wished to ask the hon. gentleman opposite what oaths Mr. O'Connell had already taken.

said, that perhaps the learned member might derive the information he required by obtaining the certificate from the clerk.

said, the certificate would afford him no such information. It only stated, that Daniel O'Connell had taken "the oaths;" though Mr. O'Connell had taken but one oath.

could only say in answer, that the hon. member had taken two oaths.

The order of the day being then read, for resuming the adjourned debate on the motion, "that Mr. O'Connell be called back, and heard at the table,"

said, he wished to have the question he had put answered. He might be mistaken; but he did think that it was one that required a specific answer. In his opinion it was material for the House to know what oaths Mr. O'Connell had taken.

said, there was but one way of enforcing a question, and that was by motion; but no member could compel another member to answer a question which he wished to decline replying to.

said, he thought it might tend to save the time of the House, if he were at once to state the view which he took of the subject under consideration. This debate was adjourned upon the day that an hon. member of this House came down to take his seat, on having administered to him the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration. The right hon. the Speaker, most properly, in the execution of his duty, which compelled him to enforce the observance of the laws and usages of parliament, according to his construction of them, hesitated to admit the hon. member on taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, and required him to take the for- mer Oath of Supremacy. The hon. member objected to take the former Oath of Supremacy, and preferred a claim to sit on taking the oath prescribed by the act passed in the present session for the relief of his majesty's Roman Catholic subjects. The question immediately for the consideration of the House was this—whether or not the member for Clare should be heard at all on the subject; and if he should be heard, whether he should be heard at the table or at the bar of the House. With these questions he would in no manner mix up any other question. He would avoid expressing the slightest opinion on the legal point, whether the member for Clare had a right to sit without taking the former Oath of Supremacy. He would postpone his opinion on that point, until such time as it should be discussed; and he would now address himself entirely to these three questions,—whether the member for Clare should be heard at all, and if heard, whether he should be heard at the table, or at the bar of the House. Having given this subject the fullest consideration, during the interval which had elapsed since the debate was adjourned, he had come to the conclusion that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it would be fitting to hear the member for Clare. He thought so because the case was a special case, which could not possibly be drawn into precedent. It was a claim founded on a question as to the construction of acts of parliament. Whatever the ultimate decision of the House might be on that claim, that decision would be more satisfactory, if the House permitted the object of it to state his case in the manner which he should afterwards point out. He was aware that the question was a special and individual one, which therefore, perhaps, might be exempted from the ordinary regulations; but he conceived that it was a question not only of admission to privilege, but of liability to penalty; because, the question would arise as to what oath was proper to be taken, and if the member for Clare should take the wrong oath, he would be subject to a penalty in a court of law. But as there were special and peculiar circumstances in the present case, he was desirous, particularly as it could not be drawn into precedent, of giving the individual so circumstanced every fair advantage, consistent with the usual practice of the House. As to the question, whether the member for Clare should be heard at the table or at the bar of the House, he had no hesitation in saying, that it would not be fitting to permit him to be heard at the table. He thought there was nothing in the precedents quoted which fortified the hon. member's claim argumentatively to discuss at the table his right to sit in that House. The only precedents bearing on the present case were limited to those of lord Fanshaw and sir H. Monson. Lord Fanshaw and Sir H. Monson were members of the convention, which was subsequently declared to be a parliament. In addition to these, there were the cases of Mr. Archdale and Mr. Wilkes, who was brought up in custody to the bar. The cases of lord Fanshaw and sir H. Monson were very peculiar. They were members of the convention parliament and had sat in the House, without taking any oaths at all, either at the office of the lord steward, or at the table of the House. In point of fact, it was impossible that they could have taken any oaths; for the only Oath of allegiance which then existed was that prescribed by king James, and it was manifestly inconsistent that the members of the convention should take an oath prescribed by king James. They continued to sit as members of the convention, and were parties to the act by which the convention was declared to be a parliament, without taking any oaths, and were found in that condition, when an act passed abrogating the old oaths and prescribing new ones. It was by that statute enacted, that after the 1st of March 1689, every member should take the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, as altered by the parliament, in lieu of the former ones. Four hundred members qualified on the first day, and on the 2nd of March there was a call of the House, and many members who had not been present on the first day, were called upon to attend, and required to take the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, as prescribed by the 1st of William and Mary. Those oaths were tendered to the two members by the Speaker, and upon declining to take them, they were ordered to withdraw. The case of Mr. O'Connell was, he apprehended, in substance the same. The Speaker having tendered to him the Oath of Supremacy, he declined to take it, and was then ordered to withdraw. Whatever peculiarity attended the cases of lord Fanshaw and sir H. Monson, as members of the convention parliament, they did in substance what the member for Clare did—they stated their objections to take the oaths, and they were then ordered to withdraw; but they did not address any argument upon the subject while in the House, and they were not competent to do so, because they were incapable of being present, until they had qualified according to law. The case of Mr. Archdale was very nearly the same. He acquainted the Speaker, that he had consented to serve as a member of parliament under the impression that his declaration of fidelity would be tantamount to taking an oath. When he came into the House, the oaths were tendered to him, which he declined taking, and he was ordered to withdraw. Then came the case of Mr. Wilkes, which a right hon. member thought established the right of the member for Clare to be heard at the table.

explained. He had stated, that the case of Mr. Wilkes established Mr. O'Connell's right to be heard at the bar.

.—The course pursued on that occasion clearly proved that a member who had not qualified must be heard at the bar. Mr. Wilkes was brought up in the custody of the Marshal of the King's Bench, and before any thing passed, he desired to put this question to the Speaker, whether or not, as he had not taken the oaths, and had not presented his qualification at the table, he did not subject himself to the penalties inflicted by the statutes of Charles 2nd, if he addressed any observations to the House. He was then ordered to withdraw. The subject was referred to the House, and the opinion which the House delivered was, that though he had not taken the oaths, and had not presented his qualification, yet there was nothing in the act which prevented him from appearing at the bar. But, independently of these precedents, the question might be tried by the dictates of common sense. Assuming that the Oath of Supremacy was in force according to the interpretation which had been placed on it by the organ of the opinion of that House, whose duty it was, subject to the control of the House, to interpret the law, and to act upon that interpretation;—assuming that it was quite inconsistent with law to permit the member for Clare to be present at discussions of the House, and to deliver arguments without taking the Oath of Supremacy,—what would be the consequence of remaining in the House, having omitted to take that oath? The law subjected individuals who sat, or voted, or entered into the House, not having taken the Oath of Supremacy, to heavy penalties; and therefore, even if there were considerable doubt on the subject, the House ought not to lend its sanction to the possible infraction of the law. The object of the House was to hear would could be urged by the individual in question in support of his claim. That purpose would be answered by hearing him at the bar. By hearing him at the bar he would be exempt from all penalties which possibly might attach to him if heard at the table; and therefore, in reference to his own security, it was better that he should he heard at the bar than at the table. These were the reasons which had brought him to the two following conclusions;—namely, that under the special circumstances of the case, as it was incapable of being drawn into precedent, being an individual question, and as it rested on the construction of acts of parliament, it was right to give to the member whose case was involved in this consideration the privilege of stating it, by himself; counsel, or agents. He had also stated the grounds why he thought the member for Clare ought to be heard at the bar of the House, in preference to being heard at the table. He knew that these matters were considered by some persons, but he believed by no member of that House, of trifling importance. Great public interest, he was convinced, was concerned in maintaining the privileges of that House, and in doings an act of substantial justice we should take care to see that it was done according to forms, which superficial minds only, held up to ridicule. An hon. friend appeared to be under the impression, that the House ought to admit the member for Clare the House. In reference to his having been permitted to advance to the table in the first instance, without being called upon to produce a certificate of his having taken the oaths before the Lord Steward, the precedents were in his favour. That was exactly the case of Mr. Archdale. Before appearing in the House, he informed the Speaker that he entertained strong objections to take the oaths. The presumption, therefore, was, that he had not qualified out of doors; and, notwithstanding that, the House admitted him to the table for the purpose of taking the oaths. The presumption was, that the member had complied with the law, which directed that certain oaths should be taken before the Lord Steward, and he subjected himself to a high penalty if, having neglected to do so, he took his seat. The power to administer the oaths was given to the Lord Steward for the satisfaction of the Crown, which was not content by their being administered by the officers a that House; and the Crown required that the members of the House should give such security with respect to their allegiance to the Crown as parliament should require. The practice of requiring the certificate had not been steadily adhered to. He had himself taken his seat in the House, after qualifying in the Lord Steward's office, without his certificate being demanded. He therefore thought that course adopted by the Speaker was exactly in consonance with the usages of the House. He should propose by way of amendment, in order to bring the question to an issue, to leave out from the word "O'Connell" to the end of the question, in order to add the words, "the member for Clare, be heard at the bar, by himself, his counsel, or, agents, in respect of his claim to sit and vote in parliament, without taking the Oath of Supremacy," instead thereof.

said, that as his right hon. friend had alluded to him, he was anxious to say a few words. He certainly was in favour of hearing the hon. member for Clare at the bar of the House; though, generally, he did not think it signified where the hon. member was heard, whether at the bar at the table. No inconvenience or danger could arise from hearing him at the table; for, by allowing him to speak there, he was no more admitted to the functions of a member than the peer who, being a member of the upper House, was allowed to enter the House, and to give evidence on support his privileges from the floor. However, he had no objection to the amendment.

said, that his right hon. friend had anticipated the few observations he had to make to the House. He differed from the right hon. Secretary as to the force of the precedents. He still thought, that the precedents bore out the original proposition; but whatever difference of opinion there might exist on that point, as there was but one opinion as to the point of hearing the member for Clare, and as he did not mean to contend for the hearing at the table, he thought he should be doing an unacceptable office, if he should waste a single moment in urging his view of the force of the precedents. He was of opinion that it was more expedient to hear the member for Clare from the bar, since it would prevent any possible litigation elsewhere. He would not anticipate the necessity for the re-election of the member for Clare; but if such an event did take place, his having entered into the House might bring him before a committee to decide whether, by so entering he had not incurred the forfeitures prescribed by the acts of parliament. He therefore thought the fit course to pursue was, to allow the hon. member to be heard at the bar.

The amendment being put and agreed to, Mr. O'Connell was called in, and informed by the Speaker of the decision to which the House had come.

then proceeded to address the said, he thought he could not be accused of affectation when he stated that he was very ignorant of the forms of that House, and therefore he required the kind indulgence of the House if he should happen to violate them. He said he was there to claim his right to sit and vote in the House as the representative of the county of Clare, without taking the Oath of Supremacy. He was ready to take the Oath of Allegiance provided by the recent statute, entitled "an Act for the Relief of his majesty's Roman Catholics subjects." He was desirous to have that oath administered to him, and of course must be prepared to verify his qualification in point of property; and whether the House should be of opinion that he ought to be permitted to take the new oath or not, he respectfully required to be allowed to take the qualification oath. If he was allowed to take that oath, be it then at his own hazard to sit and vote in the House. If he were allowed only to take that oath, he was content to run the risk of sitting in the House. His right to sit and vote in that House was in its nature perfectly plain. He had been returned duly elected by the proper officer. It appeared by that return, that he had had a great majority of the legal voters of the county of Clare, who voted for his return; and that return had since been confirmed by the unanimous decision of a committee of the House. He therefore had as good a right to sit and vote in the House, according to the principle of the constitution, as any of the right hon. or hon. gentlemen by whom he was surrounded. The voice of the people had sent him there. He was a representative of the people. The question, as it affected his right to sit and vote in the House, could not, he said, arise at common law, but only on statute laws. It was a question of statute law, whether a representative of the people was bound, before he entered on the execution of his duty to his constituents, to take oaths of any description. He was correct in saying, that, up to the reign of Elizabeth no such oaths were required. Up to the reign of Charles 2nd there were no oaths to be taken in the House itself, and the 30th of Charles 2nd, was the first act which required them. The first oath required to be taken by that statute was the Oath of Allegiance; and no man in the House was more ready to take that oath than he was. The next was the Oath of Supremacy; and there were, he was sure, many in that House who would not take the then Oath of Supremacy. That statute not only ordained that those oaths should be taken, but it provided remedies and penalties against those who should neglect or refuse to take them. Those remedies were of an exceedingly extensive, he might almost say, awful nature. One penalty amongst others was the infliction of a fine of 500l., which he mentioned now, because he should have occasion to call the attention of the House to it before he closed his address. It was necessary to consider what was the object of the statute. It was declared to be a statute "for the more effectual preservation of the king's person and government." That was the object of the statute; and the mode of effecting that object was, by disabling papists from sitting and voting in either House of Parliament. He was one of those persons whom the discourteous language of the statute called papists. He came under the description of the statute. He could not take the oaths therein provided by it, and if the declaration were now in force, he would shrink from signing it. The object of the statute was manifest from its title, and the construction of the law followed from the title itself. It was therefore perfectly plain, that so long as that statute con- tinued in force, it would have been vain for the people of Ireland to have elected him for any county. He could not then have exercised the right he was now using; because the law expressly provided, that the refusal to take the oaths should be followed by the vacating of the seat, and the issuing of a new writ. Up to the period of the legislative union with Ireland, the statute was, by means of other acts, continued in force;—that was to say, partly in force; the declaration was in force, but he found, by reference to statute, in the library belonging to the House, that the oaths were repealed by the 1st of William and Mary, section 1, chapter 1. That statute altered the form of the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. By the statute of Charles the Oath of Supremacy was affirmative of the king's supremacy in spiritual matters. By the other, the oath only negatived foreign supremacy and spiritual jurisdiction.

This was the state of the statute law up to the period of the legislative union with Ireland. At that period, in his humble opinion, an alteration took place in the effect of the statute law. He most respectfully submitted, that the alteration which took place at the period of the legislative union in the statute law, as established by the 1st of William and Mary, which was one of pains, penalties, and disabilities, against any person who sat and voted without taking the prescribed oaths, was, that there was still a direction to take the oaths, but no pains, penalties, and disabilities, consequent upon the not taking them. He submitted, that the statute of Charles 2nd did not operate on the present parliament. It was a statute made in the English parliament. No statute of the parliament of Great Britain, after the Union with Scotland, could operate. Nothing could operate in this case but the Act of Union with Ireland, or some act passed subsequently to the Union. That was a position which, as it appeared to him, no lawyer could controvert, and no judge possibly over-rule. He now claimed, therefore, firstly, to sit and vote without taking the oaths by virtue of the Act of Union with Ireland; secondly, he claimed to sit and vote under the Relief Bill, without taking the Declaration; thirdly, he claimed, according to the effect of the Relief Bill, to sit and vote without taking the Oath of Supremacy; and, fourthly, he claimed under the positive enactments of the Relief Bill, to sit and vote without taking any other oath than that mentioned in the Relief Bill itself.

He would endeavour to go over these four points as briefly as possible. The Act of Union with Ireland certainly directed the oaths to be taken, and it was equally certain that it did not enact any pains and penalties for not doing so. The act did, however, direct the oaths to be taken; and it might be considered that the legislature having directed them to be taken, the House had authority to prevent any man from exercising the right of representation who refused to take them. He would not concede that point, but he would admit, that after the Union an act was brought in for the relief of persons who had neglected to qualify. He would, however, put it to the House in its judicial capacity, and would leave it to its decision, whether the Act of Union not having given the House authority by express enactment to deprive representatives of their rights, and the people of their representatives, the House could do so of its own authority. He could not avoid reminding the House, that the oaths had, at all times, operated as a hardship only on those persons who entertained a conscientious respect for the sacred obligation of an oath. Parliament had been called upon to exclude a most meritorious class of persons; whereas those who might choose to neglect the obligation of an oath were admitted to the privilege of sitting in parliament. This legislation was founded on a bad principle. It excluded a meritorious class, and admitted all who neglected or disregarded the sanction to which he had referred: it called upon the people to elect the careless, the fearless, the mendacious; and it proceeded upon the bad principle of making a selection of the vicious to the exclusion of the conscientious. That being the spirit and principle of the law, he humbly submitted to the House, whether it would carry that spirit and principle into specific execution. He thought, if he stood on the Act of Union alone, he should stand firmly in that assembly of Christians and of gentlemen, in calling upon them not to give effect to that vicious principle—not to promote the choice of such as were hostile to those who reverenced the sacred obligation of an oath, but to throw the doors open as wide as possible to all who would illustrate that assembly by their virtues and their talents.

He quitted that point, and came to the next, to which he adverted with pleasure. He founded it upon the Relief Bill. He insisted, that the effect of the Relief Bill was, to do away with the obligations directed by the Union Act, as far it related to oaths. The Union Act directed, that the oaths should be taken for a particular period, and for a particular period only. The words of the Act of Union were—"That every member of the House of Commons in the first and all succeeding parliaments shall, until the parliament of the United Kingdom shall otherwise provide, take the oaths, and make and subscribe the Declaration, and take and subscribe the oath now by law enjoined to be taken, made, and subscribed by the Lords and Commons of the parliament of Great Britain." He could not now do that, for the direction was at an end. On that direction depended the Oath of Supremacy. If, under that direction, the Oath of Supremacy could not be required, then he succeeded at once. He contended, that the period had arrived when that direction was no longer in force. The period of the existence of the direction was limiter by the adverb of time "until." The oaths were directed to be taken until something should happen. Had that something happened? That was the only question. Let him see whether he could answer it. He said that something had happened. And how did he prove it? He took up the Act of Relief passed this session, and he found the Declaration totally abolished. Had not parliament now "otherwise provided?" The former statute was a penal act on popular rights,—a restriction for a given period, "until parliament should otherwise provide." He took up the statute and he found that parliament had otherwise provided—not for Catholics alone, not for Dissenters of any particular class, but for Protestants, Dissenters, and Roman Catholics—all—all. He had distinct evidence of that fact when he appeared at the table of the House. The oath was different from that which would have been tendered to him before the 13th of April. It was a new document, produced fresh for the occasion, by reason of the recent act of parliament. On one side were the oaths for Protestants, and on the other the oath for Catholics. And why was this? Because the legislature had "otherwise provided" than at the period of the Union. As a representative of the people, he claimed the benefit of the limitation contained in the Act of Union. He required not to come within the terms of any of the oaths. All he said was, that the period of limitation contemplated by the Act of Union had expired. If the provisions of the new act did not embrace every case, that was either the wisdom or the defect of the statute; but, in either case, the time had found its limit, and the Union statute was at an end. He now claimed to take his seat just as if that statute had not existed. But suppose that what he had said did not satisfy the House. Let him call its attention to the Relief Bill, and to point out to it, that in considering that measure there were general principles of common sense that would enable the House to decide upon the construction of the act, as well as any bench of judges, however familiar with legal topics, could possibly decide the most intricate points of law. Previously to the Union, or he might say, down to the passing of the Relief Bill from the time of the 30th of Charles 2nd, the object of parliament had been, to exclude papists from sitting and voting in either House. The decisions of the House upon that would be decisions auxiliary to that object. Here was a new statute, the object of which was to throw open the doors of parliament equally wide to Roman Catholics and Protestants,—to annihilate the bar which had opposed the entrance of Catholics; and he respectfully submitted, that the construction of the statute ought to be such as would forward its object, by facilitating the admission of Catholics into parliament. The new statute, like many other acts of parliament, sometimes took up the subject in the middle, afterwards proceeded to the commencement, and then travelled back again. Its arrangement, therefore, was not so methodical as to enable him to give an analysis of it at once. The second clause of the act enabled all Roman Catholics, being peers, to sit and vote in parliament, by taking the new oath. It would be necessary to ascertains whether any Catholic peers had been created between the period of the 30th of Charles 2nd, and the present time. There were two; he might say three; for parliament had declared, that the attainder passed against the third was unjust. He would, however, confine himself to two. The earl of Kenmure and baron French had been created peers during a period when its was impossible they could exercise the right of the peerage to sit in parliament. The new act admitted those individuals to the full rights of the peerage. He asked, then, whether, as the king's prerogative was to have full effect under this statute, the privileges of the people should not also have effect? The privileges of the people ought to be equally potential with the prerogative of the Crown. The second section of the clause to which he had referred declared, that any Catholic "returned as a member of parliament after the commencement of the act," should be entitled to sit and vote. Under the second section of this clause, therefore, it was clear, that any Catholic returned as member of parliament subsequently to the passing of the act, was clearly entitled to the benefit of the act. And here he would make one observation. If he was included in the second section of the clause, he certainly was not excluded by any thing in it: if it did not contain the affirmative of the right for which he contended, it did not negative it by any legal declaration or enactment. There was one point of view only in which the clause could be considered. It was a point of legal subtilty. It depended on the authority of the House to give him the benefit of the act upon the construction of that clause. He would abstain from entering into merely technical arguments; which he considered unfitted for the popular assembly he was addressing. He would, however, just observe, that an important decision had lately been come to, with respect to the construction of wills; namely, that property given to children to be born might be shared by children born long before the making of the will. Whilst he pointed out this technical distinction to hon. members, he really hoped they would never understand it at their own expense. The second section of the clause applied, he considered, to a person claiming, like the earl of Surrey; but it did not contain one negative word to exclude him; and he claimed the assistance of legal gentlemen in the House to put it beyond doubt, that if the words of the clause did not aid his case, they at least did not injure his right to sit and vote without taking the oaths.

He would now come at once to the tenth clause of the act; and he implored the House to forgive him for having trespassed so long on other matters when he had the tenth clause of the act to refer to, which in his humble judgment rendered doubt impossible. The tenth clause was as follows:—"And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any of his majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion, to hold, exercise, and enjoy, all civil and military offices, and places of trust or profit under his majesty, his heirs, or successors, and to exercise any other franchise or civil right, except as hereinafter excepted, upon taking and subscribing, at the times and in the manner hereinafter mentioned, the oath hereinbefore appointed and set forth, instead of the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, and instead of such other oath or oaths as are or may be now by law required to be the taken, for the purpose aforesaid, by any of his majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion." He claimed the benefit of that clause. Its meaning was plain and distinct. It required no technical subtilty to discover its meaning. It was impossible for technical subtilty to throw a cloud over that meaning. He would stand on the evident meaning of that clause alone; but not having the right of reply he felt bound to anticipate the objections which might be urged against it. If, in doing so, he adduced arguments which hon. gentlemen would disclaim, let it be ascribed solely to his anxiety to meet every possible objection, and not to any intention to undervalue the understandings of those whom he was addressing. The word "franchise" was introduced into the fifth clause, which provided that Roman Catholics should vote at all elections for cities counties, and towns upon taking the oath provided by the act. Again, "franchise," relating to corporations, was mentioned in the fourteenth clause as relating to boroughs; and yet in the tenth clause, for fear any franchise had been omitted,—for fear this statute should not be as beneficial in practice as it was intended, and as he hoped it would be,—parliament had wisely introduced the word "franchise" again. The clause then went on to give to Catholics all civil rights, "except as hereinafter excepted." The exceptions were contained in the twelfth clause, and were, the offices of Regent, lord chancellor of either kingdom, justices or guardians of the kingdom, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, or high commissioner of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. And in the fifteenth clause, again, Catholic members of corpo- rations were excepted from voting as to the disposal of church livings in the gift of corporations. Those were the exceptions mentioned in the bill; but they did not include the right for which he contended.

He would not detain the House by going minutely through the act. He would rest his claim upon the tenth clause, which conferred the right of exercising every civil right upon Catholics. If he should be asked, whether the right of sitting and voting in parliament were a civil right, he would reply, if it might be permitted, by asking another question, namely, "If it be not a civil right, what is it?" He had looked through the law books, and he found that Blackstone divided the entire law into rights and wrongs, and amongst the civil rights he classed the privileges of sitting and voting in would appeal to the common sense and understanding of men. Was it not a civil right? Must it not be a civil right? In this very statute itself civil and military rights were contradistinguished. Thus there was in the act itself a clue to the meaning of the act. If he went out of the act, and referred to those authorities which decided the meaning of words in the English language, he found that the words "civil rights" included every right of the description for which he was now contending. "Civil," according to Dr. Johnson, was an adjective which meant "relating to the community; political; relating to the city or government." Now, political and civil were just the same thing, only that one was derived from the Latin, and the other from the Greek. What he claimed was a political right. No man could deny that it was a political right to sit and vote in parliament. One of the examples which Dr. Johnson gave, showed that "civil" and "political" bore the same meaning. The example was—"But there is another unity which would be most advantageous to our country, and that is your endeavour after—a civil, a political union in the whole nation." This definition proved that the tenth clause necessarily included such a right as that which he claimed. He now came to the definition of the word "right." Dr. Johnson said, it was a noun substantive, meaning first at "just claim;" next, "that which justly belonged to one;" next, "property, interest;" next, "power, prerogative;" next, "immunity, Privilege." In short, there was not one of those signi- fications which was not more comprehensive than he desired it to be. In reference to the signification of "just claim," Dr. Johnson gave this definition:—"The Roman citizens were by the sword taught to acknowledge the Pope their Lord, though they knew not by what right." There was a plain definition of the meaning of the language of the tenth clause where it spoke of "civil right." It could not mean "franchise;" for that was included. It could not mean "property," for that was already included under the twenty-third clause, which provided, "that from and after the passing of this act, no oath or oaths shall be tendered to, or required to be taken by, his Majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion, for enabling them to hold or enjoy any real or personal property, other than such as may by law be tendered to and required to be taken by Majesty's other subjects." It was evident, therefore, that the words of the tenth clause did not mean franchise or property, but a just claim to protection, privilege, and immunity of any kind whatever. Thus, then, common sense showed what the law sanctioned, that the phrase "civil rights" must necessarily include the right to speak and vote in that House.

Another observation (continued the hon. and learned gentleman), is, that this section relates to the time and manner of taking the Oaths; but suppose I were to concede that no time and manner are expressed, yet the civil right being granted under the oaths directed, and time and manner being the only condition, necessarily would supply the condition. We have in the nineteenth section the mode of taking the oaths for corporate offices, and in the twentieth, the time and manner of taking the oaths for other offices; but I will not detain the House upon that point, because in the twenty-third section the legislature has wisely provided for the case; it declares, "That the oath herein appointed and set forth, being taken and subscribed in any of the courts, or before any of the persons above mentioned, shall be of the same force effect, to all intents and purposes, as, and shall stand in the place of, all Oaths and Declaration, required or prescribed by any law now in force for the relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects from any disabilities, in capacities, or penalties." That is the second portion of the twenty-third section, and in one mode of punctuation it will bear the meaning I attribute to it. However, as there is no punctuation in acts of parliament, I shall not trouble the House with any special pleading on particular words: but come to the remaining and distinct portion of the section:—"And the proper Officer of any of the Courts above-mentioned in which any person professing the Roman Catholic religion shall demand to take and subscribe the oath herein appointed and set forth, hereby authorised and required to administer the said Oath to such person; and such officer shall make, sign, and deliver, a certificate, of such Oath having been duly taken and subscribed." There is the time, and that time is when it is demandded. The courts are also specified, viz. the King's-bench, Common Common-pleas, Exchequer, and Chancery, The time is as universal as the benefit of the statute was intended to be, and every thing is complete for my purpose. The objection vanishes, because the time is as extensive as can be demanded. I have taken that oath in one of the courts named. I am ready to prove it. I produced the certificate at the table; and have taken that Oath, and produced that certificate, I now turn round and respectfully ask, why I am not to be allowed to exercise my rights? Let it be remembered, that my case cannot be drawn into precedent: it can never occur again; and I ask the House, in construing the act, whether it intends to make it an outlawry against a single individual [hear, hear!]? If the meant to meet my case, why was not my case specified in it? It existed when the act was passed; it was upon the records of the House, for a committee had sat while the bill was pending, and had given in its report upon oath. Why, I ask again, was not my case specified? Simply, because it was not intended to be included. Where, then, is the individual who would think it ought to be included? Let me call the attention of the House to the recital of the statute;—"Whereas, by various Acts of Parliament certain restraints and disabilities are imposed on the Roman Catholic subjects of his Majesty, to which other subjects of his Majesty are not liable." It includes all restraints and disabilities affecting Roman Catholics; and proceeds—"And whereas it is expedient that such restraints and disabilities shall be henceforth discontinued: and whereas by various acts certain oaths and certain declarations, &c. are or may be required to be taken, made, and subscribed, by the subjects of his Majesty as qualifications for sitting and voting in parliament, and for the enjoyment of certain offices, franchises, and civil rights: Be it enacted, &c. that such restraints and disabilities shall be from henceforth discontinued." All are to be discontinued. What do I claim? That they shall be discontinued. It is a maxim of law, that the recital of a statute shall not control the enactments; but with this qualification, that although a particular recital cannot control a general enactment, there is no rule of law that a general recital shall not explain a particular enactment. But I have a general recital, and a general enactment too, in my favour. If to sit and vote be not a civil right, what civil right was intended by the word; every other is provided for? Why should this be excluded? Look at the recital and look at the intention of the statute; and shall I then be told that a doubt can arise as to the right to sit and vote? If I have not that right, what is to be done? Is the statute of Charles 2nd, enabling the House to exclude me, still in force? What is to become of me? Am I to remain the representative for Care? Will the House not let me in, and is it not able to turn me out? What, I ask again, is to become of me?—I call the attention of the House to that what is to become of me [hear! and a laugh]? The statute of Charles 2nd imposed penalties for not taking the oaths and the signing the Declaration; among others there was a pecuniary penalty, and it continued in force until the Union with Ireland. The first question I would ask the lawyers of the House, then, is this—Did the Union Act continue those penalties? I take upon me to say it did not. Then, I ask, can any penalty or punishment be continued on a free born British subject, when an act of parliament, like that of the Union, is silent, and contains no enactment as to penalty? That is a question of constitutional law; and if I were sued to to-morrow for the penalty of 500l. in a court of justice, I should, of course, instantly demur. If I am right in that position—if the penalty of 500l. could not be recovered, shall the greater infliction remain? When courts of justice, would refuse to enforce the fine, shall this House take the law into its own hands, and deprive me of what ought to be infinitely more precious—the right to sit and vote as the representative of a divided, a disinterested, and, I had almost said, a martyred people? The Union statute, I apprehend, would alone be sufficient; but I do not stand on that merely. This Relief Bill has abolished the oaths and Declaration, and abolished with it the punishment for not taking the one and subscribing the other. If the Declaration be abolished, does the pecuniary penalty remain? I answer, no; and if the pecuniary penalty do not remain, does the heavier penalty of exclusion continue? Certainly not; and I respectfully submit to the House, that it has not now jurisdiction to prevent the exercise of my civil right of sitting and voting here. I acknowledge that I should take the oath prescribed by the Relief Bill; and, then, let any individual, by favour of justice, bring an action against me, and if the court should determine that I ought to pay the penalty of 500l., my exclusion follows as a matter of course. The House should consider that this is a large and comprehensive enactment; and I ask why this House should interfere in my case, and not leave it to the courts of justice? I do not want this House to submit its privileges to the decision of any court or tribunal in existence; but I wish to shew that the House, by deciding with me, could not preclude any body from trying the question legally. It is to put my case into that transfer of decision that I am arguing here; that is the utmost I struggle for. The question is: Is it not my right, on this return, to take the seat to which I have been duly elected? Is the question free from doubt? If there be a doubt, I am entitled to the benefit of that doubt. I maintain, that I have a constitutional right, founded on the return of the Sheriff and the voice of the people; and if there be a doubt on the subject, it should be removed. The Statute comes before us to be construed from the first clause. I did—and I am not ashamed to own it—I did defer to the opinions of others, and was averse from calling for that construction; and if it had not been for the interests of those who sent me here, my own right should have been buried in oblivion. But now I require the House to consider it. Will you decide, that a civil right does not mean a civil right? And if this case of mine be not excepted, will you add it as an additional exception? It might have been said by some of those who supported the bill, that it was intended by that measure to compensate a nation for by-gone wrongs, and to form the foundation-stone of a solid and substantial building, to be consecrated to the unity and peace of the empire. But if what is certain may be disturbed; if what words express may be erased; if civil rights may be determined not to be civil rights; if we are to be told that, by some excuse or by some pretext, what is not uncertain may be made so—we shall be put under an impossibility to know what construction we must hereafter place on the Statutes. I have endeavoured to treat this House with respect. My title to sit in it is clear and plain; and I contend that the statute is all-comprehensive in its intention, in its recital, and in its enactments. It comprehends every principle and measure of relief, with such exceptions as are thereinafter excepted. But while I skew my respect for this House, I stand here on my right, and claim the benefit of it.

The hon. and learned gentleman then bowed to the House and withdrew, amidst loud and general cheering.

said, that the hon. and learned member having withdrawn from the bar, after having stated his claim with the ability which might have been expected from so distinguished a member of his profession, and with a temper which did equal credit to his feelings as a man and a gentleman, it became the duty of the House to discuss the important point at issue with the same good temper and feeling with which it had been introduced, and, without reference to any party considerations, to come to a decision upon it as a matter which came judicially before them. Such was the temper with which he was disposed to look at it. He would view it as the construction of an act passed in times long by-gone, and of which all the actors had passed off the stage. He would, in as brief a compass as the nature of the case would admit, state his opinions upon it; and he believed the House would be disposed to go with him, unless they should hear stronger and more conclusive arguments in support of the view taken of it. by the hon. and learned member for Clare. His opinion was, that Mr. O'Connell the member for Clare, had no right to sit without taking the Oath of Supremacy. The first point on which the hon. and learned gentleman relied was, that the necessity of taking that Oath was done away by the act of Union with Ireland; and the second was, that he had a right to sit under the Catholic Relief Bill. These were certainly very different grounds; but if either of them could be made out to the satisfaction of the House, there could be no doubt that the hon. member would have a right to sit and vote. If he understood the argument of the of the hon. and learned gentleman on the first point, it was this—that the penalties enacted by the 30th of Charles 2nd, for not taking the Oaths, were done away with by the act of Union with Ireland, and that that act had placed us in a new state of things with respect to the necessity of taking those Oaths. He must own, that as far as he was personally concerned—and on general grounds he could wish to be able to view it in this light—it would be desirable if they could bring their minds to think that Catholics could have taken their seats in that House, without those Oaths before the late measure; for, in that case, much of the irritation, many of the differences and heart-burnings which that measure had produced would be removed, when it was known that in conceding it, we had given up no securities whatever; but he was bound honestly to express his firm conviction, that the act of Charles 2nd was operative up to the passing of the late bill. Now, the difference as to the taking of the oaths, without reference to the late bill, resolved itself into two points only. It would be admitted by all, that by the statute of Elizabeth and down to the time of William and Mary, all persons, before taking their seats in either House of Parliament, were bound to take the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance before the Lord Steward or his deputy. It was contended by some—but he dissented from the opinion for the reasons which he should hereafter state—that this act of the 1st of William and Mary was a repeal of the statute of Elizabeth in this respect; but the statute of Charles 2nd was, he presumed it would be admitted by all, binding as to the taking the oaths at the table before taking a seat in the House. The only questions, then, for the consideration of the House were—first, whether by the operation of the statute of William and Mary, the act of Elizabeth was removed as far as the necessity of taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance; and secondly, whether the Act of Union took away the necessity of, or at least the penalty for, not taking those oaths before the Lord Steward, previously to taking a seat in the House. He took these to be the principal points at issue, and to these he would confine himself waving any detail as to minor subjects. He would contend, that the act of William and Mary did not dispense with the necessity of taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance before the Lord Steward or his deputy before entering the House, and that any member who should enter the House for the purpose of business, or taking any share in its proceedings, would by that act cease to be a member any longer; and according to this view of it, if the hon. member for Clare should, after this evening, come into the House to take any part in its business, without having taken those oaths, the House would be bound to deal with his case, according to that act, and to issue a new writ for that county.

He would now call the attention of the House to the circumstances under which the act of the 1st of William and Mary was passed. It was well known, that when William was coming to this country, letters missive were sent to various parts of the country, in the name of the prince of Orange, calling together an assembly as nearly resembling a parliament as could be. This assembly consisted of members from counties, cities, and boroughs, in all parts of the kingdom. It was necessary, of course, that they should take some oaths; but as they could not take those oaths to William Or the late king, it occurred to several of the leading men of that day, that some provision should be made to render them as near a parliament as possible, and therefore the 1st of William and Mary was passed, which he would say turned a convention into a parliament. In that act, an alteration was made in the oaths to be taken at the table of the House; but it had no reference whatever to the oaths to be taken up stairs before the Lord Steward or his deputies. The object of the act was, to impose the necessity of taking in the House the Oath of Supremacy as it was then framed; but it had nothing whatever to do with the oaths to be taken out of doors. Let houourable members look to the commission given to the Lord Steward and his deputies in the first year after the 1st of William and Mary. The commission was made out for William earl of Devonshire, who was appointed to fill the office of Lord Steward, and the only alteration in it from former commissions was, that he and his deputies should administer the Oath of Supremacy, as it was regulated by the 1st of William and Mary. This, be it recollected, was within one year after the passing of that act; when all the parties to it were still alive, and when the intentions of the legislature were fresh in their recollection. And who were the legal authorities whose advice and opinions would have been sought, if there was any doubt as to the construction of the act of the 1st of William and Mary? Lord Holt was at that time chief justice. Sir John Somers was Attorney-general; and it was the opinion of these men, that the 1st of William and Mary had not repealed the statute of Elizabeth; for if they had thought otherwise, they would not have sanctioned the administration of the oath by the Lord Steward. Independently of these authorities, he had the sanction of every contemporaneous authority from that time down to the present day, during which the practice of administering the oaths by the Lord Steward, or his deputy, before members went into the House, was invariably, continued. With these authorities, then, he was justified in maintaining, that the act of Elizabeth was still in force, and that that the oaths prescribed by it must be taken before the Lord Steward; or if a member should sit without having taken such oaths, his seat would de facto become forfeited.

He would now come to the argument of the hon. and learned gentleman as to the operation of the Act of Union. If he understood the hon. and learned gentleman's arguments on this point, he contended, that by that act there were no penalties or disabilities created for not taking the Oath of Supremacy and the other oaths required. It was hardly necessary to say that an act must be construed according to its subject matter; and he must take leave to say, that the oaths in Ireland were the same for members of parliament as those in England, except that, there being no such office as that of lord Steward in that country, the oaths to be taken here before that officer were there unknown; and the oaths were to be taken at the table of the House in the same manner as in England. It was unnecessary for him to mention any authority for these statements, for they were known by all who knew what the practice was in the parliament of Ireland. There had been, he admitted, some doubts as to whether, the act of William and Mary was binding as to the paths to be taken under it in Ireland; but those doubts were removed by Yelverton's act, in 1782 or 1783, which enacted that the same oaths, which were necessary as a qualification for any office or place in England should also be required in Ireland, and from that time the oaths taken in both countries were the same in similar cases, with the exception that, there being, no Lord Steward in that country, no oath could be taken before him. Thus, then, when they had separate legislatures taking the same oaths, he would ask, how could the union of those legislatures into one parliament be considered as abrogating the necessity of those oaths in any case?

But, he did not rest the argument here. He would contend, that by that act the continuance of the same oaths which had before been held necessary was positively enacted. By one of the articles of Union it was enacted, "that all laws in force at the time of the Union shall remain in force, subject only to such alterations and regulations from time to time, as circumstances may appear to the parliament of the United Kingdom to require;" and touching the oaths to be taken by members of the House of Commons, another section stated that, "every member of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom in, the first and all succeeding parliaments, shall until the parliament of the United Kingdom shall otherwise provide, take the oaths and make and subscribe the declaration, and take and subscribe the oath now by law enjoined to be taken, made, and subscribed, by the Lords and Commons of the parliament of Great Britain." Thus it appealed, that there was no exception contemplated, and, as he contended, none directly or indirectly made in the Act of Union, as to the taking the oaths before the taking of seats in either House; and it was singular, if the meaning of the act had been otherwise, that all the oaths should have been taken without any dissent or objection, until the new light had lately broken in upon them. Let it also be considered, that the act expressly stated, that representative peers in Ireland could be chosen only by those peers who had taken the same oaths as were required to be taken by peers in England. In further proof of the necessity of taking those oaths, he might mention the acts of Indemnity which had been passed since the Act of Union, for the relief of those persons who had neglected to take the oaths. In 1805 an act of Indemnity was passed in the case of lord J. Thynne, who had Omitted to take the oaths before taking his seat. In 1812, another act of Indemnity was passed; and in 1814 a similar act was passed in the case of Mr. C. Grant. Now, the first of these acts, so soon after the passing of the Act of Union, was a full declaration as to the law, and the sense in which it should be received. Indeed, in that act the oaths which should have been taken were recited. The whole of these cases furnished an insurmountable argument to prove the necessity of taking the oaths before taking seats in either House.

He would now come to the Relief Bill itself, and he would contend, that, according to the hon. and learned gentleman's own admission, the necessity of taking the oaths was evident. The very first clause said "whereas by various acts, certain oaths and certain declarations, commonly called the Declaration against Transubstantiation, &c. as practised in the church of Rome, are or may be requited to be taken, made, and subscribed, by the subjects of his majesty, as qualifications for sitting and voting in parliament, and for the enjoyment of certain offices, franchises, and civil rights." This clause admitted the fact, that the oaths and declarations had been necessary, and no exception was made, as none had been intended, by the act of Union. It was true, that the act of Union said, that those oaths should continue to be taken until parliament should otherwise provide; but he would put it to the good sense of the House to say, how far that was an argument applicable to the case before it. He would, of course, admit the right of parliament to determine in any way it might please, as to the future regulations with respect to those oaths; but suppose it had decided to try the experiment, and to say that peers should be exempted from taking them: that, it would be admitted, would be "otherwise providing" on the subject; but would it be for an instant contended, that such provision would make any alteration as to the necessity of taking the oaths by members of the House of Commons? Would the hon. and learned gentleman think a provision of that kind such as could in any way be made applicable to his case?

He came now to the second part of the hon. and learned gentleman's argument: he meant the ground which the hon. and learned gentleman had taken under the new act, and upon which he contended, that he had a right to enter the House, and to sit and vote in it as a member. Now, he must say, that a very little attention to the framing of that bill would put this question at rest so completely, that no doubt could exist hereafter as to the intention of the legislature not to confer the right which the hon. and learned gentleman argued that it had conferred. Observe, in the first place, how the law stood at the time of the passing of the Relief Bill. By the old law no member could enter the House without first taking the Oath of Supremacy and the Oath of Allegiance before the High Steward or his deputy, and without subsequently taking the same Oath of Supremacy and of Allegiance again in the House; making at the same time the Declaration against Transubstantiation, the Invocation of Saints, and the Sacrifice of the Mass. No one could legally take his seat in the House, except by taking these double oaths, and subscribing to the declaration. Now, this statute repeals all such declarations; and there-fore if it had stopped at the first clause, no member could take his seats without having first taken the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of Supremacy before the High Steward, and without having subsequently taken the Oath of Supremacy here. But the next clause bestows capability on a certain class of persons; for it enacts that "from and after the commencement of the act, it shall be lawful for any person professing the Roman Catholic religion, being a peer, or who shall after the commencement of this act be returned as a member of the House of Commons, to sit and vote in either House of Parliament respectively upon taking and subscribing an oath" which follows. On what class of persons, then, is it, on whom the act confers a new right? Clearly not on those who were returned as members to the House of Commons previously to the commencement of the act, but on those who should be returned after it. Then, since it is clear that before you come to the second clause of the act no one can enter the House without taking the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of Supremacy, and then when you come to the second clause, you find it to be a clause enabling Roman Catholics to sit and vote in parliament on taking a certain oath—how can you say that Roman Catholics have that right conferred on them by words of a general nature contained in a subsequent clause? You have the clear and manifest intention of the legislature expressed in this second clause; which stales that all Roman Catholics who shall hereafter be returned to this House, shall only take the oaths which, are subsequently set out in it. There is a reason why such should be the case in another act of legislation, which runs parallel with this act. Indeed, that act makes it only consistent with justice, that the second clause of this act should be thus restricted in its operation; for though the disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders is not included in this act, still it is understood to be a condition annexed to it; and therefore, to secure the beneficial effects expected from it, it is no less necessary than just, to interpose the restriction of the second clauses so as to prevent the return of members by individuals of that class whom it was thought expedient to disfranchise. It is only right that the second act—namely, the Disfranchisement Act—should be taken in continuation with the first act, the Relief Act, just as if it were part and parcel of that act. He said that as the disfranchisement of a part of the Irish freeholders had been one of the conditions on which the Relief Bill had been granted, it was fitting that no Roman Catholic should reap the benefit of the Relief bill, until the Irish elections, were conducted upon that new principle which the Disfranchisement Bill would introduce; for otherwise the hon. and learned gentleman, or any other person, who was returned under the old system, would be entitled to claim the benefits of the new system; which it never was the intention of the legislature to grant him. Be that, however, as it might, it was of little importance except to remove the imputation Which the hon. and learned gentleman had thrown out upon this act, as having been passed in a spirit of hostility against himself. Looking at the second clause of the act, it was impossible to come to any other conclusion than this,—that only a limited class of persons professing the Roman Catholic religion were entitled to the benefit of taking the new oath; and therefore, as the hon. and learned gentleman did not and could not bring himself under the conditions of the second clause, it was quite clear that he was not entitled to sit and vote in that House. He was inclined to think, from his mode of treating it, that the hon. and learned gentleman did not rely much on his argument, that a person returned as a member of that House before the commencement of this act was also a member returned after the commencement of it. Once returned always returned, might be a very comfortable doctrine to many gentlemen; but it was a little too monstrous to be admitted in that House as a serious argument.

Let the House now proceed with him a little further into the act. The two first sections of the act related to the sitting and voting of Roman Catholics in parliament. The tenth section related to their enjoying all civil and military offices and places of trust or profit; and to their exercising any other franchise or civil right, except as hereinafter excepted, upon taking the oath hereinbefore appointed and set forth. Now, the argument of the hon. and learned gentleman was this,—and he placed his finger on the tenth clause as the main support of it,—that the words "any other civil right" included the right to sit and vote in that House. Now, if hon. members would look at the act they would see that the legislature had given a distinct title to the different privileges which it restored to the Roman Catholics, and that therefore the words "any other civil right" could not properly be considered as including any right which had been expressly given before. Every gentleman was aware, that the rule of law was to look at the whole bearing of an act of parliament, and to construe one part of it by another, so that the whole might stand. Lord Coke had said, that such was the best mode of getting to the real interpretation of a statute, for in that manner the meaning was "quasi ex visceribus actum." Let the House, therefore, proceed with him to eviscerate the meaning of this act, from an examination of the clauses which bore on the point at present in debate. No man who read this act through, could suppose that the words "civil right," were meant by the legislature to include the right of sitting and voting in parliament. Let the House look at the very first clause of the act. It recited that, "whereas by various acts, certain oaths, and certain declarations, are or maybe required to be taken, made, and subscribed, by the subjects of his majesty, as qualifications for sitting and voting in parliament,"—that is one thing, "and for the enjoyment of certain offices, franchises, and civil rights," and that was clearly and distinctly another. Here the preamble followed the three divisions of disabilities, under which the Roman Catholic subjects of his majesty formerly laboured. They were disqualified from sitting; in parliament,—they were disqualified from holding all civil and military offices and places of trust,—and they were also disqualified from exercising any franchise without taking certain oaths specified in certain acts of parliament. Their disabilities were of a three-fold nature—parliamentary, civil, and municipal. To remove this triple disqualification was the object for which parliament had legislated; and if the House would enter into the details of this bill, it would see, that parliament had followed out that object very distinctly, The three first clauses of the act related to the right of the Roman Catholics to sit and vote in parliament; and the last of them declared, that the oath appointed to be taken by them should be taken before the same persons, at the same times, and in the same manner, as the oaths and the declaration, now required by law, were respectively directed to be taken. Then, quitting that subject, the act proceeded to lay down the oaths of office, the time and manner of taking them, and the penalties which attached to such persons as should not take them within the stipulated time after their admission into office. It then went on to provide regulations respecting their admission to franchises or other civil rights, and specified how they were to be taken before the necessary municipal officers. "The hon. and learned member for Clare, after putting his finger on the tenth clause, and particularly on the words "other civil rights," which he should say was exclusive, not inclusive, of those which had previously been legislated upon by the House, said "I will disregard every thing that is given me by the first clause, and will take the general words of this tenth clause, as comprehending the grant of every privilege and every right to which I seek to exercise." He was inclined to say that such an argument was, on the part of the hon. and learned gentleman, most unwise. He should say, that the hon. and learned gentleman was, upon his own showing, completely out of court. If we looked at the tenth section of the act, we should find that it was enacted that "it shall be lawful for any of his majesty's, subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion to exercise any other franchise or civil right, upon taking and subscribing in the manner hereinafter mentioned the oath hereinbefore appointed." Now, the hon. and learned gentleman had not taken the oath in the manner hereinafter mentioned. He begged the attention of the House to another point. If there were any foundation for the assertion of the hon. and learned gentleman, that the words "other civil right" comprehended the right of sitting and voting in this parliament, and if there, were any thing in his argument that a person returned before the commencement of this act of parliament was also a person returned after it, then would his argument include the right of any Roman Catholic elected at any time to sit in parliament. Now, if such were the case, what need would there be for any man to come to the table of that House to take the oath appointed by this act, when it could be taken as correctly before any two justices of the peace in any part of the country? And if the oath could be so taken, what became of the first and second clauses of the act, which pointed out the manner in which members of that House were to take the oath required of them? He thought, if the House would only bear in mind how necessary it was not to allow one word to be taken out of an act of parliament to be construed in the most extended signification that the dictionaries, could give it, without any reference to the remainder of the same act; and if it would only bear in mind, that it was laid, down by the highest law authorities, that all acts of parliament were to be considered in reference to their context, it would not entertain the slightest doubt that the hon. and learned gentleman laboured under some mistake, when he supposed that, under the tenth section of this act, he had a right to sit and vote in that House. He did not pretend to assert, that the right of sitting and voting in parliament was not a civil right: on the contrary, he considered it to be a civil right of the most valuable description. He was even ready to admit to the hon. and learned gentleman, that, if there were no other clauses in the bill relative to the right of sitting and voting in parliament, the words "any other civil right" might give him every thing for which he was contending; but taking all this act together—looking at the first clause of it, relative to the admissibility of Roman Catholics into parliament, and comparing it, with the subsequent clauses relative to their admissibility to office, it did appear to him, that this act excluded the hon. and learned member as completely as if the words "any other civil right" had been erased from it.—He was sorry to have trespassed at such length upon the attention of the House; but as the present was a question in which many points of law were involved, he had felt it to be his duty, as one of the law-advisers of the government, to come forward and state his opinion upon them. With reference to the hon. and learned individual whose case was then before the House, he had merely to say, that he had not risen to oppose his claims from any desire to keep him out of the House, but from a desire to preserve its rights and privileges inviolate. Looking only at the words of the law, and endeavouring to frame an honest and impartial conclusion upon them, he would conclude with moving, "that it is the opinion of this House, that Mr. O'Connell having been returned a member of this House, before the commencement of the act passed in this session of parliament 'for the relief of his majesty's Roman Catholic subjects,' is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy."

said, that the question certainly appeared to him to be one of some difficulty, but as he believed that the act which had recently been passed had been conceived in an enlarged and extensive spirit, he thought they were bound no to be too nice as to the minor points a issue, and he should therefore give his vote for the admission of Mr. O'Connell. He would state to the House the way in which he read the clauses of the act: the declaration contained in the preamble expressly stated, that every disability should here-after be removed; in the second clause he found an arrangement that related to persons who should hereafter be returned to the House of Commons. It was difficult cult, he admitted, to forget the circumstances of the times in which they lived; but if they could suppose this generation passed away, and the statute commented on by a generation who had never heard of the particular circumstances attending its passing into a law, what would be the observation on that section which confined the privileges contained in the act to those who should be hereafter elected? They would say, that it was not proposed to make any distinction between the persons returned before the act and those returned after, but that the cases of those returned before the act were omitted by accident. In the reign of Henry 6th, on the trial of the duchess of Gloucester, a doubt arose as to whether peeresses were entitled to the benefit of clergy, and an act was in consequence passed, stating, that all noble, ladies, whether duchesses, countesses, or baronesses, were entitled to that benefit, entirely omitting to mention either marchionesses or viscountesses. When this act was commented upon, as it was very much when the case of the duchess of Kingston was before the public, it was not supposed that there was any intention of purposely omitting the latter titles, but it was rather thought probable, that there were none at that time holding such rank; the same thing would probably be said about this act, and the case of the hon. member for Clare being forgotten, it would be supposed by after senators, that the act was only made to apply to those elected after the passing of the act, because there were none elected before its passing and awaiting for its operation. If they were to go on and look at the question under the tenth section, he certainly did not know how they were to define the right of sitting in parliament but as a civil right; but then the question arose—were the two clauses at issue with each other? Not at all, as it appeared to him. The second clause only referred to the particular case of persons elected after the passing of the act, but the tenth applied generally to all civil rights of all Roman Catholics; and it was therefore to this general arrangement that they were to look in Mr. O'Connell's case. He trusted that the House would be cautious how it laid itself open to the imputation of levelling this act against an individual.

said, that if there could be any doubt upon the mind of the House, as to which way it ought to decide, the petitioner was certainly entitled to receive the benefit of that doubt; but, on the best consideration that he had been able to give to the subject, he thought it was as clear as possible. It appeared to him, that it was never contemplated to include the case of the hon. member for Clare within the late act. He should not touch upon the Act of Union, as he thought the Solicitor-general had sufficiently proved that the Act of Union made no difference in the case; and that up to the time of the present act of parliament, no change had been made; so that every member was bound to take the prescribed oaths before the Lord Steward, and again at the table of the House. In opposing the motion that had been made in favour of the hon. gentleman, he did it with considerable reluctance; for if he could have brought his mind to believe that he had a right to sit, he was convinced, from what he had seen of the hon. gentleman that night, that he would be a valuable acquisition to the House; but, looking at the question simply in a judicial point of view, he took it, that it was impossible to come to the conclusion, that he could be admitted without taking the Oath of Supremacy. He could not agree with the hon. gentleman in thinking, that he was not excluded by the new act of parliament. That act was strictly an act of admission; and consequently if the hon. gentleman was not distinctly admitted by it, he was to all intents and purposes excluded. The hon. and learned gentleman had stated, that he was returned for Clare before the commencement of this act, and that he was returned at that moment; and he had argued there from, that he was returned as a member of it after the commencement of this act, and that he was therefore entitled, under its provisions, to take his seat. Now, that was reading this act as if the words "before" and "after" meant the same thing; and as if he who was returned a member before the commencement of this act was in the same situation with him who was returned after it. He wished to call the attention of the House to the difference which existed between the two cases. In this bill there was no disability, there was no penalty imposed on any person professing the Roman Catholic religion, who, being returned to the House previously to the commencement of it, should sit or vote without having taken the oath which it prescribed; but disabilities and penalties were inflicted by this act on all Roman Catholics, who, being elected after its commencement, should pursue the same line of conduct. For instance, the case of Mr. O'Connell, provided he were allowed to take his seat, would be very different from that of the noble lord (Surrey) who took his seat a few days ago; for the act expressly provided, that "any person professing the Roman Catholic religion, who shall sit or vote in either House of Parliament, without having first taken and subscribed the oath in this act appointed and set forth, shall be subject to the same penalties, forfeitures, and disabilities us are by law enacted and provided" in the case of Protestants who sit without taking the oaths and declaration required by law. Now, it was quite clear from this clause, that no one could incur any of its penalties, except a person who had been returned after its commencement. The hon. gentleman had been returned before its commencement, and therefore, if he could sit at all, could sit without incurring any of the risks which must inevitably befal every Roman Catholic who should hereafter be returned as a member of the House of Commons. Now, he was of opinion that the legislature did not intend to legislate in favour of the hon. gentleman; and yet, if his argument were correct, it had bestowed a boon upon him which it had withheld from every other person who professed his religion.—He must here complain, that the framers of this act had been treated with great harshness, upon the unfounded supposition, that they had excluded the hon. gentleman from his seat from motives of personal hostility. Now, he was convinced that this second clause would have been in the bill, even though such a person as Mr. O'Connell had never existed. The hon. member for Clare had divided the latter part of his argument into two distinct parts. The first related to the operation of the words of this act, which he said did not exclude him, but which certainly did exclude him, if they did not expressly include him. The second related to the words of the tenth section of the act, which entitled Roman Catholics to enjoy all civil and military offices and places of trust or profit, under his majesty, and to exercise any other franchise or civil right; and which the hon. gentleman contended gave him the liberty to sit and vote in parliament—a civil right was of all others the highest and most important. In reply to the latter part of this argument, the Solicitor-general had said, "Judge of this clause by the comment which the other clauses make upon it, and then recollect, that if you find a general clause not including a particular case, it is only sound logic to conclude, that that particular case was intended to be excepted from it." Upon this particular clause another point struck him forcibly. If, in the construction of this act, the words relating to the exercise of a civil right were to be construed as including the right to sit and vote in parliament, it was impossible to deny, that they thereby included the highest civil right. He was also willing to admit, that if this act had gone no further than to provide for the exercise of civil rights, and had contained no particular clause respecting seats in parliament, it would have enabled the hon. gentleman to take his seat there. But, how was it, that after the first clauses in the act, we found in a subsequent clause the mention, first, of civil and military offices and places of trust and profit, and then of other franchises and civil rights? An act of parliament was to be construed in this manner—"if it treat of things or persons of an inferior rank, it cannot by any general words be extended to those of a superior" Why, then, we found that in one part of this act there was a particular clause which limited the admission of Roman Catholics into parliament to those who were to be returned hereafter; and in another part there was a clause, couched in general words, which admitted Roman Catholics to civil and military offices franchises, and other civil rights. How, then, could any lawyer contend, that the right which was not given by the particular words of the first clause, was given by the general words of the last? The words, "other civil rights," could not extend to seats in parliament; since civil and military offices were the highest rights mentioned, and a seat in parliament was a right of a still higher nature. For these reasons, upon a review of the whole case, believing that the second clause would have been in the act, even if Mr. O'Connell had not existed,—seeing that there was no injustice perpetrated by the clause itself,—being convinced that the insertion of it was not owing to private hostility to Mr. O'Connell, he should give his vote, much as he lamented it, against the claim of that hon. and learned gentleman.

said, he approached a question of this kind with considerable diffidence, and with no little apprehension of being entangled amongst the mass of legal deductions which lawyers drew to their aid on such occasions. He was emboldened, however, by the conviction that this was not one of the cases to be governed by such principles, and that there really would be round little difficulty in coming to a conclusion in favour of the right of the member for Clare to take his seat in that House. Applying himself, however, for an instant to the legal arguments through which the right of the member for Clare was attempted to be resisted, he confessed it was not without considerable surprise that he had listened to the observations of the learned Solicitor general. That learned gentleman, in referring to the arguments of the member for Clare, upon the tenth section of the act, admitted at once, that if the case turned on that alone, he was willing to concede the point that Mr. O'Connell was eligible to take his seat in that House. But the learned gentleman contended, that the tenth section was to be taken purely with reference to the second, and that it was to be construed in connection with it, while the hon. member for Clare, on the contrary, maintained that the second section was to be taken with reference to the tenth section. Now, he really thought, that if a clause of an act was to be judged of by any test, it was by the plain and obvious meaning of the words contained in it; and if it was plainly and decidedly declared in the tenth section of an act, that a Catholic might exercise any franchise or civil right upon taking and subscribing the oaths hereinbefore appointed, it could scarcely be said, that there was not in these words a fair ground for contending that the hon. member for Clare might claim the benefit of the exception contained in them. What would be the effect of the learned gentleman's arguments, if carried to their full extent? In the first section of the act, all declarations were repealed with reference to all descriptions of persons, both Catholic and Protestant. Now, as the learned gentleman contended, that no persons can take these oaths, and, therefore, claim a seat in the House, except the persons distinctly and positively pointed out in the second section, it followed, that the Oath of Supremacy was retained wholly for the Protestants. The conclusion to which the learned gentleman and the hon. member for Kirkcudbright had come, however, was, that Mr. O'Connell could, not take advantage of his situation, because there was no express clause applying to his peculiar case. It was his desire, as he was sure it was the desire of every liberal man in the Country, that if, from any looseness in the wording of this statute or from any other cause, there remained a doubt upon the construction of the clauses, that that doubt should be construed in favour of the member for Clare. He, and other honourable members, stood with the hon. member for Clare on the rights of the people who sent him as their representative to that House; and, in their name, he required that the act should be construed according to the spirit and intentions of the legislature, with reference to that sect of which the hon. member for Clare professed himself to be. He claimed, where doubt existed, that every fair and liberal construction should be put on the terms of that act; for if ever there was a time when there should be a liberal construction in favour of the rights of the people, it was that time, when their recent act of legislation and their still more recent declarations, had proved them indisposed to extend the right of representation. For this reason, he thought they should be cautious how they wantonly limited those rights which already existed. The learned Solicitor-general, in observing upon the manner in which the member for Clare advocated his cause, had taken occasion to ridicule the attempt to draw conclusions from the application of common forms of expression; but what, he would ask, could be more natural than to construe a clause accenting to the plain and obvious meaning of the words? He should conclude by declaring that, in his opinion, they ought not to resort so much to the constructions of lawyers as to the force of public opinion, and that, above all, they ought to rescue parliament from the odious imputation of having framed their act in terms expressly calculated to exclude one individual of that class whose penalties and disabilities they were pretending wholly to remove.

said, that as the question was one of a purely judicial nature, he thought it impossible that any angry feeling could be raised from it in the breast of a single individual. The bill, in his opinion, had been framed in such a manner as to leave no doubt respecting the exclusion of the hon. member for Clare. The words of the second section were quite conclusive upon that point. There was an express stipulation to apply the provisions of the bill to those who were hereafter to be elected, and to them alone.

said, he admitted that this was simply a judicial question, to be decided upon its own merits; and upon those merits he begged to trouble the House with a few observations. He would only discuss this question as it related to the condition of the House, and of the learned gentleman at present sitting below the bar. That hon. and learned gentleman had sent forth printed statements of his case; in one of which he depended upon the old law, and in the other upon the new. If he succeeded on the first point, the law not only affected the hon. and learned gentleman, but it applied to every other member of parliament who should hereafter be elected, except those professing the Roman Catholic religion. Before he proceeded further he wished to allude to the remark which had been made, namely, that the Catholic Relief Bill, instead of being a healing measure, was one which passed a sentence of outlawry against an individual; and that expression had been cheered by the same hon. members who had cordially co-operated in promoting the measure which they now so severely arraigned. It was, however, his business to show that the bill did not deserve such a name. Let it be remembered, that when a question arose upon the discussion of this particular clause, and its operation upon the individual case, an hon. member had risen in his place, and said, that he was authorized by Mr. O'Connell to declare, that he did not wish his right to stand in the way of the general measure of relief to his fellow-countrymen. Now, he thought that after it was universally felt that the effect of that bill went to exclude Mr. O'Connell, he did not expect that they would now have heard these denunciations against the bill, and have had this struggle for its inclusion of the excepted case. He had only one other observation to make upon the appeals which had been made to their feelings, with reference to the strict force of the law. It was said, "if you have a doubt will you not throw your decision into the scale of Mr. O'Connell?" To this he would reply that that was not a very judicial way of disposing of such a case; for if he had a doubt upon the meaning of any particular clause, he should not look to the right or to the left to see in whose favour, or against whom, that doubt would operate, but he should look through the whole body of the act, and decide according to the deliberate view which he could take of the intention of the legislature in the enactment. He observed, however, that in the hon. member for Clare's address to them, he did not mainly rely on the acts before the Relief Bill, but rather, in passing, alluded to them, than wishing to place any strong reliance on their import. In his former letter he had, however, taken his ground upon the old law: in his last letter, he confined his case to the Relief Bill; expressing at the same time as strong an opinion upon that as he had done upon the former. The old law was strong enough for him when he first wrote: the new law was equally potent now. The hon. and learned gentleman's mode of arguing upon this point was, however, material only in this way,—the House could not be considered to have any knowledge of the oaths taken before the lord steward's deputy, until the delivery of the certificate at the table of their being so taken; and it was therefore that they required the oaths to be likewise taken in the House. Mr. O'Connell contended, there was no specific, time settled for taking these oaths particularly the lord steward's,—that they were not imperative on his entrance. It appeared, that Mr. O'Connell had taken two oaths before the lord steward's deputy; but the certificate did not specify what oaths these were, or whether they were those of the old or the or the new act. The hon. member for Montrose said, that Mr. O'Connell had taken two oaths He wished to be informed, whether the one oath was a repetition of the other;—whether, for instance, the same oath had been taken before the lord steward's deputy which had previously been taken in the court of King's-bench; for if that were the case, he should not call the double act two oaths, according to the proper expression of the legal injunction. Had the hon. member taken two distinct oaths under the new Relief Bill, and had he considered how he was to avoid the influence of the former few? A good deal had been said about the operation of the act of the 5th of Elizabeth; but it ought to be remembered, that that act referred more to Mr. O'Connell individually, than to the proceedings of the House with reference to his particular case. If he were expelled, he was open to the penalty; if he sat, he did not avoid it. The act of Elizabeth expressly attached the penalty "for entering the House" without taking the necessary oaths, and expressly enjoined that he should cease to be a member, and be disqualified from re-election for the remainder of that parliament. If that be, as he believed it was, still the law, of what use would be Mr. O'Connell's re-election? He was afraid he would not find himself in a condition to be returned again in the present parliament; that was, however, Mr. O'Connell's own consideration, and not a matter in the present view of the House.—With reference to the Relief Bill, both the clauses so often referred to related to members of parliament. In Mr. O'Connell's paper he said, that all he asked was to take his seat and brave the penalties; but this could not be permitted in the face of the existing law. The act of William did not get rid of the previous act, as Mr. O'Connell seemed to think; for it was recited in chapter eight of the 4th and 5th of queen Anne, and it described the manner in which the oaths were to be taken by members of the English parliament. How, then could it be said, that the Act of Union abrogated that part of the previous law, which had existed for centuries, so far as regarded the taking of these oaths? But Mr. O'Connell said, that in the Act of Union with Ireland, no time had been appointed to take these oaths. How could such a perversion of the intention of the legislature be achieved? How could it be implied, by so flippant a conclusion, that the previous laws were done away with, and that the obvious intention of the legislature could not be carried into effect? Did not the Irish Act of Union direct, that the oaths should be taken in the same manner, time, and place, as they had heretofore been?—He was here confining himself to the mere form prescribed for taking the oaths, and making no allusion to the penalty of refusal; for with that the House had nothing to do, although they might, perhaps, think proper to finish their proceedings upon such a case, in a manner so as to prevent the individual from being harassed by any body out of doors, who might wish to intermeddle for that purpose.—This brought him to the discussion with reference to the Relief Bill, Now, he would here observe at once, that if he thought a mistake or error had crept into the construction of that bill, which legally vitiated its provisions, he would be the last to turn round upon Mr. O'Connell, and make him the victim of such an imperfection. But, it was impossible so to look at that bill. Now, in what manner were they to ascertain the real meaning and intention of the legislature, when called upon to construe acts of parliament? Why, clearly this:—when called upon to consider the sense of general acts, they were obviously first to inquire what was the mischief the act was intended to remedy—what particular view was taken of it, and what remedy was meant to be applied. He should be a bad constructor of acts of parliament, unless he deliberately weighed their meaning in this careful and effective manner. It would not do to pick out one clause, and select another, by way of contrast. An act of parliament must be looked upon as a whole; and that was the only safe mode of ascertaining its meaning. Apply, then, this mode of examination to the Catholic Relief Bill: that act divided itself into two branches: it first, in deliberate and express words, devoid of doubt or ambiguity, and in a business-like way, stated what it meant to do, and the manner in which it was to execute its provisions. In its preamble it stated the intention of the legislature. Now, it was always the rule of law, to take the preamble as explanatory of the main intention, and as governing the construction of the bill, though certainly not to the extent of nullifying any express provision which might be directly framed in any of the clauses. The act was both imperative and retrospective. It was restrospective, inasmuch as it repealed the declaration taken under the old law, and of which repeal Mr. O'Connell would have had the benefit under the new bill, had his return been subsequent to its enactment; he could not, however, under the old law, because his conscience, or religious feelings, did not allow him to make that declaration. He did not quite agree with the description which they had heard given of the old law; the construction of which, they were told, was to let in the bad, and exclude the good. Suppose, for instance, a man to be a Roman Catholic, and under the old law to come in and take the oaths at their table—was it likely that the experiment would not cost such a person his caste, and that his fellow-Catholics would not instantly expel him, and refuse him the hand of fellowship? Tests, therefore, detected the individual; because he could not venture to evade them with impunity: and that was at once their justification, and the reason of their imposition.—Let the House look now at the framing of the Relief Bill. It began with setting forth, that it should be lawful for any person being a Roman Catholic peer to take his seat, upon taking the oath hereinafter provided. The reference here to the Catholic peer was of course retrospective; for the act found him a peer. But when it came to describe the persons who were to be eligible to sit in the House of Commons, it became prospective; and, were the words then introduced not intended for a specific purpose? Here was an express distinction between the reference to the Lords and the Commons: to the former, the bill was left open; for the latter, in the form of words there was an express distinction, which specified those who were "hereafter" to be elected. One word as to the nullity of the act of Elizabeth. If the hon. and learned gentleman believed that act to be repealed, why did he resort to the lord steward's deputies to take that oath? For it was only under the act of Elizabeth that that tribunal was constituted. All members were clearly, by the terms of the bill, required to take the oaths in the usual manner; which was, between the hours of four and five, the Speaker being in the chair, a full House, and all other business standing still, till that ceremony was complied with. The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by eulogizing the talent and temper evinced by the hon. member for Clare. They were such as entitled him to his approbation; and although he did not know whether the hon. member would accept the compliment in the spirit in which it was intended, he trusted he would pay implicit deference to what he hoped might be the fair, unbiassed opinion of the House.

began by declaring his entire concurrence in the eulogy pronounced by his hon. and learned friend who had immediately preceded him on the good temper and ingenuity which had marked the address to the House of the hon. and learned member for Clare. It certainly would be a subject of great regret to him if the House should feel obliged, in the discharge of its duty, to vote the exclusion of so able a map. Notwithstanding that feeling, however, he was bound to look at the subject, divested of all personal feeling. It would, indeed, be most unbecoming to make it a party question; and he was sure that no one would think of so making it. He owned that he should be better pleased if he could be more completely satisfied with respect to the merits of the case; but he could not refrain from saying, that he very much doubted whether all the arguments of the hon. and learned member for Clare had. been met by his hon. and learned friend. At the same time, looking at the whole case, he found, it impossible to come to any other conclusion than to agree to his hon. and learned friend's proposition; although the steps by which they both arrived at that conclusion were not precisely the same. Were he to be compelled to decide the question on parliamentary authority, on the resolutions and practice of the House, which had great weight with him, he was aware that it would be a hopeless task to attempt to maintain that the statutes requiring the oaths to be taken by members of the House, before the Lord High Steward, had been repealed. At the same time, and with the concession which he had just made with respect to the practice of parliament, if he were called upon to pronounce judicially on the question, he must say that, in his opinion, they were repealed. He would shortly state why, As his hon. and learned friend had truly observed, the 1st of William and Mary, cap. 1, in, the convention parliament, was framed with a view to remove doubts respecting their own legality; and to reconcile their existence with the antecedent law of the land. They could take no Oath of Allegiance to James, the 2nd, because he had abdicated the throne; nor could they all take the Oath of Supremacy. Many of those members who had most warmly aided in the Revolution must have been excluded from parliament if the Oath pf Supremacy had been left in its original form. The history of the act to which he alluded was this:—A bill was sent down from the Lords to the Commons, on the 22nd of February, and read a first time. A great discussion then arose upon it. It was well known, that in the convention parliament there was a large party adverse to the new order of things, and inclined to throw doubts on the legality of that parliament, That party had just before addressed the king and queen to dissolve the parliament, and to issue new writs, for the purpose of assembling a parliament of a legitimate character. The subject was much discussed by the lawyers of that day; and he was glad to say, that they all took the liberal side of the question. The bill having, as he had already observed, come down to the Commons from the Lords, and been read a first time, it was on a following day read a second time, and was then referred to the consideration of the select committee; which committee was instructed to examine and report to the House, what other acts relating to taking the oaths by members of the House of Commons, besides, that of Charles 2nd, ought to be repealed. The Journals were silent on the subject; but he had looked at the original records, and found that such was the case. The bill, as sent down by the lords, referred to the act of the 30th of Charles the second only; some of the members of the lower House wished to extend it further, and an amendment to that effect was proposed and adopted, The third clause of the bill in question, so amended, was to the effect, that the act of the 30th of Charles the second, and all other acts concerning the taking of oaths by members of parliament, should be repealed. It had been said by his hon. and learned friend, that those acts had no relation to the sitting and voting of members of parliament. But if they related to the oaths necessary to be taken before entering the House, they related to the sitting and voting of members of parliament. The fourth section of the bill enacted new oaths, to be taken in the same manner as the former. That act, however, related only to the convention parliament; and if the matter stopped there, it might be said that it was only a repeal pro hac vice. But see what followed. He, had looked carefully into the subject, and he had been unable to discover any other acts relating to oaths but the 30th of Charles the 2nd, the 5th of Elizabeth, and the 7th of James the 1st. The hon. and learned gentleman here read at length the amendment introduced into the act of the of the convention parliament by the House of Commons, and maintained, that if the question turned on the statute alone, and without reference to the usage of par- liament, there could be no doubt that the oaths had been repealed. There could be no reason why the convention parliament should not have repealed the other acts as well as that of Charles 2nd, in order, after modifying, to re-enact and apply them to themselves. Then there came the act of William and Mary, chap. 8, which the hon. member appeared to suppose applied to members of parliament. His learned friend said, that section 5 alluded to members of parliament. The words of it were, that all persons, excepting those concerning whom other provisions were made, should, on entering on any office, take the new oaths. These were some of the circumstances which excited doubts in his mind. If the former act of parliament had not existed, and this clause did not make an exception, the words might have applied to members of parliament. He felt disposed to defer to parliamentary authority. Had it not been far this, it would be a clear case, that the act repealed the statutes of Elizabeth and James 1st. It appeared, however, that in practice, the oaths taken be fore the lord high steward continued to exist—except in the case of Archdale, the Quaker, which occurred ten years after the passing of the act. In 1698, the House directed Archdale to come to the table and take the oaths, when they knew that he had not taken the oaths before the lord steward. If his entering the House under these circumstances had been calculated to compromise his right of sitting in parliament in future, the House would have done wrong to admit him. In many cases, however, between the year 1698 and the Union, the House experienced great inconvenience to individuals from the absence of the lord steward from London; and had, on several occasions, been obliged to adjourn, because they had no means of adding to their number. This he was obliged to admit, showed what the practice of the House had been. Bills of Indemnity had been passed in favour of certain individuals, who had violated that practice. That, however, only proved that there was doubt. It did not absolutely decide the subject. A right hon. friend of his and a noble lord had been the subjects of bills of Indemnity on this ground; but that did not imply that there was any fixed opinion on the subject, only that great doubts existed respecting it.—He now came to the Act of Union with Ireland. He owned he was struck with the argument urged by the hon. and learned member for Clare, that the omission in the Act of Union with Ireland of any penal clause was a circumstance well worthy the consideration of the House. A penal act affecting any particular parliament could not by construction be applied to another parliament not in existence at the time it was passed. Accordingly, in the Act of Union with Scotland, the ant of the 30th at Charles 2nd, and the other acts containing penal clauses, were by name expressly re-enacted. There could be no doubt, therefore that it was the intention, in the Act of Union with Scotland, to exclude Roman Catholics from parliament for ever; or as long, at least, as the spirit in which that act was framed should continue to exist. By this proceeding the penal statutes in question were rendered applicable to a parliament not at the time in existence. But that was not the case in the Act of Union with Ireland. At the time of the Irish Union there was a party in the state, of which Mr. Pitt might be taken to be the leader, who contemplated, at no distant time, the passing of an act for the repeal of the penal laws affecting the Roman Catholics. He thought it must be admitted, that this was their intention when the Act of Union was framed; and it would therefore have been inconsistent if they, contemplating the removal of these disabilities, had re-enacted them. They therefore enacted, that members should take the oaths appointed until otherwise directed by law. He could not agree with his hon. and learned friend in thinking, that what applied to either parliament separately applied to the united imperial parliament. With reference to the argument which the House had heard from the baron the subject of the time and manner of administering the oaths, he thought that the House was, by implication, authorised in administering them, as they had been appointed; and also in fixing the time and manner of taking them. However, he could not think that any penal consequence could ensue to the hon. member for Clare from entering the House as he had done. Impressed as he was with a strong admiration of the hon. gentleman's talents, he wished that the exception could be made in any way to operate in his favour. The House could impose oaths to be taken by its members; the act of parliament directed it to do so, and members were bound to obey the authority, if the House chose to exercise it. He now came to the last part of his argument. The member for Glare had said, that the Relief Bill had provided, by the tenth section, for all cases whatever of civil rights, and that sitting in parliament was a civil right. There was no question that it was. His hon. and learned friend had said, in legislation they must refer to the previous sections, and that as they referred to members of parliament the tenth applied to a different class of men. The hon. member admitted, that all cases of civil right, previously provided for, were not included in the tenth section. The member for Clare said, "there were cases of persons elected and returned after the passing of the act: mine is the case of a person elected before, and therefore it is not included in the previous sections." And therefore, argued the hon. member, "if the words 'civil rights,' are sufficiently comprehensive to cover my case, it is included in the tenth section. My case occurred before the passing of the act; the cases afterwards occurring are otherwise presided for." If the claim stood on the tenth and subsequent sections alone, then, said his hon. and learned friend, "I agree there is something in the argument;" but it appeared to him, that his hon. and learned friend did not entirely meet the reasoning of the member for Clare, who said "my case does not rest upon the first section, but on the tenth." If it really rested there, he should have thought great weight was to be attached to the argument; but though "civil rights" in the tenth section were words large enough to comprehend the case, yet afterwards they appeared to be limited, by confining the enabling acts in point of time and manner There were two modes of taking the oaths before a, corporate officer, or in a court of record. As to the time when they were to be taken, some further right or indulgence appeared to be contemplated. The argument of the members for Glare was, that time and manner should not be allowed to embarrass us. Upon this point some further consideration might be necessary. When he considered the probable intention of the legislature in passing the Relief Bill, and the design to apply it to subsequent elections, and that this case was not contemplated in it, he felt unwilling to come to the same conclusion as his hon. and learned friend, who desired the House to consider the act of parliament as if it had been passed a hundred years ago. He could not believe that the framers of the bill intended to exclude a particular ease, when the bill was intended for general relief. Though the words "hereafter elected" appeared to exclude the present case, yet subsequent expressions seemed to remedy that. It had been, it was said, no part of the intention of the legislature, by the act of this session, to exclude the individual who was the subject of the present motion from the privilege of a seat in that House. If such was their intention in the former act, certainly they would not do their duty, unless they did every thing which lay in their power to remedy the defect of the law. With respect to the argument of his hon. and learned friend as to the right of Mr. O'Connell to assume his seat under the tenth section of the act, he confessed he had heard enough, and considered the subject sufficiently, to induce him to hesitate ere he would form a decision on a subject which had give rise to so much doubt in several well-informed minds. If the question should be pressed to a vote, he confessed he should be disposed to support the motion of the Solicitor-general. If the question had been for the Speaker to issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown to make out a new writ for the representation of the county of Clare, he should feel inclined to hesitate as to the conduct he ought to pursue, and the vote he ought to tender. In this state of mind, therefore, he felt it would be much more congenial to his feelings that the House should come to the resolution to adopt a middle course. What that course might be, it was for them to decide upon; but it certainly would be the safest mode, according to his apprehension, which the House could pursue under the singular circumstances of the case they were called upon to determine, and he should conclude, therefore, by cordially recommending it to their adoption.

observed, that this was a question which it was incumbent on that House to determine. The House of Commons was the proper tribunal in which it should be decided, and no where else. Hence it was that he could not agree with the hon. member for Clare, that he should be allowed to take his seat first, and that then the question of his eligibility to that seat should be mooted in a court of law, upon an action for the recovery of the penalty of 500l., in consequence of his refusal to take the old oaths. The mere permission to take the seat would, in a great degree, decide the question in Mr. O'Connell's favour. If allowed to take the seat, it would be taken out of doors as such a declaration of the right to the seat, that no court of law would be induced to come to any other opinion but that pronounced by the legislature itself in a case affecting its own privileges. In a word, he should think this declaration on the part of the Commons of England would be obligatory in a court of law. The first point to consider was, the taking of the oaths before the Lord Steward. Upon this he did not feel himself under the necessity of saying much. If this were a question upon a statute, he should say, that the fifth of Elizabeth had been decidedly repealed, and that there was necessity whatever to take the oaths pre scribed to be taken by that statute before the Lord Steward. It was evident that none of the members of the convention parliament could have taken the oaths before the Lord Steward, for there existed at that time no such officer before whom they could have taken them. Afterwards several members of the House of Commons were made peers or judges, and new members were elected to supply their vacant seats; but yet it did not appear by the Journals of the House, that the Lord Steward had administered the oaths to such newly-elected members. On the first day of the succeeding parliament there was evidence that he had administered the oath. The first of William did repeal the act of Elizabeth; for it directed that the oaths should be taken at the table of the House, and not elsewhere. Suet were the conclusions to which he should be obliged to come upon considering that statute; but, in opposition to this, he had the whole current of parliamentary experience. Nothing was more familiar than to hear it said in courts of justice, "if this were an act upon which we were now called, for the first time, to decide, we should entertain no shadow of a doubt; but we are bound by a long course of practice in the court, in which a different view of the act has uniformly prevailed." The practice of this House had put a different construction upon the act of William; and it had been deemed necessary, that the oaths of Elizabeth should be exacted of members taking their seats in that House. He could refer to a number of cases upon this point. There were four cases of members of the House of Commons, and three of members of the House of Lords; and since the Union with Ireland, there were cases of acts passed to relieve members from the penalties of having taken their seats and voted, without having previously taken the prescribed oaths. In all such cases the House had declared the seats of such members to have been vacated. They had passed acts to relieve members of the penalties, after those penalties had been recovered in courts of law; but they had always given effect to that part of the act by which the seats of the members who did not take the oaths were ipso facto vacant. In 1812, the House passed an act to legally the oaths taken irregularly before the Lord Steward. The present act was prospective; there were no negative words; and the question, as the Solicitor-general had truly declared, was to be decided as if it arose out of an act a hundred years old. He had argued, that the House ought to leave out of the question all it had heard as to the particular reasons which might have induced particular members to give their assent to the bill, and to look at the act itself. If he took the act itself, he could not find out that it was not retrospective. He found contrary declarations. He found that no other civil right or practice whatever was controlled by its having been acquired before the passing of the act. All persons appointed to offices—the mayors and officers of corporations, elected or appointed prior to the act were at full liberty to take the oaths under the act, instead of the old oath. No doubt existed of this; whether they acquired the place before or after. A seat in that House was a civil right. Was it, then, consistent with the spirit that it should in one instance be construed to have a retrospective effect and not in others? The act declared, that Roman Catholics should give assurance of their loyalty and fidelity by taking the oaths therein prescribed, and that all persons taking such oaths should be able to exercise all civil franchises why, then, should not a member of that House, elected before the passing of the act, and willing to take the oaths, be considered entitled to his seat? If this act had been passed many years ago he could not help construing it to extend to all classes of civil rights what- soever. He must, however, say that the preamble of the bill made a distinction between civil rights and the right of sitting and voting in parliament. Notwithstanding, he could not conceive that the functions of parliament did not constitute a civil right. He felt great difficulty in the ease, and he was disposed to concur with those who would set the question at rest by another act, including the case of the member for Clare. If there were any doubt, he should feel it his duty to give the most full and ample scope to the remedial part of the act. It was a measure intended to remove all the disabilities existing under all former statutes whatever, and in any doubtful circumstances it ought to be construed largely.

said, he had hoped he should have been spared the necessity of addressing the House upon the subject now under discussion, when he found so many and such opposite opinions at both sides of the House, and all putting a different construction upon the act to which such frequent reference had been made. He should have preferred giving a silent vote; for no one could be ignorant of the relation in which he stood towards the hon. and learned gentleman out of whose case the present discussion had arisen. He felt the delicate situation in which he stood in giving a vote that might have the effect of excluding him for a time—he hoped but for a short time—from a seat in that House. But the present was not a question on which any member might vote according to his wishes; it was, on the contrary, a judicial question on which every man ought to vote according to his impression of the law. He could not agree with the right hon. member who had just addressed the House, in considering the present question to be one on which any doubt could exist. His mind was clear upon the subject, and he was coerced to give his vote with his hon. and learned friend the Solicitor-general. They could not construe the proposition of the opposite party, or admit it as one of expediency. The time for so considering it had passed. When the recent act was in progress through the House it would have been perfectly consistent for any member then to have introduced the question as one of expediency. They might then have proposed any amendment, for the purpose of removing the clause that excluded any member from taking his seat in parliament to which he had been elected. But, if such a measure had been proposed he should have conceived it his duty to vote against it. But, in now considering the case of Mr. O'Connell, they could not set aside the act that had passed. If that hon. and learned gentleman had been disqualified from taking his seat before the passing of that act, and if, before it passed, he had been elected, and the words "heretofore elected" remained in the act, it was clear he could not take his seat, until after that act he was elected to serve in parliament. Let the House consider the terms of that act. He would appeal to any member who read it, section by section, what could have been the intention of the legislature? Was not the opinion of the legislature clearly expressed in it? If any hon. member answered, that such opinion was not clearly expressed he would ask, why, then, did he permit a doubt to rest upon it? The intention of that act was clearly to prevent—not Mr. O'Connell, for he was not exclusively referred to—but any person who had been elected before the passing of that act, from sitting in parliament. The right hon. gentleman who spoke last might, if he pleased, propose a declaratory law, or any other mode; but if it was the intention of the law to prevent Mr. O'Connell or any other individual from taking his seat, having been elected before the passing of that law, let not the House establish such a precedent as to violate a law they had but just passed. Such a system would throw an air of ridicule upon the whole proceedings of parliament. It was of no consequence how expedient might be the admission of Mr. O'Connell into parliament; his wish was that he should soon take his seat; but when called upon to administer the law, it would be wrong to consider the question of expediency at all. The greater our desire upon this head, the greater should be our caution. We ought not, during the same session, to adopt a principle which, though more agreeable was perfectly at variance with one which had been previously laid down. It would be little short of a mockery to pass an act declaratory of certain intentions, and, within a few weeks afterwards, to pass another act contradicting them. He did not seek to influence the opinions of others: those who entertained doubts should give the party the benefit of those doubts; but he deprecated the assertion, that it was not intended that the recent act should be retrospective. The talent with which the learned gentleman had advocated his cause at the bar of the House, was of itself a sufficient proof how worthy he was to possess a seat in parliament. It was no disparagement of that learned gentleman, to say that he had made a sanguine over-ratement of his own case. He certainly had heard some doubt and surmise thrown out by the opponents of his hon. and learned friend's motion, but he felt satisfied that the positive argument was decidedly the other way.

said, he very willingly concurred with the hon. and learned gentleman, in bearing testimony to the temperate and deliberate tone in which the discussion of that evening had been conducted: but he could not agree with him that the question was one on which the high authorities of the House had affirmed decidedly on the one side, while there was nothing but doubt and surmise on the other. If there was doubt on one side, and he did not mean to deny there was, it was, to use the words of the hon. and learned gentleman himself, a grave and serious doubt, arising no less from the difficulties which the subject presented itself in—difficulties aggravated, if not altogether occasioned, by the novel circumstances of the case—than from the fact, that those difficulties had not been removed by those hon. and learned members who had expressed their opinions that evening;—it was, he said, a doubt which caution and just deliberation should induce every hon. member to entertain, and of which, he contended, every hon. member was bound to give Mr. O'Connell the entire benefit. He would take it upon himself to say, that after the arguments that had been so ably advanced that evening, which arguments must have in themselves given birth to doubts in the minds of all who had attended to them, no hon. member could boldly say, that he had deliberately made up his mind—that he had no doubt on the right conclusion which he should arrive at. And yet he had heard that some hon. members had so expressed themselves, and that they would hesitate before they acknowledged any doubt on the subject. Good God! did these hon. members who had so unhesitatingly come to a conclusion on a difficult legal question, requiring the maturest deliberation of the House in its judicial capacity recollect who had that evening expressed the strongest doubts on the subject? First, there was his hon. and learned friend, the member for Peterborough, whose whole life had been spent in the investigation of legal difficulties—who had for so many years applied the powers of his acute intellect to the light construing of judicial declarations—whose experience and ability to decide on difficulties in kind similar to that under discussion were to say the least, inferior to no man's; and yet he, so competent in every sense to come to a conclusion, had said that he reluctantly ventured to express any opinion on those difficulties, and begged that he might be spared the necessity of coming to a decision on what other hon. members, forsooth, could make up their minds upon without any misgivings or delay. His hon. and learned friend had stated truly, that the arguments on both sides showed the subject to be fraught with doubts and difficulties, requiring mature and calm deliberation to reconcile and do away with. Nor was he alone in that opinion. A right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Wynn), whose knowledge on points of legislative difficulty was perhaps not equalled, certainly not surpassed, by that of any man in that House, had owned, that the question presented many difficulties, but that he, nevertheless, was prepared in justice to the rights of individual, to give Mr. O'Connell the benefit of his doubt. He would take it upon himself to say, that so far from, any hon. member having reason to be ashamed to doubt before he came to a conclusion on the present question, he should much rather be ashamed, if without weighing the merits of the arguments on both sides he had come to a decision without considerable doubt and much hesitation. He, for his own part, felt it would be but simple justice to pause and re-examine his own opinion, if it were opposed to such authorities. With respect to what had fallen from his hon. and learned friend—the Solicitor-general, he must say, that he conceived Mr. O'Connell's first and main argument had been wholly untouched by his hon. and learned friend. Indeed, his hon. and learned friend had passed it over as if it were wholly unworthy his notice; and yet he would say, that no argument was more worthy of his best consideration. For what did Mr. O'Connell's argument rest upon? Upon the express declaration of the Act of Union with Ireland, that all members of the united Parliament shall take such and such oaths, shall be subject to such and such prohibitions, &c., until the said united parliament "shall otherwise provide." He would ask, had not the parliament of the united kingdom "otherwise provided;" and, if so, had not the prohibition ceased? Was not the late act retrospective as far as prohibitions were concerned, and prospective with regard to oaths and declarations;—in other words, had the parliament of the united kingdom fulfilled those conditions by which the prohibitions of the Act of Union were abolished, and new oaths, &c., "otherwise provided?" Since the passing of the Belief bill, had we not anew law? Were not prohibition and oaths, in relation to our Catholic fellow-subjects, in a new state? Were not all placed on a new and different footing? By the old law, no member of that House could take his seat until he had taken certain oaths and made certain declarations. By the new law, he might take his seat without the declaration, on taking a certain oath. The case was altogether different. The point which had been urged with most unobtrusive modesty and ability by Mr. O'Connell had been slightly passed over by the Solicitor-general. Had his learned friend shown that the act was wholly a prospective measure, his not touching the argument might be justified. Indeed, had such a proposition been realized, his opinion would be firmly made up against Mr. O'Connell's claim. But his learned friend had done no such thing; therefore the argument should have its entire weight with him. It was true, that his learned friend the member for Weymouth (Mr. Sugden) had laid down for himself an expository rule, which he had endeavoured to apply to the Catholic Relief act, for the purpose of doing away with the force of Mr. O'Connell's argument; but his learned friend seemed to forget that more astute talent than ever he possessed would be applied in vain to accomplish impossibilities. His learned friend's expository rule, that an act should be interpreted in the spirit of its general tendency, and according to its general consistency, would, doubtless, be very useful in construing the statute under discussion, but for one objection namely—it could not be applied to it; for, notwithstanding the zeal with which his learned friend was animated on the present occasion—he would contend, that there was another party to the construing of the Relief Act—the legislature who enacted—that was well aware the separate parts or members of that measure did not constitute as homogeneous a whole as his learned friend's zeal had induced him to imagine and assert. He did not mean to say that that act was contradictory in its several parts: all he meant was, that a satisfactory mode of reconciling some sections of that act with the spirit of others, and the whole, had not been pointed out by either of his learned friends. If the Relief bill, in which these apparent inconsistencies were thought to exist, were a measure of some hundred and sixty years' standing, we should very properly be told of the necessity of approaching its discussion with the calmness to which the wisdom of our ancestors was at all times entitled. We should be told, that the act should be interpreted according to the spirit of its framers, and in its own tone and letter, and not according to some fancied expository rule, by which its several parts might be reconciled. But as that act was not a legacy of our wise ancestors—as its parents were actually alive in that House—it was not unnatural that they should be blind to the defects of their own bantling. This fact might explain his learned friend's partiality to his own measure. But what was the real tendency of that measure was the question for the House to determine. It was clear, that the act was not wholly prospective—that it was but partly so—leaving it to the sagacity of the House to find its way out of the difficulties which this twofold nature created, and to apply to Mr. O'Connell's case what was prospective and what was retrospective in the Relief bill. It was admitted, that the bill relieved Roman Catholics from the disabilities under which they laboured. According to one part, then Mr. O'Connell might partake of the benefits of the bill, but being elected before the passing of the act, he could not, according to the opponents of his claim, sit in that House, under the provisions of other parts of the same bill. But, did not the preamble of the act confer on him every benefit of the act; for did it not explicitly state, that the restraint and disabilities imposed on Roman Catholics "shall be from henceforth discontinued?"' Now, these restraints and disabilities were those which the argument of his learned friend would continue in force against Mr. O'Connell; though his learned friend must know that as that gentleman's particular case had not been provided for, it could not be an exception to the benefits which the preamble of that act conferred on all other Roman Catholics. The question then was—that as Mr. O'Connell's peculiar case of having been elected before the passing of the act, but not having taken his seat until after, was wholly passed over in the act,—whether there was not some clause in it, which, judged according to the spirit of the whole measure, might entitle him to partake of all its benefits. His learned friend, the Solicitor-general, had admitted that the spirit of a part of that act was in favour of Mr. O'Connell's present claim; and who could know that spirit better than his learned friend? And here he could not but call the attention of those hon. members who were ashamed to entertain a doubt on a most complex legal question, to a fact which, perhaps, would show them there was some ground for dubitation. On the single point of the spirit and meaning of the tenth section of the Relief bill, three of the highest legal authorities in that House had expressed a different opinion. His learned friend, the member for Peterborough, did not consider positively that it alone entitled Mr. O'Connell to take his seat. His learned friend, the member for Weymouth, said it positively did not; while his learned friend, the framer of the measure, the Solicitor-general, freely admitted that per se it was in favour of Mr. O'Connell's present claims. Now, he agreed with the Solicitor-general, and would, moreover, contend, that if Mr. O'Connell was entitled, under the tenth section of the Relief Act, to take his seat, nothing less than express exclusion in the preceding clauses could deprive him of his right. Now, the preceding clauses contained not one word of Mr. O'Connell's exclusion; in fact, did not allude to him at all; therefore he was not only entitled to the benefit of any other doubt in his favour, but to the advantages to which the strict rule of statute construction would entitle him.—He was unwilling to introduce any topic not bearing directly on the question before the House; but he could not avoid alluding to the mischiefs which would be consequent upon not giving Mr. O'Connell the benefit of every doubt entertained upon the merits of his case. He did not include in those mischiefs events of a more local aspect which might arise from their refusing Mr. O'Connell leave to take his seat; but to the mischiefs of a suspicion that the Relief Bill was one less in spirit than in letter. He begged the House to bear in mind, that in the nature of things Mr. O'Connell's then taking his seat could not act as a precedent on future occasions. That gentleman, according to every principle of law and justice, was entitled to the benefit of the doubts which might be entertained as to the abstract merits of his case. In any of the courts of common law he would receive the benefits of those doubts. Were they to be only withheld from him in the House of Commons? If such was the case with respect to legal documents in a court of law, the benefit of a doubt should have double weight in a case like that before the House. He was sure it ought—he was sure it would. The Journals of that and the other House of parliament showed that statutes were construed according to their fair literal construction, without any reference to the probable intention of their framers. They had a recent striking instance of the fact in a clause moved—he could not say whether by a high legal authority or a sensible layman in the other House, in which the whole purpose was to guard against the misconstructions of verbal omissions—showing that, in the opinion of the mover, one clause was binding, unless expressly contrary to the letter of a preceding. He quoted the instance, in order that its weight might be cast in the balance of doubt in favour of Mr. O'Connell.

said, he felt great diffidence in venturing to offer an opinion on a question which required for its due discussion advantages of professional education and professional experience, which he had not the good fortune to possess. But he still felt that this doubt of his competency did not relieve him from the obligation of forming an opinion on its merits, nor prevent him from expressing that opinion in his judicial capacity. The conclusion at which he had arrived was so far satisfactory as to have the sanction of three of the most eminent legal authorities. It was his good fortune, in the judgment which he had formed on the present question, to concur with his learned friend the Solicitor-general, with the learned member for Peterborough, and with his learned friend (Mr. Sugden), whose acuteness and ability were so justly appreciated. He was not prepared to concede the point at issue, on the ground that, by the act of William and Mary, the Oaths of Abjuration and Supremacy had been repealed; for on reference to that act he did not see the repeal, nor any thing to warrant his saying, that such was the design of the eminent men who framed that measure. But by referring to the 8th chapter of the first of William and Mary, it would at once appear obvious, that it never was the intent of the parliament of that day, in passing the latter act, to repeal the Oaths of Supremacy and Abjuration. The 8th chapter of the first of William and Mary provided, that the oaths shall be administered by the Lord Steward, in the Lord Steward's office, to all members of parliament previous to their taking their seats, and that the said oaths shall be administered at the same time, and in the same place, as the former oaths. The 5th section of the 8th chapter of the 1st of William and Mary afforded an additional proof, that it never was the intent of the legislature, in passing the 1st of William and Mary, to repeal these oaths. That section constituted a renewal of the enactment which made it obligatory on all persons coming into other situations, civil or ecclesiastical, to take these oaths; and it provided, that every person who should be admitted to any employment, civil or ecclesiastical, or who should come into any capacity in respect whereof such person was bound to take those oaths, under the former act, should take the oaths aforesaid in the manner, at the time, and in such courts and places, as he ought to take the former oaths, on entering upon such employment. Here was a strong proof of what was the intention of the legislature in passing these acts. The 1st of William and Mary provided that these oaths should be administered to all members of parliament, and this clause of an act passed subsequently in the same session provided, that the oaths established to be taken by virtue of that act, should be administered to all persons holding offices of emolument or trust under the Crown.—But he would show by a reference to the course pursued by parliament, almost immediately subsequent to the period at which the 1st of William and Mary, cap. 1, was passed, that no doubt whatever could be entertained in respect to this matter. In 1689, a few months only after the passing of the act to which he had alluded, in the new parliament which succeeded in that year, a fact occurred, which in his mind at once set the question at rest. He would ask, if the legislature had intended by the 1st of William and Mary, c. 1, to repeal the Oaths of Supremacy and Abjuration, whether if such had been, as was contended, the real intention of the legislature in passing that act, it would appear that those oaths had been administered by the Lord Steward as usual in the assembling of the new parliament. Was it possible, he would ask, if such had been the case, hat an entry would appear upon the Journals of this House, dated the 20th of March, 1689, and which stated, that on that, the first day of the meeting of parliament, the earl of Devonshire came into his office, and that in the presence of the clerk of the Crown, and of others then and there present, he administered to certain members of parliament, the oaths appointed to be taken by an act in the first year of his majesty's reign, entitled "an act," &c., and that having done so, he formed a commission, consisting of his deputy, and such of the members as had been sworn to administer the said oaths to the other members of the House of Commons, and that the said persons so commissioned and deputed, and attended by the clerk of the House of Commons, did, according to the power given to them administer the said oaths to all the members of the House previous to their taking their seats, and that the said members having been thus sworn proceeded to elect their Speaker. Would it be contended after that, that it was the real intention of parliament of 1688 to repeal the Oaths of Supremacy and Abjuration, or to afford to any persons relief from the obligation of taking such oaths? The hon. and learned gentleman who had just sat down said, that the case was full of doubt and difficulty; and that, under such circumstances, we were bound to give the individual the benefit of that doubt. Now, he was of opinion, that they were bound to stand, in this instance, upon their privileges. If this were, indeed, a case where a question before a court of justice, and a doubt arose, he would say that all the benefit of that doubt should be given to the individual. But it should be recollected, that the question before them was one which regarded more the privilege of parliament than the right of an individual; and that they were bound to decide that question without reference to the claim of any particular individual. It was said, that Mr. O'Connell should not be made a solitary exception to the general relief afforded by the late bill. But, if the Relief bill excluded Mr. O'Connell, why was not that objection urged to it during its progress through that House? Why was not an alteration in the Relief bill then proposed, in order that Mr. O'Connell might not be excluded? But now they had to decide the claim preferred strictly in reference to the privileges of parliament, and the obvious intent and, meaning of the acts under which that claim was advanced; and there was no necessity for infusing into such a case the painful discussion of personal feelings and consideration. Good God! that personal feelings could be supposed to have any operation in this case! The claim was undoubtedly an individual, but (if he might be allowed to make the distinction) not a personal one, which was advanced in this instance by Mr. O'Connell. He happened to be the only Roman Catholic that was returned to parliament previous to the passing of the Relief Act, and if the case had been that of lord Surrey, the member for Horsham, instead of the member for Clare, it was his firm conviction that the House would deal with it precisely in a similar manner Mr. O'Connell, being a Roman Catholic when he was elected, was disqualified by the operation of the then existing law from taking his seat. He knew at the time when he was returned, that such was the meaning given to the law then in operation; there was therefore nothing unjust in telling him, that as he was elected under the former law, by that law he must abide. They might justly say to him, "we deprive you of nothing; we leave you in the state you were in before the passing of the late bill. We have certainly for the future relieved you, in common with all Roman Catholics, from the necessity of making the Declaration against Transubstantiation. That bill was intended to place all Roman Catholics in that respect upon an equal footing; but it was not intended to apply to your personal case; it was not intended to relieve you from the necessity of taking the oaths prescribed by acts of parliament which were the law of the land at the time that you were elected. It is by the operation of the former law that you are now excluded; and as you were elected previous to the passing of the Relief bill, there is no injustice whatever in now excluding you, and no necessity has been shown to induce us to go put of our way to perform an uncalled-for act of grace and favour." Mr. O'Connell was elected at a time when the passing of that act was neither contemplated by him nor by his constituents; and he had no right to have it applied retrospectively for his peculiar benefit. The learned gentleman had attributed much force to the position which Mr. O'Connell had taken up in reference to the Act of Union with Ireland. That act provided, that the oaths prescribed by the former acts to be taken by members of parliament, should continue to be taken "until parliament should otherwise provide. "Now," said Mr. O'Connell" parliament has 'otherwise provided:' the time has expired and the House is no longer competent to administer these oaths." The learned gentleman who spoke last characterised that as a strong point; but to him it appeared to be a most futile argument indeed.—It was not necessary take up the time of the House in showing, that the late act was limited to a particular provision of relief for the Roman Catholics, and that a particular provision of that nature could not be urged as an alteration in the law which took away the force of all the previous enactments in every instance. If it were admitted, that the House was not competent to administer those oaths to Mr. O'Connell, neither would it be competent for the House to administer those oaths to Protestant members; and if the passing of the Relief bill took away from this House the power of requiring Protestant members to take those oaths, how had it happened that there was no objection made to them since? If the argument of Mr. O'Connell were well founded, every individual, except a Roman Catholic, on being elected, would have a perfect right to sit in parliament without taking any oaths. The argument was a most futile one indeed; but he was not a little surprised to find the learned gentleman,—after advancing such a position that, endeavouring to support his claim under the tenth section of the act for the relief of the Roman Catholics,—after thus putting forward his right to sit under the old law, making an effort to sustain it under the act passed subsequently to his election.

.—He only adverted to that portion of the act.

.—He endeavoured to force a construction upon it favourable to his particular case.

.—He only mentioned it incidentally.

said, that he only intended to do the same. It was asserted, that this enactment had not only a prospective but a retrospective operation. Without entering upon the question as to what decision a court of justice might pronounce, in reference to the penalties for not taking the oaths, he would maintain, that the Relief act had a retrospective operation, so as to embrace Mr. O'Connell's case, and it could in no other way be made applicable to it; for Mr. O'Connell was elected before the passing of that act. It was not the law under which he was elected, and there could be no cavil on that point; for so early as the reign of Henry the 6th, the certificate of the sheriff that an individual was duly elected constituted sufficient evidence as to the time that member was returned, and such certificate as to the learned gentleman's return was in possession of the House.—The hon. and learned gentleman had adroitly endeavoured, by referring to proceedings in another place, and by alluding to a clause which had been there proposed by a high legal authority, during the progress of the Relief bill, for the purpose of excluding Mr. O'Connell by name, to prove that there was a strong presumption that the present enactment was insufficient for that purpose. Now, he apprehended that that argument of lord Tenterden on that occasion was, that if Mr. O'Connell would take the Oath of Supremacy, there was nothing to prevent him from taking his seat; that the necessity of making the Declaration against Transubstantiation was removed, and that there only remained the Oath of Supremacy to keep him out. But, by referring to the act, it would be seen that its operation was wholly prospective: for it enacted, "that from and after the commencement of this act, it shall be lawful for any person professing the Roman Catholic religion, being a peer, or who shall, after the commencement of this act, be returned as a member for the House of Commons, to sit and vote in either House of Parliament respectively, being in all other respects duly qualified to sit and vote therein, upon taking and subscribing the following oath, instead of the Oath of Allegiance, Abjuration, and Supremacy." The act thus applied, not only to a Catholic in the situation of a peer, but to a Catholic who should be returned a member of the House of Commons; and its operation was strictly confined to the future.—The right hon. gentleman proceeded to state, that they were to deal judicially with this question, and to decide according to the privilege of parliament, without reference to extrinsic circumstances. Mr. O'Connell had complained that he was excluded from the enjoyment of a civil privilege. But the legislature had drawn the distinction in the Relief act between a mere civil privilege and the right of sitting in parliament; and the House would see at once the justice of the distinction. The hon. member was excluded from no franchise or civil right whatever to which his Catholic fellow-countrymen had been admitted by the Relief act. He was entitled to the enjoyment of all the privileges and franchises conferred by that act on complying with its provisions; but, in this instance, he claimed a right to sit as member of parliament under the old law, and by the operation of that law he was excluded. Upon the whole, he considered it their bounden duty to act in accordance with all the previous custom of parliament in such cases; and no considerations connected with, or arising out of other questions, should induce them to depart from that course. To Roman Catholics returned hereafter they would extend the benefit of the existing law; but it would be wrong to extend its benefit, by a retrospective operation, to a Roman Catholic who had been returned under a different state of the law. Under such circumstances, he felt himself bound to say that, on this occasion, he was not governed by a reference to any external circumstances, and that, let the consequences be what they might, he could not bring himself to adopt a different course. He was acting judicially, and he must vote for the resolution proposed by his hon. and learned friend.

The House divided: Ayes 190; Noes 116. Majority 74.

After a short conversation, it was ordered, "that Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day; and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said Resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy?"