every year:—and the first half-yearly dividend on the said new four pounds per centum annuities shall be payable on the fifth day of January, 1823; and that the said new four per cent annuities shall not be liable to be paid off until the fifth of January, 1829."

said, that before he proceeded to remark upon what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman, be was anxious to put one question to him: upon the answer his (Mr. Ellice's) conduct would entirely depend. He begged to ask if it were probable or possible that the determination of government, so distinctly stated by the chancellor of the exchequer on the subject of the dissent of the proprietors of 5 per cent stock, would undergo re-consideration?

said, he considered the plan suggested by ministers on the whole the best, and he saw no reason, founded upon the convenience or the advantage of the parties concerned, to alter any part of it.

was much indebted to the right hon. gentleman for the clear answer he had given, although it would oblige him to state some objections to the proposition before the House; which he was the more reluctant to do, as he felt equally anxious with every other member, that the country should be relieved by a reduction in the rate of interest, whenever it could be effected on terms consistent with public credit and good faith. But he was afraid the present scheme was of a very different description; and, above all things, be did not expect to have beard it compared with Mr. Pelham's plan in 1749. That was distinguished in all its pants by openness, candour, and fair dealing; while the present was characterized by crookedness, trick, and artifice. He wished to God the right hon. gentleman had the benefit of such Advice in his transactions with the city, or that House the benefit of such counsel from its representatives, as Mr. Pelham had derived from that upright distinguished person, sir J. Barnard. They would scarcely then have heard, that a fair way of dealing with the public, in such a transaction was, by borrowing money from the Bank to reduce, artificially and temporarily, the proffered rate of interest; and, under that delusion, and the various difficulties thrown in the way of trustees and other stock-holders, by the shortness of time, and especially by requiring their dissent, compel them to accept of any terms that might be offered. Among the various difficulties and objections attending the transaction, not the least were those applicable to that part of the scheme that related to paying off numerically those persons who should express their dissent. How was it to be ascertained which letter of dissent was first delivered? The property of individuals, after the delivery of the letter, was likely to be affected by the situation in which he stood in the list. Suppose he (Mr. E.) happened to be the first, and wished to sell his stock, where was he to find a buyer? The first question asked would be, in what order are you on the list of dissentients? Other difficulties presented themselves: if two trustees differed in opinion as to assent or dissent, how was government to deal with them? Which was to be considered as binding the other, and binding the party beneficially interested in the question. It was proposed to extend the period for persons residing abroad; this was open to every kind of abuse: and, again, what provision was to be made where one of two or three parties were absent and the others present? In short, difficulties of this description met us at every step, and were all to be ascribed to a deviation from the plain, straight-forward course pursued on the former occasion, to which the right hon. gentleman had ventured to advert in opening the present proposition. Had there been the slightest resemblance in the two plans, all sides of the House would probably have concurred in securing the advantages anticipated, and unanimity would have contributed both to the success of the measure, and to the satisfaction of parties interested. The House must also consider, in the present instance a capital of 7 millions was to be added to the public debt, exactly in the same manner as if the amount had been borrowed in the market, and of course no advantage could really accrue, until the saving in interest exceeded that sum. A period of 7 or 8 years, calculating compound interest, must elapse, before any saving could be calculated upon. The interest of money had certainly been declining; and if ministers were so confident, as the noble marquis had expressed himself, of the continuance of peace and the permanent prosperity of the finances, why not have offered, as in the previous case, the option of a gradual reduction? Suppose 5 per cent had been continued for next year, 4½ for two following, and the rate had only been then reduced to 4 per cent. The country would have saved one half of the proposed bonus; and be put it to any gentleman conversant with what was now passing out of doors, whether a great proportion of the parties interested, particularly the more numerous, who did not so much calculate the ultimate profit or loss of the transaction as the effect of the immediate reduction on their domestic arrangements, would not hare been more or equally contented? The precipitation with which it was intended to force through the measure, discredited the transaction, and the professions of government. A fortnight was only given to the holders of 150 millions of stock, some of whom resided in distant parts of the country, to consider the terms proposed, and how their dissenting to them might affect the various family arrangements dependent on property, so great a change in the income from which, they had probably scarcely contemplated, before their immediate decision is required. Why all this unaccountable and unnecessary precipitation? The deduction was only to be made on the January dividends. Was the revenue likely to fall off, or the state of public credit to decline, before January? According to the statements of ministers, their expectations were directly the reverse. On the contrary, they had heard sanguine anticipations of a further advance in the price of the funds, enabling government also to reduce the 4 per cents. Mr. Pelham did not in this manner profess his confidence in the progressive advance of the financial and commercial prosperity of the country, which alone justified the transaction then, or can justify it now, and then turn round immediately and belie his professions, by saying that "although I believe this, and that our foreign arrangements will guarantee a lasting peace, I will not trust any thing beyond a fortnight." Had the pending dissensions between Russia and the Porte any influence on the otherwise almost unintelligible anxiety with which this measure was pressed forward? But he would acquit ministers, in the present instance, of any intention to defraud the public creditor; for no other term could be applied to the transaction, if they had really any apprehension as to the result of these negotiations.—To return to the plan itself, the right hon. gentleman says he sees no difference to the stockholder, in requiring from him a dissent rather than an assent. Why not then allow him the choice, that he may judge for himself? It was essential also, in finally determining on this measure, to look at the effects which had been already produced, first, by the rumours of the intention of ministers, and then by the communication of them to the public. Somehow or other it did very oddly happen, that certain influential individuals on the stock exchange, who were supposed to have the ear of the right hon. gentleman, and who very shrewdly guessed what was about to take place, had been more busy than usual, previous to the meeting of parliament, in their speculations to raise the funds. It was notorious, that enormous loans, to the extent of many millions, as any of the bankers in the House could inform them, had been specially borrowed on the security of stock purchased with this object. These gentlemen had exercised a very clear foresight on the present occasion. The funds in which they had made their purchases naturally rose on the declaraion of the noble marquis in the commencement of the session, and the 5 per cents, declined. The holders of 5 per gents, consisting in a greater proportion of small annuitants, and persons whose necessities and limited means compelled them to look for the greatest possible extension of income, alarmed at the threatened reduction, crowded the transfer offices at the Bank in such numbers to sell out their little pittances, that it was scarcely possible for several days to get through the business. The powers of attorney provided to persons in the country of the same class were in equal proportion, and the small sums brought to market in consequence, of from 100l. to 1,000l., fell into the hands of the great speculators, who were possibly further gifted by some spirit of divination as to the bonus to he offered by the chancellor of the exchequer. The quantity, however, sold even exceeded their calculations, and the interest of money had consequently nearly doubled in a short period in the market. All this might apparently lead to difficulties not exactly contemplated by the right hon. gentleman, or the Bank, when they so readily consented to a further advance of 4 millions. The property thus sold out had been forced into foreign funds; which was proved by the great advance in all foreign securities, entirely disproportionate to any in our own, after even all the efforts of the stock-jobbers. Within a week or ten days French stock had risen 5 per cent, Danish 8, Spanish, Russian, and Prussian 8, or 7, and the bonds of the Columbian republic, which have been within 12 months at 15 and 20 per cent, discount, to par. Would all this produce no alteration in our exchanges, no demand of gold and silver to supply the means of remittance; and was our stock so abundant of these metals as to prevent the least apprehension of an extraordinary and sudden demand for. them having any influence on the measures recently adopted with respect to the currency? Was it so certain that no event of this description, putting out of the question any interruption in the peace of Europe, might not create a great scarcity of money, and oblige the speculators who became possessed of the new 4 per cent stock merely as an article of trade, to force it on the market and duress the funds? and might not a sudden fall prevent the success of the measure—or, if it happened after the holders of 5 per cents had accepted, or rather have been driven into the terms, dissatisfy them with the manner in which their interests had been dealt with in the transaction? The right hon. gentleman had said, if the present opportunity was missed another might not again occur. He was probably right; the country would be worn out and sickened by the repetition of so many juggling and temporary expedients as had been resorted to in our finances since the peace, and at last refuse all confidence to the schemes of the right hon. gentleman. He says the 5 per cents might have been paid off in 1818, when the stocks were at 84, and urges the loss of that opportunity as a reason why he should not neglect the present one. How were the funds then raised to 84? By loans from the Bank, and the issue of a greater amount of paper, than in the extraordinary annals on that account, as well as on others of the war. What are we not now suffering from the unaccountable conduct of ministers and the Bank, with respect to the currency in that year, and the delusion it not only enabled them to practise on the country, but on the committees of 1819, with respect to the extent of the depreciation? He (Mr. E.) had, however, no doubt the right hon. gentleman would accomplish his purpose; and the object he had in view was certainly a proper one, at a fit season, and if obtained in a candid and fair manner; but he could scarcely call the profit to be derived from it a public advantage, if gained at the expense of national credit or character. When Mr. Pelham brought forward his plan, what were his means of ensuring its success? After giving the stockholder the most ample time to consider his offer, stating firmly and candidly his financial prospects and arrangements, for which the country had a right to expect a reduction of the interest, he was enabled successively by the developement of his Means, to make more favourable terms with those who at first held out, and ultimately to pay off the dissentients from the surplus of the revenue. Where was the right hon. gentleman's surplus? It was notorious the consolidated fund, which was deficient 7 millions last year, was this year in a still more deplorable condition, from the addition of 2 millions, since bor- rowed, to add to what was called a sinking fund; much in the same manner as he was now borrowing 7 millions to reduce the interest on the 5 per cents. Why did the noble marquis on the preceding evening leave those 9 millions out of his financial statements? It was rather too large an item to form an accidental omission. Had it, then, been purposely and studiously kept out of view, that an unfair impression of the actual situation of our finances might assist this scheme of his right hon. friend? He would not fatigue the House by going into all the objections that had been raised, or could be stated to the measure. Even legal doubts had been suggested of the right of government to pay off the 5 per cents under present circumstances; but passing by these, the most objectionable points which occurred to him, were the dissent required, and the shortness of time allowed to the stockholders for consideration. Besides, the policy of the proceeding, looking to its obvious tendency to drive capital out of the country, at the moment we were attempting to restore a money circulation was more than questionable. Looking, however, to the proposed object of relief to the country, he would offer no opposition to the immediate proposition of the right hon. gentleman, and opportunities would occur in the future stages of the bill, to enter into farther examination of its details.

entertained considerable doubt as to the policy of the plan, at least so far as it affected persons who had money in the five per cents to an amount less than 1,000l. Of these persons there were upwards of 50,000. There was another objection to this plan, that it would have the effect of increasing the national debt. It would actually add 7,000;000l. to it; and it would take six years to bring us back to the same situation in regard to the debt, in which we now were. The right hon. gentleman had argued upon the principle, that the raising of the funds was beneficial to the country. Now he (Mr. W.) maintained the direct converse of that proposition. Speculators and jobbers might, indeed, be interested in having the funds high; but individuals who depended upon a permanent annuity were interested in a low state of the funds.

said, that looking to all the circumstances of the case; first to the difficulties which necessarily attended the transaction; and next, to the political state of Europe, he could wish that the time for affording an option were extended from the 16th to the 30th of March.

thought the plan very desirable, and the terms proposed by ministers extremely fair. With regard to the time allowed for option, he thought it amply sufficient. But, suppose persons were to purchase stock in the name of others residing abroad, with a fraudulent intention, would they be entitled to the extended term, or would they be obliged to give their answer by the 16th of March?

said, the case supposed by the hon. member would, he hoped, be precluded by some resolutions which would be subsequently read at the table.

said, it would very much facilitate the plan, if such holders of five per cents as assented, could know at what time the transfer to the four per cents was to take place. The question of the dividends might at first sight offer some difficulty, but this difficulty was more apparent than real, because the very same dividend which was given to a person holding 100l. in the five per cents might be given to a person holding 105l. in the four per cents. If this stock were quickly transferred, the natural consequence would be, to raise the price of it in the market; and as persons would be induced to speculate in it from the advantage of a small but quick profit, the operation from this circumstance would be much facilitated. The right hon. gentleman would do well if he explained the mode in which the money was to be paid off to persons who dissented. It was evident that persons having an option, and who were in doubt whether they might or might not have made a bad bargain, would not decide till the latest moment. He should like to know then, if many thousand letters came in on the 16th of March, how these applications were to be disposed of.

said, that however expedient this measure might be, with a view to the reduction of taxation, still if there were a class of persons upon whom it pressed with peculiar hardship, it was incumbent upon the House to mitigate its severity as much as possible. The interest of this fund was not only reduced from five to four pet cent; but a rod was kept over the heads of the holders, and it was liable to be reduced again within seven years. He thought this term should at least be extended to a later period.

wished to know what regulations were to be adopted with regard to trustees.

could not help thinking that the present project of a sinking fund, was the less meritorious, inasmuch as that plan of liquidating the public debt by the, operation of compound interest was abandoned. He wished to know at what time it would be convenient to the right hon. gentleman to take the debate on this subject.

said, he by no means considered the question of abolishing that part of the project of a sinking fund which went to liquidate the debt by compound interest, as decided. It was a question which demanded the most serious attention, and which formed no part of the present measure. It was a question which involved the repeal of many acts of parliament; and he must confess that it appeared to him to be a measure of very questionable policy. As to the question which had been put with regard to trustees, they would be eat powered to act for their principals, and. would be indemnified. The hon. member for Weymouth had expressed some doubt as to the competence of parliament to pay off the five per cents; but it had never before been suggested that the condition imposed by the act of 1784, with regard to the reduction of the five per cents was any other than that parliament should not pay off that fund until 25 millions of the 3 or 4 per cents were paid off or redeemed. But the hon. member seemed to suppose that the national debt was first to be reduced to that amount—a construction which the act of parliament could not bear. As to the hardship with which the transfer was likely to operate upon persons of small property, it should be recollected, that such persons had purchased this stock at a lower rate, and with a larger return of interest, under the express liability of being paid off by government. However much, therefore, they might be objects of commiseration, they had no title to complain; and the inconveniences of their situation would be greatly mitigated by the great reduction which had taken place in all the necessaries of life. Some reasons had been urged for prolonging the time at which holders were to make their option; but the period on which government had fixed, was sufficiently long to enable them to make up their minds on the subject. As to the question, from what fund and in what manner the payment was to be made to such holders as did not assent to the terms? That question could not be answered until the option was made. As soon as the number of persons dissenting was ascertained, he should be ready to submit a plan to parliament, by which they were to be repaid. He could not see the force of the objection of the hon. member for Coventry; namely, that it was more unfair to call for the expression of dissent than of assent. The hon. member had attributed the rise in the price of foreign stocks to the plan now proposed by government; but it should be recollected, that that rise had taken place long before the present plan was promulgated. It was not the plans of government, but the alarms which had been raised in consequence of rumours that the public credit was about to be infringed, which had had the effect of driving large sums of money abroad, and consequently of raising the price of foreign stocks. He doubted not that a contrary effect would take place; and that such sums as had been withdrawn from the country under the influence of a temporary panic would return, when it was known that there was no foundation for such rumours, and that the public credit was fixed upon a secure and lasting basis.