rose to address the House. He began by observing that, though he had heard a great deal lately of the mischief arising from overtrading, he had not heard it stated that the right hon. gentleman opposite had taken any pact, in producing, any of the inconve- nience under which the country was at present labouring. Now it was his opinion, that the government, and especially that part of it over which the right hon. gentleman presided, had, in concert with the Bank of England, added greatly to the previously existing causes of distress. He felt it to be his duty to point out where the great error in their conduct lay, and to show by what means they had aggravated the calamity under which the country had been recently suffering. The statement which he had to make he should divide into two parts. The first would relate to the mismanagement of the unfunded debt, and the latter to the misarrangement and mismanagement of the funded debt; both of which had, in his opinion, added greatly to the inconvenience of the country. He was now called upon to allude particularly to the manner in which the government had managed the issue of Exchequer-bills. He should suppose, from the ready eagerness with which certain hon. gentlemen came down on an evening to vote away 30 or 40,000,000l. of Exchequer-bills, that they did not know what the nature of those securities was. He was therefore induced, as he should found a strong case upon them, to enter into a description of this species of security. Exchequer-bills were bills issued for a debt previously contracted, which was usually denominated the unfunded debt. They were not payable on demand, though they were almost equally pressing and dangerous—they were rather bills on the government, payable at sight. He had a paper in his hand, which had been recently printed, showing exactly at what periods these bills at sight became bills payable on demand. And he ought here to inform the House, that when they were payable on demand, they became receivable as payment for the revenue, and that government, when it was obliged to pay them off, paid them off either in money or revenue receipts. Hence it was that when government advertised that it was ready to pay off Exchequer-bills, the time was always found to be near that in which the revenue became due. Though he should have some difficulty in stating what portion of Exchequer-bills had been paid into the Exchequer on account of the revenue, he could now show what quantity of bills they had due on particular days, without having one shilling in their coffers to meet them. On the 6th of April, 1825, there were 6,258,00l.; on the 6th July in the same year, 30,000,000l. of these promissory notes, payable at sight, due and receivable as money by the revenue. On the 11th of October, there were 20,160,000l.; and on the 6th of January, 7,400,000l. of these dangerous promissory notes in existence. This would be sufficient to show the danger which might arise from a too copious use of these securities. He expected to hear from the right hon. gentleman opposite, that this was the ordinary mode of getting money for the government. True, it might have been so; but then there was a wide difference between the time when the restrictions on the Bank were in existence and the present time, when the issues of the Bank were payable in gold. In looking at the debt thus created by the government, he was able to show how dangerous it was, not by putting an imaginary case, but by putting a case as it really had happened. In December last, Exchequer-bills were at 80s. discount. The government saw a depreciation of its paper arising out of its over-issue. No one could doubt that this paper, like any other paper, could be over-issued; for the proof of over-issue was discount, as the proof of the contrary extreme was premium. When, however, the Exchequer-bills were at a discount of 80s. the Bank very good-naturedly stepped in, and raised them to par. It was, moreover, at the pleasure of government to raise, whenever it might see occasion to do so, the interest upon this species of security. Notwithstanding ail these advantages, they were not able to keep them from depreciation, and on the 14th of February they were again at a discount of 20s. Then the Bank stepped in again, and again the Exchequer-bills were raised to par. Could, it then, be doubted by any man who was acquainted with, or who would take the least trouble to understand the subject, that this species of paper was a most dangerous one to be afloat in the market r It appeared that the Bank had advanced 5,500,000l. towards the payment of the January dividends; and if they had not done so, it was impossible to say what inconvenience the country might not have felt from the immense amount of Exchequer-bills which were then abroad. The returns showed that in July last, the whole amount of those bills was 30,000,000l., that between July and October there were issued 20,000,000l. and between October and January, 7,000,000l. All these sums might have been forced upon the government instead of money in payment of the revenue; and but for the measure he had alluded to on the part of the Bank, in taking up what was called the deficiency bills, that event must have happened. Where was the government to get money to pay the dividends but for the assistance of the Bank? And how was the Bank to give that assistance but by an extensive issue of notes? Then, said ministers, "If you will give us this, of which we are in present need, and if the exchange should take such a turn as to bring a demand for gold, we will give you another restriction act." Had he not a right, then, to call that a dangerous species of paper which produced consequences like these? He should be told, perhaps, that it was useful, because it was easily negotiable. That very facility increased the danger, and in proportion to the ease with which government adapted it to their own purposes, made it unadvisable for the public interests.—But, let the House suppose the country to be placed in circumstances of difficulty. Suppose the Russian army should march (and there was a greater probability that it would than that it would not), how would the government be able to clear the market of this paper, which then would become a positive and sensible inconvenience? What would become of the 24,000,000l. of paper issued by the Bank? If the exchanges which were always hung, as it were, upon a pivot, should turn round and be against this country, by what means could they be restored? The House had been told in one of the triumphant speeches of the right hon. gentleman, that this was the best and cheapest mode of carrying on the public business. This he wholly denied. When he had suggested to the right hon. gentleman, that a gradual diminution should be effected in the amount of Exchequer-bills, and that this species of unfunded debt should be discharged by means of a tax, he had been laughed at; but he was nevertheless sure that it would have been beneficial to the country, and he was sure that many opportunities had occurred of adopting that measure. There was an opportunity when the funds had been raised from 80 to 90. The ministers told the House that there had been a saving of 300,000l. a-year in the interest on the stock which had been reduced; but they forgot to state, as he as he contended was the fact, that between 6,000,000l. and 7,000,000l. of capital had been lost to the country. It appeared to him, that instead of appropriating the sinking fund to the discharge of the funded debt of the country, on which it had no operation whatever, it would be better to use it for the relief of the unfunded debt. Upon this part of the finances he thought the conduct of the right hon. gentleman had not been such as was likely to prove beneficial to the country. The right hon. gentleman, in a flourishing speech, had said, that it was not expedient to carry this debt beyond certain limits. Perhaps he would say, that they were those limits which he meant, and if he did he (Mr. Maberly) would call upon the Bank of England to prove that this unfunded debt had been increased to a most dangerous amount. For these reasons, he should submit to the House certain resolutions on this subject, which he would now read; but before they were put, he should touch upon another branch of the subject, in which also he believed there had been considerable neglect.—The hon. member then read the following resolutions:— "That it appears, by returns to the House, that on the 6th of January, 1826, the amount of Exchequer-bills outstanding and unpaid was, 37,502,017l. 9s. 7d. that on or about the 20th of December they were at a discount of 80s. and that it therefore became necessary to raise the interest previously granted on them, in order to prevent their being paid into the Exchequer as revenue, or a part of them being demanded in cash. And that, notwithstanding this advance of the rate of interest on Exchequer-bills, it became necessary to relieve the market by reducing the quantity on sale, which was effected by means of a large portion of them being absorbed in purchases made by the Bank, which brought them to about par at the end of the month. "That on the 14th of February they were again at or about 21s. per cent discount, when the Bank came once more in the market, and brought them to par. "That the Bank, from various circumstances, might not have been able thus to relieve the market without endangering its credit yet, had not relief been afforded, bills paid in as revenue might have left the Exchequer without any means of paying the dividends, provided the Bank could not advance the whole amount of them. "That the Bank, in order to pay the January dividends, having already advanced 5,548,817l. 9s. 7d. it is highly improbable that it could at such a moment make a further advance of 3,128,183l. (the additional sum necessary) without placing itself in a most hazardous situation; and it appears therefore that although the prompt relief in the purchase of Exchequer-bills given by the Bank did at the moment avert these calamitous consequences; still the danger of having such a large unfunded debt becomes strikingly obvious, by the Bank being obliged a few days since to come into the market a second time to prevent a further depreciation of them. "That, notwithstanding the low rate of interest which has been paid on Exchequer-bills, it has been both inexpedient and dangerous to leave so large an amount of debt unfunded; not only for the reasons stated in the foregoing resolution, but because it might have been funded on most advantageous terms, and at a saving of some millions to the country, whilst by leaving it unfunded until a period of political difficulty arrives, it cannot fail seriously to affect public credit, and to impair the energies of the country; and that it appears therefore to this House, that it is highly expedient to reduce the unfunded debt within more reasonable limits." These were the resolutions which lie thought it expedient to propose in this, part of his speech. But he considered it proper to state that, in his opinion, considerable error and mismanagement had prevailed upon another most important subject; namely, in respect of the general public debt. It was well known to every hon. gentleman who heard him, that there had been, some time ago, introduced into that House a measure of considerable notoriety respecting what was since known as "the dead weight." This had been, upon parliament, Heaven knew! a dead weight ever since; and so long as the arrangement in question existed was likely to prove so. It had, from the first moment of its being proposed for their adoption, involved them all in considerable difficulty; and, if it were not removed, it could not fail to involve them still more. In 1822, a noble lord, now no more, had come down to the House and had declared, that it was impossible the country could be saved unless it possessed a clear sinking fund of 5,000,000l. [hear.] He was stating these things with a view of showing how completely the country had been imposed upon. That plan for transferring the dead-weight was adopted by the vote of a large majority of the House. No sooner had the noble lord he was speaking of retired home, after car-Tying this measure, than he began to perceive—probably from its not having been greeted with all the cheers he had expected—that his financial schemes did not seem to be well relished by his hon. friends on the same side of the House; for they had anticipated a reduction in the malt tax of 2,000,000l. This dead-weight measure, which the noble lord assured the House was perfectly correct and expedient, was, in fact, a grant by government, or the public rather, of an annuity of 2,800,000l. for a term of 45 years. This loan, therefore, imposed a total debt upon the country of no less than 75,000,000l. [hear]. He was perfectly accurate in stating it at this amount; for, by returns which he held in his hand, the value of this annuity, now that it had a term of 41¼ years, to run was, according to the estimate of the most experienced accountants,74,632,000l. The loan, therefore, which government, by reason of granting such annuity, might be said to have taken up, was undoubtedly the largest that had ever been raised in this country. In fourteen days after propounding and procuring the sanction of parliament to this plan, the government came down and said, that nothing could possibly save the country but a clear sinking fund of 5,000,000l. But inasmuch as only a fortnight before, the noble lord had held out precisely the same doctrine with regard to the deadweight scheme, the government, in effect, by this latter proposal, violated their own recorded principles, and deserted their Own plans. Great opposition was manifested to this measure, and, if he remembered rightly, the House divided upon it no less than twelve several times. Even in the very last stage of the measure, they Went to a division upon it. His late lamented friend, the hon. member for Port-arlington (Mr. Ricardo), strenuously argued against it; and every time it was proposed to be agitated, made a point of remaining in the House on purpose to oppose it. That gentleman, indeed, always predicted the very serious evils that must arise from it. It might be affirmed as to this dead weight, that the Bank did not advance the whole of the money necessary for its purchase. But the Bank certainly came forward, and did buy up an enormous amount. They purchased this deadweight annuity up to the year 1828, and to the amount of 13,000,000l. having already advanced other 8,000,000l. upon other accounts. The whole measure was, in every respect, one of the most dangerous which had ever been resorted to; and not the less so, as to the connection of the Bank with it. The Bank might now say, probably, "what fools we were not to sell this amount when we could have parted with it." But he doubted much whether the Bank could ever re-sell any considerable portion of their purchase without, at all events, considerably alarming the country. Their advances had been enormous, and it would have had an injurious effect for them to have come into the money market, with a view of endeavouring to replace the capital they had, in this particular instance, expended. At no former period of that company's history, had they ever been under such immense advances upon security, without convertibility. For the question was not as to the amount of the securities it might hold, on these accounts, but as to their greater or less degree of convertibility. He much doubted whether the Bank ever could convert its share of this annuity. But, was this the only weight which now pressed upon that concern? By no means. They had advanced about 5,500,000l. upon deficiency-bills. It was admitted, moreover, in a recent speech of the right hon. gentleman opposite, that they had made advances upon Exchequer-bills to the extent of 7,000,000l. It was well known that they had also issued about 3,000,000l. to payoff the dissentients, under the operation of converting the fives into four per cents; and latterly they had issued 2,000,000/. more in order to keep the market price of Exchequer-bills at par. Taking one matter with another, the Bank had advanced altogether about 25,000,000l.; from which, deducting about five millions and a half for the deficiency bills, there would be a total of 20,000,000l., in round numbers, advanced by the Bank to the government. Still, it would seem, that they had not had enough of advances; for, upon another scheme—that of loans upon mortgages—they had lent 1,400,000l. Now, from such extensive engagements, he would defy the Bank to disengage itself, without en- taking upon the country the most ruinous consequences. There was but one way in which it could be disenthralled, at all; and that was for the right hon. gentleman opposite to issue Exchequer-hills very largely. What would any hon. gentleman venture to predict of the effects on public credit that must follow upon the Bank beginning to unlade themselves either of their share of the dead weight, or of those other securities which he had mentioned? Those securities were not convertible within any such period of time as would be necessary to save the credit of the Bank, were it under a necessity of converting them. It was now altogether, it might be objected, a dangerous and inconvenient time to attempt any thing like Such a conversion. But the way to disengage the Bank from this unfortunate bargain would be at once to annihilate the act of parliament which had granted, in the first instance, these most extraordinary, inconvenient, and dangerous means of raising money. He now proceeded to advert to another topic of singular moment; he meant the account which had been rendered to parliament of the public debt of this country. The results given by that account were very different from those which really existed. The capital of that debt, he would undertake to say, was absolutely above 100,000,000l. more than the sum at which the government of the country had put it down. He by no means imputed this error in their statement, enormous as it was, to any improper motive, or to design on their part. After passing over in detail the various items of debt arising out of the 5, 4, 3½, and 3 per cents.—the account omitted altogether the debt due- on the life annuities and the long annuities. On this very large proportion of the public debt, they had forgotten to put any value whatever; and, more especially, no account whatever was Liken of that absurd and ruinous charge (a charge to which it was difficult for him to assign, with any degree of temper, a distinctive name) the dead-weight annuity. Now, by the government's own accountants the valuation of those charges had been elsewhere, made; and the total amount, as upon these items, was nearly 101,000,000l.; and. that amount, therefore, was to be taken in addition to the total sum of the national, debt, as this had been officially held out to the country up to the present bour.—If this were so—if he was correct (and correct he contended that he was); in this statement—the interest of that debt must of course have been returned in the same erroneous way—and it was so returned. By a paper, which would be in the hands of every hon. member in a very few days, it would appear that the national debt, on the 5th of January 1819, was 832,000,000l. The debt as it now stood, notwithstanding our boasted sinking fund of 5,000,000l., and all the amount of our yearly taxation, was immoderately increased. For what was this total enlarged to in January 1826? As compared with what it was in 1819, it appeared, upon a return signed by Mr. Finlayson, the actuary at the National-Debt Office, and by M r. Hyam, that there was an increase of 61,646,636l.; the life annuities being valued upon the same principles in both years, 1819 and 1826, Then, how stood the charge upon this statement? Why, at a sum of 31,395l. more at present than it was in 1819, seven years only having elapsed since that period. Thus the House would perceive we had an enlarged debt, and an enlarged interest—nearly 62,090,000l. more of capital, and upwards of 31,000l. more of charge, being the amount of the increase since January, 1819; and all this, notwithstanding government considered they had saved the country between 1,500,000l. and 1,600,000l. by the reduction of the five per cents to four per cents. Still he would ask, in spite of this last-named benefit, how came our condition to be no better? Had the right hon. gentleman afforded the country any intimation that such was the state of its debt? No: this statement had been kept altogether in the back ground. Figures proved facts; but hitherto these figures had not come to light. Let him not be told that this was not an accumulating debt; for that would be but to repeat what had been already too successfully done: it would be to throw dust in the eyes of all the country. And, certainly the right hon. gentleman, in the discharge of those duties with which, these statements were connected, did appear to have been completely blinded by a deplorable, fatuity. Year after year the country had been told that it would get out of debt. But when the paper, he had; alluded to should have been printed, every hon. member who would be at the pains of judging for himself, would perceive, that the measures of the government had retarded, almost beyond calculation, the period at which, by any possibility, that anticipation could be realized. The Bank had been again recently called upon for a very considerable advance—and that advance to be made on a species of security Which they could not, at pleasure, turn into money. Really, he was obliged to declare, that although hitherto the country bankers had been exceedingly blamed on all hands for their over-issues, the fact was, that his majesty's government had had more notes or bills out, than, if they had been suddenly called upon, they could by possibility have met; and that at one period, the Bank itself had had more notes out than, upon an emergency, it could have met. He did not mean to say that the Bank had a general over-issue of paper; but that abstractedly, and with reference to the premises he had stated, they had had such an over-issue. There even now remained a very large proportion of this dead-weight, as it was called, to sell. He should like to ask the right hon. gentleman, whom he proposed, in his own mind, as a purchaser for that remaining portion?—He had already filled the hands of the Bank of England. While he mentioned this fact, he thought he saw a smile upon the face of his hon. friend opposite, the Bank director, which seemed to say, that in truth the Bank had got enough of it. Would the right hon. gentleman proffer it to the South-Sea company? Whether or no the public would be disposed to buy it off his hands, it was perhaps not difficult to anticipate. Certain it was, that the hon. gentlemen who surrounded the chancellor of the Exchequer were never very strenuous in support 6f the original proposition. He had no wish to embarrass the right hon. gentleman; but he really would advise him to say to parliament, "We will do this act away altogether, we will come to our senses;—and for myself, I declare, that so long as I may have the honour of being a member of the government, never will I propose such another scheme as this, the mischiefs and danger of which I have seen so clearly." He did therefore strenuously advise him to get rid of the dead weight, by annihilating the act under which the arrangement for its transfer was effected; and further, to clear himself by funding Exchequer-bills. By that means alone could he meet the difficulties to which he was otherwise liable; for, in that ease, come what might, he would find himself free to act; and surely it was the worst policy which any government could adopt, to allow its hands to be fettered in money matters of this nature, at the moment when perfect freedom of action might be most necessary. There would be no disgrace in the right hon. gentleman's abandoning such a measure as the dead weight. The only disgrace, after this night, would consist in his adhering to it. In regard to that measure, he repeated his conviction, that the right hon. gentleman never had the cordial support of many of his colleagues; and it was to be recollected that no former chancellor of the Exchequer had ever enjoyed the support of more able, more active, more intelligent, or more popular colleagues; or colleagues of more extensive practical information upon all matters connected with the political interests of the country. He did therefore hope and trust, that when the right hon. gentleman should come down to the House next Monday, he would declare to parliament that he would have no more to do with this measure, but would re-model it, and throw the charge accruing upon it on the sinking fund, or some other source of income. Such injurious arrangements, at once so dangerous and so inconvenient to the, country, the right hon. gentleman should certainly take the earliest opportunity of recalling and abolishing. If the country should not be exposed to any new necessity for such a course of proceeding, there could he no danger in adopting it; but if it should be, in how much better a situation would she not be placed by reason of having adopted it? Connected with these concluding observations, he begged to submit the second part of his resolutions: "That, although, by a vote of this House, five millions were declared necessary as a sinking fund to uphold public credit, by diminishing the national debt, yet, in the course of a very few days after that declaration, the House came to the determination of granting an annuity of 2,800,000l. for 45 years, thereby increasing the public debt many millions (by return to the House, March 1826, 74,632,051l.), and at the same time violating the very principle which it had declared to be the only one by which public credit could be supported. "That part of the said annuity, amounting to 585,740l. for 44 years, was sold to the Bank of England for 13,089,424l, payable by instalments, the last of which falls due in July, 1828, and part, amount- ing to 2,214,200l. still remains unsold, to the value of nearly 50,000,000l.; and that, under present circumstances, it will be inexpedient to sell the remaining part of the said annuity, and that it will be expedient to repeal so much of the act granting the said annuity as relates to the part unsold, and to charge the amount necessary to defray the naval and military pensions from July, 1828, on the consolidated or sinking fund. "That the capital of the funded unredeemed debt of the United Kingdom stood in the finance accounts, on the 5th of January, 1825, at 781,123,222l. 15s. 6d., whereas, the real capital debt of the country approaches to nearly 900,000,000l. inasmuch as the capital of the terminable annuities is not included in the above sum."

rose, and expressed his intention of detaining the House but for a short time in answering the observations of the hon. member for Abingdon. The hon. member had confined his speech to two points. In the first, he took a retrospective view of the conduct of government with respect to the unfunded debt; and in the other, he had alluded, with no small condemnation, to the manner in which the government had managed the funded debt. The hon. member had accused the government of confusion in making up the accounts of the funded debt. The confusion existed only in the ideas of the honourable member; and greater confusion than prevailed there he had never known. The hon. member, some time ago, had called for a paper, to show the state of the funded debt, which the House ordered to be produced. The hon. member had directed, that in that paper an estimate should be made of the total value of the annuity of 2,800,000l. set apart for providing for the charge of the military half-pay. This estimate was set down under last year's head alone, and the consequence was, that in that year, as compared with former years, there appeared an enormous difference in the amount of the funded debt. Upon this mistake, created by the hon. member himself, he had raised an argument as erroneous as its basis. The hon. member had charged the government with not having effected the reduction of the national debt. He begged to call the attention of the House to this subject. The bullion committee of 1819 recommended, that the unfunded debt should be reduced to the extent of 10,000,000l.; and he was able to show, that government had not only complied with that recommendation, but gone beyond it. From the time of the report of the bullion committee up to the present moment, government had discharged upwards of 13,000,000l. of the unfunded debt. In order to make the subject perfectly intelligible, it was necessary to explain the nature of the unfunded debt. It was divided into two parts. One part, consisting of Exchequer bills, was called the unprovided debt; and the other part, existing merely by anticipation of the funds by which at a limited period it was to be discharged, was called the provided debt. When he spoke of the reduction of the unfunded debt, it would be understood that he alluded only to that part of it which was unprovided. To the unprovided debt, no addition had been made since the date of the report of the bullion committee; on the contrary, it had been made the subject of gradual reduction. On the 5th of January 1819, the unprovided debt stood at 19,480,000l.; on the 5th of January 1826, it stood at 6,139,000l. The chief reduction in the amount of this debt took place in the first three years after the recommendation of the bullion committee. In 1820, 1821, and 1822, it was reduced 10,000,000l., and in 1823, and 1824, it was reduced 3,000,000l., making a total reduction of 13,000,000l. Now, he asked the House, whether this perseverance in the gradual reduction of the amount of debt exhibited any inattention on the part of government to this important subject? The question raised by the hon. member was this—whether it would have been wiser for ministers to have funded the Exchequer-bills, or raised money to pay them off, or to have adopted those measures which had relieved the country from a portion of taxation, and enabled us to enter upon a more liberal system of commercial policy? It was impossible that government could have adopted both plans. If they had funded the Exchequer-bills, they would thereby have been prevented from pursuing the other advantageous measures to which he had alluded. They could not row two ways at once. Was there any thing in the state of the country which should have induced ministers to resort to the expedient of funding Exchequer-bills? The hon. member had indulged in some talk about government being overwhelmed with Exchequer-bills, in consequence of their coining in as revenue. Now, what was the fact during the few last years Exchequer-bills had been at a premium? So great had been the demand for them, that an opportunity presented itself, which government would have been to blame to let pass, of reducing the interest on them. It was true that these securities had recently suffered a depreciation of value; but it was impossible that government could have anticipated the late convulsion. No person could be accused of a want of foresight in not providing against such a contingency. Ministers would, he was sure, have been censured for imprudence, if, instead of reducing the taxes, they had funded Exchequer-bills, at a period when the state of the market presented no inconsiderable difficulties to such a measure. The whole amount of unfunded debt at present out-standing in the hands of the Bank and the public might be called 30,500,000l. On the 5th of January, 1819, it was about 44,000,000l. For the sake of argument he would suppose that the whole of that sum had been funded in any year since 1817, to see the way in which that proceeding would have operated on the public interests. If that amount then, had been funded in 1818, the country would have incurred a burthen of 5,042,000l.; in 1819, the burthen on the country would have been 5,155,000l.; in 1820, the burthen would have been 5,302,000l.; in 1821, the burthen would have been 4,126,000l.; in 1822, 2,692,000l.; in 1823,2,469,000l.; in 1824, 1,017,000l.; and in 1825, about half the last sum. Independently of any other considerations, the expense to which the country would have been put by the proceeding formed a reason for not resorting to the funding of the debt. With respect to all that the hon. member had said about the choakage or embarrassment of the Bank, owing to their transactions with government, he was sure it was completely fallacious. As a proof of this, he might mention, that when very lately the Bank found it necessary to make advances to the merchants, they did so unhesitatingly, and to a very considerable extent. He might take that opportunity of stating, that the Bank always, as far as came under his observation, employed its powers for the advantages of the public. He was convinced that on all occasions they were actuated by the most anxious regard for the welfare of the public. He had now stated all that seemed to be necessary in reply to the speech of the hon. member. The chancellor of the Exchequer would, in a few days, lay before the House a statement of his financial projects for the year, and he thought it would be extremely wrong for the House to pass a resolution three days previous to that statement, pledging itself to certain financial operations which could not be carried into execution for two years. For that reason, he must oppose the prospective resolution; and to adopt the retrospective one, would be to place on the Journals a censure on the conduct of ministers to which he could not consent.

said, he fully concurred in what had fallen from the hon. gentleman, that it would not be proper to enter into any discussion upon the present occasion, which could have the effect of anticipating the statement of the chancellor of the Exchequer. For that statement the public were waiting with the utmost anxiety. The trade, the credit, and the circulation of the country, would depend, in a great measure, upon the disclosures of the right hon. gentleman, and he would regret if he should be drawn into it prematurely. The question they had now to consider Was the unfunded debt. He fully agreed with the hon. gentleman, that it would be acting in rather an unusual way to place upon the Journals the long resolution proposed by the hon. member for Abingdon, until the House had first heard what the chancellor of the Exchequer meant to bring forward. He felt very anxious to know what were the intentions of the right hon. gentleman with respect to the unfunded debt; but as he would in all probability explain his views relative to it on Monday, it would be inconvenient to press him into it at present. If the House should be of opinion that the plans of the right hon. gentleman were such as ought not to be adopted, then would be the time for his hon. friend to come forward with his resolutions. With respect to the amount of unfunded debt, it might be too much or too little, at any particular time, according to circumstances. At one time, forty millions might circulate without inconvenience; while, at another time, it would be considerably too much. The propriety or impropriety, therefore, of any particular amount depended entirely upon circumstances. He differed entirely however from the hon. gentleman opposite upon some part of the subject It appeared to him, (hat it would have been prudent and proper to have funded part of it when the funds were at 95, particularly that part for the re-payment of which the public might be called upon at any time. The capital of 14,000,000l. due to the Bank, he should have thought it right to fund, thereby making it a permanent three per cent debt, and getting rid of the liability of being called upon to pay it in money, when it might be extremely inconvenient to do so and when, to meet the demand, government might be under the necessity of funding at 65, an operation that must be attended with considerable loss. This was the more to be desired, inasmuch as the Bank charter would expire in a few years, when it would be necessary, either to pay this debt to the Bank, or to extend that charter. He did not mean, however, to deny that the government could pay it off at any time, with eat much difficulty. Independent of the debt to the Bank, he should be disposed to fund a large proportion of the unfunded debt. Had this been done when the funds were at 90 or 95, it would have been attended with considerable advantage. He could not clearly understand the reasoning of his hon. friend opposite. He did not see how if could have made a difference of 5,000,000l., or any thing like it, to the public if an unfunded debt of 30,000,000l. had, at any period since 1819, been converted into a funded debt. Taking the interest of the debt so funded at 3 or 3½ per cent, it could not make that difference. Though there might have been some trifling loss of interest, it would still have been an advantage to fund even at 93. Indeed, when stook fell to 75 it was easy to perceive that there Would be great loss and inconvenience in funding. Favourable opportunities had occurred for funding all that part of the debt, to the immediate payment of which government was liable; and he thought they ought not to have been neglected. It might have been attended with some trifling loss; but a saving of one or two millions was nothing in comparison to the important consideration of placing the country in what he would call a sound state. That was the first great point to be considered; and the next, by a proper system of economy to raise it to a moral proud, and commanding station—His hon. friend opposite seemed to have mistaken what had fallen from him upon a former occa- sion in reference to tire Bank. When he alluded to the choaked state of that establishment, in consequence, of its dealings with government and of other circumstances he was comparing its present situation with what it was in 1793 and in 1797, when the Bank restriction took place. He then called the attention of the House to the embarrassments of the Bank at both these periods; and as his object was, to compare them with the present, he was justified in taking into consideration the deficiency-bills. They were a fair item to bring into the account; and, after all that had been said, the whole difference between him and his honourable friend opposite, consisted in the deficiency-bills. As to the money advanced on mortgages, though the circumstance was denied, the impression still on his mind was that the measure was pressed on the Bank by government. What he was desirous, in a former debate, to press upon the attention of the House was, the inconvenience arising from the great amount of securities in the hands of the Bank that were not immediately convertible. The capital of such an establishment should always consist of securities easily convertible. Another point to which he had then alluded was, the advances made to dissentients, at the time the four per cents were reduced. The amount thus advanced would, no doubt; disappear in the course of no very long time, but that could not lessen the difficulties of the immediate pressure. After all the arguments that had been used by the hon. gentleman opposite, he had yet heard no version of the case which appeared to him to exculpate government from the charge of having brought the Bank into circumstances of difficulty. The hon. gentleman said, they were in no difficulty; that they were able and willing to come forward to assist the public. They did, it Was true, come forward in the middle: of December; but then it should be recollected, that they had been screwing up their circulation from the October previous, up to the 3rd of December. The fact was, that the whole history of the late calamity was written in figures as clearly as it could be written, and was as intelligible as any thing could be, td those who reflected oft. the circumstances; The story of the Bank was this. During the bubble period they had in circulation twenty-one millions of paper. This continued up to August in the same year, and the exchanges were favourable. They then brought down their issues to 17,400,000l., at which it wag in December. He would put it to the House, whether the Bank was not pressing, by this operation, upon all the banks in the country, for the purpose of relieving itself from the mass of choak with which it was embarrassed, in consequence of its dealings with government. Did the Bank then exhibit no symptoms of difficulty? They did, and the symptoms must have been perfectly apparent to any person at all acquainted with their usual course of proceeding. Immediately after, they raised their issues from 17,400,000l. to 26,000,000l. This was nothing less than sporting with the whole property of the country, for the difference of amount in the issues was, in fact, the barometer by which the value of all that property was regulated; and to this they were driven, in consequence of having their resources choaked up by government. He would not pretend to say to whom the blame was to be exclusively attributed, but the Bank and the government must divide it between them. The hon. gentleman opposite denied that the Bank had manifested any symptom of difficulty or distress. They were, however, selling Exchequer-bills; which was well known by every person acquainted with the subject, to be a most marked symptom of distress. But, said his hon. friend, they might sell Exchequer-bills; yes, certainly they might, but it was not the practice. They never did sell them. The custom was, to keep the Exchequer-bills by them, and while he was in the direction there was no instance of their having been sold. When anything of the kind was done, the inference immediately drawn from it by every person acquainted with the usual mode of doing business was, that the Bank was in difficulties. The circumstance of course, when it became known, excited great alarm. In fact, they had only a choice of difficulties. If they attempted to bring what was called the dead-weight into the market, it would have increased the alarm; and in that principally consisted the absurdity of this most extraordinary measure. The advances from the Bank at; present, in consequence of this utterly useless and incomprehensible sort of arrangement was, 8,000,000l. and it would run up to 13,000,000l. if suffered to continue. If he might venture to suggest any step to the chancellor of the Exche- quer, it would be to stop it where it was, and this might be done without inconvenience, as the price of stocks was now, nearly the same as when the arrangement, was first entered into. This would be taking off from the Bank a stock which it would be extremely difficult and inconvenient at any time for them to sell. When the government sold stock, the notes passed from one individual to another; but when the sale of stock was? made by the Bank, the notes which came in were stopped and withdrawn from circulation, and an injury was thereby created. This was well known; and when the Bank sold, individuals gave a lower price for the stock. The deadweight was the most perplexed, unintelligible operation he had ever heard of. The accounts connected with it were inexplicable; and when 5,000,000l. more were added to it, the thing would be still more perplexing. Even one of the ministers of the Crown had confessed, that he did not comprehend it: and he was right. He defied any person, however conversant with the intricacies of accounts, to unravel it. He could not perceive any beneficial effect produced by it. The half-pay and pensions, in place of being diminished, were rather on the increase. It would be much better at once to recognize them as part of the public expenditure of the country, and thus get rid of so much intricate and foolish calculation.

said, he did not feel it necessary to detain the House by making a long reply. As the subject was to be discussed on Monday, discussion now would tend to confuse the matter, as much as the papers moved? for by the hon. member for Abingdon would confound the question to which they related. He had one or two remarks to make on the statement of the hon. member for Taunton, respecting the reduction of the unfunded debt, to satisfy the House that no blame was imputable to government, He conceived that he was not called upon to go into a review of the financial operations of the last tea years, and to inquire whether the government ought, at any given period, to have funded Exchequer-bills, and reduced the amount of the unfunded debt. He would; say, however, that great efforts were made for that object. If the hon. gentleman had gone as far back as the year 1816, he would have found that on the 5th of January of that year, the unfunded debt amounted td 61,000,000l.; and that on the 5th of January 1826, it amounted only to 31,000,000l., having been reduced nearly one half. The hon. gentleman might say that this was not a sufficient reduction; but it afforded some proof, at least, that the government had not been inattentive to the reduction of this debt. But the hon. gentleman, in alluding to the facilities of funding in the last three years, had not made a very fair representation. When the hon. gentleman stated, that the government had been guilty of great negligence in not funding in the year 1823, when the price of the funds was so favourable to such an operation, he entirely forgot what the value of stocks was in that year. The three per cents were not then, as the hon. gentleman imagined, at 90. In January 1823 they had not exceeded 75, and in April in the same year, they were at 74. It would have been, therefore, a most impolitic measure to have attempted to fund any part of the Exchequer-bills then. Then came the year 1824, when, as the hon. gentleman said, nothing was done. Now, in the first place, it was necessary to recollect, that the unfunded debt at that time fetched a very considerable premium in the market; and that being the case, it was not so easy a matter, as the hon. gentleman well knew, to fund Exchequer-bills. It was not to be expected that the holders of Exchequer-bills, who had a premium of 60s. or 80s. per cent, would give up that advantage, unless upon very liberal terms being held out to them. To fund Exchequer-bills, under such circumstances, would be impolitic in the extreme. The hon. member for Aberdeen would not have acceded to so improvident a plan. His economical spirit would have been roused in all its usual vigour, and he would have lashed the administration with more severity than on any former occasion. In the year 1824, it would have been most inconsistent in him to have been funding Exchequer-bills when he was preparing to reduce the 4 per cents. That measure might have been unwise and improper; but it would have been a manifest inconsistency to do any act which would lower the funds, when the measure itself was grounded on the actual state of the funds. The subject of the deficiency-bills, to which allusion had been made, was, perhaps, not well understood by the House. The nature of those bills was this:—There was a certain portion of the current expenses of the country payable at the end of every quarter. These payments were charged on the consolidated fund, the guarantee of the public creditor, and composed of the aggregate of almost all the taxes. These taxes were paid into the Exchequer from day to day, and greatly exceeded the amount of the charge. The total amount was about 45,000,000l.; the charge was about 35,000,000l. The difference between the charge and the total amount was applicable to the payment of the annual supplies. But only a proportion of it was applied each quarter; and the greater part of the charge did not accrue till the end of the quarter. If no use was made of the money, it was formerly paid into the Bank; but of late years it had been deemed advisable, that the public should have the benefit of the employment of their own money. Hence there was a diminution, at the end of every quarter, of the amount of money applicable to the payment of dividends then accruing; and this called for an advance from the Bank to the amount of the difference. This advance was made on the credit of Exchequer-bills; and such was the history of the deficiency-bills. But in 1823, the receipts of the revenue had so increased, that there was scarcely any necessity for these deficiency-bills, for all demands upon the Exchequer were promptly met. In 1824, it appeared that it would be desirable to apply 4,000,000l. of the growing produce of the revenue to the reduction of the permanent unfunded debt. This measure, when proposed to the House, was approved; the hon. members for Aberdeen and for Abingdon, joining in that approval. Then, in October 1824, one million had been appropriated to this object; in March 1825, another million; in June 1825, another million, besides 3,000,000l. paid to the public creditor; so that, since October 1824, the debt had been reduced 6,000,000l. But for these payments made to the public, the deficiency-bills on the 5th January 1826, would have been almost nothing. So that the hon. member for Abingdon was not justified in charging ministers with neglect and incapacity, in relation to this matter. If he thought the financial concerns of the country had been mismanaged, he (the chancellor. of the Exchequer) was surprised that he did not bring the subject to the test, by laying the question fairly before the House. If the hon. member brought these sweeping charges forward, if they were well founded, he (the chancellor of the Exchequer) was perfectly unfit to retain his Situation; and if the House should come to that conclusion, he should not be so very much distressed as some hon. gentlemen appeared to think. He was not go delighted with the duties of office as to feel any very vehement uneasiness at being relieved from them; but he did wish the charges of utter incapacity to be brought forward fairly and directly, and not in the shape of an amendment to a motion with which such a fact had nothing to do. Certainly, it was competent to the hon. gentleman to take the course which he had taken; but, as the resolution proposed involved such a direct censure upon his conduct, as, if carried, to make it impossible for him to discharge his duties with comfort to himself or advantage to the country, he did wish that the hon. gentleman, if he thought the censure merited, had conveyed it in a less roundabout way. As it was, he should be extremely mortified if the House disposed of the question upon the point of form; and would much rather at once go into the merits. If the House should be of opinion, that his incapacity was obvious, he could no longer be fit to be a finance minister. If such was the opinion of the House, hon. members were bound in duty to declare it; and he should endeavour to submit thereto, with he might be able.

said, that the observations of the right hon. gentleman had not at all met the statements of his hon. friend, the member for Abingdon. His hon. friend's accounts had been characterized as confused and fallacious; but none of the fallacy or confusion had as yet been proved. Now, if a man, calculating the full extent of all he owed in the world in the year 1819, found it amount to 20,000l., and, after applying a sinking fund for six years of liquidate it, found it then amount to 22,000l. the inference would be, that he had lost 2,000l. by his liquidating operation. Then, what would be true as to the debts of an individual, must be equally true as regarded the debts of a nation. And let the House observe the course of calculation which had been taken by his hon. friend. On the 5th of January 1819, the whole debt of the country, as valued by the public accountant, amounted, in present money, to 832,136,445l. That sum, in currency, would have cleared the kingdom from the principal of all debt; and the yearly amount of interest paid was 29,144,361l. Now, how was our situation when our sinking fund had been seven years at work—in 1826? Why, we had had an increase of revenue over expenditure to the extent of 19,000,000l. This was exclusive of a sum of 500,000l. received from the East India Company, and another sum from Austria of more than 2,000,000l.; and yet the value of the whole amount of our debt was now 893,783,282l., being an increase, as regarded principal, of 61,646,837l.; and the interest which we paid was 29,176,000l. being an advance of about 31,000l. a year over the former period. Well, then, where was our surplus of revenue, 19,000,000l.? Where was the money that had been borrowed? It was all lost. These were the advantages of the sinking fund! In the year 1819, when our taxes had been increased 3,000,000l. to support that common delusion, the country had been told that, upon calculation, if it were maintained and held sacred, it would, in ten years, reduce 70,000,000l. of the debt; instead of this, its operation during seven years had been to add to the debt considerably. The right hon. gentleman spoke of fallacy and confusion; but it was the fallacious system upon which this fund proceeded—the buying with the right hand, and selling with the left.—that threw the whole accounts of the country into a state in which it was almost impossible to comprehend them. In the year 1822 a loan had been contracted for with the Bank of 13,000,000l., in which we had given 100l. 3 per cent stock, for every 73l. 5s. in money that we received. What followed? The commissioners of the sinking fund carried this 73l. 5s. into the market, and bought stock, paying 90l, 95l., and even 100l. for that which we had sold for the 73l. 5s. Here was a loss of no less than 15 per cent, upon the average, upon the sum paid up, which was 8,000,000l. The whole system was one which called for change in the manner of making up the accounts of it. In the year 3817, our taxes had been 57,000,000l. and our expenditure 58,000,000l.; but, from that time down to the present, the excess of income had been regular. In the seven years, our aggregate surplus had been 19,000,000l. He asked again, what had become of it? It was lost—muddled away—it had disappeared. The only real source of a sinking fund—the only legitimate source—was surplus revenue. Within the last seven years, our surplus of revenue had been 19,000,000l.; and the commissioners of the sinking fund had bought and sold, and transferred and re-transferred, stock within that time, to the amount of 117,000,000l. He now came to the manner in which the unfunded debt of the country was managed, which was just as satisfactory as the rest of the affair. The right hon. gentlemen opposite said much of the mischief which the issues of the Bank paper had done to the country. How came it that they said nothing of their own excessive issues of Exchequer-bills, which had done ten times more towards deranging the money market, and producing the causes which had led to the late distress? In 1817, they had had 49,000,000l. of Exchequer-bills out. In 1818, they had issued 12,000,000l. more. In 1819, the amount of outstanding Exchequer-bills was 48,000,000l., the rest having been paid off in the interim. It was true, that since the repeal of Mr. Peel's bill, the amount had been gradually decreasing; but from 1817 to 1819, the government had been borrowing twelve millions when there was no necessity for it. It had been decreasing since that period; but he still contended, that it would have been of advantage to have funded the floating debt in 1825. He had urged it then, and he urged it now. If that course were not approved of, could they not be paid off with the sinking fund? Having concurred so far with his hon. friend, he should observe, that it would perhaps have been better for him to have brought some specific charge, than have proceeded in the manner he had done. He should, however, second him, if his hon. friend intended to press his motion.

said, that having heard what he had, he should not press the motion to a division.

seeing the right hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his place, would take the opportunity of asking a question which concerned the honour, the interest, and, ultimately, the security of the country. Last year, the right hon. gentleman, in answer to a question of a similar nature, had stated, that the French troops would evacuate Spain before those of Austria quitted Naples. Another year had passed, and there did not seem to be any likelihood of the Spanish government being left to itself. He trusted that the right hon. gentleman would tell them whether any thing had taken place that would lead to the evacuation of Cadiz, and the other fortresses held by the French troops.

felt ready to give the hon. member for Southwark every satisfaction in his power; but he must be aware that it was unlikely for him to have any particular information as to time. He had not, however, the least hesitation in saying, that the hon. member himself could not be more anxious to see the French army out of Spain than was the French government to withdraw it. It had unfortunately happened that several partial attacks had been made upon the established order of things in Spain, which had been equally mischievous, useless, and unprofitable. This had obliged the French troops to be kept there longer than was originally intended; but he was completely convinced, that the French government were as anxious to withdraw their troops from Spain as the hon. member was that they should be so withdrawn.

complained, that this charge was annually increasing. In 1822 it had been lowered, but since that, the House had retrograded; and they had now absolutely come back to a charge as great as that of 1821. But this applied equally to every branch connected with the army. In consequence of reductions that were made in the army in 1821 and 1822, the House had allowed the pension-list to be increased to the amount of at least 500,000l. They thought the reduction would be a permanent one. But they now found out their error. The country was worse off at present than it was at the time when the pension-list was augmented, because other persons were appointed in the room, of those who were pensioned off. The country had, therefore, double the num- ber of individuals to provide for. The persons employed in Canada, at the Cape of Good Hope, and in various other settlements, as commissariat officers, were unnecessarily numerous. And he would repeat, that such a military establishment as was now kept up, tracing it through ail its ramifications, was sufficient to ruin any country, however wealthy. In Ireland there was, he observed, a corps of wag-goners, or a waggon department, which cost a large sum annually. It appeared to him to be a most useless establishment; and before he went further, he should like to have some information relative to it.

said, that the difference of the expenditure in the commissariat department, between the present and the preceding year, arose almost entirely from the increased price of provisions; bread, meat, and forage, had all advanced in price during the last two years. The expenditure in this department for 1825 was considerably beyond that of the three preceding years. The sum voted for that year did not cover the expense; and the estimate of the present year was formed on the actual expense incurred in 1825. As to the commissariat staff on foreign stations, particularly at Canada and the Cape, the number was not greater than the business required. By reducing the number, they would incur an additional expense, instead of effecting a saving, Every reduction that could possibly be made in this department had been made. But it should be observed, that various duties connected with the disbursement of money for the service of government were performed by the officers of this department; which, if not executed by them, must be performed by others; and this circumstance, he conceived, would satisfactorily account for the increase to which the hon. member had adverted. The number had, at one time, been considerably reduced: but in consequence of a representation from the commander of the forces, backed by many individuals perfectly qualified to give advice on this subject, it was thought proper to increase this useful body. It was not, however, brought back to its former amount, but was so far enlarged as to make it sufficient for the performance of all its duties. Those duties were various and important. In Canada a larger number were necessary than elsewhere, on account of the out-stations; and at times they had the charge of considerable sums of the pub- lic money. The number required at Sierra Leone was owing to a most melancholy cause. Two months after an officer arrived there, his death was almost certain; so that it was necessary to despatch double numbers, in order to supply inevitable vacancies.

begged to call the serious attention of ministers to this subject. The declaration of the Secretary to the Treasury was, that in consequence of the certain mortality at Sierra Leone, it was necessary to send out two officers to each appointment. He was quite aware of the value of colonies to a great empire; but surely Great Britain had foreign possessions enough, without clinging with such pertinacity to a settlement which was the destruction of all the British subjects sent out to it. It seemed to him quite abominable, that an hon. gentleman, himself high in office, and surrounded by the king's ministers, should venture to make a statement, which only showed that government was actuated by little less than infatuation, in thus despatching men to their graves on the coast of Africa. He spoke from no impulse of opposition, but from a strong feeling of humanity, and a desire to save the valuable lives of the king's subjects. Ministers would have to account to God and their country, for this wanton waste of human existence. If Sierra Leone could not be abandoned without serious detriment, there might be some excuse for keeping it. He called upon ministers to give some hope that this fatal colony would be relinquished, and left to the possession of the deadly maladies by which it was infested.

said, that any person who believed the colony in question to be preserved in consequence of an abstract love of colonization, took a very narrow view of the question. It should be recollected, that the possession of this colony was connected with one of the most solemn acts ever agreed to by parliament. It ought to be recollected that the possession of this colony was considered essential to the carrying into effect that great and most humane object, the abolition of negro slavery. If they gave up that place to-morrow, they would undo much of what they had previously done for the purpose of destroying the traffic in slaves. Let it not be forgotten, that there were at the present moment 18,000 liberated Africans in Sierra Leone. He regretted as much as any man the loss of lives in that colony; but surely it would require the full consideration of that House before they agreed to its utter abandonment. A commission had been sent out there; and when the report of that commission was made, it would be time enough to decide on the course which ought to be pursued with respect to this colony. Certainly, a committee of supply was not the place in which this question could be fairly discussed. Before a few months had elapsed, full information would be received relative to Sierra Leone, and until that period arrived, he thought the question of its abandonment ought not to be discussed.

said, that there were two questions connected with Sierra Leone; first, as to the trade that could be carried on there; and next, whether, if that place were abandoned, another situation could be found equally well calculated for checking the slave trade; Fernando Po, for instance. At present, an enormous expense was incurred by this country in its endeavours to put an end to that traffic; and he was sorry to say, that though this government was actuated by a sincere feeling to do away with the slave-trade, it was carried on by foreign powers, under circumstances of accumulated horror and oppression. If he were rightly informed, the representations made to the French government by the British ambassador at Paris on this subject, did not meet with that attention which they deserved. Here they were, year after year, expending large sums of money, and devising what appeared to be the best means for suppressing the slave-trade; and what happened after all their exertions? Why, they found that trade carried on, without regulation and without mitigation, by those very powers who had been paid to give it up. In fact, all their efforts appeared to have given silent encouragement to this shameful trade.

assured the House, that there had appeared, on the part of the French government, a sincere desire to carry into effect the provisions which had been entered into, and the assurances which had been given, relative to the abolition of the slave trade. He begged leave to state one fact, as a proof of the sincerity of the French government. About a fortnight ago information had been received that slave-ships were then fitting out at Nantes. The fact was brought home decidedly, and the conse- quence was, that one of the ships was seized. Now, if the French government permitted the seizure of one of the vessels of that country under such circumstances, he thought little doubt could be entertained of their sincerity. They would not, he was sure, hereafter, abet other nations in carrying on this traffic. He had further to state, that this government, after considerable importunity, and after encountering and overcoming no little difficulty, had procured an order from the Spanish government, addressed to the governor of Cuba, which, if properly executed, would leave nothing to be desired, with respect to the slave-trade so far as Spain was concerned.

said, that they heard much of the loss and waste of human life at Sierra Leone in preventing slavery; but there was no mention at all of the excessive waste of life incurred in supporting slavery in the West Indies.

said, that they had the evidence of sir G. Collier, and all the practical men who had been there, to show that the situation of Sierra Leone was one which was not at all adapted to the humane purpose of the abolitionists. Messrs. Macaulay and Co. had made a bad choice of their head-quarters. It would turn out that they had effected the reverse of their intentions. There was no hope of improving, much less of civilizing Africa by that settlement. They had the evidence of major Laing, who had gone fifty miles into the interior only two years ago; he asserted that he was the first European ever seen so far in the country. The uselessness of a colony which had cost 1,800,000l. and could not yet grow enough produce to support its inhabitants, must be plain to every body. The black settlers were almost as ignorant as ever. The difficulty of getting up to the place was so great, as to preclude any hope of lasting usefulness. Ships took six weeks in working up to Sierra Leone.

believed that no measure—not even a blockade through the whole line of coast—could effect the abolition of the trade, so long as slavery existed. He did not think that the hon. member for Aberdeen stated the subject fairly by putting it in comparative views of expense. It might be unprofitable to keep an establishment at Sierra Leone, but the question was as to its usefulness. In this view there could be no doubt in any mind after duly considering the cir- cumstances. The government were in possession of many interesting particulars, which threw still clearer light on the subject. For instance, an expedition had been planned and put in motion for penetrating to the centre of Africa. It would proceed by the route along which the chief part of all the captives to be sold were driven to the coast. The House would see, in this one circumstance, the grounds of considerable hopes as to the civilization of Africa, though the expectation of any very great success was still very far remote.

could not say whether his hon. friend included him in the firm of Macauley and Co. but he could assure him, that he agreed with them as to the necessity of putting an end to slavery. It was on the recommendation of Mr. Wilber-force that this colony was first established, and such a measure could only have been suggested by the most praiseworthy motives. In exclaiming against the expense and loss of lives in this colony, it was singular that no allusion was made to other colonies liable to the same objection, established to continue the slave trade. What had been the state of our own colonies in the West Indies I In 1796, when a large force was sent to the West Indies, almost one half of the soldiers, at least of the officers, had died. He certainly lamented that mortality, as well as that of Sierra Leone; but, considering the latter station as settled for purposes of the highest benevolence, he could not refuse to vote for this item of expenditure.

would not say whether Sierra Leone was the best situation that could have been chosen; but the experiment had at least proved, that persons of the African race and colour might be brought into a state of social and civilized life. This, under all the circumstances, was an important fact established; and he had no hesitation in voting for the grant. The resolution was agreed to. On the resolution, that 72,680l. be granted for the contingent expenses of the Offices of the Secretaries of State,

wished to know why there was an increase in these estimates for the present year.

said, it was owing to various expenses necessarily incurred by the increase of business in the foreign and colonial offices particularly. The salary of the colonial counsel was in- creased from 600l. to 1,500l. because; from the increased business, his whole time was occupied. Besides, there was a considerable expense incurred by the preparation of documents ordered by parliament.

took that opportunity of denying that the increased expense was incurred in preparing returns by order of this House; but the fact was, that the government kept governors at the Cape of Good Hope and other colonies, against whom so many complaints were made, that nearly the whole time of the persons engaged in the colonial departments was occupied in examining those complaints. The only way to save that expense would be, to call home every governor, whatever might be his rank or family, against whom complaints had been frequently made.

said, that nothing could be more easy for the hon. gentleman than to make such declarations, and nothing more easy for himself than to say, that there was not in that declaration a word of truth. He could not concur in the opinion of the hon. member, that every governor against whom complaint might be made, ought to be turned off at once. He thought the proper course would be, when a complaint was made, to institute inquiry; and such inquiries had, upon many occasions, been instituted. Was it likely that any member of his majesty's government, liable as they were to public opinion, and the opinion of parliament, would wish to support a governor, who had by misconduct forfeited the confidence of the country? He did not stand up to justify the conduct of governors, or to say that no governor had done any thing which would justify inquiry, or perhaps removal, but he thought no government would be justified in removing a governor, in consequence of complaints which might be made against him, without having previously instituted an inquiry; and he was ready to admit that the inquiry ought to take place as soon as the nature of the circumstances would admit. Were there not proceedings now pending of that very nature f He denied that any unnecessary expense had been incurred in the government of the colonies. When the committee considered that we had no less than thirty-four scattered up and down in different parts of the world, they would be convinced that no small expense must be in- curred in transacting the multifarious business connected with them. If the hon. member would make any specific charge, or point out any abuse in a tangible shape, he was ready to meet him. The hon. member never made his charges in a statesman-like manner, but was constantly finding fault with this item, and that item, without giving any one good reason for making it less. If he would pay the least attention to the subject, he must be convinced that the expense was not greater than it ought to be. Besides the increased business in the colonial department connected with slavery, there had been an increase in many other departments. He would state one fact. In 1806, when the last under secretary was appointed, fourteen folio pages of papers relating to the colonies were laid on the table; whereas last year there had been no less than 2,007, and the expense alone of printing, cost 4,000l. He was always disposed to furnish any information required by any hon. member; but then he thought it unfair to impute extravagance to the department, in consequence of expenses incurred in obedience to the vote of parliament. When he was upon this point on a former night, he might have alluded rather too personally to the hon. member; but he thought himself bound to vindicate the conduct of the department with which he had the honour of being connected; and he could now assure the House, that in consequence of the great extent of our colonies, the duty of the department had so increased that every individual employed in it was constantly occupied.

replied, that he was unjustly accused of indulging in sweeping charges. How often had he called for inquiry respecting the Ionian Islands? And, for the last five years, had he not pressed on the government the necessity of instituting investigations respecting the Cape of Good Hope? But, what did the government do? Instead of taking the part of the colonists, and listening to their complaints, they always took part with the governors against the colonists. He was not for the dismission of any man from office without inquiry; but when complaints were made, and in a manner that merited attention, he would have the government institute inquiry, and act decidedly on the result of such inquiry.

admitted that every well-founded complaint ought to be entertained by the government. But he expected the hon. gentleman no less to agree with him in the general principle, that they ought not to hold out invitations, as it were, to all discontented colonists to come home and exhibit charges against their governors. This would be a system of action which would discourage all honourable men from accepting such situations. The mean between the two extremes of apathy and rashness was to be attended to by government; and the hon. gentleman did not much clear himself from the accusation of bringing sweeping charges, when he intimated, that ministers were always disposed to support the governors against the colonists. In the particular instance to which allusions had been made, inquiries had been for some time in progress; and he trusted that the House would be ready to attend to the results of such investigations with impartiality. He hoped it was not to be assumed, because an individual was under accusation, that such fact was to be deemed proof of the accusation being just, and the party necessarily guilty.

rose for the purpose of submitting a clause for the abolition of a practice which had long existed in the army of this country—he meant the punishment of flogging the soldiery. He was aware that on this occasion he should have to encounter the prejudices of many hon. members who were officers in the army, and who, from being in the habit of witnessing such punishments frequently, did not entertain the same feelings of the propriety of its abolition that might be supposed to actuate other men. However; he did hope that they would give the subject a calm consideration, and if it should be made to appear that any other mode of punishment would be equally effectual, that they would consent to its abolition. The evil of flogging did not consist merely in the bodily torture inflicted on the individual who was thus punished; it had also the bad effect of rendering those who were obliged to witness such scenes more callous and indifferent lo their duties than before. It had precisely this effect upon the persons punished; and he might appeal to the ex- perience of those most acquainted with the army for the fact, that no man ever became a more diligent or a better soldier by the punishment of the whip. He was aware that a difference of opinion existed among many most respectable members of the military profession, on the subject of corporal punishment, and that many very humane individuals thought that the duty of the army could not be carried on without it; but he was happy to add, that there were also many highly distinguished officers who were of a different opinion, and who thought that, considering the modern improvements in the system of military discipline, corporal punishment might be dispensed with, not only without injury, but with great advantage to the service. He might, if he were disposed to go into detail, give many instances in illustration of his position, but he would confine himself to the mention of a few facts. In the Wurtemberg army, under the government of the late king, a system of discipline of a most severe and cruel kind had been carried on; but on the accession of the present king, an end was put to that system, and he had been informed by an officer that under the old system the men became worse by flogging; but the moment the punishment of the lash was abolished, so far from there being an increase of crime, the soldiers seemed to emulate with one another in avoiding every kind of punishment. He might be asked, if flogging were abolished, what kind of punishment ought to be substituted? He did not know what was the particular practice of the French army in this respect, though he was informed that in several regiments in that service flogging was not practised; but he would state that in Wurtemberg there were two regiments to which men were draughted who had been punished twice or more in their own regiments. Another regiment was appointed to receive those who had been punished only once. This system, which made it disgraceful for a man to be punished even slightly, and therefore unfit to remain longer in the same regiment with his former associates in arms, was, he was informed, found quite effectual in keeping up the discipline of the army in that country. Was it not, then, worth while that some attempt of the kind should be made with respect to our army, whose general system in other respects, and in that of flogging also, had been considerably improved? Adverting to the alterations which, so creditably to himself, had been proposed in our criminal code by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and considering the intended amelioration of the system practised towards our colonial negroes, which had been mentioned by the hon. colonial secretary, was it not monstrous that we should still keep Englishmen in constant fear of the lash, and hold that they could be kept to their duty only by that cruel species of punishment? The House were told that the whip, as a stimulus to labour, was to be discontinued in our West-India colonies. Upon what principle was it that it should not also be withdrawn as a punishment from our own fellow citizens? Never did a better opportunity occur for giving the subject a fair trial than the present. We were now in a time of profound peace, and no danger could arise to the general discipline of our army from making the trial. He was not disposed to carry the experiment too far at first; and therefore, in the resolution which he would submit, he would limit the suppression of flogging to regiments in the United Kingdom. In the colonies, the present system might be continued until it was ascertained how far the suppression could be made effectual at home. He would also limit his resolution to a time of peace, so that if a war were to break out unexpectedly, resort might be had to the old system, if necessary. Thus no possible danger could occur from the trial. From every thing which was now passing around us; from the improvements about to take place in our criminal code at home; from the change contemplated in the condition of our colonial slaves, he thought the time was arrived when an end should be put to all those cruel exhibitions of corporal punishment, which tended only to harrow the feelings of those who witnessed them, without being effectual in reforming the unhappy persons who were thus punished. Humanity called upon us to make the trial, and there could, he thought, be little doubt that it would be successful. At all events, now was the time when it could be made with the least risk of danger. He would submit two resolutions on this subject. The first would go to the abolition of flogging; and by the second another mode of punishment would be proposed for crimes to which flogging was now applied. The first resolution was to this effect:—"And be it farther exacted, that from and after the passing of this act, it shall not be lawful to punish any soldier in the United Kingdom, in time of peace, by the infliction of any lash or stripe, any usage or practice heretofore to the contrary notwithstanding." The second resolution was, "And be it further enacted, that if any soldier shall be convicted of petty thefts, or frequent desertions, or other crimes heretofore punishable by flogging, it shall be in the power of his majesty, and he is hereby empowered, to transfer the services of such soldier to any regiment serving in Africa, or any other of his majesty's foreign possessions." [A member here observed, that his majesty already possessed the power mentioned in the second clause.] Well, then, the second clause would be unnecessary, but the principle of the first was not affected by that fact. The House was not without an example of the abolition of flogging in a country, without being productive of any dangerous effect upon the military discipline of that country. In America, the punishment of flogging was abolished, and that, too, at a time when she was engaged in a war. On the 16th of May 1812, a clause was introduced into a bill then before congress, enacting, that so much of the law theretofore in force, as authorized the punishment of any soldier by any lashes or stripes, should be repealed. This was carried, and in a time of war, without producing any bad effect in the discipline of their army. On the contrary that discipline was kept up in a more effectual manner than before.

said, that he did not think the present moment a proper one for the discussion of a question of such vast importance. The principle of the resolutions he concurred in to its full extent, and would continue to support, as long as he had a seat in that House. But he did think that, instead of being thus introduced, the question should be made the subject of a specific motion, as it had been when formerly introduced by an hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett), whom he did not then see in his place, and to whose humane exertions might be attributed the improvement which had already been made in our military discipline on this point. If a specific motion were made on the subject, the whole of the facts connected with it might be brought before the House in detail; and then he thought it would be made apparent, that throughout the whole of Europe there was a gradual abandonment of cruel bodily punishments; and he believed it would be seen, that England was now; almost the only civilized government, under which this species of torture was inflicted—at least that we had not made the same progress as other nations in its abolition. He did not intend at that late hour to enter into any lengthened statements on this subject, to which he might be disposed if the subjects were brought more fully before the House. He would, however, mention one of many cases within his knowledge. He was acquainted with an officer who had, for a considerable time, the command of a troop of dragoons, and who, during the whole period of their being under his orders, never brought a man to corporal punishment. The only punishment inflicted on any of them, was confinement of a few days. This gentleman was one who had the command of his temper and passions—who watched his men narrowly, and thus became acquainted with their habits and dispositions; and, so effective was his adaptation of even the slight punishment he had mentioned, that on an inspection by a general officer, that troop received great praise for its discipline and good conduct, while other troops towards whom a more rigorous system had been applied, were censured for deficiency in both. But examples of this kind would be endless It was admitted by officers of all ranks, that the soldier who was once brought to the halbert, was more likely to be brought to it a second time, than he who had never been subjected to that disgraceful punishment. This general principle was not applicable to the army only. In the history of the proceedings at the Old Bailey it would be found, that those who were once subjected to corporal punishment by the whip were in general found to be subjected to it a second time. Then if this practice was not found effectual for reform, which ought to be the object of every species of punishment less than capital, was not the legislature bound to abolish it, and substitute one more effectual? It was pretty well known, that by such public exhibition of severe corporal punishments, the feelings of the spectators became enlisted on the side of the sufferer, and that in their compassion for the man they lost all recollection of his crime. He agreed with the hon. member, that the present was peculiarly favourable for an alteration in our code of punishment, and particularly for the abolition of military flogging. All the other nations of Europe were rapidly getting rid of their systems of bodily torture. He did not know the extent to which France had carried her improvements in military discipline on this point; but there was no question that her general code of corporal punishments had been most beneficially altered. Would she now tolerate such tortures as those inflicted on Ravillac and Damien? They had, he thought, seen too much of the infliction of cruelties to be disposed ever to wish for their revival. He had, not very long back, witnessed many disgraceful and cruel exhibitions of men publicly whipped at the cart's tail through the streets. Such disgusting scenes were now in a great measure discontinued, and he hoped that the Secretary for the Home Department, who had undertaken the greatest and most important work which had ever occupied the attention of a statesman—that of effecting a reform in our criminal code—would apply his intelligent mind to the consideration of the important question, how far severe corporal punishments were effectual for the prevention of crime? He repeated his regret, that this question had not been made the subject of a specific motion. If it had, he could stale many instances of officers who would be prepared to give it as their opinion, that when the system of severe punishment was more practised than it was at present, it invariably happened that the battalions in which the most men were punished were the least efficient. Whatever might be the result of the motion, he did hope that if he lived five years longer, he should see an end put to this system altogether. It was said, that a man who was made a slave lost half his merits; and it might be added, that the soldier who was flogged lost all.

suggested, that the chairman should report progress, and the hon. member might bring on his motion at a future day, on bringing up the report.

gave his entire concurrence to tile-resolutions; because he was convinced that the system of flogging in the army was improper, and ought to be abolished. It was improper, because every man knew that honour was the essence of a soldier's profession; and when he was disgraced, by being subjected to such punishment, he considered his honour tarnished, and was no longer capable of any heroic feeling. He also objected to it, because it did not answer the end designed; for it left the soldier dejected and callous, and generally almost incapable of future improvement. In the present improved situation of the army, flogging might be done away with, without the slightest risk of danger to the service. He therefore entreated the committee to accede to the proposition, and grant that boon to the army which its invaluable services so well merited.

thought it rather unfair in the hon. member for Aberdeen to charge officers with want of feeling, because they were frequently obliged to witness the infliction of corporal punishments. No class of men, he would assert, were more alive to feelings of compassion. He did not deny the statement of the hon. member (Mr. J. Smith), that such feelings as he had described might be called forth from a mob witnessing a punishment. It was impossible not to have feelings of compassion, in seeing a fellow-man suffer; but it was one thing to have those feelings, and another to legislate on them. It would be inconsistent with sound policy to legislate on such feelings alone; and, in looking to military punishment, it should be considered whether the discipline of the army could be kept up without them. He was no friend to severe punishment of any kind; but he did think that the power of inflicting corporal punishment was necessary to the discipline of an army. He knew of no instance of any army, ancient or modern, without similar punishments. They were in use in the Roman army, and it would not be denied that they were kept in the highest state of discipline. It was not a fact, as the hon. member had stated, that the punishment of flogging was altogether abolished in America. But suppose it were so, what comparison was there between an army of 6,000 men, scattered over the immense surface of that country, and the extensive army kept up in this? The regulations of the two armies might be extremely different, and, at the same time, be applicable to the circumstances of the country. America did not want a standing army. What power would invade America? Her power was derived from a force of another description, and, the state of discipline of her troops would be wholly inapplicable to this country. With respect to the army in France, he could say nothing of the system now kept up; but it was well known that before the present dynasty returned to the throne of that country, a system of discipline of the most severe description was kept up amongst the French troops; and that under the power of that period there was a most wasteful sacrifice of human life. As to the Wurtemberg army, though he had seen them, he could say nothing as to the discipline by which that force was now governed; but he could give the House some information on the subject of the discipline observed in the armies of other powers on the continent. He had received a letter from a gentleman who was well acquainted With the regulations of the Prussian, Saxon, and Hanoverian armies, and with the leave of the House, he would read some extracts. In the Prussian army the punishment of the cane was universal and arbitrary; but the constitution of that army was essentially different from that of the English military force; for there every man Was obliged to serve. A soldier, on entering, belonged to what was called the first class, in which he was exempted from corporal punishment. But if he violated the military law on certain points, he was transferred to the second class, in which corporal punishment might be inflicted; but it did not necessarily expose him to such punishment, although it sometimes happened that the transfer and the punishment were made at the same time. The punishment of the cane was, at all times, inflicted by non-commissioned officers, and in secret. Would the hon. member wish to see such a system of secret flogging adopted in our army? Another regulation was, that only forty stripes could be inflicted without the sentence of a court-martial. Would the hon. member desire to see an arbitrary system of this kind adopted in the British army? The extracts then went on to detail the other species of punishment to which the Prussian soldiers were liable. There was that of confinement. This was of several sorts: first, sending a man to the guard-room, or for a short time to Solitary confinement. The second was to solitary confinement, on bread and water, and a forfeiture of pay; and there was another species of confinement in which the prisoner was not permitted to lie down. Was the hon. member aware of these facts when he stated that torture was abolished in foreign armies? Another species of punishment was, the criminal was fastened to a tree, or to a wall, with his face turned towards it, and continued in that posture for a considerable period without being permitted to lie down. This was an outline of the discipline in the Prussian service; and, be it observed, this was described as the mildest military service on the continent.—He would now state some points as to the discipline of the Saxon army. The highest punishment was shooting; but in many cases, after death the body was delivered over to the common hangman to be stretched upon the rack. There were, besides, several degrees of punishment by confinement, solitary confinement—sometimes with the addition of being fed on bread and water—sometimes confined with leg-irons of 32 lb. weight; and after the infliction of this punishment a second time, the man was declared altogether unworthy of being allowed to remain in the army. Another description of punishment was—a soldier was kept in solitary confinement, in chains, in a cell, without bed or bedding, and frequently in a position called crouching; that was, the body was bent forward, by the hands and feet being fastened together, so that the party could not, while in that state, lie down. Was not that torture? The longest period during which this punishment might be inflicted at frequent intervals, was eight months; but in some cases it was limited to six. The gallant general next proceeded to contrast the military punishments of Hanover with those of this country, and to show from such contrast that the former were full as severe as the latter. He conceived that these statements would serve to confute the assertion, that other nations were more mild than we were in their military punishments, and that there had been an abandonment of torture in all nations except in England. As to the proposal, that the system of flogging should be relinquished in this country, and retained in our colonies, he thought such a regulation would be highly unjust, and attended with the most pernicious consequences. It was, in his opinion, the liability which a soldier was under to be sent to any part of the globe, and to encounter every variety of clime and disease, which mainly contributed to raise our military service to the high eminence it had attained; he also considered the continual interchange of troops of very great advantage to the service. The empire was not confined to the three kingdoms; there were limbs and members of it in every quarter of the globe; and surely it would form a very inconvenient and invidious distinction to have one system of discipline for our troops at home, and another for those Stationed abroad. It had been said that this was a boon for the army; if it were so, he must, as far as he was connected with the army, beg leave to reject it. It was to our discipline that we owed all our military honour; it was not the arms or dress of our army, but its discipline which rendered it useful to its country, and feared by its neighbours; but if he had had no other reason for rejecting this boon, as it was termed, he must confess that when he considered the quarter whence it was offered, he felt but little disposed to accept it. It was somewhat strange to find the same individuals coming forward to present a boon to that army, which they had not long ago stigmatized as a mere engine in the hands of ministers, to be applied towards the destruction of our liberties. For his part, he was fearful of accepting any thing, in the way of gift, from that hand which had attempted "with desperate hook" to cut down the military glory of the country—to deprive the army of the means of education for those who were to fill its future ranks—and to take from the veteran the well-earned reward of his toils and perils. When he found boons offered from such a quarter, he could not help exclaiming with the poet—"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes."

said, he would not enter into any particular exemplification of a painful nature; but he would state generally, that his experience left no doubt on his mind, that the sort of punishment under discussion was one which ought to be abolished. It continued to exist in our military code, though every other power in Europe had rejected it. No such punishment was known in France, nor in many parts of Germany; nor in any shape similar to our own, even in Austria. In Holland it was completely abolished. The king of the Netherlands, on his return to that country, confirmed a decree previously issued for its abolition, and it had not since been re-introduced. The abolition had been attended with no prejudice whatever to the military service of that country. The gallant general had adverted to the great waste of human life which had taken place in France during the reign of its late emperor. He believed this had been very much exaggerated. We had before us a recent instance where the French army maintained the greatest propriety of conduct, under circumstances calculated to produce great disorders—he alluded to the late invasion of Spain, on which occasion he believed no irregularities had been committed which could in any way disparage the discipline of that army. The gallant general had also drawn an analogy between the English and Roman armies, and seemed to think that both of them owed their courage to the system of flogging which prevailed in them; but he would ask, where was ever a more cruel people than the Romans? What atrocities were they not in the habit of committing on their slaves? On one occasion, where a murder had been committed by a single slave, 650 were consigned to instant execution, as an atonement for it. Was this the description of people to whom we ought to be anxious to compare ourselves? The gallant general had spoken of the cane being used by other powers as an instrument of punishment; but was there any analogy between a cane and a cat-o'-nine-tails?—was there any similarity in punishment between striking a man who had his clothes on with a cane, and flogging a man's naked back with an instrument calculated to tear his skin and flesh from his bones.' The gallant general had alluded to a punishment abroad, which prevented the offender from reposing; but he should like to know what kind of repose one of our soldiers enjoyed after he had received eight or nine hundred lashes. If flogging were abolished in our army, it would soon be composed of a different description of persons. In consequence of the prevalence of this system, our soldiers were at present frequently the outcasts of society, who had adopted this profession because they were neither fitted for, nor could get admitted into, any other: whereas, let corporal punishments be done away with, and then farmers' sons would have no reluctance in entering into the army; which they were now deterred from doing through fear that they might thereby be subjected to a punishment which would disgrace them during life. Indeed, it formed the chief objection to this system of punishment, that it degraded the moral character,; and that it vilified the individual who had been subjected to it to the last day of his life. He was convinced, that after this experiment had been tried for twelve months, there would be no complaints from officers, that they found any difficulty in controlling their men without having recourse to flogging.

said, he perfectly coincided with his gallant friend, that it was the nature of the punishment and not the severity of it, which was to be objected to. He thought some other mode might be devised equally effectual; such as stoppage of pay or provisions; at any rate, any expedient was preferable to flogging. There might be some few individuals in the army of such base and callous minds, that nothing but flogging could have any effect upon them; but it was neither just nor proper, that in order to meet these few peculiar cases, the comfort and credit of the whole army should be sacrificed.

deprecated the infliction of corporal punishment.

said, that the whole argument of the gallant general opposite, went to prove, that the chief good to be derived from the soldier must first be flogged into him. For his own part, he thought that if commanders would only contrive to command their own tempers, there would be but little recourse to that disgraceful, unnecessary, and detestable punishment,

said, he did not wish to put the question on unfair grounds, lie was ready to admit, that whenever punishment was accompanied with ignominy it must necessarily have the effect of hardening the offender; but he conceived that the doing away with this punishment would have the effect of introducing other and greater evils. There was something in the constitution of an army which required some stronger and more speedy power to control it, than was necessary for the regulation of a mere civil body. Indeed, the history of every age and. country showed this; and he would assert without fear of contradiction, that corppral punishment had prevailed in every army which had ever existed; and whether that punishment was administered with a cane or with a lash, did not seem to him to make much difference; at least with regard to the ignominy of it, urtjlch1 appeared to be the greatest objection been raised against it. He could assure the House, that a dispo- sition existed in the highest quarter to have recourse to corporal punishment as seldom as possible; and when, from the returns made to the commander-in-chief, it appeared that corporal punishment had been frequently inflicted in a regiment, the conclusion which he universally drew from it was, that the officers had been remiss in their duty. The argument of his gallant friend had been totally misrepresented, when it was imputed to him that he had ascribed the courage of the Roman and English armies to the system of flogging which prevailed in them. When it was considered that our army was raised by voluntary enlistment and not by conscription, it would be readily conceived that there must necessarily be no small difficulty in controlling a body of such different tempers and habits. He looked upon the proposition of the hon. member for Aberdeen, for confining the system of flogging to the troops employed in our colonies, and abolishing it at home, as highly objectionable, and he would conclude by re-assuring the House, that there existed a very strong disposition in the high quarter which had the direction of the army, to mitigate corporal punishment, as far as it could be mitigated, with a due regard to the maintenance of proper discipline in the army.

said, he was convinced from the speech which the noble lord had just made, that he agreed in opinion with his hon. friend who had brought forward this motion, though in his situation it might not be prudent to avow it. The analogy which a gallant general had endeavoured to draw between the soldiers of foreign powers and our own army ought not to be permitted for a single moment. The former were the subjects of despotic powers; the latter were the subjects of a free state. As far as his own personal experience went, he had always observed, that the best discipline was preserved in those regiments where corporal punishment was least frequently inflicted. From this he inferred, that whilst regiments were employed on home service, their discipline could be maintained without having recourse to the whip, or the cat-o'-nine-tails.

observed, that having been in the performance of regimental duty for thirty years, he might be permitted to say, that he brought at least the benefit of experience to this question. Corporal punishments had formerly been very prevalent in the regiment of Guards to which he had the honour to belong; but he was happy to say, that of late the frequency of its infliction had much diminished. He was, however, of opinion that gentlemen were much mistaken who thought that the discipline of the army could be maintained without corporal punishment.