moved the order of the day for going into a committee on this bill. On the ques- tion, that Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair,

said, that in rising to move an instruction to the committee to insert a clause in the bill to prevent, in future, the dismissal of officers of the army without trial by a court-martial, or the increasing the severity of any punishment awarded by the sentence of such court; he might, perhaps, in consideration of the difficulty of the subject, be pardoned, were he to intreat the indulgence of the House. But as he had voluntarily undertaken the task, as neither official duties nor imperative circumstances had forced it upon him, he was aware that he had no claim to any thing beyond a patient and a candid hearing. He should have, at the outset, to combat strongly formed opinions, not only on the part of those who might be considered his political opponents, but were among that number on whose support, upon ordinary occasions, he might confidently rely. In opposition to any arguments he could use, would be urged long established custom, an uninterrupted prescription of a century and a half; and he should be held up to reprobation as a daring innovator, whose councils, if followed, would make a breach in the just prerogatives of the crown, and tend to subvert the discipline of the army. Notwithstanding these difficulties, so impressed was he with the expediency of effecting a change in one part of the military code, that he did not despair of carrying conviction to the minds of those who were most strongly prejudiced against him. He could assure those who trembled for the privileges of the crown, that he had no wish to invade any prerogative which conduced to the comfort or splendor of the monarch, nor was he one of those who would wish to shear royalty of those beams which ought to encircle the king of such a country as this. But if he could demonstrate, that the prerogative of dismissing officers of the army without trial by a court-martial, tended in no way to promote the splendor or security of the throne; that it was a question in which the sovereign had no personal interest whatever, while it had, in a thousand instances, been made the instrument of caprice and malice on the part of inferiors; if he could show, that it was illegal, that the authority on which it was said to rest did not justify its exercise; and further, that without, in any way, conducing to the discipline of the army, it was dangerous to the constitution, then he trusted that he should have made out a case which would entitle him to the support of the House. He confessed, that, till lately, he partook; of the common opinion, that the crown legally possessed, and ought to enjoy, a discretionary power over the commissions of officers of the army. It was not until, by an extraordinary stretch of that power, a gallant friend, of whom it was unnecessary for him to say what he felt, as his services were known and appreciated by every man in the country, and whose military achievements, interwoven with the history of Europe, would go down with that history to the latest posterity; it was not until he was immolated a victim at its shrine, that he was induced to examine its nature and extent. It was then that he discovered that the authority on which it was supposed to rest, was in direct contradiction to it, and that almost every writer on military law was opposed to it. Even those who might he supposed most anxious to uphold the prerogatives of the crown, found themselves so carried away by the strong current of all those opinions which from childhood are impressed upon us, that before we had advanced ten pages in their works, they were found laying down principles which, if adhered to in practice, would render all discussion on the subject wholly useless. It was unnecessary for him to go into a long history of military law: the law, as it now stood, dated from the Revolution, and was to be found in the Mutiny act annually passed by parliament. The acts of the 13th and 14th of Charles 2nd, which were asserted by some to be declaratory of the powers of the crown, were virtually repealed by the first Mutiny act, passed in the reign of William 3rd: besides, when the complexion of the times, at the restoration, was considered, when it was recollected that the tide of public opinion set as strongly in favour of royalty as ever it had against it, and that the proposition for imposing the oath of nonresistance upon the whole nation was rejected in parliament by a majority of only three voices, no just rule for their future guidance was to be found in the acts of the legislature at that period. He, therefore, should assume, that to the Mutiny, act they were to look as the foundation on which rested all the power over the army exercised by the sovereign. That the power of the Crown was derived from the Mutiny act, and not from any antiquated prerogative, was evident, from the fact, that if parliament neglected to pass it, the army, and, of course, all power over it, would cease to exist. No one could have perused our military code, as contained in that act, without perceiving throughout the same anxious regard for the liberty of the subject, which formed the essence of our constitution; and although necessity of preserving discipline rendered essential some deviation from the strict practice of the law, yet that the spirit of that law was invariably maintained. They would find in that statute a long catalogue of crimes, with various degrees of punishment annexed to them; such as mutiny, cowardice, desertion to the enemy, and a multitude of other offences of the deepest dye. If any thing would justify a summary mode of proceeding, it might be imagined, that such crimes as these, from their very nature, might require immediate punishment: mutiny, for instance, which, if not instantly suppressed, might spread through a whole corps, and defy authority. In dealing with such monstrous offences, some discretionary power might have been vested in the sovereign. Yet, so jealous was the legislature of arbitrary power, that abandoned miscreants, who had violated every obligation, human and divine, were still sheltered under the ægis of the law, and could not be punished, except upon conviction by a court-martial. The only persons from whom these rights were withheld, were the officers of the army; they, without trial, without the means of defence, without knowing who were their accusers, or what their crime, might be punished in a manner which, to a man of nice feelings, must be worse than death, which, in most cases, attaches a stigma to the character, and in many was attended with total ruin. They found themselves, after a long period of honourable service, deprived of the commission on which they had depended for subsistence, and which, in many cases, had been purchased, not merely by length of service, but by an actual pecuniary payment. The power, so contrary to every principle of law and justice, which exposed to such cruel hardships so large a portion of the community, was assumed on the authority of the 35th section of the Mutiny act, by which his majesty was empowered "to make articles of war." Now, he would affirm, that if this section stood alone, wholly detached from the context, it would be impossible to give it the construction attached to it by the assertors of the arbitrary prerogative. The king might frame articles for the better government of the forces; he might define what should be a military offence, and what the punishment for committing it; but the conviction of an accused party, could only be had through the medium of some tribunal by whom he should be tried. The power granted to the crown by the clause alluded to, might, as far as it went, be compared to that exercised by the whole legislature, viz. the power of framing and declaring laws; yet the legislature, in its collective capacity, did not take upon itself the judicial as well as legislative functions, the transgressor of the law being handed over to the constituted tribunals. Such would obviously be the meaning attached to this clause by any man of common sense, if it were left unexplained by any thing else; but what would the House say, when he read to them the clause which almost immediately followed (the 37th), by which it was expressly enacted, "That for bringing offenders against such articles of war to justice, it shall be lawful for his majesty to erect and constitute courts-martial, as well as to grant his royal commission or warrant to authorize others with power to try any crimes or offences by such articles of war, and to inflict penalties by judgment of the same." So far, then, was the Mutiny bill from placing in the hands of the crown an arbitrary power, that it was evident, that such power was in direct violation, not only if its spirit, but of its letter. This view of the subject was not confined to him; he could support it by the highest authorities who had written on military law. Blackstone, in those celebrated remarks on our military code, which must be familiar to every member of the House, observes, "This discretionary power of the court-martial is, indeed, to be guided by the directions of the crown, which, with regard to military offences, has almost and absolute legislative power. 'His majesty, says the act, may form articles of war, and constitute courts-martial, with power to try any crime by such articles, and inflict penalties by sentence or judgment of the same.' A vast and most important trust, and un- limited power to create crimes, and annex to them any punishments hot extending to life or limb." Such were the remarks of that great lawyer, applied to the power against which he (col. D.) did not contend—the rower exercised through the medium of a court-martial. How much stronger would have been his language, had be been called upon to comment on such doctrines as they had heard promulgated in that House. The observations of Tytler, a most respectable authority on military law, were still stronger. He is endeavouring to show, that military law was unjustly accused of being vague or arbitrary, and in confirmation of his argument, proceeds to make the following remarks: "The penalties, therefore, which it is competent for the sovereign to decree by his own authority, must, at the worst, be of a very slight and subordinate nature, and calculated merely for the enforcement of good discipline; since the greater crimes, and their appropriate punishments are defined and regulated by the Mutiny act, which, as already said, is the operation, not of the sovereign per se, but of the united branches of the legislature." "Besides this, when it is considered, that even those subordinate penalties which it is competent for the soveregn to enact by articles of war, or other regulations for the army, cannot be inflicted but through the medium of a court-martial, which has the essential characteristics of a jury, and is, in fact, a trial of the subject by his peers; we shall immediately be convinced, that this power of the crown, which has furnished much matter of intemperate declamation to writers tinctured with republican prejudices, can never be exercised under our excellent constitution, to the injury of the subject, or the abridgment of any of the valuable rights of that honourable class of men who compose the military force of the state." So fir the authority of Tytler, and he (col. D.) would ask any one who heard that passage, if he could imagine, for a moment, that the writer ever contemplated the claim which was set up on the part of the crown by the supporters of the prerogative? The sentiments expressed by Blackstone and Tytler were analogous to the theory and practice of the constitution, as exercised in every instance, except in the case of this most analogous prerogative. So anxious was the legislature to adhere to the great principle, not only that the judicial should be separated from the legislative functions, but that the accuser shall in no instance be the judge; that in all cases of impeachment which are extra-judicial proceedings pro re natâ, intended to reach officers placed beyond the ordinary jurisdiction of the law; the Commons being the accusers could not be judges, and therefore the proceedings were held before the House of Peers. But in the cases where the sovereign dismissed officers without trial, he united in his own person the conflicting functions of legislator, accuser, and judge. This prerogative was more arbitrary than even that by which the proclamations of Henry 8th assumed the force of statutes, and which had justly been designated by Hume as a total subversion of the constitution. Even under that cruel tyrant, persons offending were not deprived of all trial; they could be punished only upon conviction before nine privy councillors, a tribunal strongly resembling a modern court-martial. But even arguing the question according to the view taken by gentlemen opposite, he would contend, that they had not a shadow of reasoning-to support them. The prerogative was claimed in virtue of the clause in the Mutiny bill, which grants to his majesty the power of framing regulations; he presumed, therefore, that it would be necessary to show that, by those regulations, it was enacted, that the crown should, when it thought fit, cashier any officer of the army. But what was the fact? Not only might those regulations be searched in vain for such an assumption of power, but exactly the reverse was the law as laid down by them. The regulations, after enumerating a long list of minor offences, and the penalties to be attached to them, by the second article of the 24th section, expressly declared, "that all crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not specified in the said rules and articles, shall be punished." How! at the discretion of the crown? No. "But at the discretion of a general or regimental court-martial." After this solemn pledge given to the whole, army, that no offence was to be punished with-out trial, was not every dismissal of an officer without trial, not only an act of cruelty and injustice, but a direct breach of faith? His interpretation of the law was thus, he flattered himself, borne out by the letter of the statute, and of the regulations, and fully confirmed by the great authorities he had quoted. If he referred to political writers, who, taking an extensive survey of the principles of government, had not dwelt particularly on military law, their general reasoning would, in every instance, be found to corroborate his views. It would be unnecessary to trespass on the time of the House with quotations from Locke, who had declared prerogative to be nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule; or from Bacon, Paley, De Lolme, Montesquieu, and a host of others, all of whom bore him out in asserting, that the power over the army reposed in the sovereign, was, like every other attribute of legitimate power, a trust for the public good, not, what no legitimate power ever could be, the instrument of selfishness and caprice. Leaving this part of the question, he would admit, that, even allowing him to have succeeded in showing the asserted prerogative to be illegal, still, if it were innoxious; if, like many of the enactments in our statute book, it were held out only in terrorem, to scare the offender whom it was not intended to injure; or, if its exercise were generally tempered with discretion and guided by justice; whatever objections might be made to its theory, he should not be justified in calling on parliament to interfere with its practice. But if he could show, that in many, many instances, caprice or misrepresentation had guided the blow, that the innocent had been confounded with the guilty, that not only had officers been unjustly punished without trial, but that when, after dismissal from the service, they had asked, not for restoration to their commissions, but merely for an opportunity of vindicating their characters, unjustly traduced, even that poor consolation had been denied; then he trusted, that the House would be disposed to agree with him, that nothing but a strong case of necessity could justify its continuance. To ascertain to what extent the power of arbitrary dismissal had been exercised, he had, last year, moved for a return of the number of officers w dismissed, since 1795; and, would the House believe that they amounted to 989? Here were a thousand cases of injustice [No, no! from the Ministerial benches.] He would ask those gentlemen who said no, no, if it were not an act of injustice to punish any man without trial? If a man were to commit murder in the open day, in the most crowded street of this metropolis, although there were a thousand witnesses to the fact, would he be hung up to the next lamp post, or would he be punished by the laws alone? He would state one or two cases, in support of his argument; and he pledged his honour, that, if necessary, he could cite an hundred, in which the crown had committed the greatest injustice in the exercise of this power. The first he would cite was, the well-known case of the officers of the 85th regiment. Some years ago, three captains and five lieutenants of that corps brought their commanding officer, col. Ross, to a court-martial. Out of several charges, they succeeded in substantiating but one, and that a minor one; upon this, however, col. Ross was sentenced to be reprimanded. His majesty was so much displeased with the officers, who had thus brought their superior to trial, upon charges which they were unable to prove, that the judge-advocate, by his order, wrote to the commander-in-chief, to inform him, that he had no further occasion for their service. This was a most unjust proceeding. Those officers ought to have been put on their trial in their turn, which would have given them an opportunity of showing that they had, much against their inclination, been almost forced to bring those charges against col. Ross, for which they were now so cruelly punished. So far the injustice seemed confined to the inferior officers; but what would the House say, when they heard the conclusion of the judge-advocate's letter? It proceeded to state, "that this brought to his majesty's recollection, that col. Ross had lately been guilty of a similar offence, having brought major Ottley to trial on several unfounded charges." It then concluded by ordering col. Ross also to be dismissed the service. In the name of justice, and of common sense, what system of law was this? Here was the case of an individual, who, unjustly arraigned, saw his accusers punished for the prosecution to which they had subjected him; but at the moment when he could least expect it, the blow fell on him Also; not for any new offence which he had committed, but for something which had been treasured pp, to be levelled at him when wholly unprepared to meet it. If he had been guilty of a military offence, in bringing an officer improperly to trial, why was he not punished at the time; why was he allowed to continue in command of the regiment? But it was a waste of words to comment on such proceedings; the whole transaction was of so monstrous a nature, that it needed only to be mentioned to excite the reprobation it deserved. Another case of equal or even greater hardship, was that of an officer of the Blues. Dissensions had unfortunately subsisted in that regiment for some time, when an officer, for lampooning his comrades, was obliged to quit it. It was resolved by the whole corps, that, in the event of the discarded officer challenging any one of them, such challenge was not to be accepted. Some time after, a captain of the regiment met the officer who had been dismissed; high words ensued, and a challenge on the part of the discarded officer was the consequence. A statement of the transaction being made to the regiment, it was agreed that no notice whatever was to be taken of the challenge. The officer was, in consequence, posted by his challenger, upon which, some of the regiment, with a strange inconsistency, preferred a complaint against him at head quarters. The House were, perhaps, not aware, that the king's regulations were most positive against duelling, the sending or accepting a challenge being punishable with cashiering; thus, in addition to the resolutions of his comrades, the officer was supported by the positive orders of his sovereign. Would it be believed, that, in defiance of those regulations which, that they might be generally known, were every month read to every regiment in the service, this officer was by the king dismissed for not fighting a duel; in other words, for obeying the positive order of the king himself. How was an officer to act when thus placed on the horns of a dilemma. If he accepted a challenge, he was liable to be cashiered; if he refused it, he was dismissed the service? Whenever it was asserted, that the prerogative was likely to be abused, an answer was attempted, by urging the responsibility of the servants of the crown for the advice they might give, and their liability to be called to a severe account if they abused their trust. Such an argument, experience showed to empty words. Let the House look to the events of the last session, for the effect of parliamentary control on the conduct of a minister. When, by a most outrageous stretch of the prerogative, his gallant friend (sir R. Wilson) had been removed from the service upon charges which the ministers themselves shortly after knew to be vague and unfounded, what was the result of an appeal to parliament? Not only was redress withheld, but even all explanation of the grounds on which that step had been taken, was denied: a majority of the House had refused to admit the question of inquiry; though he was convinced, that if they had been asked individually their opinions as gentlemen, there was not one who would not have been compelled to acknowledge, that his hon. friend had been treated with the most cruel injustice. Having thus endeavoured to demonstrate, and he trusted successfully, that this asserted power was illegal, in direct violation of the statute which was made the ground of its assumption, and in its exercise cruelly oppressive, still his task remained unaccomplished; and, to justify him in requiring the interference of parliament, it was necessary to convince them, that the discipline of the army could be maintained without it. This he conceived to be so easy, that he trusted a very few words would suffice to establish the proposition, that the punishment of all refractions of the articles of war, and all breaches of military discipline, might safely be entrusted to the discretion and integrity of a court-martial. The advocates of the prerogative contended, that cases might arise of a nature to require immediate and summary proceedings, and of a nature which could not safely be trusted to the decision of officers of the army. With regard to the first objection, he would ask, which were the most serious military offences? Mutiny, insubordination, or plunder in presence of the enemy. Thus, one charged with these crimes, might he brought before a drum-head court-martial, be accused, convicted, and shot in half an hour. If that were not a summary proceeding, he did not know what was. It had, however, been contended, that cases might arise of disaffection, so genes rally diffused through a garrison, as to make it impossible to bring an offender to justice, through the medium of a court formed of materials so tainted. Such an argument would be worth something, if the offence, as in civil cases, must be friend in the place where committed. But a military offender might be tried in England, upon charges laid against him in India; if, therefore, the garrison of Dublin were in a state of disaffection, any offender, whom it might be necessary to bring to justice, might he tried in Edinburgh or London. The members of the court, although usually taken, in their turns, from a list, in military phrase termed a roster, might, whenever it pleased the crown, be selected from any part of the army, least tainted with disaffection. Let them contrast these with the proceedings before the ordinary courts of justice; there the venue must be laid, and the jury chosen from the county in which the offence had been committed, from among those who might be connected by ties of friendship or acquaintance with the accused. Then the sheriff, if suspected of partiality, was precluded from returning the jury, and, in all cases, chose them from a number of not less than 48. But time unfavourable chances did not end here: they attended the military prisoner through every stage of trial. In criminal proceedings, before the ordinary courts, a right of peremptory challenge, to a certain extent, was allowed; no such privilege was extended to a military offender, who must show cause for every challenge. In the former case, the judge and jury were distinct; in the latter they were one. In the ordinary courts the jury must be unanimous to convict a prisoner: in military courts 9 out of 13 were sufficient to condemn in capital cases, and a bare majority in all cases not capital. It had been said, that the members of a court-martial might be suspected of a fellow-feeling towards one of their own profession, and be disposed to defeat the ends of justice. Without meaning to cast any imputation on the members of the profession, he could not help observing, that if any bias were to exist in their minds, it might naturally be supposed to be towards the crown, the source of all their honours and emoluments, rather than towards a friendless individual, from whom they could expect nothing. Besides all these fearful powers with which military courts were armed, they had delegated to them an indefinite power of trying every offence of which a human being could be guilty, whether declared to be such or not by the articles of war, or act of parliament; for, by the 2nd article of the 24th section of the articles of war, it is enacted, that "all, crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not specified in the said rules and articles, are to be taken cognizance of by a general or regimental court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offence, and to be punished at their discretion." Such being the power with which the crown was legally vested, he would ask, could any one really believe that the removal of the power of arbitrary dismissal, could in any way be considered as likely to prove dangerous to the sovereign? But might not its continuance prove dangerous to the constitution? Did not the evidence of all history prove, that the more the soldier was separated from the citizen, the more he was placed at the absolute disposal of the executive, the more dangerous he became to the rest of the community? It was an observation of Montesquieu, that all men in a society, who were deprived of those privileges which were enjoyed by their neighbours, were to look at them with envy, and be ready to assist in their destruction. Was it not, then, a species of political suicide on the part of a legislative assembly, voluntarily to throw into the hands of the sovereign this most dangerous power, or still more so, that allow it to be exercised in direct violation of their own enactments? If they placed the army beyond the pale of the constitution, if they showed themselves unwilling to allow them a participation in those rights which they themselves enjoyed, did they not force them into the arms of the sovereign, to whom they would naturally be disposed to look as the source of all the honours of their profession? He might be told, that our own history in former, and that of other nations at the present time, presented proofs of an army being more disposed to side with the people than with the crown. If, indeed, a tyrant similar to the last of the Stuarts were once more to fill the throne of this country, who, not content with subverting its liberties, were to attack its religion (and he begged the House to recollect, that a great contemporary authority had given it as his opinion, that had not James tried to overthrow the religion of the country, his army would never have sided against him), then, he doubted not, that the army would recollect that they were citizens before they were soldiers. But might no situation he supposed between national freedom and the tyranny of James, or that of a Bourbon of Spain, or a Bourbon of Naples? Were there no gradations through which an army might be led step by step; and did they not know, that from the nature of its constitution, it was only in extreme cases that an army could be induced to resist what they had been taught to consider lawful authority? If this were considered, it would be obvious, that an evil disposed monarch, with an army at his absolute disposal, might become dangerous to the liberties of his subjects. Probably his fears would appear ridiculous to many, who considered the manner in which the liberties of the country were cherished by his present majesty; but, although they had the good fortune to possess a sovereign anxious to promote the happiness of his people, they could not tell who might follow him. It was a just remark, that the best princes were often in one respect dangerous to liberty, by removing from the minds of their subjects that suspicion which is its best safeguard. He had now little more to add, having stated all that he considered as most likely to give effect to his arguments. On those who considered the officers of the army as menial servants of the crown, and who thought the king had as good a right to dismiss a general as to discharge a footman, those arguments would have little influence. But, if they who were disposed to think, with him, that the soldiery were the servants of the state, by whom they were paid, and for whose service they were raised, and that the power of the sovereign over them was placed in his hands for the public good; if they who would wish to keep alive those feelings of nice honour and attachment to the laws, which alone would prevent an army being dangerous to the state; if they were not convinced, he must attribute his failure, not to the weakness of the cause, but the feebleness of the advocate. Before he sat down, he begged, in the name of the army, to implore the House not to withhold from them a participation, as far as circumstances would admit, of those rights which were justly considered the birth-right of every individual in this land of freedom. He would particularly address himself to those who had so often and so ably advocated the cause of foreigners residing in this country. If they had exerted themselves in favour of aliens, to whom they were bound by no other tie than the common feelings of humanity and jutsice, would they remain silent when they saw equal if not harsher restraints about to be continued against their fellow citizens, the brave defenders of their country? No, forbid it every feeling of gratitude and justice; and he would remind them of the eternal truth applicable to the internal as well as external affairs of a state: "Non modo falsum esse illud, sine injuria non posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summa justam rempublicam regi non posse."—He concluded by moving, "That it be an instruction to the Committee, that they have power to make provision to prevent the Dismissal of Officers of the Army without trial by a Court-martial, or the punishment of any Officer, Non-commissioned Officer, or Soldier, who shall have been tried by a Court-martial, in any manner beyond the sentence of the Court."

in stating the grounds upon which he should feel it his duty to oppose this motion, did not mean to follow the example of the hon. gentleman, in producing a number of authorities, drawn from various authors, who had taken, possibly, a partial view of the subject, or had judged erroneously on a matter which did not fall within the course of their ordinary discussions. If he could not produce an argument sufficiently strong in itself to carry conviction to the mind of the House, he would not attempt to bolster it up with quotations and authority. The ground of his opposition would he, that the principle of this proposition involved a direct breach of an important prerogative, which the crown had possessed from the earliest periods; and which it was most essential for its own splendor and for the interests of the people, that it should continue to retain. He was one of those who considered that the prerogatives of the crown were not given to it for the peculiar advantage, or dignity, or interest, of the individual who might happen to wear the crown; but for the interest and the benefit of the people. It was not requisite that he should go into any long historical research to prove that this was a prerogative of a most ancient character; for he had only to refer the House to the statute book of the realm. He need only refer them to the statute passed in the beginning of the reign of Charles 2nd, which declared, "that the government or command of the militia, and of all the forces by sea and land, of this realm, is, and by the law of England always bath been, the undoubted right of the kings of England; and that of both or either of those forces the control and command ought not by the parliament to be assumed." And the act of the next year declared to the same effect. He had also before him the articles of war, which were published in the reign of Elizabeth, at a time when the earl of Essex was at the head of our army, and parliament, under the extraordinary circumstances in which the nation was placed, took upon itself the exercise of a prerogative which belonged to the crown, and the crown only, of right. He had likewise the articles of war of Charles 2nd's reign: and by these, courts-martial were instituted. They were instituted under powers which were thus delegated from the crown. The crown could not grant those powers, if it did not possess a prerogative to do so; and therefore he was entitled to assume, that it did possess the prerogative. In the articles of war of the reign of Charles 2nd it was declared, "that no officer shall be dismissed from the service, except by an order from us, our general, or of a court-martial." It was clear, then, upon every principle of strict reasoning, analogy, and common sense, not less than upon these authorities, that the power of dismission had always resided in the crown. If he was right in this assumption, he must be allowed to say, that there was nothing in the Mutiny bill which took away the prerogative. Nothing could be a greater mistake than that which hon. gentlemen opposite frequently committed, in calling the Mutiny bill the protection, the safeguard of the army; as if it conferred upon the army some privilege which was to countervail the prerogative of the crown. It was, in fact, a bill to enable the crown to proceed more summarily, in certain cases, than otherwise it would be competent for it to do. At the time of the Revolution, as was well known to every hon. gentleman who heard him, it was considered illegal and unconstitutional to proceed against a military offender, otherwise than by common form of law in the courts. It was equally notorious, that at the latter end of the reign of James 2nd, and the begining of William 3rd, the army were guilty of various acts of riot and insubordination. What did parliament then do? They passed an act, giving his majesty power to proceed summarily against such offenders. What the intentions of parliament, in enacting that statute were, its preamble would sufficiently show. It began by stating, that a standing army was, by the constitution, dangerous and illegal; that the king and parliament, nevertheless, under then existing circumstances, deemed it expedient that one should be kept up. It recited, that in time of peace, no man could legally be punished by martial law. Yet, said the same act, "it being necessary to keep he soldiers in their duty—that exact discipline should be kept up, and that those who desert the service should be brought to more speedy punishment;" and then it went on to give to the king a power of appointing courts-martial to try such offences. The Mutiny act could not be considered as abridging any of the royal prerogatives, unless it did so, not by implication merely, but in express terms. It also gave to the king the power of making articles of war; and in the next clause, there was this limitation—"that no person within the realm should be made responsible for life or limb, except for the crimes mentioned in this act, and punishable in the manner therein described." This act, therefore, left the king with the power which he undoubtedly possessed of dismissing any servants whom he pleased—a power necessary to his dignity and his independence. The case of captain Caulfield of the navy, which had been mentioned, was of a very different description from the other cases adduced by the hon. gentleman. He was tried by a court-martial. The Admiralty, thinking the sentence of that court not sufficiently severe, dismissed him from the service, independently of the finding of the court-martial. The crown confirmed this dismission, and in so doing was undoubtedly improperly advised. But, if the hon. gentleman meant to say, that the judges, in delivering their opinion upon captain Caulfield's case, intimated that the king had not the power of dismissing any of his servants, he (lord P.) must protest, that their opinion would bear no such construction. The hon. gentleman had said, that since the year 1793, no less than 929 officers, whom he denominated the victims of injustice and oppression, had been dismissed the service. It would be found, however, that the ground of dismission, in respect to the greater number of these officers, was, their being absent without leave. He flattered himself he should be able, if it were considered necessary, to prove, that in all these cases the crown had been as well advised, as he had shown it to have been in respect of a case mentioned on a former evening. On that occasion the hon. gentleman had done him the favour to inform him beforehand, that he meant to bring it forward; and perhaps the hon. gentleman's ill success in that instance, had induced him now to advert to nine or ten cases successively, in the well-grounded belief that he (lord P.) would be less prepared to meet him than upon the isolated case in question. In the year 1734, this prerogative had been admitted, by those who most questioned its propriety, to be vested in the crown. To show its expediency, however, let the House suppose the case of an officer accused of cruelty to part of any hostile population. If he were tried by a court-martial composed of officers, every one of whom had been guilty of the same offence, the consequence would naturally be an acquittal. Would it be improper that the crown should interfere under such a state of things, and do that justice which the court would not do? It was only the other night, on the contrary, that the hon. gentlemen opposite—those gentlemen who always professed themselves the friends of liberty, humanity, and strict justice—complained, in discussing a particular case, that a court-martial had violated its duty by returning too lenient a sentence. Suppose that in that case an acquittal had been returned—would not the crown have been petitioned to revise the sentence of the court? Let them suppose, again, the case of an officer, guilty of some crime cognizable by the civil tribunals of the country—how would the civil law enforce his obedience to its injunctions? Did any one suppose that a constable, with a warrant in one hand, and his staff in the other, would be any thing like a match for a general officer supported by six or seven hundred bayonets? If the views of the hon. gentleman were carried into effect, it would be impossible to enforce the laws by which the army was governed, except by the instrumentality of the army itself. The case of colonel Allen, which had been referred to on a former evening, would afford a clue to the consequence that would result from such a system. Colonel Allen, it would be recollected, demanded to be tried by a court-martial, upon a charge arising out of a complaint made by his commanding officer. It happened, that the colonel was tried, not only upon that particular charge, but also upon two others. Colonel Allen complained of that circumstance, and said that it was gross injustice to try him upon any other charge than that which he had himself desired to be brought to trial upon. He (lord P.) believed that, if the hon. gentleman's clause were agreed to, every officer would, like colonel Allen, object to be tried upon any charges except what they themselves should set up. By acceding to the amendment, the House would create a fourth estate in the kingdom; and convert the army into a power most dangerous to the country. Instead of being subordinate to the proper authorities, and incorporated with the practice of our constitution, the army would be changed into a corps of Mamelukes, which would very soon overthrow the laws, and annihilate all power but their own.

maintained, that the power of dismissing officers without previously bringing them to trial, was a prerogative which the king ought not to possess. He believed that the late emperor of France, and he was certain that the present king of that country did not possess that power. There had been instances recently of distinguished French officers being tried for state offences, and yet retaining their rank. The king of France could refrain from employing military officers, but he could not dismiss them. That could only be done by the sentence of a court-martial. He believed that not even the most despotic governments possessed the power which was said to be vested in the crown of England. He agreed with the noble lord, that the prerogative which was claimed for the king of England ought to be, and generally was, exercised for the interests of the people, and in support of the dignity of the crown: but, there were instances in which great injustice would have been prevented, if officers had been afforded an opportunity of defending themselves before a court-martial. The case of his dear and valued friend (sir R. Wilson) was one of those instances. If that distinguished officer, covered as he was with the honourable rewards which he had earned in so many bloody contests, had been tried by a court-martial, he would have been acquitted; not on account of the considerations to which he had just alluded, but upon the mere merits of the case. So confident was he of the propriety of the conduct of his gallant friend, that he did not hesitate to declare his conviction, that if ministers had known the circumstances of the case before the gallant officer was dismissed, they would not have consented to the proceeding. Sir R. Wilson had committed no offence; his exertions on the day of the queen's funeral had prevented the spilling of blood. Had it not been for his interference, many lives must have been lost, and the city must have been thrown into such a state of confusion, that all the powers of government would have been ineffectual to prevent the most terrible disasters. He trusted that a moment of calm reflection would arrive, when justice would be done his gallant friend by restoring him to the rank which he deserved, and giving to the profession to which he belonged the advantage of possessing so brave, so experienced, and so talented an officer.

was of opinion, that the king's prerogative of dismissing officers from his service was a very necessary one; and lamented that the hon. colonel, in his zeal for the liberties of Englishmen, had not rather turned his attention to the position of the privates, under the existing system of martial law and life enlistment, than to a few possible cases of very inferior hardship.

observed, that the hon. member who spoke last had said, that he thought the king ought to possess the power of dismissing his own officers. Now, he would maintain, that the army was not the servant of the king, but of the state, and that the king was only required, as chief magistrate of the state, to administer justice to it. There was a wide distinction between the power which the king possessed of dismissing his own servants, and that which was claimed for him of dismissing military and naval officers. The noble lord commenced by admitting, that the foundation of all prerogative was utility; but he had failed to show wherein consisted the utility of the particular prerogative in question. The acts to which the noble lord had alluded, were passed at a period when the kingly prerogatives were the subject of dispute between the crown and the people. Since that time many of the prerogatives of the crown had been annulled, and the king now possessed none, except those which were confirmed to him by act of parliament. If that were not the case, why should it be necessary to pass an act of parliament annually to continue those prerogatives? The army existed only by the passing of the bill before the House. If the bill did not pass, there would be no army; and if there were no army, there could be no prerogative over it. The hon. member referred to the Mutiny act of last year, which, he observed, provided, that individuals in the army who committed any of the offences recited in the act, should suffer the punishments that might be awarded by a court-martial: but there was no part of the act which gave to the king the power of cashiering officers. To he sure, the noble lord had said, that by section 35 of the act, the king had the power of establishing articles of war which were to be recognized in all courts of justice, and one of which declared, that the king might dismiss officers: but the noble lord could not fail to know, that in every act of parliament which was passed, provision was made, that no regulations should be framed for carrying the act into effect, which were contrary to the spirit of the act itself. Now, he contended, that the assumed right of cashiering officers was opposed to the spirit of the act. The noble lord had asked how the prerogative could be dispensed with in the case of a mutinous garrison. He would ask the noble lord, in return, of what use the prerogative would be under such circumstances? Mutineers usually placed themselves beyond all power, and listened to nothing but their own will. He therefore thought that the argument of the noble lord upon that point must fall to the ground. There were doubtless advantages and disadvantages attached to both the modes of proceeding with respect to officers—namely, by a dismission by the crown; and by a trial by a court-martial; but he believed that, upon a fair comparison, the balance would be found in favour of the latter. Certainly, nothing could be so bad as the tyranny and cruelty of dismiss sing an individual who, perhaps, had served his country for 30 years, without affording him an opportunity of exculpating himself.

said, that he had now, for the first time, heard it asserted in that House or elsewhere, that the king of Eng- land possessed no prerogatives, except what were granted to him by acts of parliament. The hon. gentleman, with his great legal knowledge, would perhaps condescend to point out the particular acts, nay, the particular sections of the acts, by which a few trifling prerogatives—such, for instance, as the power of making war and peace, and of assembling and dissolving parliament—were secured to the crown. The hon. gentleman had said, that there was nothing in the Mutiny act which gave the king authority to dismiss an officer. Let the hon. gentleman consider how far his argument might be carried. Did he mean to contend, that the king could not dismiss a private soldier for misconduct—that he could not disband a mutinous regiment without bringing every individual in it to trial by a court-martial? If there was any thing in the hon. gentleman's argument, it must go to that extent. He believed that the prerogative in question might be used most beneficially for the public, in cases in which it would be imprudent to subject officers to a trial by a court-martial.

was of opinion, that a prerogative which had been exercised for so long a period, must have some foundation in law. The only objection which he should notice was, that there was danger to the constitution in the assumption of this prerogative. He had frequently heard fears of danger to the constitution, expressed on the opposition side of the House; but, as it appeared to him, the only danger to the constitution, connected with the subject, would arise from the motion of the gallant member, if carried in the affirmative; for he confessed, he could not see a greater source of danger than an army independent of the crown. It had been said, that officers of the army ought to enjoy the same privileges as other subjects. Now, he had spent a great part of his life in the army, and no man could be more anxious than he was for the welfare of the service; but he could not consent to give to it the privilege now sought for; because he thought it would be of no advantage to the officers individually, but would be most dangerous to the country.

could not consent to the motion, but thought that, in cases of dismissal of the nature alluded to, some compensation ought to be given to officers. For his own part, in a corps which he had the honour commanding, he had found great advantage from the power given to colonels of reducing noncommissioned officers to the ranks; and, as that power was not disputed, he did not see why the sovereign should not have a similar power over commissioned officers.

proceeded to reply to the observations of the noble lord made in the former stage of the bill. He contended, that the 13th and 14th of Charles 2nd had nothing to do with the question. If the crown possessed this mighty prerogative, what was the use of passing the Mutiny bill in such a hurry, or what was the use of passing it at all?

considered it irregular for any member to reply directly, in one stage of a bill, to the observations of another member, made in a former stage.

said, it was not strictly regular to reply to a speech made in a former stage; but he thought the hon. member had a clear right to go again into arguments on the general measure.

resumed, and went on to contend, that, by the 37th section of the bill, it was laid down that all officers must be tried by a court-martial for any offence imputed to them, and that dismissal by the crown without such trial was against the spirit and letter of the act referred to.

maintained, that the act Charles 2nd did not confer the prerogative on the crown, but recognized it as pre-existing. The hon. member had asked why press this bill, if the crown had so extensive a prerogative? To this he would reply, that it was necessary, for the sake of discipline, to have a summary mode of punishing offences committed by officers of the army. If the crown did not possess the power of dismissing without a court-martial, then no new enactment was necessary; but such was not the true construction of the 37th section. It said, that it should be lawful for a court-martial to try for certain offences; but it did not interfere with the power of the crown to dismiss without trial. There were many cases, not breaches of the articles of war, which would not only warrant, but require a dismissal without trial. How, for instance, could a man be tried for want of talent?

said, he would submit certain items to the consideration of the committee. These were for the wages of labourers and artificers employed in the dock-yards; next, for the charge of timber and other materials for the building of ships, the charge for pilotage and other contingencies: under this head there was a considerable reduction, which was to be attributed, in a great degree, to the improved and effective state of the navy, and to the prudent reductions that had been made in the different dock-yards. Under the second head, there was also a considerable diminution; there were considerable reductions in the half-pay, and in the widows' pensions; there was, however, an additional charge of 310,000l. for Greenwich hospital. The third part of the estimates was an estimate of the sums paid in the nature of superannuations to reduced officers and clerks. The next charge was for the building and repairing of ships. Upon the whole, there was a reduction, as compared with the estimates of the last year, of 216,864l. 16s. 3d. The amount of the estimates of the last year was 5,480,405l., to which was added 310,000l. for Greenwich hospital, making 5,790,405l. From that sum was, however, to be deducted the amount of the sale of old stores, &c. The amount of the estimates for the present year was 5,442,540l. 6s. 8d., and, as he had already said, there was upon the whole a reduction of 216,864l. 16s. 3d. as compared with the estimates of the preceding year. When it was considered that we had 4,000 men more employed than were employed in the last year, it must give great satisfaction to the House and to the country, that the estimates were considerably lower. But it would give still greater satisfaction, when he stated, that the navy of Great Britain was never in so efficient a state as it was at the present moment. The hon. member concluded by moving, "That 55,406l. 5s. 1d. be granted for Salaries and Contingent Expenses of the Admiralty Office."

said, he understood that the state of the navy now, was not better than it had been three years ago. All the reductions that had been made this year might have been made seven years ago; but, better late than never. The reductions in the dock-yards ought to extend not merely to the workmen, but to every other class. The workmen were hardly dealt with. They had now the same rate of wages that they formerly received; but they were compelled to work ten hours in the day; whereas, they formerly worked but six hours and a half. As to the works in the yards, he was happy to see a reduction of 30,000l., though the expense was still greater than could be wished. He now came to the vote just proposed. Since last year there had been a reduction of 2,000l. in this estimate, on account of the vote of the House, which abolished two of the lords of the Admiralty. It was now 55,406l. From this he should propose to reduce the salaries of paymaster of marines 1,000l., and six clerks 1,770l., and the paymaster of widows' pensions 600l. and the clerk to ditto 80l., in all 3,450l. One assistant to the paymaster of the navy would be amply sufficient to perform all the duties of these establishments. So long ago as 1811 the inutility of these offices had been perceived, and a minute had been directed from the Treasury to the Admiralty, submitting the propriety either of transferring both offices of paymaster of marines and widows' pensions to the treasurer of the navy, or at least of uniting the two first offices. Two years and two months after this minute was issued, the secretary of the Admiralty had replied in a letter, which was too long for hint to read to the House, that the continuance of the offices was warranted by expediency or economy. He should, therefore, propose the reduction of the sum he had mentioned, as well as of the 200l. paid to the secretary of the fund for the relief of widows, the duty of which was done by the secretary of the Admiralty.

said, it was a great mistake to suppose, that the office of paymaster of marines could be abolished with advantage. If the business were transferred to the office of the treasurer of the navy, it would be necessary to appoint a cashier with a considerable salary; so that there would be no saving. It was not alone in making payments that this officer was employed, as the whole of the barracks of the marine corps were under his control. The correspondence which this officer had to keep up, was quite sufficient to employ him and the six clerks. As for the paymaster of widows' pensions, and the secretary to the widows' fund, the management of that fund was vested in a distinct and particular corporation, so that the business of it could not with propriety be transferred to the treasurer of the navy.

said, that the treasurer of the navy was once the paymaster of the widows' pensions. He was of opinion, that the marine barracks might be placed under the same control as the barracks of the military.

said, that the duties of the paymaster of widows' pensions had been greatly increased of late years, not only by the number of pensions being increased ten-fold, but by the payments being made, instead of once, four times a year.

said, he was not aware that his letter of 1813 was so long and tedious, until the hon. gentleman had conclusively proved it to be so, by showing that, diligent as he was, he had never read it. The hon. gentleman said, that in that letter it was affirmed, that the paymaster of widows' pensions had been once the treasurer of the navy. Now, this was not the fact. In that letter it was distinctly stated, that the paymaster of widows' pensions, had been not the treasurer, but the paymaster of the navy. The managers of the widows' fund were, in fact, a separate corporation, who might choose any one as their secretary. They had chosen him, because, from the office he held, he had greater facilities for carrying on the extensive correspondence connected with the business of the fund. The late Mr. Rose had given it as his opinion, that the business of paymaster of widows' pensions might be done by the treasurer of the navy; and so, as far as mere payment was concerned, it undoubtedly might; but this was the least part of the business. The main part was the business of inspection and correspondence. As to the paymaster of marines' office, the hon. gentleman proposed to transfer the business of payment to the treasurer of the navy, and that of the barracks to the ordnance. But, if this were done, an increase of officers would be necessary, so that nothing would be saved. To revert to the secretary ship to the widows' fund—the secretary of the Admiralty had been first appointed to that office in 1754, at a salary of 200l. a year; there were then 300 pensions, and about 4,000l. a year to pay. The salary now remained the same, and the pensions had increased to 4,000, the sum to be paid to 150,000l., and the payments were made, instead of once, four times a year. The House would hardly believe him, when he said, he received from 30 to 40,000 letters a year on the business of that office.

said, he was satisfied that, at the present crisis, four lords of the Admiralty were too few, and should move an addition to the present vote of 1,000l., in order that a salary might be given to a fifth lord. He then referred to the destitute condition of the widows of assistant surgeons of the navy, who were not allowed any pensions; and complained, that, when he had represented the hardship of the case to the secretary for the Admiralty, that gentleman had replied, "You need not trouble yourself on the subject, for greater men than you have taken it into consideration." Unless he obtained a satisfactory answer, he would bring the case of the widows of assistant surgeons under the notice of the House. He should now move, to add 1,000l. to the vote, in order that a fifth lord of the Admiralty might be appointed.

apprehended, that it was impossible to increase the amount of the estimate.

did not see why the committee might not augment, as well as reduce the estimates.

was sorry the hon. baronet, had chosen to remember words which he (Mr. C.) had never spoken, and to forget others which he had uttered. He had told him merely, that the subject had been long under consideration, by a committee of naval men; adding, that if inquiries were made of him (sir F. O.), he might say that he was not responsible, as the matter rested with the lords of the Admiralty.

was opposed to any delay in voting the navy estimates, but would support the amendment.

insisted, that of late years every attempt had been made to grind; the British navy to dust.

said, it was not true, that endeavours had been made, of late years, to grind the navy to dust. On the contrary, five millions were going to be voted for its support, and 4,000 seamen added, to the number hitherto kept up. Englishmen knew that what the gallant admiral had said was unfounded; but what would the French say to such a statement? Did the gallant admiral really think that he had spoken truth? He ought to blush for having made such a statement. He trusted that the gallant admiral would make the amende honorable.

declared, in the face of the House, that the navy of England never was in so naked a state as at present.

begged to remind the House, that they were now called upon to give their last vote for this most important bill. It was necessary for them, however, to pause. The question for them to consider was—Would they, or would they not, reduce taxation? Would they, or would they not, comply with the urgent petitions from all parts of the kingdom, calling on them to reduce taxes to their minimum, and to confine their amount to the positive wants of the country? He objected to the passing of the bill on two grounds: the first, that there was no necessity for a sinking fund; the other, that the proposed plan was not likely to effect its objects. Ever since the demise of Mr. Pitt, there had been the most violent departures from the original principle of the sinking fund. It was because the scheme of an hon. friend of his (sir H. Parnell) went to place any sinking fund that might be established out of the control of ministers, that he gave it a preference over that of the chancellor of the exchequer. How hon. gentlemen, who knew the distress which the country at large was at this moment enduring, could tolerate the principle of raising three millions in taxation above what was absolutely necessary, for the purpose of maintaining public credit, was to him a matter of utter astonishment. Feeling that the bill was most pernicious to the best interests of the public, he should move, as an amendment, "That it be read a third time on that day six months."

said that, looking to the situation in which the country stood, he thought a sinking fund was absolutely necessary for its preservation. If he were asked to adduce one argument stronger than another for the maintenance of such a fund, he should refer to the very beneficial operation effected last year in the reduction of the interest on a portion of the debt—an operation which could not have been achieved but for the keeping up of the sinking fund. Looking to the present state of that fund, he thought that a further operation of a similar beneficial tendency might speedily be effected through its agency. He regretted, that the proposition which was brought forward the other evening, to limit and confine the sinking fund to the amount of the positive surplus of income over expenditure, was not carried. The balance of 2,000,000l. on the dead charge, as it had been called, was, he felt no hesitation in saying, one of the greatest juggles that was ever attempted to be practised in that House; and after the merited ridicule which it had received, he had hoped that ministers would have given it up. If it were practicable to make an alteration in the bill to that effect, he should certainly vote for that alteration; but if he was obliged to take the whole bill as it was, or reject it, then, believing a sinking fund essential for the preservation of the credit of this country, he should vote for the original motion.

said, he was anxious to do away the error into which his hon. friend had, fallen, in attributing to the operation of the sinking fund that rise in the 5 per cents, which had enabled the finance minister last year to effect their reduction. It was evident, that there could be no real sinking fund but that which arose from a surplus revenue. The chancellor of the exchequer had, on a late occasion, brought down to the House the official returns of the amount of the sinking fund, from the 5th Jan. 1816, to the 5th Jan. 1823. So far, however, was the right hon. gentleman's. statement, that the reduction of the 5 per cents had been effected through the operation of the sinking fund, in raising the funds, from being borne out by the facts contained in those papers, that they were completely contradicted by them. In 1816, the revenue was 77,133,281l., the expenditure 83,896,768l. In 1817, the revenue was 57,650,589l., the expenditure 58,544,049l. It thus appeared, that in those two years, there was an excess of expenditure over the income derived from taxation, of 7,656,947l. In the next four years, 1818, 1819, 1820, and 1821, there was in each year a small surplus of income over expenditure. The aggregate of the six years was, of income, 373,590,658l.; and of expenditure, 372,822,437l., being an excess of revenue of only 768,221l. To that sum must be added a balance of loans funded in 1815, and brought over to 1816, amounting to 5,939,803l.; as also an excess of charge amounting to 2,856,862l. which had crept into the finance accounts of the expenditure of 1816. The total surplus, therefore, was 9,564,886l. of income over expenditure in the six years, which, if it had been applied in the simplest and most direct way in reducing the debt, would have effected a diminution in the annual charge exceeding 500,000l. per annum; whilst, on the other hand, by the very complicated system followed of raising loans, issuing exchequer bills, and afterwards funding them to the extent of 57 millions, exclusive of 36 millions borrowed from the sinking fund, and thus transferring and retransferring about 120 millions of capital, instead of any diminution, although there had been an actual diminution of charge within the six years in question to the amount of about 230,000l. per annum, by the expiry of life and other terminable annuities, and of 941,500l. per annum, by the reduced rate of interest at which exchequer bills had been issued—notwithstanding all these circumstances, the charge on the debt, funded and un funded together, for the year 1821, considerably exceeded the charge for any preceding year. By the papers on the table, it appeared, that in 1816, when there was an excess of expenditure to the amount of 6,763,487l., the chancellor of the exchequer gave the commissioners of the sinking fund the sum of 13,047,317l., with which they relieved stock to the extent to which it would go; although it was evident, that the deficiency of income ought first to have been supplied. In 1817, the excess of expenditure over income was 893,460l. Still, however, the chancellor of the exchequer gave 13,555,722l. to be employed by the commissioners of the sham sinking fund. In 1818, though the surplus of revenue over expenditure was only 1,795,513l. the chancellor of the exchequer gave the commissioners 14,418,295l. In 1819 the chancellor of the exchequer gave the commissioners for the reduction of the debt 9,285,677l.; in 1820, 4,101,025l. and in 1821, 4,324,574l.; so that, during the six years to which he had referred, the chancellor of the exchequer enabled the commissioners of the sinking fund to purchase stock to the amount of 58,732,610l., although the actual surplus in those six years, was no more than 9,564,886l. The fact was, that the chancellor of the exchequer had created a new debt of 57,500,000l. to enable him to make up the money which he had given to the commissioners. How was it possible that such a proceeding could have any beneficial effect on public credit, or the price of the funds? With regard to the present measure, it was precisely the same in principle (although on a smaller scale), as the system which had led to the results that he had stated; and he therefore gave it his decided opposition. He was convinced that, until all the different interests of the country had recovered sufficiently to bear the taxation at present imposed upon them, we ought to abstain from adopting any sinking fund at all; so that at present, he was averse even to the application of the 3,000,000l. of real surplus to that purpose. Whenever a real surplus should be so applied, it ought to be in converting permanent into long annuities, so as to afford the prospect of an actual cancelling of a portion of the debt.—But, he had a more serious objection to make to the bill than any he had yet stated. It called on the chancellor of the exchequer to pay 5,000,000l. to the commissioners of the sinking fund, even if the surplus revenue should not exceed 500,000l. The consequence therefore, in that event would be, that the chancellor of the exchequer must go into the market, with exchequer bills, to raise money to supply the deficiency. In fact, the whole of the late vicious system would be travelled over again. He could show, by accurate calculations, that if there had been no sinking fund during the last five years, the country would have been subjected to a charge of only about 28,530,000l. for that which cost it about 31,392,000l. But for the hocus pocus of the sinking fund, the country would have been less in debt at the present moment by the difference between those two sums. He called upon the House, therefore, to pause before they agreed to the bill.

said, that the hon. member seemed to assume, that he (the chancellor of the exchequer) had, on a former occasion, affirmed, that the reduction which had taken place in the funded and unfunded debt, and in the charge which they imposed upon the country, had been entirely owing to the sinking fund. Now, he had affirmed no such thing. His argument was simply this—that, if the House took the amount of the funded and unfunded debt on the 5th of Jan. 1816, they would find, that it was 864,000,000l.: that if they took the amount of the funded and unfunded debt on the 5th Jan. 1823, they would find that it was 840,000,000l.; it followed, therefore, as a necessary consequence, that in the course of the seven years, by some process or other, there had been an actual reduction of debt to the amount of 24,000,000l. But he had never said that 'this reduction was entirely owing to the operation of the sinking fund. On the contrary, he knew that it was not so. But he did maintain, that by some operation or another, there had been a reduction to that amount made during the last seven years. Why, then, should they now decide against carrying that reduction still further? The measures adopted by government had enabled them both to provide for the reduction of the debt, and to lessen the burthens of the people, and, therefore, ought to be persevered in.

did not rise with the intention of denying that a reduction of the amount of the debt had been effected. That did not appear to be the question at issue. The hon. member for Aberdeen merely wished to show, that no reduction of debt had been caused by the operation of the sinking fund; and, if the clear statement of the hon. member had failed to convince the House of that fact, it would be useless for him to attempt, to do so. He regretted that his hon. friend had proposed to postpone the third reading of the bill for six months. He thought that a delay of six weeks would afford the House sufficient time to determine what measures it would be necessary to adopt. He still thought, that more good would result to the country from the remission of taxes, to the amount of the sinking fund, than from the maintenance of that fund; but, as the feeling of the House was against him, he would not trouble them with one word more respecting it. He would confine himself to the amount of the surplus revenue over expenditure; and that brought him back to the dispute of a former night, as to whether the surplus was 5,00000l. or 3,000,000l., and whether the operation proposed to be performed on what was called the dead weight, would furnish 2,000,000l. to be applied to the redemption of the debt. He implored the House to consider those questions maturely. He believed the chancellor of the exchequer, whatever ne- cessity he might suppose to exist for the maintenance of a sinking fund, would not desire to have one which did not consist of a real surplus of income. He (Mr. T.) would contend, that, according to the papers before the House, the sinking fund consisted of only 3,000,000l., and that there was no surplus revenue beyond that amount. The answer which the chancellor of the exchequer had given to him on a former evening, appeared to have been satisfactory to the House. He had understood the right hon. gentleman to say, that, by his new plan, with respect to the half pay and pensions, the sum of 2,000,000l. would annually be saved to the country; that, in fact, instead of paying the whole amount of the pensions and half pay, as at present, the sum of 2,800,000l. would be spread over a surface of 45 years, in the payment of annuities, which would leave 2,000,000l. available in the hands of parliament, for any purpose which might be considered proper, and which might, therefore, be applied to the reduction of the debt. That being the case, nothing in the way of benefit could result from the operation. Dealing in round numbers, he might say, that 5,000,000l. was, at present, to be paid to persons who had claims upon the government in the shape of pensions and half pay; and, it should be remembered, that 2,800,000l. was, by act of parliament, provided out of the sinking fund, for the payment of those claims: that would leave about 2,000,000l. to be provided for. The chancellor of the exchequer said, that he would make an arrangement with the parties, by which they should accept annuities for the term of 45 years, instead of receiving the two millions which would be left in his hands. With these two millions the right hon. gentleman proposed to go into the market, and purchase perpetual annuities in the three per cents. Now, how it could, be maintained, that these two millions were not borrowed, he could not understand; and he was equally at a loss to perceive, how a single shilling could be saved to the country by the operation, more than would have been obtained by continuing to pay off dead weight as it was paid at present. By passing the bill, the House would be sanctioning two things, as much opposed to each other as black was to white. He could not perceive the wisdom or the efficacy of the plan. If a person, having claims upon his estate to the amount of 2,000l., should burthen his property with annuities for 45 years, and employ the 2,000l., which would be thus set at liberty, in improving his estate, by digging a canal, or by other means, he would act wisely; but, if the same person employed the money in the redemption of another debt, he would gain nothing by the operation; in fact, he would lose, in consequence of having to pay for stamp duties, and the employment of lawyers. The effect of agreeing to the bill, would be to prevent the House from taking off any more taxes; and yet, when the chancellor of the exchequer's plan was first introduced, it was supported on the ground that it would of rd an opportunity for the reduction of taxation. He hoped, therefore, that the House would agree with him as to the necessity of confining the sinking fund to 3,000,000l., and not give the chancellor of the exchequer the other 2,000,000l., which would not advance the redemption of the debt at all. He entreated gentlemen who desired to see a further reduction of taxation effected, not to let slip the only opportunity which now remained of attaining their object. The House had acted wrong in approving of the plan with respect to the dead weight, because the principle of it was directly in the teeth of that of the sinking fund; but, having done so, in the name of God, let them stick to it. For his own part, he should not consider himself at liberty to vote for the repeal of a single tax after the passing of the bill.

expressed his satisfaction at finding, that after the numerous discussions which had taken place on this question, there were so many gentlemen favourable to the principle of' maintaining a sinking fund. He was glad to find that even the right hon. member who spoke last, as well as the hon. member for Portarlington, had in some measure come round to the opinion, that it was necessary to possess a sinking fund composed of the surplus revenue, to be applied to the reduction of the debt; the last hon. member's main objection to it, arising out of a fear that it would operate as a temptation to extravagance on the part of ministers. But, ministers could not touch the sinking fund without the consent of that House. It was not fair to charge ministers with extravagance, for having, on former occasions, with the consent of the House, disposed of portions of the sinking fund in a manner most con- ducive to the interests of the country. An available sinking fund was necessary to the public credit; and unless they acted on that principle, they would place the country in a situation which would prevent them from acting with promptness and energy, in the event of any future contest. It was to the punctuality with which public credit had always been supported, that this country owed the elevation to which she had risen. He would admit, that the real surplus of income over expenditure, after deducting the taxes remitted, amounted only to 3,000,000l.; and he would admit, that the other 2,000,000l. which were to be added to the sinking fund, were not derived from surplus revenue, but the operation with respect to the half-pay, which had been described by the right hon. gentleman. The country had to pay annually 4,800,000l. for the half-pay and pensions; and by the plan of last year, annuities were granted for the term of 45 years, by which 2,000,000l. a-year would be set at liberty, and applied to the redemption of debt. The hon. member for Portarlington had asked, from time to time, why not apply the money us the lives dropped in? The hon. baronet had answered that question, by showing, that it would be more advantageous to obtain possession of the whole sum by one operation. It had been objected, that the plan would prevent the remission of taxation. So far from that being the case, the very recommendation of the plan was, that it enabled the House to relieve the country from taxes, to the amount of the sum which would be saved in consequence of its being carried into effect. So far from the plan tying up the discretion of parliament with respect to the remission of taxation, parliament bad already taken advantage of the opportunity which it afforded for the remission of taxation, and had thus in a manner pledged itself to the support of the plan. He believed that, in future, the true principle of a sinking fund would be adhered to. He could not concur in the gloomy anticipations of the rapacity of ministers with respect to the sinking fund. It was not probable that circumstances would again rise, which would induce parliament to depart from the principle laid down in 1792, with regard to the sinking fund. If the war had terminated in 1798 or 1799, which was about the ordinary duration of wars, that principle would never have been broken in upon. He wished the House to consider what would be the consequence of postponing the bill for six months. According to the law as it stood, the government would be obliged to supply the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt with 4,000,000l. to be applied to the purchase of stock between the 5th of April and the 5th of July. In order to do that, they would be obliged to borrow money; and thus would they be thrown back to the old system of raising loans, which had been so properly condemned.

contended, that the sinking fund, as it was proposed to be applied, was not calculated for an effective reduction of debt. We had, since the year 1816, had 9,000,000l. of surplus, and no reduction of debt; and indeed the experience of the last thirty years clearly proved, that we had no effective sinking fund. As far as a sinking fund went, he thought the plan of the hon. baronet a sound and just one; for it would tie it up from the hands of ministers, who had already abused it. A great objection to the bill was, that it would, to a certain degree, prevent the remission of taxes.

said, he had some difficulty as to the vote which he should give on this occasion. He was favourable to the principle of a sinking fund, but he could not see the justice or policy of making that sinking fund appear more than it really was. It was now admitted, that we had only a sinking fund of three and not one of five millions. This plan was not the offspring of the present chancellor of the exchequer. It had a nearer relation—his predecessor in office—who had left the child at his door, and he believed the right hon. gentleman would be much obliged to the House if it would enable him to throw the baby, basket and all, into the river. With respect to the plan of the hon. baronet, he thought it would not have been a bad one, if it had been applied to the reduction of the 5 per cents last year; but it could not be applied to the 3 per cents without the consent of the holders of stock; which could not be well calculated upon, because there would be a difficulty of selling the new stock in the market. In order to encourage purchasers, some advantage must be held out; and, in that case, less money would be obtained than if government laid out its stock otherwise. But suppose some advantage gained by it, would it not be counterbalanced by the loss of that simplicity in the public accounts which was so desirable, but which could not be continued in the new plan? He did not wish to see the bill pass in its present complicated form. If the motion was negatived, he would then take the sense of the House on limiting the sinking-fund to three millions; and then he hoped the chancellor of the exchequer would be prepared to give up altogether, or defend, the child of his predecessor. It was true that, besides the three millions, the public had a beneficial interest in the life-annuities for 45 years, which would be increasing yearly; and he had no objection to a value being set upon it, even of the sum stated; but he could not consent to see it now made that which it was not in reality—a surplus which should be calculated upon as real sinking fund.

observed, that he had not said, that we had only three millions applicable to the debt, but that we had only an excess of three millions of taxes paid into the exchequer; but he did say, that if the proposed plan were adopted, we should have a sinking fund of five millions.

said, that he felt great delight at the admissions which had at length been made, as to the real amount of the sinking fund now in the exchequer. That pleasure, however, was somewhat qualified, by finding that the House was now called upon to augment this real sum of three millions to the sum of five millions. The chancellor of the exchequer, a few evenings ago, had said, that he did not think there was any hocus pocus in his plan. The House, after that declaration, could scarcely expect to be called on to vote that there was at present a surplus of five millions. An act of parliament could not create a surplus where it was not. As to the objection which had been made against the plan of the hon. baronet, that it might not be agreed to by the holders of the 3 per cents, it had much weight. The plan of the hon. baronet did not presume any such consent. He only proposed, that a trial should be made whether or not the public would consent to it. He proposed to convert a certain sum, say 50,000,000l. from 3 per cents to 4 per. cents. Why should not ministers try the experiment? The public opinion would thereby be ascertained. They did not want grounds for estimating the probable event of that plan. There were then long annuities in the market, of which 37 years remained unexpired. Taking them at 4 per cent at 19 years purchase, they would be worth 75 or 76. If ministers, therefore, could go to market to sell the 4 per cent annuities at 37 years for 76, they might buy 100l. three per cents at less than 76. It was said, that we had reduced 24 million of debt since 1816. Any one would imagine, in the way this was put, that the reduction was the effect of the sinking fund. It was no such thing. The reduction was occasioned by changing one kind of stock into another. We thus lessened the capital, but we did not diminish the charge; except to a very trifling amount. He would prefer being without any sinking fund, to one upon the plan now proposed; and he was sure, that if we were, public credit would not suffer. He would therefore support the amendment, and if that were negatived, then he would support the proposition of his hon. friend (Mr. Baring.)

thought there was much inconsistency in the measure before the House. He did not see how he could vote against the bill, seeing that it got rid of the old machinery of the sinking fund, which was so objectionable; at the same time, he did not wish to support that part of the plan, which presumed a surplus of two millions where it did not exist. The best way would be to postpone the measure for six weeks.

said, that understanding that when the Speaker left the chair, it was the intention of the hon. gentleman opposite to bring forward the ordnance estimates, he should take the opportunity of calling the attention of the House to a point very intimately connected with them. Gentlemen would have observed, that in those estimates there was an item of 24,412l. for the erection and repair of fortifications and other public works in Barbadoes. As it had repeatedly fallen to his lot to call the attention of the House to this subject, he should confine: himself on the present occasion to a repetition of the main facts and arguments which he had formerly advanced, and should leave it to the House to judge, whether it was right to ask the impoverished people of this country to grant a sum of money for this item, when a fund existed that was specifically applicable to it, and that could not be diverted from it, except by a breach of trust and a positive violation of the law. It was well known, that in 1663, the colonial legislature of Barbadoes passed an act, by which it was enacted, that for the purpose "of maintaining the reparation of the forts, the building of a sessions house and a prison, and all other public charges incumbent on the government there, an impost or custom upon all dead commodities of the growth of the said island, and to be shipped off the same, should be paid to his majesty, his heirs and successors for ever, after the following rate or manner—that is to say, four and a half in specie for every five score." Now, it clearly appeared from this enactment, that the duties raised in consequence of it, were applicable to the repair of forts and public works, and to no other object. The duties for some time were applied to the purposes for which they were granted; but, somehow or other it happened, that before the close of the reign of Charles 2nd, they began to be considered as a part of the small private revenues of the crown, and to be used for defraying the expenditure of the royal household. The error which was thus committed was, however, corrected early in the reign of queen Anne. When she came to the throne, a petition was presented to the House of Commons, from the planters of the island of Barbadoes, stating the original act of 1663, and the misapplication of the fund created by it, and praying, at the same time, for the restitution of it to the original purpose; and this petition being taken into consideration by the House of Commons, hey presented an address to her majesty, praying that these duties might be appropriated to the purposes for which they were originally intended; and in answer to that petition, her majesty informed the House, by a special message, that she would issue the necessary directions to carry the prayer of its petition into effect.—The hon. member then read the address of the House and her majesty's answer to it. By an act passed in the first year of queen Anne's reign, for the settlement of her revenue, these duties were excepted out of the act. Why, then, was the country to be called upon to provide for fortifications, for which there already existed a fund specifically applicable? These funds were now applied to the payment of certain pensions granted to ministers and their dependents in this country; and the first ground of defence which had been formely urged for them by the right hon. knight of the Bath (sir C. Long), who was himself a pretty large pensioner upon them, was, that when his late majesty came to the throne, and a new arrangement was made with him, by which 800,000l. a year was granted him to meet the expenses of the civil list, on his giving up to the nation his hereditary revenues, the act which ratified that arrangement, and contained a list of those revenues which his majesty gave up, did not contain any mention of this branch of them. Why, how could it contain any mention of it? The funds in question had been given up long before; and therefore it would have been absurd and useless to have said any thing about them in that act. The second ground on which the right hon. knight of the Bath had rested his defence of the present application of the fund to the payment of his own and. other pensions, was, that very great and illustrious characters, such as lord Chatham and Mr. Burke, had not disdained to receive them from the same quarter; and, therefore, that there was nothing wrong in his being one also. That mode of reasoning, if indeed it deserved the name of reasoning, had never been heard in any other place except in that House. What would the courts of law say to any man, who, being sued for wrongful holding of another man's estate, should attempt to defend himself by declaring, that he was not the only person who held an estate by such an illegal tenure—that there were great men, my lord A. and Mr. B. for instance, who had, each of them, possession of a larger property by the same kind of fraud; and that, as such was the case, there could be no harm in his refusing to give up the property which he had so acquired? The man who used such language in a court of law would not be listened to for a moment; and, if he was not treated us an idiot or madman, might think himself very well treated indeed. He should ever, contend, that unless better argument was employed, than any which he had yet heard from the advocates of this pension fund, the fund ought not to be used for the purposes to which it was now applied. The House had not long since, in its pure, love of justice and morality, as it would appear, passed an act of parliament, creating a commission, with no other object than to inquire into such breaches of trust us had been made in the various private charitable endowments and institutions in this country. Why, was there ever such a barefaced exhibition of cant and hypocrisy as this? To be gratuitously, hunting after breaches of trust, by persons who might be bonâ fide ignorant of the conditions annexed to their estates by the original founders, and yet wilfully far shut our eyes to this open breach of a trust, created specifically and public by law, and when the breach or diversion Of; the funds was made expressly in favour of our own members. After reading the preamble in question, the hon. member proceeded to observe, that the application of the 4½ per cent duties, from the repair of the fortifications in Barbadoes, the only object which was contemplated by the grantees of them, to the payments of pensions in England (an object of which they had never so much as dreamed), was as gross a breach of trust as any that he ever recollected to have heard or read of; and that the House was bound to remedy it immediately, if it did not wish to be deemed guilty of a mere affectation of morality; for in this case they had a positive law, as clear and distinct as law could be, specifically applying the monies which it gave authority to levy, to certain fixed and definite purposes. To those purposes they had now for many years ceased to be applied; and yet, though they had been called upon repeatedly to put a stop to the shameful practice by which they were misapplied, they had shown no desire to amend the breach of trust which he had so often reprobated before them. They were bound to amend it, not less by the regard which they ought to feel for their character as a body, than by that which they ought to feel for their honour as individuals. The case was of the most clear and irresistible nature; and sure he was, that it could not fail in any other place than in the House of Commons; and that it could only fail there, because its members were not the real representatives of the sentiments of the country. After reminding the House of lord Clarendon's declaration, that the people's affections did not begin to be alienated from Charles 1st until they saw the judges acting corruptly in questions of property, so he said in this case, as long as the house should continue in its course of diverting the fund from its public purpose to their own individual advantage, so long would the affections of the people be more and more alienated from that assembly, and more deeply impressed would they become, that it had no pretension to be considered as the real repesentatives of the people. The hon. member concluded with moving, "That it appears to this House, from the estimates laid before it, for the service of the Ordnance, for the present year, there is a sum of 24,412l. for erecting and repairing fortifications in the Island of Barbadoes. "That by an act of the colonial assembly of Barbadoes, which was passed in the year 1663, it was enacted, that, for the purpose of 'maintaining the reparation of the forts, the building of a sessions house and a prison, and all other public charges incumbent upon the government there, an impost or custom upon all dead commodities, of the growth of the said island, and to be shipped off the same, should be paid to his majesty, his heirs and successors for ever, after the following rate or manner, that is to say, four and a half in specie, for every five score.' "That it further appears, from the Journals of this House, that in the first year of the reign of her majesty queen Anne, a petition was presented to it from the planters and merchants concerned in the island of Barbadoes, setting forth the colonial act of barbadoes before referred to, and praying 'That the said duty of four and a half per centum might be applied to the reparation and building of fortifications, and defraying all charges incident to the government there, as the same was originally intended, instead of being diverted to other purposes, as the same then was:' and that, in consequence of such petition, this House did address her majesty queen Anne, praying that this duty might be restored to the purposes for which it was created by the colonial act of Barbadoes; and that this House was informed, by a message from her majesty, that she would give such directions accordingly. "That, notwithstanding such specific application of this fund, by the colonial act of Barbadoes, to the building and repairing of fortifications in that island, and notwithstanding the recognition of that law by this House, and by her majesty queen Anne, this fund is now for the most part consumed by pensioners in this country, including even members of this House, or their families; whilst the fortifications and other public works of Barbadoes are left to be maintained by money raised from taxes on the people; and that, under all the circumstances above stated, and adverting likewise to the afflicting condition of a great portion of these kingdoms, this House considers it to be alike due to its own character and to the feelings of the people, humbly to request his majesty to give directions, that this fund of four and a half per centum, in the island of Barbadoes, may be again restored to the original purposes for which it was created."

said, it was an error to suppose, that the sum mentioned in the ordnance estimates, was for the erecting and repairing of any buildings to which the act of the colonial assembly could be applied. Not one penny of the ordnance grant in question went to defray the expense of buildings provided for by the act of the colonial assembly. The buildings mentioned in this act were a council-house, a chamber, a session-house, and a prison. But the sum in the ordnance estimate was required for repairing the ordnance wharf, for building storehouses, and other similar purposes, never contemplated at the time of passing the act of the colonial assembly. Various expenses were incurred by government at Barbadoes, in consequence of making it, the head quarters; distinct from any expenses the colonial assembly had contemplated; and to cover these, the grant in question was to be applied.

said, that the act of 1663 was a kind of commutation, to enable the king to maintain the public works before kept up by the inhabitants. No time could be more proper, than the present for bringing this subject under the notice of the House. If the people were to be continually burthened by new charges, when the expenses were already provided for by the colonies, there was no extravagance to which the House might not go. It would be better for England to be destitute of colonies, than to be subjected to the enormous expense entailed on us by them. They were a mere drain on the country.

said, that the act of the colonial assembly did not contemplate the present expense. The object of that act was merely the defence of the island. Since then a naval arsenal had been established; the expense incurred by which, could not be provided for out of the 4½ per cent fund. The 4½ per cent duty was given to the king for confirming titles to estates, and in consequence of his relinquishing another duty, without annexing any conditions to giving it up. In the same year, the islands of Nevis, Montserrat, and St. Christopher made similar grants to the king, without any condition whatever. In the reign of king William, lord Somers had consented that the duty in question should form part of the civil list. What queen Anne had done, on the petition of the inhabitants of Barbadoes, was all matter of grace. For a century, the proceeds had been applied as at present, and accounts laid annually before the House. Mr. Burke, when he regulated the civil list, had expressly taken this fund into his consideration. It was misleading the House to say that the money was appropriated by stealth, and that the public knew nothing of the mode in which it was expended.

said, it was absurd to contend, that the fund had not been diverted from its original purpose. He denied that the 4½ per cent was granted for any purpose but to defray the public charges of the island. The fund had been extorted from the inhabitants of Barbadoes; and, though continued for a century, it was still nothing but extortion. It was not possible to read the act, and say that 24,000l. would not be saved to the people, if the duty were properly applied.

said, that the argument of the hon. gentleman proved too much. If it were true, that the 4½ per cent duties had been extorted, they ought to be restored unconditionally; but still it would be necessary, that the House should vote the 24,412l. for the maintenance of the public works. The precedent for the present application of the fund was of a hundred years standing, and was not to be overturned because gentlemen talked of reform, and the danger of driving people to distraction by excessive taxation. Would the hon. gentleman say, that in 1660, the present circumstances of Barbadoes could have been foreseen? Was it then known that its geographical situation would make it the head quarters of all the forces stationed in those islands? The gentlemen opposite contended, that every island ought to support itself. Would they assert, that Barbadoes ought to pay expenses incurred for the general benefit? The sum stated in the estimate was to cover expenses not provided for by the act of the colonial assembly.

said, that before he moved the Ordnance Estimates in the order in which they were usually voted, he should merely observe, that there was a diminution of expenditure in every item except one, in which there was an increase of 776l. beyond the sum voted last year. He should confine himself, at present, to stating the several items, with the amount of diminution. In the ordinaries the sum was 460,334l., being 13,102l. less than the sum voted last year. The extraordinaries were 269,464l., being 23,279l. less than last year. Under the head of unprovided, there was a small increase of 776l. Under the head of superannuated military, the sum was 318,152l., being 1,599l. less than last year; under that of superannuated civil, the sum was 50,074l., being 1,478l. less than last year. For Ireland, the sum was 90,313l., being 6,316l. less than last year. The whole sum required, was 1,109,000l., being 45,000l. less than last year. From this sum there were to be deducted 38,000l. small savings upon various items of the extraordinaries for 1820 and 1821, and 91,000l. for the presumed sale of old stores, land, &c., making a total of 129,000l., being 85,000l. more than the credit for last year; and the sum to be voted this year was, therefore, 130,000l. less than the total of last year. He then moved, "That 48,027l. be granted for the expense of the Establishments at the Tower and Pall-mall."

declared, that a reduction of 4 per cent upon the whole cost of the ordnance department was not such as the country had a right to expect. With re- spect to the grant before the House, he objected that arrangements, so long since recommended by the commissioners of military inquiry, had not yet been carried into execution. As for the board of ordnance, he looked upon it to be quite as great a fallacy as the sinking fund; nor did he see any symptoms of a return to the standard of 1796. What could be the use of separating the two establishments of the Tower and Pall-mall, when a considerable saving might be effected by uniting them? Why should twenty persons be employed as porters, doorkeepers, or messengers? He objected to the great freedom used in giving gratuities, often equal to the amount of the salaries received.

objected to the unnecessary expense of the establishments at Waltham Abbey and Faversham, which had cost the country 150,000l. in the last ten years, and where little or no gunpowder had been manufactured. The inspector of gunpowder had been appointed since the peace, and lived at Faversham, where no gunpowder whatever was made.

said, it was true that the manufacture of gunpowder was no longer carried on at Faversham; but that establishment was continued because there were facilities at Faversham, which there were not at Waltham Abbey. The reason why the inspector lived at Faversham was, that there was a house at that establishment, and not at Waltham Abbey. With regard to the laboratory, be thought that the House would not object to the trifling expense of that establishment, while there was a prospect of accomplishing the ingenious projects which his hon. friend (sir W. Congreve) had conceived, of regenerating damaged gunpowder, in all cases in which it had not come into contact with sea-water.

said, it appeared to be the system that, in every place, the clerks and officers should get palaces, without regard to the expense which they cost; and, unless the house should compel them to sell off the whole of these unnecessary palaces, such would continue to be the system. He had in his hand a list of no fewer than 485 of these houses.

said, he would not repeat the objections he had offered last year to this item of charge: but should move, as an amendment, that the sum be reduced 15,000l.

adverted to the inexpediency of lessening the number of such a corps of officers as the artillery, who were obliged to go through a regular course of education and science to qualify them for their profession. He had the authority of the duke of Wellington against any reduction of officers.

said, he attached no importance to what the duke of Wellington might say on such a subject. The noble duke had said, that there was not a man more than was necessary for the service; and yet, notwithstanding this declaration, he had discharged to the right and left. He would not give a fig for such authority. He did not propose, by the present reduction, to deprive the regiment of either men or science. He merely proposed to effect a saving, by a different mode of brigading.

said, the noble duke had stated, that he could not do with a man less on the then estimates; but had added, that he had prospective views of reduction. These views he had since carried into effect.