said, that the petition had been carried by a large majority in a court which was fully attended. The fact was, that neither the freeholders of London or Southward were represented at present in that House. With the present number of members it was impossible that the interests of their constituents could be properly attended to.

said, he very well recollected having given his feeble support to the celebrated petition for parliamentary reform brought up in 1792, and in all he had ever heard upon the subject, from that time up to the present, he had never heard the arguments of the petition answered. It was very truly said, that the metropolitan freeholders were not represented in any tolerable proportion to their wealth, population, and intellect. The members of the city and borough could not possibly know whom they represented. About 11,000 persons, scattered over all parts of the country, elected the members for the city of London, which contained some hundreds of thousands. The possession of a freehold in any of the other cities gave the owner a vote for the city. Now, he had held a pretty considerable freehold in the city of London for nearly half a century, and he had never been allowed to vote for the city. He hoped that the House would listen to the prayer of the petition.

could never promise his support to any measure of parliamentary reform until brought forward in a tangible shape, by way of complaint against some stated grievance or abuse.

thought, that the reform of the petitioners began at the wrong end. They should first reform themselves.

said, that though he had not thought it expedient to agitate the question this session, he had not abandoned it, but intended early in the next session, to submit a motion upon the subject; as he considered a reform of parliament equally necessary to the protection of the people and the security of the House.

said, that the monied men who were in the habit of making advances on goods, and who were the prinpal supporters of the bill, had no reason for introducing it into the House; because, when they made their advances, they had always the means of ascertaining whether the property which was pledged to them, was really vested in the party pledging it. Foreign countries held out the same security to Englishmen sending their goods thither for sale, as we, by this bill, were about to deprive foreigners of in England. He would ask merchants whether they would willingly consign goods to the continent, if the agents to whom they were consigned were allowed to pawn them; and, in the event of the failure of those agents, to be deprived of their property? The bill was calculated to destroy the warehousing trade of the country.

said, if he thought the bill injurious to the commerce of the country, and to the warehousing system, he certainly should not give it his support. But he was convinced it would have a contrary effect. The question was very material as it affected the commercial law of the country, and the committee of the last session, which had inquired into this part of the practice of our foreign commerce, had made a report on the subject which contained a great deal of curious information. He had, however, not suddenly formed a determination on that report, but had reserved to himself to consider the question during I the recess. If this had been a legal question simply, or if it had been a practical question of trade, he should not have deemed himself competent to the forming a decided opinion on it. But it was in reality a great question of commercial policy, in determining which, neither the technicalities of the law, nor the details of the practice of trade, were of much concern. It was certainly not to be denied, that whatever obligations existed between principal and agent, or, as it was technically called, between merchant and factor, should be strictly observed, and that if the agent exceeded the powers delegated to him by his principal, he should be severely visited; but, in the consideration of the present bill, this was not the question. The point at issue was, what should be done with the third party who advanced money on goods pawned to him by the agent who had the possession and the ostensible property of them? It was quite clear that an agent, to whom goods were committed for custody, exceeded his powers if he pawned or sold them, and should be punished for such an abuse of confidence. But if the possession, on the part of the agent, were accompanied by all the symbols of property, it was not fit that a third party, who had trusted to those symbols, should suffer. What did the principal do? He selected his agent, and entrusted him with the power of shewing an appearance of property. If he selected an unfaithful agent (though it was proper that the agent should be punished for his infidelity), was it not also proper, that the principal, rather than a third party, should bear the consequences of the acts of the agent, over whose selection that third party had no control? It was said, indeed, that the possession of personal effects was no evidence of property, except as to goods sold in open market. This might be sufficient in the early stages of society, when transactions were few, open, and conclusive. But all business was carried on by credit. A merchant who sent from Ireland to the continent his butter or his other goods, obtained an advance immediately on his consignment. It was always in his power, by the bill of lading, to limit the power of the agent, so that the agent really possessed no power but what the principal chose to impart to him. But, if the bill of lading was of such equivocal import as to convey to third parties the idea that the absolute property was vested in the agent, on the principal surely the loss should fall.—If the House would take the trouble to read the cases in the report of the committee, it was impossible, he thought, to refuse coming to a decision in favour of the bill. One case was as follows; a merchant bought a quantity of seed from another, and requested the seller to allow it to remain in his warehouse. This was complied with, and after some time the purchaser asked the person in whose warehouse it was deposited, if he had any objection to advance 2,000l. on the seed? The person so applied to, knowing that the seed had not changed hands since the sale, and that it was worth more than 2,000l. advanced the money; the purchaser, after receiving that sum, became a bankrupt: the holder of the seed was about to sell it to cover the advance, when a third party stept in (a merchant at Antwerp), who said, "the purchaser has been acting as a factor for me: he had no power to pledge the seed." The court decided in his favour, and the 2,000l. advanced under such circumstances, and on the faith of such evidence of property, was lost. The existing law had been found so inconvenient, that the courts had deemed it necessary to make an exception in respect to bills of exchange and Exchequer bills deposited in the hands of bankers. A bill of lading, accompanied by the possession of the goods, was such a symbol of property, that a third party dealing bona fide with the possessor of the goods, and having no means of ascertaining whether he was not the owner, ought to be legally protected. The agent was selected by the owner, who had consequently the means of guarding himself against the possibility of the document which he placed in the hands of the agent being misapplied; while the third party had no possibility of ascertaining the extent of the agent's responsibility. The owner of the goods had the power of selecting his agent—he had the power of punishing him for misconduct—he had the power of restraining the negociability of the instruments with which he was intrusted. Was it fair or equitable, therefore, that a third party should suffer for misconduct of an agent, against which it was impossible for that third party to provide, but which might be guarded against by the discretion of the owner? The hon. member had said, that the warehousing system would be rendered inefficient if this bill were suffered to pass into a law. Now, he was so far from acquiescing in this opinion, that he thought the warehousing system would be wholly inoperative, if, while we invited foreigners to deposit their goods in our warehouses, we at the same time suffered the law of merchant and factor to remain on so vague and uncertain a foundation, as to afford no security to the deposit. At a period, when important changes were taking place in the commercial world, it was incumbent on us to avail ourselves of all the advantages which our wealth and position presented to us. Under the present circumstances of the country, and with a view of securing those commercial advantages, he thought it peculiarly important that the bill should pass.

thought the House and the country were greatly indebted to the right hon. gentleman for his exertions in promoting the commercial interests of the country.

said, that the bill conferred no new powers, and gave no new privilege to the consignors of goods. The plain state of the case was this. There was a consignor who gave his goods to a consignee, who sold them to a third party in the market; and that third party became responsible for any default of the consignee to his employer, with whom he had no conference whatever in the business. Surely the loss, if any liability to loss occurred in consequence of the default or insolvency of the consignee, ought to fall on the consignor, who intrusted his goods to him, and not on the third party, who was the mere purchaser in the market, and who had paid for them in the way of trade.

also thought, that the consignor, who could qualify in any manner he thought proper his own mandatum, and protect himself from his consignee, ought to be responsible for the acts of the latter, and not a third party, buying and paying fairly in the market.

said, that when the question was first introduced it was very intricate; but the right hon. gentleman opposite had obviated the difficulties which had obstructed his comprehension. What could be more unjust than the old plan which was, that if a man wanted 100 tons of hemp, and went to a broker who thought proper to sell for 38l. a ton what he was ordered by his principal not to sell under 40l. in such a case the sale was to be null and void; and though that hemp was sold ten times over by the buyer, still the misconduct of the original agent vitiated all the subsequent sales, and the purchasers might be ruined whilst dealing, so far as they were concerned, fairly and openly in the market? He thanked the right hon. gentleman for a bill which went to remedy so much injustice.

said, that however beneficial this bill might be to the right hon. gentleman's constituents at Liverpool, still he was informed by competent judges that its effect would be very different on the general interest of the agriculture of this country; since it would hold out an encouragement to foreign countries to deluge the British market with their corn. Entertaining this opinion, he should move as an amendment, "that the bill be read a second time that day six months."

said, that, considering the particular interests of Ireland, he would oppose the bill.

said, he was disposed to promote the principle of the bill, if the right hon. gentleman would consent to discuss the last clause first: he alluded to the clause which regulated, that there should be 1961bs. of flour for every 5 bushels of wheat.

said, that an insinuation had been thrown out against him respecting this bill which he felt it necessary, in the first instance, to repel. Nothing could be more unfounded. He never had introduced, and never would introduce, a measure to that House—and he should be unworthy of his situation if he did so—at the instance of his constituents, which was at variance with the interests of the empire at large. He had given notice of this measure before he had heard one word on the subject from any gentleman at Liverpool. The history of the bill was simply this. During the course of the last winter, many representations had been made to him, but not one from Liverpool, stating that a considerable quantity of foreign flour was importing into this country, principally from Hamburgh and Dantzic, for the purpose of being ground and sent out in flour to the West Indies. The persons from whom he had received this information were not at all concerned in the trade in corn. They were West-India merchants; and, on looking into the matter, he found that their representations were well founded. He ascertained, by a letter which he received on the 9th of March, that there were then 14,000 barrels of flour in Liverpool, and about 8,000 barrels in London, which had been recently imported from Dantzic and Hamburgh. The circumstance which led to this speculation was the difficulty which occurred in arranging and securing the supply of flour from America, for the British West-India colonies. The subject being once started, it naturally led to the consideration of the state and condition of the large quantity of foreign wheat, which had been for years locked up under bond in this country, and a good deal of it in a perishable state. In the view which he took, he saw on the one hand, that there were colonies dependent upon Great Britain for their supply of flour, and that it would be wise to allow some portion of that large British capital to get vent which was locked up in foreign wheat, merely for the purpose of having it put into a state fit to be trans-shipped for colonial use. As the law stood, this foreign corn was exportable as corn, but not as flour. What was there unfair in permitting that to be sent as flour, which could go as corn?—in fact, so far, to make that which was technically unexportable, legally exportable. Did the House think that, when such a consideration arose, it was fair to overlook the fact, that from one million and a half to two millions of British capital was locked up in this warehoused foreign corn, and some of it perishable? Did not the productive capital of individuals constitute the wealth of a state; and ought it not to have fair play when such a case arose as he had mentioned? Besides, see the extent of rigour which they were inflicting, if they acted up to the law inexorably, and permitted this corn to decay in stores, when a portion of it could get vent in a foreign market. As the law stood, this corn must perish in store; it was not convertible, when it approached putridity, into manure, or food for any kind of cattle. A remarkable instance of that had occurred not long ago. There was a calamitous fire which consumed extensive stores in Liverpool; in the property so destroyed, there was a quantity of wheat; still the consumed, and deteriorated particles were capable of being converted into manure and food for swine, but to no purpose—the law as it stood disallowed that convert ability. All that he proposed to effect by this bill was merely to allow so much foreign wheat to be taken out of the granaries and converted into flour, to meet the immediate colonial consumption. He meant no interference whatever with the corn-laws, nor had he the slightest intention of holding out any encouragement to foreign growers to deluge this country with their produce. With respect to the quantity of flour which was made from the bushel of corn, be had yielded to the suggestion of the hon. member for Cumberland, that the barrel of flour should be six bushels, and not five, this was to meet the condition of the old corn which was gradually decaying. It was very singular that this alarm should have been suddenly created about the effect of this bill upon the home-market, when merely some bran could alone find its way there from the operation of his bill. A month ago, the very same gentleman entertained "no apprehension from opening the ports, and letting the corn itself out of the warehouses. Respecting the general markets, who could, in this month of May, anticipate what would be the state of the coming harvest? The present average price of corn was 66s. [cries of "no" and of "63s."]. He would repeat, the price was as he had quoted it from the average made up yesterday of the last week's sales. Were they quite confident, that between this time and the 15th of August, the average might not rise to 70s.; and then they would have the market open, and on the eve of their i own harvest market, to 440,000 quarters of foreign corn? Why, then, all this bugbear about the operation of the present bill, which was simply and strictly what he had stated it to be. Could the landed interest be reasonably afraid of being injured by such a further supply as would come into this country, by a bill that made oats once imported into it, exportable from it? By acceding to his measure, the country gentlemen would be at once consulting their own interest and giving a fresh stimulus to native industry. The tubs, hoops &c. in which flour came from Dantzic, were formed in that country, and gave employment to a vast number of industrious mechanics. If we allowed foreign corn to be ground in this country, and afterwards exported from it, the tubs which contained it must be formed of stares taken from the demesnes of English gentlemen and wrought into shape by the industry of their tenantry. He did not see any reason why, with our extensive colonial connexion, we should not appropriate to ourselves that trade which was at present carried on lucratively by foreigners, and in which he had no doubt we should soon acquire that superiority over them which we were now ending in every other branch of commerce. But gentlemen on the other side asked him, "What security was there that this flour would not get into home consumption?" He would reply to this question by asking them another—"What security had they, that Dantzic flour, or that bonded wheat did not at this moment get into the home market?" The only security which they had was the vigilance of the officers; and he left it to the House to decide, whether it was likely to be increased or diminished by the regulations which he was now proposing. He was surprised that gentlemen should be so much alarmed as to the effects of this bill. For his own part, he considered it to be of importance only as a commercial measure, and was almost ashamed of having said so much to prove, that it was perfectly unimportant to the landed interest.

agreed with his right hon. friend as to the principle of this bill, but was obliged to differ from him in some of its details. He was therefore in some difficulty as to the course which he should pursue. He did not like to oppose the second reading; but he had certain objections to it, which he must press if they were not obviated in the committee. He wished, at any rate, that this new trade should be founded upon correct principles; because he considered it to be one which in time of plenty, could be productive of no harm, and which in time of dearth might be productive of the greatest advantage."

observed, that he intend- ed to confine the operation of his bill to the corn that was bonded previously to the last act.

said, he was not disposed, when prices were rising, to withhold a liberal relief to the mercantile body, whose capital was employed in the warehoused wheat. Under these views, he should recommend his hon. friend to withdraw his amendment.

said, that after the clear statement of the right hon. gentleman, he had no wish to oppose a measure which, without injuring the agricultural interest, was to afford relief to another great class of the community.

expressed his determination to oppose any effort to disturb the corn-laws. It had been said—why not relieve so much British capital now locked up by the operation of the present laws Who could say it was British? Was it not likely to be foreign capital? It was his conviction, that the present bill, if suffered to pass, would deteriorate considerably the security of the land proprietor and cultivator, and destroy altogether their dependence on any future legislative protection.

said, he should not give any opposition to the present measure; but, with reference to the whole question of the corn-laws, he trusted the House would exercise the greatest caution, and that it would not, from any quarter, take opinions upon trust; as he believed there was no question on which opinions, most confidently advanced, were so erroneous as on that of the corn-laws.

observed, that, from the first moment the foreign corn was introduced, he was convinced the sooner it was got rid of the better for the agriculturist. The effect of its remaining undisposed of was, to produce great fluctuations in the price of home wheat.

thought the bill ought to be postponed until they knew the condition of the next harvest. Though the price of corn was higher at present than it had been for some time past, the capital of the British farmer was still in a very poor condition; and no measure was so calculated to deteriorate it still more, as breaking down the present system of our corn-laws.

begged to say, that he had not stated any intention on his part to change the corn-laws. All that he had observed on the general question was, that he disapproved of that part of their operation which opened and shut the ports by striking averages, where the fractional shilling made the alteration. Such a system must, from its very operation, lead to a constant fluctuation of prices.

viewed the present measure as one of perfect indifference to the agricultural interest. The measure would not come into operation until the 15th of August; and if it should then appear that the harvest was not likely to be a good one, the bonded wheat would of necessity be thrown into the mass of foreign corn that would, on the opening of the ports, be introduced. As to the general question of the corn-laws, it was his opinion, that the present system of averages led to the fluctuations of price—one of the greatest evils that could affect agriculture.

said, that the bill had for its object to allow British merchants to turn a large capital to some purpose. He was sorry the right hon. gentleman had given way on the larger and smaller number of bushels. But he yet hoped to see this country the great granary of Europe, importing the wheat of all other nations, and exporting it to other countries, according to their respective wants.

said, that with the modifications of the measure, and with the understanding that the corn-laws were not to be altered, until the public mind was more prepared for such a change, he should not oppose the bill.

expressed his approbation of the plan, so far as it went: but was of opinion, that it did not go far enough. He trusted, however, that, at some future period, the right hon. gentleman would be prepared to carry it to a further extent.

said, he agreed with the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, and thought that the country gentlemen took a very wrong view of their own interest, in supporting the system of the corn-laws. The present, however, was not the occasion for entering into the large question. When that occasion did arise, he should certainly avail himself of it to point out the errors of their present policy. If any one trade required more than another to be entirely free, it was that very trade of corn. The more food was brought into the country, the better was it for our manufacturers. To augment the quantity of food was to increase the energies and to promote the industry of the country, and by that means to create a greater demand for the agricultural produce. Some gentlemen had objected to the present measure as tampering with the corn-laws; but, the whole system of the corn-laws was itself a tampering one. His own objection to the present measure was, that it was too trifling—that it did not go far enough; for if there was any thing in the principle of free trade, it was as applicable to corn as to any other commodity. But, when they talked of free trade, he would ask what trade in this country was free? The government, it would appear, stood in awe of some ignorant prejudice, and upon that account were unwilling to push the experiment further; but, as far as he could see, there was more of that prejudice within the walls of that House, than any where else [hear, hear!] In fact, the fault of the measure was, that it did not interfere enough with the corn-laws. He would vote for it, however, trifling as it was; and when the proper time arrived, he would undertake to shew, that the interests of the manufacturer and of the landed proprietor were one and the same; and it was a mistake to suppose that one could prosper in the depression of the other; and that it was only by acting for their combined advantage, that they could arrive at any useful policy. He hoped that some permanent measure would be established at last, instead of changing from day to day, as they had been doing with respect to this question, for such a number of years.

hoped, that Mr. Buxton would consent to postpone his motion on this subject at that late hour.

said, he had no objection to bring in the bill then, and discuss the measure on the second reading.; but he would be guided by the opinion of the House.

objected to the bill, as having for its object to take away the rights of individuals, without giving them any compensation.

said, he would shortly describe to the House what the nature of the bill was; but, in the first instance he felt it necessary to state what the law was, as it now existed. At pre- sent, an individual who wished to insure a vessel could not go where he pleased to effect that insurance, but was reduced by the law to apply to one of two chartered companies. Now, he would ask his hon. friend, what good reason could be adduced in support of this restriction? What good reason could be given for confining insurances to one of two chartered companies, or to certain individuals at Lloyd's? While every other species of trade was conducted by firms, what reason, he demanded, could be advanced for crippling marine insurances by this restriction? [Hear.] A man might insure his life or his house wherever he pleased—a man might insure his ship, while building, or when in port, wherever he thought fit—but, when she proceeded to sea, when the risk was greatest, then, and then only, he was compelled to seek that insurance which perhaps he considered the least eligible. In many instances this system was productive of very great inconvenience and expense. For instance, if a merchant residing at Hull wished to insure a valuable cargo, he must first apply to his agent in London. That was attended with considerable expense. That agent applied to an insurance-broker; which was also attended with considerable expense. It was proved, before a committee of the House of Commons, on this subject, which sat in 1810, that the charges to which he had alluded, amounted to 25 per cent on the sum paid for insurance. The insurance-broker finally resorted to Lloyd's coffee-house. If he succeeded in getting the policy, it was underwritten by five-and-twenty or thirty persons. In the event of the vessel's being lost, the owner came upon the insurers. Some of them, however, were perhaps dead; and he had to employ an attorney and proceed against their representative. Some of them had perhaps become bankrupts; and he had again to employ an attorney and proceed against their assignees. Some of them were perhaps litigious, and once more he had to employ an attorney, for the purpose of carrying on an expensive lawsuit. Finally, he received only a dividend upon his undoubted right. Under the present system, then, the merchant had to contend against lawyers' charges, agents' charges, and brokers' charges: whereas, if the restriction were removed, all this expense and inconvenience would be removed with it [hear]. Surely the removal of such evils would be a matter of great national bene- fit. If the Hull or Liverpool or Bristol merchants were allowed to form companies for the purpose of insurance, they would, in the event of a vessel being lost, be relieved from those great legal difficulties, and that weight of expense, to which a man was necessarily exposed, when he had to settle an account with executors or assignees. He knew that a company might fail as well as individuals; but he felt that it was an occurrence far less likely to take place. If it were necessary, he could establish by the clearest evidence, every one of the difficulties he had described—every one of the positions he had laid down: and he was quite sure, that, by getting rid of delays and litigation—by getting rid of agents charges and of law expenses, they would open a new and extensive field for commerce in this country [hear].—There was one other point which he wished to press on the House at this moment; namely, that the effect of this measure would be, to bring into this country a vast number of foreign insurances. There were at present some foreign insurances effected in this country, but not nearly so many as would be effected if the restriction were removed. The great mercantile houses in England were perfectly well known on the continent; but that was not the case with those persons by whom the insurance business was carried on; and the foreign merchant, of course, did not like to trust to the responsibility of twenty or thirty individuals, who were not known: but it would be an inducement for him to bring his policy here, if he were assured of the respectability of the security offered. His honourable friend had said, that there were chartered companies, and that they possessed rights for which they had paid, and of which they ought not to be deprived. Now, he would state to the House how those charters had been obtained. In 1720, the civil list was considerably in arrear, and it was necessary to obtain a supply of money. The minister of that day found it impossible to tax the country further; and, in this state of things, the companies to which allusion had been made came forward with an offer of 600,000l., and, in consequence, obtained those charters. He must observe that, in the first place, they obtained them under false pretences. It was stated in the preamble of the bill, that those companies were necessary to promote the trade of the country; and that therefore parliament granted them certain immunities. Now, it would be seen that they had not promoted, but that they had injured, the trade of the country. His hon. friend said, they had a right to hold those privileges, because they had bought their charters. How stood the fact? They had agreed to pay 300,000l. a-piece, and it was agreed that if, in the course of thirty-one years, notice to that effect was given, those charters might be revoked, on the money being paid by the country; but that if they continued beyond thirty-one years, the money was not to be refunded. He demanded, whether those companies had enjoyed their stipulated thirty-one years? They had enjoyed their privileges for 104 years [hear]. The next question was, had they paid the amount bargained for? No; they had not. They had paid only 111,000l. instead of 300,000l. a piece. Having, therefore, only paid one-third of what they covenanted for, and having enjoyed their privileges for more than three times the length of the period mentioned, he did not think they had quite so strong a claim, as his hon. friend seemed to suppose. He really was at a loss to understand on what grounds his motion could be resisted; the object of his proposed bill being to give advantages or facilities, not to any particular individual, but to the whole trade of the kingdom. He would not detain the House longer on the present occasion, but merely move for leave to bring in a bill, "to repeal so much of the Act 6 Geo. III. c. 18, as restrains any other Corporations than those in the Act named, and any Societies or Partnerships, from effecting Marine Assurances, and lending money on Bottomry."

said, the hon. gentleman had observed, that the privileges granted to those companies were confined to thirty-one years, and that they were then liable to be revoked. But he believed the fact was, that the grants were in perpetual succession, and subject to redemption. They could not be interfered with, unless the king, in council, notified that some inconvenience arose from them. In that case, the grants might be redeemed; but it was provided, in that event, that no similar privilege should be given to any other party. The hon. gentleman was also in error with respect to the sum of money advanced. Those two companies had paid the large sum of 150,000l. each, which was all that was required. They were originally asked for 300,000l. each; but, by the act of the government, the rest was remitted. Unless it was shown that these charters were injurious to the commerce of the kingdom, there was no ground for taking them away. To remove them would be, in fact, to interfere with private rights. It was stated, that parties wishing to effect insurances were not at liberty to go where they pleased. But, what bad consequences had resulted from this? Was it not perfectly easy to effect insurances either at Lloyd's coffeehouse, or at the office of those companies? Such a measure as that now proposed would destroy Lloyd's coffee-house. He believed insurances were effected there at a much lower rate than at any other place, and that those who went there found ample accommodation for every species of insurance. It was not now a question, whether it was right or wrong to grant those charters originally. They were in existence; and they could not, without injustice, be abrogated, unless it was shown that they operated prejudicially to the commerce of the country. Other companies, such as the Bank, and the East-India company, had also paid for their privileges; but the two insurance companies stood in a very different situation, and could not, consistently with justice, be meddled with. Until a proper case was made out against them, he hoped the justice of the House would interpose to prevent this measure from being carried into effect.

said, that the hon. mover had complained that both at these insurance offices, and at Lloyd's great difficulty existed in effecting insurances, and in recovering the sums underwritten. But from the report of a committee of that House in 1810, it appeared, that no less than 681,800l. was insured on one ship at Lloyd's coffeehouse, and that, too, at a very moderate rate. The number of persons at Lloyd's who were connected with marine insurances was no fewer than 1,500; and he believed the amount of property insured there was not less than 200,000,000l. They had agents in every part of the world, from whom they received important commercial intelligence which they published freely to all. Now, if the business of insurance were thrown into the hands of a few corporate bodies, would it not be their object to get the largest premium possible: and in pursuance of that object would they not endeavour to conceal all information? The security would not foe so good as at present; since each shareholder would only be responsible for the amount of his subscription. If there were a petition from the merchants of London in favour of such a measure, that would be some reason for introducing it; but, that not being the case, the measure being uncalled for, and one which was likely to be prejudicial to the commerce of the country, he should certainly resist it.

expressed his regret that the subject was brought forward in the absence of the chancellor of the Exchequer, who, although his opinion was on record respecting the monoply in the hands of the two chartered companies, yet ought to have an opportunity of hearing all that could be said by the opponents of the measure. The chartered companies in question must have been founded on this principle—that it was desirable to give the public a greater security by the incorporation of companies, than they could enjoy by the conduct of the business of marine insurance by individuals. The first question therefore was, whether this main purpose had been answered? What proportion of the business had these companies monopolized? It appeared by the report of the committee of 1810, that of the whole business of marine insurance, they carried on only four parts in a hundred. It thus appeared, that not only ninety-six out of one hundred were deprived of that better security which the charter contemplated, but were deprived of the ordinary security which they would have enjoyed, if the charters had never existed—because, in that case, the insurers would have had the higher security of partnerships and joint-stock companies. The result therefore was, that, although four out of one hundred had the higher security of a corporation, ninety-six out of one hundred were in a much worse relative situation than they would otherwise have been. The advantage being so small, and the disadvantage so great, it certainly was competent to the legislature to inquire by what mode a correction of the inconvenience might be effected. The law by which the charters were granted, specified, that if within thirty-one years after the incorporation of the two companies it should be thought desirable to dissolve them, two years notice should be given of such a determination, and they should be repaid the sum they had advanced, namely, 150,000l. each: after which their charters should cease and determine, and never be revived. The law further declared, that if at any time after the thirty-one years, the charters should be considered injurious to the public interests, they should then be subject to be terminated, without any such payment. It was evident, therefore, that the companies had, at present, no claim for remuneration; and the only question was, whether it was consistent with policy, and with the benefit of the public, to continue their charters. There were four modes in which all commercial business might be conducted; by corporation, by partnerships, by joint-stock companies, or by individuals. Now, why was it that the business of marine insurance could be carried on advantageously only by the two extremes of these modes? A man applying to a respectable firm to insure his ship or cargo, would be told, "we cannot insure you collectively and as a partnership, but you may apply to any one of us individually for that purpose." Where was the wisdom of such a regulation? He had the greatest respect for the gentlemen at Lloyd's; they had always exhibited the most honourable conduct, and under circumstances of considerable difficulty had proved the character and resources of this country, in a manner highly creditable to themselves, and beneficial to the public. But, the question was, whether the interests of the public ought not to be attended to in the arrangement under consideration? It was said that that arrangement would destroy Lloyd's coffee- house, Unquestionably, the public would go wherever they could get their business done in the best and cheapest manner. And why, he begged to ask, ought they not to be permitted to do so? All that he said was—let the parties interested suit their own convenience and wishes. If, as he conceived, they would prefer insuring with corporations to insuring with individuals, then the two corporations, respecting which so much jealousy had been expressed, would still be likely to transact, as at present, four parts in the hundred of the business done, although they would lose their exclusive privileges; for, although those privileges would be terminated, the general charter would remain. And, with respect to joint-stock companies, he begged leave to say, that anxious as he was for fair competition on this, as well as on all other commercial subjects, he should not be disposed to grant to these companies exemption from being sued individually for the obligations which they might contract. In his opinion, his hon. friend had taken a right course in bringing the matter before parliament. It was not necessary for any persons desirous of the proposed alteration, to apply to the Crown, with regard to the charter. That charter would remain the same, with the exception of this single change.

observed, that he did not stand there to justify the system on which such charters had been granted. He was a friend to liberal principles, but he stood there on the faith of an act of parliament. The two corporations in question had paid large sums of money for privileges, of which, he contended, they could not be deprived, unless by the king in council. This was the fourth attempt which, since his experience in parliament, had been made, and which he trusted would fail, as all the previous attempts had failed. In 1806, the Globe Insurance company brought in a bill upon the subject, which however was thrown out. In 1810, his hon. friend, the member for Taunton, had introduced another bill on the subject which had also been thrown out. In consequence of the report of a select committee, in 1811, a third bill had been introduced; and what was its fate? He (Mr. G.) had successfully moved its rejection; and in that effort had been seconded by Mr. Perceval, then chancellor of the Exchequer, by sir V. Gibbs, then attorney-general, and by sir T. Plumer, then solicitor-general, on the ground that the privy council, and not parliament, was the place to which application ought to have been made. In 1813, when the same parties brought the subject before the privy council, lord Ellenborough took so unfavourable a view of their case, that they did not venture to persevere; and from that time to the present, no stir had been made with respect to it. Now, under those circumstances it was, that the present bill was brought before the House. For himself, he had never compromised his principles upon any question; and therefore he felt himself bound to oppose a decided negative to the motion.

said, that according to the doctrine laid down by the hon. member, the question under consideration was one not to be decided by the House of Commons, but to be referred to his majesty's privy council. He would call their attention to the manner in which the bill, chartering those two companies, had been framed 104 years ago. In the preamble of that bill it was stated, that "whereas several individuals had failed, &c, it was desirable that such companies should be formed," &c. Now, if it could be shewn, that only four parts in a hundred of the whole insurance business of the country was done by these companies, it was quite clear, that the act of parliament had failed to effect its object. The hon. gentleman supposed that the act of parliament gave these chartered companies exclusive rights for ever, unless some person went before the privy council and proved them injurious; but the legislature so far from having tied up its own hands, had been particularly careful, and had in fact fixed two modes of doing the same thing. If the present objections to the measure were to be pressed, what would be the consequence? Why, measures would be taken, by which that would be done out of the country which it was thus attempted to prevent being done within it. Under all the circumstances of the case, he felt himself bound to support the motion.

thought the present companies ought to be protected, unless it could be proved that they had been hurtful. He was of opinion there were but few insurances but what could be effected at the underwriters at Lloyd's, even without the two companies; and that at present the public had all the advantages of the respectable firms in the city; for either one partner signed for the others, or a broker at Lloyd's signed for the whole, With respect to the charge of 25 per cent by the broker, the hon. gentleman must be in error; for the charge was only 5 per cent. He thought there was nothing before the House to justify the assertion that these companies had been hurtful, and that therefore, under the words of the act of parliament, they ought to be protected. The proper mode would be, to move for a committee, to inquire if they had been injurious, or to refer it to some other competent tribunal.

said, that without pledging himself to any ulterior opinion upon this question, he felt it necessary to state that, in granting the charters in question, parliament never intended to tie up its hands, and deprive itself of the power of granting new charters under any circumstances.