said, he had an important petition to present, in which the rights of a British subject, and the cause of civil and religious liberty, were deeply concerned. The right of which the petitioner complained he was deprived, was that enjoyment of religious freedom which it was consistent with the spirit and practice of the British constitution that every British subject should possess. The petitioner was Mr. Robert Taylor, who had been canonically ordained a clergyman of the established church. He was also a Bachelor of Arts of St. John's College, Cambridge. He stated in his petition, that after the most mature consideration, he could not give a conscientious credence to the doctrines of Christianity. That this was the result of a conscientious conviction on the part of the petitioner, was shewn by his having resigned a cure, which he held in a parish in Suffolk, in consequence of his sincere disbelief in the tenets of the established church. The petitioner further stated, that he arrived at that state of mind that he could conscientiously declare himself a Deist. He declared, that in various instances those who were of the same faith with him had experienced hardship and injury from being deprived of protection in courts of law, on account of the profession of Deism. This was the more a subject of just complaint, as under the act of Toleration they were entitled to protection, unless their mode of faith was opposed to morality, or was inimical to the interests of the state. The petitioner set forth an example of the hardship experienced by persons professing Deism, in the instance of a shopman of Mr. Carlile, who was prevented from prosecuting in a court of justice, in consequence of his adherence to the tenets of Deism—and because he would not take an oath according to the forms of law. The hon. member proceeded to argue, that by a resolution of that House, unanimously passed in 1680, the acts of Elizabeth and of James did not extend to Protestant Dissenters, and that the enactments of the Penal laws were not to be put in force against them. Under these resolutions, in his opinion, the petitioner was entitled to protection, and to a freedom from the oppression of which he so justly complained. It was inconsistent to refuse the oath of a person who disbelieved in Christianity, and at the same time to receive, as appeared from proceedings in the court of Chancery, and from proceedings before the lord mayor, those of Hindoos, who were infidels, and who were sworn after the form of their faith, and after the manner of their country. The profession of a belief in God was surely sufficient for the purpose of taking an oath in a court of justice. He had himself seen the natives of India sworn on the head of a child, by the water of the Ganges, and on a variety of other forms, which were found to answer all the purposes of justice before British tribunals in India. Surely, if the evidence of a Pagan would be received in a court of law, while this gentleman's would be rejected, he had a right to say, that toleration in its full sense did not exist. The petition was respectfully worded. The petitioner fairly stated his grievance, and called upon the House to take his case into consideration, and cause that right to be extended to him to which he was entitled. Every man should be allowed to enjoy liberty of conscience uncontrolled by civil disability. It would be recollected what a struggle was made, at no very distant period, against the power of the Catholic church. History did not exhibit greater exertions made by any people, than were then made by the people of this country, to free themselves from the shackles of intolerance; and yet we now refused to extend toleration to others. He believed England was the only country in the world that placed a large portion of its population under restriction on account of their religious tenets; but he hoped the time would soon come when liberty of conscience, without civil disability, would be extended to all, whatever creed they might profess.

said, he felt con- siderable surprise, after what had fallen from the hon. gentleman last session, to find him presenting a petition like the present, and introducing it with a speech such as should never have been addressed to a British House of Commons. What could the hon. gentleman mean by comparing this petitioner and his sect to Protestant Dissenters? Had the hon. member ever read the Toleration act? The hon. member, however, had himself given an answer to that question, when he said that the shopman of Mr. Carlile would not allow himself to be sworn according to the established usage of the country. He contended, that infidels could not give evidence in courts of justice, and yet the hon. member himself furnished instances to the contrary when he said that a Jew or a Mahommedan might be sworn according to their respective creeds. The law of England sufficiently provided for the grievance of which the hon. member complained; for a man who conformed to the religious forms of any sect, however wild or preposterous, found protection in the law of the land, and his evidence was admitted. Many members of the House, who were also members of the legal profession, knew, from experience in courts of justice, that the oaths of such individuals were admitted. The oath was administered according to the particular creed of the individual who made it; but what form of oath could bind the man who openly, professed no creed at all? Would not the natural question be, do you believe in a future state, and in rewards and punishments hereafter?

here intimated, that the petitioner did believe in a future state.

continued. If the petitioner did not believe in a future state, what assurance had the country, that any form of oath would be binding upon him? If such a person presented himself to seek redress before a magistrate, and refused to comply with the form prescribed by the law of England, the magistrate must tell him, "then, Sir, I have no power to administer any other form of oath than that which the law points out." Such must be the reply in all similar cases. No magistrate could, and he hoped that no magistrate ever would, deviate from a rule that was founded in sound and constitutional principles.

said, that as a member of that House, although a very young one, he could not but rise up to oppose both the petition and the principles laid down by the hon. gentleman. The hon. gentleman said, that this petition was most respectfully worded; but he begged leave to contradict that assertion, and say, that it was most disrespectfully worded, from the allusions which it made; and he conceived, that a person who did not believe in our Saviour ought not to be tolerated in a British House of Commons. It was really astonishing that the hon. member was not interrupted in his speech, and an objection in limine taken to his arguments before they were suffered to proceed. The petitioner professed a disbelief in Christianity; in the being of our Saviour; and in those doctrines and tenets on which the best and highest hopes of the community rested. Jews and Mahometans were admitted to be sworn in courts of justice, and they were sworn according to the form of their respective faiths; but the Deist could give no such sanction to his oath, for he professed no settled form of worship.

expressed his horror that any gentleman, educated in a Christian country, could be found to entertain the doctrine stated in the petition, and to claim a right to be sworn in courts of justice upon the Works of Nature. The fact was, that the case of the petitioner was not the case of Deism. He was sorry to say, it was nothing short of Atheism; for it attempted to set up the works of nature, in contradistinction to the works of the Deity. He had often, in the course, of his life, administered oaths to the Persian worshippers of fire, and to other idolaters in the East, who did not believe in Christianity, and he had done it by that form which they held binding; but certainly, nothing should induce him to administer an oath to a Deist, on what the petitioner was pleased to call the "works of nature."

said, he rose for the purpose of bringing back the attention of the House to the real question before them; from which it appeared to him that they were in some degree departing. There were two questions arising out of this petition. The first was, whether it was proper to accede to the prayer of the petition; the second, whether it was proper to receive the petition. With respect to the first question, he certainly had a strong opinion. He would not then state it; but, if ever the hon. gentleman should bring in a bill for the purpose of relieving any man in the situation of the petitioner from the obligation of an oath, he, for one, should be prepared to meet that hon. gentleman, and those hon. gentlemen by whom he might be supported, and to contend, that, for the preservation of the best rights, and the protection of the best interests of the community, such a bill ought to be decidedly rejected. But that was not the question now before the House; which was simply, whether or not the petition should be received. Now, he was not prepared to say that it would be wise to reject a petition because the House might not be disposed to accede to its prayer. Nor did he think it would be wise, on the present occasion, to attach so much importance to this petition as its rejection might involve. Whatever might be the feelings which the House laudably entertained on this subject, he thought it would be prudent on their part to restrain themselves from expressing themselves at the present moment with reference to question, which, although it had been mixed up with the other, was not actually before them.

observed, that the remarks which had fallen from the right hon. Secretary afforded another proof o that prudence and moderation for which he had so much distinguished himself. He regretted that the right hon. gentleman had not, by speaking earlier in the discussion, set the example of those excellent qualities to the two honourable members who had spoken on his side. One of those hon. gentlemen wag, as yet, but a very young member, and no doubt, when he had more experience in that House, he would learn to discuss subjects with a little more temper. With respect to the other hon. member, he thought, that if he had practised as a judge in this country, as long as he had done abroad, he would have made a distinction between receiving a petition and complying with its request. He was sorry to find hon. members confounding the opinions of an Atheist with those of a Deist. He knew not that an Atheist could give any sanction to an oath; but he believed that a Deist could, and he had no hesitation in asserting, that the interests of justice were much more likely to suffer from the oath of a man who swore on the gospels, which he did not believe, than from that of him who fairly stated that he denied the truth of the gospels, but, at the same time, firmly acknowledged the existence of a God.

expressed a wish that the petition should be read, in order to set the learned serjeant right as to the petitioner's belief.

observed, that the petition itself was a complete answer to the learned serjeant. With respect to the argument of the hon. gentleman under the gallery, against allowing a Deist to take an oath, he would ask that hon. gentleman what was a Jew, but a Deist? According to the hon. gentleman's principle, a Jew ought not to be allowed to be sworn. The argument of the hon. gentleman, therefore, was directed against the existing statutes. As to the hon. baronet, it really appeared to be very strange, that a gentleman who had for such a length of time, in Ceylon, been administering oaths to men who did not believe in the Christian revelation, should now say, that he would not believe a Deist on his oath. With respect to the introduction of any future measure on this subject, he did not intend to bring in any, but he confessed it was his opinion that some such measure ought to be introduced. He desired to see religious scruples respected by the House and the law of the land put on a liberal footing, in that respect. At one period England set an example of liberality to the world, and he hoped that the time was not far distant when she would again resume the lead, and not be as she was unhappily at present, rather following than guiding the spirit of the age. The petition was ordered to lie on the table. Mr. Hume then moved, that the petition be printed, in order that gentlemen should be acquainted with its objects. Mr. Robinson opposed it; and on the cry of "No, no," becoming general, Mr. Hume withdrew the motion.

said, that he held the present question to be of such serious consequence, that he could not allow it to pass without offering a few words to the consideration of the House. The present occasion brought to his memory the words of a once distinguished member of that House, Mr. Grenville, who had declared, that he looked upon every case of contested election, brought before the House of Commons, as a case of the utmost importance, in which the property and birth right of every subject of the realm were at stake, and in which it, therefore, behoved the House to act with the greatest caution. If he entertained this feeling upon all cases of election, he entertained it more strongly than ever in this particular instance, where the House was going to pass a judgment which would form a precedent in one of the most important parts of its jurisdiction. He was, therefore, much obliged to the hon. and learned gentleman who had brought the subject before the notice of the House, for the manner in which he had done so. At the time when the hon. and learned gentleman first brought it forward, he thought his argument particularly clear and convincing. In the interval which had elapsed between that time and the present, he had taken great pains to inform his mind upon the subject; and, though he still hoped that the House would assent to the proposition which the hon. and learned member had made to it, he did not think that there was so clear a case as to make it necessary to take proceedings against any other parties. The hon. gentleman then proceeded to review the points in which he considered the last return to be informal, and cited a great many cases on the subject, which were so imperfectly heard in the gallery, that we cannot pretend to give a correct report of them.

said, he could not offer his opinion upon this important subject without first expressing the great pleasure which he felt in finding that a subject so dry and tedious had attracted the attention of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down. The talent and industry, of which the hon. gentleman had just given the House so striking a specimen, would, he had no doubt, be productive of great advantage to their discussions whenever the hon. gentleman should apply himself to a subject which admitted at once of research and display. He did not regret the time which the House had taken to come to a decision on this question; because it was one of great importance, and therefore, required mature deliberation. When it was first presented to their notice, he thought that the latter return could not be considered a valid return; and the consideration which he had since given to it, had satisfied him of the correctness of that opinion, and of the propriety of ordering that the indenture containing it should be taken off the file. He contended, that to follow any other course would be to furnish a precedent fraught with danger. The House was aware that in all election returns, a great responsibility was imposed on the sheriffs of counties. They were required to use their best discretion; the House being ready to give them every indulgence in cases where they used it honestly but erroneously, and to punish them whenever they used it partially and improperly. Now, the sure way for a sheriff to escape from a responsibility to which he ought to be liable was, to send up, besides the regular return annexed to the writ, another paper, not annexed to it, received from some other person than the regular returning officer, and then to leave the House to decide which of the returns was the proper return. He maintained, that the sheriff was bound, in all cases, to make either a single return or a double return to the writ, and no other. He was not prepared to say whether the sheriff might not make two returns annexed to the writ. It was, fortunately unnecessary to decide that question in this particular case, as the sheriff had declined to do so: and such being the case, he thought that the House was bound to decide, that only one return had been made to the writ, and that the other indenture was invalid and of no effect. In the present case, the under-sheriff had not directed his writ to the mayor of Tregony. A doubt existed as to the validity of the claims of two different parties to that office. The under-sheriff selected one of them as returning officer: from that person he received the precept back again, with an indenture attached to it, and he returned that indenture, attached to the writ, to the Crown-office. The under-sheriff considered the return so made to be the proper return, and he (Mr. Peel) contended that the House ought to do the same. He attached no importance to the certificate which was received on a subsequent day. Indeed, he would not enter into that part of the question, but would treat the return as a single return, and would not examine whether the sheriff acted properly or not. If there was a dispute between two officers, as to which was the proper returning officer, it must be decided by the sheriff; and there might be cases in which it would be wiser for him to make a double than a single return. It was unnecessary to enter into an investigation of the precedents which had been quoted: for, in his opinion, none of them were at all applicable to the present case. The question was to be decided by common sense, and that due regard to the interests of justice which was felt by every man in that House. The safest plan upon which the House could act, was to admit no other return than a single return or a double return, and not to allow a sheriff to steer an intermediate course between the two. On that account, he for one should support the motion, which considered the second indenture as invalid, and should leave the parties mentioned in it to their remedy. He doubted whether the prudent course would not be to call in the Clerk of the Crown, to receive from him the originals, of which the entries in the books were copies, and to form their opinions upon inspection of the documents. If no objection should be made to this proposition, he would beg leave to substitute for the motion then before the House a motion to that effect; and then, if the entries appeared to be correct, as he had no doubt they would, he would move, that the return attached to the writ should be considered as a single return.

said, that if he were permitted to make one or two observations at this stage of the debate, they would, in all probability, save the time of the House from being unnecessarily wasted. The right hon. Secretary had rested the case on its proper grounds. The sheriff had a right to receive, or to reject, both returns made to him; but then he must annex them both to the writ, and must not venture upon any middle course. He had no difficulty in agreeing to the proposition of the right hon. gentleman; but he must say this on his own behalf, that the peculiar advantage of the course which he had suggested was, that, it did not strike at the Grenville act, but was content with the evidence upon the table, which was in its very nature conclusive. If it should be the pleasure of the House to call in the clerk of the Crown to produce the original returns, and if that measure, on their being found to agree with the entries in the book, should be followed up by another motion, acceding substantially to that which he had himself brought forward, he could have no objection to urge against such a mode of proceeding.

said, that if the original documents and the entries agreed, he should certainly follow up his present motion by another for taking off the file the second indenture.

said, he was anxious to explain how far he went along with the hon. and learned gentleman, and how far he differed from him on this important question. He put out of the way all observations on the manner of executing the return—on its being executed by the deputy mayor, and on its being executed by a different person from that to whom the precept was directed, because, if there was any validity in those observations, they ought to be received in the shape of a petition. The hon. gentleman who had done himself so much credit that evening by the research which he had displayed on the present abstract question, had adverted to a resolution of the House in which it was stated, that the House would look to the substance, and not to the form, of a return. Now, he would say at once, that, in the present instance, he did not think it necessary that the return should be annexed to the writ. It was true that the statute required that the returns for counties should be attached to the writ, but it said nothing of a similar nature with regard to the returns for boroughs. Indeed, the constant practice in boroughs was quite different. If it were not so, there never could be a double return in them: for, supposing a dispute to exist as to who was the proper returning officer, one of the claimants to the situation would receive the precept, and the other would not. The one who received it would annex a return to the precept, and the sheriff on receiving it would annex that return to his writ. The sheriff, however, when he had a doubt as to who was the proper returning officer, had a right to receive a return from the different claimants for the situation, and to attach both returns to his writ. In the year 1640, when this subject underwent considerable discussion, there was a distinct proposal made to the House that returns coming through the hands of the sheriff should have the preference over those coming through the hands of individuals, and that the members returned by the sheriff should sit as members, until the House came to a decision on their right to continue to do so. That proposition, however, did not meet with the approval of the House. He could state other reasons to prove that it was not necessary that the returns should be annexed to the writ. In the present case, he thought it material to learn whether it was the intention of the sheriff to make a double return, or merely to place the second return in deposit, in case the parties named in it should think right to call for it. On that account he thought it necessary to read the certificate with which the sheriff had presented it to the clerk of the Crown. If it appeared that the sheriff had received on one day an indenture which he had attached to his writ, and then that he had received another indenture which he had not attached to it, he should think that the sheriff had given the preference to the first indenture. He should, therefore, consider the return as a single return, and should presume that the intention of the sheriff in sending up the other return, was merely to have it forthcoming in case the parties should call for it. In acting thus, he thought that the sheriff had acted indiscreetly; for he ought either to have made a single return, or to have annexed both returns to the writ. He did not see the danger which some gentlemen anticipated from having a number of similar returns. Undoubtedly it was in the power of every sheriff to neglect his duty and to make such returns; but then the House possessed the power of punishing him for such misconduct, when it appeared to arise from improper motives. He was of opinion that the clerk of the Crown might have rejected the latter return, or might have made a special return to the House upon it, stating the circumstances under which he had received it, and asking for instructions how he was to act with it. Without intending to cast out any imputations upon that officer, he must say that his present entry in the book was indiscreet. In conclusion, he deemed it necessary that the House should be in possession of the original returns, and of the certificate of the sheriff; and he should therefore have great pleasure in supporting the proposition of his right hon. friend.

observed, that his intention in calling in the clerk of the Crown, was to demand from him the original returns, and not to ask him any question. The conduct of that officer had not been impugned, and therefore did not require any explanation. He should merely ask him if the returns he produced were the original returns, and he would then leave the House to exercise its own discretion.

perfectly agreed with the right hon. Secretary as to the course to be pursued when the clerk of the Crown was called in. He was happy, for the sake of individuals sitting in that House, as well as for the sheriff and the clerk of the Crown, that the House had come to a clear and decided expression of opinion on this question. He had no reason to complain of the conduct of Mr. Wilbraham, the deputy clerk of the Crown, and, under all the circumstances, as he saw no necessity for proceeding further, he would, with the permission of the House, withdraw his motion. The clerk of the Crown, being then called in, produced the writ, directed to the sheriff of the county of Cornwall, for holding the late elections in the said county, with an indenture, whereby Stephen Lushington, LL. D., and James Brougham, esq. were returned as burgesses to serve for the borough of Tregony—annexed thereunto. He also produced another indenture, certified by the said sheriff to have been received at the office of his under sheriff, but which last mentioned indenture, whereby it appeared that James Adam Gordon, esq. and James Mackillop, esq. were returned as burgesses to serve for the said borough of Tregony—was not annexed to the writ. Mr. Secretary Peel then moved, "That the return for the borough of Tregony is not a double return;" which was agreed to. And it was ordered, "That the indenture whereby James Adam Gordon, and John Mackillop, esquires, are returned for the borough of Tregony, be taken off the file."