rose to move for leave to bring in a bill to consolidate and amend all the acts on the subject of Vagrancy. In framing the bill, if be were permitted to introduce it, he would take for a ground-work his bill of last session. When he informed the House that during the last 300 years, 49 acts on the subject of vagrancy had been passed, of which 27 were now in partial operation, he thought he stated a sufficient ground for his motion. More than two centuries ago, Edward 6th had expressed a wish that the superfluous acts on the subject of vagrancy should be abolished, and that those which contained useful regulations should be combined in one statute. If such a measure was necessary at that period, how much more necessary was it now, when the Statutebook had increased more than twenty-fold? The hon. gentleman then proceeded to state the subordinate objects of his bill, in addition to the principle one; namely, the consolidation of all the various acts on the subject of vagrancy. He divided vagrants into three classes: 1st, the idle and disorderly; 2nd, the vagrant; and 3rd, the incorrigible rogue. Another object of the bill would be to specify the various punishments, and to adapt them to the present state of society. One of the best magistrates of the present day, Mr. Colquhoun, had observed, that in legislating on an offence in a free country, it was necessary to consult the feelings of the people; because, if a magistrate thought the punishment provided for an offence too severe, it was impossible for him to inflict it. He would, therefore, in the measure which he intended to propose, take care that the punishment should not be disproportionate to the offence. The regulation and amendment of the present system of passing vagrants would form another object of the bill. He had been told by some magistrates, that the system of passing vagrants might be al- together abolished. He had doubts upon that point; but it was a subject for the consideration of a committee. If a committee should be of opinion that the system could not be altogether abolished, still means might be devised for preventing the abuses to which it was liable. He had that day received a letter from a magistrate in Wiltshire, who informed him, that the expense incurred by that and an adjoining county for only one year in passing vagrants amounted to 2,587l. It was highly necessary that some regulation should be adopted with respect to the different lodging-houses for vagrants; which were, in general, nurseries for crime of every description. He was at present of opinion, that such houses should be licensed like public houses by magistrates who should bind the owners in recognizances for their good behaviour. The hon. gentleman then moved, "That leave be given to bring in a bill, for consolidating into one act, and amending the laws relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, Vagrants, and other idle and disorderly Persons."—Leave was given. After which, the hon. gentleman moved for leave to bring in a bill "to facilitate Summary Proceedings before Justices of the Peace."

said, that the public, whatever might be the result, were highly indebted to the hon. member for the attention which he had bestowed on this subject.

rose, in pursuance of notice, to call the attention of the House to a question which, whether it was considered in a constitutional or in a financial point of view, was well-deserving of that attention. In the first place, he could assure the House, that although on the orders his notice stood for a motion on "the Collection of the Revenue," he had not sufficient presumption to think of entering at present upon the whole of that extensive subject. His object was rather to open the way to a future discussion upon it; by impressing upon the House the necessity of assuming, on so important a branch of the public expenditure, the same salutary control which they exercised with respect to others. This would appear the more indispensible, when it was considered that the charges of collecting the public revenue amounted to no less a sum than 4,000,000l.; a sum nearly equal to the whole amount of the interest of the national debt, at the commencement of the late reign. This sum was altogether at the disposal of those by whom the revenue was administered. They had the sole control over it. It remained in their hands in transitu. No account was rendered to parliament of the details of its expenditure. Parliament came to no vote on the subject. When these things were considered, he thought that, bound as parliament were to retrench and pare down every part of the public expenditure which might be deemed in any way superfluous, they were bound to exercise on that branch of the expenditure to which he was adverting the same salutary control as they exercised over branches of less importance. It could hardly be necessary for him to state what was a fact of perfect notoriety, and which he did not mention as at all a matter personal to the present administration, but, on the contrary, as one common to all administrations, that this branch of the public expenditure was one great source of the patronage enjoyed by the ministers of the Crown, and of the power and influence which they possessed over the votes of that House. Surely that was an additional reason for assenting to his motion. But, perhaps, it might better enable the House to enter into his views, and might give him greater facility in rendering those views intelligible, were he now to read the last three resolutions which he intended to propose for their adoption. After stating in his first resolution the amount of the existing charge for the collection of the revenue, the next resolution was as follows:— "That the under-mentioned branches of the revenue were collected, in the years 1812 and 1820, at the following rates:—

CUSTOMS.
	Gross Produce.	Rate per Cent.			Increase since 1812.
1812	£.10,023,870	£.7	17	7	£.	s.	d.
1820	12,266,214	8	19	0	1	1	5
EXCISE.
1812	19,476,849	3	17	4
1820	29,342,898	3	18	1	0	0	9
STAMPS.
1812	5,428,811	2	16	7
1820	6,564,461	2	13	7	0	0	0
LAND AND ASSESSED TAXES.
1812	7,444,782	3	19	2
1820	7,849,768	4	2	7	0	3	5
POST-OFFICE.
1812	1,820;761	22	10	11
1820	1,894,631	25	3	2	2	12	3

ONE SHILLING ON THE POUND PENSIONS AND SALARIES.
1812	19,313	1	12	8
1820	18,346	2	12	4	0	19	8
SIXPENCE ON THE POUND PENSIONS AND SALARIES.
1812	17,081	1	15	4
1820	8,684	2	16	4	1	1	0
HACKNEY COACHES.
1812	27,869	12	1	11
1820	26,374	15	12	7	3	10	8
HAWKERS AND PEDLARS.
1812	23,141	12	18	4
1820	29,360	17	15	7	4	17	3

Now, he begged the House to observe, that the statements were taken from the finance accounts annually laid on the table of the House. If there was any error in them, it was to be ascribed to those financial accounts. If he had not gone back to the year 1812, he might have been met with the objection that he had taken a period of unfair comparison; as that was the year when the depreciation of our currency was at its height, and when the new system of paying several branches of the revenue had just been established His next resolution was as follows:— "That, on comparing the rate at which the several branches of the revenue abovementioned were collected, in the years 1812 and 1820, it appears, that although they have greatly increased, yet the charge of collection was greater in 1820 than in 1812. "That although it is the duty of this House, as the representatives of the people, to superintend and control every branch of the public expenditure, yet it appears that the large sums which have been annually expended to defray the expences of collecting and managing the revenue, have been disbursed without any account being given of the manner in which they have been applied. "That, to enable this House to exercise a proper control over the public expenditure, it is fit that estimates of the probable charges of collecting and managing the revenue, be annually submitted to the consideration of parliament, and a vote taken thereupon." He did not ask the House to go with him into any abstruse or difficult calculations. He had no intention of proposing any immediate change in the fiscal regulations of the country. That would be a subject for future consideration. But what he wished at present to press on the consideration of the House was, the expediency of assuming the same salutary control over this branch of the public expenditure, as they had assumed over other and less important branches; by having an estimate presented of the details of that expenditure. There were only two objections which, in his opinion, could possibly be urged against this proposition. In the first place, it might be said that there would be great difficulty in making out an exact estimate of the charge of collecting certain branches of the revenue. In the customs and excise, for instance, it might be said that a sudden increase of trade might render necessary the expenditure of larger sums in the collection of those branches of the revenue, than could have been anticipated on the formation of the estimates. That was an objection easily obviated. It must be in the recollection of the House, that all these sums went through the hands of the collectors, who were under the direction of the Treasury. Why not give the Treasury the power of issuing, on such an occasion as that to which he had alluded, a sum for the expanse of collection, beyond what was stated in the estimate, under the obligation of giving a detailed account of the expenditure of that sum in the next session of parliament? The other objection was, that he might, perhaps, be told, that after the proposition of the chancellor of the exchequer last night, his plan came too late; for that all had been done that could be done. If this objection were really made, it would be much in favour of his motion; for it would show, that whenever the attention of parliament was directed to any particular branch of the public expenditure, although they had been told a thousand and a thousand times by government, that that branch would not admit of the slightest farther reduction, and that any effort at additional reduction would throw the whole business of the country into irretrievable confusion, yet it was not found to be very difficult to discover means by which a farther reduction could be effected without any injury to the public service whatever. He would therefore shortly state a few of the circumstances connected with the collection of one great branch of the revenue, the Customs, which would exhibit such a lavish waste of the public money, as must, in his opinion, convince the House of the necessity of interference. The House would find, it stated in the report of the committee of finance in 1797, that the increased expense of collecting the British customs at that period, as compared with 1782, was 15,700l.; but that during the same period, the revenue had increased from 3,900,000l. to 6,100,000l. Thus it appeared that the increased revenue of 1797, as compared with 1782, was collected at 15s. per cent. Now, what was the case in 1812? In 1788, the total nett income of all the British customs establishment (including fees of all descriptions, and not merely salaries), was 375,000l.; of which sum 25,000l. went to the payment of sinecures; so that 350,000l. was the charge for those who performed the ditties of the establishment. The revenue of the customs was at that time 4,500,000l. In the year 1820, the amount of the salaries (including the superannuation fund, the long room, and other fees), was 980,000l., and the revenue was 12,200,000l.; being a charge for the collection of the increased revenue of 8l. 4s. per cent. In 1797, therefore, the charge for the collection of the increased revenue was only 15s. per cent; while in 1820, it amounted to 8l. 4s. per cent. Did not this show the imperative necessity that parliament should attend to the correction of these abuses? Did not this show that the lavish expenditure of the public money was a hydra which constantly required the pruning knife? If once the attention of parliament were allowed to slumber on this subject, up started some fresh abuse. It was the business of the Treasury to watch the proceedings of the commissioners of the customs; but "quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" By a paper which had been laid on the table, he found that the nine commissioners of the customs, between 1784 and 1813, had shared no less than 80,000l. among them, in the shape of gratuities, exclusive of salaries, &c. In his opinion there was something in their proceedings which almost amounted to fraud. In 1786, the commissioners appointed to inquire into the public accounts stated in their 15th report, that the income of the commissioners of the customs was nominally 1,200l.; but that when the peculiar taxes which they had to pay were deducted, the nett income was 975l. That sum parliament thought enough. But the fact was, that at that very moment the amount of those taxes was actually returned to the commissioners, in consequence of an order from the Treasury. Some of those gentlemen had received enormous sums independent of their salaries. In 1802, a Mr. Bruin, one of the commissioners, received 750l. beyond his salary. In 1803, he received 3,250l. beyond his salary; in 1804, 1,073l.; in the next year, 746l.; in the next year, 750l.; in the next year, 680l., and in 1808, 2,392l. And all that time a Mr. Roe received 1,000l. a year for doing Mr. Bruin's duty. Would the House allow such enormous sums to be thus misapplied without investigation? If so, they had better cease to consider themselves the guardians of the public purse. Another gentleman of the name of Dean, a commissioner of the customs, received for many years a salary of 1,500l. as a commissioner of another public board. Unless he was much overpaid for that latter situation, he could not have had much duty to perform as a commissioner of the customs. With respect to the commissioners of the customs generally, he was persuaded that their number might be reduced from nine to six, without any impediment to the public service. Such a reduction would be much more humane, as well as more expedient, than the reduction of a number of unfortunate tide-waiters, and other inferior officers, whose salaries did not amount to more than half-a-crown a-day. He did not mean to assert that the reduction of these latter was not a proper measure; but why not reduce some of the higher officers? He would now say a word or two to the lords of the Treasury. In the report of one of the commissions on the subject, there was notice taken of a Treasury minute addressed to the commissioners of the customs, in which the lords of the Treasury express their opinion, that the Board of customs would fail in their duty, if they appointed any individual to a situation in the customs, unless they were fully satisfied of his ability to fulfil the duties of the situation. But those very lords of the Treasury who had issued this recommendation failed to observe it themselves; for it appeared that out of the nine commissioners of the customs, seven had, been appointed from other civil departments, wholly unconnected with the customs. With the exception of Mr. Richmond and Mr. Williams, would the right hon. gentleman opposite say, that any of the commissioners of the customs were qualified to discharge their duties when they were appointed? One of them had been a police magistrate. Was that a proper apprenticeship for a commissioner of the customs? Within a few months an officer of the army, who had had a seat in that House, who was connected with a noble lord opposite, and who had warmly supported administration, was appointed a commissioner of the customs. No doubt the individual to whom he alluded, was a very gallant officer; but it was utterly impossible that he could be qualified for a commissioner of the customs. To make room too, for that gallant officer, a brother of his, who from long habit must have become competent to discharge the duties of a commissioner, however unqualified at his original appointment,' was removed from the Board. If the lords of the Treasury conducted themselves in this way—if their practice differed so materially from their precept—it afforded abundant proof that the whole of the system, ought to be under the control of parliament. This fact was, indeed, rendered evident by the commissions of inquiry which it had been found necessary so frequently to appoint. In 1784, 1797, 1810, and 1817, commissions were sitting, investigating different parts of this subject. What could be the necessity of so many commissions to pare down the existing abuses, unless those abuses, from not being under parliamentary control, were much more extensive" than in the other great branches of the national expenditure. It was impossible to doubt that there were many charges in the collection of the revenue which would not exist, if estimates were regularly on the table of the House. The number of commissioners of the customs might, he was well assured, be as advantageously reduced in Scotland as in England; in the former country three commissioners and in the latter six, would be quite sufficient to discharge the duties of the two boards. He came now to the consideration of the superannuation fund. On referring to the report of one of the commissions on this subject, it appeared, that it was one which had called for severe animadversion. Under the operation of the 50 of Geo. 3rd. c: 117, by which the practice of creating a superannuation fund, by the reduction of salaries was changed; it. appeared, that in 1817, the sum expended in superannuation allowances, was 67,3354l.; and that in 1818, it was 71,095l. Now, the whole amount of the superannuation fund, previous to the 50 of Geo. 3rd when it was created by the reduction of the salaries, was 10,000l.! That act had been abused by the grossest system of jobbing. As the commissioners had said, the principle of the act was, that there should be no recommendation for retired allowances, unless the parties were entitled by their age, infirmities and long services, and could produce certificates to that effect. What was the case at present? That some of the officers had been superannuated after fifteen, some after ten, some after five, and some even after three years' service. In the great majority of cases, the moment an officer had served twenty years, then, without any regard to whether or not he was capable of further duty, he was immediately superannuated. And yet the act expressly declared, that the superannuation should not be granted unless the individual was disabled by age or infirmity from further service. The consequence of all this profusion was, that since the year 1816, there had been no fewer than 2,700 new appointments in the customs alone in Great Britain! He should next advert to the preventive service; or, as it might more properly be called, the coast blockade, for preventing smuggling. He found by the returns, that this service alone cost the country, in the last year, 611,000l. But notwithstanding this, smuggling was still carried on to an alarming extent; in fact, it was known that ladies of high rank were in the habit of smuggling to a great extent. But there was another light in which this question might be viewed. Suppose the capture of 500 tubs, making 2000 gallons of foreign spirits—that cargo could be purchased abroad, and imported here at an expence of little more than 250l. By the existing regulations, there would remain (after the payment of the king's share, and other expences) a sum of 1,200l. to be divided between the officer and the informer upon this capture. Of this sum, two-thirds went to the officer, and one-third to the informer. So that an informer, even informing upon himself, would receive a sum of 400l. for that cargo, which originally cost him no more than 250 or 260l. The gallant officer here read an extract of a letter from a magistrate at Brighton, in which it was stated, that a person who had given information of a smuggling transaction, had, when put upon oath, denied any knowledge of the business, and when more closely examined, he admitted that he was prevented by fear from substantiating his statements. He should recommend, as the best mode of preventing smuggling, a reduction of the importation duty on foreign spirits, from 19s. to 12s. This would have the effect of putting an end to smuggling, as it would render it an unprofitable business. By this means they would add to the revenue on the one hand, and, on the other, they would be enabled to make a considerable reduction in the expence incurred by the coast blockade. By the increase of the duty on spirits since 1810, from 15s. to 19s., there had been a reduction of revenue from 2,000,000l. to 199,000l., being, in fact, no more than one tenth of the former duty. Alluding to the ruinous ex-pence which attended exchequer prosecutions, he mentioned the fact of a man who was accused, and who, though conscious of his innocence, offered 150l. as a compromise, rather than incur the expence of a law suit. The offer was refused, the cause went to trial, and the man was acquitted. The hon. member concluded by moving his first resolution:— "That it appears to this House, that the sum of 4,102,245l. 17s. 11d. was applied in the year ending 5th of January, 1821, under the head of charges of management, to defray the expellees of collecting and managing the sum of 62,882,156l., the gross ordinary revenue of the United Kingdom, being at the rate of 6l. 10s. per cent."

said, that the gallant officer had made numerous mistakes in his view of the public accounts, not only in the items, but in the mode and manner of their application. He had made a mistake of 3,262,000l. in speaking of the customs, and 5,235,000l. in the excise. How could the House, after this, depend upon what the gallant officer had advanced? He did not impute wilful error to the gallant officer, but he was sure he should convince him that he had grossly deceived himself. The gallant officer had alluded to the charges of collecting the revenue in 1812 and 1820. He was surprised at the conclusions to which the hon. member had come. The mistake of the gallant officer arose from this. He had compared the permanent duty of 1812 with the permanent and temporary duties of 1820, omitting to take into consideration the temporary duties of 1812. The conclusion to which the gallant officer had come was, that the charge of collecting the revenue had become enormous in 1820, whereas it had only increased one twelfth of a pound per cent, since 1812. The charge being in 1812, 5l. 9s. 8d., and in 1820, 5l. 11s. 4d. It had been stated on a former occasion, that no steps had been taken to prevent smuggling, but he held in his hand a document which showed, that on the articles of tea, spirits, and every thing but tobacco and snuff, there was an increase of revenue. This was the most satisfactory proof which could be given of the vigilance of the officers employed in the preventive service. In the article of stamps the hon. member was also in error. Adverting to the law charges of the exchequer, he could assure the House that the emoluments of the solicitor of the excise amounted not to 40,000l., or 30,000l., or 20,000l. a-year. The sum received in one year by the solicitor of the excise was 9,000l., and this was to be divided between two persons, making 4,500l. for each. Considering the important duties which that solicitor had to perform, this could not be considered too large a remuneration. With respect to the charge of 610,000l. for the coast blockade, there again the gallant officer had mis-stated the amount. The total expence of this service, including every thing, was 520,000l.; and in adverting to the retrenchments which gentlemen seemed to think it was very possible to effect under this head, the real question was, not so much the charge of this extensive service, as whether or no it was necessary to be kept up? When the immense interests which were to be protected were duly considered, he had no doubt that the House would be of opinion, that its necessity was indisputable. With respect to the resolutions, to the first he would make no objection. The second he would object to, because it was full of errors. The third resolution should have stated, "that the charge for collecting the revenue was very little increased," instead of "greatly increased," as it at present stood; for the fact was, that in the period of years mentioned by the hon. gent., the charge of collection had varied on an average, only 1½ per cent. In the aggregate of the various amounts, stated by the gallant officer in these resolutions, he had committed an error of 8,000,000l. To the next resolution he also found it impossible to agree. It had been his (Mr. L's.) duty to lay before the House yearly, 9 large volumes, containing all those returns which the gallant officer complained were not regularly made. If the gallant officer would take the trouble of referring to the last set of nine volumes, he would find at the end of them, an account of the increase and decrease upon all the salaries and allowances to which he had alluded. The last resolution was to the effect, that there ought to be submitted to parliament, annually, estimates of the probable yearly expenses for the management and collection of the revenue. He should be glad to be informed how it would be possible to do this? These estimates must depend, the one upon the state of commerce, and the other upon the seasons and productions of the current year. He thought he had said enough to satisfy the House, that the gallant officer had taken a most imperfect view of the case that he had endeavoured to bring before them, and he should, therefore, conclude with moving the previous question.

thought, that the grounds of objection stated by the hon. secretary, to the motion of his gallant friend would apply with equal force to every motion where returns might be called for. Nothing was more necessary than to have returns made to that House. If returns were regularly made, the enormous increase under the various heads of public expenditure would not have taken place. To illustrate that assertion, he would state that in 1805 the amount of collecting the revenue for Scotland was 17,000l.; it was now 39,000l. In 1807, the nett amount of the customs was 10,550,000l., the expense of collecting it 655,000l. In 1821, the nett receipt was 9,337,000l. The expense of collecting it amounted to 1,097,000l., being an increase of 400,000l. on the collection of the revenue. The increase since 1793 in various departments was equally striking. In the board of taxes the first commissioner, in 1793, had a salary of 600l., in 1821, he had 1,600l.; in 1793 the second commissioner had 500l., in 1821, 1,000l.; the third commissioner 500l., in 1821, 1000l. Such an enormous increase of salaries might well account for the present heavy amount of charges. It was little better than a mockery, on the part of the chancellor of the exchequer, to think of bringing back the salaries in public departments to the standard of 1792 by a reduction of 10 per cent on the excessive salaries of some, and of five per cent on others. In the customs, the first commissioner had 2,000l., double his former allowance; the deputy chairman, who had 500l. a year; had now 1,000l.; the secretaries, who had 630l. had now 1,700l. The first chief clerk, who had formerly 500l., had now 1,000l., and the increase of other officers was in the same proportion. In the ex-else there were nine commissioners. The first commissioner had 2,500l. a-year—the junior commissioners 1,500l. each. In Scotland there were five commissioners. The senior, Mr. Earl, a gentleman of great merit, who had done much to promote reform in the department under his control had 1,500l. a-year. The four junior commissioners had 1,000l. a-year each. Now he was credibly informed, that two commissioners would be quite sufficient to do the business for which the five commissioners were so highly paid. The expense of the custom-house department for Leith, amounted to 12,000l. a year, and for Glasgow and Greenock 12,000l. In each of these places, officers who were totally unnecessary, were retained at large salaries. It was these large offices which he would wish to see abolished. He would rather see the reduction of two great officers, than to see one or two dozen of junior clerks turned out of office, and deprived of the means of subsistence. With respect to the question of superannuation, there was no doubt whatever that, in many instances, the amount of pensions to persons superannuated was greater than in all fairness they ought to have been. In the colonies, men who had served five, and some not more than three years, with salaries of from 3 to 4,000l. a year, retired on pensions for life of 1,500l. a year. He would instance the case of one individual, who held a place of 2,000 a year at St. Lucie, and who had retired, after a few years service, on a pension of 500l. a year; He found also the name of A. Murray, collector of Nassau, who had a salary of 1,386l. and who retired in 1820 on a superannuation of 700l. a year. There was also the name of a Mr. Walsh, who was the comptroller of entries, at 1,000l. a-year, and who, after six years service had retired with 600l. a-year. This was a borne case, to shew that the system of extravagance was not confined to the colonies. There was a Mr. P. Lyne, who had been collector at Sandy Point in St. Kitt's: he had 500l. a-year granted on the 21st March 1821, which slimed that the system of economy was of very re- cent adoption. A Mr. Sansom who had a salary of 500l. a-year for fifteen years, retired on 330l. a-year. Now, whether he took what the noble lord called a high tone, or a low tone, these facts must tell with the country. He could not quite go with his gallant friend in classing the customs and excise together. The management of the excise was different from that of the other branches of the revenue; because the patronage was confined to the commissioners, who admitted into the department only those who were under 26 years of age. To the customs this principle was extended last year by sir C. Long's commission. In those branches of the revenue of which the Treasury had grasped the patronage, they had no such limitation.

begged to say a few words in consequence of the allusion made by name to a relative of his, Mr. Lyne. On the return of his relative to this country, he (sir I. C.) had taken him up to the Treasury. He was then quite blind, and offered to surrender the 2,500l. a year salary which he had enjoyed, relying upon the liberality of government to provide for him, he having lost his sight in the public service. The Treasury had in consequence, given to him that reward to which he was so fairly entitled. He only wished the hon. member for Aberdeen might as well deserve from the country a similar reward. He was in the habit of bearing that hon. member night after night and looked upon him as no better than a forestaller.

said, the hon. member had complained, that ministers had not reduced the number of the commissioners of customs. It was very true they had not done so, and for this reason—because they were all perfectly convinced that, if the commissioners were actively employed there was not one too many. He was sorry that the hon. member had complained of some of the commissioners, as unfit for the situation in which they were placed. He had alluded particularly to one of them who had formerly been in the military line. Now, he thought, there was not connected with any department of the public service, a more able or efficient man than the individual thus noticed by the hon. member. With respect to another of the commissioners (Mr. Stewart,) no gentleman could possibly be better recommended than he was. It had been said, that he received very considerable fees. But it should be recollected why he got those fees. The fact was, that he had been employed by the chancellor of the exchequer in drawing bills relative to the revenue—a branch of duty which no other man could perform in the same manner. The hon. gentleman had complained of the lavish expenditure of the public money in the grant of superannuations. He would not defend all the superannuations; he admitted that the system was carried much too far; and, if he were asked where it was more particularly carried too far, he would say, in the customs; and if gentlemen would look through the reports on the subject, they would find that opinion stated by himself and others. Both the hon. members had alluded to various points which, they supposed, had not been touched on by ministers. But it so happened, that there was not one of those points that had not been under consideration, as would be proved by the subsequent reports. One of those points was, the employment of offices and servants at the different boards. It would be found, that that subject had been maturely considered, and that great reductions would be made in consequence. The next point was the preventive service; and here his own decided opinion was, that shortly a very large saving would be made. The expense of keeping up the coast-blockade was, he wished to observe, included in the sum of 600,000l. That force was at present partly under the Treasury, partly under the commissioners of customs, and partly under the excise; but when it was placed under one superintending head, much saving would be effected. The hon. member for Aberdeen had endeavoured to make an impression on the House by means which he did not think were worthy of being resorted to. He had stated, that in 1807, the collecting of the customs cost the country between 500,000l. and 600,000l., and that last year it cost 1,000,000l. Now the hon. member must know, that at the former period, the officers of the customs received fees, which were subsequently withheld, and on that account, an additional expense of 2 or 300,000l. was incurred. Therefore, when the hon. member stated merely the increase, without noticing the cause, he deceived the House. There was certainly a difference between the salary of the officers employed in the coast blockade and those attached to the preventive service. The latter received higher salaries, but by no means extravagant ones; and, when it was considered that they were officers of the navy, that they were intrusted with a command of high importance, and that they had performed their duty most effectually in every respect, surely no man could resist their being properly remunerated. When the hon. member spoke of instances of smuggling having been discovered on the coast. Surely he did not mean to say, because such instances had occurred, that the keeping up or a force of this nature was wholly useless? The contrary fact had been clearly established; since, notwithstanding the high duties, and the large sum which the service demanded, the amount of the revenue had considerably increased. With respect to the motion of the hon. officer, it could not be productive of any good effect, and therefore he should oppose it. How could government lay before the House an estimate of the probable expense of collecting the customs next year? What data had they to proceed upon? If they attempted such a thing, the hon. member and his friends would certainly come down next year and declare that government had acted most absurdly, in forming an estimate within the bounds of which they had found it impossible to confine themselves.

briefly replied, and contended, that the rate of collection which he had spoken of in 1812 was correct. However, without dwelling on these details, the main question was, why the four millions expended on the collection of the revenue should not be brought under the view of the House by estimates, as well as the other branches of the public service.

observed, that his hon. friend (Mr. Hume) had given notice of a motion for an instruction to the committee respecting the power of the king to dismiss officers. He hoped he would not press the motion at present, as it did not, as a general question, excite that interest which it deserved. It was the complaint, that in the House as well as out, it was the disposition to treat lightly constitutional questions in comparison with money matters. But in those times, when the members of that House were not so numerous, 152 had voted for the motion of 1734, while in the other House no less than 62 peers voted on the same side. But there was not at that time such a general indifference to constitutional questions, as unhappily prevailed at present. The gentlemen on his side of the House were on this occasion reduced to a sort of select society [a laugh]. The gentlemen on the other side might laugh and jeer, but he expressed most unfeignedly his surprise and regret, that the distinguished members with whom he had usually the honour to act, should have been absent on an occasion so deserving of their support. But in consequence of this absence, and in the hope of the presence of his hon. friends upon a future occasion, he earnestly recommended his hon. friend to postpone his intended motion.

said, that whatever might be the reasons which induced others to be absent or present, he looked at this question as one which had received serious attention in better periods of our history, and he strongly wished that the House would return to its former character, and examine the foundation of our institutions in the spirit of those institutions. He had been taught to entertain great suspicion of a standing army. However he might differ from gentlemen who were now absent or present, in a most sacred regard for the constitution be yielded to none. The right of dismissing officers, without cause assigned, had been, on a former occasion, treated as one of the prero- gatives of the Crown. He would say, should that question be again mooted, that the Crown possessed no such prerogative. It might be clearly made out that such a prerogative had never existed; and this was a time peculiarly fit for investigating that question and setting it at rest. A great war had recently terminated: a military spirit had risen up, and in considering the glorious successes of our army, we were too apt to overlook the character which constitutionally belonged to it. He looked at the navy with admiration—he looked at the militia as our constitutional and adequate defence—and he hoped, if the hon. member for Montrose should delay his proposition, that it would be only in order to bring it specifically forward at another opportunity.

said, that although he had known a question of as great importance as the present met by as empty benches, he would not persist against the advice of his friends, but would bring the subject forward on the bringing up of the report.

said, that the 29th clause of the bill respected courts martial, and to that clause he should move an amendment, which would confine courts-martial to the forms there prescribed, and declare "that no punishment whatever should be inflicted but such as was agreeable to the sentence of a court-martial, and to the forms of the act."

said, that no punishment could be inflicted but such as was legal, under the act; therefore the amendment was unnecessary.

said, that if the amendment meant nothing beyond the carrying into effect the clause to which it was attached, it was clearly superfluous. But, if it indirectly aimed at the prerogative of the Crown to dismiss officers, let the question be fairly met, as the hon. member for Bristol had proposed.

would recommend a little modesty to the mover of the amendment, if he meant that the final approbation of the sentence should not be left to the commander-in-chief.

thought the proposed addition was a round-about way of bringing on the question which the hon. mover had said he should decline bringing on that night. He should be happy to meet the question upon constitutional grounds; for he considered the prerogative alluded to, the best safety against the interference of the army with the constitution.

contended, that some ground ought to have been shown for the necessity of the amendment. What grievances were there which the amendment remedied? If it meant to prevent the dismissal of officers, it was the proposition which had been postponed, in another form; if it did not, it was unnecessary.

felt, that the dependance of the officers of the army upon the will of the Crown, or that of the minister was so obvious, from the recent dismissal of a gallant officer, without any cause made out, or trial instituted, that he should conceive it his duty, if no more competent person undertook the task, to move for leave to bring in a bill for the exclusion of all military officers from seats in that House, and also from the right of voting for any person becoming a candidate for a seat in that House; for he thought that many persons were excluded from those privileges who might fairly be deemed more independent than the officers of the army were now become, in consequence of the conduct of the Crown, or its ministers.

said, he was as jealous of a standing army as his hon. friend, and regarded the prerogative as a check upon the army. The only true dangers which had occurred in our history, was when the army was severed from the Crown, and power was placed in the hands of the army. He saw no reason for such a quantum of suspicion of officers in that House. They sat on both sides. To receive the thanks of parliament in their place there, was the best reward which they could receive for a service in which, God knew, they got little wealth, though they might gather some laurels. There was no reason for excluding them any more than gentlemen of the navy or the law.

asked, whether his majesty had the power of depriving a barrister of his rank, at his sole will and pleasure? There was no analogy in the cases. If the army had the power to destroy or uphold the constitution, it ought not to be under the control of any individual however high. They might turn against the people as well as against the Crown.

said, it was clear that the king could not inflict a more severe punishment than that which had been pronounced by a court-martial. But, though the Crown could not make it more severe, it might mitigate it. Now, if the amendment were carried, it would take from the Crown the power of mitigation. If a court-martial awarded the punishment of death, the king could not, should this amendment be carried, transmute it for transportation.

said, there were many instances in which officers who had been acquitted by courts martial had been afterwards dismissed. He instanced the case of the officers of the 85th, who having brought forward charges against their commanding officer, and failed to prove them, were dismissed; and the commanding officer was himself dismissed afterwards, although the court-martial had acquitted him.

said, the dismissal of the officers who had prosecuted groundless charges was no argument on the present question.

said, his argument was, that the commanding officer had himself been dismissed, after having been acquitted by the court martial.

said, it was then evident that the amendment raised the question of the prerogative.

said, he was not convinced by the argument of the solicitor-general, but he had no wish at present to agitate any point which would involve the question of the prerogative. The gallant colonel would remember that if an army, not under the control of the king, had interfered with the members of that House, and with the privileges of the people, the same might be done by one under absolute control. Its officers were perfectly dependant on the Crown, and, if he might use the phrase, were even the slaves of the Crown, in consequence of this power of dismissal.

said, he was himself no slave, and did not believe that the officers of the army were slaves. He thought they had the interest of the constitution at heart as much as any set of men in the country.

said, that when the hon. member for Weymouth brought in his bill to exclude officers of the army from the House, he hoped it would include officers of the navy, that they might all go out together.

flung back the insinuations of the hon. member for Aberdeen, to the foul source from whence they sprung. He was surprised that any member should dare to throw out such an aspersion against a body of men, who surely were not unfitted to sit in that House, because they had devoted years pf their lives to the service of their country.

begged to protest against this mode of making a sort of personal appeal, which was both contrary to the Orders of the House, and inconsistent with the freedom of debate. The hon. officer had expressed great indignation, because the hon. member for Aberdeen had called the officers of the army slaves. Now, he (Sir. F. B.) had not the slightest hesitation in declaring his perfect conviction of the propriety of this language. It was language which our forefathers had held—it was an argument which had been frequently used by constitutional lawyers against the expediency of a standing army. The great objection to a standing army was, that it had a direct tendency to make the officers of the army slaves. The hon. officer might assume as high a tone as he pleased as to the purity of the motives which influenced the conduct of officers of the army—he might contend, that they were free from all undue prepossessions, and inaccessible to those motives of interest which operated on the rest of mankind; but he (sir F. B.) concurred in the sentiments, and would therefore vindicate the language of the hon. member for Aberdeen. He agreed with his hon. friend, that a standing army, and every thing connected with a standing army, was fraught with danger to the constitution and to the liberties of the people, and he would a thousand times rather die in his seat than submit to its unconstitutional control. Standing up as he did for the constitution, he had no hesitation in declaring, that a standing army was a gross infringement of every principle of that constitution. That it was such an infringement, and that it would sooner or later lead to the destruction of the constitution, was the Opinion of a person, who must be admitted to be a man of some genius even by the side of the learned solicitor-general—he alluded to Montesquieu, in his book on the Spirit of Laws—it was an opinion held by the soundest lawyers, and the ablest constitutional writers this country had produced. It was to be found in almost all the great writers, both ancient and modern, who had treated on the science of government. It was the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackstone—a man who would not be suspected of being over anxious to support liberal opinions, though certainly some of his sentiments in favour of liberty would be considered as licentious in these days, by many gentlemen on the other side of the House, and especially by gentlemen of the long robe. Now what did this writer say? He complained of the act, of which the House was now discussing the provisions. He never dreamt of the doctrine, that the control of a standing army was a part of the king's prerogatives; but he declared that the power over the standing army was conferred on the Crown by the mutiny act. He complained of the severity of this act—he complained of the cruelty of many of its provisions—he stated that it had been penned in haste, and without due consideration; and he expressed a hope, that it would he revised by the wisdom of some future parliament. He expressed his regret also that the soldiers of this country should be the only slaves among a nation of freemen, and he pointed out the extreme danger to the constitution which arose from placing arms in the hands of men who were in a more debased and degraded condition than any other class of their countrymen. Every thing which had been most deprecated by this learned commentator which would have made our forefathers shudder, and at which every friend to English freedom must tremble, had been since adopted. The English soldier was set apart from his fellow-countrymen—he was made a sort of artificial Mameluke—he no longer lived under the same laws—he was shut out from the protection of the constitution. Every apprehension of the learned commentator had been realised; and, instead of endeavouring to unite and amalgamate the citizen and the soldier, the government had employed the most artful and unconstitutional means to separate the two characters, and to cut off the soldier from all connexion, all feeling of interest and sympathy with the people. The learned commentator observed, that in whatever country an army was placed out of the pale of the constitution, they would naturally become the enemies of those rights which they could not themselves enjoy; and he expressed a hope, that the constitution of England would be able to survive what had led to the ruin of every other nation in which it had existed—the establishment of a standing army. To prevent these fatal consequences, it was incumbent upon us, he observed, to take care that the army should not be too numerous; that the character of the soldier should be mixed up as much as possible with that of the citizen; that there should be no barracks, no inland fortresses; that no means should be employed to cut off the communication of the army with the people; and that the term of service should be short, so that a principle of rotation might he established, and the soldiers be returned, from time to time, to the great mass of the people. These were the constitutional means of making the army a national support, and not an enslaved class of the community; these were the only means of avoiding the necessary consequences of maintaining a standing army in time of peace, in a free country. The noble lord opposite considered a standing army the best defence of the people of England. This was, indeed, making rapid strides towards overturning all the prejudices of our forefathers. What was Mr. Hume's opinion on this subject? Even that writer, with all his monarchical prejudices, was of opinion that a standing army would give a final blow to the liberties of the country, that it would be the euthanasia, or natural and proper death, of the liberties of the people of England. And well might we be said to be approaching rapidly towards this consummation, when we considered the amount of our standing army, the vast sums of money which were expended to support it, or the systematic means employed to perpetuate it. Under the guise of charitable institutions for soldier's children, infants were brought up by beat of the drum, and a race of artificial Mamelukes was created in the country. For God's sake let the children and orphans of soldiers be protected; but, was it protection to exclude them from all other employments or professions, or to bring them up as a fighting class in the country?—The hon. baronet proceeded to advert to the power assumed by the Crown to dismiss the officers of the army at its pleasure, and without assigning the cause of dismissal. It was a power which it was most dangerous to exercise, and which ought not to be suffered to exist in any country. It was said, that the king could have no interest in the improper exercise of such a power; but it was the principle to which he objected. The king might be a good or a bad king; he might be a patriot monarch or an ambitious tyrant: but, whatever might be the character of the reigning sovereign, he never wished to see the liberties of the people of England dependant upon any king. Gentlemen opposite said, we might depend upon the king; and the king would take care that the army should not turn out the parliament in these times. But, where was our security for his forbearance? Suppose the king, like Cromwell, should choose to turn out the members of that House by the instrumentality of the army. If such a power were sanctioned by the constitution, it was a constitution which deserved not to be praised for its beauty, nor admired for its wisdom, nor relied upon for our security. For his own part he would place no such implicit reliance, and was disposed to place a much greater reliance upon the honour and feelings of the officers themselves, by giving to those officers, and to the army at large, the protection and benefit of the constitution. As to the power of subverting the decisions of a court martial, or dispensing with a court martial altogether, by the fiat of the Crown, or rather of the ministers of the Crown, it was a most monstrous, irrational power, and mischievous even to those who exercised it. The Crown might in this way, by listening to the calumnies of some insidious enemy, and affording no opportunity of explanation to the party accused, do injury to its best friends. Such a power existed, he believed, in no other country of Europe: for in every other country the soldier had at least the protection of being subjected to a court martial—of being heard before he was condemned. Were the soldiers of England, then, to be placed in a situation more degraded and more slavish than that of the dependent satellites of the most despotic governments? This was not, as had been contended, a mere question of prerogative; for that House was bound to listen to no plea of prerogative, unless it could be shewn that that prerogative existed for the benefit of the people. On the same principle, the judges might be dismissed at the pleasure of the Crown; for it was not to be assumed that the Crown would not misuse its power, or at all events that its ministers were so immaculate as to be incapable of abusing it. There had been ministers who had not only turned out officers from their commissions, but from their seats in parliament; and though he supposed we now lived in more virtuous times, and the present parliament was of course immaculate, yet the possibility of the thing could not be denied, since it had actually happened at a former period of our history. The hon. baronet concluded, by thanking his hon. friend, for having drawn the attention of the country to this important subject, and by expressing a hope that he would not withdraw his amendment.

thought it no part of the rules of debate to permit gentlemen on one side the House to use such expressions as to them seemed convenient, and to forbid those on the other side from using strong language in their defence. The hon. baronet was in the habit of giving the House the result of his private studies; but he had omitted to state, in his quotations from Blackstone, the paragraph which identified the standing army with the British constitution. However dangerous might be the existence of a standing army, it would be infinitely more dangerous to have no army at all; and the amount of existing danger, whatever it might be, would be increased by the measure suggested by the hon. member for Aberdeen. If the army was not to be elected into a fourth estate, it must be placed under some species of control. The hon. baronet objected to that control being vested in the Crown. Was parliament, then, to have the control of the army? Wherever popular assemblies had attempted to command a military force, the thing had usually ended by that force commanding them. The observation of the hon. baronet respecting "artificial Mamelukes," referred, he supposed to the children of the Military Asylum; but the children of that establishment were allowed to choose their own professions, and the majority of them had actually chosen civil pursuits. With regard to the military rules of other governments, he apprehended that the king of Prussia had often exercised the power in question.

said, his hon. friend had not applied the term "slaves," to the army tauntingly or sneeringly. Certainly the language of the gallant officer was entirely new.

said, he had beard the hon. and gallant officer make use of the word "dared,"—a word, the use of which was always considered highly un-parliamentary.

said, his objection was not to the word "dared," but to the words "foul source," which had been used by the gallant member and which he trusted he would take an opportunity of explaining.

said, that the expression used by the hon. member for Aberdeen had certainly appeared to him to be coarse and foul-mouthed. He had answered it in a moment of indignation, and as he was not often in the habit of addressing the House, he feared he had inadvertently gone beyond the rules of debate. He apologized to the House for having done so, but he should not carry his apology any further.

informed the Speaker, that when the House had been in a Committee, a dispute had arisen betwixt two hon. members, of which, as he was not in the chair, he could not probably be supposed to be aware. One of those hon. members was his hon. friend, the member for Montrose, the other the member for Cambridge; and he regretted to say that in consequence of expressions used by his hon. friend, the other hon. member had made a retort, couched in a manner which as he was not then present, he could not designate. A subsequent explanation had been made by his hon. friend, which had been accepted by the House. A similar explanation had been made by the other hon. member, of the expression he had used; as far as the house was concerned, he might say he had made an apology; but not one word had he said with regard to the person towards whom those expressions were directed. As it was not the custom in that House, or elswhere, for such language to pass without a retractation, or ulterior consequences, he hoped some means would be taken by the House to stop any further proceedings.

commended the course which the hon. member had taken, with such an apprehension on his mind as he had described. With respect to the circumstance to which he had called his attention, he begged to state, that he was present in the House as a member during the time it occurred. He was sorry the impression left on the mind of the hon. member was such as he described; but he was bound to say that it differed from his own. The language which had caused the excitement in question, used on the one side had since been explained as being applied, not personally, but to a profession, or class of persons, to which the hon. member feeling himself aggrieved, belonged. The explanation of the hon. officer in return, was one which admitted that he spoke with warmth, and in an unguarded manner; but, what was more important, the hon. officer expressed his regret that he had used any language inconsistent with the orders of that House. Now it was plain that language tending to a personal misunderstanding, must be contrary to the orders of that House, and therefore it was, that he conceived that an explicit disavowal of all ulterior intention of pursuing the subject had been made. One hon. member was in the House, however, and it would be a satisfaction to the House to know that his sentiments were such as he had just stated.

stated, that according to his apprehension, the explanation of the hon. officer, notwithstanding the reservation it contained, was not meant to be applicable to him in a hostile sense. For his own part, he felt perfectly satisfied, and would have prevented his hon. friend from troubling the House, had he been aware of his intention.